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


















HISTORY  
OF THE  
CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA.

BY  
THE COMTE DE PARIS.

*PUBLISHED BY SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT WITH THE AUTHOR.*



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VOLUME III.

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
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## EDITOR'S NOTE.

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IN editing this volume I have endeavored to see that the translation conformed to the original and made clear its meaning.

The notes appended, I hope, will be understood as explanatory, not controversial; for, whatever opinion may be formed concerning the author's judgments, it can be affirmed that he has sought to write with truth and without bias for either side.

JOHN P. NICHOLSON.

PHILADELPHIA, <sup>a</sup> June 4, 1883.







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# THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA.

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## BOOK I.—THE WAR ON THE RAPIDAN.

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### CHAPTER I.

#### *DOWDALL'S TAVERN.*

THE year 1863 was destined to have a decisive influence over the results of the war, which had been prosecuted for nearly two years. This was the prevailing impression on both sides, and each party was preparing with equal determination for new sacrifices.

Although the Federals had gained some territory from their adversaries during the year which had just closed, they had paid dearly for these acquisitions, and the latter months of that year had been marked by so many disastrous checks to them that the restoration of the Union by force of arms seemed to be farther off than ever. It was idle to rely upon the resources of the North, upon its stubbornness, or the strength which would accrue to it by the Emancipation Proclamation; there was good reason to doubt of its success when the results obtained came to be compared with the efforts they had cost. At the East the month of December alone had seen the Army of the Potomac exhaust its strength in vain against the redoubts of Fredericksburg, whilst Sherman, on the Mississippi, experienced a bloody check before Vicksburg; finally, at the centre, the last day of the year had been marked by the sad battle of Murfreesboro', so desperately fought and yet so undecided.

The Confederacy, as we have shown at the close of the preceding volume, seemed to gather strength in the midst of these

attacks so frequently repulsed, and it was reasonable to believe that the North would be tired out before the South became exhausted.

It will be seen how the perseverance of the free States and the courage of their soldiers succeeded at last in conquering adverse fortune in the course of that year. But, before narrating the decisive events of the month of July which marked the decline of the Confederate power, we shall yet have to record more than one check to the Federal arms.

We will begin by following into new conflicts the two large armies which we have left fronting each other in Virginia, separated by the Rappahannock, and which are about to measure strength once more on the banks of that river before going to seek another battlefield in Pennsylvania.

We shall then return to the operations of which the Mississippi was the theatre during the first six months of 1863. These operations, which were initiated by the Federals in the midst of extraordinary difficulties and terminated by the capitulation of Vicksburg, are so well linked together that we should be loath to interrupt their recital. This will occupy a part of this volume. It was on the 26th of January that General Hooker assumed command of the Army of the Potomac. The President of the republic had not entrusted him with this command without some anxiety. The manner in which he had criticised his superior officers caused Mr. Lincoln to fear that he might not be able to secure that passive obedience from his new subordinates which is so essential to success, and of which he had himself failed to set an example. General Halleck, whom he had never spared, was secretly hostile to him. But at that time he appeared to be the only man capable of shouldering Burnside's heavy legacy; and, after giving him some good advice,\* the President left him all the freedom of action which he needed. After what we have already said, the reader may form an idea of the difficulties of the task imposed upon him. It is well known in what manner this army was discouraged and demoralized: out of eighty-two thousand soldiers and nearly three thousand officers who were not present for duty, more than one half of them had obtained

\* See the Appendix to this volume, Note A.

leave of absence through irregular methods;\* the service of the outposts was neglected; the bonds of discipline were being loosened; gloom, home-sickness, and a disposition to criticise were becoming daily more and more prevalent among that large body of troops lying torpid amid the mire and rime of the clayish slopes of Stafford county.

But the discouragement which was creeping into the hearts of all was less due to the remembrance of honorable defeats than to the paucity of confidence inspired by the leaders. Consequently, the mere name of Hooker was sufficient to arrest the progress of the evil, and the measures which he adopted for the purpose of suppressing it were soon productive of the best results. The Army of the Potomac resumed all its former habits with that promptness which is the characteristic of troops among whom education has developed the intelligence of the soldier.

The strictest orders were issued to prevent desertions to the interior, and to punish those who were guilty of that crime. Assisted by the President, Hooker got rid of this scourge, more fatal to an army than the most fearful epidemic. Deserters frequently made their escape in citizens' clothes, which their relations sent them or which were sold to them by the inhabitants of the country. All packages coming from the North were strictly scrutinized. Provost-marshal's apprehended the farmers who, to their misfortune, resided in the vicinity of the army, and who, driven by want in consequence of the war or yielding to the threats of deserters, became either willingly or by force the accomplices of their flight. On the other hand, intimidation and clemency were both used to induce the culprits to return to their ranks. A proclamation of the President, issued on the 10th of March, held out a promise of complete amnesty to all those who should rejoin their regiments before the 1st of April, and at the same time Mr. Lincoln relinquished his right to review the sentences of courts-martial in favor of army commanders. According to the testimony of a competent writer on such matters, General de Trobriand, this measure produced an effect as prompt as it was salutary. It put an end

\* Report of Hooker to Kelton, Asst. Adjutant-General to Halleck, dated Feb. 15, 1863.—ED.



to the long proceedings and appeals to Washington, which Mr. Lincoln's humanity always terminated by a commutation of penalty. The sentences of courts-martial, approved without delay by General Hooker, were immediately executed, and the spectacle of a small number of deserters shot to death in the presence of the troops was sufficient to restrain those who might have been tempted to follow in their footsteps.

At the same time, the officers were brought to a sense of their duty and the respect due to their chiefs by a few severe examples. Finally, Hooker, fully aware that it was necessary to keep an account of the causes which might mitigate the crime of a portion of the fugitives, established a system of regular leaves of absence,\* securing to the most deserving the means of revisiting their families for a few days. At that season, all military operations being impracticable, such a system was not attended with any inconvenience. All the regiments were carefully inspected; those favorably reported upon were awarded each the privilege of granting leaves of absence to two officers and one soldier out of fifty. These leaves of absence were generally for ten or fifteen days, and as soon as they had expired the same favor was extended to other officers and soldiers.

The organization of *grand divisions*, a heavy and useless machinery invented by Burnside, was abolished, and a return was quietly made to that of army corps, which, six in number,† contained each from fifteen to twenty-two thousand men. The three divisions of cavalry, which had hitherto been attached each to one of the three great commands, were united into one single corps and placed under the command of General Stoneman.

Under the management of this excellent officer the Federal cavalry made rapid progress, and was soon in a condition to undertake, in its turn, those great expeditions into the heart of the enemy's country which until then had only been attempted by their adversaries. Finally, in order to neutralize the fatal effects

\* General Orders, No. 3, Jan. 30, 1863, Head-qrs. Army of the Potomac.—ED.

† General Orders, No. 6, Feb. 5, 1863, Head-qrs. Army of the Potomac, gives seven. But this was caused by the withdrawal of the Ninth corps and the addition of the Eleventh and Twelfth corps. The two latter had not been included in the *grand divisions*.—ED.

of inaction, Hooker ordered regimental, brigade, and division drills to take place whenever the rigor of winter permitted.

Considerable changes were also made in the composition of the army and the *personnel* of its chiefs. On the 10th of February the Ninth corps, which had been under Burnside during the preceding summer, was removed from the banks of the Rappahannock, and the largest portion of it was sent to Suffolk, a place which the Confederates were preparing to attack in considerable force. Two new corps, the Eleventh and Twelfth, took its place. The Eleventh, formed of the three divisions of Devens, Steinwehr, and Carl Schurz, passed for a German corps, but out of the twelve or thirteen thousand men composing it scarcely six thousand really belonged to that nationality: it is true that a large number of the other seven thousand were of the same origin, and even yet spoke German. These troops had made the campaign of Manassas in Pope's army, under Sigel. But in the month of March, 1863, the latter, having taken an unlimited leave of absence, was replaced by Howard,\* who had recovered from the serious wound which had cost him an arm at the battle of Fair Oaks. The Twelfth, composed only of the two divisions of Williams and Geary, was Banks' old corps, at the head of which Mansfield was killed in September, 1862; it was now commanded by Slocum. These troops had passed the autumn in the Valley of Virginia, where, at the beginning of 1863, they were replaced by new levies. Distinctive badges† were adopted for the soldiers of each corps, varying in color according to the division to which those who wore them belonged. These badges not only prevented much confusion in battle, but likewise developed a salutary emulation among the soldiers, who found themselves thus united by one common symbol, and the army corps constituted during the remainder of the war a grand military unity. General Sickles, who had always distinguished himself by his bravery, was placed in command of the Third corps in place of Stoneman. Butterfield, who commanded the Fifth, a very able officer and an excellent organizer, was selected by Hooker as chief of the general staff, while Meade, who had

\* Assumed command April 2.—ED.

† Circular March 21, 1863, Head-quarters Army of the Potomac.—ED.

particularly distinguished himself at Fredericksburg, took his place. The Sixth corps was taken away from Smith, who was too great a friend of McClellan not to be made to suffer disgrace, and was given to Sedgwick, a brave and good manceuvrer, although somewhat slow. Finally, one of the most important branches of the general staff, that of inspection, was reorganized and considerably increased.

While the army was regaining confidence and courage for the hard battles it was about to fight, its effective force was not only augmented by the return of deserters, but also by the addition of some ten thousand men. Unfortunately, there were in its ranks nearly twenty-three thousand men whose term of service expired in the month of May. These consisted of thirty-three New York regiments and two from Maine, which, out of a total of 20,842 men, numbered 16,472 who had enlisted for two years at the breaking out of hostilities in April, 1861; also eight regiments of Pennsylvania, mustered into service for nine months only by the call for troops which followed Pope's disaster in August, 1862, and which numbered 6421 officers and men under arms. The soldiers appertaining to the first category, trained up to the hardships of war by two years of campaigning, were about to leave a great void in the Army of the Potomac, but the law was explicit: they were to be set free *on the 1st of May, 1863*, and if the Federal general desired to make use of them, he had to fight before that time. A large number of these soldiers were undoubtedly disposed to re-enlist, but they wanted to avail themselves of the expiration of their term of service in order, first of all, to enjoy a little vacation, and then to obtain the bounties by re-enlistment which were offered both by the States and the government to the newly-enlisted recruits.

The Confederate army had no need of recuperation from the shock of Fredericksburg, for it had obtained an easy victory; its losses were not great and its *morale* was excellent. Inured to all kinds of fatigue and privations, accustomed to dangers of every description by two years of desperate struggles, full of confidence in the chiefs who had so frequently led them to victory, and so perfectly certain of seeing it always perch on their banners that they even reckoned the battles of South Mountain



and Antietam as successes,—trained, in short, to a strict discipline, the soldiers of the Confederate infantry were more formidable than they had ever been before. But from the day when they had crossed the Potomac for the purpose of invading Maryland their ranks had been thinned by musket-balls and sickness, their equipments had become worn out, their very arms bore evidence of the service to which they had been put. Moreover, discipline had not been able to suppress among them the evil which had so much weakened the Federal army—desertion to the interior. Many stragglers left in the rear of the army during its last marches, invalids who had been sent on leave of absence to their families, had not reappeared in the ranks. Finally, a considerable detachment taken from it was the means of depriving the army of some of its best soldiers. On the 1st of February, Longstreet was sent with three divisions of his corps into South-eastern Virginia, where we shall find him at a later period laying siege to Suffolk. There, as we have stated, the Ninth corps came for a while to hold him in check, but only to be replaced by other troops which we shall soon see at work. The cavalry was exhausted, the horses lame, wounded, or foundered. The artillery, always inferior to that of the Federals, had also much need of reorganization. In order to place the Confederate army once more in condition to undertake an active campaign, the officers should have had time to work and the soldiers to rest. The season allowed them three months yet for preparation, and they availed themselves of it. The generals and the government at Richmond set to work with that energy of which they had already given so many proofs.

The new conscription law was applied with the utmost rigor, while leaves of absence were wisely granted to soldiers whose terms of service were about to expire and who renewed their engagements. Patrols overran the whole country for the purpose of picking up deserters; the ranks of the army were rapidly swollen by the arrival of new regiments and the additions made to the old ones. The former were distributed among the various brigades, which were made to undergo a complete reorganization. Two brigades were added to Jackson's corps, while the others received one or two new regiments each.

The effective force of this corps rose, within three months, from twenty-five to thirty-three thousand men. The resources of the whole of Virginia were collected together for the purpose of provisioning the army and forming dépôts capable of securing its subsistence: that of Guiney's Station especially became of great importance. The arsenals of the Confederacy redoubled their activity, the blockade-runners made some happy ventures, and the Southern soldiers received a large number of new arms, as well as ammunition in sufficient quantity, while their equipments were likewise much improved. Important reforms, in short, were introduced in the *personnel* of the army.

All the batteries of artillery, which until then had been independent of each other, were united into one single corps and placed under the command of General Pendleton. This corps was composed of eight battalions, comprising thirty-eight mounted batteries, besides one battalion of horse artillery and one of reserve artillery.

The general staff was organized so as to constitute a special corps. Finally, Lee formed a regiment of engineers, similar to those existing in the Army of the Potomac.

Promotions were granted to those who had particularly distinguished themselves at Fredericksburg. To Jackson was awarded the rank of lieutenant-general, which he had long deserved. The independent division of D. H. Hill was added to his corps, which was thus made to comprise one half of the army, the other half forming that of Longstreet. Hill having been called to a territorial command in North Carolina, his division was given to Rodes, a valiant officer. Jackson's old division was commanded by Trimble, and that of Ewell by Early, who had distinguished himself in all the battles in which he had been engaged.

Lee occupied the right bank of the Rappahannock, and extended his cantonments so as not to encumber his troops and to guard the principal passes of the river. Works were constructed at all the important positions from Banks' Ford, above Fredericksburg, as far as the neighborhood of Port Conway, where the Rappahannock becomes an obstacle almost insurmountable.

The left wing, formed of the two divisions of Longstreet's corps, occupied the country around Fredericksburg and all the

locality of the late battle as far as Hamilton's Crossing; the task of guarding the lower course of the river fell to Jackson.

The two armies remained thus for three long months in the presence of each other, watching without striking a blow. The experience so dearly bought on both sides had not been thrown away. Hooker was not blamed for his inaction during the rainy season, as McClellan had been the preceding year, and at the end of those three months he found himself at the head of an army much more homogeneous, better disciplined, and consequently more manageable, than that of his two predecessors. On the other side, General Lee, favored by the season, by the natural and artificial strength of the positions he occupied, and by the *prestige* which rendered the ensanguined heights of Fredericksburg impregnable in the eyes of both parties, was enabled to devote himself to the instruction of the valiant bands which up to that time had only learned to manœuvre under the fire of the enemy. Full of solicitude for the soldiers of whom he might at any moment ask the sacrifice of their lives, he neglected nothing to secure their welfare and keep up their confidence. He might be seen, either alone or accompanied by Jackson, who was actuated by the same earnest zeal and the same religious sentiments as himself, visiting the bivouacs, encouraging his men by words always full of kindness without descending to familiarity, and giving them an example of devotion as simple as it was sincere.

In the mean time, the season which paralyzed the movements of large armies did not condemn to the same inactivity those small corps of mounted troops which, not being dependent for their subsistence upon the intricate machinery of heavy supply-trains, did not, like the infantry, find any insurmountable obstacle in the mud of Virginia. The Confederate cavalry, scattered among the counties that are watered by the Rapidan, and as far as the foot of the Alleghanies, for the purpose of gathering the forage of which they stood in need and to enforce the application of the conscription laws before the Federals should come to interrupt it, was commanded by officers of too enterprising a character to be satisfied with such a rôle; the progress which the cavalry of the Union had lately made compelled their adversaries, moreover, to



be doubly vigilant in order not to lose the superiority they had acquired during the early days of the war. Thus left to themselves, being no longer compelled to follow the marches of a large army in order to watch and cover it, these bold champions of the South were able, during that period, to carry on what we might properly call a fancy war. Stationed among the villages of Virginia, where each of them contended for the honor of having such defenders of the Confederate cause, feasted everywhere, and surrounded by those attentions which compensate the soldier for many months of suffering and privations, they availed themselves of the inauspicious weather in order to rest and prepare for new conflicts. When the sun reappeared the sound "To horse!" was heard, and they were quickly in the saddle, ready to manœuvre before some of their favorite chiefs, Stuart, Jackson, or Lee; at times a division of infantry would even be called to witness their evolutions. And again, when some of the thousands of volunteer spies who overran the Federal lines pointed out some new bold stroke to be dealt, a detachment more or less strong according to the importance of the enterprise received in the evening the order for marching. From early dawn all the windows of the village would be crowded with women, who cheered the dashing raiders on their departure, while the latter rushed gayly into the country occupied by the enemy.

Stuart possessed the rare gift of communicating to those serving under him the ardor which burnt in his own bosom, and of moulding their character after his own. In achieving, within the space of one year, the high position he occupied, and a military reputation which justified it in the eyes of all men, he had lost none of the brilliant qualities which had attracted public notice from the commencement of his career. Passionately fond of his profession, always endeavoring to instruct and perfect himself in the great art of war, he had preserved all the dash of the young cavalry-officer joyfully going forth for the first time to the field of battle. Exemplary in his conduct, warmly attached to his family, sincerely religious, and of strictest sobriety, he found no relaxation during the intervals of his campaigns except in the society of young women, differing widely in this respect from Jackson, who, it was said, only found pleasure in the company of



old ladies or the ministers of his religious faith. His handsome face, the elegance of his attire, his taste for feathers, embroideries, and brilliant scarfs, his exquisite gentlemanly address, in short, that suavity of temper which never forsook him,—everything in this young general of twenty-eight was calculated to captivate the imagination of the beautiful women of Virginia whenever he appeared in their villages or in their half-deserted homes surrounded by the *prestige* of his exploits. As to his soldiers, what they especially admired in him was his imperturbable presence of mind in the midst of danger and the turmoil of battle, and that wonderful vigor which enabled him to retain the full use of all his intellectual faculties when his companions were either overcome by fatigue or prostrated by privations.

Stuart's regular force was composed of three brigades, commanded by General Wade Hampton and the son and nephew of the commander-in chief, Generals W. H. F. Lee and Fitzhugh Lee, who worthily bore that illustrious name. It is proper to add to this force the brigade of General Jones, who was waging hostilities west of the Blue Ridge in the Valley of Virginia, but who, notwithstanding his distance, was under Stuart's command.

Moreover, wherever the Federals had any outposts there was a small detachment of Confederate cavalry always engaged in watching and harassing them, while Mosby and his followers watched for an opportunity to strike at some points of the railroads or the *dépôts* which supplied the enemy's army with provisions. These skirmishes, which it would be impossible to enumerate here, show that the Confederate partisans were wide awake at all points in Virginia, resorting alternately to cunning and audacity in order to conceal the inferiority of their numbers. At Williamsburg, for instance, on the field of battle where so much blood had been shed the preceding year, they resorted to an expedient against their adversaries which was susceptible of frequent application. By means of false information conveyed to the Federal garrison of Yorktown, on the 7th of February, 1863, a squadron of the enemy was enticed into a narrow road bordered on both sides by a thick forest. The Unionists, who were advancing cautiously, suddenly espied a small band of Confederates, who, after firing a few shots, fled rapidly. A

charge was immediately ordered, and the squadron rushed forward in pursuit. But they had scarcely broken into a gallop when they encountered a multitude of telegraph-wires reaching from tree to tree across the road. The horses stumble over each other, the men, entangled by this simultaneous breakdown, are unable to extricate themselves, and become exposed in this defenceless condition to the fire of the Southerners, who take leisurely advantage of the success of their ambushade. This exploit cost the Federals thirty-five men. A month later, on the 8th of March, Mosby signalized himself by a bold stroke of extraordinary audacity. The reader will probably remember that the Virginia attorney, having landed on the 4th of August, 1862, at Aiken's Landing, was the first to carry to Lee the news of Burnside's departure for Alexandria: he was then returning, after an exchange of prisoners, from the Northern prisons, where he had expiated, during two months, the crime of having once slept too soundly near the Federal outposts. Since then he had thought of nothing but to revenge himself for his mishap, and to catch in his turn some Unionists in *flagrante delicto* of profound sleep. But his victims must be officers of high rank; he determined to go in search of them in the very centre of the Federal quarters, at Fairfax Court-house, between Washington and Hooker's army. Several regiments were encamped around this village, where the head-quarters of Colonel Wyndham, a brigade commander, and those of Colonels Stoughton\* and Johnson, were located. Favored by darkness, Mosby, with twenty-nine men, slips between these camps, surprises and gags one guard, penetrates into the village, disposes of his soldiers so that they may seize the principal officers of the enemy, and goes himself to pay a visit to Colonel Stoughton, with whose quarters he was fully acquainted. He had the great pleasure of finding him asleep and of waking him up in person. The colonel, indignant at such familiarity, threatens to have the intruder arrested.

\* Stoughton was promoted from colonel of the Fourth Vermont Infantry to brigadier-general Nov. 5, 1862, but not being confirmed, his appointment expired by constitutional limitation March 4, 1863. When captured, March 9, 1863, he probably had not received notification of his non-confirmation, and was practically still a brigadier-general, the vacancy in the Fourth Vermont having been filled.—Ed.

“Do you know Mosby?” remarks the latter.—“What! have you captured that wretch? tell me quickly,” answers the Federal, who believes that his sleep has been interrupted by the bearer of this good news.—“Not exactly; it is Mosby himself who has captured you and is going to carry you off.” And this was done instantly. Wyndham and Johnson, however, were not taken, the latter having hidden himself without clothes under a stack of hay; but many other officers had been taken by surprise like Stoughton, while Mosby, as fortunate as he was daring, succeeded in getting through the Federal lines unperceived, taking with him thirty-five prisoners.\*

During the first months of the year 1863 the Confederate partisans, mounted and on foot, showed themselves in West Virginia at Moorefield, where, on the 3d of January, General Jones succeeded in capturing about sixty Federals; and again at Point Pleasant, where they were repulsed with loss on the 30th of March. They finally returned to the charge at the end of April, while one detachment tried in vain, on the 28th, to force the defile of Greenland Gap in the Alleghanies. Jones, passing through Beverly and Philippi at the head of a large brigade of cavalry, levied contributions upon the whole flat country and forced his way as far as Morgantown. The latter returned into the mountains by way of Fairmont on the 2d, after having captured a Federal detachment which had sought to dispute with him the passage of the Monongahela, and completely destroyed the magnificent railroad-bridge across that river. At the South-east, General W. H. F. Lee had made an unsuccessful attack, on the 10th of February, upon Gloucester Point on York River, and a few days later, on the 25th, he cannonaded the Federal ships in the Rappahannock, while his cousin, crossing that river some distance below Falmouth, surprised a Federal post and captured about one hundred prisoners at a place called Leedstown. Finally, in Northern Virginia, Captain McNeil, on the 16th of February captured a Federal convoy near Romney. On the 26th, General Jones, prior to his expedition along the Monongahela, made a

\* For a detailed account of this raid see a letter from Colonel Mosby to a friend in Richmond, chap. vii. of *Mosby and his Men*, by J. M. Crawford.—ED.

bold move in the Valley of the Shenandoah, and, surprising two cavalry regiments which had been sent by Milroy for the purpose of checking his course, dispersed them near Strasburg, taking two hundred prisoners. A detachment of his brigade even pushed on as far as the Potomac, and, crossing the river in boats, captured about sixty Federals near Poolesville in Maryland.

The Federal mounted men were not so sprightly as their adversaries; they did not like to rush in small bands into the midst of a country where the inhabitants were all hostile to them, and rendered the chances too unequal. Nevertheless, they displayed a considerable amount of activity, and the only serious battle we have to record during that period was provoked by them on the banks of the Upper Rappahannock. While the Confederates were dividing their forces in order to appear everywhere at once and to occupy the counties situated between the last-mentioned river and the mountains effectively, the Federal tactics were to penetrate into those localities in compact masses which would have nothing to fear from partisan bands scattered along their route, and could fight with numerical advantage the well-trained regiments of Stuart.

Toward the middle of March they at last decided to go in search of the latter in order to measure strength with him. A large portion of the Confederate cavalry was drawn up *en échelon* along the Rappahannock above and below Fredericksburg, so as to watch the course of the river and keep Lee advised of all the movements undertaken by Hooker's army. The nucleus of Fitzhugh Lee's brigade was at Culpeper Court-house; this brigade, although composed of the first five Virginia regiments, could not then bring more than one thousand sabres into line. The right wing of the Federal army, from Falmouth to Bull Run Mountain, was covered by Averell's division of cavalry, composed of McIntosh's and Duffié's brigades and two small regular regiments, the First and Fifth, forming a brigade under Captain Reno. After assembling them secretly, Averell took up the line of march on the 16th at the head of his three brigades, numbering between two thousand and twenty-five hundred horses, with a battery of artillery. The following morning, March 17, the column left Morrisville, and reached Kelly's Ford on the Rappa-



hannock at an early hour. The right bank was lined with the enemy's sharpshooters. Lieutenant S. A. Brown, with a platoon of mounted men of the First Rhode Island, rushes into the river under the fire of the Confederates, arrives in their midst, takes twenty-five prisoners, disperses the rest, and opens a passage for the division.\* The Southern cavalry, thus taken by surprise, got back as well as they could to their horses, which they had had the imprudence to leave at too great a distance from them, and then hastened to carry the news of the approach of the Unionists to Fitzhugh Lee. This general had been informed of their march the day previous. A despatch from Lee's head-quarters had apprised him of Averell's departure, while his scouts, keeping a vigilant watch over all the movements of the enemy, had informed him of his departure from Morrisville. He had been under the false impression that by reinforcing the post at Kelly's Ford, the only practicable ford for a considerable distance along the river, he might be able to hold them in check for some time. At the first news of the crossing he hastened with his brigade to meet the enemy. Stuart, who happened to be at Culpeper, joined him as a volunteer, without taking command of the troops.

The Federals had lost much time in the passage of the ford, which was covered by more than four feet of water: they advanced cautiously and as slowly as a troop of infantry, the skirmishers having landed in order to scour the woods. Accordingly, they were yet at a distance of about a mile and one-third from Kelly's Ford when they found themselves facing Lee's brigade, which had arrived in haste, followed by a battery of artillery commanded by the young and valiant Pelham. Averell's dismounted men occupied the edge of a wood, strongly intrenched behind a stone wall; beyond this wood lay a quantity of fallow lands which separated them from the heads of the Confederate columns. Lee, believing that he had only an advance-guard to deal with, hurls upon them a squadron on foot as skirmishers, which, notwithstanding Stuart's efforts, is instantly driven back in disorder and out of the clearing by the well-sustained fire of the Federals. The latter have deployed themselves, McIntosh on the right, Duffié on the left, and Reno in the centre, with the

\* See *Sabres and Spurs—First Rhode Island Cavalry*. By Denison, 1876.

Fifth Cavalry, while the First is kept in reserve. The battle soon rages along the line, the Confederates assuming at first the offensive, with the more vigor that they are not aware of the number of their adversaries. The Third Virginia dashes across the fields against the centre of their line; without allowing itself to be shaken by the fire of musketry, it reaches the enemy's lines with sabres drawn, when its progress is stopped by the wall of stones, which no horse can overleap; and while the Southerners are trying in vain to effect a passage, exposed at short range to the fire of the Federals, Colonel Duffié attacks them in the rear with the First Rhode Island, and drives them vigorously back. The Second Virginia tries in vain to check this charge; its commander, having leaped over a large ditch at the head of his men, is surrounded and captured. The fight is now carried on with side-arms in a narrow road where the Unionists have pursued their adversaries; the latter are definitely stopped and compelled to fall back upon their reserves. Lee, finding the left of the enemy so strong, decides to try his right, and orders Colonel Bower to make an effort to outflank him with his regiment, the Fifth Virginia. But these troops have scarcely advanced a short distance in that direction when they find themselves confronted by McIntosh's brigade and the Federal guns. Received by a terrible fire, the regiment is quickly driven back in disorder, and this causes the retreat of the whole Confederate line. The Unionists, who have been astonished at so vigorous an attack, do not take advantage of this opportunity to press the enemy and complete his defeat. They advance slowly, firing upon the small squadrons which Stuart and Lee are vainly bringing back to the charge in order to check their progress, and covering every group of men within their reach with shells. One of these projectiles inflicted a mortal wound upon young Pelham, who, at the age of twenty-one, had already gained the esteem and admiration of his chiefs.

The Confederates, thus repulsed, got as far as Brandy Station, about eight miles from Kelly's Ford; night was approaching, but it was absolutely necessary for them to hoodwink their adversaries in order to prevent them from completing their victory before dark. Lee had only three or four hundred men

left, the remainder having been dispersed. He halted them on the other side of a large clearing, made the greater portion dismount, and placed them on foot behind the shelter of a wall, whence they could fire like infantry; he planted his artillery behind this line, and, placing himself at the head of the Third Virginia, which had only one hundred horses left, he charged the Federal lines with the energy of despair. He was in hopes of capturing Averell's guns, but he was stopped by a wooden fence behind which the Fifth Cavalry lay in ambush; while they were trying to effect a passage his mounted men were taken in the rear by a charge of the Third Pennsylvania, of McIntosh's brigade, and driven back upon their line of skirmishers. But the latter presented such a bold front, and the Southern artillerists, anxious to avenge the death of Pelham, served their pieces with so much zeal and precision, that the Unionists thought they had to cope with a brigade of infantry which had come to the assistance of Stuart. At the very moment when a final effort would probably have secured him a decisive victory, Averell paused, and, to the great joy of his adversaries, who knew now his numerical superiority, contented himself with deploying a line of skirmishers to cover his retreat, and retraced his steps to Kelly's Ford, which he crossed that same evening. The Confederate losses were 11 killed, 88 wounded, and 34 prisoners; those of the Federals only amounted to 80 men in all:\* the conflict, therefore, was not sanguinary, but we have narrated it in detail because it was the first encounter which took place in the East between two cavalry corps of considerable magnitude without any infantry support.

It is difficult to imagine what could have been the real object that Averell had in view, but we can only judge of an expedition by the means employed, the plan supposed to have been laid, and the results foreshadowed. The result of the combat at Kelly's Ford to the Federals was that it enabled them, first of all, to reconnoitre a pass of which they were to avail themselves six weeks later; and, secondly, that it inflicted a serious check upon the enemy's cavalry. But as regards the reconnoissance, the few squadrons which captured the defenders of the ford would have

\* Or 6 killed, 50 wounded, and 24 missing.—Ed.



been sufficient, and from the moment that Averell marched against the enemy with his whole division he should not have been satisfied with an incomplete victory; even if his plan had been different, he should have taken advantage of the opportunity to crush Lee's brigade and push at least as far as Culpeper.

Be that as it may, it is at the ford visited by this brigade on the 17th of March that the Federal cavalry is about to open a passage to the advancing columns of the Army of the Potomac. The latter, in fact, is preparing to resume the offensive. Hooker has gathered the fruit of his excellent administration, the soldiers salute him cordially whenever they see him in their midst, the chiefs do him justice and are ready to give him their confidence on the first occasion he shall show himself as commander-in-chief. The favorable season approaches, and the green attire in which the beautiful forests watered by the Rappahannock array themselves reminds the combatants that the moment has arrived for taking the field once more.

We are now in the second week of April. Hooker has formed a plan concerning which he has kept the most profound silence. The authorities at Washington, we are happy to say it to their credit, have been wise enough to respect his secret. The cavalry is the first to take up the line of march, and on the 13th of April it moves toward the Upper Rappahannock. But no one in either army knows whether it is a feint to divert the attention of the enemy or a movement intended to cover that of the heavy columns of infantry.

Notwithstanding the approach of the mild season, the roads are not yet passable for those columns followed by numerous wagons, while the rivers, being still swollen, render the crossings difficult; but we have stated the reasons which will not allow Hooker to remain any longer inactive. In the first instance, the term of service of forty regiments is about to expire, and the battle must be fought previous to their discharge. On the other hand, Longstreet has only been sent to the south, with three fine divisions detached from Lee's army, to take advantage of the truce imposed upon the combatants on the Rappahannock by the bad season. It is therefore probable that the return of fine weather will bring him back near his chief; he must be forestalled.



The Federal cavalry is under the command of an experienced leader. Always master of himself, although very zealous, endowed with a clear and discriminating mind, prompt and just in his decisions, General Stoneman in uniting three strong divisions under his own management has placed them in a condition to render important services to the army. Hooker directs him to move toward the Upper Rappahannock, as if he intended, by marching north-westward, to reach the Valley of Virginia, cross the river above Rappahannock Station, and then to strike at the Gordonsville Railway, destroying it, dispersing the enemy's cavalry, and cutting off its communications.\* As soon as the weather will permit he proposes to cross the Rappahannock with his army below Falmouth, and to attack Lee on the side of Skinner's Neck and Hamilton's Crossing, or, better still, to surprise him on his retreat; for he is convinced that Stoneman's manœuvre will suffice to make him abandon the positions which Burnside has not been able to carry in front.

By separating his whole cavalry from the main body of his army on the eve of decisive combats, and by relying upon a simple detachment for the purpose of compelling the enemy to retire—a result which all his forces combined could scarcely have achieved—he committed a double error, which he repeated a few days later, the disastrous consequences of which will be seen presently. The unpropitious weather interrupted Stoneman's movement. On the 17th and 18th of April, after some little skirmishing with Stuart's cavalry, he had taken possession of the principal crossings of the Upper Rappahannock, when the rain fell down in torrents, swelling the river, submerging the fords, and rendering all the roads absolutely impassable. One division, which occupied the right side of the river, and had advanced as far as the vicinity of Brandy Station, had the greatest difficulty in crossing the swollen waters of the Rappahannock in order to reach the left bank. Stoneman was ordered to wait for the first falling of the swell in the positions he occupied: he waited for fifteen days; the waters did not regain their level until the 27th of April. Under the influence of a burning sun, however, the roads dried up rapidly: there was nothing to further oppose the long marches

\* Hooker's instructions of April 12.—ED.

and the great movements of the troops across the fields of Virginia. Hooker took advantage of this to modify his plan of campaign, and, giving up the idea of going to seek his adversary in the latter's own positions, he decided to manœuvre so as to compel him to abandon them and to fight in the open country. This new plan was involved in as much secrecy as the preceding one. It was necessary that it should be executed quickly, because several regiments, by reason of expiration of term of service, had already gone home, and a few days more of delay would deprive the Army of the Potomac of more combatants than a pitched battle.

The ground on which the two armies were about to measure strength had long since been examined by both parties; the river behind which Burnside had so unfortunately stationed himself in November, 1862, still separated those two armies; the Federals had tried in vain to cross it at Fredericksburg and above and below that city; as we have already stated, their adversaries had lined the banks with works which rendered its defence easy from its confluence with the Rapidan as far as the point where it becomes a real arm of the sea. Hooker understood that the positions thus protected in front must be turned by ascending the course of the river.

The confluence of the Rappahannock with the Rapidan occurs at a little less than ten miles in a straight line above Falmouth. Between these two points the Rappahannock, wide, rapid, and of extreme depth, presents an obstacle which the Federals could not venture to surmount, because, contrary to the conformation of the ground below Falmouth, the right bank is the highest and commands all the approaches to the river; the latter had but two fordable crossings during the dry season; at this period they were the only points where bridges could be thrown across, owing to the roads leading to them and the depth of water, which affords anchorage for boats. These are Banks' Ford, two and two-thirds miles, and United States Ford,\* eight miles and a quarter, in a direct line above Falmouth. The first pass was commanded by the left extremity of the line of works with which Lee had covered his whole front since the battle of Fredericksburg. The

\* By way of abbreviation of "United States Mine Ford," the ford being near the United States Mine, a gold-mine formerly worked by the government.

second, very difficult of approach along the right bank, led to a vast and impenetrable forest, destined to become, within the space of one year, the scene of two of the most terrible battles fought on the American continent. This forest, called the Wilderness, or the Wild Place, covers a surface of from twenty to thirty thousand acres, and is easily distinguished by its vegetation from the surrounding woods. It occupies an elevated pebbly plateau; its soil is sterile, but rich in oxide of iron, deeply guttered by numerous small streams which descend at the north toward the Rapidan and the Rappahannock, and which at the south form the Po and the Ny, two of the sources of the Mattapony. From the early days of colonization, under the government of Spotswood, who gave his name to the county of Spotsylvania, the iron ores of this locality have been worked openly, the soil has been ripped up by repeated excavations, while the trees of the forests have been recklessly cut down for the purpose of supplying the upper furnaces with fuel. From this destruction the lofty trees of the forest have given place to a stunted though very thick vegetation, consisting of dwarfed oaks, thorny plants, and juniper trees, among which vines and creepers of every description are intertwined, thus forming an impenetrable thicket, across which sinuous paths are winding—a perfect labyrinth, known only to the few inhabitants of that miserable region. The forest is bounded at the north by the right bank of the Rapidan, then of the Rappahannock after their confluence, from Ely's Ford as far as United States Ford; at the west, by a tolerably fertile valley watered by the Wilderness Run; at the south, by the slopes which reach down to the Mattapony; at the east, by a well-cultivated district, where the woods are intersected by large and numerous clearings dotted with farms and dwellings. The southern portion of the forest is traversed from west to east by a large highway, being the road from Orange Court-house to Fredericksburg. The old route, or the Old Turnpike, and the new road, called the Plank Road, by following a parallel direction penetrate into the forest after crossing Wilderness Run, the former at the Old Wilderness Tavern, the latter two miles and two-thirds farther south, at Parker's Store; then they draw near again across the forest, and meet upon a barren plateau, where



the church of the Wilderness and the inn called Dowdall's Tavern stand; then, plunging into a ravine, the only road reascends the heights of Fairview and crosses a new clearing, where stands a beautiful edifice called Chancellorsville, after the name of its proprietor. At this point the road becomes once more divided; the old route, which still pursues a northerly direction, and the Plank Road, emerge from the forest at a distance of about two and a half miles beyond Chancellorsville, and become at first separated, the former crossing the streams which descend into the Rappahannock, the latter following, in a general sense, the ridge which divides the waters between this river and the Mattaponi; then they draw near again at the entrance of a cultivated plateau, and passing, one close to the church called Zoar Church and the other near an abandoned edifice called Tabernacle Church, they meet again finally at the other extremity of the plateau.

The route—which retains the name of Plank Road—then follows a narrow ridge commanding Banks' Ford at the north, which it approaches within a distance of a little over one mile, and the valley of Hazel Run at the south—that same stream which flows at the foot of Marye's Hill, and which played so important a part at the battle of Fredericksburg. At a distance of about four miles from the last-mentioned city, and six and a quarter miles from Chancellorsville, one meets Salem Church, located upon a spot where the ridge is particularly narrow; a little farther on, at two miles and two-thirds from Fredericksburg, this ridge widens again, forming an open plateau which terminates above the city. The slopes of this plateau are known by the name of Marye's Hill at the south-east, and that of Taylor's Hill at the north-west.

We have stated that the pass of United States Ford gave access to the forest called the Wilderness a little below the confluence of the Rappahannock and the Rapidan. Among the various fords which are to be met higher up along this last-mentioned river during summer, two only are easy of access and practicable for an army: these were Ely's Ford, situated at three and one-third miles, and Germanna Ford, at nine and one-third miles, in a straight line above the confluence. A good road leads to the Old Wilderness Tavern, south-west of Germanna Ford, where it crosses



the Old Road and joins the Plank Road, a little farther on, in the midst of the forest, near the Wolfrey House. Several roads, running from Ely's Ford and United States Ford, after a sinuous course meet on a hillock where there is a small clearing surrounding an edifice called the White House, and forming a road which joins the turnpike at Chancellorsville. It will be seen that the latter point was the nucleus of all the open passes across the stunted and thick growth of the Wilderness. It was here that Hooker determined to plant himself with a portion of his army, in order to compel the Confederates to abandon the impregnable positions of Fredericksburg.

In order to reach this place he was obliged to cross the Rappahannock and the Rapidan separately above their confluence, the passes below this point being too difficult to allow of an attack by main force, and too close to the Confederate army for any attempt to take them by surprise. The course of the two rivers favored this movement; for, prior to becoming united, they follow parallel directions for a distance (between ten and twelve miles), being only separated by a space of ground varying from five to two miles in width. They were only guarded by some cavalry pickets which maintained communication between Culpeper Court-house and the brigades of Mahone and Posey of Anderson's division, which guarded United States Ford and formed the extreme left of Lee's army. It was a very eccentric flank movement, which had to be made by a flank march in the presence of a vigilant and active adversary. The difficulty was immense. If the movement had been undertaken by the whole army, it was to be expected that it would have failed, as Burnside's march from Warrenton to Fredericksburg had done six months before: it was probable that the Federals might be forestalled by Lee, and that they would find him everywhere on their route. Hooker, availing himself of his large numerical superiority, determined to divide his army into two nearly equal parts—to make the right wing execute the flank movement, while the left wing remained facing Lee's army at Fredericksburg, holding it in check by means of various demonstrations, and attacking it if it should attempt to retire. The first movement of the right wing being once accom-

plished, the latter would descend the Rapidan and the Rappahannock on the south side, until it met the enemy, who would thus be caught between two forces, each strong enough to hold him in check. It was a bold plan, but it possessed the inconvenience of not allowing the chief who had conceived it to direct its entire execution in person, as it compelled him to abandon one half of the army in order to follow the other. The plan, however, as will be seen presently, would no doubt have succeeded if the commanding general had not himself deviated from it. It was therefore a good plan, and reflected much credit on Hooker's talents. The latter, unfortunately, aggravated all the dangers by the part he assigned to his numerous cavalry. Instead of employing it in clearing the complicated movements that his infantry was about to execute, and in watching those of the enemy, he sought to make it undertake a separate expedition, the object of which was to destroy Lee's communications with the capital of Virginia at a long distance back of Fredericksburg. Counting upon victory, he was thus taking precautions in order to render it more decisive; he even hoped, as we have observed before, that this expedition would throw sufficient confusion into the commissary department of the Southern army to compel it to beat a retreat before he had made an attack. This blunder deprived him of an indispensable instrument in the operations he was about to execute.

Before putting his army in motion when he found that the return of mild weather would render him once more free in his movements, Hooker tried to put the enemy on the wrong scent by means of certain demonstrations along the Lower Rappahannock. About the 21st of April, Doubleday's division proceeded as far as Port Conway, twenty-one miles below Fredericksburg, and made a feint of preparing to build a bridge; two days later, the 23d, a regiment, the Twenty-fourth Michigan, having actually effected a passage in boats, made its appearance in the village of Port Royal, on the right side of the river. At last, on the 27th of April, Hooker thought the moment had arrived for taking the field. His instructions were given with great clearness. The Eleventh and Twelfth corps, followed at a short distance by the Fifth, formed the right wing, and were directed to proceed at

daybreak on the 28th toward Kelly's Ford and encamp, the former beyond, and the latter on this side of, the river. Hooker accompanied them as far as Morrisville, where he gave his final orders to their commanders, Howard, Slocum, and Meade. The first two were ordered to proceed to Germanna Ford, the last to Ely's Ford. Germanna Ford was so far from the enemy's army, and Hooker had taken so many precautions to conceal his movements, that Howard and Slocum ought to have been able to have crossed the Rapidan without striking a blow. They were ordered to descend immediately by the right side of the river, so as to free Ely's Ford in the event of Meade having met the enemy there, and to join him in order to occupy the position of Chancellorsville without delay.

Whenever these three corps should be united the command would devolve upon Slocum by right of seniority. "If you reach Chancellorsville quickly," said Hooker to him, "the game is ours." He foresaw that the Confederates would soon abandon United States Ford, and he directed ponton-bridges to be thrown over the river in order to establish direct communications with the rest of the army. Finally, if the enemy did not appear inclined to move to meet Slocum, the latter was to continue his march in a parallel line with the Rappahannock, and follow the Plank Road in the direction of Fredericksburg until he had reached the heights of Banks' Ford, which would have enabled the two sections of the army to effect a junction by way of this pass; if the enemy should seem disposed to attack him in front, he was to take a good position and wait for that attack. In order to prepare the junction of his two wings, and to avail himself of the passes which Slocum's movement would have opened along the Rappahannock, Hooker ordered Couch, who commanded the Second corps, to lead two divisions toward Banks' Ford, sending one brigade and a battery of artillery to wait in front of United States Ford for the troops which were expected to come down by the right side of the river. The third division of this corps, commanded by Gibbon, whose encampments near Falmouth were in sight of the Confederates, was ordered to remain there, so as not to arouse suspicion.

The left wing, comprising this division, the First corps under



Reynolds, the Third under Sickles, and the Sixth under Sedgwick, was placed under the command of the latter. Hooker, supposing that the whole right wing would have crossed the Rapidan on the 29th before sunset, fixed upon that day for beginning the operations which Sedgwick was to undertake. General Benham, who commanded a brigade of engineers, was ordered to throw two ponton-bridges over the Rappahannock during the night at a place called Franklin's Crossing in remembrance of the battle of December 13, one hundred yards below the mouth of Deep Run, and two others at a mile and a quarter lower down, fronting Smithfield. The Sixth corps was to hold itself in readiness to cross at the upper bridges, Reynolds at the lower, while Sickles remained in reserve in order to support either of the others. In the preceding volume, in describing the battlefield of Fredericksburg, the reader will remember that the road called the Telegraph Road, after skirting Marye's Hill, stretches in a southerly direction—that is to say, toward Richmond—passing behind the positions which Franklin had attacked in vain on the 13th of December; the route called the River Road, which skirts the river, becomes divided before reaching the Massaponax, one branch of which, called the Bowling Green Road, pursues likewise a southerly direction; finally, the railway between Aquia Creek and Richmond follows a parallel course between the two. These three routes supplied Lee's army with provisions, and afforded him the shortest line of retreat upon the capital of Virginia. Hooker directed Sedgwick to cross the river on the morning of the 29th with sufficient force to make a demonstration against the positions of the enemy, and to take possession of the Telegraph Road. If Lee should happen to send a portion of his forces westward to fight Slocum, Sedgwick was to capture some of the Confederate works at any cost and take a strong position along the Telegraph Road; if the Southern army should fall back upon Richmond, the three corps of the Federal left wing were to start in pursuit by way of the Telegraph Road and that of Bowling Green. The part assigned to this wing therefore consisted in keeping the enemy as long as possible before Fredericksburg, in pursuing him if he attempted to fall back upon Richmond, and in merely taking possession of his



works and his line of retreat if he marched upon Chancellorsville; the movements of the right wing were those intended to effect a junction of the two sections of the army on the plateau situated between Banks' Ford and Marye's Heights.

In thus dividing his forces into two parts destined to fight and to manœuvre out of reach of each other, although operating in the same direction, Hooker evidently ran the risk of concentrating all the efforts of the enemy upon either one or the other, and especially upon the right wing, which had assumed the offensive. It was important, therefore, to clear the movements of this wing in the distance, so that it might know how far to advance without exposing itself too much, and that by signalling the approach of the enemy in time the general-in-chief might cause a diversion to be made by the rest of the army. In short, the whole of this wing should have been surrounded with a curtain of skirmishers which would have concealed its manœuvres and left Lee in a state of uncertainty as to what direction it might take. The three fine cavalry divisions under Stoneman would not have been too much to accomplish this task. Hooker, as we have stated, had assigned them quite another *rôle*, and made them undertake an expedition which would have been very useful as a diversion at any other time, but which could have no influence over the results of the struggle of which the shores of the Rappahannock were to be the scene. It will be seen that Stoneman aggravated the blunder of his chief by giving to his operations the character of a guerrilla expedition, and by scattering his forces, instead of concentrating them in order to destroy the communications of the enemy. The instructions which Hooker had forwarded to him on the 12th of April, which were confirmed and completed on the 28th at the moment when the right wing was about to cross the Rappahannock, directed him to cross that river with all his corps above Kelly's Ford on the same day; to fight Fitzhugh Lee's brigade if he should meet it, this being the only cavalry force that the enemy could oppose to him on that side; to follow the railway known as the Orange and Alexandria Railroad from Culpeper Court-house as far as the important junction of Gordonsville, destroying it as he went along; then to take the line called the Virginia Central Railroad, and to proceed south-eastward toward

the point where this railroad and the Pamunkey River meet the Aquia Creek line at Richmond. This was to designate the vicinity of Hanover Court-house, a name already well known to the reader. Stoneman would thus reach the principal line of the enemy's communications—a line he was especially ordered to destroy—while a portion of his corps was intended to take the chord of the arc he was directed to describe, so as to protect his left flank. The object of this large *détour* was to cut off at once the two lines of communication from which Lee's army received its supplies—one coming from the west and the other from the south; but the whole expedition had been conceived on the supposition that the enemy, being either beaten or driven back, would be in full retreat, for Hooker had directed his lieutenant to bar as much as possible the passage of either of the two routes he might follow. But if, on the contrary, the Confederates held their ground around Fredericksburg, it was evident that the temporary destruction of either line of railway would lose all its importance. Hooker only left one small brigade of cavalry, under General Pleasanton, near Slocum, in order to clear his movements. It must be acknowledged that the intelligence, the determination, and the activity of this officer compensated to a certain extent for the insufficiency of the means at his disposal for the performance of so difficult a task.

The right wing executed with much precision and success the first part of the instructions of the general-in-chief. A floating bridge of canvas was thrown over the river at Kelly's Ford on the evening of the 28th, and on the following morning the three Federal army corps, after having passed to the other side of the river, were already on the march toward the fords of the Rappahannock. The Confederates had not anticipated this movement, and Lee did not seem to have foreseen it. At the very moment that Slocum was proceeding in the direction of Germanna Ford the engineers of the Southern army were at work at that point constructing a trestle-bridge in order to facilitate communications between Culpeper Court-house and the general head-quarters, situated above Fredericksburg. Early on the morning of the 29th, Stuart was informed of the presence of the enemy on the right side of the Rappahannock. He immediately assembled all

his forces—that is to say, the brigades of the two Lees (that of Hampton having gone farther south and been dispersed for the purpose of recruiting and resting their horses)—and repaired at once to Brandy Station, with a view of occupying the positions in which he had held Averell in check a fortnight before. His habitual sagacity seems to have failed him on this occasion.

Enveloped in a dense fog, he quietly waited until noon for the attack of the Federals, while the latter, not being even aware of his presence, left him on their right and proceeded southward. When the mist had been dispelled, finally revealing to him their long columns in the distance, he at once fathomed their design and tried to outspeed them along the Rapidan, in order to dispute to them the passage of Germanna Ford. But he was too late, and the utmost he could do was to harass the rear-guard, while Pleasonton's mounted men surprised the enemy's pontonniers on the Rapidan, capturing some of them, and, crossing the ford, took possession of the right bank.

This rapid movement had separated Stuart from the rest of the Confederate army. He was unable to apprise the posts stationed *en échelon* along the Rappahannock below Kelly's Ford, which were taken in the rear and captured before they had even heard of the crossing of the river by the Federals; the couriers sent by him to put the troops posted at United States Ford on their guard were intercepted. It was on the afternoon of the 29th, in the vicinity of the Madden farm, where he had made his headquarters during the winter, that he came up with the rear of Slocum's column with two or three regiments. He took a small number of prisoners and threw some detachments into confusion, but was unable to impede the march of the Federals. It was absolutely necessary for him to put himself once more in communication with the rest of the army in order to clear its way during the battle about to be fought, and it was also important to protect the dépôts at Gordonsville, a rich prey which could not fail to tempt the cupidity of the Federal cavalry. Stuart ordered W. H. F. Lee's brigade, which was to have the sole charge of watching Stoneman's movements, to move toward this point by way of Culpeper; and, taking with him Fitzhugh Lee's brigade, he undertook, notwithstanding the fatigue of his horses, to outspeed



the Federals, in order to pass from their right to their left, and go to the assistance of his chief.

While the small brigade of Fitzhugh Lee was crossing the Rapidan at Raccoon Ford, the numerous battalions of Slocum and Meade were crossing the river a little lower down, at Germanna Ford and Ely's Ford. The waters, which were still very high, rendered these fords rather dangerous, but it was impossible to wait for the bridges' equipages, and the soldiers, appreciating the importance of getting speedily over this river, which had already stopped their progress on several occasions, threw themselves cheerfully into the current, supporting each other, whilst the mounted men picked up those whom the waters were carrying off. Ways rapidly constructed gave the field-pieces and the wagons an easy access to the ford, and the crossing continued without interruption during the whole night by the blaze of fires kindled along both banks, whose lurid flames, agitated by the wind, threw a vivid light, now on the fantastically carved shadows of the tall trees which crowned the bank, and then over the numerous personages forming this strange and picturesque scene.

On the morning of the 30th the three Federal corps were on the right side of the Rapidan. Without wasting one moment, they continued their march in the direction of Chancellorsville, which Hooker had indicated to them as the rallying-point. They only encountered the small parties which they had easily dislodged from the river-fords the day previous, and a single regiment of Stuart's cavalry, which, having reached the church of the Wilderness before them, had thus been able to cross over to their left flank. The remainder of Fitzhugh Lee's brigade, arriving a little later, found the troops of Slocum in possession of this point.

By a vigorous charge it compelled the latter to come to a stop about noon, and to deploy in order to resist its attack ; but Stuart, becoming aware soon that he would not be able to force a passage by way of the Plank Road, determined to make a circuitous turn southward, by way of Spotsylvania Court-house, in order to join General Lee, who had sent for him in great haste, leading his column through cross-roads toward a point called Todd's Tavern,



situated four and a half miles south-west of Chancellorsville. On the evening of the 30th most of the troops belonging to the Federal right wing were gathered near this latter point, those that had not yet reached it being within a short distance and on their way thither.

Up to this time the Confederates had not been able to throw any serious obstacle in the way of their march. If Stuart, with his cavalry, had not succeeded in heading them on their way to Chancellorsville, how could the infantry have attempted it? By withdrawing a portion of his army from Falmouth unknown to his adversary, and by masking his earlier movements behind the Rappahannock, Hooker had gained an advance the advantages of which he could have preserved to the end. About midday on the 29th, Lee had been informed by Stuart of the passage of the Rappahannock; it was only in the evening, however, after the skirmish at Madden, that his lieutenant was able to give him any positive details regarding the strength and direction of the Federal columns. But the magnitude of the demonstrations made around Fredericksburg having proved to him that a considerable portion of the enemy's army was still in front of him, he understood that it would be impossible for him to divide his forces as his adversaries had done; that in order to conquer it was essential to keep all his troops together; and that it was yet too soon to go with his forces to meet Slocum. He therefore merely directed General Anderson on the evening of the 29th to take Wright's brigade along with him to Chancellorsville, in order to watch the movements of the enemy, and to send for Mahone's and Posey's brigades of his division, then holding United States Ford. Anderson, having arrived with Wright during the night, found these two brigades already in position at Chancellorsville, on which place they had fallen back at the news of Meade's passage at Ely's Ford. He only remained there a few hours; on the morning of the 30th, at the approach of the enemy's columns, he left his positions, followed closely by Pleasonton's cavalry, with which his rear-guard had some sharp engagements. Having emerged from the forest without waiting for the Federal infantry, he proceeded to take position around Tabernacle Church, resting on the two roads leading to Fredericksburg. Lee had

been informed on the evening of the 29th of the march of three Federal corps toward the fords of the Rapidan. From that moment he became convinced that these forces would speedily cross that river, unless their object was to draw him away from the real point of attack by a simple demonstration. Their arrival at Chancellorsville could alone reveal their intentions, and he was waiting for news from Anderson, which only reached him during the day of the 30th, in order to satisfy his doubts. The passage of the Rappahannock by a portion of Sedgwick's forces below Fredericksburg therefore engrossed for the time being all his attention. The three corps composing the Federal left wing were, in fact, so disposed as to be able to attack the Confederate lines as soon as the latter had been weakened by the retreat of a portion of their defenders. On the 28th, Sedgwick made them occupy the positions which had been assigned to them, taking care to conceal this movement, as much as possible, behind the slopes of Stafford Heights; the bridge-equipages were brought down during the night to the edge of the river, and at daybreak some Federal detachments crossed in boats at Franklin's Crossing and in front of Smithfield. At the latter point General Wadsworth, who had been the first to land in person, had to sustain a very brisk fire from the enemy's sharpshooters, which held his command for a moment in check. But the Federals, having soon become masters of the right side of the river at the two points which had been designated to them, were enabled to erect two ponton-bridges at each place. During the day two divisions crossed the river—that of Wadsworth of the First corps at Smithfield, and that of Brooks of the Sixth corps over the bridges located higher up. Such a display of forces might have been the prelude to the main operation: Lee must have been at a loss to guess where the feint was, whether on the Rapidan or the Rappahannock. As it was of greater importance to him to retain possession of Marye's Heights than Chancellorsville, he only ordered three brigades, as we have seen, to proceed toward the latter point, preparing himself to receive the attack with which Sedgwick seemed to menace him on the old battlefield of December 13th.

On the morning of the 28th of April the Confederate troops were still in the positions they had occupied after that battle, and

in which they had passed the remainder of the rainy season, sheltered by tents or wooden huts. Jackson's entire corps, which of itself constituted two-thirds of the army, since it comprised four divisions out of six, was located below Deep Run; Trimble's division, commanded by General Colston, at the extreme right near Skinker's Neck; that of Rodes, near Grace Church on the right bank of the Massaponax; that of A. P. Hill, at Hamilton's Crossing; and finally that of Early, near Bernard's Cabin. Lee's confidence in the strength of the works which had been erected above Fredericksburg was such that on the departure of Longstreet with a portion of his corps he had left the whole range of works under the charge of McLaws' single division, a brigade of which (that of Barksdale) occupied the town which it had so heroically defended against Burnside; the brigades of the other division of the First corps (that of Anderson) had been dispersed: we have seen that Mahone and Posey kept guard over United States Ford; Wright was in reserve at Massaponax Church, in the rear of Early; Perry and Wilcox occupied the north-western extremity of Marye's Heights, to the left of McLaws. This army numbered about fifty thousand infantry, three thousand cavalry, and five thousand artillery, with one hundred and seventy pieces of cannon. In the Confederate camps every one was enjoying the first balmy days of spring, which had at last succeeded the storms and freshets. A large number of officers—Jackson among the rest—who were never to behold their domestic hearths again, shared with their families the humble shelter of the soldier. But the very return of fine weather apprised them that these days of rest were numbered. On the morning of the 29th the news of the passage of the river had stirred the whole army. Lee hastened to concentrate his forces. Early deployed his division above Bernard's Cabin, while Wright placed himself in reserve near him—a position which he was soon to abandon, at first for the purpose of repairing to Marye's Heights, then to follow his division commander to Chancellorsville during the night. Jackson, on his side, had brought, since morning, Trimble's and Rodes' troops, west of the Massaponax, and massed them near Hamilton's Crossing, one in the front and the other in the rear of Hill's line, thus holding his



entire corps within reach of the two passes which the enemy had just opened. The day of the 30th passed without any hostile encounter between Sedgwick's and Jackson's troops, notwithstanding the short distance which separated them.

The Federals, conformably with the instructions received from Hooker, were waiting for a movement in retreat on the part of their adversaries in order to attack them, and were actually throwing up rough intrenchments around them for fear of being attacked in their turn, whilst Lee confined himself to the task of watching them in order to fathom the designs of the Union general. When he saw the day of the 30th passing away without any offensive demonstration on the part of the enemy, and was notified of the passage of the Rappahannock by Couch, which increased the enemy's forces concentrated in the Wilderness to four corps, he concluded that the greatest danger lay in that direction, and that the troops massed below Fredericksburg had but a secondary part to play in the plan of his adversary. He at once decided what course to pursue with that promptness which characterizes great warriors. Placed between the two wings of the Federal army, he could take advantage of this position to fight either one or the other while still adhering to his principle of dividing his army as little as possible. Sedgwick was the nearest to him, with forces inferior to his own, and he might have been tempted to inflict a severe lesson upon that general; but these forces, protected as they were by the batteries planted on the south side of the river, could easily have escaped him. Besides, if he had achieved a success in that direction, he could not, without danger, allow the right wing of the enemy time to take position in his rear in a menacing attitude. After consulting Jackson, in whose judgment he had the utmost confidence, he determined to march with all the forces at his disposal against the right wing, whose movements but a short time before had not appeared to disturb him in the least, and to slip away so quickly from Sedgwick that the latter would not have time to follow and harass his march. The necessary orders were given on the evening of the 30th. Early's division, Barksdale's brigade, and the reserve artillery were alone charged with holding the Federal left wing in check on the battlefield of December 13, and the rest of the



army started to meet the Federals on the road to the Wilderness. This movement only began during the night of April 30–May 1. We shall give a detailed account of it presently.

In the mean while the bold plan of General Hooker was being carried out with a precision which did equal honor to the chief and his subordinates. Couch, with Hancock's and French's two divisions of the Second corps, had on the evening of the 28th placed himself within reach of United States Ford, and on the 29th, at the news of the arrival of the heads of column of the right wing on the Rapidan, Hooker sent Couch an order to throw bridges over the river, which was not fordable, and to hold himself in readiness to cross it. On the 30th, being fully convinced that the great flank movement undertaken by his right had been successful, the general-in-chief prepared himself to take advantage of this favorable result. The passage of the Rappahannock at United States Ford was free; Meade, whose skirmishers had actually appeared on the right bank that day, having by his march obliged the enemy to abandon that side of the river, Couch was ordered to take possession and to assist Slocum in the forest. The labors of the pontonniers having been completed by two o'clock, the two divisions of the Second corps effected the passage before dark, and reached Chancellorsville at ten o'clock in the evening. The batteries of artillery and a considerable wagon-train, which Meade had left behind in order not to embarrass his march, crossed over in the wake of Couch. At the same time, while he was directing this movement, about noon on the 30th Hooker sent an order to Sickles to bring the Third corps, which had been kept in reserve until then, to Chancellorsville by way of United States Ford. It was found necessary to take up one of the two bridges at each of the crossings opened by Sedgwick over the Lower Rappahannock, and forward them to Sickles as far as the heights of Banks' Ford, in order to establish a connection between the two sides of the river as soon as the right wing should have reached that point. Sedgwick thus saw the wing which he commanded reduced to two corps only. New instructions from his chief, dated in the afternoon of the 30th, specified with more precision the part which had been assigned to him: he was not to attack the enemy except in the event of

the latter weakening some of his positions, which, when well defended, were impregnable, and against which all demonstration would be in vain. In this case his chief objective point was to be Bowling Green.

From the tenor of the instructions given to Couch and Sickles, Hooker was evidently preparing to concentrate, during the night of April 30–May 1, thirteen divisions—that is to say, about sixty-five thousand effective combatants—around Chancellorsville. The moment had arrived for him to assume the command of those troops in person: on the 30th, toward five o'clock in the evening, he arrived in their midst, full of confidence and hope. The soldiers, who had cheered him everywhere on his way, shared these sentiments. Acute observers, criticising severely those officers who exacted from them useless efforts or sacrifices, they had thoroughly appreciated the advantages which their chief had secured to them in crossing the Rappahannock and the Rapidan without striking a blow. This confidence on the part of the Federals was fully justified. The passage of these rivers, only one of which was scarcely fordable, by a whole army with its artillery, its trains, and eight days' provisions on the back of the soldier, had been accomplished at the precise hour fixed upon, without accident and without the loss of a single wagon, and so cleverly masked that Lee, notwithstanding his great vigilance, had not been able to offer any opposition. The game therefore seemed to be in the hands of the Federals; but it was not yet played out. Hooker, dazzled by this successful commencement, deemed the game almost won, and on starting for Chancellorsville he issued a general order to the army setting forth that the enemy would be compelled to fly in disgrace or to fight him on ground where certain destruction awaited him.\* As it will be seen, this excess of confidence proved to be his ruin. On his arrival at Chancellorsville he found Slocum there with the greater portion of the three corps that had crossed the Rapidan; Humphreys' division, forming the rear-guard, was to arrive on the morning of the following day, May 1; Couch was only a few miles distant from Chancellorsville, as he had reached that point on the 30th of April at ten o'clock in the evening, and the gen-

\* General Orders, No. 47, Head-quarters Army of the Potomac, April 30, 1863.—ED.

eral-in-chief must have known that Sickles was already on the march to join him. It was a beautiful evening, the moon being at her full; the enemy was too far away to admit of any fear of a night-attack with all its chances. A few miles from Chancellorsville, both on the right and the left of the two good roads leading to Fredericksburg, there stretched out two wide spaces of open country in which the Federal army could deploy at its ease and avail itself of the superiority of its artillery. Everything, therefore, tended to induce Hooker to come out of the dense forest in which his troops were massing, and without delay make a new movement in the direction of Banks' Ford, the possession of which would have made him master of the positions of Marye's Heights and placed him in direct communication with his left wing. Notwithstanding the urgent solicitations of General Pleasonton, who advised him to make a much bolder movement—that which Grant executed the following year, the march upon Spotsylvania Court-house—he decided not to put a single division on the march before the next day. While the Federal infantry was waiting for daylight among the dark thickets of the Wilderness without encountering any enemy except some trifling detachments, Pleasonton was endeavoring, so far as the small number of his mounted men allowed him, to clear the route along which he was anxious to see that infantry engaged. One of his regiments, the Sixth New York, emerging from the forest, was pushed ahead in the direction of Spotsylvania Court-house, where it was known that the Confederates had parked a large train. The moonlight enabled the cavalry to pick their way amid the tangled woods. While the Federals were exploring a cross-road which branches out from that of Spotsylvania at Piney Branch to connect with Todd's Tavern at the south-west, Stuart had reached the latter point, and, leaving Fitzhugh Lee with his brigade behind him, he plunged into the cross-road with only a few mounted men, in the hope of thus speedily reaching the Plank Road, and of arriving at Lee's head-quarters before daylight, not suspecting that the enemy might be found lurking in that direction. Suddenly he met a Federal detachment, and was only indebted for his safety to the swiftness of his horse. Fitzhugh Lee, on receiving an urgent



call for assistance from him, despatched the Second Virginia\* to his aid, whilst preparing to bring up the rest of the brigade in person. But the Federal scouts had also given the word of warning to the regiment whose route they were clearing. This was the Sixth New York, under Lieutenant-colonel Duncan McVicar, who was leading it back toward Chancellorsville by the same route he had followed a few hours before. The surprise of this officer was therefore equal to that of the Confederates. The latter were barring his retreat unknown to themselves. Without stopping to ascertain their numbers, this brave officer resolved to open a passage for himself through their ranks by main force, although he had but three or four hundred mounted men with him. He had just deployed them in an open space when the Virginians debouched from the woods. The Unionists received them with a murderous discharge of fire from the saddle, and immediately afterward rushed upon them with drawn sabres and routed them completely. The Confederates scattered in every direction, those who remained in the road being closely pursued by their adversaries, when, the two parties becoming somewhat mixed up, the fight was continued with side-arms at a gallop until the Second Virginia, coming at last to the assistance of their comrades, put a stop to the pursuit. The Unionists, momentarily carried away by their zeal, had also come to a stop, for they had gone beyond the line where it was intended to open a way. They could now reach Chancellorsville, but they had lost their commander, who was killed during the thickest of the affray.

The combat was a bloody one; indeed, the uncertain light of the moon, which rendered it impossible at times to distinguish friend from foe, but which nevertheless threw sufficient light upon men and horses to enable them to guide themselves, favored this skirmish, in which the Confederates sustained serious losses. They rallied around Lee's brigade, and in their turn even captured a few prisoners. But the scene in which they have just participated has made a strong impression upon them, and they have hardly started in the direction of Spotsylvania Court-house, by the route indicated by Stuart, in order to avoid another noc-

\* Stuart's report, May 8, 1863, says "Fifth Virginia Cavalry, Col. Tyler."—ED.



turnal encounter, when the cry, "The enemy is upon us!" started by the rear-guard, throws the whole column into a state of indescribable confusion. According to the narrative of an eye-witness, Major von Boreke, whom we have already quoted in this work, shots are fired at hazard in every direction. The First and Third Virginia, no longer recognizing each other, charge upon each other mutually. Stuart's mounted men, generally so brave and so steadfast, no longer obey the orders of their officers, and gallop off in great disorder. At last quiet is restored, when it is ascertained that all this confusion has been caused by some Federals who, carried away by their zeal, had lost themselves in the woods, and the brigade finally reaches Spotsylvania Court-house, firmly believing that it had escaped from the whole of Stoneman's cavalry. The latter was then very far away from that spot, at Culpeper Court-house, distributing to his officers the rôles he had assigned to them in the expedition of which he had charge, while the small band which had caused so much alarm to Stuart was quietly retiring to Chancellorsville.

The sun of the 1st of May, as it rose, seemed to invite Hooker to take advantage of the situation in which he had placed his army. The two roads leading from Chancellorsville to Fredericksburg, that which skirts the Rappahannock, and the cross-roads emerging from the forest into the plain, were free; he had only to give his army the signal for moving which all his lieutenants were awaiting with impatience. Couch had arrived, and Sickles was crossing the bridges at United States Ford. In consequence of a hesitation very difficult to explain this signal was long delayed. Hooker, after making such excellent combinations and carrying out so successfully the first part of the plan of his campaign, seemed to have forgotten that the point the possession of which was to decide the fate of the enemy's army was not to be found in the forest of the Wilderness, but on the heights of Salem Church, which command Banks' Ford. Instead of hastening to take possession of this point with that zeal which had animated him when, as a simple division commander, he led his soldiers against the enemy, one would have supposed that he desired to allow the latter sufficient time to come to attack him among the entangled masses of the copsewood, whose thickness

was so unfavorable to the largest army and the best provided with artillery. Having told Sedgwick, as he was about to start for Chancellorsville, that he would be on the heights situated west of Fredericksburg on the following day, and having caused two bridge-equipages to be brought in great haste in front of Banks' Ford for the purpose of opening that pass as soon as he should have reached Salem Church, he allowed the night to go by without making preparations for any movement on the following day, and only decided to give the necessary orders for resuming his march in the course of the morning. Whilst waiting for these orders the four corps gathered around him had settled as well as they could in the positions they had taken on their arrival, occupying as much as possible the open spaces they found in the forest. Meade near Chancellorsville, Slocum on the Fairview Heights, and Howard still farther west near Dowdall's Tavern, had brought together their artillery, their equipages, and all the troops they were able to place in line in the clearings which border the highway at those points. Couch had remained stationed on the road leading to United States Ford. These various chiefs had sent a few scouts to explore the forest in front of them; they had obstructed some of the roads by cutting down the trees, and they had established connections between the lines of their out-posts; but they had selected the camping-grounds for their troops solely in view of the night they intended to pass there, nothing being thought of except to prepare for the march of the following day.

The time lost, however, could yet be recovered: the enemy had not appeared, and in preparing his instructions Hooker was evidently preoccupied with the idea of taking the position in which he thought he might confidently wait for the enemy between Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg, outside of the forest and near Banks' Ford. He described this position in his instructions to his lieutenants, locating the centre at Tabernacle Church, the left between Mott's Run and Colin's Run, on the heights known as Smith's Hill, and the right near the unfinished railroad which skirts the Plank Road at the south. He directed them at the same time to occupy the place at two o'clock in the afternoon; and he felt so sure of catching his adversary unprepared that he

gave them no instructions against the contingency of their meeting the enemy before they had taken possession, although he was perfectly aware that Anderson had halted on this side of Tabernacle Church.

The Confederates, on the contrary, as we have stated, were on the march for the purpose of disputing with him the position which he was in so little hurry to occupy. Lee's situation was critical in the extreme, and he could only extricate himself from it through the rapidity and precision of his movements. McLaws, leaving Barksdale in the town of Fredericksburg, had started with his other three brigades in the direction of Chancellorsville at midnight. Wilcox and Perry, who were keeping watch on the Rappahannock, and who occupied the north-western extremity of Marye's Heights, did not follow this movement, either because Lee wished to keep them in their positions until relieved by Early, or that the absence of their division commander, Anderson, who was at Tabernacle Church, had delayed the forwarding of the instructions which were intended for them. Pendleton remained with the artillery reserve in order to fill the place left vacant by the infantry in the works. The three fine divisions which the commander of the Second corps brought with him numbered altogether about twenty-seven thousand men. Lee had allowed their chief to choose the hour of departure and the route he intended to follow, instructing him only to march upon the enemy in the direction of Chancellorsville, and to attack him wherever he might find him. Jackson did not wait for daylight, hoping thereby to hide his movement a little while longer from the enemy's troops in front of him. In the middle of the night, Early, leaving one brigade at Hamilton's Crossing to keep guard over the dépôts, deployed the other three along the long range of hills which extends from this point to Marye's Heights, merely occupying the principal works which lined their summits.

During this time the remainder of the Second corps had shouldered their knapsacks. Jackson directed in person the minutest details of this decisive movement. When everything was ready he was seen to enter his tent, the last he was destined to occupy, and kneel to offer a fervent prayer to the God of battles. A profound silence immediately ensued amid the busy crowd which



surrounded this venerated chief, and when he returned among his soldiers he appeared to be animated by a new zeal: it was difficult to identify this reticent and resolute general with the simple and modest man who for several months had been absorbed in the daily routine of cantonments. The first rays of light showed the long Confederate columns marching to reach, by way of circuitous paths out of sight of the enemy, the Plank Road, which was to lead them to Chancellorsville.

The heads of these columns, formed by Rodes' division, reached Tabernacle Church on the 1st of May, about eleven o'clock in the morning. Jackson, having preceded them, had reached the place as early as eight o'clock. He had found Anderson, with three of his brigades, occupied, since the previous evening, in erecting wooden bastions which extended nearly as far as the Rappahannock. These troops were very much fatigued, the men of Wright's brigade, in consequence of successive counter-orders, having been obliged to march a little over twenty-eight miles in the course of twenty-one hours. But McLaws, with his three brigades, had arrived just two hours before. Jackson, on taking command, deemed the reinforcement sufficient to march at once to meet the enemy. The moments were precious: he had only a few squads of Federal cavalry in front of him, and he hoped to encounter the Union columns before they had emerged from the defiles of the forest, in which their numerical superiority was useless to them. The defensive works were interrupted. Anderson took the Plank Road at the south with the two brigades of Wright and Posey, the first to the left, the second to the right, of the main road; he placed that of Mahone at the north, on the old road, called the Turnpike, and sent orders to Perry and Wilcox, who had remained near Fredericksburg, to come up in all haste. McLaws, placing his three brigades behind Mahone, had command of this portion of the line, which was formed by Kershaw on the left, Semmes in the centre, south of the turnpike, and by Wafford on the right, along the Mine Road, leading from Zoar Church to United States Ford. The whole line was in motion about eleven o'clock. Jackson's corps, whose heads of column reached Tabernacle Church at this moment, followed it at a certain distance.



Precisely at this hour the Federals were at last moving forward. Meade, with two divisions, had started by the River Road, which runs in the direction of Banks' Ford, by following the left bank of Mott's Run, through a long range of hills. Humphreys led the march, Griffin following him over the same route: Sykes, with the third division of the Fifth corps, took the Turnpike Road at the same time. On his right Slocum followed the Plank Road with the two divisions of the Twelfth corps: Hooker's instructions directed him to start early in order to enable the Eleventh corps, which was to follow him, time to deploy on his right as soon as its line of march had brought it near the turnpike. Couch sent French to occupy Todd's Tavern with one of his two divisions, in order to cover the army on the side of Spotsylvania Court-house. The second, under Hancock, was started on the Old Road about one o'clock, in order to support Sykes. Sickles, who had arrived from United States Ford with the Third corps, was ordered to remain massed back of Chancellorsville, along the road he had followed on his way up, and to send one brigade and a battery to relieve Howard's troops at Dowdall's Tavern: this brigade was to cover the army at the west, as French covered it at the south. But some of Hooker's orders reached their destination very late; the narrowness of the roads rendered the movements of the troops extremely slow and difficult, and, as they all intersected each other at Chancellorsville, this point was constantly blocked up; finally, the reserve batteries, which had been distributed among the various corps, increased the difficulties of the march. The result was that Hooker's instructions were very imperfectly carried out. Sykes, having a straight and easy road to follow, was the first to start; Slocum, being obliged to wait until the Chancellorsville pass was free, found himself delayed from the outset; Howard did not leave the position he had taken the day before near Dowdall's Tavern; while Sickles, whose heads of columns had reached headquarters at nine o'clock in the morning, was sent, about noon, with the largest portion of his corps to that part of the forest extending north-eastward of this point as far as the river, in order to cover the right of the Eleventh corps and the pass of United States Ford against an imaginary enemy whose presence had been sig-

nalled at the west. It was four o'clock when he was recalled from this position, which had been so uselessly assigned to him. Hooker was beginning to experience the difficulties which the density of the woods threw in the way of the movements of an army like that under his command: it would seem that this fact ought to have afforded him an additional reason for wishing to get out of the forest quickly.

Sykes' column thus found itself in advance of those on the right and on the left; and as Mahone, on the Confederate side, who was following in the centre the same route as himself, but in a contrary direction, had also placed himself in advance, it was between these two bodies of troops that the first encounter was to take place. The Federal mounted men fell back before Mahone, holding him in check as well as they could, but without being able seriously to impede his march. The road along which the combat was about to take place is bordered at the north by woods which cover the slopes of small ravines whose waters meet to form Mott's Run. These ravines, which the road crosses generally at a right angle, afford excellent defensive positions, but they can all be turned from the south side, where the country is considerably open. The principal hill between these ravines is that on which stands the Newton house, the first to be met after crossing the marshy stream called Big-Meadow Swamp, on the west side of which is the edge of the forest. Higher than all the surrounding hills, it commands both the clearings which border the road to Fredericksburg at the east and the plateau of Chancellorsville at the west; it extends northward as far as the hills crowned by the River Road, from which it is only separated by a small ravine, and southward to the ridge that the Plank Road follows, and which it strikes again at the Aldrich house, between the points where the road to Catharine Furnace and the road to Todd's Tavern connect with the Plank Road. Just as Mahone's soldiers were reaching the summit of this hill, Sykes' troops were ascending it from the opposite side. The latter belonged to the regular brigade that we have seen fighting so valiantly at Gaines' Mill the preceding year. Without allowing their adversaries time to take possession of it, they rush upon them and capture the position before they have been able to receive any reinforcement.

Sykes, seeing at the first glance the importance of this position, causes the rest of his division to advance at a rapid pace, and, deploying it across the road, takes possession of all the approaches to the hill on the side of Tabernacle Church. It is now about noon.

The Confederate generals have not been less prompt in recognizing the value of this position, and they are preparing to dispute its possession to the Federals with the utmost vigor. McLaws, soon arriving to support Mahone, places Wofford's brigade on the right, Semmes' on the left of Wofford, and next to it that of Kershaw. These four brigades form a much larger force than the Federal division, which, in order not to be outflanked on the right, is obliged to deploy a whole regiment as skirmishers.

The combat begins at first between the batteries of artillery, and soon after between the regular Federal brigade on one side and that of Semmes on the other. The Confederates press their adversaries by a very brisk fire, but they dare not attack them in full force, for they have seen Humphreys' battalions drawn up on the other side of Mott's Run, which threaten to outflank them in their turn; in fact, the Federals, having met no enemy on that side, have advanced within about two miles of Banks' Ford, the rapids of which they perceive from the heights of the hills they occupy. Wofford's brigade is placed in a triangular position in order to watch their movements, and soon after Perry, then Wilcox, coming from Falmouth, are ranged so as to prolong his line beyond the Mountain Road. Sykes, on his side, finding himself outflanked on the right, tries in vain to assist Slocum: his aides-de-camp are not even able to find the latter, the two roads lying considerably apart in this section of the country, and Kershaw's skirmishers having penetrated, by the head of the ravine, between Sykes' position and the Aldrich house, near which Slocum has encountered the Confederate brigades of Wright and Posey, the latter, who are following the Plank Road, the first on the left, the second on the right, become engaged in a pretty sharp fight with the Federals, but they soon find themselves hard pressed. Fortunately for them, Jackson, who directs their movements, has ordered Rodes' division, forming the first line of his corps, to follow them



closely. He immediately sends for two brigades of this division : that of Ramseur comes to take the place of Wright, while the latter general, supported by Doles, extends his lines to the left, beyond the unfinished railroad, in order to take the enemy in the rear. A third brigade, under Colquitt, is sent to the neighborhood of Duerson's Mill to reinforce the extreme right. The battle is about to become general. Jackson, who directs all the operations on the Confederate side, has McLaws' three brigades, the five brigades of Anderson, and two of Rodes in line, three other brigades of this division being kept in reserve, followed at a short distance by the six brigades of Hill ; the third division of the Second corps, under Colston, is yet very far away, and will not arrive before night. These nineteen brigades, with their artillery, represent a force of about thirty-seven thousand men. The Federals could readily bring into line a larger number of combatants. Hancock has come to take a place in the rear of Sykes, and is ready to support him. Howard has but a very short distance to march to join Slocum. Without counting the Third corps, the Unionists can oppose the Confederates with nine divisions, which, with their artillery, cannot number less than forty-five thousand men. The position they occupy, both in the centre and on the right, is easily defended ; their artillery sweeps the roads followed by the enemy, while Meade, who is advancing on the left, menaces him seriously.

The Federal generals were preparing to maintain the struggle when they suddenly received an order to fall back, each on the position he had quitted in the morning. Most of them would not believe at first that such an order had been issued : no one could understand that Hooker, shut up in the solitary house\* which gives to the locality the name of Chancellorsville, would voluntarily abandon all the outlets of the forest, without even coming to reconnoitre the ground, in order to allow himself to be invested therein : Couch himself, a cold and reserved man, little disposed to assume any responsibility, implored his chief to recall such fatal instructions. It was all in vain : the general was determined. The soldiers shared the astonishment of their leaders when they saw that, after the first engagements of this offensive campaign,

\* Chancellor's.—ED.



they were being brought back into the dismal forest from which they had believed themselves so happily rid, and the confidence which had animated them since the passage of the Rappahannock was considerably shaken.

The retreat of the Federals, however, was not seriously disturbed. Sykes alone had some trouble in getting away from the enemy, who, believing it a flight instead of a deliberate movement, was pressing him very closely. Everywhere else the Confederates contented themselves with following their adversaries step by step. The right, with the exception of Wilcox's brigade, which remained stationary at Duerson's Mill, crossed Mott's Run and occupied the Chancellorsville Road at Banks' Ford; the centre, after having reached the position abandoned by Slocum, and planted its batteries there, marched down as far as Big-Meadow Swamp; finally, three brigades of Hill's division, having crossed over to the first line, pushed their skirmishers within sight of Chancellorsville, and before night they were able to distinguish the front lines of Hancock's division. The left easily took possession of the Furnace Road, while Ramseur and Posey followed Slocum as far as the forest. Doles arrived at Todd's Tavern, which French had not been able to approach, while Wright, skirting Lewis' Creek, reached Catharine Furnace, where he found Stuart and his mounted men, who had never ceased to watch the Federals on that side. Lewis' Creek is a stream which flows southward toward the river Ny across a large portion of the forest, at the bottom of a ravine bordering the extremities of the hills of Dowdall's Tavern and Fairview: this ravine, less wooded than the neighboring localities, opens a kind of passage leading into the Wilderness. Stuart and Wright determined to follow it in order to ascertain the positions of the Federals on these hills, and to support the infantry which was climbing up their sides across the woods. They endeavored to plant some pieces of cannon upon a height fronting that occupied by the enemy, but the Federal artillery received them at once with such a vigorous fire that they were obliged to fall back in great haste, after having sustained very serious losses. During this time two of Stuart's regiments, at the extreme right of the Confederates, completed the investment of the Federals by posting themselves above the River Road, so as to intercept their commu-

nications with Banks' Ford through the right bank of the river, and to watch their movements if they attempted to emerge from the forest at that point. This, however, was unnecessary trouble, for on that side also the Fifth corps, by Hooker's orders, was only thinking of strengthening itself. At this juncture night supervened, and the soldiers of both armies remained in the positions in which it had found them.

Hooker assembled his generals around him in the Chancellor house. He had not a moment to lose in order to decide what he should do on the following day. The 1st of May, which might have produced decisive results in his favor, was lost through the order to retreat which he had so unfortunately issued. His most tried friends, those who had always found him so earnest in battle—and the author thinks he may count himself among the number—have never been able to understand the motives which prompted that fatal order. He has since alleged that, finding his troops attacked before they had entirely emerged from the forest, he had feared that they would not have time to get through the defiles in which they were entangled, and that they might be beaten in detail before they had been able to deploy themselves. This reasoning is not sustained by subsequent investigation, for the positions which the troops occupied when he called them back were infinitely stronger and more easily defended than those which he assigned to them in the evening. It is to be supposed that, surprised at meeting the enemy sooner than he had anticipated, he fancied that the latter was trying to conceal the abandonment of Fredericksburg and his retreat upon Gordonsville, and that, suddenly changing all his plans, he determined to remain in the forest in order to compel him to come to meet him, or to be on his flank if his line of retreat should become defined. Since his arrival at Chancellorsville he appeared to be impressed with the idea that Lee had no other alternative but to retreat. We shall see the fatal results of this blunder. He rejected the proposition of General Warren of the Engineer corps, who urged him to take again, with all his forces, the route followed by Meade, in order to reach the Banks' Ford pass, by menacing the right flank of the enemy, and he even gave orders to close up the front lines formed by his troops in order to render its defence more easy.

But, fearing to discourage them by a new retrograde movement, he subsequently countermanded this order, and each division remained stationary, strengthening the ground it occupied by means of abatis. He definitely gave up the offensive, thus abandoning all the great advantages he had obtained by the successful manœuvres of the preceding days. The positions of the Federal army were indeed very bad: they had been selected in haste and in the dark; they had neither perspective nor eminence; some of them were commanded by neighboring heights; they were all surrounded by thickets which did not allow the soldiers either to move back of their lines or to perceive the approach of an enemy; in short, there was no advantageous connection between them. It would have been better for Hooker, since he insisted upon fighting in the forest, not to have come out of it, and to have employed the 1st of May, which he had wasted in fruitless manœuvring, in rectifying his positions. Howard, at Dowdall's Tavern, which he had not left, formed the extreme right; Slocum was in the centre at Fairview and Chancellorsville; Sickles came to place himself between them in order to reinforce them, Birney's division occupying the front line, the two others being kept in reserve; Hancock took position on the left of Slocum on the turnpike, in advance of the other division of the Second corps, that of French, which remained massed near Chancellorsville, as well as that of Sykes; Meade formed the left, along the River Road, with Humphreys' and Griffin's divisions.

In thus persisting in defending the approaches to Chancellorsville, Hooker might still have preserved the advantage of the offensive by resuming that attitude at some other point, and by shifting the place of attack from his right to his left wing. It would have been sufficient for him to have sent one of the army corps which was blocked up in the forest to Sedgwick, with such a reinforcement that the latter could have swept Early before him and fallen upon Lee's rear.

But such was not the plan of the Union general, who desired to fight a decisive battle with the greatest possible number of troops in the positions occupied by the bulk of his army on the evening of the 1st of May. At two o'clock in the morning, therefore, he sent an order to Reynolds directing him to bring up



the whole of the First corps by way of United States Ford, while the instructions forwarded to Sedgwick directed that general to make a demonstration against the enemy's positions on the 2d of May at one o'clock in the afternoon, without, however, running the risk of a serious attack, such demonstration to be confined to the Bowling Green road. This last recommendation, upon which Hooker laid particular stress, showed that he was not then contemplating making Sedgwick play an active part in the battle he was preparing to deliver around Chancellorsville. It was at this place, however, that the fate of the campaign was to be decided.

While the Federals were thus falling into these positions, Lee had once more joined Jackson, and Colston's division was within supporting distance of the troops which had just invested the Federals in the forest. Notwithstanding the unhoped-for advantage it had just obtained, the Confederate army was in a critical condition. Lee had about forty-five thousand men with him—that is to say, four-fifths of his forces—but he had only been able to effect this rapid concentration by leaving but a small body of troops in his works before Fredericksburg, too weak to defend them against the vigorous attacks of an enemy. It was therefore necessary to act promptly, lest the enemy's left wing, by driving Early's division before it, might succeed in effecting that junction on the field of battle which he was anxious to prevent. But the manœuvre was difficult and hazardous. His adversary, numerically much stronger than himself, was posted in a dense forest, all the approaches of which he had blocked, and the roads of which, surrounded by impenetrable thickets, were commanded at every turn by his powerful artillery. To attack him in front in these positions would have been taking the bull by the horns, and using up his army in bloody struggles against an adversary who was able to bring fresh combatants into the field much oftener than he could. Whilst seated around a large camp-fire, Jackson and himself anxiously discussing the plans of attack for the following day, Stuart, who had never ceased to watch the enemy's positions on every side, came to inform Lee that the right wing of the Unionists at Dowdall's Tavern was unsupported, and that he felt sure that some byways must lead to this point across the forest.



Jackson's genius then conceived the most brilliant idea that had ever emanated from him during his whole career, and he proposed to his chief to make a great flank movement around the enemy's army, so as to strike it where an attack was least expected. A bolder plan could not have been conceived; for, after leaving a little more than one division ten miles behind him at Fredericksburg, a considerable detachment had yet to be set apart in order to occupy Hooker's attention along the roads in the vicinity of which there had been any fighting, and to go afterward to take position on the opposite side, thus giving him a chance to divide the army into three sections unable to effect a junction. Such a manœuvre would have been fatal in the presence of an active and vigilant adversary; but Lee understood that Hooker, by going back into the forest, had doomed himself to powerless immobility, and that the curtain of woods in which he had wrapped himself permitted the assailant to venture upon a manœuvre which it would have been impossible to execute in any other locality. However rash Jackson's plan might appear, it was the only one that offered any positive chances of success; nor did it compromise the safest line of retreat, which was upon Gordonsville. Lee, in adopting it, assigned the most perilous part of this plan to his lieutenant. This, however, was not the most difficult, for by allowing him to take away his whole army corps he assumed the responsibility of holding Hooker in check with only seven brigades, four belonging to Anderson and three to McLaws: Anderson's fifth brigade, under Wilcox, had been sent back to Banks' Ford to defend that important pass.

Jackson immediately gave orders for marching. His three divisions were to start at daybreak, for he could not think of taking his soldiers through the labyrinthine pathways of the forest in the night, and it was moreover necessary to allow them time to recuperate their strength before undertaking a march the success of which depended on their activity and speed. He found a guide who undertook to lead them through byways as far as the Brock Road, which, coming from the south, connects successively with the Plank Road and the turnpike two miles and two-thirds west of Wilderness Tavern, where the extreme right wing of the Federals terminated.

The Confederate line, as we have seen, extended to the River Road on the right, facing the Fifth corps, but the infantry on that side did not reach beyond Mott's Run. McLaws' division and two of Anderson's brigades were stationed north of the Old Road, occupying indeed the same ground which had been abandoned by Sykes. Anderson's two other brigades, those of Posey and Wright, had dislodged the Federal skirmishers during the night from the marshy ravine called the Big-Meadow Swamp, and had only stopped when in sight of the abatis behind which the enemy was posted. Hill occupied, as far as the Furnace on the left, the hill which commands the old smelting-works. Jackson's two other divisions were massed on the Plank Road in the rear. The latter put his troops in motion at early dawn. The cavalry, under Stuart, took the lead in order to clear the way and to mask this movement by keeping any of the enemy's squads, which might have watched him, at a distance—an important task, which was performed with great ability, as it would have been sufficient for any of the Federal mounted men to have met the Confederate battalions to give the alarm to Hooker. Rodes placed himself at the head of this long column, which descended by a single road toward the Furnace; Colston followed him; whilst Hill remained deployed in order to conceal the passage of this division behind the positions he occupied. When he took up the line of march in his turn, he left Posey and Wright in charge of them. Having reached the Furnace, Jackson took the Furnace Road, which winds along the stream called Lewis' Creek, then runs south-westward to connect with the Brock Road a mile and a half from Todd's Tavern. He was thus turning his back completely upon the enemy in that part of the road which was the most exposed to observation.

Fearing, above all, to get too near the Federals before he had completed this flank movement, he decided not to take the Brock Road, which would have brought him near Wilderness Church, and, pushing still farther west in order to extend the circle he was describing, he selected the road which passes near the Stephens' and the Trigg's houses. It was then only that, making his head of column take a circuitous turn, he directed it northward. While Stuart was galloping in front through deserted roads,

Jackson, absorbed by the idea of the great blow he was going to strike, was silently leading his battalions on the march. This column was assuming singularly lengthy proportions. It was a rare thing, even in America, to see a body of thirty thousand men, with its artillery, its ammunition, and its ambulances, passing over a solitary cross-road which could be quickly broken up, and which was almost invariably bordered by copsewood of such thickness that it was impossible to step alongside of it. The Second corps was stretched out for the distance at least of three or four miles, notwithstanding the zeal with which the soldiers hurried forward and assisted in extricating the wagons that were from time to time buried in the mud.

In the mean while, a strange calm seemed to pervade the two armies lying in ambush in front of each other, and which were nearly in close contact without perceiving it, such was the density of the woods that separated them. In order to fathom its depths, some daring men belonging to Colonel de Trobriand's regiment,\* as he himself tells us, were perched upon the tallest trees of the forest; they could be seen balancing themselves on the waving branches, which they caused to oscillate violently in order to distract the aim of the enemy's skirmishers, whose bullets whistled in their ears.

Lee, while watching his adversary closely in order to follow the least of his movements, took every care not to provoke an encounter so long as the manœuvre of his lieutenant was not completed. Jackson's cannon were to give him the signal of the assault he intended to make upon Hooker's positions in order to prevent him from reinforcing his right wing at the critical moment. The Union general, on his side, was calmly and confidently waiting for the attack in front which he believed to be the only alternative of the Confederates, to be followed by a disastrous retreat. His soldiers were at work strengthening their positions in view of this attack by means of abatis and parapets for the artillery, which was posted on the roads. The officers felt uneasy at the apparent immobility of an enemy whose great activity was known to them from experience.

\* Thirty-eighth New York.—Ed.

Hooker himself, astonished at this pause, paid an early visit to his centre and his right wing, and on his return to head-quarters he ordered Generals Slocum and Howard to make preparations of a defensive character in case the enemy should make a flank attack; he especially enjoined the commander of the Eleventh corps to fortify his right and to cover it more completely, as his position appeared to him to be weak, while the enemy seemed disposed to strike in that direction. These instructions, which were certainly very vague, had scarcely been issued when the apprehensions of the general-in-chief regarding his right wing were set at rest by an incident which should, on the contrary, have confirmed them and put him on his guard. The outposts of Birney's division, which occupied a height commanding the small valley of Lewis' Creek between Howard and Slocum, had noticed, about nine o'clock in the morning, Jackson's column ascending the opposite slopes on the other side of the Furnace. A battery of artillery had immediately opened fire upon these troops and thrown a few shells into their midst. It was the first division, commanded by Rodes: the latter, on finding himself discovered, left one regiment, the Twenty-third Georgia, at the junction of the road which runs from Dowdall's Tavern to the Furnace, in order to protect the flank of the column against any attacks which might be made from that direction, and continued his march; the troops that followed him made a slightly circuitous turn, so as to avoid the point exposed to the enemy's fire. Hooker was informed that some of the enemy's battalions, followed by wagons and artillery, had been seen marching southward. Nothing more was wanting to convince him that Lee was falling back upon Orange Court-house, and that the enemy's whole army was only trying to escape from him—a fatal error, showing how little he understood the character of his adversaries. Sickles hastened from head-quarters for the purpose of starting with his whole corps and Pleasonton's cavalry in pursuit of the enemy's column, which had been signalled; but considerable time was lost before the two divisions of Berry and Whipple had fallen into position in the rear of Birney, and before the latter had himself been able to cross the woods which separated him from the little valley of Lewis' Creek. It was near two o'clock when the



Federals debouched upon the Furnace. The whole of Jackson's corps had already passed, the artillery of Hill's division was within a short distance, but the trains of this division had not yet crossed the junction, in front of which was posted the Twenty-third Georgia. This regiment resisted for some time Birney's vigorous attack, thus enabling the wagons to escape from the enemy under the protection of a battery from Hill's artillery, which had turned back at the sound of musketry. But soon after the Georgia soldiers, finding themselves surrounded by superior forces, were obliged to surrender, to the number of about five hundred.

After this success Sickles brought his first line to a halt in order to wait for the remainder of his corps, which had not been able to join him. This time Hooker entertained no further doubt than that the Confederate army was in full retreat; and the long train, accompanied by artillery, proceeding in a southerly direction, that rear-guard which had allowed itself to be crushed in its effort to protect it,—all appearances, in short, it must be acknowledged, justified such an opinion. He thought of nothing else than to pursue the enemy. Howard was ordered to send one brigade to support Sickles' right, and Slocum, who was stationed to the left of the latter, was also directed to push forward a brigade along the Plank Road in order to feel the strength of the Confederates on that side. Finally, new instructions were forwarded to Sedgwick. Hooker, in announcing to him that the enemy had taken flight and was only anxious to save his trains, directed him to pursue the flying column vigorously after having taken possession of Fredericksburg. Jackson's column, however, could not allow Sickles to advance in pursuit of it without trying to bar his passage. Hill's last two brigades, under Archer and Thomas, were brought back and took a position along the unfinished railway, two-thirds of a mile south of the Furnace—one in which they were not attacked, and where they remained until dark. Elsewhere, Posey's troops, which had occupied the heights situated east of the Furnace since Hill's departure, and had not come down to take part in the conflict in which the Twenty-third Georgia had succumbed, found themselves in their turn engaged with Birney's soldiers, a few stray shots from skirmishers having

at last culminated into a real battle. Anderson, on seeing Posey hard pressed, detached three regiments of Wright's brigade, which was stationed on his right, and sent them to his assistance; the fourth was about to follow them when it was attacked in its turn by the brigade which Slocum had sent on a reconnoitring expedition along the Plank Road. This reconnoissance was so feebly conducted that the Confederates easily put a stop to it, notwithstanding their small number, while Sickles, no longer seeing the enemy on the road leading south, but finding him, on the contrary, on the left, did not press Wright and Posey very hard. These two brigades alone thus succeeded during several hours in defending the central positions of the Southern army, which a vigorous blow would certainly have captured. This blow might have been decisive if dealt at the time when Jackson was still lost in the Wilderness. The Federals failed to take advantage of the passing opportunity, and it soon became too late.

Jackson was, in fact, hastening the movements of his column, and about three o'clock he reached the Orange Plank Road, which he intended to follow in order to strike the right flank of the enemy. Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry occupied at a distance in front and on the flanks all the passes by which the skirmishers of the Unionists could have approached the infantry. Jackson, following in their wake, advanced as far as an elevated piece of ground, whence through the trees he could perceive the encampments of the Eleventh corps, located on the plateau of Dowdall's Tavern, and extending westwardly along the Old Road beyond the Taylor farm. Like the watchful hunter, who, on suddenly discovering the game he has long been in pursuit of, looks at it and rejoices at the chance which brings the unsuspecting animal within his reach, Jackson was astonished and charmed when, on reaching that spot with only a few mounted men, he was enabled at once to contemplate at leisure the rich prey upon which he was about to hurl his legions. No one in the Federal camp seemed to have any suspicion of the approach of danger. The simplest precautions required by an army situated in the midst of a dense forest had been neglected. Hooker, by dint of concentrating his cavalry, had left but thirty-five men to clear the Eleventh corps, whereas it would have required at least a whole brigade to scour

the surrounding woods far and near, so as to prevent any surprise. Moreover, as we have stated, Barlow, in going to Sickles' assistance, had reduced Howard's forces to five brigades. In order to defend a position so extended as that he was obliged to guard, he had placed Buschbeck's brigade at Dowdall's Tavern; Schurz's division was deployed more to the westward, also facing south, to the right and left of the church of the Wilderness. The extremity of the line, over the fields of the Taylor farm, was occupied by Devens' division, which fronted two ways, McLean's brigade prolonging that of Schurz, while the largest portion of the brigade of Gilsa was drawn up triangularly in a perpendicular line with the Old Road and facing west. Earthworks covered Howard on the south side, but his right wing was entirely exposed and without protection, the brigade of Gilsa having been obliged, before it could think of reducing its own strength, to clear a space in the dense forest for the purpose of connecting the western extremity of the Taylor farm-lands with the Hawkins clearing. This gap, which was necessary for locating his encampments, was too narrow to shelter him from any surprise. Devens had planted on the Old Road or turnpike the only battery he had with him, two pieces of cannon facing west, and four facing south; he had been able to place but two regiments in reserve, all the rest of his division, which scarcely numbered four thousand men, having been deployed on a single line.

By a kind of fatality a reconnoissance made by one of Schurz's regiments in the direction of the Brock Road had advanced as far as the Carpenter farm, only about two-thirds of a mile from the enemy's column, and, returning without having seen them, had imparted a dangerous sense of security to the commanders of the right wing. This security was not, however, fully justified, for since ten o'clock in the morning Lee's mounted men, with a view of reconnoitring the ground, had exchanged some musket-shots with Howard's outposts, to whom these demonstrations should have been a warning; Jackson's passage above the Furnace had been noticed by the Federals; in short, toward three o'clock two soldiers who had been sent out as scouts came to inform General Devens that the enemy was massing on his right—a valuable piece of information, which, unfortunately for him, he merely



forwarded to his chief while waiting for orders which did not reach him in time.

At one glance Jackson saw that the Orange Plank Road would lead him to the front and not to the flank of the Eleventh Federal corps, and, leaving his old brigade, known as the "Stonewall Brigade," then commanded by Paxton, on this road, near the Wolfrey farm, all the rest of his corps were ordered to continue marching northward until the turnpike was reached. Toward four o'clock, after a march of nearly ten miles more, Rodes\* reached the turnpike, and followed it in an easterly direction as far as three hundred yards beyond the Luckett house, so as to leave sufficient room for the other divisions. Four of his brigades were deployed on both sides of this road: his own, under Colonel O'Neal, then Iverson's brigade to the left, Doles, and next to him Colquitt, on the right, Ramseur, with the fifth, remaining in rear, so as to fill up on the right the front of Trimble's division, which Paxton's absence had reduced to three brigades. This division, commanded by Colston, followed close upon the first, and soon fell in position behind it; Jones' brigade, then Nicholls', north of the road, and that of Colston south of it, supporting its right on the left of Ramseur.

It was not an easy matter to form a continuous front across the copsewood, in which a single man would often find it difficult to clear a passage for himself, and the very density of which seemed to afford protection to the Federals; so that the manner in which Jackson's soldiers succeeded in preserving their order of march in the midst of such obstacles is a remarkable and exceptional fact, even in America. The two lines, separated only by an interval of two hundred yards, occupied each a front of from one and seven-eighths to two and one-sixth miles, each line being from six to seven thousand men strong, in two ranks; this arrangement afforded a space of little more than three feet to each man. This was absolutely necessary to enable each individual to move between the trees without incommoding his neighbor too much; the skirmishers were posted at four hundred yards in advance of the first

\* Rodes had not been definitely replaced in command of this brigade, D. H. Hill being still the nominal chief of the division of which he was temporarily in command.



line. Finally, the regiment which formed the extremity of this line on the left could not be refused, so as to cover this extremity, and was obliged to march in column by flank. Every man took his position in silence, orders were transmitted in a low voice, the bugles were still, the soldiers did not salute Jackson with those cheers which ordinarily were wont to announce his approach from a distance ; for the enemy must not be alarmed. The two divisions were to follow each other closely, preserving as much as possible a direction perpendicular to the road, the second ready to sustain the first as soon as the combat had commenced. It was impossible to give other instructions to the generals and colonels, who, once engaged in the fight, would be out of the way of Jackson's immediate supervision, or even that of his division commanders. Time was pressing, for the sun was sinking below the horizon, and it was essential to take advantage of the last moments of daylight in order to strike a decisive blow, at the risk of losing all the benefits of the great movement which the Second corps had just executed.

At a quarter-past five o'clock, Hill's first two brigades, under Pender and Heth, came up to form a portion of the first line to the left of the road ; Archer and Thomas having remained near the Furnace, Hill had only two other brigades under his control, those of Lane and McGowan. Leaving them instructions to follow him by column, and planting two pieces of cannon in the centre of the first line on the road, the narrowness of which did not permit a larger number to be placed in position, Jackson gave at last the signal so impatiently waited for by his soldiers. It was a solemn moment. While the Confederates were advancing with difficulty across the forest the small Federal division which was about to receive the shock of more than one half of the enemy's army was quietly preparing for the evening meal. The arms were stacked, the soldiers seated about their camp-fires among the horses and mules that were feeding around them. The first indication of danger was the sudden appearance of wild game, which Jackson's soldiers were driving before them in this novel kind of hunt. The deer and wild-turkeys, the sole inhabitants of this sylvan region, burst upon the Federal lines in great fright before any sound had as yet announced the approach of the enemy,

like those leaves which, driven by the wind, precede the storm from afar while the sky is still cloudless and serene.

A few musket-shots are soon heard along the road, and before Gilsa's brigade has had time to seize its arms the sentinels and pickets, followed closely by the Confederates, are seen rushing in. Jackson's battalions, without losing their order of battle, have traversed sixteen or eighteen hundred yards of a wood of such density that they emerge from it with their clothes torn to tatters; joining their skirmishers, they rush at once upon all the points of the line occupied by the brigade of Gilsa. The Federals defend themselves as well as they can, but individual prowess cannot check the impetus of O'Neal's and Doles' brigades, which surround them on all sides: the former, getting over the abatis, is already advancing in the midst of Gilsa's bivouacs for the purpose of attacking the works occupied by McLean's brigade on the farm in the rear; the latter has taken possession of two pieces of cannon which had been pointed by Devens on the road, and, soon after, of the remainder of the battery. Before McLean has been able to form his troops into line the Federal fugitives and the Confederates arrive in their midst almost at the same time; the intrenchments are attacked in the rear; the commanders, isolated like their soldiers, can neither guide nor rally them. The Federals, however, do not yield their ground without fighting; musket-shots are fired in every direction, hitting the victims at short range; but the surprise has been too complete to admit of any remedy. In less than a quarter of an hour sixteen hundred men, out of four thousand of which Devens' division was composed, have either been captured or placed *hors de combat*; nearly all the superior officers are wounded. The remainder precipitate themselves in great confusion, with the wagons, the ambulances, and a large number of unharnessed horses, along the road in the direction of the church of the Wilderness. The position of Talley farm is in the hands of Doles and O'Neal, who alone have participated in the fight; for Iverson, on the left, has not encountered the Federals, while Colquitt, on the right, has remained in the rear in order to keep an imaginary enemy in check.

Without waiting a moment's time, the Confederates continue their march in the direction of Chancellorsville; the encampments

which extend to the right and left of the road, west of the church of the Wilderness, enable them to form again their line and to preserve it while marching in order of battle. It is beyond this church that the commanding position of Dowdall's Tavern stands—a position which it is important to carry speedily, for it is defended by a line of earthworks constructed across the road, which cannot be turned like those of the Talley farm. Schurz's division, which occupies this position, does not number more than three thousand combatants. At the sound of cannon it has taken up arms and is hastening to change front by facing west; but it has scarcely fallen into line when the horde of fugitives rushes into its ranks, carrying confusion and disaster everywhere. In the mean time, the first brigade, under Schimmelpfennig, abandoning its encampments, succeeds in forming into line behind the works before the enemy has been able to reach them. On the side of the Confederates the two wings are still in the rear, but the centre hurries forward, keeping in the direction of the road. Jackson, in the midst of his soldiers, does not cease to urge them on by both words and gestures, imparting to them the ardor that is burning within him at this decisive moment—sometimes extending the left arm, according to a singular habit of his, at other times raising his eyes heavenward as if absorbed in a short prayer. When about to approach the new position of the Unionists he causes the second line to close upon the first, the former having already recovered nearly all the distance which separated them. The centre of the two lines becomes thus mixed up, and for the future forms but a single mass of four brigades, which, supported by the artillery-fire from the road, charges the positions defended by Schimmelpfennig. After a short resistance this small band is crushed, and its *débris* are carried off by the weight of the assailants. The remainder of Schurz's division shares the fate of this rout; his five pieces of cannon, which have been served to the very last moment, are in possession of the enemy.

A little farther on, along the edge of the wood which faces south, are the bivouacs of Howard's third division, under Steinwehr; but Barlow having gone to the assistance of Sickles near the Welford Furnace with one of his two brigades, there is only one left to occupy this position. Buschbeck, who commands



it, has had time to make preparations. After having vainly attempted to check the flight of the fugitives, he has drawn up his soldiers along the edges of the wood, resting on each side of the road. Howard and Steinwehr, who had accompanied Barlow, have joined him at a gallop, for the purpose of making an effort to repair the disaster. These chiefs excel themselves and rival their adversaries in courage: some pieces of cannon are placed in position, a few groups of soldiers are formed again into line around Buschbeck's brigade, and for the first time the Confederate battalions are brought to a stand. Jackson at the present moment has only the four brigades of the centre with him, which, having alone participated in the fight until now, are beginning to weaken, but his example and intrepidity sustain the courage of the soldiers and revive their strength; to all those who ask him for instructions he simply replies, "Forward! forward!" The Federals are driven back, while the Confederates, following in pursuit, penetrate into the wood with which the road is again bordered on both sides. Howard tries in vain to rally his soldiers; the artillerists, abandoned by the infantry, allow themselves to be slain by the side of their guns to no purpose; the crowd of fugitives is already ascending the heights of Fairview, passing between the broken or mud-imbedded wagons which encumber the road. In less than one hour Jackson has annihilated the Eleventh corps, captured positions which Hooker had deemed impregnable, and completely turned the right flank of the Federal army. Upon whom does the responsibility of the disaster to the Eleventh corps rest? It appears to us that it rests as much upon the general who failed to discover the flank movement of the enemy as upon the commanders of this corps, who have allowed themselves to be taken in the rear under the most unfavorable circumstances.

In the mean time, the alarm has been sounded at Chancellorsville, and Howard, while looking out for Barlow, who, unfortunately, cannot arrive in time to aid him, has warned Sickles of the danger which threatens the whole army. The position of the Third corps is peculiarly a dangerous one, because, having advanced as far as the Furnace, it is now menaced with the prospect of seeing Jackson occupy in front of it the positions commanding Lewis'



Creek, which it has just left, and cut off its retreat upon Chancellorsville.

At the first news of Howard's defeat Hooker has left the latter point with Sickles' third division under Berry, and Hays' brigade of the Second corps, which were stationed in the vicinity of his head-quarters, in order to hasten to meet the enemy. He has hardly proceeded a few rods when he meets the fugitives, who are already swarming upon the plateau of Chancellorsville. The open space in the centre of this plateau around the various roads which intersect each other at this place only contains from fifty to sixty acres. It is encumbered with cannons, caissons, wagons loaded with provisions or ammunition, ambulances, and vehicles of every description, which it has been found necessary to heap up within this narrow space for want of ability to park them elsewhere. This clearing is nevertheless the only point at which the troops occupying the woods east, south, and west can be rallied and formed into line—the only pass, in fact, affording means of communication between the different sections of the army. If any confusion occurs among these vehicles, that army would be paralyzed. Such is the fatal and inevitable consequence of the error committed by Hooker by remaining in the centre of the forest. Sickles, on his side, hastens to bring back his two divisions and Barlow's brigade toward the positions he had quitted a few hours before, and near which he has left the greatest portion of his artillery.

But Jackson has the start of him—an advantage of which he cannot fail to avail himself. He has reached the point where the road called the Mineral Springs Road, which leads to United States Ford by passing north of Chancellorsville, connects with the turn-pike on the left. A portion of the fugitives, whom the instinct of self-preservation is driving toward the river, has taken this road; by following it the Confederates can turn all Hooker's positions. Jackson is aware of its importance, and during the action he conceives, it is said, the bold project of outflanking the Federals by that route, so as to take them thus between two fires by cutting off their retreat. For the time being, however, he cannot alter the line of march in the direction of Chancellorsville which he has indicated to his troops, for the battle has mixed up regiments, brigades, and divisions, while the darkness which is beginning to

- hover over the battlefield, no longer allows him time to halt for the purpose of re-forming their lines. Some abatis which had been erected at the junction of the roads have fallen into his hands, together with several pieces of cannon belonging to Sickles' corps. The Confederate line continues to advance across the wood, and arrives at last at the entrance of the clearing which extends as far as Chancellorsville. The clearing is intersected on that side by a strong stone wall. After passing this wall the road reaches a ridge commanding an extensive view north, east, and south, the slopes of which, facing those of the Fairview Hill, are separated by a tributary of Lewis' Creek. The road winds down these slopes, then ascends to the plateau of Chancellorsville by passing north of Fairview. Neither Hooker, who is following the road, nor Sickles, who is reascending from the depths of Hazel Grove, will arrive in time to dispute the possession of the ridge to the Confederates.

Fortunately, a man of great energy and determination has taken the advance of them. General Pleasonton had been sent with his brigade of cavalry to assist Sickles in pursuing the enemy, who had been met near the Furnace; but Sickles having come to a halt and the forest presenting obstacles against any movements of cavalry, Pleasonton had left him one regiment and taken position along the slopes commanding Hazel Grove with the other two and his battery of light artillery. It was there that a message from Howard brought him information of the rout of the Eleventh corps, asking him for immediate aid. Understanding at once the danger which threatens the whole army, he starts the Eighth Pennsylvania at a gallop by the way of a wood-road leading back of Dowdall's Tavern, with instructions to rush upon the road among the enemy's battalions in order to hold them in check at any cost until he has been able, with the aid of the Seventeenth Pennsylvania, to take his battery over that same road and place it in position a little in the rear. Major Huey bravely executes this order. Rushing through the woods, already filled with Confederate infantry, he falls suddenly upon the centre of Rodes' line. About thirty of his men, Major Keenan among the rest, are stricken down, never more to rise. More than eighty horses are wounded, and one half of the regiment is thus dis-

abled;\* but when the Confederates, staggered for a time by this unexpected shock, are at last emerging from the wood, they are received by a fire of grapeshot from the twenty-two pieces of cannon, most of them belonging to the Third corps, which Pleasonton has thus secured time to get together and turn against them. The first discharge dismounts the only two pieces of cannon that the Confederates had brought with them, and wounds nearly all the artillerymen, among others Colonel Crutchfield, who commands all Jackson's artillery. The Confederate infantry, however, deployed upon successive lines, is advancing in good order: some Union flags, captured from the Eleventh corps, waving in front of its ranks, deceive Pleasonton and his officers for an instant. But their uncertainty is not of long duration, and a formidable volley of grape-shot brings the assailants to a sudden stop. The latter, perceiving through the evening mist the Federal mounted men and a few soldiers of the One Hundred and Tenth Pennsylvania infantry drawn up behind a stone wall, take it for granted that the artillery is supported by reserves massed back of the slope. If they could only have seen Pleasonton and a handful of men trying in vain to bring back the fugitives, and compelled to draw their sabres in order to prevent the artillerymen from cutting their traces and abandoning their guns, they would not have delayed long in seizing this new prey; but the favorable opportunity quickly slips away, and when, after having formed their ranks again at the command of their leaders, they make a final effort to reach the stone wall once more, they find it

\* The Eighth Pennsylvania cavalry, proceeding at a gallop along the wood-road which connects Hazel Grove with the Plank Road, encountered portions of the Confederate infantry; scattering these, the regiment turned to the left as it entered the Plank Road, and charged with great vigor full upon Rodes' advancing troops, meeting them a short distance east of Dowdall's Tavern, penetrating and demoralizing that portion of Rodes' line, and causing it to halt for a time sufficient to allow the artillery and troops at Hazel Grove to take position, and the cavalry to re-form and collect other troops between the enemy and Chancellorsville.

In this brilliant charge the sabre alone was relied upon as a weapon. Five officers led the cavalry; of these, three were killed: Major Peter Keenan, Captain Charles Arrowsmith, and Adjutant John Hazeltine Haddock. The horse of Captain J. Edward Carpenter was shot under him, and the commanding officer alone escaped with horse and rider unhurt.—ED.



swarming with numerous defenders. In fact, Sickles, after having stopped a party of fugitives at the foot of Fairview Hill, has come to the aid of Pleasonton with Birney's and Whipple's divisions and the remainder of his artillery. He deploys these forces to the right and left of the road at the very moment when the Southerners, having recovered from their confusion, are about to crush Pleasonton under the weight of their battalions and storm those batteries. The soldiers of the Third corps, encouraged by the example of their chief, receive them with a close and well-sustained fire, such as they have not encountered since the beginning of the battle.

This time they are definitely checked ; their impulsive strength is exhausted. At the centre the two lines form nothing more than a confused mass, utterly beyond the control of their officers. On the right Colquitt and Ramseur, turning toward the south, have stopped in some abandoned works, whence they have seen Birney's division massed in the little valley of Hazel Grove. On the left Iverson and Nicholls have met with no resistance, but the wood is of such density that, fearing to lose themselves in the dark, they have not ventured to advance. The moon, in fact, throws but a dim light across the trees. The movements of the whole line is thus interrupted ; the battle ceases at the same time, for the greater portion of the Unionists are already far away, while those who have bravely offered resistance are too glad of the respite granted them to think of provoking the enemy. In the Southern ranks groups are forming ; efforts are made to ascertain the casualties, to reconstruct the regiments and re-form the ranks. Proud of their success, the soldiers lay down to rest, believing their task for the day ended ; but the vigilant Jackson does not share in this illusion. He knows that Hooker cannot fail to come to dispute the occupancy of positions too easily captured, and that, knowing the ground, the Federals are not likely to allow the night to stop them. Anticipating their attack, he orders Hill to make his division defile along the road in order to deploy it in front of the troops who have just participated in the fight, and who have been too severely handled to admit of their offering any serious resistance ; he inspects their ranks in person for the purpose of restoring order therein. Finally, on learning that the earthworks across



the woods extend in a south-easterly direction, he orders Rodes to send a portion of his troops to occupy them. The Confederates, as we have stated, have taken possession of these works in the vicinity of the road, but have abandoned them after Pleasonton's cannonade, and this line has remained unoccupied between the two parties.

Being desirous of reconnoitring in person this position, which gives him the key to the whole system of Hooker's interior defences, Jackson presses forward, followed only by a few mounted men, whilst Hill, without waiting for the remainder of his division, takes Lane's brigade, which, having escorted the artillery along the road, is the first at hand, and posts it in front of Rodes' division. This and Colston's division being in the greatest state of confusion, it has been found impossible to detach a line of skirmishers from it in order to clear the wood in front of them. Hill has ordered Lane to employ one regiment in forming this line, but Jackson passes on before the order has been executed, and, ignorant of this fact, he advances without mistrust in the direction of the enemy. Hill, seeing him before him, follows him close with his staff. It is ten o'clock in the evening. The night is dark; a profound silence has succeeded the din of battle. The exhausted conquerors are waiting for the third line to take their place, and confine themselves to keeping up a brisk fire along their line of skirmishers, which has finally taken position on the outskirts of the wood. On the side of the Federals, Sickles, always ready for an attack, has asked Hooker for permission to take the offensive with his three divisions as soon as he shall have been able to organize his line of battle. In the mean while, Berry's and Birney's battalions, the latter south, the former north, of the position defended by Pleasonton, cause their skirmishers to advance, who drive back those of the enemy and cautiously penetrate into the forest. Birney's skirmishers soon perceive the group of mounted men on the road formed by Jackson's staff, and open fire upon them. The Confederate general, perceiving his error, rushes hurriedly into the wood, northward, in order to avoid the bullets and to join, across the thicket, his line formed on that side by the Eighteenth North Carolina, which is stationed about one hundred yards in the rear; Hill

joins him. The Southern soldiers, under the twofold effects of fatigue and fighting, had lost that coolness and self-possession which characterizes well-trying troops; at the least alarm during that bloody night shots were fired at random, and more than once the Confederate skirmishers, meeting unawares, fired upon each other. Lane's brigade had been warned to be on its guard against the Federal cavalry. The soldiers of the Eighteenth, seeing Jackson and his followers coming at full gallop toward them, naturally believe they are about to be attacked. The first rank kneels to the ground, and when the staff is only within twenty paces of their line they receive it with a terrific discharge of musketry. This volley, caused by the merest accident, and which another accident equally trifling might have prevented, proved more fatal to the Confederate cause than a lost battle. Jackson is seriously wounded by three balls. Around him lie men and horses. The animals that are not mortally wounded carry off their riders, exposing them either to be dashed against a tree or to fall into the enemy's lines. Jackson has received one ball in the right hand and two in the left arm: he has no doubt been struck at the moment when he was parting the branches of the trees before him; nevertheless, he succeeds in stopping his horse. Being turned toward his soldiers, whose officers have caused their fire to cease, he looks at them with astonishment, unable as yet to believe in so fatal a mistake, and asking himself whether he has not fallen into an ambush of the enemy. He faints away, and falls into the arms of his aide-de-camp, Captain Wilbourne, the only one who has not been wounded among those around him. The left arm is shattered close to the shoulder; the artery is severed, and the blood flows in streams; Wilbourne has nothing but a penknife with which to dress the wound, through which life is fast ebbing away. Fortunately, Hill, who has remained a little in the rear, arrives at this critical moment, and his skilful appliances succeed in stopping the hæmorrhage.

The Federals, who have no suspicion of what is passing within a few rods of them, advance very slowly, groping their way cautiously, but their skirmishers are already approaching the spot where Jackson has fallen; two of them are captured by Hill by the side of his chief, while a Unionist general, in advance of his

men, appears for a moment near the group which surrounds him, to disappear immediately after in the dark.\* It is important to hide from the enemy, at all risks, the precious prey which lies so close to them, and while Hill is returning to his post in order to prepare for the attack with which he is menaced, Jackson, making a desperate effort, proceeds on foot in the direction of the Confederate lines, where he finds a litter upon which he is placed.†

While this incident, so serious for the future of the war, is passing in the dark recesses of the forest unknown to almost all the combatants—to those who followed Jackson with enthusiasm, as well as to those who had learned to dread him—the Federals are preparing to check the victorious march of the enemy by assuming a vigorous offensive attitude themselves. On the left Sickles has massed the whole of Birney's division on the borders of the wood along the road which connects with the turnpike from Hazel Grove, and it is the skirmishers of his first brigade, under Ward, who have encountered Jackson; Whipple is placed so as to support him; on the right, along the turnpike, it is again the Third corps that is about to take the offensive. As we have stated, Hooker, at the sound of battle, had started with Hays' brigade of the First corps‡ and with Berry's whole division. This was the same division he had himself organized eighteen months before on the borders of the Lower Potomac, and that he had led through many battles since the day when it was decimated at Williamsburg; it was at the head of this division that he had acquired all his military reputation, and among these soldiers, many of whom he could call by name, that he had exhibited all the dash to which he was indebted for this reputation. He had thrown himself among the fugitives of the Eleventh corps

\* General Revere, of whom we shall speak hereafter, is supposed to be the officer thus designated in some of the Confederate narratives.

† The Federals have asserted that Jackson was wounded by the first discharge of Birney's soldiers, and have claimed as an honor the right of being able to say that their great enemy had fallen under their fire. This version ought certainly to be more consoling to the Confederates; but, notwithstanding some plausible reasons given to the author by General Sickles, we have not adopted it, it having appeared to us more logical to rely upon the recitals of all the eye-witnesses, the companions of Jackson, their accounts agreeing in a most striking manner.

‡ Hays' brigade belonged to French's division of Couch's (Second) corps.—ED.



with drawn sword. Under his lead Berry's troops had passed through the frightened crowd without being shaken by the demoralizing spectacle, and had come, with Hays' brigade, to range themselves north of Fairview in the positions selected by an engineer officer, General Warren.

Slocum, on his part, although obliged to face south of Chancellorsville, where Lee is menacing his line of battle, has brought on Williams' division with most of his guns—a reinforcement far more useful, under these circumstances, than infantry. He posts the artillery upon the heights of Fairview, so as to oppose a last barrier against the enemy in case the latter resumes the offensive, and causes Williams to advance along the road in order to support Sickles. These troops arrive just in time, toward nine o'clock in the evening, to take position to the right of the road between Birney and Berry, so as to complete the line of battle of the Third corps. At the same hour, Hooker, who has accompanied this last division, seeing that the offensive movement of the enemy has been checked, returns to his head-quarters, where his presence is required. But he has scarcely arrived when he receives the message from Sickles, and he renews the order he had already sought to convey to him through Berry, directing him to attack the enemy and to recapture as much of the ground as possible. At eleven o'clock that night Sickles gives Birney the signal of attack. Ward's brigade is the first to penetrate into the thicket; his four regiments on being deployed form but a single line without intervals; the superior officers are all on foot behind the rear ranks; the words of command are spoken in a low voice.

Scarcely has this brigade disappeared in the woods than the other two, breaking into companies, follow in their turn. Sickles' order is to go forward, driving back whatever may be encountered, until the causeway is reached along which aid may be given to Berry. The first line proceeds for some distance without encountering anybody, listening for the least noise and looking for the enemy behind each tree. But suddenly the few isolated shots which, like funeral knells, had resounded in the distance, are followed by a furious discharge of musketry which bursts at once in every corner of the wood. Unionists and Southerners, who are looking for each other in the dark, are suddenly



brought face to face. One soon hears the cheers of the battalions that are charging upon one another: in one place the assailants are victorious, at another point they are repulsed. Although Birney's troops, who have attacked Rodes, are still separated from the road by a ravine and a dense thicket, the Federal artillery, at the sound of musketry, advances along that road and penetrates into the wood, supported on the right by a portion of Berry's infantry. But the remainder of this division, finding the left of the Confederate line strongly posted on the wooded slopes which rise north-west of Fairview, does not venture to go after it. In the mean while, the Federal artillerists, having boldly planted their pieces within less than one hundred yards of the Confederate battalions, open a terrific fire upon them. The grape-shot which sweeps the right line of the causeway carries death and confusion not only to Lane's brigade, but to the remainder of Hill's division, which has not yet been completely formed into line, the largest portion of which is massed in column upon that causeway. General Hill is wounded, and one of the men who is carrying Jackson is struck at the same time; the aides-de-camp of the latter place him in the ditch by the roadside, and lay themselves alongside of him in order to avoid the shower of projectiles which has caused the Confederate column to disperse in an instant. The soldiers have scattered right and left into the wood, and the road, which but a while ago was so full of life, would have been entirely deserted if the Federals had not been seen approaching within a short distance. In order to get away from them, Jackson makes another effort to walk across the wood, but he is exhausted by the loss of blood, and has to be laid once more upon a litter; and again the bearers, stumbling in the dark, fall to the ground with him. The unfortunate wounded general, rolling over upon his shattered arm, received then, it is said, some internal injuries which proved to be the ultimate cause of his death. His sufferings did not prevent him from giving his attention to the battle which was raging around him, and on General Pender coming to inform him that his soldiers, all in confusion, can no longer maintain themselves in their position, he replies with his wonted firmness of voice, "*They must remain in it.*" Notwithstanding all the precautions taken to conceal from the

troops the loss of their chief, Jackson has been recognized, and before he has reached the ambulance near Wilderness Tavern, where he finds at last some rest, the news of his wound has already spread from mouth to mouth.

In the mean time, disorder reigns supreme among all the combatants, who are running against each other at haphazard in the thickness of the woods. The Confederates, having been surprised while marching in single line, have lost ground. The two divisions which have borne all the brunt of the battle have fallen back upon the works captured from Schurz in the clearing near Dowdall's Tavern; Hill's division, which has relieved them, is still fighting in the wood; but the Federals have recaptured the intrenchments lying across the forest, as well as several pieces of cannon belonging to Whipple's division which had been abandoned a few hours before near the road. When the original order of proceeding is once abandoned on either side, it is impossible to recover it; the army corps become divided into brigades, regiments, companies, and finally into small groups, which wander about as chance directs them, each fighting on its own account. In this way many prisoners are taken on both sides; it frequently happens that two friendly parties encounter each other abruptly, and are on the point of coming to blows. But by degrees the combat languishes, and finally dies away, both sides thinking only of recuperating and re-forming their ranks. The woods are strewn with the dead and wounded. It is past midnight. From time to time firing is suddenly resumed: it is some Federal battalion which has unexpectedly run against the enemy's line. One of these partial engagements causes the Confederates to take up arms again about two o'clock in the morning. But everything soon falls back into stillness: for the time being the serious struggle is ended, and it is necessary to prepare for the conflict of the morrow.

South of the road Birney has freed the approaches of the ridge defended by Pleasonton, and driven the enemy from the heights opposite to Fairview—positions the importance of which will soon be seen—but at the north Berry has not been able to approach Jackson's left on the slopes which it occupies. On the Confederate side the officers are busy in getting their shattered battalions

together and in re-forming their line. Hill's division, commanded by General Heth, has received a timely reinforcement by the arrival of two brigades which had been left at the Furnace in the morning. But Jackson is no longer there to direct; his army corps is without a recognized chief.

As we have stated elsewhere, there were four grades of general officers in the Confederate army: Lee, general, was commander-in-chief; Longstreet and Jackson, lieutenant-generals, had each an army corps; the divisions were commanded by major-generals, while the brigades were under the lead of brigadier-generals. On the morning of the 2d of May, Jackson had but one division commander with him, A. P. Hill, and both of them having been wounded in the evening, there were only brigadier-generals left in his corps. Rodes was entitled to the command by right of seniority, but this brave officer having neither the authoritative rank nor the required reputation to fill Jackson's place at this critical moment, the chief of staff of the Second corps, with Rodes' consent, summoned Stuart to come and take command. It was reasonably supposed that this popular name would inspire the soldiers with confidence for the battle to be fought on the following day. Stuart, following Jackson's instructions, had taken a portion of Lee's brigade, which was thenceforth useless on the Turnpike Road, to reconnoitre Ely's Ford and try to take possession of this pass, which might chance to lie on one of the enemy's lines of retreat. He had just given orders to attack the encampment of Averell's cavalry, which was quietly located on the banks of the river, when he was informed of the heavy task imposed upon him in such an unlooked-for manner. On reaching the field of battle he sent word to Jackson, asking him if he could give him any instructions. The illustrious sufferer, feeling too weak for such a mental effort, replied that he relied entirely upon his judgment. Stuart made at once all his arrangements for resuming the attack at daybreak by advancing his right more and more, so as to get nearer Lee and to assist him before Chancellorsville. He has been criticised for not having followed the plan attributed to Jackson by pushing all his forces to the left, so as to take possession of the roads leading from Chancellorsville to the fords of the Rapidan, near the Bullock house. Undoubtedly, if this



manœuvre had been entirely successful, Hooker, taken between two fires and shut up within the clearings of Chancellorsville by an enemy posted in the woods all around him, might have seen his army paralyzed, and possibly thrown into disorder; but although forty thousand men may whip seventy thousand, they cannot surround them: it was not to be expected that all the corps assembled in the forest could be so easily conquered as the Eleventh had been. By dint of striking with the same instrument, it might finally have been worn out and broken to pieces; and Stuart was the less able to, adopt so dangerous a plan with troops already decimated in that this plan was directly at variance with all that had been agreed upon between Jackson and Lee.

The latter had, on his part, faithfully carried out that portion of the task which he had reserved for himself. As soon as the distant echo of Jackson's cannon had announced to him the commencement of the attack against the right wing of Federals, he had made strenuous efforts to occupy their left. Anderson's division had been engaged since four o'clock with Sickles' troops near the Furnace in one direction, and with Williamson's brigade\* of Slocum's corps near the Plank Road in the other. He had therefore only McLaws' troops, which were posted to the right and left of the turnpike, at his disposal. By his orders the latter made vigorous demonstrations against the positions occupied by Slocum's and Couch's right until dark, at first with cannon-shot, then by drawing sufficiently near so as to fire volleys of musketry, but without intending a serious attack. The sound of the battle which Jackson was delivering had, in drawing nearer, proved to Lee that the manœuvre of his lieutenant had been crowned with success, but he had received no direct news from the Second corps. At last, shortly before daylight, Captain Wilbourne arrived near a cluster of pine trees at the foot of which Lee was sleeping. After listening to his recital with considerable emotion, Lee arose, saying, "The enemy shall be closely pressed this morning, as Jackson requests;" and he immediately gave orders for a general attack. Stuart was confirmed in his command of the left wing, and the measures he had adopted were fully approved.

\* This was Williams' division of Slocum's corps.—ED.



## CHAPTER II.

### *CHANCELLORSVILLE.*

THE importance and multiplicity of the operations we have to describe have obliged us to divide the narrative of the campaign on the Rapidan into two chapters; but in order not to interrupt the thread of the story, we will resume it, without any preamble, at the point where it was dropped at the moment when the bloody struggle inaugurated by Jackson against the Federal right wing near Dowdall's Tavern was brought to an end.

Hooker's position was a critical one, and he was about being compelled to fight a decisive battle under very different circumstances from those which he had expected. He was, so to speak, blocked up on the plateau of Chancellorsville, closely pressed at the west by Jackson, who had made a portion of his line of defence give way, while at the east and south Lee closed the outlets of the forest against him. As yet, only a small portion of his army had been under fire; the rest was still fresh and full of ardor. Reynolds had crossed the Rappahannock at United States Ford, with the seventeen thousand men of the First corps, during the afternoon, and notwithstanding the fatigue of these men, who had just made a march of nearly twenty-four miles at a single stretch, with eight days' provisions in their knapsacks and haversacks, their arrival compensated largely for the losses which the army had sustained. The Federal line formed an angle the centre of which lay above Chancellorsville, while the two flanks rested, one at Ely's Ford on the Rapidan, and the other below United States Ford on the Rappahannock. The remnants of Howard's corps formed the extreme left along the River Road, in the positions which Meade had occupied on the 1st and 2d of May, and where this

disorganized body of troops could again form without being exposed to another attack. On his right was Couch with the Second corps, with the exception of Hays' brigade,\* Hancock's division in the front line; French's first brigade in reserve in the fields around Chancellorsville. Slocum, strongly posted behind some abatis, defended the little valley where Mott's Run takes its rise, his left resting on the turnpike, his centre on each side of the Plank Road, his right having fallen back on the hill of Fairview. Fronting Stuart was the Third corps, occupying the heights on which the efforts of the Confederates had been checked during the night. Its line of battle had been speedily formed again by Sickles, and its skirmishers were in possession of the greater portion of the wood. A powerful array of artillery was also ready to sweep once more the road on which the assailants had already sustained such fearful losses. These heights, which rise west of Lewis' Creek, are bounded at the south by the bare hillock of Hazel Grove, which is isolated and surrounded on every side by ravines. Birney, who had started from Hazel Grove to make the night-attack upon Jackson, had remained master of this position, as well as of the whole of that portion of the wood situated south of the road and west of Lewis' Creek; Whipple was in reserve behind him on the slopes of Fairview; Berry's division and Hays' brigade, more in the rear, were deployed perpendicularly to the road in the woods which extend northward along one of the small tributaries of Lewis' Creek. Thus, Sickles' right was not brought into action, but it occupied low ground and was covered on every side. On the other hand, the elevated position he occupied on the left completely concealed from the enemy the plateau of Chancellorsville, upon which the army-trains, its reserves, and a part of its artillery were still huddled together; the latter formed a kind of fortress flanking the batteries posted at Fairview, and thereby enabled the Federals to prevent the junction of the two wings of the enemy's army.

In the ravine of Lewis' Creek the road had been freed of the broken wagons which obstructed it, and several bridges over the stream established easy communications with the rest of the army.

In order to fill up the unoccupied space to the right of Berry,

\* Hays' brigade was the second of French's division.—ED.

into which Jackson had intended to push his left, Meade, facing about in order of battle and traversing the Bullock clearing, had passed over from the left to the right of the army-lines about one o'clock in the morning. Humphreys was deployed to the right of Berry. Griffin, then Sykes, prolonged the line on each side of the road from Dowdall's Tavern to the Bullock farm. Reynolds, having reached this last-mentioned house during the night, had continued his march and deployed his worn-out troops along Ely's Ford Road; he formed the extreme right, and assisted Averell's brigade, which, as we will show hereafter, had lingered in the rear of the army.

Hooker had thus seventy-five thousand men, without counting the Eleventh corps, posted between the two wings of the enemy's army, which, in the aggregate, could not place more than forty-four thousand combatants in the field. In this situation it was sufficient for him to make a vigorous effort on the morning of the 3d in order to separate these two wings definitely, and inflict an irreparable blow upon either one or the other. Everything pointed in that direction. The experience of the previous day showed how dangerous was the purely defensive system he had adopted; the position of Chancellorsville, at the junction of the three roads occupied by the enemy at the east, south, and west, was an excellent one for attacking that enemy upon one of these lines, and to serve as the pivot to a great movement directed either against Lee or Stuart; but it was a bad one for resisting an assault from them, because they could concentrate all their forces against this narrow plateau and crush its defenders, whose number must be limited by its very dimensions. It was much more easy for Hooker to take the offensive under these conditions, because in twenty-four hours he could be reinforced by the twenty-two thousand men of Sedgwick's corps. After having reduced the left wing by successively detaching from it the Third corps, and then the First, it was natural to make the Sixth follow the same route, so as to bring the whole army together. The display of forces that Lee had just made proved conclusively that Sedgwick's demonstration below Fredericksburg had kept but a very small number of combatants on that side. As a diversion, therefore, it had no longer any object; but it was also certain that Sedg-

wick could henceforth take possession of the famous Marye's Heights. Hooker therefore had the choice between Chancellorsville and Marye's Heights; it was easy for him to keep the first of these positions or to capture the second, and to concentrate his army upon either of them, so that the enemy could not dislodge him from it. Indeed, as regards the second hypothesis, he could have sent two, or even three, corps to Sedgwick by way of United States Ford, and, after having closed up his lines in the forest, have drawn Lee's and Stuart's attention while his lieutenant would have taken possession of the works which commanded Fredericksburg. He was thus certain of securing, almost without striking a blow, the advantages which Burnside had sought in vain to obtain on the 13th of December at the cost of so much blood. Unfortunately for him, he failed to make this choice: he tried to retain Chancellorsville and take possession of Marye's Heights at the same time. In order to accomplish this object, he should at least have endeavored to occupy the enemy in every direction by attacking him simultaneously at both points; instead of this, he decided to leave his seventy-five thousand men on the defensive at Chancellorsville, making the isolated corps of Sedgwick assume the offensive, and imposing upon it the task of coming to deliver the bulk of the army from the clutches of the Confederates.

On the evening of May 2d the commander of the Sixth corps had received several despatches written by Hooker when the latter believed Jackson to be in full retreat. The general-in-chief informed him that Early's division had alone remained in front of Fredericksburg, ordering him to cross the river and to pursue the enemy along the Bowling Green road. Sedgwick had naturally made all his forces cross over to the right bank without delay by way of the bridge at Franklin's Crossing, which had not yet been taken up, as Hooker had desired the day previous, and he had put his heads of column on the march south-westward, in an opposite direction to that of Fredericksburg. At ten o'clock in the evening, Hooker, after having witnessed the rout of the Eleventh corps, placed Berry in line, and, ascertaining that Jackson's movement was interrupted, ordered Sedgwick by telegraph to cross the river immediately at Fredericksburg, and to march upon Chancellors-



ville with all his troops, leaving his supply-trains behind him. Sedgwick was to be near the positions occupied by Hooker at day-break, "so that Lee, thus taken between two fires," added the despatch, "could not fail to be annihilated." The Unionist general had calculated that this movement would at least have the effect of compelling Lee to fall back upon Jackson's corps, and of opening the road to Fredericksburg and Richmond to the Federals. Having resolved to remain on the defensive, he took advantage of the night to place his right in the positions in which it seemed to him they could offer the best resistance to the conquerors of Dowdall's Tavern.

The night-attack of Birney's division had obliged Stuart to make his right fall back. Whilst he occupied, with the two brigades of Pender and Thomas, all the wood as far as the border of the stream which runs into Hazel Grove north of the road, Heth, who had assumed command of Hill's division, had placed the four brigades of Lane, McGowan, Archer, and his own (commanded by Colonel Brockenbrough) in line of battle on the other side, parallel to the road. The position of the Federals in front of this line commanded all the neighboring localities. So long as they remained masters of it they covered Chancellorsville, while their artillery could sweep with projectiles that part of the wood which the Confederates had preserved north of the road. But Hooker, who had not been able to examine thoroughly in the dark all the irregularities of the ground, having learned that Berry had not dislodged the enemy's left from this wood, believed himself menaced by it. The slopes of Fairview appeared to him more easy to defend than the ridge opposite. He therefore directed Sickles to abandon this ridge, together with the wood captured by Birney, and to fall back upon the plateau of Chancellorsville by occupying, perpendicularly to the road, a line resting on the left of the batteries of artillery posted on the Fairview height—a fatal order, which, as it will be perceived, seriously compromised all the troops stationed at Chancellorsville, and involved the loss of this position.

Notwithstanding the success of Jackson's manœuvre, the 2d of May had not proved decisive in its results for the Confederates, and every hour passed in the strange position in which they found

themselves rendered their position more dangerous. It was evident that the 3d would not elapse without an effort being made by Sedgwick to bring the powerful aid of his twenty-five thousand men to his chief near Chancellorsville. Early could not prevent him. The greater this danger, the more determined was Lee to act vigorously against Hooker without noticing what was taking place at Fredericksburg. He was probably influenced by his knowledge of Sedgwick's character—a man of a somewhat slow and methodical mind whom he had long known, for the commander of the Sixth Federal corps had served under him in the regular cavalry. All preparations were therefore made for beginning the battle at daybreak on the 3d. Anderson and McLaws were to participate in it. Stuart was ordered to bear to the right in order to assist them. The closing hours of the night were employed in forwarding the artillery of the Second corps, which had unavoidably remained in the rear, and in looking out for positions in the forest whence it could cover the Fairview hillock.

From earliest dawn, Stuart, anxious to show his comrades that he is not only a brilliant cavalry officer, but that he is likewise able to lead an army corps, is occupied in rectifying his lines and in making the Second corps take the most favorable positions for renewing the attack. Hill's division is in the front line; his left, resting perpendicularly to the road, is composed of Pender's and Thomas' brigades; Brockenbrough, in the centre and a little in the rear, occupies each side of the road; the right, which is not brought into action at all, is formed by Lane, McGowan, and then Archer. It is this wing that Stuart pushes forward first by pivoting upon the centre, in order to extend his lines south-westward in the direction where he is to meet Lee. It is five o'clock in the morning; provisions are about to be distributed to the soldiers of these three brigades, who have fully earned them by twenty-four hours of marching and fighting; but at the cry of "Let us remember Jackson!" they are all in motion, without waiting for anything, for they are no longer ignorant of his wound, and are burning with desire to avenge upon the enemy the fatal accident that has robbed them of their chief. This cry is repeated by the rest of the division, which is advancing on the left of the road

under Stuart's lead, and by the two other lines, that have passed beyond the clearing of Dowdall's Tavern in order to get back into the wood. Paxton, having arrived from the Wolfrey house during the night, has rallied the rest of Colston's troops, and deployed his battalions north of the road, resting his left on Nicholls' brigade: the front of the division is formed, on the right, by the brigade the command of which Colston has given to Colonel Warren, and by that of Jones. Rodes' division follows this first line closely. Its chief, after having restored order in its ranks, has placed O'Neal's brigade, and then Iverson's, to the left of the road; on the other side Ramseur's and Doles'; Colquitt, still farther back, is held in reserve.

As Hill's right was making the movement which was to bring it in front of the positions occupied by Birney, the latter, in compliance with Hooker's instructions, was preparing to abandon those positions in order to fall back upon the heights of Fairview. Graham's brigade had alone remained in the logworks which traverse the wood, and which it had recaptured during the night. Archer's soldiers finding themselves suddenly brought face to face with their enemies, did not wait for the signal of attack that Stuart was to give them. They rushed upon them so fiercely that Ward's brigade had to come back in all haste to support Graham. The battle was again raging, and the retreat of the Federals was the more difficult that their adversaries, not believing it to be a voluntary act, became encouraged by this easy triumph. Several dismounted pieces of Federal cannon were abandoned. Finally, after a sanguinary struggle, in which Graham's and Ward's soldiers defended themselves foot by foot, the whole of Birney's division came to place itself between Fairview and the road, east of Lewis' Creek. Archer started in pursuit, and attacked it in this new position, but was repulsed with loss, and compelled to fall back on the height of Hazel Grove. The movement he had made in order to occupy this height had separated him from the rest of the line, and he was not strong enough to resume the offensive. But he had cause to be satisfied for the time being with the commanding position that the Federals had voluntarily abandoned to him. The thin mist which had hovered over the battlefield at this early hour having disappeared, Stuart,



whose great military qualities manifested themselves at this trying moment, perceived at once the importance of this position. He brought on the spot thirty pieces of cannon, which opened a terrible fire upon the weak works behind which the Federals had formed. The plateau, which extended as far as Chancellorsville, was soon mowed clean by their projectiles.

During this time, Brockenbrough, Lane, and McGowan, following the road, had attacked a portion of Berry's division in the line of logworks which traversed the wood west of the ridge defended by Pleasanton the previous evening. The Federal troops, which on that side, as well as at the south, had been ordered to fall back east of Lewis' Creek, abandoned these logworks to them by slowly retiring. Stuart immediately pushed forward all the batteries he had yet on the road, and planted them on the top of this ridge, whence they commanded the little valley which the road follows to reascend the opposite slope. He had thus, since the outset of the battle, captured positions in which his artillery was to bring him a powerful aid to assist in the attack of the new line of defence of the Federals. This line was formed by Sickles' three divisions: Whipple, at the south, near the Fairview Cemetery; Birney, in advance and on the left along the slopes of the hill; Berry, on the right of the road, behind some abatis constructed in haste across the wooded bottoms where Lewis' Creek takes its rise. Hays' brigade was on the right of Berry; Williams' division of Slocum's corps south of the road, on which it rested its right, and in advance of Whipple's positions.

Protected by the fire of his artillery, which was posted along the road, Stuart makes his line press forward in order to cross Lewis' Creek. Heth, who is in the centre and finds no obstacles before him, gains some ground; the two brigades of the left carry the abatis that have opposed their progress; Lane and McGowan, on their side, while proceeding in the direction of Lewis' Creek, find themselves exposed to a raking fire which enfilades their right and checks their movement. Sickles, who leads his corps, with as much quickness of perception as self-possession takes advantage of this circumstance to resume the offensive, and hurls Ward's brigade upon the flank of McGowan and Lane. The



Confederates, on that side, are driven back into the wood. North of the road the struggle is the more desperate that the fighting is carried on in a thick undergrowth. The Unionist general Hays is taken prisoner. But French comes to his assistance with his second brigade, which he brings from Chancellorsville, thus changing the aspect of the fight. The left wing of the Confederates is repulsed with loss and thrown into confusion. Heth is compelled to retire in his turn; the whole of Stuart's line is staggering, and disorder is beginning to creep into its ranks, while the officers are being killed in fruitless attempts to get their soldiers to follow them. But at this moment the other two lines come to take part in the battle. North of the road Nicholls and Iverson, who form the extremity of these two lines, face to the left alongside of Thomas, thereby checking French's movement upon the flank of the army. During this time, Paxton, crossing to the right of the road, hastens to the assistance of Lane and McGowan; O'Neal follows him closely in order to support Pender and Brockenbrough. The arrival of these two brigades is the signal for a new effort to cross Lewis' Creek; but south of the road the Confederates are immediately repulsed, and may consider themselves fortunate that Birney's division, decimated and exhausted, is no longer in pursuit of them. O'Neal's brigade, in the centre, still pushes forward, and passes beyond the logworks captured in the morning, behind which the soldiers of the first and second line had rallied without order. The greater portion of Pender's and Brockenbrough's brigades join it for the purpose of resuming the offensive. But the troops thus formed cannot preserve their battle-line amid the coppice-wood which extends north of the road: it divides into two groups: one, bearing to the left in the wood, throws itself upon Berry's right, which is posted between the clearing of Chancellorsville and that of Bullock; the other, under the lead of Colonel Hall, who has just succeeded O'Neal, the latter being wounded, bears to the right, and crossing the road ascends the north side of the slopes of Fairview.

The rest of Berry's division occupies the summit of these slopes. Thus attacked on all sides at once, it defends itself with difficulty: the enemy's artillery, posted along the road, which has just been reinforced, carries death and destruction into the rear ranks. But

Sickles, whose eye takes in the whole battlefield at a glance, sends Ward's brigade to support Berry's right in the wood, and this timely reinforcement gives once more the advantage to the Federals in that direction. In the mean time, the Confederates, led by Hall, have secured a foothold upon the edge of the plateau of Chancellorsville, and, after a veritable *mêlée* with side-arms, have taken possession of a portion of the earthworks erected thereon. But the check sustained by their left leaves them without support, and exposed, in their turn, to a convergent fire. The New Jersey brigade, which was formerly organized by the valiant Kearny,\* and is desirous of proving itself worthy of its old chief, returns to the charge: a new conflict takes place in the intrenchments. General Mott, in command of the Federals, is wounded, but his soldiers take possession of the work again, which is strewn with the dead and the dying; a number of prisoners and two regimental flags fall into their hands, and the enemy recrosses Lewis' Creek in disorder.

As yet, the right of the third Confederate line has not participated in the combat. Its turn comes at last. Colquitt, after several useless countermarches, is sent to the left to support Nicholls' brigade, whose commander has just been killed, and which French, having rallied his troops, has vigorously attacked in the wood. The arrival of this reinforcement gives the advantage once more to the Confederates, while Hall, followed by those who surround him, whom his example stimulates, recaptures the intrenchments adjacent to the road. But this success is of as short duration as the preceding one, and Hall is soon driven back into the wood whence he has just emerged. After this effort the combatants on that side remain fronting each other, without venturing to come nearer. At the same time, south of the road the two brigades forming the right of the third line, under Ramseur and Doles, finally reach the logworks which had been abandoned since morn-

\* This was the organization known as the Second New Jersey brigade, composed at this time of the Second New York, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth New Jersey, and One Hundred and Fifteenth Pennsylvania infantry. When General Mott, its commander, was wounded, the command devolved on Colonel William J. Sewell, Fifth New Jersey volunteers. The First New Jersey brigade, of which General Kearny was the original commander, belonged to the First division, Sixth army corps.—Ed.

ing by the Federals, and in which, as we have stated, are huddled together in a confused mass the *débris* of the first two Confederate lines. The troops composing them are without leaders: Heth and McGowan are wounded; nearly all the colonels have experienced the same fate, and Ramseur, unable to make his soldiers follow him, is advancing alone, with a portion of Doles' brigade, against the positions occupied by Williams and Whipple on the heights of Fairview. This attack is led with so much spirit, and is so well supported on one side by the fire of the guns posted at Hazel Grove, and on the other by a new demonstration on the part of Colonel Hall along the road, that it seems to foreshadow success. Ramseur, undismayed by the oblique fire, which inflicts upon him some severe losses, scales the slopes of Fairview and drives Whipple's troops into the intrenchments which crown them: he takes a position within short range, and from it opens a brisk fire of musketry. Neither of the two parties is willing to yield, each stubbornly defending the line it occupies. In the mean time, Doles, ascending the ravine which encircles its summit south-eastward, finds himself protected by this bend in the ground, and thus reaches the plateau of Chancellorsville under cover, on the left flank of Geary and almost in Whipple's rear. He has scarcely reached the spot when he opens a terrific fire which enfilades the ranks of the latter, throwing his troops into confusion. In another moment the Federal line will give way. But the Unionists have not been long in discovering how small is the number of their adversaries. Geary, withdrawing a portion of the troops who are fighting Anderson, takes the Confederate brigade by the flank in his turn, whilst Sickles hastens to bring back Ward's soldiers against it. Doles and Ramseur, left alone on the slopes of Fairview, are defending themselves with difficulty, when Paxton, at the head of the famous "Stonewall" brigade—the same which shares with Jackson this henceforth historical appellation—comes to take position between them. These brave troops carry the intrenchments that are before them, but all the efforts of the Federals are soon turned against them. Paxton is killed, and his soldiers, crushed by superior numbers, retire in their turn, with those of Ramseur and Doles.

The commanders of the Second Confederate corps, having no

more reserves with which to renew the fight, are compelled to discontinue the struggle in order to form their disorganized battalions again, and to allow them some rest. The cannonading, however, continues on both sides without cessation. This alone prevents them from hearing the sounds of the battle which is being fought on the other side of Chancellorsville; for Lee, true to the promise he had given to the wounded Jackson, has ordered the two divisions he has kept about him to attack the enemy in front at daybreak. Anderson and McLaws have only seven brigades at their disposal; that is to say, about thirteen thousand men to occupy a front of two miles in extent. The former deploys his lines from the Furnace to the Plank Road in the following order: Perry, Posey, Wright, and Mahone. McLaws' three brigades are deployed on the right, Semmes along the Plank Road, Wofford on each side of the turnpike, Kershaw between the two. This line is too weak to undertake any attacks after Jackson's fashion: it has not a single battalion in reserve, and if once broken the Federals could take possession of the outlets of the forest. The fight has to be conducted in such a manner as to occupy and retain their forces without provoking them to take the offensive. Since morning, Anderson and McLaws have been pushing their troops forward to within a short distance of the abatis behind which the Federals are posted, and are exchanging murderous discharges of musketry with them, while the artillery of the First Confederate corps, stationed along the two roads and on the neighboring heights, pours showers of shells beyond Hooker's lines, well knowing that they will fall in the midst of his reserves. This portion of the Federal line is defended by Hancock's division, fronting that of McLaws, whilst Geary and part of Williams' division are opposed to Anderson. The forces, therefore, are nearly equal. The greatest effort of the Confederates, who have complete command of these positions, is directed against Hancock; but this chief, as intelligent as he is brave, aided by Colonel Miles, who was to play an important rôle in the war at a later period, distributes his troops so admirably that the enemy does not venture to attack him in a close fight.

Such, then, is the situation toward nine o'clock in the morning. South and south-east of Chancellorsville the combat is not carried



on so as to produce serious results. At the west and south-west the two parties occupy positions naturally strong in front of each other; they are exchanging cannon-shots, which do more harm to the Federals, who are massed on an open plateau, than to the Confederates, who are deployed along the edge of the wood; but they are both equally exhausted; they are in want of ammunition, and are counting the number of their dead and wounded in perfect amazement. At this juncture the victory will fall to the lot of that army which shall be able to attack the other with a body of fresh troops at any given point of the battlefield. The Confederates, who understand much better than their adversaries how to utilize all their forces, have not a battalion left that is available; they have not a man who has not been in action. Is Hooker similarly situated? We do not think so. In the recital of the terrible combat brought on by three of his army corps around the plateau of Chancellorsville we have not spoken of him until now, because we have found no traces of the guiding hand of the general-in-chief during the conflict. Deeply affected by the deplorable rout of the Eleventh corps, his only thought has been, as we have previously stated, to deliver a defensive battle in the positions he occupies whilst waiting for Sedgwick to come to his assistance and deliver him from Lee's clutches. He has even laid out a new line back of Chancellorsville along the Ely's Ford and Mineral Roads, the centre of which lies at the junction of these roads near the Bullock house, as if he had foreseen the impending necessity of abandoning to the enemy the only routes by which he could assist Sedgwick. The ground upon which the battle is being fought does not admit of great manœuvres: the troops once placed in position, all that the general-in-chief has to do is to let them fight; but he should be careful to relieve them in time and to bring all the forces at his disposal into action. He would thus reap the advantages of his numerical superiority, of which the narrow space of the battlefield threatens to deprive him. Without counting the Eleventh corps, which has not yet fully recovered from its disaster, he has the First and Fifth corps under his control; that is to say, nearly thirty-five thousand men who have not yet fired a shot, with not a single enemy in front of them. Sickles on the right and Slocum on the left, seeing their

ranks thinning off rapidly, and the ammunition for both infantry and artillery about to give out, have sent him message after message asking for the aid of some of the six divisions which they know to be massed in the neighborhood. They have received no reply: the opportune hour has passed away at last; the moment has arrived when one half of the army will be vanquished by the side of the other half, which is doomed to immobility for the want of a single order issued in time; and the general-in-chief, after having delayed too long issuing such an order, finds himself, by a strange fatality, physically unable to give it at the most critical moment. The wound which he presently receives does not allow us to comment upon his conduct on this occasion as it deserves. He has himself stated that but for this wound he would have adopted proper measures to sustain his lieutenants: he might probably have succeeded in retaining possession of the plateau of Chancellorsville. But when he was wounded it was already almost too late, for he had not yet taken any preliminary step for bringing reinforcements upon the field of battle, and the causes of this strange inaction have never been explained.

The critical moment is drawing near: the Confederate artillery is increasing its fire in order to prepare for a new attack; the guns which Stuart has brought together on the Plank Road sweep the entire plateau of Chancellorsville; the cannon-balls fall among the vehicles and in the groups of officers and soldiers who are hurrying into the clearing; the shells are bursting in every direction; finally, a projectile knocks down one of the wooden columns of the portico of the Chancellor house against which the general-in-chief is leaning. At the shock the latter falls insensible to the ground. Those who are near him believe him to be dead, and crowd around him; he soon returns to consciousness, but is so terribly stunned that he cannot recover his senses. At this moment an aide-de-camp from Sickles, Major Tremaine, arrives at head-quarters to announce that the enemy is returning to the charge along the whole line, and that the Third corps, being without ammunition, will not be able to offer resistance if not immediately reinforced. He finds no one to whom to address this supreme appeal. Hooker, who has scarcely recovered his senses, cannot listen to him; General Butterfield, his chief of staff, who

possesses all the necessary qualities to supply his place, is at Falmouth; Warren has gone during the night to join Sedgwick; General Van Alen, who signs every order in the absence of Butterfield, has not the requisite authority to assume command or to transfer it to another; Couch, who would be entitled to this command by right of seniority, is at Chancellorsville, but he does not consider himself justified in exercising its functions so long as he has not been regularly appointed, and he issues no orders.

In the midst of these painful uncertainties the Confederates, who have again formed their ranks, are beginning to attack the positions of Fairview on all sides. An important fact has revived their courage. Perry's brigade, posted at the extreme left of Anderson, above the Furnace, has ascended Lewis' Creek, and is come to the aid of Archer at the foot of the hill of Hazel Grove. Lee—who fully understands the importance of making a final effort to unite the two sections of his army which had been separated since the day previous—accompanies him. His presence affords ample evidence to the soldiers of the Second corps that this junction, which is the crowning act of their chief's splendid manœuvre, has been effected. Lee himself gives the signal for this new attack. Henceforth, Anderson and McLaws have no further need of sparing their troops. They attack with unwonted vigor Geary's and Hancock's line of battle, upon which their artillery concentrates a destructive fire, whilst that of Stuart, taking advantage of the falling back of this line upon the plateau, enfilades it. Anderson dislodges Geary from the earthworks which surmount the plateau at the point where the Plank Road begins its downward course on the south side. Archer and Perry reach the cemetery by way of the slopes fronting Hazel Grove. All the rest of the line, composed of an inextricable mixture of regiments and companies, is put in motion all at once; the movement extends north of the road.

The Confederates reach the plateau from every direction, notwithstanding the stubborn defence of the Federals, who, having nearly exhausted all their ammunition, fight with side-arms. Sickles sends Major Tremain once more to head-quarters to ask for assistance: his mission is as unsuccessful as the preceding one. The Confederate artillery, following the assailants, ranges its bat-



teries upon the heights it has so long been storming. Its projectiles strike into the very ranks of Hancock, who is still holding McLaws in check on the other side. The plateau is soon covered with soldiers flying in disorder, and the abatis, filled with the dead and wounded, catch fire. The conflagration is soon communicated to the Chancellor dwelling, which has been converted into a hospital: with it perish all the victims of this frightful conflict who had sought a protecting shelter under its roof.

Hooker mounts his horse again with difficulty, and proceeds, in sadness and in silence, in the direction of the new line which he has caused to be formed in the Bullock clearing. The three corps that have been fighting since morning, pent up within a narrow space surrounded by victorious troops on three sides, are visibly much reduced. French has fallen back across the wood, resting upon Meade's left. Near the road Sickles has successively brought all his reserves into action; Franklin's brigade of Whipple's division supports Berry, who has posted himself on each side of this road, so as to help Williams on his left; the latter receiving, moreover, the co-operation of Graham's brigade. Nevertheless, one of his regiments finally falls back, and the assailants rush into the breach thus left open, before Sickles, who is hastening as usual to the spot where danger is most imminent, has been able to fill it up. Berry's division is thus taken in the rear. Its valiant chief is slain; Mott, who leads his brigade on the left, has just fallen seriously wounded. Amid the confusion which their loss creates among the soldiers, General Revere, who assumes command, orders a retreat. Although Sickles causes this general to halt on the spot, he cannot remedy the evil consequences of such an order. The artillery, crushed by a converging fire, has already been obliged to withdraw. The position, besides, would not have been tenable a few moments later. Ward, who has been summoned in great haste, does not arrive in time to take the place of Berry's soldiers. The only question now is to fall back in good order. Birney, with a view of covering the movement and to free Graham, who is almost entirely hemmed in, makes a vigorous charge at the head of Hayman's brigade, and succeeds in checking Archer's soldiers for a while. Sickles and Slocum manage to retain a portion of their troops in the ranks, and gradually



retire; but it is at a fearful cost, for the officers sacrifice themselves in the hope of influencing the soldiers by their example. The Chancellor dwelling is abandoned. Hancock alone has maintained his position on the left, but he too is obliged to retire, or risk being surrounded. With the assistance of Colonel Miles he effects with much coolness and success the retrograde movement which has become necessary. The Confederates, who are pressing the Federal line too closely, are severely punished, for the latter troops have recovered their energy as soon as the edge of the wood has been reached, while Sickles even captures a number of prisoners. At last this line comes to a halt in the new intrenchments. Each section falls at once into position, and places itself in a state of defence without being seriously molested by the enemy, who is taking a breathing-spell. The latter, however, keeps up a steady skirmish-fire, which adds a serious loss to those already sustained by the Third Federal corps; after the fall of Berry, Whipple, another of its division commanders, is mortally wounded.

During this time Lee is in the vicinity of the Chancellor dwelling; his soldiers are in possession of the whole plateau. It is ten o'clock in the morning. It is upon this ground, conquered at the cost of so much blood, that the ranks so terribly thinned by death are at last being formed again, that the officers of the two corps are once more brought in contact, and that Lee can congratulate, not Jackson, who lies stretched upon his bed of suffering at Wilderness Tavern, but his brave soldiers, on the victory achieved by their daring manœuvre. Out of seventeen general officers, the Second corps has lost six of them. The battle of the 3d of May has been much more disastrous than that of the previous day. The heights of Fairview have been captured by the determination of the troops, whom no want of success has been able to discourage. We cannot avoid pointing out, however, what we consider as an error in the mode of conducting the attacks during these two days. By making a single division display its whole front, and forming the others behind it in successive lines, Jackson, then Stuart, as we have seen, created great confusion in their order of battle at the first serious encounter. The brigades and regiments of the various lines soon became mixed, and each section of the front found itself under the lead

of chiefs whom chance had brought there, while the division commanders were unable to direct all the movements of their troops. This inconvenience, so serious in the case of soldiers marching in order of battle across a dense forest, would have been avoided if each division, formed in three lines, had come in contact with the enemy with a front of small extent only.

The Federal line was well defined; each organization fell readily into its place in the same order as around Chancellorsville. The position, which was very bad for an army desiring to get out of the forest, was easy to defend. Yet Lee, giving his troops only the time strictly necessary to breathe and form again, was already preparing to attack it. He wanted to bring matters to a close with Hooker's army before it could gather together all its forces, and to deal it repeated blows, so as to disable it from resuming the offensive when another conflict should take place with Sedgwick. But at this moment alarming news came to put a stop to his movement, obliging him to form a resolution even more daring perhaps than that which the day previous had brought Jackson upon the flank of the enemy.

The time has arrived, therefore, for us to mention what had taken place within the last twenty-four hours around Fredericksburg, and the serious events which had so suddenly checked the Confederate general in the midst of his victorious career.

We have stated that Hooker, having decided on the evening of the 2d to remain on the defensive, had imposed upon Sedgwick the perilous task of coming, with his single corps, to relieve all the rest of the army. This manœuvre was the more difficult to perform because the enemy had a wide and straight road connecting the positions he occupied before Chancellorsville with those that Sedgwick was going to attack. Thanks to this road, he could easily move his troops in whatever direction he chose, whilst the ways of communication between Hooker and the Sixth corps, following the left bank of the river, were long and troublesome. Sedgwick was already on the right side, and had pushed his troops forward in the direction of Bowling Green, according to the last advices from his chief, when, at eleven o'clock at night, he received orders to occupy Fredericksburg and to march upon Chancellorsville. He could not

think of crossing the river twice in a distance of a few miles, so he made his three divisions turn to the right in order to march up the south side of the river as far as Fredericksburg. During the night General Warren brought him specific instructions, and ordered General Gibbon, who occupied Falmouth with one division of the Second corps, to come up and take position on the right of the Sixth above Fredericksburg.

We have seen that since the 1st of May at daybreak the long line of positions extending from Taylor's Hill at the north to Prospect Hill southward, for a distance of from five to seven miles, was only guarded by Early's four brigades, that of Barksdale, and the reserve artillery of Pendleton, about ten thousand men in all. Hooker had known of this since two o'clock in the morning. If, without waiting till evening, he had immediately sent word to Sedgwick, directing him to march upon Fredericksburg, instead of employing him in useless demonstrations, the result of this movement might have been very different, as the two sections of the Federal army would then have gone into action at the same time. There was even a moment in the afternoon of the 2d when, in consequence of a misunderstanding, Early vacated his positions, leaving only six regiments before Fredericksburg. He soon returned to them, but his line was so weak that in order to protect the intrenchments he had to rely rather on the remembrance of the 13th of December than upon the number of their defenders.

On the morning of the 3d, at the precise hour when Stuart was renewing the fight against Hooker's right wing, thirteen or fourteen miles distant, Early was posted with his four brigades upon the hills extending from Bernard's Cabin to the Howison dwelling, while Barksdale's brigade, supported only, it is true, by several of Colonel Pendleton's excellent batteries, was left to guard the heights which command Fredericksburg from Taylor's Hill to Lee's Hill, on a front of over three miles in extent.

The march of the Federals during the night had been slow. The moon, although shining quite clear on the plateau of Chancellorsville, was obscured by a dense fog along the humid plains they were traversing, while the fire of the enemy's skirmishers, lying everywhere in ambush along their route, had delayed them.

In the mean time, Newton's division had established itself before daylight in the city of Fredericksburg, which had been abandoned by the Confederates. A number of inhabitants who, for the last four months, had become accustomed to live almost at ease between the two lines of hostile batteries, still remained there. Howe's division was deployed on the north-west of the railway, facing Lee's Hill; that of Brooks, on his left, had remained massed south of the bridges erected at the Franklin Crossing, on the Bowling Green Road, in front of the enemy's skirmishers, whom it had encountered the previous evening. As soon as the day dawned Gibbon's division crossed the river at Fredericksburg, over a bridge which had been constructed during the night. The Federals were only within two-thirds of a mile of the heights which command the city, and which barred their passage on the road to Chancellorsville. The surest way of taking possession of these heights was to surprise their defenders without loss of time, and to take advantage of the numerical superiority of the assailants in order to find out the weak point in their line by attacking them everywhere at once with equal vigor. But Sedgwick, always too methodical, committed again the same error which had already proved so fatal to Burnside. He began by timidly reconnoitring the positions which a few months before had acquired such terrible celebrity. Early in the morning two small columns advanced against Marye's Hill, but a single regiment of Barksdale, ambushed behind the famous stone wall, sufficed to check them. A little later Brooks' skirmishers opened a brisk fire upon Early's extreme right, which the latter had posted at Bernard's Cabin in order to retain a portion of the enemy's forces on that side. As to Howe, having received no positive instructions, he confined himself to the task of watching Lee's Hill and the neighboring positions situated along the right bank of Hazel Run, and of exchanging cannon-shots from a distance with Pendleton's batteries, which occupied them.

On the right, Gibbon, after having crossed the river, lost much time in forming his ranks before taking up his line of march. A deep canal separated him from the enemy's positions of Taylor's Hill and Stansbury Hill. General Warren, who felt the importance of a speedy attack, had discovered a bridge which had been



thrown over this canal, the platform of which only wanted a few planks, and so called Gibbon's attention to it. But the Confederates, who at daybreak were not prepared to defend this pass, had noticed the movements of the Federals. Early, withdrawing Hays' brigade from his extreme right, sent it to reinforce Barksdale at Marye's Hill; Wilcox's brigade, which since the 1st of May had been watching the approaches to Banks' Ford, was already on the way to Chancellorsville, when its chief, having been apprised of the passage of the Federals at Fredericksburg, hastened to occupy Taylor's Hill; finally, two pieces of the Washington artillery arrived in time to cover with projectiles the Federals, who were beginning to reconstruct the bridge. The Confederates, protected by their intrenchments, found it easy to stop that work without suffering much from the fire of the assailants, whose movement was thus interrupted. It was nine o'clock, and the Federals had not yet made a serious effort to take possession of the enemy's positions. This slowness of action was the more unaccountable that, since morning, they had distinctly heard the roaring of cannon, announcing to them that a great battle was being fought at Chancellorsville. The troops, massed in the streets of Fredericksburg waiting for orders, were burning with impatience.

At last, at the urgent solicitations of Warren, Sedgwick resolves to give the signal for a decisive and direct attack upon Marye's Hill. Two assaulting columns are formed by Newton, but much precious time is again lost in these preparations: it is near eleven o'clock when Colonel Spear on the right and Colonel Johns on the left advance, each at the head of two regiments\* in serried ranks, against Cemetery Hill, north of the Plank Road. Colonel Burnham supports this movement with four regiments, which, being deployed south of this road, proceed in the direction of Marye's Hill. The long line of stone wall extends before them on both sides of the road. Barksdale has only two regiments and six pieces of cannon with which to defend it. Seeing the enemy debouch *en masse* and advance resolutely, he concludes

\* Spear's column was composed of the Sixty-first Pennsylvania and Forty-third New York, and Johns' comprised the Seventh Massachusetts and Thirty-sixth New York.—ED.

that the critical moment has arrived: he sends for Hays and Wilcox, but these generals are too far away to afford him any assistance. The Federals are within about three hundred yards of the place; the two cannons are firing grape-shot, and the guns planted on the left open an enfilading fire upon them without being able to check their progress. The Southern infantry, having full confidence in the strength of these positions, nevertheless reserves its fire and allows the assailants to approach within less than one hundred yards, when it receives them with a volley which makes the heads of the two columns fall back. Having promptly rallied under the fire, the assailants renew the attack, but are again repulsed. This time, however, they have almost sealed the intrenchments. The Confederates have accused Colonel Johns of having sent a flag of truce at this moment, the bearer of which, under the pretext of asking for a suspension of hostilities for the purpose of carrying off the wounded, took occasion to notice the small number of defenders. None of the Federal narratives have mentioned this incident: at all events, such a trick, unworthy of the brave officers who were to shed their blood as an example to their soldiers, was not in the least necessary to enable them to ascertain the number of their adversaries, whom they had just met face to face at the distance of a few paces. So that, going beyond Sedgwick's instructions, which directed them to fall back in case of their meeting with a stubborn resistance, Spear and Johns returned to the charge for the third time. The former is killed, the latter falls dangerously wounded; but their soldiers reach the parapet, get over it, and, after a short *mêlée*, capture the stone wall, with several hundred prisoners and four pieces of cannon. Burnham has followed their movement, and shortly after the Federals occupy the ridge of Marye's Hill. This combat has not lasted more than a quarter of an hour, so that Hays and Wilcox, who are posted on the left, have no chance to come to the assistance of Barksdale's brigade, the remnants of which are driven back upon the Telegraph Road, which passes behind Lee's Hill.

In the mean time, Howe, having been informed by Sedgwick of the movement which was about to take place, has assumed the responsibility of attacking this last position at the same time.

Colonel Grant, at the head of six regiments deployed in two lines, makes a direct attack upon it, whilst three other regiments march upon the Howison dwelling, and a third column attempts to turn the left of the range of hills which is bounded by Deep Run. Two of Barksdale's regiments and one of Hays' were alone charged with the defence of this range of hills. The Confederate skirmishers are promptly dislodged from the railway embankments. The main Federal column becomes divided in scaling the slopes of Lee's Hill: a portion of it, crossing Hazel Run, takes Marye's Hill in the rear, and reaches its summit at the same time as Burnham; the rest, joining the three regiments of the left, takes possession of Lee's Hill after a very sharp fight. A number of prisoners and four additional pieces of cannon fall into the hands of the assailants. Early, who is hastening from the extreme right with Gordon's brigade, arrives too late to prevent the disaster; but he forms his troops along the Telegraph Road, and falls back in good order in a southerly direction. Hays, who had been driven back north of the Plank Road, takes advantage of the slow movements of the Federals to join his chief again by making a great *détour* westward. Wilcox, who is with him, taking a better view of the situation, returns with his soldiers toward Banks' Ford, in order to worry the enemy on its march upon Chancellorsville.

At half-past eleven Sedgwick was in possession of the famous heights which for the last three months the two armies had been accustomed to look upon as impregnable. The assault had cost him about one thousand men. The centre of the enemy's line, too much extended for the number of its defenders, had been broken, and the latter, having dispersed north and south, were hastily retreating, leaving prisoners, cannons, and, what was still more precious, the possession of the Chancellorsville Road, in the hands of the assailants. It was of great importance to take immediate advantage of this. The sound of Hooker's cannon was no longer heard, but this could afford no excuse for delay. Unfortunately, Sedgwick insisted upon pushing Brooks' division to the front line, and, as the latter was still near the bridges, this inexcusable manœuvre made him lose nearly four hours. The Sixth corps did not resume its march until three o'clock in the



afternoon. The open country afforded him ample facilities for his movements. Brooks' three brigades marched in order of battle, one behind the other at a short distance, being thus always ready to engage the enemy. But Newton's division, which followed them, was formed in column by the flank along the road—an arrangement which would not allow him to speedily participate in the combat in case Brooks should need assistance. Gibbon remained at Fredericksburg in order to cover the passage and protect the immense dépôts of Falmouth against any sudden attack on the part of the enemy. Leaving one brigade in the city, he took the other two to the heights on the left bank of the river. Marye's Hill was only occupied by outposts. In the mean while, Sedgwick was advancing cautiously along the Plank Road. It was to be expected that the enemy would be encountered, for ample time had been given him to recuperate. Wilcox had maintained himself as long as possible upon Taylor's Hill with the guns he had been able to save, and through his skilful arrangements he had greatly harassed the Federals, who were slowly deploying upon the plateau. Finally, when he saw the Federals advancing, Wilcox, in order to prevent his brigade from being cut in two, proceeded in the direction of Banks' Ford; but having easily obtained the advance of the enemy, he conceived the bold idea of barring the way to them, and selected for that purpose an excellent position near Salem Church, a point where the road is only separated from the angle of the Rappahannock by a space of between seventeen and eighteen hundred yards: a stream which crosses it in its northward course toward the river covered the position selected by Wilcox, which was in the dense forest; open fields stretched out on the other side of the stream. In the centre of these fields, upon a prominent point near the road, and at a distance of eight hundred and fifty yards from the church, in the direction of Fredericksburg, stood the toll-house. Salem Church occupied a site on the edge of the road at the entrance of the wood; it was flanked by a school-house situated sixty yards south and a little in advance of the church. These two solid edifices afforded Wilcox an excellent support for holding the enemy in check, or at least for delaying his progress. If he had been alone, he would not have been able,



however, to hold out long, but the slow movements of the Federals allowed Lee time to come to his assistance.

We have seen, in fact, that the news of Early's defeat had reached the astonished commander of the Confederate army in the midst of his troops, who were resting and forming in the ensanguined clearing of Chancellorsville. The abatis which had been constructed two days previously by the Federals, and the resinous undergrowth adjoining them, had caught fire; the crackling of the burning wood had succeeded the rattling of musketry and mingled mournfully with the cries of the wounded, who were too numerous to be all rescued from the flames. Heavy masses of black smoke hovered between the two armies as they were preparing with equal activity, one for the attack, the other for the defence. It was, we believe, a little after one o'clock: the Confederate battalions had already formed into line, when Lee received a message from Early informing him that Sedgwick was in possession of the turnpike. Bad as this news might be, he had every reason to consider himself fortunate in receiving it at a moment when he was not engaged, and could quickly ward off this new danger. Lee received it without betraying the least emotion, and determined what course to pursue without a moment's hesitation. He concluded that Hooker had just experienced a check sufficiently serious to prevent his resuming the offensive before dark, and that by confining himself to the task of watching him closely with four of the divisions that had just participated in the battle, without attacking him, he could send the fifth to meet Sedgwick in order to delay the march of the Sixth corps until night. It now fell to the lot of Longstreet's soldiers to undergo long marches and hazardous manœuvres. Mahone's and Kershaw's brigades immediately began moving along the Plank Road, and shortly after McLaws received orders to follow them with Semmes and Wofford, who formed the remainder of his division. Lee therefore kept with him three divisions of Jackson's corps and three of Anderson's brigades, for the purpose of holding the whole of Hooker's army in check. While McLaws' and Mahone's brigades were marching in the direction of Fredericksburg, Wilcox was establishing himself at Salem Church, and Early, believing the enemy to be moving on the Bowling Green Road, was making

useless preparations to dispute it to him, far away from the real battlefield. It was near five o'clock when Brooks' skirmishers encountered those of Wilcox near the toll-house. The Confederates made a vigorous defence in the neighborhood of this dwelling, but they were soon ordered back to Salem Church, where the reinforcements sent by Lee were expected to arrive: it is, in fact, in the very position of which this church is the key that all the disposable forces should have been gathered in order to oppose Sedgwick's advance in the most effective manner.

McLaws has left Wofford at the junction of the Mountain Road, and, continuing his rapid march along the Plank Road with his three other brigades, he has the good fortune to reach Salem Church before the Federals have made an attack upon this important position. His line of battle is speedily formed perpendicularly to the road—Semmes, then Mahone on the left, Kershaw on the right. Wilcox falls back on this line, and, posting himself on each side of the road, occupies the church and the school-house. The Federals are following him closely. Colonel Brown, with the New Jersey brigade,\* advances north of the road; General Bartlett, with his own, south of it. Newton has been ordered to deploy to the right of Brooks, but the length of his column retards the movement. The Unionist artillery plants itself near the toll-house and opens the fight. In less than twenty minutes it silences the guns of the enemy, who is short of ammunition, and the two brigades immediately advance across the open space which separates them from the wood where the enemy is posted. Although exposed to a murderous fire, they do not slacken their pace, but penetrate into the wood; a few steps farther and the two lines come in contact. A final discharge from the Confederates staggers the assailants, but Bartlett rallies his men and brings them back to the charge, capturing the school-house and all its defenders. Taking advantage of the impulse which this success gives him, he rushes upon Wilcox's line of battle and breaks it down. It is a decisive moment; Wilcox's brigade is almost entirely routed. But its commander is not discouraged. He has one regiment left in good condition; he leads it forward to meet Bartlett, and succeeds in checking the course

\* Kearny's original command.—ED.

of the latter. The reinforcements of the Federals are at some distance, whilst the Confederate troops can sustain themselves with promptness. Wofford has come to take position on the right of Kershaw, making thus five brigades as the total amount of forces gathered on this battlefield. Semmes, on the left of the road, has driven back the soldiers from New Jersey. The whole Confederate line makes a forward movement beyond the wood. A portion of Newton's division, added to Brooks' troops, offers successful resistance, but when the Federals attempt to resume the offensive, they meet with a vigorous opposition. Night supervenes: they are worn out with twenty-four hours of marching and fighting, and have no intention of prolonging the struggle in the dark.

The battle of Salem Church had checked the menacing movement of Sedgwick; the Confederates occupied a strong position which barred his way to Chancellorsville. If he had kept his troops more closely together during the march, he might perhaps have carried this position; at all events, the day was already too far advanced for him to have been able to strike Lee's flank before dark. If, on the other hand, he had shown more alacrity both before and after the capture of Marye's Heights, he could have reached the vicinity of the battlefield, if not at daybreak, as Hooker had requested, at least about ten o'clock in the morning. But he would undoubtedly have arrived too late to save Chancellorsville, and his diligence would only have resulted in exposing to his view the whole Confederate army turned against him. If Hooker blamed him for not having been more swift in his movements when he heard the cannon in the morning, he could launch the same reproach at his chief, who, knowing him to be on the march, isolated in front of Lee, and hearing the sounds of battle in the neighborhood of Salem Church in the afternoon, had not endeavored to make the slightest diversion in his favor.

These mutual mistakes, however, could yet be easily remedied. The harmony of action which the Federals had failed to establish in their movements amid the casualties of the 3d could secure them success on the morrow. One half of Hooker's army had not yet been under fire; Sedgwick's soldiers had all the *prestige* of victory. The news of the capture of Marye's Heights had restored confidence to every one. The two sections of the Union



army occupied strong positions; the communications between them were easy, thanks to Banks' Ford, which Sedgwick had disengaged, and over which General Benham had promptly thrown some bridges. Hooker could bring these two sections together, either by ordering the Sixth corps to join him in the forest or by going himself to join it before Salem Church. The latter alternative presented great advantages. The positions which Hooker had taken after the loss of Chancellorsville were so strong that a single army corps could have defended them for a considerable length of time against Lee's attacks. In the mean while, the remainder of the Federal troops could have joined Sedgwick, the distance between the Bullock house and Salem Church, by way of United States Ford and the bridges constructed a little below Banks' Ford, being only between ten and twelve miles: a portion of the army could have performed this march during the night, and be in the positions occupied by the Sixth corps on the 4th. Hooker would thus have secured all the advantages he had sought to obtain by going to Chancellorsville: Fredericksburg was turned, and Lee separated from the heights commanding this city; the Federals, posted in an open country where they could manœuvre at ease, compelled the latter either to retire or to come and attack them under the most unfavorable conditions with an army extremely weakened.

Unfortunately for the Union cause, Hooker was no longer himself. Since the shock he had received he not only suffered terribly, but, despite all his efforts, he could not shake off the torpor which constantly seized upon him. His aides-de-camp found it difficult to attract his attention in order to communicate to him the most urgent despatches. It was evident that he had not sufficient control of his faculties at this critical moment to direct the movements of a great army. Under these circumstances he should have transferred the command to another general or caused its functions to be exercised by his chief of staff, Butterfield, whose presence at Falmouth was no longer necessary. He did wrong in failing to perform this duty, or perhaps he was not even in a condition to appreciate the situation. None of those around him dared to tell him the truth, so that the army found itself in reality without a chief, without a controlling spirit.



From the time that it had fallen back upon the works of the Bullock clearing until evening, this army had remained inactive in the positions it had chosen. The divisions that had just been in action were enjoying a well-merited rest; the others were wondering at the inaction to which they were doomed. This astonishment increased when, toward evening, Sedgwick's cannon were heard thundering in the distance; and when night came without any order having been issued, every one understood that the blow which had prostrated Hooker had paralyzed the whole army. This night was passed in a state of immobility by the combatants of both parties. When daylight appeared on Monday, the 4th of May, it found them almost everywhere fronting and mutually watching each other, but both hesitating alike to assume the offensive. During the night Hooker had been fully informed of the situation of the Sixth corps by Warren, who had left it after the battle of Salem Church. The latter, whilst proceeding in the direction of Banks' Ford, had found, a little lower down, at Scott's Ford, the two ponton-bridges erected by General Benham and the engineer brigade, with thirty-four pieces of ordnance placed in a prominent position along the left bank, so as to command the ford. If at this moment Hooker had been in possession of all his faculties, he would no doubt have conceived and executed the simple and effective movement which he does not appear to have thought of till after the campaign, when he had recovered from his wound. As we have already stated, he could have sent a portion of his army to the aid of Sedgwick by way of the bridges, thus affording him the means for delivering a decisive battle on the 4th in an open country, while the rest of the Federal troops, occupying strong positions, would have sufficed to retain an important fraction of Lee's forces around Chancellorsville. Instead of a promise of reinforcements or co-operation, instead of positive instructions regarding the rôle he was about to be called upon to play, Sedgwick only received a despatch from Warren informing him that Hooker was waiting for the attack of the enemy in his positions, and directing him not to assume the offensive: by a singular contradiction, the general-in-chief, while recommending him, on the one hand, to preserve his communications with both Banks' Ford and Fredericksburg,

admitted, on the other hand, the probability of his recrossing the river; and being at too great a distance, as he has said, to give any precise instructions to his lieutenant, he authorized him to provide for the safety of the Sixth corps as he thought best. Later on the morning of the 4th, Hooker sent him several other despatches, which simply enjoined him to maintain himself as long as possible on the right bank above the bridges of Banks' Ford, intimating the possibility of an attack by the main army upon Chancellorsville on the following day, the 5th. Even these messages did not reach their destination until after unheard-of delays. In consequence of a singular neglect in the telegraph service, Warren's despatch, which a mounted courier could easily have brought in three hours, was not less than eight or nine hours on the road, and all those that were exchanged between Hooker and Sedgwick encountered the same fate. These delays increased still further the uncertainty which for the last three days had pervaded all the movements of the Federals.

Sedgwick's situation was a delicate one. The morning was advancing without his having heard one word from his chief. He did not dare either to go forward or fall back whilst waiting for instructions; but, his lines being formed for aggressive action, and having been interrupted on his march, he was not in an advantageous position to defend himself. Newton was deployed to the right of the road, fronting Salem Church, on the ground he occupied at the close of the combat; Brooks had posted himself on his left and somewhat in the rear: the fear of being attacked by the flank on the south side had compelled him to draw his line of battle on this side parallel to the road; finally, Howe's long column had bivouacked still farther in the rear, between the Stansbury house and the Guest dwelling, and along the road which leads to Cemetery Hill from the last-mentioned place, the same road it had followed in the afternoon of the day previous. The despatches he received from head-quarters gave Sedgwick to understand that the game was not probably lost, but given up. From the moment that Hooker relinquished the idea of resuming the offensive, either one way or the other, on the 4th, the rôle of the Sixth corps was changed; the farther it advanced in the direction of Chancellorsville, the more it would have

exposed itself to the concentration of all the enemy's forces against it. With his effective force reduced to twenty thousand men, retreat had become a necessity for Sedgwick. He could fall back either upon Banks' Ford or on Taylor's Hill. In the first instance, he would have preserved an entrance to the bridge in easy communication with the rest of the army; in the second case, a commanding position not difficult to defend, whence, having a full view of all the works of Marye's Hill from the rear, he could prevent the enemy from recovering possession of them. The latter choice was the best, but Hooker's instructions scarcely allowed Sedgwick the option of acting upon it. The troops were worn out, and the confidence of the various commanders had been shaken by the defeat of Salem Church; in the absence of positive instructions he was unable to adopt a decisive course of action; he was unwilling to make any retrograde movement for fear of provoking an attack on the part of the enemy, and so he left his generals in the same state of uncertainty that he was in himself. He simply recommended Howe to provide against a flank attack, and the latter extended his lines so as to rest his extreme left on Taylor's Hill, the importance of which had not escaped him.

The two sections of the Federal army, after having successively assumed the offensive, found themselves, therefore, equally reduced to a defensive attitude, and, without making any effort to effect a junction, they waited until it might please the enemy to attack them. Sedgwick with only twenty thousand men occupied a front of nearly five miles in length. Hooker, who had lost almost twelve thousand men, found himself confined within the lines occupied on the afternoon of the 3d, with about seventy-five thousand men. Protected by breastworks and strong abatis, he hoped that Lee would come to attack him in his positions. The Confederate general took good care not to gratify him. On the morning of the 4th he sent Anderson, with the three brigades he had left and several batteries of artillery, to feel his left flank. These troops, having advanced by way of the River Road, encountered Howard, who occupied a position west of Mineral Spring Run, but they came to a stop as soon as they had ascertained the number of his forces. Other reconnoissances having convinced Lee that the enemy's position could be more easily



defended than that of Chancellorsville, he determined not to attack him until he could do it with his whole army. It was necessary, first of all, to get rid of Sedgwick. The inactivity of the Federals allowed him ample leisure to do so: he took advantage of it with that promptness and vigor which was the secret of his superiority over his adversaries. Anderson was ordered to go and join McLaws, while Heth, with three brigades of Hill's division, came to relieve him in the positions he had taken in the morning. The three divisions which had followed Jackson in his flank movement remained, therefore, alone in front of Hooker's army, although worn out by four days' marching and fighting and reduced to less than twenty-five thousand men.

The task of holding an enemy in check whose forces were three times more numerous was all the more difficult for the Second corps that the latter was obliged to envelop the Federals, and that its concave line was consequently more extended than the convex line of its opponents. But the density of the forest enabled Stuart to conceal the inferiority of his forces, while Lee, leaving the management of this matter in his hands, counted, with just cause, upon the vacillating disposition of his adversaries. The event justified his expectations. In the afternoon of the 4th, Hooker, finding that the enemy did not come to attack him, naturally concluded that he contemplated marching against Sedgwick. He then directed General Griffin to make a demonstration to the right of the Bullock clearing with one division of the Fifth corps, in order to try the Southerners on that side. The combat was a sharp one, for the Federals lost about five hundred men, but the attack was not pushed with vigor; so that, instead of enlightening Hooker as to Stuart's weakness, it led him to believe that he stood in the presence of very considerable forces. The Union generals, finding themselves without either guidance or support, displayed no longer any zeal in leading their troops, and only fought, if one may say so, for conscience' sake. Hooker became more and more convinced that his adversary was gathering his army together at Chancellorsville, and allowed the remainder of the day to pass without stirring.

In the mean time, Lee, with all the forces at his disposal, was preparing to attack Sedgwick in the difficult position which the



latter did not seem in a hurry to vacate. Early, who had seen his division scattered by the capture of Marye's Heights the day before, had succeeded in rallying it, with Barksdale's brigade, on the Telegraph Road, near the Cox house, a little over three miles south of the intrenchments from which he had been driven. He had not been able to participate in the battle of Salem Church, but on the morning of the 4th he had reopened communications with McLaws, and, without waiting for instructions, had put his troops on the march for the purpose of attacking Sedgwick's column in the rear and trying to recapture Marye's Hill. While Hoke's brigade, advancing in a direct line northward, was taking position along the southern declivity of a hill which separates the two branches of Hazel Run, the three other brigades, with that of Barksdale, were crossing this water-course lower down, reaching the foot of the slopes of the plateau occupied by Howe without encountering the enemy. Toward one o'clock in the afternoon Gordon, then Barksdale and Smith, extended their lines to the right, and took possession of Marye's Heights without striking a blow, these heights being separated from Howe's position by a deep valley. Smith brought his forces up so as to form the extremity of this line on Cemetery Hill; Barksdale again took possession of the works of Marye's Hill, over which he had conquered, so to say, the right of ownership in two battles; but he did not venture to attack the city of Fredericksburg, which was defended by one of Gibbon's brigades; finally, Gordon, turning his back upon him in order to face the west, took a position along the Plank Road, resting his left upon Hays' right. He was scarcely settled in these positions when Early, encouraged by the facility with which he had taken possession of them, tried to seize upon Taylor's Hill; but the reception given to Smith, who was driven back with a loss of two hundred prisoners, convinced him that in order to obtain any chance of success it was necessary to wait for the co-operation of one or two other divisions.

This co-operation did not fail him. In fact, Lee, with Anderson, reached at the same hour the positions which McLaws had occupied since the day previous in the vicinity of Salem Church. Leaving instructions with the latter to make a vigorous attack upon the enemy in front of him as soon as the sound of battle

should proclaim the success of the manœuvre he was about to undertake in person, he led Anderson's three brigades, making a large *détour* to the right, as far as the declivities back of the hill of which we have already spoken, and which we shall designate by the name of the Downman house, situated on the summit. It is along these slopes that the left of Early's line extended; Anderson thus prolonged this line, leaving a vast space between himself and McLaws, which became contracted in proportion as they were advancing upon the enemy. Considerable time had been consumed in making this disposition of the troops, and it was after five o'clock in the evening when Lee finally gave the signal for the attack. The positions occupied by Sedgwick were weak at the west and south-west, but excellent south and east, where they were covered by two ravines and crowned the summit of high-reaching slopes. But on this side Howe had only six thousand men to defend a front of more than two miles in extent from Taylor's Hill to the Guest dwelling. In order to cover this front his skirmishers occupied the heights of the Downman hill, thus supporting, in the vicinity of the house, those of Brooks, whose division extended to his right.

It is against this portion of the Federal line that the main effort of the Confederates, led by Lee in person, is directed. Wright's brigade, charging across the cultivated fields which surround the Downman house, captures this large farm, together with some of its defenders. Posey's brigade supports him on the left, and both of them, after crossing the stream, take possession of the heights opposite, compelling Brooks' troops to fall back upon the Plank Road. At the centre, Hoke, making a similar movement, scales the slopes commanded by the Guest dwelling, while Hays takes this position in the rear by following the track of the road. On the right, Gordon advances alone in the direction of Taylor's Hill. The attack has been made with rapidity and vigor. The Federals make a desperate resistance. Mills'\* brigade repels Hays' assault, taking a considerable number of prisoners; but Howe's line is too weak for a long resistance, and, in order to preserve the important position of Taylor's Hill, he is compelled to abandon that of the Guest dwelling in the centre.

His line would certainly be broken if all the forces which Lee has arrayed against the Sixth corps were to take advantage of this success to attack it all at once. These forces, in fact, number more than twenty-three thousand men, whilst Sedgwick can only bring against them nineteen or twenty thousand, all discouraged by the rôle they had been made to play. But, despite their activity, the Confederates cannot avoid those uncertainties, those waverings, which so frequently cause the loss of a fleeting opportunity on the field of battle. McLaws, not hearing the sound of cannon, and receiving no instructions, has remained immovable. Anderson is waiting for him to continue his march. On the right, Hays' and Hoke's brigades, in coming together, have fallen into inextricable confusion. Night supervenes, and with a dense fog : the Confederate leaders, fearing lest their soldiers might fire upon each other, are obliged to lead them back into the ravine at the foot of the heights they have just captured, in order to re-form their ranks. The Federals take advantage of this respite to fall back upon Banks' Ford. Sedgwick, as we have intimated, was only waiting for night to make this movement, but the battle he had just fought, besides the material losses that had resulted from it, had greatly impaired the confidence of his troops. The position that Sedgwick sought to occupy near the river was difficult to defend ; that of Taylor's Hill was much preferable. At all events, the commander of the Sixth corps cannot be blamed for having directed his line of retreat toward the bridges of Banks' Ford, for in doing so he conformed entirely to the spirit of Hooker's instructions. Howe, who appreciated the importance of the heights of Taylor's Hill, abandoned them to the enemy with regret, and only when the other divisions had already left him far behind them. Indeed, the movement of the Federals was executed in the midst of much confusion, and they had reason to congratulate themselves in not being molested by the Confederates, who merely followed them at a distance.

The result of the battle of the 4th caused no surprise at the Unionist head-quarters, where it was immediately made known. What might have been the consequences? If Hooker, taking advantage of the fact that the Sixth corps effectively covered the outlets of the bridges at Scott's Ford, had immediately started to



join him with the largest portion of his army, he might yet have fought Lee that battle in the open country to which he had not hitherto been able to compel his adversary, and probably have made the fickle fortune of war to perch once more upon his banners. Otherwise, the game was lost. There was no reason for attempting on the 5th the movement upon Chancellorsville which he had not thought proper to undertake on the 4th. Sedgwick, isolated as he was, could not fight on Tuesday the three divisions which had forced him to retreat on Monday. He would have been driven into the river, and compelled to recross it as soon as Lee had got his forces together. This result once secured, the latter was certain of being able to invest the remainder of the Federal army in the Wilderness, and to keep it there closely blockaded until it voluntarily abandoned a position which was henceforth as useless as it was dangerous.

Hooker, whose mind had not yet recovered all its lucidity, did not think of reinforcing his lieutenant, but simply advised him not to cross the river except at the last extremity, holding out a hope to him that he should endeavor to make a diversion in his favor.

In the mean time, the Confederate artillery, approaching the bivouacs of the Sixth corps, was beginning to harass with its projectiles the Federals who were hastening to reach the shallow waters of the Rappahannock. Sedgwick and Hooker were exchanging telegraphic despatches which had to be conveyed by mounted couriers to distant telegraph-stations. These despatches crossed each other in such a way that the message received by one party was never an answer to the message he had just despatched. Another cause of confusion added to the disorder which already prevailed in the management of the army. Sedgwick informed his chief that he should be obliged to recross the river; then assured him that, conformably to his instructions, he would endeavor to maintain himself on the right bank; and Hooker wrote to him successively in reply, first ordering him to come back, then directing him to remain. The first despatch was received by Sedgwick at one o'clock in the morning; the second only reached him more than two hours later. During the interval the passage had been effected; the Sixth corps was on the left.



bank, and the bridges were already being dismantled. It was the most striking acknowledgment on the part of the Federals of their defeat. But, even granting that the circumstance or chance of a despatch having been more promptly forwarded might have kept Sedgwick on the right bank, the result on the morning of the 5th, considering the situation in which both his chief and himself found themselves, would have been absolutely the same, with the exception of a few additional victims.

At the news that Sedgwick had recrossed the Rappahannock, Hooker understood at once that all the advantages of his position on the right side of the river were irrevocably lost; the provisions which the army had brought along with it one week previously were nearly exhausted, and it would have required several days to procure fresh supplies. Finally, sad to relate, a certain number of regiments whose term of service had expired the day before insisted upon being immediately discharged, and some of them having even refused to fight, it was deemed expedient to send them North. It was therefore necessary either to make a great effort early in the morning under the most unfavorable circumstances, or to go back to Falmouth. Hooker had the good sense and the courage to adopt the latter alternative, and at once caused a new line of intrenchments to be prepared near the river in order to cover the passage. But, not wishing to assume all the responsibility of this decision, he summoned his corps commanders to a council of war, in order that they might share it with him. He even adopted the singular notion of leaving them to deliberate among themselves. The various opinions expressed in this council of war have been the subject of numerous discussions and recriminations: it appears in evidence that the majority were in favor of retreat. But these details are of little consequence. It behooved the general-in-chief, who had conducted the whole campaign, to adopt the final resolution, such as the circumstances in which he had placed himself imposed upon him, and to act according to his judgment, or, if he did not feel able to do so, to transfer the command to some one else.

Preparations for the retreat were made during the day of the 5th, the army being enveloped in a fog which had pervaded the atmosphere since the day previous. The trains and the artillery

had begun to cross the river when, toward seven o'clock in the evening, after a terrible storm which had broken out in the afternoon, the waters of the Rappahannock suddenly rose. Immediately, the ends of the three bridges were submerged: the river was rising at the rate of one foot per hour; it became necessary to take one bridge to pieces in order to lengthen and strengthen the other two; the roads were in a wretched condition, and the wagons could scarcely be made to move; the soldiers, sad and desolate, were waiting in the rain for the bridges to be made free in order that they might cross over in their turn.

Evening, however, had supervened without any attempt being made by the enemy to disturb this movement; the latter had not even noticed it. The Confederate army had been marching and fighting for the last seven days, and was beginning to feel the effects of the fatigue: Lee was obliged to take this fact into consideration. On the morning of the 5th he had been apprised of Sedgwick's passage, and, almost at the same time, of the evacuation of Fredericksburg, which Gibbon's troops had vacated during the night. There was nothing left for him but to carry out the last part of his plan and invest Hooker in his intrenchments, and, if possible, to attack him with all his united forces. Leaving Barksdale to keep a guard over Marye's Heights, and Early the care of watching the passes of the Rappahannock in front of Sedgwick, he brought back Anderson and McLaws to the vicinity of Chancellorsville. These two divisions were to form his right wing from this point down to the river, while the three divisions of the Second corps would extend to the left in the direction of Ely's Ford. But these movements, which had been delayed by bad weather, not having been completed until the evening of the 5th, the contemplated attack was postponed till the following day.

The Federals continued the passage of the river during the whole night. No one was allowed to take any rest, for, this operation once commenced, it was necessary that it should be completed before daylight, at the risk of being exposed to disaster. The difficulties were increasing hourly. On one occasion both bridges were submerged. Hooker was already on the left bank with the artillery, and the latter was forming into batteries

in order to cover the passage, whilst three-fourths of the army were crowded together on the opposite bank among the narrow roads which ran down to the river. By dint of severe labor the communications were reopened; the unpropitious weather which had delayed the march of the Federals had also proved an impediment to their adversaries; and when daylight appeared the greater portion of the army had crossed the river without having been seen by a single Confederate soldier.

The Fifth corps soon found itself alone on the right bank, established in the breastworks it had occupied for the purpose of covering the passage. Its turn came at last. It crossed over the two bridges, leaving the post of honor—which was the rear-guard of the whole army—to the regular infantry. This operation was performed in fine order. By eight o'clock in the morning, which was dark and gloomy, the last Federal foot-soldier had crossed the bridges. The engineer brigade immediately set to work to dismantle them: the Confederate skirmishers, who had finally made their appearance, were kept at a distance, and at four o'clock in the afternoon the bridges were again packed upon their equipages. The rain was falling in torrents. The excitement of the conflict no longer existed to make the soldier forget his sufferings and privations. The Federal army, trudging along with difficulty through the mud, once more took the road to Falmouth, and on the 7th each corps was again settled in the cantonments it had occupied during the winter. It was the fourth time that these troops had thus returned to their old quarters—twice without having encountered the enemy, and twice after having fought bloody and fruitless battles. An army capable of enduring such reverses without becoming discouraged must have possessed, notwithstanding its imperfections, some rare qualities.

On the morning of the 6th, Lee soon perceived that the defensive dispositions of the enemy, the unfavorable state of the weather, and the fatigue of his own soldiers rendered it impossible for him to harass Hooker's retreat. He accordingly put his columns on the march in the direction of Fredericksburg. They also, therefore, reached their old cantonments again, but in a frame of mind very different from that of their adversaries.



Full of confidence in their own strength and the ability of their leaders, their only regret was that so many companions-in-arms were left behind them, dead or wounded, who could not share in their triumph. Among all these victims there was one whose loss was an irreparable calamity to the Confederate army. On the morning of the 4th of May, Lee, writing to Jackson, said, "It would have been better that I had been wounded instead of you." Lee was undoubtedly too modest, for no one could have succeeded him in the command without detriment to the army; but he was also well aware that no one could take Jackson's place under him. Unfortunately for the Confederates, this place was henceforth to remain vacant, for he never again appeared at the head of his soldiers.

Soon after he had reached the ambulance at Wilderness Tavern his arm was amputated. Notwithstanding his exhausted condition, the operation had proved successful. On the 4th he was carried to Guiney's Station, between Fredericksburg and Richmond, where he received every careful attention and many comforts which it would have been impossible to have obtained in the vicinity of a battlefield. But, after having apparently recovered some strength, he was attacked with inflammation of the chest, caused either by a former cold or by the applications of cold water which he constantly asked for, or more probably by the effects of his fall. His constitution, shaken by wounds, and weakened, above all, by the hæmorrhage, could not withstand the inroads of this illness: on the 10th of May he passed away like a soldier and a Christian, breathing the names of his brave lieutenants in his last humble prayers.

He died in the zenith of his fame, after having seen his most brilliant operation secure a splendid victory to the Army of Northern Virginia, and, unfortunately for that army, the last victory it was destined to achieve in an open country. The battle of Chancellorsville is probably the most interesting to study of all those that were fought in Virginia, for the two adversaries depended upon complicated and boldly-conceived manœuvres for success. The Confederates prevailed over their enemies by reason of the greater mobility of their troops, the energy they displayed in the attack, the far-sightedness and



decision of their leaders, and, finally, by reason of the errors of their adversaries. Their losses amounted to 10,281 men, 8700 of whom were wounded and 1581 killed, without counting from one thousand to fifteen hundred prisoners; they had no less than six generals placed *hors de combat*. The Federals lost in killed, wounded, and prisoners 17,197 men. A few pieces of cannon were captured on both sides.

The absence of Stoneman's fine cavalry had probably been the principal cause of Hooker's defeat, as he had deprived himself of all means of obtaining information when about to enter an impenetrable forest. Such was Jackson's own opinion, expressed a few days before his death. Whatever Stoneman might have done, his operations having no influence over the results of the battle, he could not atone for the wrong which this absence, ordered by Hooker, inflicted upon the army. To bring our recital to a close, we must say a few words concerning these operations, and follow Stoneman for a while in his rapid incursion through Virginia—an incursion which, after all, did but little damage to the enemy.

It was the first time that the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac had undertaken one of those great raids the monopoly of which had hitherto been enjoyed by Stuart. This first effort showed the great progress that had been made by the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac in two years. But the plan which Hooker had laid out for Stoneman, and to which we have previously alluded, supposed *a priori* that the enemy would be beaten. Stoneman was to cut off his retreat, destroy the railway between Aquia Creek and Richmond, along which it was presumed he would fall back, demolish the *dépôts* where he would be seeking to procure supplies, and, if possible, even to bar the way to him. We have seen how the fortune of war upset Hooker's calculations. From the moment that he had failed to compel Lee to retreat the *rôle* assigned to Stoneman lost almost all its importance. If he had been able to completely intercept the communications of the Confederate army with Richmond, he would no doubt have caused it serious embarrassments; for it lived almost from hand to mouth, and during its short stay in the Wilderness the provisions which arrived from the Confed-

erate capital were forwarded to it from Guiney's Station, the nearest point on the railroad, in wagons: it had not been able to take along a sufficient quantity to last during the operations. Still, this army, inured to privations, situated in a friendly country still possessing some resources, would not, we are perfectly convinced, have been obliged to retreat in consequence of this simple interruption, which, indeed, could not have lasted long; for Stoneman, isolated between Richmond and Fredericksburg, would not have been able to have maintained himself along the railway, while the greatest damage he would have been able to have inflicted could very soon have been repaired. Not knowing the result of the battle, his duty was certainly to act as if the expectations of his chief had been fulfilled; but if the latter had erred through overweening confidence, Stoneman aggravated Hooker's fault by not following implicitly the instructions that had been given him.

Stoneman crossed the Rappahannock on the 29th of April, a few hours after Slocum's column, but he did not display subsequently the same celerity as the infantry. Buford's division and Gregg's brigade, detached from Pleasonton's division, which had crossed the river near Kelly's Ford under the immediate leadership of the cavalry commander, encamped after marching a short distance, and thus found themselves in the rear of the army, which was proceeding in the direction of Chancellorsville. The second division, under Averell, was still more in the rear, having crossed at Rappahannock Station. It will be remembered that it was the part of this division to cover the first on the west side, while the latter, following the railway from Gordonsville to Richmond—called the Virginia Central Railroad—eastward, should destroy the Aquia Creek line in the neighborhood of Hanover Junction. Stoneman, instead of keeping this division within his reach, deprived himself entirely of its services by ordering Averell on the 30th to watch and attack the enemy's cavalry on the side of Rapidan Station, without giving him any instructions for the future; and the latter, far from supplying this deficiency, was not even able to come up with the enemy at a time when fighting was going on all around him.

We have seen that Stuart, taking one of his two brigades

along with him for the purpose of harassing and outstripping the Federal column which was marching upon Chancellorsville, had directed W. H. F. Lee to cover the junction and the dépôts at Gordonsville with the other. The latter had left Culpeper, and was at Rapidan Station on the 30th. Averell came to attack him there on the morning of the 1st of May, but he allowed himself to be diverted during a portion of the day by a useless *fusillade*, and only closed upon the enemy when it was too late to secure any important success. Under cover of the night Lee got away from him, and led his mounted men to Gordonsville at a single stretch. Leaving Averell on that side, he hastened in pursuit of Stoneman, whose movements were much more menacing to the railways of Virginia. In fact, Buford's division and Gregg's brigade, after crossing the Rapidan separately, had encamped in the evening of the 30th on the right bank, near Raccoon Ford, and on the morning of the 1st of May they had started for Louisa Court-house, having sent a detachment to clear their right flank along the Madison Road. It was this rapid movement in the interior of Virginia which caused W. H. F. Lee to follow in the track of Stoneman, although his force was not sufficient to seriously harass his march.

On the morning of May 2d, Stoneman entered the village of Louisa Court-house without striking a blow, to the great astonishment of its inhabitants, who little expected such a visit, and he set about at once to destroy the railway which passes through it. A few hours later W. H. F. Lee reached Gordonsville. But Averell, instead of following him, resolved, for some unexplained reason, to fall back with his whole division on Hooker's army, and encamped at Ely's Ford in the evening in the rear of this army, where, it will be remembered, Stuart was preparing to attack it when he was interrupted by the news of Jackson's wound. In fact, the great conflict was already progressing around Chancellorsville before a single Federal trooper had reached the Virginia Central Railroad: the expedition was yet very far from the Aquia Creek line, the only important line to be destroyed. This delay was caused, in the first instance, by the fact that Hooker, anxious to reach Chancellorsville, had made his infantry cross the Rappahannock before his cavalry; secondly,



that the latter had been extremely slow in its movements during the march of the 29th and 30th; and finally, that the untimely retreat of Averell had deprived Stoneman of one half of the forces he should have had at his disposal.

Under these circumstances the latter should have marched with rapidity and kept his troops close together. He did not do so. The day of the 2d was passed at Louisa Court-house. In the afternoon Lee came to feel the Federals, but after a sharp engagement he was compelled to fall back upon Gordonsville. So long as the Unionist column did not become divided it could pursue its way at leisure and accomplish its work of destruction without anything to fear from the enemy. In the evening this column encamped at Thompson's Cross-roads, where the road from Fredericksburg to Columbia intersects that from Charlottesville to Richmond. It was at this place that Stoneman carried out a plan he had conceived—an excellent plan if the object of the Union general had been to throw trouble and confusion into the whole of Virginia, and not to intercept Lee's communications with Richmond in the most effective way possible.

Calling his principal officers together, he explained to them this plan, comparing his corps to a bombshell which bursts in the midst of the enemy, hurling fragments in every direction, each of which causes as much havoc as a whole projectile. He forgot that, in order to destroy and demolish, the shell, powerless for this purpose, must be replaced by a solid ball. He divided the thirty-five hundred mounted men he had with him into seven detachments, assigning to each an independent task. We shall merely state in few words what they did and the route they followed.

While Stoneman and Buford remained at Thompson's Cross-roads with five hundred men to serve as a rallying-point to the other detachments, Colonel Wyndham, at the head of a regiment, proceeded by a forced march toward Columbia, a little town situated on the James River. The canal, following this river and crossing the Rivanna stream over a bridge near the town, gave it great strategic importance. Wyndham found it in a defenceless state, and took possession of some warehouses, but by some strange oversight, the destruction of the bridge not having been taken into



consideration, he had not the necessary materials for blowing it up. Not daring to prolong his stay beyond a few hours, and learning that the enemy was approaching, he retraced his steps, and joined Buford again that same evening. W. H. F. Lee, who fully appreciated the importance of the bridge, had hastened to the spot in order to dispute it to the Federals, and his approach no doubt was the means of securing its safety. Two other detachments, under Captains Drummond and Merritt, also joined Buford's reserve on the evening of the 3d, after having destroyed some of the bridges of the Virginia Central Railroad. General Gregg followed this same road with two regiments as far as Hanover Junction, where he struck the Aquia Creek Railway. He thus followed the route traced out for Stoneman, and undertook the work of destruction for a considerable distance. But, fearful lest his small force might be surrounded by the enemy, he was unable to accomplish this with the care and method that were necessary to render it effective, and he again joined Buford on the 4th, without having destroyed the great bridge of the Aquia Creek Railway on the North Anna, the demolition of which would have interrupted all traffic by that line for some time.

In the mean while, Stoneman and Buford, after having encamped a short distance east of Thompson's Cross-roads on the 4th, at a place called Shannon's Hill, and brought together all the detachments whose return was anticipated, proceeded northward again on the 5th, passing through Yanceyville; they were followed by Lee, whose pursuit of Wyndham had once more led him to Stoneman's rear, but who could not seriously molest them. On the 7th the column crossed the Rapidan at Raccoon Ford, without any attempt having been made on the part of the enemy to disturb its march, and on the following day, taking the same road by which it came, it crossed the Rappahannock at Kelly's Ford.

Two regiments remained behind, the Second New York and the Twelfth Illinois; these, under the leadership of two intelligent and enterprising officers, Colonels Kilpatrick and Davis, separately traversed the whole of Virginia as far as the sea, and accomplished during this incursion all that could be expected from such small detachments. The former, marching all night

in the direction of Richmond, reached the Aquia Creek Railway at Hungary Station on the morning of the 4th, burnt the dépôt, cut down the telegraphic lines and tore up the rails; continuing his daring march, he forced his way through the outposts which surrounded the Confederate capital, passed between the redoubts which enveloped it at intervals, and captured a considerable number of prisoners in sight of the city; then, leaving the enemy astounded at so much audacity, he crossed the Chickahominy near Meadow Bridge, destroyed the railway-bridge, quickly gained the banks of the Pamunkey at Hanover town, and, being ferried over, succeeded at last in placing that river between himself and the enemy, who was pressing him closely. On the morning of the 5th, starting again for the north, he crossed the Mattaponi, and reached the Rappahannock at the village of Tappahannock. From thence, in order to throw the detachments that had been pursuing him all the way from Richmond on the wrong scent, he suddenly turned once more southward; picked up on the way a squadron of the Twelfth Illinois; and finally, on the 7th, reached the strong place of Gloucester Point, at the entrance of York River, which was occupied by the Federals.

Here he found Colonel Davis, who had arrived the day before. The latter had started at the same time as himself, and had followed, more to the northward, along the South Anna, a parallel direction with his own. His route being the shortest, he reached the Aquia Creek Railway at Ashland, which neither Gregg at the north nor Kilpatrick at the south had expected to strike before the following morning, about six o'clock in the evening of the 3d. So that, arriving unexpectedly, he had a chance of intercepting a train of cars coming from Fredericksburg. His presence along the line connecting Richmond with Lee's army threw the capital into a state of extraordinary confusion. Two hours later he occupied the other line at Hanover Junction. The stations were destroyed, as also some of the cars, one or two locomotives, and a large quantity of provisions; the railroad-ties which had been wrenched off with the rails were formed into a pile and set on fire; while two small bridges, one on Stony Creek, near Ashland, the other on Machumps Creek, near Hanover, were burned. But these damages were of small importance: in order

to adequately destroy the usefulness of the two lines of railway it would have been necessary to have burned the two bridges of the South Anna, which, as the reader will remember, had played so important a part in McClellan's campaign during the month of May, 1862. To effect this would have involved the loss of a few hours: Davis did not consider himself sufficiently strong to risk this delay, and, like Gregg a little more to the northward, he allowed the opportunity of inflicting serious damage upon the enemy to slip from him. After having passed through Hanover Court-house, and given his soldiers a short rest, he struck the White House line of railway at Tunstall's Station on the morning of the 4th, just as Kilpatrick was making his appearance at Hungary. Less fortunate than the latter, he encountered a detachment of infantry, which blocked the way to Williamsburg after having caused him some losses; but he turned northward, crossed the Pamunkey at Plunkett's Ferry and the Mattaponi at Walkertown on the following day, almost at the same time that Kilpatrick was effecting a passage a little higher up, and finally reached Gloucester Point.

To close the recital of the cavalry operations coincident with the battle of Chancellorsville, it will be sufficient for us to mention another bold stroke attempted by Mosby upon the rear of the Federal army. Wishing to take advantage of Stoneman's absence and to harass the communications of that army while it was engaged with Lee's troops, he flung himself on the 3d of May, with three hundred mounted men, upon the railroad running from Alexandria to Warrenton Junction. But General Stabel, who had charge of guarding this line, was, as usual, upon his guard, and sent a squadron after him which put him to flight.

On the 7th of May, whilst Hooker was returning to Falmouth, the whole of Stoneman's cavalry was regaining the Federal lines along the borders either of the Upper Rappahannock or of York River. The railroads it had intercepted were already repaired, and the interruption of the railway service was so short that Lee's army was not inconvenienced by it. This fact affords the best proof that the real object of the expedition had not been accomplished. But it was not altogether fruitless to the Federals: it



gave a certain degree of confidence to their cavalry, made it understand how easy it was for it to overrun an enemy's country, and taught it at the same time that the destruction of a line of railway in order to be effective should be performed with great care—a lesson which was not lost in the future.

The battle of Chancellorsville was a defeat, but not a disaster, for the Federal army. The latter was coming back exhausted, reduced in numbers, but not discouraged, as was the case after the useless butchery of Fredericksburg. Its leader had committed some errors, but he had also displayed some of the attributes that should characterize a commander-in-chief. He cannot be held responsible in the judgment of his country and of history for the want of a controlling direction which had given so much advantage to the Confederates since the morning of the 3d—since that fatal hour when, stricken down like so many others around him, his feeble hand had been equally powerless in wielding the baton of command or for transferring it to one of his lieutenants.

The share of responsibility resting upon each one gave rise to lively discussions and bitter recriminations, but none of the soldiers who had crossed the Rappahannock during that memorable week entertained the least doubt as to the gravity of the check sustained. Three of Hooker's subordinates paid for the faults of all, although the errors for which they were made to suffer had exercised no influence over the general result of the battle. Averell had been deprived of his command on the 3d of May, even while the action was pending, by the general-in-chief, who reproached him for his inaction; and a few days later Hooker insisted upon Stoneman being superseded by Pleasanton. Finally, General Revere, who had commanded Berry's division for a short time after the death of the latter, being charged with having given the signal of retreat at the most critical moment of the battle, was arraigned and tried before a general court-martial and dismissed from the military service.\* Although Hooker's check had been strikingly obvious, he had

\* This dismissal, announced in General Orders, No. 282, War Department, A.-G. O., August 11, 1863, was revoked by Special Orders, No. 302, War Department, A.-G. O., September 12, 1864, and his resignation accepted, to date from August 10, 1863.—ED.



no sooner returned to Falmouth than he sought to palliate it in a general order addressed to his army.\* But this pompous language was not calculated to fill up its ranks and to restore it all it had lost.

Diminished by combats and the expiration of a large number of enlistments, this army needed recuperation before resuming the offensive. Lee was not to allow it time to do so.

\* General Orders, No. 49, Head-quarters Army of the Potomac, May 6, 1863.—ED.

## CHAPTER III.

### *SUFFOLK.*

WE must suspend the recital of the struggle that is taking place between the two great armies of the Potomac and Northern Virginia, and avail ourselves of the rest which they enjoyed after the battle of Chancellorsville to cast a glance at the operations of which the long coast of the Confederate States was the scene during the first half of the year 1863, and to say a few words relative to the combats fought in Virginia by bodies of troops acting independent of Hooker's and Lee's armies.

In the second volume we have brought the narrative of the operations undertaken along the coast of the Southern States to the close of the year 1862. We have seen the Federal navy pursuing a double object: on the one hand maintaining its indisputable superiority on the sea by closing all access to the coast to neutral flags, and by fighting the armed vessels of the Confederates; on the other hand, either singly or in concert with land-troops, taking possession of this coast, reducing or investing the fortresses commanding the entrance of the ports in order to lessen and facilitate the task of the blockading squadrons. We shall continue to follow in this place the division we have adopted, which was indicated by that of those squadrons, two of which were stationed along the Atlantic coast, one north and the other south of Charleston, and two in the Gulf of Mexico, one east and the other west of the mouths of the Mississippi.

We find them on the 1st of January under the respective commands of Admirals Lee, DuPont, Bailey, and Farragut; but the latter, so fully occupied with a portion of his vessels in the waters of the Mississippi, is obliged to leave the control of the remainder of his squadron to subordinates.

The operations of Admiral Lee's fleet, called the North Atlan-

tic Squadron, present but little interest in themselves, but they are intimately connected with those of the detachments of land-forces stationed along the coast which will have to sustain, during that period, struggles of sufficient importance to exercise a certain influence upon the total bearings of the war. The recital of the battles fought in South-eastern Virginia and on the inland sea of North Carolina is the more appropriate in this place, after the battle of Chancellorsville, that we shall meet in these combats a portion of Lee's soldiers under the command of such leaders as Longstreet, D. H. Hill, Hood, and Pickett, who until then had always been arrayed against the Army of the Potomac. In fact, D. H. Hill had been sent into North Carolina for the purpose of imparting a better organization to the militia of that State, and about the 26th of February, Longstreet, with three divisions, under Hood, Pickett, and Anderson, had taken up his quarters at Petersburg, south of Richmond. A military department had been created for him, and a fourth division, newly formed, under General French, had been added to his command. His first care was to fortify by a series of works, in which he placed one half of his forces, the line of the Blackwater, an important tributary of the Chowan River, which runs southward to about twenty miles west of Suffolk. Thanks to these works, he felt sure of being able to resist henceforth any offensive movement of the Federals on that side.

The Richmond government must have considered the danger imminent to have assembled such important forces along the coast to the detriment of Lee's army, in whose ranks ten thousand men more or less could exercise a decisive influence on the day of battle. The Federals on this occasion were gathering the fruits of McClellan's campaign against Richmond, which were not entirely lost at the time of the evacuation of Harrison's Landing. They had then preserved the important positions of Williamsburg and Yorktown on the Virginia peninsula, of Norfolk and Suffolk on the right bank of the James. These were points whence an army, speedily transported by sea, could always debouch for the purpose of operating either against the city of Richmond itself or against the lines of railways running south from that town. The Fourth army corps, commanded by General Keyes, had charge

of these positions. It occupied Fortress Monroe, Yorktown, and Fort Magruder near Williamsburg with one division; the other, under General Peck, was located at Norfolk and Suffolk. The latter town, situated on the Nansemond River at the point where it forms a creek running into the James, is only separated by a few miles of mainland from the vast marsh called the Dismal Swamp. The impenetrable bogs of this swamp encircle with a thick belt the black and infectious waters of Lake Drummond, the accursed spot of the Indian legends, the horrors of which Thomas Moore has sung in one of his most poetical ballads, and extends as far as the vicinity of the inland sea of North Carolina. Suffolk thus commands an isthmus which connects Norfolk with the mainland. Hence the importance of this position, which Peck hastened to occupy on the 22d of September with the nine thousand men of his division, and which he began at once to fortify. The Confederates allowed him to proceed without interruption until the month of January, 1863. At this period they began to take notice of the scope he had given to these works, and, fearing lest he might make them the basis of incursions against their railways, they watched him a little closer. General Pryor came with one brigade to station himself on the Blackwater River, and on the 26th he advanced as far as within eight or nine miles of Suffolk. Peck immediately sent forward the Corcoran brigade against him. The latter on the 30th of January found him posted at a point called Kelley's Store, and attacked him vigorously. The Federal artillery soon silenced that of Pryor, but when the infantry tried to carry the strong positions he occupied, it was repulsed. The Confederates, however, did not consider themselves able to maintain their ground, and availed themselves of the advantage they had obtained to retire. They were not long pursued. The losses of the Federals amounted to one hundred and twenty men, those of their adversaries to about fifteen only. But from that time the latter did not again venture into the neighborhood of Suffolk.

We have pointed out elsewhere the distribution of the forces which under General Foster had charge of defending the principal towns and ports of the inland sea of North Carolina against any offensive return of the enemy. Posted at the entrance of



three great rivers, within reach of railways of great importance to the Confederacy, he had shown, by his expedition against Goldsborough in November, 1862, that his presence was not an idle threat.

The Federal navy kept up a connection between the various stations of the land-forces, protected them in case of need with its powerful guns, and participated in the reconnoissances, the small expeditions, which were undertaken for the purpose of preventing the enemy from approaching them. Thus, on the 8th of January two steamers,\* combining their movements with those of a regiment of cavalry, ascended the Pamunkey River as far as the White House, and destroyed some large dépôts of grain; on the 30th of the same month a Federal gunboat† entered the waters of the Perquimans River, which runs from the Dismal Swamp into Albemarle Sound, reached the town of Hertford, and destroyed the bridge of a road through which the Confederates drew their supplies from the neighboring districts. In short, on the 4th of March a naval expedition dispersed some partisan bands in the bay of Pungo on the Pamlico River.

The rôle imposed upon the navy was a difficult and dangerous one: it was required to put to sea in all kinds of weather, to navigate along a difficult coast, destitute of lighthouses, frequently occupied by the enemy, and to chase blockade-runners at the risk of striking against sunken reefs. The vessels, for the most part old merchant-ships, were often commanded by improvised officers. On the 14th of January the steamer *Columbia* was wrecked near Masonboro' Inlet on the coast of North Carolina; notwithstanding the efforts of a vessel‡ sent to her assistance, she was destroyed by the enemy and her crew taken prisoners. On the 23d of February two Union ships,|| having attempted to attack a blockade-runner at the entrance of Cape Fear River, were driven back by the fire of Fort Caswell, an old Federal work which defended its entrance.

At the approach of the mild season, from the middle of March,

\* The gunboats *Mahaska* and *Commodore Morris*, and an army-tug, the *May Queen*.—ED.

† With fifty men of the Twenty-seventh Massachusetts on board.—ED.

‡ Two, the *Penobscot* and the *Cambridge*.—ED.

|| The *Dacotah* and the *Monticello*.—ED.

the Confederates determined to employ the forces assembled in those latitudes for an offensive campaign. They proposed to confine themselves no longer to the task of simply harassing the Federals and shutting them up in their positions, but to recapture all those positions from them. Longstreet was to direct their main effort against Suffolk, the fall of which would involve that of Norfolk. Once masters of this fine port and its arsenal, they would be able to again close the James River, the most direct route to Richmond, the only one able to supply with provisions an army besieging that capital; they could even harass Federal vessels as far as Chesapeake Bay. In order to facilitate this operation, Hill was ordered to draw the attention of the Union generals toward North Carolina, and to make them believe that the attack was to be directed against Foster's troops, which had recently been singularly reduced in numbers.

In fact, at the end of January the government of Washington, being no doubt desirous of satisfying public opinion in the North, which was always clamoring for the capture of Charleston and felt vexed at beholding the cradle of secession still standing, decided to send a powerful reinforcement to the troops assembled at Beaufort under Hunter's command, and Foster was ordered to take twelve thousand of his best soldiers to him. This was a great error, because even if those troops had succeeded in capturing Charleston—a very doubtful matter, as the event proved—the only result would have been to gratify political hatred without exercising hardly any influence on the war. In order to accomplish this object, two well-trained and organized divisions were unnecessarily exposed to a murderous climate; whereas in North Carolina, a much healthier country, they would have been able, under Foster's direction, to continue the operations they had so successfully commenced the preceding autumn. These operations, directed against the lines of railways which supplied Richmond with food, could have been considered as connected with those of the Army of the Potomac, and would sooner or later have been of great help to it. The Federal government, through unaccountable neglect, had not even notified Hunter of the powerful reinforcement which had thus been sent to him. Foster had embarked at Beaufort in North Carolina on the 2d of February.

When he arrived at Port Royal nothing was found in readiness for his soldiers. He was received as an intruder; soon after Hunter took advantage of Foster's temporary absence to break up the corps which the latter had brought him, and distributed its troops among his own brigades. A quarrel between the two chieftains naturally followed, and Foster was compelled to return to New Berne alone, leaving in the hands of Hunter the troops he had organized, and which were destined to remain too long inactive among the Sea Islands. He tried to conceal from the enemy this weakening of his forces by employing in the best way he could the troops that remained with him, to which were soon added a few recruits. During the month of March he undertook, to this effect, several reconnoissances into the interior of the country; but he could not deceive the Confederates, who were thoroughly informed of all that was taking place in his camps. This was a fine opportunity for them: Foster, being menaced, could not fail to ask Keyes for reinforcements, and if he was left to his own resources an effort would be made to drive him into the sea, instead of making a simple demonstration. Hill began by attempting a bold stroke against Fort Anderson, a considerable work which the Federals were erecting on the left bank of the Neuse in front of New Berne. This was to harass Foster at the most important point of his command. On the 13th of March, General Pettigrew, following some by-roads with one or two Confederate brigades, took advantage of the absence of the greater portion of the Federal vessels that were guarding the Neuse to burst suddenly upon the fort, which was occupied by a small garrison. The first attack was vigorously made, but after a not very sanguinary engagement the well-directed fire of the two Federal gunboats\* was not long in making the assailants beat a retreat.

Following the execution of this plan, Hill, who was striving to magnify the number of his soldiers in the eyes of his adversaries, conveyed them from the banks of the Neuse to those of Tar River; on the 30th of March he came with one division to invest the small town of Washington, which the Federals had converted into a dépôt for supplies for the fleet, and which was

\* The *Hunchback* and the *Hetzel*.—ED.



surrounded by a belt of redoubts and half-bastions. This place, situated on the left bank of the Tar, was occupied by a small garrison; two gunboats were at anchor in the river. While the Confederate infantry were occupying some old works which had been erected the previous year when this same town had been attacked, considerable detachments with a powerful artillery force took position on the opposite side of the river, carried off the buoys which indicated the course of the channel, and thus succeeded in blockading the garrison. At the first news of the attack General Foster had repaired to Washington by sea, and had reached that town before the investment. Two brigades had followed him close with ammunition upon transports, while most of the vessels stationed in the inland sea came over for the purpose of co-operating with him. But the Confederate batteries, skilfully posted and admirably served, succeeded in preventing the passage of the transports. The attempts at landing on the part of the Federals were frustrated, and it was with the utmost difficulty that a single vessel, the *McDenner*,\* succeeded, by forcing the blockade, in carrying the reinforcement of a detachment of infantry to the besieged, together with the ammunition of which they were beginning to feel the want.

The troops sent by land from New Berne were not more fortunate. Spinola's brigade, which had left Fort Anderson on the 8th of April, was stopped the following day at Blount's Mills by the Confederate cavalry, and forced to turn back. A second expedition, formed of Naglee's entire division, was organized a few days later, but was unable to start before the 17th. In the mean while, the Washington garrison was holding out bravely, notwithstanding the dangerous position in which it was placed, while the fire of the gunboats did not allow the besiegers to approach sufficiently near the place to make an assault. They do not appear, however, to have seriously contemplated an attack by main force, their principal object, as we have stated, being to divert the attention of the Federals from the campaign which they were preparing elsewhere. At all events, the Union vessels constantly exposed to their fire had suffered greatly, the sup-

\* This was the *Ceres*, under the command of acting volunteer Lieutenant J. Macdarmid.—Ed.



plying of the garrison was becoming more and more difficult, and it was waiting with the utmost impatience for the assistance which was to reach it by land, when on the 16th of April the besiegers suddenly disappeared.

The news that Hill had received from Longstreet had prompted him to this step, and, turning his back upon Washington, he had, with all his troops, started to join the latter. The demonstration he had just made was entirely successful. In fact, Foster, finding himself seriously menaced, had asked for reinforcements. He was promised ten thousand men, three thousand of whom were to be detached from the Fourth army corps.

Hill, who was in command of a large division, had made the Carolinians believe, and through them the Federals, that his forces were much more numerous. Longstreet, on his part, having spread the rumor that he was going to lead his troops to Charleston, the Federal military authorities had yielded credence to it, and were the less reluctant to take away one brigade from Peck that on the 14th of March the latter had received with Getty's division, detached from the Ninth corps, the effective force of which amounted to from nine to fourteen thousand men. This is what Longstreet, who was perfectly well informed by his spies of all that was taking place in the Federal camps, was waiting for, in order to strike a decisive blow against Suffolk. On the 10th of April the troops intended to join Foster took the cars that were to convey them from Suffolk to Norfolk: just as the first train was about to start, Peck received a despatch from General Viele, who was in command at the latter place, informing him that Longstreet's whole army was on the march to attack him. A letter which, by a fortunate chance, had been taken from a Confederate emissary a few moments before, had revealed in time the preparations of the enemy, the arrival of a bridge-equipage, and the concentration of troops which was being effected along the lines of the Blackwater. Peck kept all his troops and prepared himself for the attack of which he had been notified.

Suffolk formed a vast intrenched camp, consisting of redoubts and lunettes connected by a continuous belt of about ten miles in length; notwithstanding its extent, this belt was easily defended,

about six miles of it being protected by water-courses. At the north it was bordered by the deep waters of the Nansemond; at the west, by a considerable tributary flowing from the right side of this river; at the north-east, by the large stream called Jericho Creek. At the south-east the belt had been extended beyond this stream in order to command the isthmus which separates it from the Dismal Swamp: this isthmus was, moreover, intersected by the discharging-channel which carries the waters of the swamp into the Nansemond. At the south a double line of works supplied the absence of natural obstacles. But Peck had not only to defend the space comprised between the river and the swamp. Below Suffolk the Nansemond pursues its winding course for a distance of four miles in a straight line, or say about eight miles, by following its sinuous course, as far as a promontory called Hill's Point, where the stream, receiving the waters of a river called the Western Branch from the west, forms a vast estuary which takes the name of Lower Nansemond.

This estuary was too broad for the Confederates to think of crossing it. But a bar of small depth off Hill's Point prevents large vessels from reaching the Upper Nansemond. Between Suffolk and Norfolk the river, narrow and tortuous, bordered by dense forests, and fed by marshy streams, was very difficult to defend, and seemed to invite Longstreet to force a passage: he had the bridge-equipage necessary for this operation, and his numerical superiority enabled him to undertake it. In fact, he had left the lines of the Blackwater with his four divisions, about thirty thousand strong.

Being convinced that Hill's demonstrations had succeeded in weakening Peck and deceiving him in regard to his intentions, he wished to take advantage of his strength in order to carry the works of Suffolk by surprise. It was a rich prey, well calculated to tempt the skilful lieutenant of Lee, who, invested for the first time with an independent command, was burning with desire to signalize himself by a brilliant exploit. Besides the strong garrison, which, driven into its intrenchments, would be reduced to capitulate, Suffolk contained a large number of heavy guns, all kinds of provisions, and, among other things, more than sixty miles of rails for railroads. Once master of this point, Norfolk

with its arsenal, so indispensable to the fleet which blockaded James River, was at his mercy. On the 12th of April the troops were on the march along the roads which, coming from the west and south, converge at Suffolk, while Hood, following that of South Quay, captured the advance-posts of the cavalry which Peck had sent out as a reconnoissance in the direction of the Blackwater.

On the following day about noon the Confederates appeared simultaneously on both sides of the Nansemond. Anderson's and Pickett's divisions, coming from the south, one by the route debouching upon Fort Dix, the other by the Somerton Road, drove back the Federals into their works; whilst at the west, Hood, following the Roanoke Railway, took position along the water-courses which protected the Federal front, and French, following the left bank of the Nansemond, appeared in front of Suffolk. But the defenders of this place were fully prepared; they had at their head a chieftain and some leaders whose intelligence and activity compensated for their small numbers. Peck had entrusted Getty with the task of guarding the long line of the Nansemond from Suffolk to Hill's Point, the weakest place on his whole line; he himself, with his division, occupied the intrenched camp and the borders of the discharging-channel, having posted a detachment of cavalry at South Mills, south of the Dismal Swamp, in order to cover the road, which, passing around the swamp on this side, would have enabled the enemy to reach Norfolk by turning his position.

The Federal navy was represented in the waters of Suffolk only by a river-boat\* carrying a battery of light howitzers, and by two small vessels† hired by the agents of the War Department. But Admiral Lee immediately sent to their assistance all the vessels that were then in the harbor of Newport News whose small draught enabled them to get over the shallows of the Nansemond. On the evening of the 12th the naval forces assembled on this river numbered two vessels below the bar of Hill's Point and six above; four others were to follow in quick succession. It is true that they were too lightly built to resist the enemy's artillery:

\* The *Mount Washington*, Lieutenant R. H. Lamson.—ED.

† The *West End* and the *Smith Briggs*.—ED.

some of them were steamers intended for river-service, whose flat bottoms supported a frail construction of iron and planks; the others were small merchant-vessels, whose weak frames could scarcely resist the recoil of the guns. But they were commanded by two energetic and daring officers. Lieutenant Lamson had charge of guarding the Nansemond above Hill's Point, and Lieutenant Cushing below. The latter, who distinguished himself during the war by several brilliant actions, was first in command in virtue of seniority.

On arriving in front of the Federal works, which had been put in a perfect state of defence, provided with heavy guns, and well garrisoned by Peck's infantry, Longstreet saw at once that all surprise was impossible, and did not deem it expedient to venture an attack by main force. He tried to avail himself of his numerical superiority in order to turn those works. While Anderson's and Pickett's divisions were to occupy the besieged along the right bank of the Nansemond, Hood was to join French in order to force a passage below Suffolk. The character of the river between that city and Hill's Point was, as we have stated, favorable to such an operation: Getty's seven thousand men had great difficulty in effectively guarding the eight miles entrusted to their care. Longstreet's first object, before attempting a passage, was to get rid of the Federal vessels, which could interrupt the operation or cut up his bridges if he succeeded in throwing any across the river. To effect this, strong works were erected in front of the principal angles of the river, while the field-artillery, concealed in the woods, would hold itself in readiness to occupy them as soon as one of the enemy's vessels should come in sight. It seemed that these vessels, whose lower works and machinery had no protection whatever, would be speedily destroyed or compelled to put back to sea, thus leaving the pass perfectly free to the Confederates. In order to divert the attention of the Federals while these works were being constructed, the troops stationed south of Suffolk made strong demonstrations against that place during the day of the 13th, while a swarm of skirmishers, ambushed along the left bank, were trying to harass Lamson's flotilla.

Some of the Confederate batteries were in readiness on the fol-



lowing day, the 14th: the opportunity for testing their strength was not long coming. The flotilla which had charge of watching the whole course of the river proceeded on the morning of that day toward the estuary of the Lower Nansemond, along the banks of which the enemy had shown himself, when all of a sudden one of the hostile batteries opened fire upon it. The smallest vessels passed through without much injury, but the *Mount Washington*, presenting a much wider surface, was struck by several balls and her machinery damaged. Unable to manœuvre in that condition, she ran aground near the bar in front of Hill's Point. The Confederates, perceiving her situation, immediately brought forward some field-pieces, which they placed in a small work in process of construction at that point, and began to riddle her with shot at a distance of seven hundred and fifty yards. She would inevitably have been destroyed, in spite of the vigor with which Lamson defended himself, if Lieutenant Cushing had not come in time to his assistance with the steamer *Commodore Barney*. For the space of four hours these two vessels, as also the river-boat *Stepping-Stones*, held out against the Confederate artillery and skirmishers until the tide enabled the *Mount Washington* to get free and resume her course. Cushing did not join her again until after he had silenced the enemy's guns. But this engagement was very costly to the Federal vessels, which were greatly damaged by the projectiles of the Confederates, and had a large number of wounded on board.

On the following day the latter, feeling encouraged by the results they had achieved, armed several new batteries along the left bank of the river. But General Getty, on the opposite side, had not been inactive. In order to be able to convey his forces with greater facility to the point which might be menaced, he had constructed along the river a new road which passed over the tributary streams, until then deemed impassable, and connected various works which had been erected in front of the enemy. These works were also speedily fortified, and the main battery of the Confederates, constructed at the extreme point of Norfleet\* for the purpose of covering their passage, was so vigorously cannonaded that it was soon reduced to silence. Lamson took

\* Otherwise known as Norfleet's farm.—ED.

advantage of this on the morrow to go up the river, where the presence of his vessels afforded much encouragement to the land-troops. The latter had been constantly pressed by the skirmishers of the enemy, who were endeavoring to find out the weak point of the Federal line, but without attacking it seriously. Longstreet, in fact, had changed his tactics. He was gathering his forces below Suffolk, fully convinced that by multiplying his batteries along the river he would finally obtain complete command of its course, and might then effect a passage which he did not dare to attempt by main force. By declining to run the risks of this operation in the hope of rendering his success more certain, he allowed his adversaries, on the contrary, time to prepare themselves and complete their means of defence. Nevertheless, he came very near succeeding. The battery of Hill's Point had been completed, its elevated position sheltering it from the fire of the fleet; the guns which were dismounted on the 13th had been replaced by others of larger calibre. Although the range of their fire was reduced by the embrasures, they had entire command of the pass, and again caused serious damage to the flotilla when it proceeded up to Suffolk. Lamson determined to destroy it. On the evening of the 16th he landed a few companies of infantry, but these troops were seized with such a fearful panic that they had to be re-embarked without approaching the enemy. Admiral Lee, thinking that his vessels were too much exposed in the tortuous current of the Nansemond, ordered them to evacuate at once that portion of the river comprised between Suffolk and Hill's Point; this was to invite the enemy to attempt a passage which the Union troops, discouraged by the withdrawal of the gunboats, could not have prevented.

Fortunately for the Federals, Lamson was not so easily induced to give up the game: in concert with General Peck he resolved to try another bold stroke upon the battery of Hill's Point. This time General Getty determined to lead his soldiers\* in person, in order to encourage them by his own example. Delays cause the loss of one night; finally, the attack is fixed for the evening of

\* Three hundred men, composed of detachments from the Eighty-ninth New York, Lieutenant-colonel England, and the Eighth Connecticut, Colonel Ward.—ED.

the 19th. Time is pressing, for on the previous day two vessels\* having passed up the river, the battery has done them much harm and killed their pilots. Two works have been constructed and fortified by the Federals in front of this battery; at six o'clock in the evening they open fire upon it, supported by the whole flotilla, which had been collected together for this purpose, with the exception of the *Stepping-Stones*, she being loaded with troops hidden from the enemy's view by canvas screens along the sides, and comes down the river as if with the intention of forcing a passage. As soon as she arrives nearly abreast of the battery the Unionists cease firing, and Lamson, suddenly veering his vessel around, runs her aground a few yards above the redoubt. Before its defenders have time to turn their guns against the assailants the latter have landed, and, rushing forward under the lead of General Getty, they find themselves already in their midst. A second battery rises in the rear of the first, from which it is only separated by a deep ravine. A portion of the Confederates are trying to defend themselves in it, but they have scarcely fired a gun when the howitzers landed by Lamson open fire upon them; the Federal soldiers pursue them into their work, notwithstanding the roughness of the ground, and compel them to surrender. One hundred and sixty-one prisoners, together with five pieces of cannon, remain in the hands of the conquerors, who leave a strong garrison in the redoubt. They have only a few wounded on their side.†

This brilliant feat of arms completely paralyzed the Confederates. Instead of seeking to cross the river, they occupied themselves solely with the task of protecting their positions, which they thought to be all menaced at once. Longstreet, feeling convinced that the passage of the Nansemond would be no less difficult than the capture of Peck's lines by assault, determined to reduce the latter through the slower process of a regular siege. The weak works that his soldiers had erected were transformed into parallels, the intricate windings of which were infinitely multiplied. In order to push forward the operations with vigor it required more men and guns of heavier calibre. Hill, who was already marching upon Suffolk after having abandoned the investment

\* The *Alert* and the *Cœur de Lion*.—Ed.

† Four killed and ten wounded.—Ed.

of Washington in North Carolina, was ordered to hasten his march, while guns of large calibre were sent from Richmond for the purpose of arming the batteries of the besiegers.

The evacuation of the redoubt at Hill's Point, ordered by Peck on the 20th, which led to the withdrawal of the Federal vessels below the bar, did not induce the Southerners to resume the offensive. Satisfied with increasing their works, they left this rôle to the Federals, whose courage had just received an additional stimulus by the arrival of a few reinforcements. Thus, on the 22d, Cushing landed with his sailors on the western shore of the estuary, and led a reconnoissance as far as the village of Chuckatuck, about three miles in the interior; on his return he drove off a squad of cavalry that was trying to surround him. Two days later, at the other extremity of the line, near the Dismal Swamp, General Corcoran's brigade, supported by two other detachments, made a sortie along the Edenton and Somerton roads, which dislodged the Confederates from their advance posts and drove them back into their main works. The operations on both sides were thenceforward confined to the construction of new batteries and a constant interchange of projectiles, without either party assuming the offensive. In these artillery duels the advantage rested invariably with the Federals, who with their well-served guns silenced those of the Southerners whenever the latter were unmasked. Longstreet at that time was only provided with field-pieces.

It was not long, however, before he received some siege-guns sent from Richmond. These being at last placed in the advance works of the Confederates and in some of the fortifications situated along the river, he tried the range of their projectiles on the 30th of April. Elsewhere, the heads of Hill's column had just reached his camp, and on the 2d of May all the forces of this general, amounting to more than ten thousand men, having arrived, it seemed that the moment had come for striking a decisive blow. But the news that the government of Richmond had received on the same day from the borders of the Rappahannock suspended its execution, most opportunely for the Federals. On being informed of the movement which on the 1st of May had brought Hooker's right wing to Chancellorsville, Mr. Jefferson Davis, in pursuance of a desire expressed by Lee,



had telegraphed Longstreet to return immediately to Richmond with all his forces. He was to cover that city or rejoin the Army of Northern Virginia, according to circumstances. He had not a moment to lose to execute the orders of the President. Longstreet only remained before Suffolk long enough to withdraw his *matériel*, and on the 3d of May, precisely one year after the evacuation of Yorktown, he abandoned all his positions, which were occupied on the following day by the Federal forces of land and sea.

His first stopping-place was on the Blackwater. At three o'clock in the morning Peck was apprised of the retreat of the enemy. Wishing to ascertain his movements at once, in order to be on his guard in case it should prove to be only a feint, and to harass him if he was falling back upon Richmond, he immediately puts the larger portion of his small army on the march, without allowing himself to be intimidated by the numerical superiority of his adversaries. Getty, with about seven thousand men, crosses the Nansemond over the Suffolk bridge, and advances rapidly in pursuit of them along the direct route to Richmond, which passes by Providence Church and skirts the Petersburg Railway south of the Western Branch. In the mean while, two detachments are crossing the river a little lower down in the hope of striking the flank of the enemy's rear-guard. Landing, one near the village of Chuckatuck, the other at Hill's Point, they propose to march up the Western Branch along both sides of the stream. But Longstreet has taken every measure to cover the retreat of his army. The largest portion of Hill's division forms the rear-guard, which, availing itself of all the advantages that the ground offers, disputes it inch by inch to Getty from noon till evening. The Federals, having been unable to effect a breach in his lines, in spite of several attacks vigorously made, come to a halt at nightfall in an exhausted state, while the Southerners take advantage of the darkness to join the main body of troops on the borders of the Blackwater. The other two detachments have been separated and paralyzed by Longstreet's cavalry, which has prevented the first from crossing over to the right side of the Western Branch, and has driven the second upon Hill's Point.

On the morning of the 4th the Unionists, having ascertained that their adversaries have crossed the Blackwater, give up the

pursuit. Nevertheless, although he is no longer molested, Longstreet cannot make his army undergo long marches. The railroads at his disposal, being in a very bad condition, are scarcely sufficient to convey his supplies, and cannot be made available for the transportation of his infantry, which the arrival of Hill has swelled to six divisions.\* Consequently, he does not reach Richmond until the 10th of May. On the 11th his rear-guard abandons the line of the Blackwater.

The fate of arms had been decided a week since on the borders of the Rappahannock, but the victory had singularly weakened Lee's army. Deprived of Jackson and ten thousand of its bravest soldiers, this army, in order to accomplish the task which had been assigned to it, needed a powerful reinforcement. Longstreet, in joining it with his four divisions, enabled it to undertake the offensive campaign which we shall describe presently.

At the beginning of the siege of Suffolk the Confederates had made a strong demonstration against Williamsburg. In order to prevent a repetition of the same, General Keyes, after having inspected the course of the Mattaponi in person, caused a detachment of infantry to be landed at West Point, at the entrance of this water-course into York River. These troops, stationed in a small fort under the protection of the gunboats, were a menace to the Confederates who occupied the peninsula, and they kept the entrance to the river free. At the end of May, Keyes, fearing lest the Southerners might succeed in capturing this garrison, withdrew it; but on the 4th of June he got up a new expedition, in conjunction with the naval forces, in the waters of the Mattaponi. Taking advantage of the fact that the evacuation of West Point had lulled the vigilance of the enemy, the Federal gunboats ascended the river as far as twenty miles above its mouth; the troops, landed during the night, proceeded to Aylett's, where they utterly destroyed a large foundry, and, the object of the expedition being accomplished, returned to Yorktown without accident.

The navy, as will be seen, afforded powerful aid to the land-troops scattered along the coast of Virginia and North Carolina.

\* This comprehended the whole of Longstreet's command (Department of Virginia and North Carolina), which consisted of Elzey's, French's, D. H. Hill's, Whiting's, Hood's, and Pickett's divisions.—ED.

We shall not stop to enumerate the prizes it made in those waters, and, having no further incident of importance to notice before the 1st of July, a date we shall not reach in this chapter, we will pass to the second part—that is to say, to that which relates to the coast of South Carolina, of Georgia, and East Florida.

We left the Federals at the close of 1862 masters of a large number of points along that coast. Their central dépôt is in the bay of Port Royal, where their fleet finds excellent shelter for victualling purposes, and near which the land-forces are stationed. These forces have been collected together for the purpose of blockading Charleston and attacking that place by land and sea at the same time.

Since Hunter succeeded Mitchel on the 30th of October, 1862, the rainy season has not allowed him to undertake such an operation. Whilst waiting for more favorable weather the fleet of Admiral DuPont is preparing for the rôle it will have to play at this siege by testing the strength of its iron-clad vessels against the works which the enemy still possesses along the coast. In fact, in anticipation of the battles he might have to fight in the bay of Charleston, the Federal government had given DuPont all the vessels of this class of which it was in possession at the time. The *Monitor*, which was lost on the 30th of December while on her way to join him, had been replaced, on the 24th of January, by another vessel of the same character, called the *Montauk*, a "monitor," to use the term thenceforth applied to all ships of this class. Others were to follow shortly. In order to try the resisting power of this new vessel, DuPont sent her to the Ogeechee River to attack a large work constructed by the enemy at Genesis Point, called Fort McAllister, which closed the navigation of that river to the Federals. They were the more anxious to penetrate into the waters of the Ogeechee because the steamer *Nashville*, of which we have spoken before, had taken refuge in those waters a few months previously: they knew that she had been equipped and armed for cruising purposes, and were apprehensive lest some fortunate chance might enable her to elude the blockade.

On the 27th the *Montauk*, commanded by Captain Worden—the same who had made himself famous while in command of the *Monitor* at Hampton Roads—brought her broadside to bear



upon Fort McAllister at a distance of twelve hundred yards, and for the space of four hours the fire of her two heavy pieces, eleven- and fifteen-inch guns, was directed against that work. The Confederates replied vigorously to the last, although one of the enemy's shells had dismounted one gun, killed an officer, and wounded seven soldiers. The *Montauk* retired after having exhausted all her ammunition. She bore the marks of numerous cannon-balls which had done her no harm, and Worden, satisfied with this experience, obtained at the common expense of both combatants, reported in favor of this new implement of war.

The Confederates, however, were fully determined to make use also of this kind of machine against their adversaries: instead of allowing themselves to be discouraged by the loss of the *Manassas*, the *Virginia*, the *Arkansas*, and other "rams" which they had hurled against the Federal fleets, the ephemeral successes of these vessels had inspired them with great confidence. Thanks to the activity of General Ripley and Commodore Ingraham, who commanded the land and naval forces at Charleston, the hulls of two steamships had been strongly clad with iron after the fashion of the *Virginia*, provided with a ram, and supplied with some heavy guns; these improvised iron-clads were respectively named the *Palmetto State* and the *Chicora*, and were completely equipped during the month of January. The Confederates had thus outstripped their adversaries, who at that date had not yet a single iron-clad vessel before Charleston. This superiority could not last long; they resolved to take advantage of it, and were not long in wanting an opportunity. They found out that the two most powerful ships in the enemy's fleet, the sloop-of-war *Powhatan* and *Canandaigua*, had been sent at the same time, through a singular imprudence, to coal at Port Royal: all the others, ten in number, were old merchant-ships: they were armed with heavy guns, it is true, but their hulls could not resist projectiles, and their boilers were particularly exposed.

We have described elsewhere the approaches of the port of Charleston. A line of sandbanks stretches out from north to south for several miles eastward, leaving three passes of small importance on the side of Sullivan's Island, while the main pass, called Main Ship Channel, hugs the coast of Morris Island for



a distance of four or five miles, and empties into the open sea at the southern extremity of the bank. The ships loaded with stones which the Federals had sunk in these passes had been absorbed by the sand, together with their contents: the passes were free, but the entrance of each was, as formerly, marked by a bar of small depth. The blockading fleet kept outside of these bars, and had therefore a vast extent of water to watch. One portion kept guard over the northern passes; the remainder, separated by a considerable space, guarded the principal entrance. The *Housatonic*, the *Augusta*, and two others\* formed the northern division; the *Mercedita* and the *Keystone State*, the one of eight hundred and the other of fourteen hundred tons, were in front of the southern bar; the *Memphis* and the *Quaker City* more in the rear. On the evening of the 30th of January the whole fleet, as usual, was under steam, moored to anchor-buoys, ready to slip their cables and fall upon any blockade-runners that might happen to heave in sight. It had made an important capture during the day, that of the English steamer *Princess Royal*, coming from the Bermudas, and the hope of new prizes not less lucrative stimulated the vigilance of the Federal crews. But a dense fog stretching over a perfectly calm sea enveloped each of their vessels with a veil that was impenetrable to the most practised eyes.

Commodore Ingraham on the *Palmetto State*, followed by the *Chicora*, took advantage of this fog to venture unperceived into the main pass; and, overcoming all the difficulties of such navigation in spite of the darkness, got over the bar at four o'clock in the morning, being fully convinced that he would not have to go far to encounter the enemy, whom he proposed to surprise. In fact, espying through the mist the lights of the *Mercedita*, he makes for that vessel with the greatest speed. The *Palmetto State* is within a hundred yards when she is signalled by the lookout, and before her hull, which is but a few feet above water, has been clearly defined, he has got so close that the enemy's vessel cannot give her guns the necessary depression to reach him. He then fires a single cannon-shot against his adversary, which passes through her boiler, and, ramming her almost at the same moment, springs a large leak

\* The *Stettin* and the *Ottawa*.—ED.

in her side. The Federals, considering themselves lost, offer to surrender. Not wishing to load his vessel with prisoners, Ingraham receives a Federal officer on board, who capitulates in the name of the whole crew and acknowledges himself a prisoner on parole. Without taking any further notice of the *Mercedita*, which succeeds in stopping her leak and allows herself to drift into the open sea, the *Palmetto State* joins the *Chicora* for the purpose of attacking the *Keystone State*, which is preparing for the fight. The two Southern iron-clads, approaching this vessel, one on either side, throw a few shells into her, which set her on fire in the fore hold. The *Keystone State*, whose machinery remains intact, withdraws rapidly, but her commander, Lieutenant Levy,\* does not allow himself to be intimidated by the fate of the *Mercedita*, and will not give up the game: he partly extinguishes the fire, and, putting on a heavy pressure of steam, heads for the *Chicora* with a speed of twelve knots, determined to board and sink her. Unfortunately for him, just as he is getting near a shell bursts both his boilers. The scalding steam is rushing through every part of the vessel; more than one-fourth of the crew have either been killed or wounded, and the disabled ship is left at the mercy of her adversary. The latter riddles her with shot, to which, owing to the short distance that separates them, she is not, as was the case with the *Mercedita*, in a condition to reply: the ship is on fire, the water is pouring in from every direction, and Levy\* lowers his flag; but Captain Tucker, who is in command of the *Chicora*, believing this to be a ruse of the enemy, refuses to recognize the signal and renews the fight, which has been interrupted for an instant. It was a fortunate chance for the *Keystone State*, for at this moment the *Memphis* comes to her assistance, and in spite of the enemy's projectiles succeeds in taking her in tow before the *Chicora*, whose movements are very slow, has been able to get up to her. The *Quaker City* has come in her turn to exchange shots with the Confederate rams, without allowing them to come too close to her. It is six o'clock; the day has dawned. The *Augusta*, having witnessed the fight from a distance, comes up at last, followed by the *Housatonic*. Ingraham, dreading to measure strength with so many adversaries at

\* Commander W. E. Le Roy.—ED.

once upon vessels whose slow movements render them almost unmanageable, gives the signal of retreat, and abandons the pursuit of the *Keystone State*.

The small Federal vessels have prudently withdrawn, but the *Housatonic* and the *Augusta* pursue the Confederates, firing at long range and trying in vain to cut off their retreat. While the *Mercedita* and the *Keystone State* are being towed away from the scene of action, Ingraham recrosses the bar and anchors in the north channel, about two-thirds of a mile from the guns of Fort Moultrie, where the authorities of Charleston, who during the action had not moved from under the cover of the guns of the fort, were waiting for him on board of two small vessels.

The combat was ended at eight o'clock. The Confederate ships re-entered the port of Charleston late in the afternoon. The losses of the Federals were heavy, the warning a serious one. They had been made to understand that their improvised war-vessels were pitted against formidable adversaries. But the blockade had not been interrupted for a single instant: notwithstanding their impenetrable armor, the assailants had not been able to force the fleet to abandon the waters it had been ordered to guard.

Nevertheless, the Confederates sought to avail themselves of the comparative advantage they had gained to proclaim the raising of the Charleston blockade. It is well known that, according to international laws, in order to be recognized by neutrals the blockade of a port must be effective, and that the restrictions which it imposes upon them cease to be in force if the power establishing such a blockade does not maintain it permanently, whether it voluntarily withdraws its vessels or that the latter are compelled to give way before a superior force. The blockade thus raised cannot be re-established except by again granting to neutrals all the delays required for its proclamation: this secures the opening of the port for a few weeks at least. Such had been the result of Renshaw's disaster at Galveston, the blockade of which port the Confederates had effectually raised. But the opening of that port, separated by immense deserts from the rest of the Confederacy, was of small importance, while that of the



bay of Charleston would have rendered the greatest possible service to the cause of the South. An effort was made to make neutral powers believe that the fleet charged with guarding this bay had been destroyed or dispersed. To effect this the positive successes achieved by Commodore Ingraham were exaggerated, and some consular agents on board of one of the small steamers which had appeared in the waters of Moultrie certified that after the conflict they had tried in vain to discover the whereabouts of the Federal fleet. It is probable that they looked for it among the narrow northern passes, whereas it had rendezvoused at the entrance of the southern pass for the purpose of giving chase to the iron-clads; which did not prevent the blockade from being effective. Perhaps their accommodating vision had been obscured by the fog. However that may be, they took good care not to go out into the offing to verify the fact to which they pretended to testify, and their evidence, formally contradicted by that of all the Federal officers, was not taken into consideration by the neutral powers. No merchant-vessel was imprudent enough to venture in the midst of the Union fleet on the strength of the proclamation of the Confederate authorities.

Just as the blockading squadron was resuming its positions DuPont learned that on the previous day it had experienced another check not far from the bay of Charleston. The group of islands extending south of this bay, upon which the Federals had long since obtained a footing, is bounded by the estuary of Stono River. Some Union vessels occupied the entrance of this arm of the sea, deep but tortuous, and sometimes ascended it for a considerable distance in search of blockade-runners, who, it was said, could communicate with Charleston by that way without passing through the entrance guarded by DuPont. The Confederates determined to lay an ambushade for them, and erected some batteries along both banks of the Stono, which they fortified, taking care to mask their guns. On the 30th of January, the Union steamer *Isaac Smith* having penetrated into the channel, they allowed her to pass without revealing their presence; then, when the vessel had proceeded as far up as Legaréville, she was attacked by the cross-fire of these batteries, which riddled her with shot and soon obliged her to haul down her flag. Another



vessel,\* which had hastened to her assistance, had barely time to make her escape in order to avoid the same fate. This was another proof, in addition to many others, of the imprudence of venturing among narrow and sinuous water-courses with wooden vessels without the support of infantry able to clear the banks for their passage.

The absence of iron-clads came near proving very disastrous to the fleet assembled in front of Charleston. The *Montauk*, the only vessel of that class which was then under DuPont's command, had been provisionally detached, as we have stated, from the fleet. But her return was no longer a sufficient reinforcement for the future. Three new monitors, the *Passaic*, the *Patapsco*, and the *Nahant*, having been equipped during the month of February, were immediately sent to DuPont; four others were soon to follow. Their arrival was the signal for the grand attack which was relied upon for subjugating the cradle of secession. In the mean while, the three first-named vessels were despatched to the mouth of the Ogeechee, in order to undergo the same trial as the *Montauk*. DuPont also proposed at the same time to destroy the *Nashville*, which, as we have remarked, could not be reached except by passing under the fire of Fort McAllister. But the intrepid Worden, availing himself of a fortunate chance, did not allow his comrades time to come up to divide with him the honor of this bold stroke. Watching incessantly the *Nashville*, which he considered as destined to belong to him, and whose masts he frequently got sight of above the flat banks of the Ogeechee, he discovered, on the evening of the 27th of February, that this vessel, while manœuvring, had run aground one mile above the enemy's fort. On the following morning, at daybreak, he ascended the river, and while the gunboats that followed him at a distance were endeavoring to occupy the attention of the Confederate gunners, he brought his broadside to bear against the very dike which barred the river nine hundred yards from the guns of the fort. The latter immediately directed their fire against the spunky little craft which had come to defy them to their very teeth. But Worden, trusting to his armor, did not take the trouble of replying, but quietly opened fire upon the *Nashville*. The Ogee-

\* The *Commodore McDonough*.—Ed.

chee, in its numerous windings, passes close to the fort, then glides away from it before watering its base. By a fatal chance, the Confederate ship, which had run aground at a considerable distance from the fort, in following the current of the river found herself, owing to this angle, within two-thirds of a mile only in a direct line from the *Montauk*, to which all her side was exposed. After having deliberately determined this distance by means of some preliminary shots, the monitor, firing upon her as at a target, lodged some enormous fifteen-inch shells in her hull, and soon set her on fire. As the *Nashville*, which was loaded with powder, blew up with a tremendous crash, Worden quietly retired, without having received the least damage from the projectiles of the enemy: he would have been absolutely intact but for the explosion of a torpedo, which did some injury to the bottom of his ship.

The other monitors arrived on the following day, and on the 3d of March they proceeded in their turn to make trial of their strength against Fort McAllister. The *Montauk* did not accompany them, the experience she had acquired being deemed sufficient. The narrowness of the channel obliging the three Federal vessels to proceed in file, the *Passaic*, which was foremost, advanced to within one thousand yards of the enemy's fort, and had concentrated upon her nearly the whole fire of the seven pieces of heavy calibre which this work mounted. She sustained this fire during eight hours without having a single man wounded, but the mechanism of her turret was terribly shaken and the deck greatly damaged; and Captain Drayton, who commanded the naval division, perceiving that the enemy's fire had not slackened, and concluding that it would be impossible to silence it, gave the signal for retreat.

This experience, which was soon to be confirmed in a striking manner, showed that by dint of effort to render the monitors invulnerable some of the offensive qualities necessary to men-of-war had been impaired: if their guns were well protected, their fire was too slow to reduce even a simple earthwork like Fort McAllister; but the time for experiments was past, and it was against the formidable citadels at the entrance of Charleston harbor that these vessels were now to be led.

Before continuing our narrative we propose to devote a few lines to the small feats of arms which were performed during the month of March along that portion of the coast which is now occupying our attention. It was shown in the first volume that the Federals, after having occupied the town of Jacksonville in Florida, had evacuated it, thus subjecting those inhabitants who had compromised themselves through their sympathy for the national flag to severe reprisals. They renewed and aggravated the same error in the spring of 1863. This is the way it happened. The organization of colored troops forming at Beaufort under the auspices of General Hunter had made great progress during the winter. Two regiments, commanded by white officers, were in complete order; they were sufficiently drilled and armed. General Saxton, who, as has been said, had special charge of everything concerning fugitive slaves, was desirous to give employment to these soldiers. The refugees from Florida never ceased to assert that this State had been entirely stripped of troops by the Confederate government, that it would require but a small force to take possession of it, and that there would be found in it, besides some valuable material resources, the entire black population ready to swell the ranks of the new regiments composed of colored men. Saxton determined to send two of these regiments to Jacksonville. They went up St. John's River upon transports, and on the 10th of March they occupied this point without striking a blow. But the Confederates gathered their forces, and soon confined the Unionists within the limits of the town. The latter fortunately received a timely reinforcement. Two white regiments had been sent from Beaufort to relieve the colored troops, and allow them to go into the interior of the country for the purpose of establishing an armed propaganda, from which great results were anticipated. They arrived on the 21st of March, and drove back the Confederates, whose attacks were beginning to become serious. But the projected expedition had to be given up. Political animosities, which always assert themselves whenever the negro is in question, became mixed up with military matters, and gave rise to bitter rivalries between the immediate leaders of the white forces and the organizers of the colored troops. The town of Jack-



sonville and its inhabitants were the victims. General Hunter, believing that the forces detached from that side would be required for the operations he proposed to undertake against Charleston, recalled them all to Beaufort on the 31st of March. The incidents which marked this third evacuation rendered it particularly unfortunate for the Federal cause. Jacksonville, celebrated for the mildness of its climate, was, before the war, the rendezvous of numerous families who came there to find a shelter against the rigor of the winters of the American continent. They had brought comfort and luxury to the place: charming villas nestled under palm trees, while gigantic oaks and orange trees formed long and pleasant avenues. Most of the proprietors, devoted to the cause of the Union, did not venture to face the return of the Confederates, and took refuge on board the Federal transports. Here they were badly received, and, to render their exile still more bitter, they had to witness the almost complete destruction of the town, which was burned and pillaged by the Federal soldiers in the midst of a confusion which did not permit the leaders either to identify or to punish the guilty parties.

But let us resume the narrative which has been for a moment interrupted. The month of March, when storms were yet too frequent to enable the monitors to keep at sea in the dangerous harbor of Charleston, had expired: it had been remarkable for the capture or destruction of a number of blockade-runners, and among others two large steamers, the *Queen of the Wave* and the *Georgiana*, which, being hotly pursued by Federal ships, were driven upon the coast and abandoned by their crews. The operations against Charleston were about to commence. A regiment of infantry had occupied Cole's Island, on the left bank of the Stono River, on the 28th of March—a position extremely well chosen for commanding both this arm of the sea and the entrance of the long channel which under the name of Folly River runs as far as Secessionville. The navy had completed its preparations and collected together all the forces it could dispose of. These forces comprised nine iron-clad vessels. They were the four monitors already mentioned, the *Montauk*, the *Passaic*, the *Patapsco*, and the *Nahant*; three others, named the *Weehaw-*



ken, the *Catskill*, and the *Nantucket*; the iron-clad frigate *New Ironsides*; and, finally, the *Keokuk*, a species of monitor differing from the original type in so far that it carried two stationary turrets, each furnished with four portholes and containing but one single gun on a revolving platform. This pattern, which exposed the portholes much more than in that of Ericsson, was intended to avoid the accidents already frequently caused by the balls striking the point of contact of the deck and the moving turret. The monitors, all of the same appearance, carried each two guns in its turret: this turret, surmounted by a small iron cage intended for the pilot, was composed of eleven sheets of iron, each one inch thick and fastened together; those of the *Keokuk* and the *New Ironsides* had only five- and six-inch armor. These ships could single-handed face the fire of the forts of Charleston; the wooden vessels outside the bar were to confine themselves to the task of maintaining the blockade.

For the last two years the Confederates had been constantly at work increasing and completing the defences of the city which they knew to be so eagerly coveted by their enemies. Beauregard, deprived of the command of the Army of the West by Mr. Davis, had received, by way of compensation, that of the forces stationed in South Carolina. But the real organizer of the defence of Charleston was General Ripley, who, like Beauregard, was an old Federal officer of engineers, a man of fertile resources, profoundly versed in his science, and of untiring energy. He had made a wonderful use of the means which Nature and art had placed in his hands. The large gap which allows the sea to run into the beautiful bay of Charleston opens between two sandbanks, analogous to those bordering the coast of North Carolina, and extending, one east-north-eastward and the other south-south-westward. At the angle formed by these lowlands are the banks which compelled the blockading-squadron to keep at a long distance from the entrance. Behind the sandbanks immense swamps, intersected by numerous channels, stretch out as far as the cultivated plains of James Island and Mount Pleasant, thus forming a belt equally impassable for the naval and land forces. The ships entering Charleston are obliged to pass between Fort Moultrie, situated at the extremity of the northern bank, called

Sullivan's Island, and Fort Sumter, which stands upon a sandbank, a continuation of the southern bank called Morris Island. A space of fifteen hundred yards separates the two forts. A third work, built of masonry, called Castle Pinckney, formerly constituted the entire defences of Charleston; it stood upon a low island in the inner bay, very close to the city. This bay has a length of not less than four miles; and, although the surrounding shores are far apart, at some points more than two miles and a half, the navigable portion has a width of only one mile and a quarter; it becomes still narrower south of Castle Pinckney in consequence of a sandbank which, under the name of Middle Ground, divides it into two unequal passes, the widest of which is at the south. At the upper end of the bay, at the junction of the two rivers, Ashley and Cooper, which empty their waters into it, stands the city of Charleston, once rich and prosperous, but now existing only for the war and through the war. Her wharves were no longer frequented except by blockade-runners, which chiefly brought her arms and ammunition, and whose arrivals the increase of the Federal fleet had for some time rendered much more rare. Too far from the entrance to be reached by the projectiles of the enemy, she was near enough for her inhabitants to see the struggle which was about to decide their fate, while the high steeples, which in the evening were clearly defined between a burning sky and the sombre profile of Fort Sumter, seemed to the Union sailors like a tempting vision which an invulnerable guardian forbade them to approach.

The system of defence against naval attacks had, in fact, been completed by General Ripley with the close of the year 1862. Two batteries had been erected, so as to flank eastward and westward the half circle of sandbanks of which Moultrie occupied the most salient part: the first, named Beauregard, commanded the approaches to the open sea; the other, called Bee, flanked the fronts of Sumter north-east and north-west. The latter was much the weaker, never having been finished. Morris Island was occupied by two new works: one, in front of Sumter, at Cummings Point, which was at a later period to take the name of Battery Gregg; the other commanded a narrow strip of solid ground between the marsh and the sea; it was then a

simple battery called Wagner, which a few months later, after much labor, was converted into a fort of considerable magnitude; it commanded the main channel, which skirts Morris Island. These batteries, with much permanence, constructed of sand, the material which offers the best resistance to projectiles, were supplied with trenches and immense iron-clad covers: they formed, with the eastern fronts of Sumter and Moultrie, the first circle of converging fire which was to strike the Federal fleet whenever it should attempt to force a passage. The interior of the bay was equally well defended. A fortress had been erected upon blocks and piles in the centre of Middle Ground, the faces of which were covered with large horizontal beams. General Ripley, whose name had been given to the fort, had by means of this happy innovation thus replaced the walls of masonry usual in the construction of a casemated battery, which the character of the soil did not allow him to build without immense labor in laying the foundation. At the south, along the coast opposite to James Island, a large work had been erected under the name of Fort Johnson. Forts Pinckney, Ripley, and Johnson thus formed a second line, which, supported by the guns of Sumter and Battery Bee, would have completely hemmed in the vessels bold enough to pass through the first. Finally, a third line of defence was composed of a battery at the extremity of the city of Charleston itself, and another located on the right bank of Ashley River. In order to give these concentric fires all their efficacy, it was necessary to keep the enemy's vessels as much as possible within the space reached by the projectiles of each line. To effect this long rows of wooden piles had been sunk in deep water and in all the passes where the current was not too strong: special care had been taken with these obstacles in order to introduce false entrances calculated to lure on the vessels of the enemy, so that they might pass over the torpedoes lying at the bottom, which could be fired by means of electricity. The deep portion of the main pass remained open to navigation, but a movable obstruction was ready to close it in case of attack. This consisted of floating casks supporting large cables, from which were suspended nettings and ropes calculated to embarrass the steering of such vessels as might not allow themselves to be intimidated by the threaten-



ing aspect of these contrivances. Two or three cables thus disposed, one behind the other, formed serious obstacles which completed the two principal lines of defence: they were to extend from Fort Sumter to Fort Moultrie and from Fort Ripley to Fort Johnson. In short, the channel was strewn with floating torpedoes; but, to judge from the only one which exploded, these engines, yet imperfect, were too weak to do any serious damage to the solid hulls of the monitors.

Several hundred guns of all constructions and of different calibres had been collected together for the armament of the forts of Charleston. The number of pieces forming the first circle of defence—that is to say, that which protected the entrance of the channel—amounted to sixty-nine. Besides five mortars and about fifteen cannon of small calibre, there were two new specimens of seven-inch rifled guns of Brooke's pattern,\* which discharged enormous slugs of beaten iron, and some old rifled brass thirty-two and forty-two pounders, and several large naval howitzers, also of brass, having diameters of eight, nine, and ten inches, with which the Confederates did not hesitate to fire balls of immense weight. Fort Sumter—which, as the reader will remember, had a tier of casemated batteries—contributed to the amount thirty-three pieces of cannon, mounted over its eastern and north-eastern fronts. Each work had a good and numerous garrison; officers and soldiers, nearly all of them belonging to the city of Charleston, vied with each other in their zeal to prepare for its defence. The range of each gun was known, and buoys among the passes marked the distances, carefully measured, at which the enemy's vessels could be reached with almost faultless precision.

The task of the Federal navy, as will be seen, was a singularly difficult one. The government, yielding to the unthinking pressure of public opinion, was calling for the capture of Charleston. But DuPont was unable to imitate the bold stroke which had delivered up New Orleans to Farragut's fleet. The latter, after having forced the passage of Forts Jackson and St. Philip, had before him the immense artery of the Mississippi along which he could guide his vessels with impunity, whilst DuPont, had he

\* The guns of the Brooke pattern were cast at the Tredegar Works, Richmond, Va.—ED.



proceeded as far as the third circle of defence prepared by the Confederates, would have found himself cut off from all chances of retreat. Having once reached this point, he could undoubtedly have bombarded and burnt a portion of the city of Charleston; but this barren success would have been dearly bought, for all the vessels which could have ventured so far, being unable to turn back, would finally have fallen into the power of the enemy. In order to avoid such a disaster, instead of simply endeavoring to pass under the fire of the Confederate works, it was necessary to silence that fire and to disable the works. It was not enough to demolish a few guns and to destroy some embrasures; it was important to prevent the enemy from repairing the damages that might be inflicted upon him; it required, as in the case of all sieges, to be ready to occupy the batteries the defenders of which might have been momentarily driven off by the guns of the besiegers. This task could not be accomplished except by an army landed for that purpose: confiding it to mere detachments would have been to expose the latter to an offensive and victorious return of the larger force commanded by Beauregard.

DuPont adopted the only plan which, in the midst of all these difficulties, offered him some chances of success. He decided to concentrate his efforts against the walls of Sumter, which, in consequence of their height, presented a large target for his guns, while, the work itself being isolated by the waters, the Confederates could be prevented from building it up again if once destroyed. Having achieved this result, he hoped to be able to reduce the two batteries located along the sandbank of Morris Island; for the small size of this bank and the swamps which separated it from the mainland would have enabled the few regiments collected at Cole's Island to have taken permanent possession of it. It was therefore of paramount importance to destroy Fort Sumter before all: the north and north-west fronts being the most vulnerable, DuPont was desirous of making the attack on that side, but in order to do this it was necessary to get over the pass and the first line of the enemy's defences.

The machines of war with which he was about to venture upon this undertaking had as yet only been tested against Fort McAllister: though they had withstood its fire, they had not

succeeded in silencing it, and the trial could not be considered as sufficient. The bay of Charleston and the defences with which it bristled bore some resemblance to those of Sebastopol. It was before this latter place that the last great battle between ships of war and forts had been fought eight years previously. The advantage had then been entirely in favor of the latter. Has the invention of the monitors given the navy the superiority over the land artillery?

DuPont was looking for the solution of this problem among the Charleston passes. In order to bring on the conflict, he required certain meteorological conditions in his favor: first of all, a very strong tide to enable the large frigate *New Ironsides* to get over the bar; then at such an hour that the squadron would have to fight during the ebbing tide, which rendered her evolutions more easy; and finally, a perfect calm, for the least sea prevented the monitors from making use of their guns. On the 5th of April the attacking squadron was assembled in front of Charleston: DuPont hoisted his flag on board the *New Ironsides*, while the *Keokuk*, taking the lead as the least sluggish in her movements, proceeded, under the direction of a distinguished engineer, Captain Boutelle,\* to sound and buoy the bar. On the following morning the whole fleet crossed the bar in front of the central or Swash Channel, and cast anchor at the entrance of the harbor before noon. This pass had been selected in preference to the southern one, which was the best, because the latter would have led too close to the batteries of Morris Island. There was found, strange to say, one foot of water more than was laid down in the charts which had been drawn before the immersion of the famous stone fleet. The Confederates, being notified of the presence of the Federals in the channel, were already on their guard, and DuPont, wishing to avail himself of the returning tide, was preparing for the attack. But a dense fog, hovering over the placid waters and the sandbanks for which both parties were about to contend with so much animosity, doomed the assailants to immobility, as if to oblige these men who were so eager to destroy each other to once more compose themselves prior to the battle.

Finally, on the 7th the clear weather and calm sea favored

\* Of the U. S. Coast Survey.—Ed.

DuPont's plans of attack. Having to depend upon the tide, he waited until noon to give the signal for weighing anchor. The narrowness of the channel obliged the Union vessels to proceed in single file. The *Weehawken* was to lead the way under the direction of Captain John Rodgers, an officer of the highest distinction. The task was a perilous one. In order to diminish its dangers, a species of triangular raft from which was suspended grappling-irons, intended to catch and carry off the torpedoes, had been fastened in front of the ship's bow. The anchor of the *Weehawken* having become entangled in this machinery, it required considerable time to disengage it: the fleet was unable to start until a quarter-past one. It had yet sufficient daylight before it to measure its strength with the enemy. Three monitors, the *Passaic*, the *Montauk*, and the *Patapsco*, followed the *Weehawken*; then, with the admiral on board, came the frigate *New Ironsides*, which occupied the centre in order to facilitate the transmission of orders. Directly astern of her rode the *Catskill*, the *Nantucket*, and the *Nahant*, the column being closed by the *Keokuk*.

A battle between a fleet and a fortress presents in its surroundings all the solemnity of an ancient tournament: it admits of no surprises or masked manœuvres. As soon as the sun, dispelling the mist on the morning of April 7th, had thrown a flood of light over the Federal fleet, the defenders of Charleston understood that the day for the attack had arrived. While the Unionists were putting their floating iron-clads in order a steady and well-regulated activity prevailed in all the Confederate batteries; the minutest details of the armament were critically examined. Every man was at his post; the forts located in the inner bay were ready, like all the rest, to take part in the fight, while the population of the city, quickly informed of these preparations, was hastening in the direction of the wharves in anxious expectation. Nothing, therefore, was wanting to impart an interest to the struggle—neither the magnificence of the prize which was its object, nor the swarms of idle although not unconcerned spectators, nor even the courteous salute prior to the first passage of arms.

Indeed, when the Federal column, which was advancing slowly, was within sixteen hundred yards of Fort Sumter, the flag of the



Confederacy and that of the State of South Carolina were hoisted above the parapets of this fort, and immediately saluted by thirteen guns loaded with blank cartridges. All the field-glasses of the Southern officers were levelled at the monitors, whose turrets alone, painted either black or gray, were reflected on the glistening surface of the waters, looking all the more formidable as they advanced because they were smaller in size and less exposed to the projectiles of the enemy. At three o'clock the first shot was fired by Fort Moultrie at the *Weehawken*. This vessel, under whose keel a torpedo had just exploded, replied immediately, but by directing her two shots against Fort Sumter, as had been ordered. In an instant all the enemy's batteries opened fire upon the foremost monitor, while the others, following close, came to take part in the conflict. But at the very first stage of the struggle Admiral DuPont's plan of battle was modified by unforeseen circumstances. The frigate which carried him, having got into a narrow channel, with scarcely any water under her keel, steered very badly; she came near colliding with two of the nearest monitors, and was obliged to cast anchor in order to right herself. DuPont, being thus brought to a stop within one thousand yards of Moultrie, allowed the vessels that were following him to pass, and merely exchanged a few cannon-shots with the enemy at long range. In the mean while, the *Weehawken*, having advanced for the purpose of turning the guns of Fort Sumter, had perceived, at a distance of a few hundred yards, the double line of casks and cables which barred her passage, and which the flood tide, which had just made, was driving back toward the interior of the bay. Not daring to force her way against this obstacle, which appeared too formidable, she took a position within eight or nine hundred yards of Fort Sumter, while the other three monitors followed as closely as possible. These vessels were thus placed in the centre of the circle of defences prepared by General Ripley—a position which was the more unfavorable for them because shots were being fired from various directions at once, so that they could not, by turning their turret, cover the portholes, which were the weakest points. The manœuvre which was to bring them in front of the most vulnerable part of the fort was therefore abandoned from the first, and the vessel which carried the admiral, with the larg-



est number of guns, was kept away from the scene of action. The other four vessels, however, were approaching in their turn, and before half-past three o'clock they began firing alternately upon Forts Sumter and Moultrie and against the battery of Cumming's Point. The entrance of the bay of Charleston presented at this moment a truly wonderful sight. The eight Federal vessels, collected within the space of two-thirds of a square mile, steaming slowly forward and backward in the midst of a dense volume of smoke, not wishing to remain stationary for fear of facilitating the aim of the enemy's guns, were driven hither and thither by the contrary currents of a slack tide, manœuvring so as to avoid coming in contact with each other, and with the greater difficulty that their pilots were obliged to look through a narrow fissure between two plates in order to guide them. On every side the Confederate batteries, placed at convenient distances and well manned, poured volleys of cannon-balls and shells in their midst, with such rapidity that one could frequently count as many as thirty per minute. Nevertheless, these valiant little ships, steady at the post of danger, persisted in directing their fire against the walls of Sumter. Every now and then one or two flashes illumined the atmosphere amid the smoke, and their enormous projectiles went forth, either to shake the solid battlements or to explode within the interior of the fort. But the principal defect of these implements of war was soon made manifest to those who managed them as well as to their adversaries. Their fire was too slow to be effective: more than ten minutes would elapse between the discharges of their twin pieces. In order to effect a serious breach in so massive a work as Fort Sumter they should have been able to remain for an almost indefinite period under the terrible fire to which they were exposed. Could one hope for so much from the solidity of their armor? One should rather have been astonished at finding them still resisting after three quarters of an hour of such a trial. The vessels which had been first under fire in this action were beginning to suffer seriously. At four o'clock the *Weehawken* withdrew to some distance from Sumter; her side-plates were shattered in many places, and a cannon-ball had pierced her deck. The *Passaic* followed this movement, for she had been still more seriously damaged;

one of her guns had been entirely disabled, while a rifled projectile, after shattering the eleven plates of the turret, fortunately at the top, had greatly injured the pilot-house. About the same time the *Keokuk*, which was the last to fall into line, outstripped all the other vessels, and, with a degree of audacity which the defenders of Sumter were the first to admire, advanced as near as seven hundred yards from the fort. The Confederate artillery forthwith concentrated its fire against this new adversary. Its projectiles, fired in volleys from the batteries, and thus striking the sides of the vessel all at once, were not long in penetrating her plates, which, as we have already stated, were of much less thickness than those of the other monitors. At the end of half an hour she had been struck about ninety times, and, as her position did not allow her to make use of more than her forward turret, she had not succeeded during the same space of time in firing more than three cannon-shots. Nineteen of the enemy's balls had pierced her through, at and just below the water-line; others, passing entirely through her turrets, had scattered death among the gunners who were crowded within these narrow recesses; sixteen of them were fatally wounded, and the brave commander, Rhind, seeing that his vessel was about to founder, and not in a condition to fire a fourth shot, withdrew from the conflict. It was now half-past four o'clock. The fire of the monitors had again slackened; the shots which had struck their turrets at the point of contact with the deck, without absolutely preventing their revolution embarrassed them greatly and rendered the process of aiming very difficult. The *Passaic* had withdrawn; the *Patapsco* could only make use of one of her two guns. Of the three vessels that had arrived last, two had also been seriously damaged: one of the *Nantucket's* guns had been completely disabled after the third fire, while on board the *Nahant* the failure to use the precaution which had been adopted on board the other vessels had proved fatal to the gunners: the shock of the enemy's projectiles upon the plates had loosened their numerous bolts, and, for want of an inner lining of sheet iron to keep them in position, this new kind of canister-shot had killed or wounded seven persons; the vessel's armor had been greatly damaged; finally, a last shot having rendered her turret immovable, she became disabled and retired

from the contest. The *New Ironsides*, keeping at a distance of one thousand yards, had nevertheless been struck several times. The effect of the enemy's projectiles, one of which had carried away a port-shutter, showed that this vessel, excellent for firing broadsides in rapid succession, and much less vulnerable than a wooden frigate, would have speedily shared the fate of the *Keokuk* if she had ventured to approach the enemy's batteries.

It was difficult to estimate the damage caused to the masonry of Fort Sumter, but the fire of the Confederates had not slackened. There was no longer any hope of silencing it: it was therefore useless to prolong the struggle. At half-past four o'clock DuPont gave the signal for retreat; but this signal was not immediately perceived, and the monitors foremost in the fight did not withdraw from the conflict until a quarter-past five. The Confederates, having become chary of their projectiles in anticipation of a new attack, did not attempt to harass their retreat, and before sunset the whole iron-clad fleet cast anchor near the *New Ironsides*, inside of the bar. The *Keokuk* alone was unable to join it; Captain Rhind succeeded with much difficulty in taking his disabled ship out of reach of the enemy's guns; by dint of hard work he kept her afloat during the whole night, but a considerable sea having risen on the morning of the 8th, the *Keokuk* was submerged, and sank in a few fathoms of water about two-thirds of a mile from Morris Island beach, all the crew being saved.

On both sides the combatants engaged in this duel with new arms had been taught their importance for the future of the artillery and iron-clad vessels; they had consequently noted down their smallest details with the scrupulous care of a scientist who is trying experiments in his laboratory. Leaving the *New Ironsides*, which had played an insignificant part in the combat, out of the question, the eight Federal turreted vessels had come into line with sixteen guns, fifteen of which only had done service, it having been impossible to make use of the second turret of the *Keokuk*. Out of these fifteen guns, there was one one-hundred-and-fifty-pounder rifle and fourteen of Dahlgren's pattern, seven of which were of fifteen inches calibre and seven of eleven inches. This arm was as new to the



ordnance department as the vessels that carried them were to the navy. Admiral Dahlgren, who combined the consummate experience of a naval officer with all the science of the artillery, had substituted for the old howitzers, denominated columbiads, guns of enormous calibre of iron, cast upon Rodman's plan, which gave them an immense power of resistance. At a later period experience demonstrated that these cannon could throw, without danger, projectiles of the largest size, those of fifteen-inch calibre weighing not less than four hundred and fifty pounds, with a charge of seventy pounds of powder. But the dread of an explosion still held back the Federal officers, who had singularly reduced their efficacy by employing them only in throwing shells and loading them with no more than thirty-five or fifteen pound charges of powder, according to their calibre. In this combat, which had lasted nearly two hours, these fifteen guns had discharged one hundred and thirty-one projectiles, one hundred and twenty-five of which had been fired against Fort Sumter. As numerous splinters had struck the wall, it was impossible to make an exact calculation of the shots that had carried home: they were supposed to amount to fifty or fifty-two. The greater portion had caused but trifling damage, but a certain number of shells had penetrated the masonry to a great depth, some of them as much as five feet, causing large rents in its sides, and at one place tearing it for the length of eight yards: two or three of them, having fallen through the embrasures, had exploded in the casemates. It was a remarkable result if one takes into consideration the small number of projectiles, the weak charges of powder, the irregularity of aim, which sent them sometimes in one direction, and again in another, without the ability to follow the system adopted in storming batteries; and finally, the distance which separated the monitors from Fort Sumter. It is true that the Federal officers asserted that they had approached within six hundred yards of its walls, but we deem it proper to put more faith in the statements of their adversaries, who had measured this distance beforehand, estimating it at eight or nine hundred yards. There was enough in this to impart confidence in the efficacy of the double system of turreted vessels and large iron cannon with smooth bore for storming naval for-



tifications. But the Federals could not show these results, and were more impressed by their own injuries than by the damage caused to the enemy's works. The Confederates had fired 2209 shots, of which, deducting those that had struck the *New Ironsides*, 346 had hit the eight turreted vessels. With the exception of the *Keokuk*, none of these ships had been seriously damaged, and, but for the negligence we have alluded to in regard to the *Nahant*, no one would have been wounded on board of them. If they had failed to reduce the forts of the enemy, the cause of this failure must be looked for, first, in the floating obstacles which they had not deemed themselves able to surmount, then in the slowness of their fire and the small charges of powder they had used. It was difficult to renew the experiment under the same conditions, as it would undoubtedly have involved the loss of several vessels; it showed, at all events, that by learning more thoroughly how to make use of these ships and their ordnance, by employing them in the successive reduction of exterior works, as was done subsequently, in conjunction with the land-forces, they could render the most valuable services.

But too much reliance had been placed upon them, and the disappointment of naval men as well as the public was in proportion to the hopes that had been conceived. On the morning of the 8th the captains of the monitors, all well-tried and brave officers, declared to DuPont that they would not be able to make another attack without running the risk of uselessly sacrificing their vessels. This was a wise suggestion: the admiral, who entertained the same opinion, adopted it without hesitation. He remained four days longer in the waters of Charleston, watching closely the enemy, who confined himself to the task of fishing up, by means of boats, the guns and some of the *débris* of the *Keokuk*. But on the 11th he decided to recross the bar, believing that the monitors were too much exposed to be injured by the first storm that might occur on that dangerous coast. On the 12th the fleet had resumed the positions it had occupied prior to the attack, with the exception of the *Passaic*, which had gone North to undergo repairs.

The check experienced by the monitors inspired the defenders of Charleston with excessive confidence. Public opinion at the

North was highly excited on the subject. Mr. Lincoln insisted that DuPont should take his fleet back inside of the bar, fearing lest the relinquishment of the operations against Charleston might enable the Confederates to send a portion of the defenders of this city to Lee's army. The Secretary of the Navy, on the other hand, yielding to other influences, was urging DuPont to promptly renew the attack in order to set free the monitors, which were to go to the Gulf of Mexico for the purpose of either reducing Mobile or to reascend the Mississippi as far as Vicksburg. These instructions demonstrated that the Secretary had not yet realized the results of the 7th of April. The admiral could have recrossed the bar, kept the enemy constantly occupied, and by degrees have perfected himself in the management of his vessels; but in order to do this these vessels should not have been taken away from him a few days later. For his own part, DuPont did not believe that these vessels could play a useful rôle before Charleston: he stated this deliberately. The Secretary of the Navy having soon decided to leave him the six monitors, he sent them to the bays of Port Royal and North Edisto, instead of keeping them in sight of Fort Sumter. The government did not insist, but determined to supersede him as soon as the moment for resuming active operations against the cradle of secession had arrived.

The Washington authorities had at length profited by the experience acquired on the 7th of April, and recognized the fact that these operations, in order to be successful, should be combined between the War and Navy Departments. It was time, for, as we have stated, the fine army corps which Foster had brought to Hilton Head from North Carolina in the beginning of February had remained inactive since then. Whether General Hunter was waiting for the result of the campaigns which were being prosecuted along the borders of the Nansemond, the James, and the Potomac, or rather that his attention was distracted from his strictly military duties by his solicitude for the maintenance, the education, and the arming of fugitive negroes, he suffered the whole spring to pass without giving any other employment to his troops than the task of guarding the too numerous posts they occupied. The month of June thus arrived

without any incident of the least importance to disturb the monotonous life of the soldiers and sailors.

The government, thinking that the moment had finally arrived for another effort to carry out its projects against Charleston, confided the siege operations to an officer of undoubted ability. On the 2d of June, Hunter was superseded by General Gillmore. A better choice could not have been made. The conqueror of Pulaski combined the science of the engineer and the artillerist with the inventive genius, the audacity, and energy required for so difficult an enterprise. Admiral DuPont persisting in his incredulity regarding the efficacy of the monitors in the operations about to be undertaken, his removal was a natural consequence of Gillmore's advent and the instructions that had been given him. But before relinquishing the command he had creditably exercised for the last two years he had the satisfaction of being able to announce to his government a brilliant exploit which deprived the Confederates of a vessel upon whose success they had built the most extravagant hopes.

On the 12th of November, 1861, the English steamer *Fingal*, forcing the blockade, had entered Savannah River with a valuable cargo of small-arms and cannon. But since that period the vigilance of the Federal sailors had not allowed her to put to sea. This vessel, of twelve hundred tons, two hundred and four feet in length and forty-one feet in breadth, had been built at Glasgow; her hull was solid and her machinery powerful. The Confederate government, seeing that she was unable to continue trading with England, purchased her with a view of converting her into a man-of-war. The hull, which was of iron, was cut down to within two feet of the water-line, while in the centre of the new deck, constructed at the water's edge, there was erected a casemated battery having the shape of a truncated rectangular pyramid, whose four faces had an inclination of twenty-nine degrees with the horizon. The object of this extraordinary inclination was to make the projectiles of the enemy glance off. In order to secure this result without diminishing the altitude too much, and to leave a level surface on the top, the two lateral faces jutted out considerably beyond the hull: a strong piece of timber connected them under the water with the lower works, which they were

thus intended to protect. On the terrace stood the smoke-stack, and the pilot-house whence the vessel was steered. When fully loaded she had a draft of fifteen feet nine inches, and she carried four rifled cannon, two of six-inch and two of seven-inch calibre, of the Brooke pattern, similar to those which had disabled the *Keokuk* in front of Charleston. The battery, however, had but three portholes on each side, so that the two seven-inch guns could be so pivoted as to work at the end or at either of the nearest broadside portholes by means of iron traverse circles. The armor was composed of timber eighteen inches thick, covered by two layers of rolled iron, in plates two inches thick and seven inches wide, made no doubt from flattened railroad iron, adjusted crosswise, those of the first layer being horizontal and the others vertical; doors of equal solidity closed each porthole. The Confederates, who did not possess the means for manufacturing thick armor out of a single block, were in hopes that this construction would be able to resist the projectiles of the enemy: the remembrance of the fight in Hampton Roads seemed to justify this expectation. In fact, the *Atlanta*—such was the new name of this vessel—had been constructed upon the same principles as the *Virginia*: in order to complete the resemblance she had been furnished with a powerful iron ram. A new instrument had moreover been added to this aggressive arm: this was a torpedo, containing fifty pounds of powder, suspended at the extremity of a long rod of iron under water, at some distance in front of the spur. This torpedo could be fired either through an electrical apparatus or by percussion on striking the side of an enemy's vessel.

After a first attempt, which took place in January, 1863, for the purpose of forcing the channel at Fort Pulaski—an attempt which was abandoned in sight of the whole Federal fleet assembled in the waters of Savannah River—it was at last determined in the month of June to send the *Atlanta* to sea. In order to avoid the guns of the fort, it was decided to take her by way of Augustine Channel to Wilmington River, which empties its waters into Warsaw Sound. This is the pass which the Federals had vainly attempted to follow previous to the capture of Fort Pulaski. The *Atlanta*, rapid in her movements, had been fitted out in view



of a long campaign on the Atlantic; she was to go and attack the various Federal stations along the coast, raise the blockade of Charleston, and even defy the Union flag in the ports of the North. Thanks to the torpedo which she carried at her prow, and which, we believe, had recently been added, it was supposed that she would have nothing to fear even from the monitors themselves. Consequently, the Confederate sailors were not in the least alarmed when they heard that DuPont, who was fully informed of the presence of the *Atlanta* in Wilmington River, had sent the *Weehawken* and the *Nahant* to those waters for the purpose of watching her and preventing her from coming out. Being obliged to unload their vessel in order to enable her to get through the Augustine Channel, which was shallow, they had thus allowed the Federals time to prepare for their reception. If the *Atlanta* had met nothing but wooden ships in Warsaw Sound, she could easily have overcome them; once in the open sea, she could, without venturing near the forts and the iron-clad vessels, have harassed the Federal stations along the Southern coast, and even destroyed some commercial ports in the Northern States. She had a crew of one hundred and forty-five men, twenty-one of whom were officers, who, for the most part, had served in the Federal navy. Her captain, William A. Webb, had been at the Naval School with John Rodgers, who commanded the *Weehawken*. On the evening of the 16th of June everything was ready; at daybreak the following day the *Atlanta* moved off rapidly, followed by two small steamers loaded with sightseers, and intended, it was said, to bring back to Savannah the enemy's vessels, of whose impending capture no one entertained the least doubt.

The two monitors were at anchor near the mouth of the river; the guard-boat which went up every night had just returned. It was at quarter-past four in the morning when the *Atlanta*, coming down with a full head of steam, was sighted at a distance of three miles. To descend this narrow and difficult river, Captain Webb had chosen the hour of flood-tide, which facilitated the action of his rudder. The monitors heading toward the sea by the influence of the tide, Rodgers did not wish to turn them in the channel where he was, for fear of running them

aground at this critical moment. The *Weehawken*, slipping her cable, passes down the river while preparing for the fight: the *Nahant* does the same. The Confederates believe the enemy to have taken flight, and pursue him at full speed: their eagerness is such that they neglect the necessary precautions for navigating these shallow waters. The *Atlanta* touches ground once, and the second time is completely stranded, the current driving her athwart the channel. Before she is able to right herself the monitors have turned round and are approaching the Confederate craft, which they believe to be preparing for a fight. The *Weehawken* advances first; the *Nahant*, having no pilot, follows in her wake at some distance. At five o'clock in the morning the *Atlanta* fires her first shot at a distance of about a mile and a half; the projectile, passing over the *Weehawken*, strikes the *Nahant* without doing her any harm. The Federals reserve their fire, so as not to bring on the action except at close range, while their adversaries, confiding in their strength, appear to adopt the same tactics. A lapse of twenty minutes supervenes; finally, the *Weehawken*, leaving her consort behind, comes up to within three hundred yards of the *Atlanta*, which has not yet been able to extricate herself. Rodgers himself points his fifteen-inch gun: the enormous ball strikes the armor of the enemy's vessel, and, in spite of its inclination, pierces it through and through, covering the between-decks with iron and wooden *débris*, by which a large number of persons are wounded; the shock is so violent that more than forty men are thrown down. This first shot is the decree which decides the fate of the *Atlanta* by utterly demolishing her pretended invulnerability. Officers and sailors see all their dreams vanish in an instant, realizing the fact that they are at the mercy of their adversaries. Nevertheless, they try to defend themselves: the gun which protects the lateral face has been disabled; the two pivot guns are endeavoring to reply, but the gunners are so disconcerted that they can hit neither of their adversaries. Besides, they have scarcely time to compose themselves. The projectile of the eleven-inch gun of the *Weehawken*, which was fired almost immediately after the other, has struck the inner extremity of the armor, and has been arrested by the massiveness of the wood. But the second discharge of the two pieces suffices to complete

the defeat of the *Atlanta* by shattering one of the port-shutters in one direction, and in another the house in which the three pilots of the Confederate ship are sheltered; two of them are wounded. Captain Webb, perceiving the ravages which a few minutes' fight has caused to the battery which he had thought impregnable, and unable to get away from the sandbank upon which he has stranded, hoists the white flag just as the *Weehawken* fires another shot, which fortunately passes too high. The Federals received the vessel from his hands, and the two steamers that had escorted her speedily returned to Savannah to carry the news of the disaster of which they had been witnesses. The conflict lasted fifteen minutes: the *Atlanta* had fired four shots, the *Weehawken* five, the *Nahant* none. These few minutes sufficed to demonstrate the power of the fifteen-inch gun: they showed that a full-sized ball of beaten iron, fired by this piece of ordnance with a sufficient charge of powder, easily penetrated four inches of iron and eighteen inches of wood. The monitors, with their turrets of eleven inches thickness, were undoubtedly, at that time, the only vessels capable of offering resistance to this projectile. They were therefore the best armed vessels both for attack and for defence; they were also, unfortunately, the slowest in their movements.

The *Atlanta*, with her *matériel* and *personnel*, was a magnificent prize. A few days after, having complimented the brave Rodgers upon his success, the Secretary of the Navy, at the request of DuPont, relieved the latter of his command. Admiral Foote, who was appointed in his place, having been carried off by a premature death before he had embarked, the South Atlantic squadron was entrusted to Admiral Dahlgren. He reached Port Royal on the 4th of July—a date rendered memorable by the events which marked that epoch in other sections of the theatre of war. The operations against Charleston were about to be pushed with vigor. Gillmore, who had arrived a month previously, had commenced them at once; but we must reserve their recital.

The narrative of naval operations in the Gulf of Mexico will not detain us long. The division charged with maintaining the blockade east of the Mississippi, under command of Commodore

Bailey, extended its supervision to the western coast of the Florida peninsula: it had thus to keep guard over a multitude of creeks and passes in which the small vessels that carried on active contraband trade with the English colony of the Bahama Islands found shelter. The Federal sailors, unable to venture with their ships among these dangerous labyrinths, had been in the habit of exploring them in boats, and of endeavoring by this means to capture blockade-runners which they suspected to be lurking somewhere. These bold expeditions, which possessed all the attractions of partisan warfare—the chase, the ambuscade, the surprise, and the boarding excitement—were the only things to distract their attention from the monotony of the blockade. Most of them were successful: in the course of one month the Confederates were deprived of five vessels, one of which was captured on the 23d of February in St. Sebastian River; another was destroyed near Mosquito Inlet on the 2d of March; a third in the Ocklockonnee on the 20th; and the last two at Baysport on the 24th. By way of retaliation, two expeditions were repulsed with the loss of some men on the 20th of March in the bay of St. Andrews, and at Gadsden's Point on the 27th. The latter was drawn into an ambuscade by some Confederate partisans, who with blackened faces and clothed in petticoats played the rôle of fugitive negresses on the beach trying to obtain the protection of the Federal flag.

The naval division which blockaded the Gulf of Mexico west of the Mississippi having been reduced to the strictest necessary requirements by Farragut's operations on that river, had experienced, as the reader will remember, a signal check on the 1st of January, 1863, before Galveston. The first six months of this year, which had commenced so unpropitiously, were only noted by new misfortunes, although of less gravity. This division, after the death of Renshaw, had been entrusted to Commodore Bell, a sailor of great distinction; the officers placed under his command were full of zeal, and many of them possessed the experience, knowledge, and daring necessary to accomplish the difficult task which had been assigned to them. But their crews were composed of bad materials. There were no non-commissioned officers, the gunners did not understand their business, and most of the vessels, formerly belonging to the merchant service, were unsound.



As soon as Farragut was informed of the loss of Galveston and the precipitate retreat of the vessels that had succeeded in effecting their escape from the bay, he had sent Commodore Bell, with the sloop-of-war *Brooklyn* and five gunboats—the *Hatteras*, the *Scioto*, the *Cayuga*, the *New London*, and the *Clifton*—to blockade that port once more, and, if possible, to recapture the city. On the 11th of January these ships had just collected at the entrance of the bay, and were announcing their arrival to the Confederates by throwing a few shells into the batteries which defended the pass, when, toward evening, a sail was sighted in the horizon. The *Hatteras* was ordered to go and ascertain her character. The two vessels soon disappeared in the twilight. A brisk but short cannonade was heard in the offing; then everything was once more quiet. The *Hatteras* did not reappear. At early daylight Bell started in search of her, and finally, at a distance of twenty miles from land, he came across the two masts of this ship protruding from the shallow waters where she had foundered. A few *débris* of the wreck were floating around this silent witness, but she seemed to have carried her secret with her to the bottom of the sea: no shipwrecked mariner was there to reveal it. In the evening a boat which had escaped the disaster gave an explanation of the affair.

In the preceding volume we left the Confederate privateer *Alabama* at the end of November, 1862, slipping away from the Federal sloop-of-war *San Jacinto*, which had tried to blockade her in the port of St. Pierre, Martinique. The Secretary of the Navy at Washington persisted in sending in pursuit of this fast sailer vessels which were much inferior to her in speed, and from which she could easily get away when by chance she happened to encounter one. At the same time, he left without any protection whatever those well-known points where the *Alabama* was sure to make rich captures, such as the whaling-station near the Azores, where Semmes had struck his first blows against the merchant marine of the United States, and the channel of the Bahamas, where all the American trade with the Gulf of Mexico passed. Thus free in his movements, Semmes proceeded to lie in ambush along the route of the steamers plying between Aspinwall and New York, hoping to seize upon some one of them a cargo of

California gold, which would have enabled him to fit out another privateer in England, and, as he himself very wittily remarks in his *Memoirs*, would have sufficed to develop the growing navy of the Confederate States in British ports. But chance did not favor him. After capturing a steamer that was sailing in a contrary direction, on board of which he had the satisfaction of capturing and releasing on parole a number of Federal officers and soldiers, an accident to his machinery rendered him for some time utterly powerless. But a bolder project, and one more worthy of the military flag which he flew so boldly when in pursuit of in-offensive merchantmen, soon called him into other waters. General Banks was then enlisting troops in Massachusetts, destined, it was said, to land at Galveston for the purpose of invading Texas. In reality, they were to assist the fleet in conquering the Lower Mississippi, and we have seen that only two regiments were despatched in the direction of Galveston. But the newspapers positively announced that a whole army was to land on the 10th of January on the coast of Texas. Semmes conceived the idea of falling suddenly upon the fleet of transports which conveyed this army while it was being landed. In order to conceal his whereabouts he hid himself during the period of one month among the small islands of the Yucatan coast; then, on the 11th of January, he suddenly appeared before Galveston. Instead of the immense unarmed fleet into which he had hoped to throw confusion even before they had recognized him, he only saw five or six Federal men-of-war under steam, which from a distance were bombarding the city he had thought them masters of. He guessed at once what had taken place. He could not think of attacking the squadron of the enemy, and was no doubt about to retire greatly mortified when his adversaries afforded him the opportunity of fighting under favorable conditions.

It was, in fact, the sails of the *Alabama* that Bell had espied on the evening of the 11th of January, and in ordering the *Hatteras* to go and reconnoitre her he was sending that vessel, without suspecting it, to almost certain destruction. Semmes slackened the speed of his ship, for he wanted to draw his adversary, whose movements were rather slow, as far as possible from all chances of aid. Lieutenant-commander Blake, who was

in command of the latter, soon noticed this manœuvre, and realized the fact that he was about to fight a desperate battle. He prepared himself for the encounter and resolutely continued the pursuit, although his vessel was evidently inferior in every respect to the one to which he was giving chase. The *Hatteras* was a merchant-vessel, which, like many others, had been converted into a man-of-war by placing a few guns on her deck; she carried six or eight, the heaviest of which was a rifled thirty-pounder. But it had been found impossible to remedy the defects of her construction: the hull was weak and very high above the water; the essential parts of the machinery were not protected at the level of the water-line; instead of a screw, she was supplied with side-wheels, easily broken.

In the mean while, night had supervened. Semmes, deeming the moment favorable for commencing the fight, came to a halt at last, but, according to his habit of disguising his flag until the very last moment, he replied to Blake's summons that his vessel was an English man-of-war. A useless subterfuge, for the *Hatteras*, which was only within seventy-five yards of the *Alabama*, had scarcely lowered a boat for the purpose of verifying this strange assertion when the Confederate vessel fired upon her adversary, while an officer ran up a flag bearing the name of the already famous privateer. The Federals were ready to respond, which they did without delay, and the two ships, manœuvring so as to rake each other, went off side by side, under full steam, leaving behind them the long-boat of the *Hatteras*. The latter, being thus abandoned, witnessed the conflict from a distance, and finally succeeded in joining the fleet the following day.

The struggle was of short duration. The heavy guns of the *Alabama*, admirably served by gunners who had acquired much experience in England, soon completely disabled the *Hatteras*. The Federal gunners do not appear to have shown much skill, for none of their shots caused any serious damage to their adversaries. At the end of a quarter of an hour Blake, seeing his machinery shattered, his hull pierced at the water-line, and the water pouring in in every direction, was obliged to surrender. He was received with all his crew on board the *Alabama* just as his vessel was sinking. Semmes, satisfied with his brilliant success,

paid no further attention to Galveston, and repaired to Jamaica, where we will leave him for the present.

Commodore Bell had only arrived before Galveston on the 10th of January. The battle which had scattered the Federal fleet was fought on the 1st of the month. The entrance of the port was therefore free for the period of ten days. General Magruder hastened to take advantage of this to announce the raising of the blockade. He had a right to do so. The case was very different from that of Charleston, to which we have previously alluded. Neutral vessels were therefore at liberty to trade with Galveston until the expiration of the time required by law for the issuing of a new proclamation of the blockade. Unfortunately, none of these vessels were on the spot to export the cotton that had accumulated in Texas, and none came from foreign parts to this distant mart at the risk of having the question of international law decided in the United States courts at their expense. Indeed, the government of Washington, instead of issuing a new proclamation, insisted that the blockade had never been raised, and Commodore Bell was instructed to maintain it in all its force and strictness. The neutral powers made no remonstrance.

The early part of this year, which had already seen such a bad beginning in these waters by the capture of Galveston and the loss of the *Hatteras*, was destined to bring about nothing but disasters to the Federal squadron. Two sailing vessels, the *Morning Light* and the *Velocity*, blockaded the entrance of the port of Sabine in Sabine Pass. The Confederates had fitted out at this port two river-steamers, which they had surrounded with walls constructed of bales of cotton. About the 20th of January, taking advantage of a dead calm, these steamers boldly put out to sea to attack the Federal ships, which the absence of wind had doomed to immobility; a few raking shots were sufficient to compel them to surrender. But, being unable to bring them back into port in consequence of their draft of water, they were obliged to set them on fire on the 23d, in order to keep them from the steamships that Commodore Bell had sent for the purpose of recapturing them.

Two months later, as we will show hereafter when speaking of the military operations in Louisiana, one of the ships belonging



to the squadron, the *Diana*, was captured by the Confederates in the waters of Bayou Teché. The month of April brought on still further misfortunes. On the 7th a river-steamer, the *Bar-rataria*, which the Federals had fitted out as a guard-ship to watch the waters of Lake Maurepas, near New Orleans, ran aground at the mouth of the river Amite, when her crew, finding themselves attacked by a large number of partisans ambushed along the shore, were obliged to abandon her after setting her on fire. On the 18th some Union officers, having landed near Sabine City for the purpose of watching the Confederate ships, were surprised by a detachment of the enemy, and a number of them were either captured or killed; among those killed was Lieutenant-commander McDermot, who commanded one of the blockading vessels. Finally, on the 27th, the gunboat *Preble*, stationed at Pensacola, accidentally caught fire and was completely destroyed.

Before concluding this chapter we have a few more words to say concerning the small feats of arms of which West Virginia was the theatre during the first six months of the year 1863. The small armies that are contending for the possession of this section of country, surrounded by high mountains and a deep river, scatter and reassemble, advance and fall back, meet and separate, without taking any notice of the great operations that are taking place in the neighboring States. The Federal troops occupy the principal points on the Virginia side of the Ohio, the whole valley of Monongahela, where McClellan made his début, and the sources of the upper tributaries of the Potomac in the Alleghanies; General Kelley occupies this last region between Romney and Moorefield. The Confederate forces, very much scattered, are, for the most part, commanded by General Jones. The latter opens the campaign at the end of March by coming down the Kanawha in small boats with a few companies of his best troops. Having arrived near the town of Point Pleasant at the entrance of this river, he lands and attacks the small Federal garrison, but after a brisk fight is repulsed. Hoping to have thus put the enemy on the wrong scent, he makes preparations for a stupendous raid into the rich valley of the Monongahela. He gets his troops together, equips them, and at the end of April comes down from

## BOOK II.—THE MISSISSIPPI.

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### CHAPTER I.

#### *THE BAYOUS.*

IN the preceding volume we described the fruitless attempt made by Sherman against Vicksburg. Since that time the capture of this citadel has become the main object of all the efforts made by the Federal armies of the West. Every one feels that in losing the Mississippi and its communications with the States of the extreme West the Confederacy will be deprived of the conditions indispensable to its existence. Jefferson Davis, on visiting his native State, talks loudly of the necessity of defending Vicksburg at any cost, and the Union generals freely accept the challenge which he hurls at them.

Since the 17th of January, the day when Grant joined the army of McClernand on his return from Arkansas, until the capture of Vicksburg, the military and naval operations were so closely connected that we have not deemed it practicable to divide their recital. We shall continue it here as far as the memorable July 4, 1863; after which we will resume the narrative of the struggle between Lee and the Army of the Potomac, which was interrupted after the battle of Chancellorsville.

The four chapters composing this portion of the volume will comprise, first, all the efforts made by Grant in the course of three months and a half along the left and right banks of the Mississippi for the purpose of surmounting the obstacles which prevented him from approaching Vicksburg; then the operation which enabled the Union general to overcome these obstacles by crossing the Mississippi below the enemy's defences; afterward the aggressive campaign which terminated in the investment of the place; finally, the siege and the capitulation.

We shall be obliged to interrupt this recital from time to time









in order to speak of the operations of Banks and Farragut along the Lower Mississippi: we will show the efforts they made to assist Grant and Porter, so as to bring about that junction of the two fleets which was the crowning glory of their triumphant achievement. We shall also have to give a rapid sketch of the minor operations which marked the first six months of the year 1863 both east and west of the Mississippi. Blunt and Holmes on the one hand, Rosecrans and Bragg on the other, after the bloody encounters of Prairie Grove and Murfreesborough which have signalized the close of the year 1862, appear to be resting and calmly waiting for the result of the great conflict of which Vicksburg is the prize; consequently, in the States in which they are contending for supremacy, in Missouri and Arkansas, as well as in Kentucky and Tennessee, we have nothing to record during this period but trifling feats of arms utterly unconnected with each other.

The opportunity offered to the Federals for destroying the unfinished works, mounting but a few guns, which alone commanded the Mississippi during the summer of 1862, had passed. Sherman's campaigns at Chickasaw Bayou and those of Grant along the Yallabusha had just taught them, through hard experience, that henceforth it would be as difficult to turn Vicksburg as to approach it from the front. These obstacles only afforded them a fresh stimulus. Public opinion, which was in perfect accord with the sentiments of army men, demanded that there should be no drawing back before any sacrifice in order to accomplish the object in view. Thanks to the reinforcements he had received, Grant found himself at the end of January with one hundred and thirty thousand men under his command.\* In order to be able to bring as many as possible before Vicksburg, he limited the occupation of the reconquered districts which he left behind him to such places as Iuka, Corinth, Memphis, and the stations located along the railroad connecting them. The village of Mound City, almost in front of Memphis, which served as a rendezvous for Southern partisans, was destroyed; General Dodge, with a division of infantry and the cavalry brigade of Colonel Cornyn, stationed himself at Corinth; Colonel Grierson

\* This included the entire force in the Department of the Tennessee.—ED.

and his mounted men had charge of guarding the railway-line. Grant caused all the garrisons stationed above Memphis to occupy the eastern shore of the Mississippi, being well aware that the Confederates would not be able to obtain a footing in that section of country, and that small detachments could not protect it against any new raid on the part of Forrest or Morgan. Henceforth, all his supplies followed the course of the river, the guarding of which was exclusively entrusted to the gunboats. General Washburne, who occupied Helena, and had led a successful expedition in the direction of Lagrange on the 3d of January in order to free its approaches, was charged with the defence of this important point, which occupied a portion of the territory of the State of Arkansas, and he kept an advance post at Clarendon on the White River.

McPherson, who still occupied Holly Springs, and whose cavalry kept watch over the banks of the Tallahatchie, started again by the Memphis road on the 21st, and everything was ready for transporting a considerable portion of the army by water as far as Vicksburg. Grant reserved for himself the right of directing this great expedition in person. By this arrangement McClelland was reduced to the command of his single army corps, as Sherman, under him, had been a few weeks previously. He remonstrated, stating that the President had granted him the exclusive right of leading any expedition along the Mississippi; but in vain. More fortunate than McClellan, Grant was sustained by the government at Washington; his relations with his subordinate, however, were always of a very delicate nature. The two other corps, the Sixteenth and the Seventeenth, which constituted the bulk of his army, were, as we have above stated, commanded by Hurlbut and McPherson.

The hills extending from Haines' Bluff to Vicksburg stretch out beyond the city, following close the course of the Mississippi as far as Warrenton; then, standing apart in order to leave a passage for the Big Black River, and returning to hug the shore a short distance beyond this point, terminate at last in an acclivity upon which stands the village of Grand Gulf. The Yazoo first, then the Mississippi (which waters the base of these hills), form a natural moat which no army could cross without the aid of a nu-

merous and powerful fleet. This moat is not separated from the heights except in the lower part of the Yazoo: the Federals, having control of the pass at this point, had learned to their cost that the obstacle of Chickasaw Bayou and the neighboring swamps rendered this control useless to them. It was impossible to make an attack from the front, between Haines' Bluff and Warrenton, upon this range of cliffs bristling with redoubts and cannon: it was therefore necessary to turn it at either extremity; but this operation, which was to be initiated by the crossing of the Yazoo above Haines' Bluff, or the Mississippi below Vicksburg, could only be accomplished by the aid of naval vessels, and the latter were not in a condition to penetrate into those parts of these two rivers where their co-operation would have been necessary. On one side rafts of timber and torpedoes obstructed the navigation of the Yazoo in the vicinity of Haines' Bluff even more effectively than at the end of December, and on the other Pemberton was completing the armament of the earthworks, which threatened any vessel attempting to force the passage of Vicksburg with almost certain destruction. Instead of erecting batteries at the water's edge, which would have been exposed to the converging fire of the men-of-war, he had placed his guns on the summit of the cliff, so as to give them a plunging fire and protect them from the naval guns, which could not attain sufficient elevation to reach them. In short, he had spaced and isolated them in such a manner that they scarcely presented a mark in case of bombardment. It is true that this arrangement had been strongly condemned by Johnston. He had told the Confederate engineers that these batteries had been constructed rather with the view of protecting all the approaches of the city than to intercept the passage of the enemy's vessels: if placed closer, they would undoubtedly have been more exposed, but they would also have been able to concentrate a destructive fire upon those vessels; whereas, placed as they were, they could not support each other. The Federal fleet had thus a chance of avoiding their fire by passing successively in front of them. These wise suggestions were not heeded, Pemberton thinking that he had not time to replace his large guns before the attack of the Federals. Besides, notwithstanding their defects, the Vicksburg batteries were yet sufficiently



formidable to keep the latter in check. A few months sooner they would have been able to have turned Vicksburg by ascending the river and making New Orleans the base of operations. This is what Williams had done in the summer of 1862 with insufficient forces. But since then the Confederates had built the fortress of Port Hudson, before which the Federals, if they had transferred the theatre of war as far as that, would have met with the same difficulties they had encountered at Vicksburg. The aid of the fleet was indispensable, not only for fighting the enemy, but also for traversing the half-submerged country which borders the right bank of the Yazoo and that part of the Mississippi below Vicksburg. The Confederates, relying upon the natural obstacles, had left only a few guerillas in that section of country. They knew that if Grant had intended to traverse the space which separates the two rivers in order to cross the last above Haines' Bluff, he would have been obliged to build hundreds of bridges, to construct a causeway hundreds of miles long, and to plunge his army into almost impenetrable swamps. He thought at first of leaving Porter in front of Vicksburg, and of descending the right bank of the Mississippi as far as Port Hudson in order to assist Banks; but, in addition to the distance, the Red River would have interposed an almost insurmountable obstacle. Besides, Pemberton, having control of these rivers, would always have had it in his power to harass him, to head him off everywhere; and the repulse of Chickasaw Bayou was too recent a lesson to allow Grant to separate himself from Porter's fleet. These two officers, therefore, determined to make every effort, by following roundabout passes, to introduce men-of-war either into the Yazoo above Haines' Bluff or into that part of the Mississippi which separates Vicksburg from Port Hudson.

The peculiar character of the immense alluvial plain traversed by the great river had until then obstructed the operations of the Federals. Now, on the contrary, it proved to be in their favor. From Memphis to the sea the Mississippi encounters no hills but those extending along the left bank between Vicksburg and Port Hudson. Everywhere else the Father of Waters flows on without hindrance in a bed which may be said literally to be of its own creation; for, like the Po in Polesinea, the Rhine in Hol-

land, and the Nile in Egypt, it has exhausted this bed by continuous deposits, and at the same time reduced its proportions by means of natural dikes that have been formed along its shores. In some places these dikes have been strengthened by artificial levees; but, like an all-powerful and capricious master, after having first pretended to respect these fragile barriers, we see it during its overflows breaking down each of them alternately; at one place overflowing its banks in order to invade a small peninsula at which it has been nibbling for several years, in another direction stretching out through a vast circuit, and leaving a wretched swamp in place of the deep channel where the largest ships were wont to navigate. Man seeks to control its caprices; and if the engineer is skilful, if he knows how to open a new pass at the proper point, he succeeds in facilitating navigation by closing all extraneous passes; but sometimes the river rebels against all restraints and all allurements: an eddy suffices to neutralize its docility, and it persists in leaving completely dry what was apparently the best channel. Like a king surrounded by his court, it flows toward the sea escorted by numerous rivers, which, instead of bringing it tribute, are fed by its own waters, and, running in a parallel direction, form by its own sides the network of bayous of which we have already spoken. Along the left bank the network is suddenly interrupted by the massive character of the bluffs, and the bayous empty into the Yazoo, which skirts the base of these heights, like a vast draining-channel. The bayous only reappear below Port Hudson to form the tributaries of Amite River, discharging their contents into the vast sheet of water called Lake Pontchartrain. At the west the line of bayous, meeting with no resistance, is much more developed, existing for a distance of about six hundred miles in a straight line from the first infiltrations which are formed near Cape Girardeau, across the lake and the river St. Francis, the marshes of Helena, the White River, the mouths of the Arkansas, the Bayou Macon, the Washita River, the Tensas River, and part of Red River, as far as the long and tortuous channel of Atchafalaya (signifying in the Indian language the "lost waters"); which channel, in fact, loses itself among the neighboring lakes and swamps of the Gulf of Mexico.

Some of these channels are deep and navigable. Could they not be made available for surmounting the obstacles which obstructed the Yazoo and the Mississippi? Grant and Porter determined to make the attempt at three different points at once, and set to work about the latter end of January.

First of all, they resumed the work which had been commenced by Williams for cutting off the narrow strip of land which the Mississippi embraces in passing before Vicksburg. The deflecting channel was only about twenty-two hundred yards long. It would have been sufficient to impart to it a depth of ten feet to enable the greater portion of Davis' fleet to pass, the waters, which were very high at this moment, promising to reach this level with ease. In 1862 these waters had already passed through the trench which was opened by Williams, and it had been found necessary to construct a strong levee at each extremity to prevent them from overflowing their banks during the progress of the work. Once open to the fleet, this channel would have deprived Vicksburg of all its importance, and, although Grand Gulf was protected at the north by Big Black River, as the first-mentioned place is by the Yazoo, the Confederates would not again have found so strong a position there, the course of the Big Black not being bordered by any swamp or bayou. This plan, simple to all appearances, whose success would have been productive of decisive results, pleased Mr. Lincoln, who strongly insisted upon its being carried out. The President could not appreciate from a distance the difficulties which, as we will show presently, ended by causing its failure.

Grant had foreseen these difficulties, and tried to find among the bayous on the right bank a more unfrequented pass in order to reach the Mississippi between Vicksburg and Port Hudson. At about seventy-five miles above Vicksburg an abandoned fragment of the old bed of the river forms an immense horseshoe, known by the name of Lake Providence: it is separated from the Mississippi by a strip of land only about one mile wide. A channel called Bayou Baxter connects it with Bayou Macon, a navigable water-course, through which one can successively reach the Washita, the Tensas, and the Red River, and thence strike the waters of the Mississippi. Among this chain of lakes, rivers,



and bayous it was hoped to find a passage for the fleet, and whilst a portion of Sherman's troops were at work in Williams' channel, McPherson would land with a considerable detachment of his own corps near Lake Providence and open a trench in order to establish a connection with the river.

He had gone to work on the 29th of January. But Porter, knowing how doubtful was the success of such an attempt, resolved at the same time to explore the network of the bayous which follow the left bank of the Mississippi toward the tributaries of the Yazoo—a network which had already been reconnoitred by Hovey's cavalry at the close of the year 1862. There was formerly a pass in this network of bayous frequented by small steamers plying between Memphis and Yazoo City. It was a bayou called the Yazoo Pass, from twenty to thirty yards wide, with a depth of between eight and ten. It branches off from the Mississippi at the village of Delta, nearly in front of Helena; after traversing Moon Lake, which, like Lake Providence, is an abandoned fragment of the old bed, it runs eastward by winding through a most fertile section of country, and empties into Cold Water River, one of the tributaries of the Tallahatchie, which becomes itself the source of the Yazoo by forming a junction with the Yallabusha at Greenwood. As this deflecting channel frequently overflowed its banks, the government of the State of Mississippi, in order to stop these inundations, a few years before the war had caused the communication between the great river and Moon Lake to be closed by means of a strong levee, thus interrupting the navigation of Yazoo Pass. If he succeeded in reopening it, Porter would gain a double advantage: in the first instance, he could, by way of this pass, reach Yazoo City, which, during the last six months, had become one of the principal arsenals of the Confederates. All the vessels which Farragut had driven before him after the capture of New Orleans had found shelter in this place; here they were fitted out, covered with armor, and others constructed. It was from this place that the *Arkansas* had started on her cruise, and this unapproachable arsenal was a perpetual menace to Porter's fleet. He was in hopes of destroying it by turning the defences which constituted its protection. Then, once in control of the Upper

Yazoo, he could open the Haines' Bluff route to Grant's whole army, and the latter would be able to renew the campaign of December, 1862, against Vicksburg without fear of having his communications interrupted, as they would no longer have to depend upon the unreliable support of railways, but their safety would be secured by a river-route and protected by the fleet. At the end of January the first strokes of the pickaxe were dealt at the artificial levee which obstructed the Yazoo, and a mine was prepared for opening a breach.

Porter, however, was not satisfied with these works, which the soldiers compared to those of the beaver, the first denizen of these great rivers.

Since the destruction of the *Arkansas* the Confederates had only a few weak vessels between Vicksburg and Port Hudson, and those afloat in the Yazoo were not yet in a condition to enter the Mississippi waters. One or two of the ships composing Porter's flotilla were not only sufficient to give the absolute control of the river to the Federals, but to destroy the commerce which was being carried on between Texas and the rest of the Confederacy by way of Red River. It was through this channel that the Confederate armies received a large portion of their supplies. It was therefore of the utmost importance to intercept them. We have already seen the naval brigade and the rams organized and commanded by General Ellet and his brothers signalize themselves in many combats along the borders of the Mississippi. This energetic family was always to be found in the front rank wherever there was any danger to encounter. Colonel Charles R. Ellet, with the *Queen of the West*, had received the perilous mission not only of forcing the Vicksburg pass under the fire of the enemy's batteries, but also of attacking and sinking a Confederate ship which was being fitted out and at anchor almost alongside of the quay of Vicksburg. Ellet had intended to attempt this operation during the night, but, having been delayed by an accident,\* he only arrived before the batteries of Vicksburg, which saluted him with a shower of balls, on the 2d of February and in the daytime. He does not allow himself to be repulsed, few of the projectiles having struck the *Queen of the West*, and their effect

\* See Ellet's report to Porter, February 2, 1863.—ED.

being deadened by a double row of bales of cotton. The Federal steamer makes for the enemy's vessel, but the force of the current causes her to swerve from her course, and her shot misses the mark. She has time, however, to throw three shells into the hull of her adversary, which set her on fire. But a conflagration has also broken out in the wall of cotton which the Federal ram carries: Ellet and his sailors turn aside from the fight in order to extinguish this fire, and when they have at last mastered it they find themselves below Vicksburg, out of reach of the enemy's balls.

The obstacle so much dreaded was therefore surmounted. Ellet was not long in taking advantage of his new position. As soon as he had repaired damages and provided himself with a good supply of fuel, he started for that part of the river where the Federal flag had not been seen floating for the last nine months, and where his unlooked-for presence promised him some important prizes. He did not even meet the only adversary capable of coping with him, the steamer *Webb*, which was in the waters of Red River. In the course of a few days he captured another steamer and destroyed vast quantities of provisions. Having returned to the anchorage below Vicksburg on the 5th of February, he started again on the 10th, each time braving the fire of the batteries that the Confederates had erected at Warrenton.

Porter had promised him to send one of his vessels, the *Indianola*, to support him: this vessel, having been delayed by some unforeseen cause, passed under the guns of Vicksburg on the 13th without experiencing any serious damage, and at once continued her course toward Red River, where the *Queen of the West* had preceded her. But these two ships, which, sailing together, would have had nothing to fear, were not destined to meet.

Ellet, after exploring a portion of the Atchafalaya, continues to ascend the Red River, actuated by the hope of fighting the *Webb*, which Porter has especially directed him to destroy. On the 14th of February he surprises one of the steamers employed by the Confederate government in the transportation service, the *Era No. 5*: he has taken possession of her and placed some of his men on board as a crew. But as neither himself nor his men are acquainted with the very difficult navigation of Red River,



he has most imprudently ordered the pilot of the *Era* to direct the course of the *Queen of the West*. After proceeding for a short distance the smoke of several steamers engaged in getting up steam in order to make their escape is seen curling above the tree-tops: the Federal vessel cautiously doubles a winding turn in the river, hoping to be yet in time to surprise the enemy, but at the same moment he is saluted by a battery which rakes the whole length of his ship. Instead of obeying the orders of Ellet, who directs him to back out, the pilot runs the vessel aground in full sight of the enemy's guns. By this act of devotion to his cause, which might have cost him his life, this courageous man, named George Wood,\* delivers up the *Queen of the West* to the Confederates. Shortly after, the vessel, riddled with balls and unable to extricate herself, was abandoned by Ellet and a portion of the Federal sailors, who floated down the river on bales of cotton, and thus reached the gunboat *De Soto* and the *Era*, which had remained out of reach. They took with them George Wood, and, so far from doing him any harm, they made him pilot of the *Era*, which he soon tried to run aground as he had done with the other ship. Pursued by the *Webb*, Ellet met with the *Indianola* near Natchez, whose presence brought the Confederate vessels to a stop. But their number was soon increased by the *Queen of the West*, which had again been set afloat and speedily repaired. The rôles were once more changed. The *Indianola*, leaving the mouths of the Red River, which it had blockaded until the 23d, was trying to gain the anchorage-ground below Vicksburg, in the hope of falling in with some other Federal ship, but her progress was delayed by two tenders loaded with coal fastened at her sides. The Confederates took advantage of this circumstance to give chase and attack her. On the evening of the 24th the *Webb* and the *Queen of the West*, escorted by two small vessels, come up with the *Indianola*, whose movements are embarrassed by the tenders, between Grand Gulf and Warrenton, and fire several shots into her. Her hull is soon staved in, leaks are sprung in every direction, and just as she is about to founder her commander hauls down the Federal flag. The Confederates, who

\* Ellet in his report to Porter, February 21, 1863, gives the pilot's name as Garvey.—ED.

took possession of her, had time to beach her, and soon placed her again in fighting order.

The successful passage of the Vicksburg batteries had, then, only been the means of giving the Confederates two new and powerful ships, which secured to them more thoroughly the control of the whole course of the Mississippi between Vicksburg and Port Hudson. Thenceforth a whole fleet would have to be brought between these two places by braving the fire of each fort. Porter and Farragut were men of too much determination of character to hesitate before such ventures, and we shall find both of them undertaking the task successively.

But, first of all, we must follow the progress of those works the object of which was to open a less perilous route to naval vessels. Grant, who had arrived at Milliken's Bend on the 2d of February, had been very active in pushing them forward. The completion of Williams' channel was attended by a great many difficulties. In order to secure the required depth it had been found necessary, after penetrating a layer of black alluvial soil, to attack a very compact substratum of sand and gravel. They had succeeded at last in rendering the channel navigable for a dredge-boat, which, being introduced by means of a narrow deflection, replaced manual labor to great advantage, when, on the 8th of March, the Mississippi broke down the dam which protected the entrance of the channel, in spite of all that had been done to strengthen it. In an instant an enormous volume of water rushed forward with such violence that instead of simply traversing the channel it demolished the two levees which had been constructed on its borders. The encampments of the division employed in this work were immediately flooded: every man, abandoning arms and baggage, hurried off as fast as possible before an enemy to whom the bravest could turn their backs without any sense of shame. The losses in provisions, material, ammunition, and horses were immense. The small peninsula was completely submerged, and the water, instead of flowing back into the Mississippi, spread among the bayous of the right bank and swept as far as Red River, rendering that whole section of country more impassable than ever before. And yet, strange to say, it had not deepened the channel, and in spite of all the efforts of the en-

gineers the principal current of the river refused to absorb it. Turned aside by the formation of the bank, the current persisted in following the old bed, which drove it under the walls of Vicksburg. The Confederates, on their part, not being satisfied with the river as an auxiliary, had erected batteries on the cliffs facing the lower outlet of the channel, intended to enfilade it in such a manner that the navigation of this new route, if it should ever become practicable, would prove even more dangerous than that which the Union fleet was desirous to avoid. From this moment the hope of making use of it had to be relinquished, although the work of repairing the levees of the channel, in order to re-establish the water-routes which the freshet had submerged, was continued for three weeks longer.

The works which were intended to open a pass by way of Lake Providence did not promise a better result. They had, however, been initiated under favorable auspices. Grant had visited them on the 4th of February, and a few days latter a narrow channel had put the lake in communication with the river. The news of the opening of this channel, exaggerated by the press, had caused great commotion in the Confederacy. It was thought that the entire Mississippi, forsaking its ancient bed, was about to precipitate itself into Bayou Macon, the Washita, and the Atchafalaya, and that it would abandon New Orleans to discharge its waters into the Gulf of Mexico farther west. Nothing of this kind happened, and the deflection of the waters had no other effect than to obstruct all future works. Between Lake Providence and Bayou Macon there occurred a depression of the ground occupied by an immense swamp which fed a rank and thick vegetation, under which Bayou Baxter, reduced to the size of a small stream, disappeared entirely. The swamp was flooded in an instant, and in order to open a practicable pass for naval vessels it was deemed necessary to cut down the trunks of trees, then to pull up the stumps of enormous white oaks and cypresses to disengage them from the iron-wood which covered it. The men, who were at work with the water up to their shoulders, could not long endure such fatigue. The route which it was thus sought to open in the forest was not less than about fifteen miles in length: the whole of McPherson's corps was engaged in this work for several weeks.



But as it was found that this pass, once practicable, could only admit of the passage of small steamers, and that Porter's large vessels would not be able to avail themselves of it, the project was finally abandoned during the month of March.

The reconnoissances that had been made in the Yazoo Pass in the beginning of this month had been productive of better results. Just at the time when the Federals had lost the *Queen of the West* and the *Indianola*, when Williams' channel and that of Lake Providence were closed to them, when therefore it seemed impossible for them to turn the Vicksburg batteries by way of the south, the entrance of the Yazoo was thrown open to them, and they had good reason to believe that they had at last a good route to follow for investing the citadel of the enemy.

The mine prepared in the dam which obstructed the Yazoo Pass had been fired on the 2d of February, the very day when the *Queen of the West* passed Vicksburg and Grant arrived at Milliken's Bend. The waters, rushing with great force into the bed they had so long occupied, soon opened a channel ninety yards in width as far as Moon Lake. A combined expedition was immediately organized for the purpose of penetrating into it. Two gunboats, partially armored, the *Chillicothe* and the *De Kalb*, accompanied by five steamers of light draught carrying two regiments from Missouri\* intended for sharpshooters, and followed by about twenty transports with Ross' division of McClernand's corps on board, nearly five thousand men strong, entered the waters of Moon Lake under command of Lieutenant Watson Smith of the navy. During this time an engineer officer, Colonel Wilson, with a few hundred soldiers, had succeeded in opening a pass to the flotilla as far as the Tallahatchie. It was a laborious and difficult task. As soon as the dike had been attacked, the Confederates, guessing the object of their adversaries, had obstructed the course of the Yazoo Pass below Moon Lake. Wilson had been obliged to carry off, sometimes for a distance of several miles, the trees which encumbered the bed of the bayou, and which a few skilful strokes of the axe had felled, requiring superhuman efforts to pull them out. The water, which was spreading through the breach, had soon flooded

\* The Twelfth and Seventeenth regiments, from Sherman's corps.—ED.

the whole surrounding country, and it was through these marshy or submerged tracts of land that Wilson's soldiers were advancing with the saw in one hand and a musket in the other, alternately working and exchanging shots with the Confederate partisans. Finally, allowing nothing to deter them, they succeeded in overcoming all obstacles, and on the 2d of March the expedition entered the deep and navigable bed of the Cold Water.

As soon as Grant was informed of this, he thought of making the largest portion of his soldiers follow the same route. The latter had suffered much—some in consequence of inaction, others by being compelled to work in the marshes in the middle of a cold, damp winter. They were scattered along the right bank of the Mississippi from the neighborhood of Memphis as far as Vicksburg—McClermand at Helena, McPherson at Lake Providence and Milliken's Bend, Sherman at Young's Point. The overflow of the river having flooded all the surrounding country by infiltration, even the levee became at last the only piece of dry ground where the Federals could find footing. Crowded upon this narrow strip of land, they could not find a space sufficient for the sanitary requirements of a camp, and they were soon obliged to dispute this land with the dead, whose numbers were increasing at a fearful rate, and whose bodies prudence and charity alike forbade being thrown either into the swamp or into the river. McClermand received instructions to embark Quinby's division, and make it follow Ross'; McPherson held himself ready, with his whole corps and one division of Sherman's, to enter the Yazoo Pass for the purpose of renewing the campaign which had failed in December, 1862, by resting on the Tallahatchie.

In the mean while, Watson Smith's flotilla, after having experienced some difficulties in the Yazoo Pass in consequence of the rapidity of the current, which did not allow it to be navigated during the night, had moved down the Cold Water, and on the 10th of March entered the Tallahatchie, a river of sufficient depth and width to admit of easy navigation, without fear of running against the trunks of trees which had so long obstructed its passage.

But it had given the Confederates eight days to prepare for an attack the promptness of which was the principal element of success,

of which the latter cleverly availed themselves. The Tallahatchie and the Yallahusha form a junction a little above the village of Greenwood. The Yazoo, which takes its source from the confluence, flows in a different direction from that of the Tallahatchie, so as to leave a peninsula nearly four miles in length between them, which at the narrowest point is only four hundred and fifty yards wide. At this point the Confederates had constructed a work of considerable magnitude, known as Fort Pemberton, which completely commanded the course of the Tallahatchie: it consisted of a series of bastions dividing the peninsula in two, to which a mixture of earth and cotton-bales imparted both solidity and prominence. Two heavy guns and a battery of field-artillery constituted its armanent. The waters of the Tallahatchie, in overflowing its banks, had submerged all the approaches to this work and turned the peninsula into a veritable island. Ross's troops therefore could not land to make an attack, and the task of reducing it fell exclusively upon the two gunboats. The *Chillicothe* opened fire on the 11th of March, but this vessel was too weakly built and her armor too fragile. Most of the enemy's balls penetrated her through and through; others, loosening the bolts of her plates, did still more damage to her between-decks, and she was obliged to abandon the attempt after having had four men killed and fifteen wounded.

On the 13th, the impossibility of an attack by land having become manifest, the two gunboats fired up again: for a while the *De Kalb* silenced the guns of the fort, but Ross did not dare to land his troops on the only accessible point, which was too much in sight of the enemy's works, for the purpose of making an assault. In this fight the Confederate garrison had only one man killed and twenty wounded. Not wishing to have recourse to force, the Federals tried to dislodge it by less dangerous means. The fort was only two feet above the level of the river: it only required a slight overflow, therefore, to flood it. It was hoped to produce an artificial inundation by cutting through the levee of the Mississippi at Austin, above Delta, so as to throw a larger volume of water into the Tallahatchie. But this water spread over such an immense space that the level of the river was not sensibly affected; and after waiting five days Ross decided to retrace his steps.



• His position was indeed becoming critical. The railroad from Jackson to Grenada passes by Carrollton, within reach of Greenwood. By this route, as well as by that of the Yazoo, where he had several vessels, Pemberton could rapidly transport a sufficient number of troops to Greenwood to crush Ross' small division, isolated as it was and out of reach of any assistance. Several regiments had already left Vicksburg, and a few batteries placed along the Cold Water could bar the passage to the Federals, who were too far away from the Mississippi to reach it by any land route.

As soon as Grant became aware of Ross' situation he determined to make a diversion in his favor which might possibly open another route to Yazoo City, and which would, at all events, give Quinby time to join the expedition with sufficient forces to extricate it.

The indefatigable Porter, finding that the great overflow in the beginning of March was destroying all the works of Williams' channel, thought that if it closed the route against him on one side, it might, in return, open a pass in the labyrinth of bayous bordering the mouth of the Yazoo for debouching into this river between Yazoo City and Haines' Bluff. A reconnoissance made in Steele's Bayou, which ordinarily is only a large ditch, where he found five fathoms of water, had convinced him that the undertaking was worth a trial. He had immediately organized an expedition composed of his best and most powerful ships, such as the *Louisville*, the *Cincinnati*, the *Carondelet*, the *Mound City*, the *Pittsburg*, four mortar-boats, and four tow-boats. Grant had accompanied it on the 14th as far as Steele's Bayou. On his return to Milliken's the general-in-chief was informed at the same time of the repulse sustained by the gunboats on the Tallahatchie and the movements of the enemy in the direction of Greenwood. He immediately ordered Sherman to follow Porter, to support and assist him in reaching the Yazoo. Once in the waters of this river, the Federal fleet could have destroyed all the enemy's vessels that happened to be there, taken Greenwood in the rear, and made navigation safe as far as Yazoo Pass. Sherman, resting on this new base, would have been able to take a strong position on the border of the Yazoo, and crossed this river in order to turn Haines' Bluff.

The route followed by Porter was tortuous and difficult. Among the tributaries on the right bank of the Yazoo, ascending it from its mouth, one meets, first of all, Steele's Bayou, which at times runs within three-quarters of a mile of the Mississippi; then a water-course of larger size called Deer Creek; and, finally, Sunflower River, a stream of considerable dimensions. Channels which were then full to overflowing establish a communication between these water-courses before they reach the Yazoo: the Rolling Fork brings the waters of the Sunflower into Deer Creek, and lower down the Black Bayou conveys those of Deer Creek to Steele's Bayou. Deer Creek empties into the Yazoo in front of Haines' Bluff, and the Sunflower about fifteen miles higher up. Porter's plan was to ascend successively Steele's Bayou, Black Bayou, Deer Creek, and the Rolling Fork in order to descend the Sunflower afterward as far as the Yazoo.

On the 15th, in spite of many difficulties, he had reached a point in Steele's Bayou which is only separated from the Mississippi at Eagle Bend by a marshy space of about three-quarters of a mile: Stuart's division of Sherman's corps was landed near the latter point, crossed the swamp, not without difficulty, re-embarked on board the transports that Porter had brought along with him, and followed the route he had laid out. At the same time, Grant, countermanding the order he had given to McPherson to proceed in the direction of Yazoo Pass, kept him ready to support Sherman's movement.

After leaving Steele's Bayou the navigation became extremely difficult. Porter had not repeated the error committed in the Yazoo Pass, when, in preparing the route for the vessels in advance, a warning had been given to the enemy, who had thus ample time to put himself on his guard. Porter was well aware that it was important, above all, to take his adversaries by surprise, and with his enormous iron-clad steamers he dashed into the narrow channel, whose waters had never been disturbed except by the paddle of the Indian or the oar of the negro boatman. The branches of the trees hung over these placid waters, while the intertwined bindweed formed every now and then a kind of bridge spanning the water from side to side; but the heavy iron-clads passed through these obstacles, breaking

and tearing everything in their way. When some abrupt bend was reached, it became necessary to heave the vessels round on the spot by means of ropes; occasionally a tree of too large dimensions required the use of the axe to open a passage. At the end of twenty-four hours of assiduous labor Porter had traversed the Black Bayou, which is nearly three miles long, and Sherman, with a portion of Stuart's troops, joined him at a point named Hill's Plantation just as he was entering Deer Creek. From this point the infantry took the land route to reach the Rolling Fork, which was only about fifteen miles distant, whereas the fleet, by following the windings of Deer Creek, had at least twenty to travel.

According to the information he had received, Porter did not anticipate meeting any serious obstacle in the water-course last mentioned, and up to that moment everything had presaged success. The enemy, taken by surprise, had not sought to obstruct his way. The inhabitants of this rich section of country did not conceal their astonishment at the sight of the Federal vessels, being unable to explain to themselves how they had got there. In the mean while, the agents of the Confederate government set about executing the instructions they had received, directing them to burn all the cotton liable to fall into the enemy's hands. At first, only a few isolated fires attracted the attention of the Federal sailors gathered on the decks of their respective ships; but the flames soon spread out in every direction: in the evening they lighted up every point in the horizon by their sinister glare, and during the daytime the white smoke of the burning cotton rose in thick spiral columns above the forest. Seeing his approach signalled in this fashion, Porter hastened the speed of his vessels, but the obstacles were increasing at every step.

Having at length arrived within four miles of the Rolling Fork, he found a number of felled trees across the bayou. In proportion as the Federals freed the channel by dint of enormous efforts, the Confederates, musket in hand, were compelling the negroes collected on the neighboring plantations to obstruct it a little farther up, out of reach of their shots. Pemberton, on his part, hastened to despatch five thousand men from Haines' Bluff, in order to stop the Federals on the Rolling Fork before they had



time to debouch into the great current of the Sunflower. On the evening of the 19th, Porter had only about nine hundred yards more to run to enter the waters of the Rolling Fork, where he hoped to encounter fewer difficulties. But on the morning of the 20th, when his men, exhausted by constant labor, had resumed their work, the enemy suddenly made his appearance. While they were pulling up, one by one, the small willow trees which completely filled the bed of Deer Creek, a masked battery posted along the edge of a wood opened fire both upon the gunboats and the workmen. The situation was becoming critical. The whole of that section of country lies flat: here and there only may be seen some conical-shaped hillocks from thirty to fifty feet high, known by the name of Indian mounds—monuments undoubtedly consecrated by the first inhabitants of this country to warriors who had become illustrious in their day among their tribes. But the bayous which traverse this plain have deeply hollowed it, so that their banks overtop the level of the highest waters by several yards. Consequently, the heavy cannon of the gunboats were rendered powerless, and a few field-pieces planted on the upper deck could alone reply to the enemy's fire. The latter was not very enterprising, but he had succeeded in interrupting the labor of freeing the pass from obstructions, and Porter soon learned that he was actively at work in felling trees behind him and throwing them into Deer Creek, so as to cut off his retreat. The danger was imminent. Sherman was yet far away: he was still waiting at Hill's Plantation, with his advance-guard, for the remainder of his troops, a portion of which had remained on board the transports, while the rest were at work in widening the pass in the Black Bayou. Shut up in a channel which was obstructed at both ends, surrounded by high banks which paralyzed their ordnance, and so close to each other as to admit of no evolutions, Porter's ships would have been lost had they been attacked by a few thousand determined men. The admiral understood this, and immediately gave the signal for returning.

Whilst all the available men, numbering about three hundred, are following the bank of the bayou by land in order to interrupt the enemy's workmen busy in obstructing its passage, the gunboats unfasten their rudders and with much difficulty begin moving

backward, stern foremost, now striking against the bank on one side, then rebounding to the other side, groping their way like blind people; for until they have re-entered the waters of the Yazoo they cannot find room to turn round. The danger is increasing at every step of this painful journey; the number of the Confederates, who are following these unwieldy ships like a pack of hounds barking at an animal at bay, is constantly increasing, and they are becoming bolder and bolder every hour. On the 20th, Porter finds himself absolutely blockaded: an old coaling barge, sunk across the river, completely obstructs his passage, and while the enemy is actively at work trying to render this obstacle insurmountable, on the other side the pass which the Federals have just traversed in their retrograde movement has been closed by stumps of trees newly thrown into it. The Southern sharpshooters do not expose themselves to the fire of the Northern sailors, but, hidden in the bushes or behind trees, these skilful marksmen rain showers of balls upon them as soon as they show themselves. Those who have landed are obliged to re-embark in order to avoid this invisible foe: all attempt to free the pass is abandoned, and Porter is preparing to leave the ships in order to cut his way on foot sword in hand, when a brisk discharge of musketry announces to him the arrival of help which he already despaired of receiving. A negro who had been deputed by him to carry an urgent appeal to Sherman has succeeded in reaching the latter during the evening of the 19th-20th. The Union general loses not a single moment in hastening to the assistance of the fleet. Colonel Giles A. Smith, who happened to be at Hill's Plantation with the Eighth Missouri, started on that very evening. Porter receives from him a valuable co-operation, together with the announcement of approaching deliverance. In fact, Sherman, having remained alone at the entrance of the Black Bayou, boldly jumps into a boat to go in search of the remainder of his troops: on his way he overtakes those that are encamped along the borders, and puts them on board some barges, which a gunboat, happily met and already loaded with troops, takes in tow. Night has supervened: in spite of the darkness, the vessel forces her way through the bayou, and on the morning

of the 21st Sherman himself, at the head of two brigades, starts on the same errand, following the levee bordering Deer Creek. He is on foot like his soldiers, for it has been found impossible to bring any horses, and his example stimulates their zeal. The march is long and painful, the ground being at times completely submerged. Finally, before noon, nearly twenty-one miles have been accomplished: the fire of naval howitzers is heard from behind a clump of trees; soon after a detachment of the enemy, leading a squad of negroes bent upon obstructing the river along Porter's path, is met and dispersed. The latter, with the assistance of Smith's soldiers, has freed Deer Creek and resumed his retreating movement; but, being constantly harassed, has only progressed a few miles in twenty-four hours. Finally, an officer mounted on the bare back of a horse appears on the bank: it is Sherman, who, having found the animal on his way, has taken possession of it in order to join the fleet with greater speed. The latter is saved, but the expedition has failed.

Porter, taught by danger, is anxious to get out of the labyrinth into which he has penetrated. Sherman has not a single mounted man to clear the borders of the river, nor any artillery to cover them; even his infantry will barely suffice to protect the gangs of laborers employed in carrying off the trees which the enemy has felled and carefully distributed along the whole route. Indeed, this enemy is there in force; he can rapidly concentrate his troops at any point of the Rolling Fork or the Sunflower that he pleases, and thus stop the progress of the fleet. It is impossible either to take him by surprise or to organize a methodical campaign against him in a section of country so full of difficulties. Finally, Ross' flotilla, which it was important to set free at any price, has been assisted by Quinby on the Tallahatchie, and we know that Grant has ordered the latter to bring the troops and vessels that had been repulsed in front of Fort Pemberton to the Mississippi.

The return of Porter and Sherman was attended with much trouble, but the enemy offered no molestation. They had not achieved the results they had anticipated, and Grant was greatly disappointed; but they had probably saved Ross by diverting the attention of the enemy from him. They reached Milliken's on the 27th of March.



In the mean time, Quinby, with a portion of his troops, had made a rapid march, and met Ross on the 19th of March at a short distance above Fort Pemberton. He resolved to make another attack upon this work, landing some of his troops, and occupied a few batteries which had been erected by the Federal navy. But, being without guns of heavy calibre, he could do no harm to an enemy protected on all sides by the flood. In order to reduce the fort it would have required a fleet, which the dimensions of the Yazoo Pass did not permit of being brought to this point. After waiting about ten days for the arrival of McPherson, of whom he was only the advance-guard, Quinby, as we have stated, had been ordered to return to Helena, which place he reached in the early part of April.

The loss of the *Queen of the West* and the *Indianola* had given the Confederates absolute control of that part of the Mississippi between Vicksburg and Port Hudson. Porter, it is true, had taken revenge for this disaster by a ruse which had proved completely successful. On the deck of an old boat he had constructed a turret of painted wood, which gave her the appearance of a monitor, and in the evening of one of the earliest days of March he had set her afloat on the river above Vicksburg. The forts soon noticed this strange craft, and opened a terrific fire upon her, but had not succeeded in sinking her. At early daylight they saw with consternation that she was pursuing her silent course. The telegraph had soon communicated the alarm along the whole course of the river, and, fearing lest the *Indianola* might become the prey of this formidable adversary, her commander was ordered to destroy her. The flames were yet devouring her when the false monitor ran aground a little higher up, thus making known to the Confederates the ruse of which they had been the victims. But the loss of the *Indianola* did not prevent them from retaining exclusive control of the river.

It required a vigorous effort to dispute this control of the river to them. It was from the south that this effort was first made. The instructions given to Banks and Farragut directed them to attack Port Hudson, and endeavor to reduce this place whilst Grant was operating against Vicksburg. Circumstances had not permitted them until then to conform to these instructions. Banks





Federal  
Batteries

Marsh

Marsh

PORT HUDSON

MISSISSIPPI  
RIVER

Federal Batteries

Houses

Fort

Federal Works and Trenches

Church

Redoubt

RAIL

Bridge

Batteries

Depot

Redoubt

Batteries

Batteries

Houses

Fort

Confederate

Redoubt

House

Trenchments

Federal Works

Battery

Federal Works & Batteries

Battery

Pond

Village

PORT HUDSON

Scale 30,000

0. 500. 1000 Kilom

Scale 2 3/32 in 1 Mile

1/4 1/2 3/4 1 Mile



had been occupied by the Brashear City expedition and the cares of governing New Orleans, where the despotic rule of his predecessor had left him an extremely difficult task to perform. Farragut had seen all his forces absorbed by his operations along the coast of the Gulf of Mexico. The blockade of Mobile and the unfortunate occurrences at Galveston and Sabine Pass had not permitted him to remain in the waters of the Mississippi, where, to blockade Port Hudson, he had left only a few rams and mortar-boats, unfit for navigation in the open sea.

But in the beginning of March an attack upon this place was finally resolved upon. Banks collected all his available forces at Baton Rouge, amounting to about twelve thousand men, and Farragut, entering once more the river with his sloops-of-war, got his fleet together a little below Port Hudson. In order to invest the place he determined to force the passage of its batteries, so as to command its approaches both from above and below. This difficult operation once accomplished, Banks was to commence the siege by land, while some of Farragut's ships would ascend the river to within sight of Vicksburg.

On the 13th of March everything was ready, and Farragut was giving his last instructions, always practical and clear, to the captains whom he had already led in enterprises not less perilous. The fleet which was to force the passage was composed of the sloops-of-war *Hartford*, *Richmond*, *Mississippi*, and *Monongahela*, and the three gunboats *Albatross*, *Genesee*, and *Kineo*. During this operation the mortar-boats were to bombard the enemy's batteries; and on the 13th, Banks, having arrived at Baton Rouge a few days previously, had pushed his reconnoissances as far as in front of Port Hudson in order to harass the garrison.

At half-past nine o'clock on the evening of the 14th the fleet received the signal for departure. The three gunboats were each fastened to a sloop-of-war in order to facilitate their motions, as these large ships had great difficulty in ascending the current, which is very strong at this point: lashed to the port side, the gunboats were protected by the hulls of the sloops-of-war against the shots of the enemy. The *Hartford*, leading as usual, had the *Albatross* at her side; the *Richmond* followed her, and, as she was the slowest sailer, the best gunboat, the *Genesee*, had been

assigned to her as a helpmate; then came the *Monongahela*, fastened to the gunboat *Kineo*; last of all came the *Mississippi*, which, being a side-wheeler, could not take a gunboat alongside with advantage.

The position of Port Hudson rendered this attempt extremely difficult. The village is situated on the left bank of the Mississippi, on the summit of a cliff forming a semicircle which encompasses a large angle of the river: on the opposite side a low sandy point, called Thompson's Point, stretches out to the centre of this semicircle, driving the principal current against the foot of the acclivity, the lower part of which is gradually crumbling away in consequence of the continuous action of the waters; a number of Confederate batteries were erected from the edge of the water to the foot of the slope, while others crowned the summit of the cliff. If you seek to avoid the current, you are carried by the eddies over the shoals of Thompson's Point; if you bear to the eastward in order to double this promontory, you run the risk of being thrown by the force of the water against the steep bank on the right side of the river. Navigation at this place is at all times difficult. How much more must it be, then, in the midst of the inevitable confusion of a night-combat! In order that the pilot of his vessel might be the better able to direct her course by keeping clear of the smoke, Farragut had placed him in the mizzen-top, and had constructed a long tube by means of which orders could be transmitted directly to the tiller.

The fleet was slowly ascending the river, carefully hiding all its fires, and the *Hartford* had already passed the first batteries, when a rocket thrown by some Confederate sentry on the right bank rose suddenly in the air. Before its luminous track had disappeared a cannon-ball, fired from the opposite side, strikes the water in front of the *Hartford*: the Federals are discovered, and the fight is about to commence. It is twenty minutes past eleven when the flotilla of mortar-boats opens fire in its turn, and the sky is soon furrowed by the large thirteen-inch shells which presently fall in the midst of the enemy's works. Shortly after an immense fire is kindled on Thompson's Point, and Farragut's vessels, standing out in the darkness like so many fantastic Chinese figures, present in this sinister light large targets to the well-sus-

tained fire of the Confederates. The Unionists reply to this fire, and, drawing close to the enemy's batteries near the edge of the water, substitute grape-shot for shells, whose ravages soon succeed in silencing the enemy's cannon. But the guns posted higher up on the crest of the hill, which rake the whole river, are beyond the reach of their shots, and do them much injury.

The *Hartford*, ascending the current with extreme difficulty, succeeds at last in doubling Thompson's Point; but at this moment the force of the current causes her to swerve from her course, and she almost strikes against the bank on the left side of the river. Farragut, backing the *Albatross* and going ahead strong on the *Hartford*, at length heads up the river, and resuming their regular course the vessels soon pass out of reach of the enemy's batteries. The *Richmond* followed them closely: she had already doubled Thompson's Point successfully, avoiding a torpedo which exploded at a short distance from her rudder, when a cannon-ball shattered the safety-valve chambers of two of her boilers, and, the steam escaping, the machinery, which was already in very bad condition, was no longer able to give her headway against the current. All the efforts of the *Genesee* were useless, and the *Richmond*, no longer able to advance, was obliged to turn back. The *Monongahela*, which was following in her wake, had been stranded at the extremity of Thompson's Point, being exposed for thirty minutes to the converging fire of the enemy; but with the aid of her gunboat, the *Kineo*, she had succeeded in extricating herself, when an accident to her machinery prevented her also from proceeding any farther. Her commander had been wounded, and the second officer, unable to follow the admiral, fell back with the *Richmond* below Port Hudson. Finally, the *Mississippi* ran aground shortly after on the same point, but having no gunboat at her disposal, she was unable to free herself, and after vainly trying for half an hour to get out of this dangerous position, her machinery was shattered by several cannon-balls. Convinced of his inability to save her, her commander caused her to be abandoned and set on fire; a portion of her crew gained the right bank, and proceeded on foot as far as where the mortar-boats lay; some were picked up by the gunboat *Kineo*, which had come back, but too late, to save her, and the



remainder of the saved found refuge on the *Richmond* and *Pensacola*. The flames rising above the masts of this vessel were saluted with a shout of joy from all the Confederate batteries, conveying at the same time to Farragut, who was left alone above Port Hudson with the *Hartford* and her gunboat, the intelligence of the destruction of one of his ships. It was two o'clock in the morning. While the rest of the fleet were rallying around the mortar-boats, and everybody was counting the losses, attending to the wounded, and ascertaining the extent of damages, the *Mississippi*, having been lightened and set afloat by the conflagration, was seen drifting like a blazing phantom in the morning mist, then disappeared shortly after with a tremendous explosion.

The Federals had one hundred and three men disabled. The loss of the *Mississippi*, and the return of four out of the six vessels which were to pass the batteries, rendered the attempt of the 14th of March a positive failure: Banks, on being informed of it, took the back track and returned to Baton Rouge. From what he had been able to learn, the garrison of Port Hudson consisted of sixteen thousand men, and he could not think of laying siege to it with the forces at his disposal. He set about to find, by way of Bayou Teché and Red River, a route less dangerous for turning the batteries of Port Hudson. But the moment has not arrived to follow him in this new campaign.

The repulse at Port Hudson was partly compensated for by the passage of the *Hartford* and the *Albatross*. There was nothing between Vicksburg and Port Hudson that could offer any resistance to these two vessels. On the 16th they made their appearance at the mouth of Red River, but Farragut would not stop there. Hoping to be able to assist Grant in his operations, and at the same time to receive some ammunition and perhaps reinforcements from Porter, he continued his course up the river. On the 19th of March he forced the passage of the Grand Gulf batteries, which only cost him six men, and came to anchor below Warrenton, whence he could put himself in communication with Porter's fleet. The latter was at that time in Deer Creek; but the intrepid General Ellet, who had remained at Young's Point with his rams, soon came on board the *Hartford* by land, and promised the admiral that two of his vessels, the *Switzerland* and the *Lancaster*, com-

manded by his two brothers, Colonel and Lieutenant-colonel Ellet, would force the Vicksburg passage in order to join him. They were to assist him effectually in intercepting all the communications that the Confederates had established between the two sides of the Mississippi, and to destroy, if possible, the Warrenton batteries. The two rams started during the night of the 24th of March, but, their progress having been delayed, it was daylight before they were able to pass Vicksburg. They experienced a terrible fire. The *Lancaster*, an old ship, almost rotten, was sunk by a cannon-ball which burst her boilers; the *Switzerland* came to anchor alongside of the *Hartford* after having received some damages, which were promptly repaired. This affair gave rise to severe remonstrances with General Ellet on the part of Porter, who refused to send Farragut any more vessels by the same route, but promised him to do so by way of the channel of Lake Providence, which it was then contemplated to recapture.

The Federals, notwithstanding their wonderful energy and perseverance, were therefore but little more advanced than in the month of January, when they had commenced struggling against Nature in order to avoid approaching the works of Vicksburg from the front. All their efforts had failed, but the tenacity of their leader and their inventive powers would not permit them to consider themselves beaten.

It remains for us to show how, by a bold stroke on the part of the navy and the persistent labors of the army, this object was finally accomplished, while some expeditions of secondary importance on the part of the Federal cavalry into the State of Mississippi prepared the way for those successes which were to end in securing the undisputed possession of the Great River to the Federals.

From the moment that he had become convinced of the impossibility of reaching the Upper Yazoo, Grant had fallen back upon the idea of crossing the Mississippi below Vicksburg in order to invest that place. The arrival of Farragut was an additional reason for adopting this plan of campaign, and he had informed the admiral of his intention to send a reinforcement of twenty thousand men to Banks by water to

assist him in capturing Port Hudson. If this obstacle to navigation was once destroyed, the whole of Farragut's fleet would be at the disposal of the army, and Vicksburg could easily be attacked from the south. Whilst waiting for this expedition Farragut moved down the river on the 1st of April, passed Grand Gulf, and returned to the mouth of Red River, which it was important to blockade, and whence he could, in case of necessity, communicate with Banks by way of Atchafalaya.

This blockade deprived the strong garrison occupying Port Hudson, under the command of General Gardner, of indispensable resources. Consequently, finding that Banks had given up the idea of laying siege to it for the present, Pemberton withdrew a portion of the garrison. He stationed the brigades of Rust and Buford at Jackson, a point highly important for him to protect against the incursions of the Federal cavalry, and where these troops could obtain provisions, which were very scarce at Port Hudson.

This movement was rendered the more necessary by the fact that Pemberton had just been deprived of the co-operation of Van Dorn. We know what services this general had rendered a few months previously by interrupting the campaign undertaken by Grant along the Yallabusha. He had gathered around his old regiments all the recruits to be found about the dépôts north of the Mississippi who had been at all drilled. Leaving the others under the command of General Chalmers, he had thus succeeded in forming a corps of four thousand mounted men, with whom he had gone, by Johnston's order, to join Bragg at Tullahoma. His arrival had been of great assistance to the Army of the Tennessee: covering the whole country east of Duck River, he had enabled the Confederates to pick up in that rich section the provisions that the only railway-line through which they received their supplies could not have brought them. Without his support, Bragg would have been obliged to retire to Chattanooga during the winter. But, on the other hand, his absence was severely felt by Pemberton, and Stevenson's division of infantry, which was left with him as a kind of compensation, could but imperfectly supply Van Dorn's place.

In the mean while, as soon as Grant had resolved to operate



on the Mississippi below Vicksburg, he put his troops in motion in order to occupy that portion of the right bank in force. Once established there, he fully expected that Porter would find means to bring him the men-of-war and transports which he should require for crossing the river. In fact, as he had told Farragut, if he were to send an army corps to Port Hudson, he would have to repair with his whole army to some point whence he might, in case of need, assist it, and at all events prevent Pemberton from leaving Vicksburg in order to crush him. With this object in view, he selected the village of New Carthage, situated on the right bank about twenty-two miles below Vicksburg. From this base of operations he intended to attack either Warrenton or Grand Gulf, whose batteries had fired upon Farragut. Once master of one of these two points, he could prevent Pemberton from going to the assistance of Port Hudson, and oblige him either to leave Gardner to his own resources or to come out and attack the Union army in the open country. With the aid of a few vessels he could, if he did not leave the borders of the river, keep his communications open with New Carthage, and from this place with Milliken's or Young's Point by land.

This was a bold plan, especially with an army possessing so few of the elements of mobility. All his generals represented to him the danger to be incurred in thus placing the enemy between the Federal army and his base of operations, and of venturing between two hostile citadels without having the safety of his communications secured. Sherman himself begged him to desist from an attempt which he believed would prove disastrous, and to return to Memphis in order to renew the campaign by land, resting on the Tallahatchie. But Grant's determination was not to be shaken.

He was anxious to act. For the last three months the powerful army entrusted to his care had only been employed in cleansing muddy channels, and the good sense of Mr. Lincoln, who sustained the conqueror of Donelson, found it difficult to withstand the demands of those who were clamoring for a more enterprising chieftain. To return to Memphis, whatever might be the ultimate plan of the campaign, would have looked too much like a retreat, and would have had a disastrous effect both on public

opinion at the North and on the *morale* of the army. Besides, Grant was already foreseeing the brilliant operations which enabled him to find the keys of Vicksburg at the end of the route he was then following.

His army, heretofore scattered along the Mississippi, was concentrated at Milliken's. Hurlbut sent from Memphis all the regiments he could spare; McClernand, leaving only an indispensable garrison at Helena, brought him the remainder of the troops occupying that section of Arkansas; McPherson definitely abandoned the works of the Lake Providence channel; a third division, recently formed under the command of General Tuttle, was added to Sherman's corps. Grant had nearly eighty thousand men about him.

These forces were far superior to those that Pemberton could bring against him, which had held him in check until then, not by their number, but through the aid that Nature had afforded them. At the moment when the return of mild weather was evidently about to give the signal for a new aggressive campaign to their adversaries, the Confederates should have combined all their efforts and concentrated their means of action for the defence of those points the conquest of which was the object of this campaign. But that harmony between the government and the various chiefs which had contributed so largely to the successful defence of Virginia did not exist in the West.

On the 24th of November, 1862, General Joseph E. Johnston, who had scarcely recovered from the severe wound he had received at the battle of Fair Oaks, had been placed by President Davis at the head of all the Southern forces stationed between the Mississippi and the Alleghanies; but at the same time, whether through excessive solicitude for his health, or out of regard for his favorite general, Bragg, to whom he did not wish to assign a too subordinate *rôle*, he had directed Johnston to take up his head-quarters at Chattanooga, and to exercise only a general and distant supervision over the troops in the field. This situation, analogous to that which Halleck had occupied the previous year in the Federal armies of the West, was scarcely fitted for a soldier of Johnston's worth: he soon found that it did not confer upon him any influence over the general management of military operations.

His first thought had been to procure reinforcements for Pemberton, whom Grant was then menacing, as we have seen in the preceding volume: he had requested the President to draw these reinforcements from Arkansas, where General Holmes was lying inactive with an army of fifty-five thousand men, and no enemy in force before him. His request had been refused in such a peremptory manner that Mr. Randolph, the Secretary of War, who had warmly supported it, tendered his resignation after this occurrence. When Mr. Davis went to the West in December, 1862, Vicksburg was already seriously menaced: it was absolutely necessary to send reinforcements to Pemberton, but the President preferred to draw them from Bragg's army instead of Holmes'; in spite of Johnston's protestations, he took away Stevenson's division, together with a brigade of McCown's division, from the Army of the Tennessee, which he despatched to Pemberton on the 20th of December. These troops arrived at Vicksburg on the 7th of January, when the issue of the campaign was no longer doubtful, the Federals being already in full retreat; but they were terribly missed by Bragg on the battlefield of Murfreesborough, for it can be said without exaggeration that their presence in the ranks of his army on that occasion would have secured him the victory. The visit of the President to Vicksburg threw yet more light upon this fatal diversity of opinion existing between the leaders of the Confederate armies of the West. If, on the one hand, Mr. Davis disagreed with Johnston and Pemberton, both of whom were urging him to send at least twenty thousand men from Holmes' army to Vicksburg, on the other hand these two generals could not come to an understanding either as to the manner of fortifying Vicksburg, as we have already stated, nor, which was a more serious matter, regarding the very object of the campaign which was about to open in the spring. Pemberton attached the highest importance to the strong place itself, and was disposed to make everything subservient to its defence—to sacrifice everything rather than abandon it; Johnston, on the contrary, only looked upon this place as an auxiliary of more or less value, but of secondary consideration in the forthcoming campaign, the main object of which ought to be to beat the enemy's army if possible, leaving



the Southern Army of the Mississippi intact. In proportion as the march of events progresses we shall see this misunderstanding between Johnston and his subordinates becoming more and more pronounced. Again Mr. Davis turned a deaf ear to the sage counsels of the former, and sent him back to Chattanooga, giving him to understand that, notwithstanding his nominal authority, he was not to issue any orders to Pemberton in future.

In the mean while, the latter, encouraged by the facility with which the Federal soldiers had been repulsed on the Yallabusha, allowed himself to be lulled into a delusive sense of security. He thought only to defend certain points on the right bank of the Mississippi against any sudden attack that the Federal ships might attempt. To effect this, he had confided the task of guarding Grand Gulf to one of his best officers, General Bowen, who occupied that place with his Missouri brigade, about three thousand strong. But the detachments he had sent to the opposite side of the river could not stop the Federals for an instant whenever Grant should come down that way with a large force. The only obstacle the latter had to fear was the character of the ground. The great overflow of the river had flooded that section of country to such an extent that no army could pass through it on foot. But there was found a natural channel affording a way of communication which had already been examined by Grant long ago. He had not sought to render this channel practicable for large steamers, because it would have been impossible to find camping-ground in the neighborhood for the large number of men required to perform such work. Now it was only a question of securing a passage for the boats, tenders, and small vessels that would be employed in transporting troops, materials, and provisions. This pass was the Roundaway Bayou, which takes its source in the adjoining swamps of Milliken's, and after pursuing a winding course as far as the village of Richmond reaches New Carthage. At a short distance from this point, at Smith's plantation, it becomes divided: one branch runs back into the Mississippi, passing before New Carthage; the other branch continues its course under the name of Bayou Vidal, losing itself at some distance from that locality among the marshes, which, in their

turn, become the sources of new bayous. A trench was opened from Young's Point for the purpose of putting the Roundaway Bayou in communication with the river across the small channels by which it is fed at this point as far as the vicinity of Duckport village. In the mean time, McClernand, having left Milliken's on the 30th of March, was marching upon Richmond. From this place he was to endeavor to reach New Carthage with as many troops as he could manage to push forward along the half-submerged roads of that country. Richmond was occupied without fighting by the Federal advance-guard, and the road from Milliken's to this village rendered almost passable in a few days; finally, on the 6th of April, some flatboats, with howitzers on board, descended the bayou for the purpose of taking possession of New Carthage. This little town had been evacuated, but the freshet having broken down the levees of the channel, it was completely surrounded by water, and it would have been useless to think of bringing an army there. This new difficulty compelled McClernand to halt Osterhaus' division, the only one on the march, at Smith's plantation, and to try to reach the Mississippi lower down by going around Bayou Vidal. Pending this movement, the Duckport trench was progressing, thanks to the workmen who had been brought over from Williams' channel, which had been entirely abandoned. Finally, in order to mislead the enemy, Grant had sent a few troops to make a reconnoissance in Deer Creek as far as Haines' Bluff.

He found it an easy matter to deceive Pemberton, for the latter, not being aware of the tenacity of his adversary, had believed him to be in full retreat toward Memphis at the very moment that McClernand was moving on New Carthage. He had no doubt been confirmed in this false impression by the reports of his spies, who from the banks of the Mississippi had noticed a large number of transports ascending the river; these were vessels that Grant had kept near him until then in anticipation of a campaign on the Yazoo, or a flood which might have compelled him to gather up those of his troops whose camps ran the risk of being submerged. At the request of Halleck, he had sent back these ships in ballast, as they were wanted in the waters of the Tennessee to supply the Union army around Murfreesborough

with provisions. As a sequel to his mistake, the Confederate general wrote to Johnston in the early part of April that the Federals, despairing of reducing Vicksburg, were sending reinforcements to Rosecrans, and, far from doing anything to resist this new attack with which he was menaced, on the 11th of April he had sent the Rust and Buford brigades, stationed at Jackson, to Tullahoma, together with that of Tilghman, detached from Vicksburg. The Vaughn brigade was to follow the latter, raising the reinforcements intended for Bragg's army to eight thousand men. It was only on the 16th of April that intelligence received from Memphis made Pemberton aware of the real movements of his adversary. The orders he had given were countermanded, but much valuable time had been lost.\*

Between the 8th and 12th of April two divisions of McClelland's corps had arrived at Smith's plantation and New Carthage. But during this time the waters of the Mississippi had fallen, leaving the Roundaway Bayou, which a few days before seemed to afford a pass easily navigable, almost dry. The works in the Duckport trench were abandoned, and it was found necessary to construct across the marshes and muddy channels adjoining the bayou a wagon-road which could alone, in future, convey supplies to the Thirteenth corps, and afford the means of transporting supplies for the rest of the army in front of Grand Gulf. This position, in fact, was the same that Grant had desired to take possession of in order to establish himself in it with his whole army.

In order to effect this operation the aid of the fleet was indispensable. Porter decided at last to follow Farragut's example and boldly force the passage of Vicksburg, which for the last three months he had vainly endeavored to turn. The night of the 16th of April, the period of the new moon's advent, was designated for this dangerous enterprise, and the Federal commodore determined to take along with him seven of his best ships. The *Benton*, which carried his flag, the *La Fayette*, lashed to a small steamer called the *General Price*, the *Louisville*, the *Mound City*, the *Pittsburg*, and the *Carondelet*, were to

\* General Pemberton's report to Adjutant-general Cooper, from Meridian, Miss., November 1, 1863.—ED.



proceed in the order we have named: most of them had tenders in tow loaded with coal, an indispensable article for them in the future. Three army-transports, the *Forest Queen*, the *Henry Clay*, and the *Silver Wave*, had been ordered to follow them, and to take advantage of the combat to slip rapidly along the right bank; the *Tuscumbia*, bringing up the rear, was to pick up the stragglers and force them to accelerate their movements.

The evening of the 16th of April was clear and the sky fretted with stars. A light fog hovering over the waters of the great river did not prevent anxious spectators, who had come out of the Federal camps in thousands, from noticing the sombre profile of the Vicksburg heights, which stood out in bold relief under the canopy of heaven.

At nine o'clock Porter gives the signal of departure, so as not to be overtaken by daylight before he has passed the batteries. The Federal ships have long since kindled their fires, in order not to betray their presence by their smoke: not a light is to be seen on board; the transports have been encompassed round by large stacks of wet hay, so as to deaden the effect of combustible projectiles. The whole fleet is being gently drifted onward by the current, each vessel following the one preceding her at a distance of about fifty yards. The *Benton* has already passed the first batteries when, at a quarter-past eleven, the enemy perceive her. Flashes of cannon immediately illumine the atmosphere on all sides; an immense wood-pile, which has been prepared on the summit of the hill, blazes out quickly, casting a vivid light over the ships that have come to brave the formidable citadel. Some children, hidden away among the ruins of the De Soto village on the right bank, reply to this signal by setting fire to some wooden shanties, which throw an additional glare over the waters of the river. The Federals reply to these blazing batteries the best way they can. In spite of the danger, the inhabitants of Vicksburg, roused by the sound of cannon, hasten to witness this stupendous sight, following with deep emotion the varying fortunes of the struggle which is to decide their fate. The women who have collected under the verandahs are counting the shots fired by the enemy's vessels; they even brave the projectiles which are beginning to fall over the houses spread out in terraces through the city.

The *Benton* passes at a distance of forty-five yards from the quay, and fires her broadside into the batteries that are posted along the water's edge. Aided by the rapidity of the current, she does not remain more than half an hour under fire; before midnight she has passed the last of the enemy's works. The *La Fayette* and the *Price* follow her closely, but they come in contact with the *Louisville*, which, having been misled by the bright light on the right-hand shore, is compelled to make two full turns, and the Confederates, taking advantage of this accident, concentrate all their fire upon the three ships. The latter, however, succeed in extricating themselves, and are soon out of their reach. During this time the *Mound City* has passed them; the *Pittsburg* and the *Carondelet*, being momentarily embarrassed by the current, draw near the enemy's batteries. Perceiving the circle of fire through which they have to pass, the hearts of the captains of two of the transports fail them, being sailors in the merchant service who have been hired with their vessels by the Secretary of War. They have already turned their bows up the river, when the *Tuscumbia*, which is watching them, compels them to resume their course; and this delay enables the enemy to bring all their guns to bear on them. The *Henry Clay*, penetrated by a shell, is soon transformed into a vast brazier, by the aid of which the proceedings on the river are seen with alarm from the Federal camps: the *Forest Queen*, having become disabled, is saved by the *Tuscumbia*; while the *Silver Wave* again joins Porter's fleet.

The Warrenton batteries are passed without accident before night has drawn to a close, and soon after the fleet is brought to a halt in order to wait for daylight to continue the navigation, which is henceforth free from danger. The Federals at New Carthage were impatient to know the results of the combat, the sounds of which, echoing along the shores of the Mississippi, had brought them news during the night. At daybreak they got sight of the blackened planks of the *Henry Clay*, then of some boats set adrift during the fight, which the current was rapidly carrying off. The inhabitants, being Secessionists, were already greeting these sad *débris* as messengers announcing the destruction of the fleet, when the fleet itself hove in sight, as

sound and intact as it was before the conflict: not a single man had been killed, twelve only had been wounded, and, with the exception of the *Henry Clay*, none of the vessels had sustained anything but trifling damage. The great problem was therefore solved; the junction of the fleet and army below Vicksburg was effected, and the real work of the campaign was about to begin in earnest.

Encouraged by this success, Grant immediately ordered six new transports to be got ready, which, by forcing the passage in their turn, were to bring over to him all the *matériel* he yet needed. He did not wait for them to commence operations. Assigning to McClernand the place of honor at the head of the army in order to gratify the burning ambition of his subordinate, he enjoined him to try to take possession of Grand Gulf: having once made sure of a point of disembarkation on the left bank, the latter was merely to occupy it. The passage by main force of one of the four largest rivers in the world was so difficult an undertaking that it became necessary, at any cost, to take advantage of the first moment of surprise, so as not to allow the enemy time to recover from its effects.

The batteries of Grand Gulf had been increased and reinforced by General Bowen since Farragut had passed them. But the former, as we have stated, had but three or four thousand men to defend this position, which was fortified only on the water-side. We know that Pemberton had not seriously believed in Grant's movement until he had seen the Federal fleet pass below Vicksburg, and the reinforcements he was preparing to send Bowen could not reach him for some days. Among the lowlands extending between Grand Gulf and Warrenton there is an old landing-place called Congo Island, whence a road leads to the border of the Big Black River. It was not occupied, and afforded great facilities for landing. The naval force, after having protected this operation, could cover the passage of the Big Black near its mouth above Grand Gulf. Grant had recommended McClernand to make sure of this point, which was so necessary to his future movements, as soon as possible. Porter had scarcely arrived at New Carthage when he earnestly solicited the co-operation of the Thirteenth corps in order to take possession of this point.



McClelland positively refused, and the favorable opportunity, of which he failed to take advantage, soon went by. Finally, Grant, whose plans had been too long frustrated by the slowness of a lieutenant to whom he had desired to afford a chance for achieving some brilliant exploit, hastened to New Carthage. But Pemberton, on his part, despatched Green's brigade, the Sixth Mississippi, with a battery of artillery, to Bowen. Congo Island was occupied by Confederates, and the garrison of Grand Gulf was thenceforth sufficiently strong to resist any sudden attack.

In the mean while, the Federal troops stationed on the right bank of the Mississippi had not remained altogether inactive. A passable road had been constructed along Bayou Vidal, and the larger portion of the Thirteenth corps had gone to take position at Perkins' Landing, lower down than New Carthage, where the embarkation could be more easily effected. The transports, six in number, which had to force the passage of Vicksburg were ready, having on board all the material necessary for the campaign. The larger portion of their crews, who had not enlisted in the army, but were simply engaged by contractors who had hired these vessels from the owners, refused to expose themselves in such a venture. But in a few hours many willing men, able to take their places, were found among the regiments encamped at Milliken's—machinists, Mississippi sailors, and pilots—who came forward in larger numbers than were required. On the evening of the 22d of April the transports, thus fitted out, started by the route which had been laid out by Porter a few days before, and, having no armament, sustained the fire of the Vicksburg batteries without replying to them. Only one among them, the *Tigress*, was sunk: it was unfortunately the one which carried all the equipments for the hospitals. The others escaped with some damage and a small number of wounded. In order to repair this damage, there was again found in the ranks of the army men of all trades, and in a few days machinists, blacksmiths, carpenters, caulkers, etc., taken from the Thirteenth corps, made every trace of the enemy's balls disappear.

The arrival of the five vessels was indispensable for transporting the whole army to the hostile bank of the Mississippi; but if they sufficed for simply ferrying over these troops from one side.

of the river to the other, they could not, in view of their small number, be made to navigate those waters even for a few hours. Congo Island being well defended, it was impossible to avoid landing within sight of the guns of Grand Gulf. It was for the naval force to silence these guns. On the other hand, the army had to descend once more the right bank of the Mississippi, in order to reach the point of embarkation. A new road was constructed, which, running apart from the river in order to avoid the swamps, made a circuit of the old basin known by the name of Lake St. Joseph, and connected with the levee at the Hard Times plantation, a little above Grand Gulf. It was a repetition of the same labors and the same difficulties that were encountered in order to reach New Carthage. Finally, on the 28th of April the whole of the Thirteenth corps had arrived at Hard Times, partly by land, partly by water on board the transports. The Seventeenth, under McPherson, was following close, and the road from Hard Times to Milliken's, although very bad, was sufficiently passable to be used by the commissary department for supplying the army.

Grant resolved not to lose a single moment in taking possession of Grand Gulf with the co-operation of the fleet. The latter had orders to attack the enemy's batteries, and as soon as these were silenced the transports were to land about ten thousand men; that is to say, all they could carry. These troops were to make an attempt to penetrate into the Confederate works, and, at all events, to plant themselves on the eastern shore.

Sherman had remained above Vicksburg with his corps. Grant, placing entire confidence in his judgment, had assigned to him the thankless but important task of covering his communications. He had instructed him to watch Vicksburg, and to attack the place immediately in case the Confederates should diminish the strength of its garrison; in short, he had recommended him to draw their attention as much as possible in the direction of Haines' Bluff. He had left him the choice of means, for he did not wish him to compromise himself by a demonstration of too great a magnitude, which in the army and with the public might be taken for a failure, and expose him again to the severe censures of which he had already been the subject after the

repulse at Chickasaw Bayou. In thus writing from New Carthage to his lieutenant, whom he had left above Vicksburg, Grant had certainly no intention of throwing upon him any portion of his responsibility as commander-in-chief, for one of his chiefest merits had always been to shield his subordinates. But he knew very well that the very form of his letter and the considerations before which he appeared to hesitate would prove a stimulus to the proud and high-minded Sherman, and silence any objections he might feel disposed to raise against this thankless undertaking. Indeed, the latter set immediately to work. On the 29th of April he landed a large portion of his troops on the left bank of the Yazoo, at the very place where he had fought the enemy a few months before, making them march along the bayou in sight of the enemy's works, and feigning to prepare for throwing bridges across, while some vessels kept up a distant cannonade against the batteries of Haines' Bluff.

By this time Pemberton had at last been made to realize the full danger of his situation. The troops which had been sent to Bragg were returning in great haste, and going to take position along the Big Black River. Five thousand men were hastening from Vicksburg to reinforce the brigade already stationed at Warrenton. On the 28th of April, when the attack on Grand Gulf was no longer a matter of doubt, another detachment of equal force was sent after them; one brigade, taken from the garrison of Port Hudson, was ordered to Jackson, and all the troops scattered about under Loring for the defence of the lines of railway were concentrated in the last-mentioned town. The prompt execution of these movements could alone secure their success, but it was prevented by the audacious raid of a body of Federal cavalry, which traversed the whole extent of ground occupied by Pemberton's command, destroying the telegraph lines, the bridges, the stations, and the supplies of the army.

Grant had for a long time been thinking of hurling his cavalry against the railway lines of the enemy, but the necessity of protecting West Tennessee had not permitted him sooner to collect together the required forces for securing the success of such an enterprise. Finally, when he had decided to attack Vicksburg from the south, he gave orders to Hurlbut, who was in command



at Memphis, to organize a great raid, an art which the Confederates seemed until then to have alone possessed. The officers of the Union cavalry, taught by the example of Morgan and Forrest, had concluded to profit even by the experience which had cost them so dear. Why, in fact, should not they as well as their adversaries have resorted to those practices of partisan warfare which they had learned together when fighting against the Indians? Their horses and men, trained for the last two years to long marches, fatigues, and privations of every kind, could certainly assume in their turn an aggressive rôle, which is the easiest played in a war of this description. They therefore ventured to organize three great expeditions, one of which, that of Stoneman in Virginia, has already been described; the other two, under Colonels Grierson and Streight, ended very differently. While Stoneman was operating at the eastern extremity of the line which separated the belligerents, Streight was to pierce this line toward its centre, and Grierson at the west near the Mississippi. Since the commencement of the year the latter had had nothing to do but guard the neighborhood of Memphis and the Corinth railway. He had only met the enemy on one occasion, at Covington on the 10th of March, when he had dispersed a band of Confederates four hundred strong. On the 17th of April he left La Grange, near Grand Junction, and took the field with his own regiment, the Sixth Illinois, together with the Seventh of the same State and the Second Iowa—seventeen hundred horses in all—accompanied by a battery of artillery. Grant, wishing to leave him perfect freedom of action, had given him no positive instructions, simply directing him to cut up the railroads and destroy the dépôts in the rear of Pemberton.

On the 18th, crossing the Tallahatchie above New Albany, Grierson entered the open country of the enemy. In order to fulfil his mission faithfully he tried to find out the weak and vulnerable points of the enemy, while he avoided any serious engagement. Every morning when he did not feel himself pressed by any considerable force he divided his command into various small columns, which he despatched in several directions, in order to cover the largest possible extent of country and mislead the enemy in regard to his movements: these columns ren-

dezhoused at a given point early in the morning, some arriving there during the day or in the evening, others marching part of the night in order to reach such point sooner or later according to the task assigned them.

Between Tallahatchie and the village of Pontotoc there were found several camps of instruction which served as dépôts to the newly-organized regiments of Confederate cavalry. The detachment sent forward by Grierson dispersed them on the 19th, and encamped south of Pontotoc.

On the following day, as the enemy was beginning to muster his forces for the purpose of starting in pursuit of him, he got together all the weakest materials he had on hand, both in men and horses, about one hundred and seventy-five men in all, and sent them back to La Grange with the booty, the prisoners, and one piece of cannon. Just as the Southerners, deceived by the passage of this column through the streets of Pontotoc, were imagining that Grierson was retracing his steps, the latter was penetrating into the interior of the country, and on the 20th was encamping between Houston and Starkville, thus drawing closer to the Mobile and Ohio Railway, which he hoped to be able to damage.

Pemberton had not enough cavalry to protect all the points that were menaced at once. The small number that remained with him consisted partly of recruits which Van Dorn had left under General Chalmers between Grenada and Oxford, and of Wirt Adams' brigade, which was encamped in the vicinity of Port Hudson, and was watching the Federals stationed at Baton Rouge. Pemberton was therefore obliged to oppose the rapid movements of Grierson's cavalry with infantry; despairing of his ability to overtake them, he wished at least to prevent them from destroying his principal dépôts: the troops that were returning from Tullahoma were stationed *en échelon* along the Mobile and Ohio Railway at Okolona, Macon, Meridian, and especially at Enterprise, where there was an arms-factory of considerable importance. But in so doing he deprived himself of soldiers who would have been of great utility to him elsewhere. Chalmers' mounted men were pushed forward in the direction of Corinth, in order to compel Grierson to come back to defend

this place: this insignificant diversion was not attended by any success. Unable to cause the enemy to be watched closely, Pemberton could only obtain information of his movements through the exaggerated and contradictory reports of the inhabitants, and did not know which way to look for them. He wrote to Johnston, stating not only that several expeditions had penetrated into the interior of his lines, but that a whole Federal army was marching from Memphis upon Grenada.

Grierson had divided his brigade. Colonel Hatch, with the Second Iowa and one piece of cannon, had marched from Starkville toward the east, and was to return to La Grange after having destroyed the Mobile and Ohio Railroad between Macon and Okolona: he found this line too well guarded for the accomplishment of his task, but he regained the Federal lines in perfect safety. During this time the two other regiments, about one thousand strong, were still pushing southward. Taking advantage of the confusion of his adversaries, who were gathering all their forces for the purpose of preventing his return northward, Grierson conceived the idea of striking the railroad line which was of the greatest importance to the enemy. This was the Southern Railroad, a line completed since the beginning of the war, which connected Jackson on the Mississippi Central with Meridian on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad: it was, in fact, the only railway line through which Pemberton communicated with Bragg's army at Tullahoma, with the dépôts and the factories situated in Georgia, and with Mobile, whence he derived nearly all his supplies. But in order to succeed it was necessary to avoid stoppages under any pretext whatever, so that all detached squadrons, either for the purpose of feints or for burning bridges or for destroying military establishments, were ordered to proceed by forced marches in order to join the rest of the troops, who could not wait for them. A large shoe-factory, an object of great value to the Confederate army, was demolished during the movement. After passing through Louisville, Grierson reached the immense swamp in which Pearl River derives its source, and which is known by the name of Oka Nuxubee. It was important, at any cost, to gain the bridge over Pearl River, on the road from Louisville to Philadelphia, before the enemy had an oppor-



tunity of occupying or destroying it. The troops penetrated into the swamps during the night; it was a terrible march. The rain made darkness still darker; it was impossible to distinguish the trace of any road in the midst of the dense forest, where the ground was covered with two or three feet of water; every now and then the men stumbled into a quagmire wherein men and horses suddenly disappeared; the ranks of the column had to be kept closely massed to prevent the rear from losing itself. At last this formidable swamp was crossed; even the artillery succeeded in getting through, only about twenty horses being drowned. On the 23d, Pearl River was crossed, and Grierson, after pushing his way beyond Philadelphia, on the following morning took possession of the Southern Railroad at Newton Station. He had accomplished the principal object of his expedition. The railroad was destroyed with method; a large number of cars were burned, the tracks torn up, several locomotives were blown up with powder; in short, squads of cavalry were started eastward and westward for the purpose of setting fire to all the important bridges as far as possible. Pemberton acknowledged that this line was rendered completely useless for more than one week; and this long interruption was the more unfortunate for him that it occurred at the very period of the passage of the Mississippi by Grant's army.

After having granted some rest to his troops, Grierson became convinced that it would be less dangerous for him to continue his march southward than to try to return northward. He therefore decided to take the Raleigh route, and to proceed to Georgetown in order to cross over to the right side of Pearl River: thence he could shape his course either toward Grand Gulf, in the hope of joining Grant's army, or to Baton Rouge, where he was sure to find the garrison which Banks had left there. The Confederates did not expect to see their audacious enemy venturing so far: in the mean time, they were everywhere in motion in order to surround him. Pemberton was sending out despatches of every description, ordering Loring, who happened to be at Meridian, to mount two regiments of infantry, without thinking that it would be impossible for his lieutenant to collect the necessary number of animals with sufficient speed. He forwarded troops to the

north, and stationed some of them at Jackson; he occupied the Southern Railroad the day following the destruction of a portion of it by Grierson; he concentrated his forces for the purpose of preventing the latter from giving any assistance to Grant, and caused Gardner's cavalry to occupy the point where the direct route from Philadelphia to Baton Rouge crosses Pearl River. But the Georgetown crossing was not yet guarded when the Federal scouts reached it on the morning of the 26th: a few hours later the whole brigade was on the other side of the river; the men were ferried over and the horses crossed by swimming.

The inhabitants of the sections of country which Grierson's soldiers were thus traversing were so little prepared for their appearance in those latitudes that they almost invariably took them for Confederates. When they inquired whence came those blue coats with which they were not familiar, they were told in reply that they had been captured at Holly Springs, and thereupon some facetious remarks would sometimes be bandied round concerning the cowardice of the Federals. The scouts, according to the universal custom of both parties, were disguised, and wore the light brown overcoats of the Confederates. Frequently also, when they went out alone to cut down the wires of some neighboring telegraph, they assumed the garb of civilians. One of these, meeting a squad of the enemy's cavalry which was about to strike the flank of the column, succeeded by false representations in making it take the wrong track. Sometimes, however, the inhabitants would prepare to dispute a passage to the Federals, but they never dared to offer resistance when they found themselves face to face with them; and Grierson, after having disarmed them, contented himself with sending them back to their homes. His object in treating them thus, and scrupulously respecting their property, was to belie the odious and ridiculous rumors which had been spread through the South regarding the ferocity of the Federal soldiers.

Whilst Grierson was crossing Pearl River for the second time he was joined by Captain Forbes \* with thirty-five men, whom he had detached from Starkville for the purpose of making a dem-

\* Of Company B, Seventh Illinois Cavalry.—ED.

onstration against Macon. Finding the railway-station there well defended, Forbes had proceeded toward that of Enterprise, but on arriving at the latter place with his small band he had fallen in with the whole of Buford's brigade, which Pemberton had despatched toward that point. Without appearing in the least disconcerted, he steps forward as the bearer of a flag of truce, demanding the surrender of the place. The Confederate general, believing that the whole Federal cavalry is at hand, takes this proposal in a serious sense, and asks for time to reflect. "I will come in an hour for my answer," says Forbes to him; and he makes off immediately at full gallop. Falling again into Grierson's track, he follows it for several days, and finally overtakes him without having lost a single man or horse.

On the very day that the Federal column crossed Pearl River it reached the Mississippi Central Railroad at Hazelhurst, and set to work at once to destroy it. A considerable amount of supplies and ammunition was captured both at Hazelhurst and farther down at Gallatin. Grierson was marching directly upon Grand Gulf. But the enemy had at last fathomed his design, and Wirt Adams' cavalry, superior in numbers to his own, was preparing to block his way. He exchanged a few musket-shots with it, the first he had fired. Adams had intended to attack him on the 29th, but Grierson succeeded in getting away from him. In order to make him believe that his object was to gain Grand Gulf, which Porter was storming on that very day, he made a feint in the direction of Fayette village, near Rodney on the Mississippi; then, suddenly turning southward, he reached Brookhaven Station along the railroad, where he surprised a drilling-camp and took two hundred prisoners, whom he released on parole. Following the track, he continued his work of destruction; but this time the Confederates started in pursuit of him in earnest, for they could no longer have any doubt as to the road he had taken, Baton Rouge being the only point which he could henceforth reach. Consequently, holding his little band close together, he pushed on by forced marches, notwithstanding the exhausted condition of his men and horses. Being obliged to cross the Tickfaw River twice, he encountered each time some bands of the enemy, which he dispersed after a few shots. A considerable



water-course, Amite River, still separated him from Baton Rouge, and the only bridge by which he could cross it was located in the dangerous vicinity of Port Hudson. Thanks to the rapidity of his movements, he succeeded in taking possession of it on the evening of the 1st of May, two hours before the arrival of a column of infantry which had been sent to dispute his passage. Henceforth he was almost without opposition. Having encountered on his route the camp of Hughes' cavalry, sent in pursuit of him, he surprises and destroys it, taking a large number of prisoners; a little farther on another detachment of cavalry, charged with guarding Comite River, experiences the same treatment, leaving forty men in his hands. After this last success the Union general, fording the river, arrives at Baton Rouge on the 2d of May, where his small band is received with acclamations by Augur's division, which had come in solid phalanx to meet these bold partisans, who were thus emerging from the very heart of the enemy's country. They only left behind them three men killed, seven wounded, five sick (one a surgeon), and nine missing; they had taken more than five hundred prisoners, who were all released on parole—in a somewhat irregular way, it is true; destroyed between fifty and sixty miles of railroad and telegraphic wires and a considerable amount of provisions, and thrown the utmost confusion into the movements of the enemy. They had avenged themselves for the disaster of Holly Springs, and demonstrated by this raid into the interior of the Confederacy that the latter, as was said by Grierson, was but a hollow shell. While all the forces and all the resources were conveyed to the frontier, there were left in the interior neither available men nor horses, nor any other supplies except those belonging to the government. Nowhere could there be found materials with which to organize any kind of resistance; the negroes, finding that all the whites had gone to the war, worked in a slovenly way; agriculture languished, commerce was suspended, misery reigned everywhere.

## CHAPTER II.

### *PORT GIBSON.*

**B**EFORE resuming the narrative of the campaign which Grant and Porter have just opened, we must, as we have intimated, cast a glance at the armies that are watching one another in the other sections of the immense basin of the Mississippi north-east and north-west of Vicksburg. They are feeling each other without daring to come in contact, each seeming to have no other object in view than to prevent its opponent from joining Grant or Pemberton without its knowledge. In Louisiana the Unionists are striving to capture Vicksburg from the rear; the Southerners are sparing no efforts to harass their march. We will continue the recital of these secondary operations till the early part of May, and resume it in the following chapter, when we shall reach that phase of the history when the surrender of Vicksburg shall change the entire face of the war in the West.

Rosecrans, unwilling to acknowledge himself as vanquished on the borders of Stone River, has gathered the fruits of his obstinacy; he occupies Murfreesborough, which Bragg has abandoned to him by retiring as far as Tullahoma. He strongly intrenches himself, unable to do more in his new positions. Thomas, in the centre, is stationed above Murfreesborough along the routes leading straight to the enemy by way of Woodbury, Bradyville, Manchester, and Shelbyville; McCook on the right and Crittenden on the left each keeps his respective wing from being drawn into action, in order to surround Murfreesborough and form a junction on Stone River below this city. As the latter will not always enjoy this protection, the genius of the Federals conceives the idea of converting it into a stronghold which may serve as the basis of operations in an offensive campaign and a rallying-point in case of defeat, without being exposed to a sudden attack like

that of Van Dorn upon Holly Springs. While the troops are building intrenchments along the whole vast circumference they occupy, earthworks, more compact and of greater strength, encircle the city itself, and are erected around a large central fortress susceptible of serving as an intrenchment. But the place will possess no value unless it is strongly connected with the Northern States, which supply the army with food: this is the first condition required for reinforcing this army, and thereby enabling it to resume the offensive. The reconstruction of the railroad from Nashville is therefore the first object to occupy Rosecrans' attention: the work is pushed with vigor. The task of guarding the city of Nashville and the railroad-track is entrusted to Steedman's division, recently arrived from Kentucky. The Cumberland being easily navigable above this city, and of great assistance in supplying Rosecrans with provisions, Forts Heiman, Henry, and Donelson, which dominate its course, are placed within the sphere of his command on the 25th of January. This river-route is the more useful on account of the long railway line from Louisville to Nashville being greatly exposed to incursions from the enemy's guerillas. These partisan bands set the closest vigilance at defiance. Thus, for instance, since the opening of the Nashville and Murfreesborough branch on the 25th of January they have captured one train. Twice, on the 15th and 26th of February, between Louisville and Nashville, they have seized trains destined for the army: on the second occasion the perpetrators of this bold stroke conceived the atrocious idea of running a locomotive at full speed, without an engineer, to meet an ordinary train of passengers, and if, by a fortunate chance, it had not been stopped before meeting it, the shock would undoubtedly have cost the lives of many innocent persons. The necessity of guarding these long railway lines abstracts from the Unionists more than one-third of their active forces: besides Steedman's division, another, and a very large one, under General Gordon Granger, is kept within the borders of Kentucky. So that, notwithstanding the apparent superiority of his effective forces, Rosecrans cannot bring into line more soldiers than his adversary beyond Murfreesborough. The Federal government promises him reinforcements. In the mean while, his army, previously desig-



nated as the Fourteenth corps, is reorganized, divided into three corps, and called the Army of the Cumberland. Thomas, McCook, and Crittenden each retains the troops under his respective command, forming the Fourteenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-first corps.\*

The positions taken by Bragg are very strong. The great plateau of the Cumberland, forming the *échelon* farthest west of the Alleghanies, extends southward as far as the thirty-fourth degree of latitude; the Tennessee, after traversing from east to west the first chain of hills, called Waldron's Ridge at the north and Lookout Mountain at the south, hugs the eastern base of the plateau as far as Guntersville, where it winds around its extremity as it flows in a westerly direction. The waters which descend on the opposite side of this plateau toward the plains of Tennessee are absorbed on one side by Duck River, and on the other by the tributary of the Cumberland called Caney Fork. These two rivers cover Bragg's front, which extends from McMinnville on the right to Columbia on the left, passing through Manchester and Shelbyville. The infantry is concentrated between these two latter points and Tullahoma; the first two mentioned are occupied by Morgan's cavalry on the right and Wheeler's on the left. All the roads traversing the plateau of the Cumberland pass through defiles easy to defend: the aridity of the soil and the rough climate of this plateau are moreover calculated to oppose a serious obstacle to the Federals if they attempt to force the line of Caney Fork and of Duck River. But, on the other hand, the character of this section of country does not afford the Confederate army the necessary means of subsistence. These must be sought for at Columbia, and even farther yet in the rich country between Duck River and the Tennessee. As we have stated, the cavalry which Van Dorn had organized at Grenada came, during the month of February, to occupy this section of country and to protect it effectively against the incursions of the Federals. It was, besides, the only reinforcement granted to Bragg. He had asked for twenty thousand men to repair his losses: the Richmond government did not even reply to him.

\* General Orders, No. 9, War Department, Adjutant-general's Office, January 9, 1863.—ED.

The weakness of his adversary and the bad season proved a substitute for reinforcements during the early months of 1863. The operations which marked this period in Tennessee and Kentucky are nothing but a consecutive series of small warlike exploits, without any connection between them and without any influence over each other: we shall proceed to enumerate them in chronological order.

The Confederates, anxious, no doubt, to indemnify themselves for their forced retreat, are the first to take the offensive. Eight days have scarcely elapsed since they have left Murfreesborough when Wheeler, braving the rigors of the season, is already in the field with one of his brigades. Pushing directly toward Nashville, he burns one of the bridges of the Columbia Railroad about eight or nine miles from the city, then descends on the right side of Harpeth River, and on the 13th of January reaches the banks of the Cumberland, where he surprises four transports which were going up the river loaded with provisions destined for the Union army. The Confederate artillery, by a well-directed fire, stops these vessels, which are utterly defenceless, and promptly compels them to capitulate. The crews, released on parole, are sent back on one of the transports; the other three are burned. The gunboat, *Major Slidell*, which arrives too late to save them, becomes in her turn a prey to the flames. After destroying some important dépôts along the right side of the river, which some adventurous horsemen cross by swimming, Wheeler turns back without having been molested; but he gives only a few days' rest to his men, and starts out again on an expedition which this time proves of much more importance. The Federal cavalry, which seems paralyzed by the audacity of its adversaries, confines itself to the task of reconnoitring the neighborhood of the posts occupied by the infantry, abandoning the remainder of the country to the Southerners. Wheeler is thus enabled to bring together on the very banks of Harpeth River, near Franklin, less than twenty miles from Nashville, the greater portion of his division, Forrest's and Wharton's brigades, with a detachment under Major Hodgson; that is to say, about three thousand men, with two batteries of artillery. This concentration of troops has not escaped the notice of the Federals, and Rosecrans puts at once a considerable force

in motion to block the way of the Confederates. He has cause to fear that Wheeler, one of whose brigades has been signalled at Triune, may throw himself between Nashville and Murfreesborough. With this impression, General Jefferson C. Davis, at the head of his division of infantry and two brigades of cavalry under Colonel Minty, is despatched from Murfreesborough for the purpose of striking him in the rear by way of Eagleville, whilst Steedman, with a portion of his forces, is to march upon Triune from Nashville. Davis reaches Eagleville with his infantry on the evening of the 31st of January, whilst Minty, making a wide *détour* southward as far as Unionville, captures a *dépôt* of about three hundred Confederate cavalry at Rover, between the latter village and Eagleville. But this capture is all that results from the trap laid by the Federals. Wheeler, being fully convinced that he would be looked for between Nashville and Murfreesborough, has suddenly taken a direction which leads him far away from the enemy's forces which are expecting to circumvent him. With his mounted men he pushes on by forced marches toward the north-west, leaving far behind him the infantry which has been sent in search of him, as well as Minty's squadrons, whose *détour* southward has greatly delayed them. While his astounded adversaries meet at Franklin, he has reached the borders of the Cumberland, made his appearance at Palmyra on the 2d, and before the little town of Dover on the 3d. The reader will undoubtedly remember that this town is situated on the left bank of the Cumberland, less than two miles above Fort Donelson, and is comprised within the fortified enclosure which Grant had besieged one year previously. As this post had to be entrusted to a small garrison, the enclosure had become useless, the Federal engineers having preferred the position of Dover to that of the old fort for the location of the garrison. The town had been surrounded with parapets commanding the ravines that bordered it north and south. In the centre there rose a large earthwork, having the public buildings as a part of the defences: a thirty-two pounder placed in this work enfiladed the principal streets. At the north-west the enclosure rested upon a fortified cemetery, affording an excellent position for a battery. The garrison was composed of the Eighty-third Illinois, two sections of artillery,



and a squadron of cavalry—about seven hundred able-bodied men and four field-pieces—under the command of Colonel Harding.

On the 3d of February, after a march of more than forty miles, which the rain and cold have rendered extremely painful, the Confederate cavalry makes its appearance before Dover. Forrest, who is following the line of the Cumberland, having destroyed some important forges and captured nearly the whole Union squadron which occupied them, reaches the heights situated south of the village. Wharton captures the mounted scouts of the enemy, and soon completes the investment on the land-side by extending the left of the Confederate line as far as the river by way of the north. Harding has hastily made his preparations for the combat: he has sent for assistance to his chief, Colonel Lowe, who occupies Fort Henry, and has placed the sick, non-combatants, and the women upon one of the two transports that are moored close to the landing-place. The other vessel descends the river with a full head of steam, in the hope of meeting some man-of-war which might afford the assistance of its heavy guns to the Dover garrison.

Wheeler has ordered his two lieutenants to begin the attack at half-past two. At the appointed hour, Forrest, deploying his eight hundred mounted men along the hill opposite to that upon which the houses are located, steadily advances in order of battle: crossing the ravine which separates them, he gallops up the slope under a shower of bullets. The Federal troops, being well posted, inflict upon the assailants fearful losses, but are unable to check their headlong dash: they charge upon the Unionists, who are scarcely two hundred strong on this side, getting over the work and penetrating into the town. But here the combat assumes a different aspect: the defenders have rallied within the central earthwork and are occupying the neighboring houses; a murderous fire is directed from all sides upon the Confederate mounted men, whose movements are greatly embarrassed by their animals: Wharton has failed to bring Forrest assistance. The former, in fact, who has two thousand men under his command, has made them dismount for the attack: he has not been able, therefore, to act as promptly as was necessary, and has not yet approached the position of the Unionists, when the latter,

combining all their forces against Forrest, compel him to recross the ravine. Wharton, on seeing this, is brought to a halt. But the Confederates, anxious to take advantage of the last moments of daylight, soon return to the charge, and with greater unanimity of action; not, however, before having first endeavored, through the bearer of a flag of truce, to induce their adversaries to capitulate. Harding holds out bravely against a force five times his superior. While Forrest's mounted men are still charging in the very streets of Dover, without allowing themselves to be checked by the first line of defences, Wharton covers with projectiles the four Federal field-pieces posted in the cemetery, reduces them to silence, and by a vigorous assault makes himself master of this position. But being short of ammunition, he finds himself checked in front of the first habitations. Forrest, on his side, has been unable to carry the intrenchment. His bravest companions have fallen around him; Colonel McNairy has been killed, and he himself has lost two horses; he fights in vain at short range and with the pistol; his men are also short of ammunition; notwithstanding the moonlight, partial darkness favors the defenders, and the Confederates are obliged to abandon the ground they have so dearly bought. The Federals pursue them at the point of the bayonet and take about thirty prisoners. It was time, however, for the sake of Harding's small band, that the fighting should cease. These men, who, for the most part have never before been under fire, have fought admirably, encouraged by the example of their chief, but their strength and ammunition are alike exhausted, and one hundred among them are unfit for service. They are not aware of the losses they have inflicted upon the enemy, and have reason to believe that if daylight finds them in that position all resistance will be useless. But at eight o'clock in the evening a cannon-shot fired in the distance revives their hopes; a few shots sounding a little nearer dispel all doubt, and soon the large hull of the gun-boat *Lexington* shows itself upon the silver-crested waters of the Cumberland. This vessel, warned in time of the danger which menaced Harding, has left, with a few others, a fleet of transports loaded with troops which she was convoying, and hurls her enormous projectiles upon the hills occupied by the

Confederates. If the latter had intended to renew the attack on the following day, the arrival of these new enemies would suffice to dissuade them from the attempt. They have sustained severe losses, amounting to two hundred and sixty men, which cannot be sufficiently compensated by the capture of a gun taken from the enemy. They are short of provisions. Consequently, they think of nothing but to beat a retreat, so as to avoid the Federal forces that are rushing in every direction in pursuit of them.\* The transports which the *Lexington* was convoying were bringing from Louisville to Nashville the whole of General Granger's division, from eight to nine thousand men strong; Colonel Lowe arrives from Fort Henry with reinforcements; finally, General Davis follows in Wheeler's track. The latter quickly retraced his steps, but on learning at Charlotte that Davis was on the march to meet him, he suddenly turned to the right and reached the village of Centreville, by way of Piney Factory, along the lower course of Duck River. This march was slow and difficult; the roads were covered with frost and the streams half frozen: Wheeler's soldiers suffered intensely, but their adversaries, who had been delayed by the same causes, were unable to overtake them. Finally, having succeeded in fording Duck River, the Southern cavalry arrived at Columbia on the 18th of February, worn out with fatigue and mounted upon horses which for the most part were unfit to renew the campaign. Its repulse was complete, and Forrest, who had condemned the plan of the expedition, grew thereby in the estimation of his comrades. Fortunately for Bragg, Van Dorn, with his new division, reached Columbia at a time when Wheeler was no longer in a condition to defend the line of Duck River. He brought with him nearly five thousand mounted men. The Federals were not long in being made aware of his presence.

Whilst Wheeler was thus drawing a portion of the Union forces in pursuit of him, the neighborhood of Murfreesborough was the theatre of small encounters, the mention of which in a few words will be sufficient.

From the end of January, the Federals, anxious, no doubt, to

\* See report of Colonel Abner C. Harding, Feb. 6, 1863. He was promoted to brigadier-general U. S. Vols. May 22, 1863.—Ed.



avenge the disaster of Hartsville, assume the offensive against Morgan, who covers Bragg's right wing. On the 26th, General Palmer surprises a detachment of Southern cavalry at Woodbury, taking about one hundred prisoners; on the 1st of February a new surprise awaits the latter at Milton, on the Liberty road, with similar results. The Union general Reynolds, following up this success, advances, by way of Auburn, as far as Liberty on the 3d, breaking up some recruiting-camps and capturing dépôts of supplies laid up by Morgan; thence, on the 8th, he proceeds north-westward toward Lebanon, which the latter has caused to be occupied by a strong detachment; he captures this village with its garrison, picking up considerable booty and nearly six hundred prisoners. Finally, on the 15th, a trifling encounter at Cainsville brings this series of engagements to a close. Rosecrans' left wing finds itself thus completely freed; the enemy's troops are driven back upon McMinnville and the plateau of the Cumberland.

But the Confederates, in order to take their revenge, soon transfer the theatre of this petty warfare more to the northward: by worrying their adversaries in Kentucky they keep back the reinforcements which Rosecrans needs in order to assume the offensive. On the 23d of February a band of Confederate mounted men advance to within a few miles of Lexington, and only stop at Athens, south-west of this city, before the forces that have been sent in haste to meet them. On the same day a detachment of about seven hundred mounted men, under Colonel Cluke, taking advantage of the alarm caused by this demonstration, makes its appearance in the villages of Winchester and Mount Sterling, destroying all the provisions that were found there; on the 25th, after a skirmish at Licktown, near the latter village, Cluke gets away from Colonel Runkle, who had been sent in pursuit of him, and returns to the mountains whence he had emerged by way of Hazel Green and the Prestonburg road.

Since the beginning of the year both parties seem to have abandoned Western Tennessee by common accord. It is sufficient to mention a few slight skirmishes, such as that at Ripley on the 8th of January, that at Ayresburg on the 30th, and that at

Bolivar on the 13th of February, between the Confederate scouts and detachments from the garrisons of Fort Pillow and Memphis. But at the moment that Cluke invades the plain of Kentucky the Federals, in order to divert the attention of their adversaries, determine to make a demonstration along that section of the Tennessee River which crosses the northern part of the State of Alabama, and which furnishes abundant provisions to Bragg's army. On the 26th of May five Union gunboats, ascending the river, make their appearance before Tuscumbia and Florence, destroying the ferries and trying in vain to find one of the enemy's vessels which has eluded them. A brigade of cavalry under Colonel Cornyn, detached by General Blair, who is in command at Memphis, has combined its movements with those of the fleet: arriving at Tuscumbia only a few hours after the Federal ships, it takes advantage of the excitement caused by their appearance to approach the town by way of the south and penetrate into it unperceived. The few detachments of the enemy that happen to be at Tuscumbia are captured and dispersed; contributions are exacted from the principal inhabitants; and the Federal column moves off, carrying with it horses, wagons, and booty more or less legitimately obtained.

In the mean time, the presence of Van Dorn and the powerful reinforcements he has brought with him have enabled the Confederate cavalry to resume its audacity; this time it is not afraid even to show itself in the neighborhood. It draws nearer and nearer to the Federal army, driving in its outposts and menacing its communications with Nashville by way both of the east and the west. The situation of Rosecrans would have become intolerable if the reinforcements to which we have heretofore alluded had not arrived in time to enable him to get out of it.

On the 1st of March, the presence of a strong detachment of the enemy having been reported at a point less than eight miles south-east of Murfreesborough, General Stanley, with seven hundred mounted men and sixteen hundred infantry, has started to attack it. The Unionist cavalry, getting ahead of the rest of the column, soon reach the village of Bradyville, where they find their adversaries, numbering between seven and eight hundred men, strongly posted. Their assault is conducted with so

much dash that they dislodge them without allowing the infantry time to come up to take part in the fight. The Confederates speedily beat a retreat and scatter, leaving about one hundred of their men in the hands of the assailants. On the following day, the 2d of March, the brigade of regular infantry was pushing a reconnoissance in an opposite direction as far as Eagleville. A detachment of Confederate cavalry endeavoring to defend this village was dispersed by the regulars, who returned to Murfreesborough after having scoured the country and picked up a considerable amount of supplies.

These are but small and isolated events. But Rosecrans is about to be in a condition at last to make a serious effort to put his adversary to flight and compel him to fall back upon the Tennessee. In fact, Granger's division has relieved that of Steedman, which occupied Nashville, enabling it to advance in the direction of Murfreesborough. Rosecrans has stationed it at Antioch. New regiments, coming from the camps of instruction in Kentucky, soon swell the number of Granger's soldiers to more than fourteen thousand; his division is about to assume the proportions of an army corps. One of his subordinates, Gilbert, who had only brought one brigade, is already in command of two; since the 12th of February he has taken them to Franklin, on the road from Nashville to Columbia; on the 24th Crook's brigade is conveyed by water as far as Carthage on the Cumberland. Nashville is only occupied by Baird's infantry brigade and the cavalry brigade of Green Clay Smith.

On the 1st of March, Rosecrans makes preparations for a considerable movement of troops. His plan having been frustrated by the disastrous result of the fight at Thompson's Station, which we will relate presently, it is difficult to say exactly what object he had in view. It is natural to suppose, however, that he would not have put such an important section of his army on the march for the purpose of making mere reconnoissances a few miles from his encampments. He no doubt intended to advance as far as the line of Duck River, between Shelbyville and Columbia, to pierce it near the latter point with a portion of his forces in order to turn the left wing of the enemy, and thus compel him to evacuate the country whence Bragg drew his supplies. The retreat of the



latter as far as Chattanooga, the loss of the Cumberland plateau, might have been the consequence. Unfortunately for him, while noticing the new exhibition of audacity on the part of the Southern cavalry, Rosecrans was not aware of the powerful reinforcement it had received by the arrival of Van Dorn at Columbia. He formed his plan as if he had only Wheeler's squadrons, weakened by their repulse at Dover, to contend with, and committed the error of establishing the point of concentration for his various columns in the very heart of the country occupied by the enemy.

The Federal troops were put in motion in the early part of March. On the 2d, Smith's cavalry takes position at Brentwood, south of Nashville, replacing Coburn's brigade, which had left this village the previous day in order to join Gilbert at Franklin. The general movement commences on the 4th. There are three columns on the march. The strongest, the left one, is composed of the whole of Sheridan's division and Minty's two brigades of cavalry. Leaving Murfreesborough, it is to march toward Eagleville, and thence to proceed in the direction of Columbia in order to assist the right column along the railroad. The latter consists of Coburn's brigade and about six hundred mounted men under Colonel Jordan. The third column, in the centre, is formed of Steedman's troops. The latter, who has already taken position at Nolinsville, is to advance by way of Triune upon Harpeth, in order to support and connect the two other columns.

On the 23d of February, Van Dorn, as if he had foreseen Rosecrans' intentions, was marching with all his forces from Columbia to Spring Hill, and preparing to take the offensive on his side. Coburn, having the shortest road to travel, was the first to meet this unlooked-for adversary. He had five regiments under his command—the Thirty-third and Eighty-fifth Indiana, the Nineteenth Michigan, the Twenty-second Wisconsin, and the One-hundred-and-twenty-fourth Ohio; Jordan's mounted men and Captain Aleshire's battery—twenty-eight hundred and thirty-seven men and six pieces of artillery in all. His soldiers were brave and zealous; most of their chiefs were men of intelligence and self-denial; but nearly all of them were on the field

of battle for the first time, and had never been under fire. The recent movements of the enemy had not been reported to the Federals, and Gilbert, believing that the approaches of Duck River were only guarded by Wheeler's mounted men, had directed Coburn to lead his small column to Spring Hill. Having reached this point, it was to divide, a portion of it to go to Sheridan's assistance by the Lewisburg and Bolly Hill road, the remainder to push a reconnoissance as far as Columbia, and to fall back afterward upon Spring Hill. He was so far from anticipating any serious resistance that he had added a train of eighty wagons to Coburn's force, intended to gather up provisions on the way. Van Dorn had sent a strong detachment of cavalry, with two pieces of artillery, along the turnpike between Nashville and Columbia, in order to watch the neighborhood of Franklin. On the morning of the 4th, almost in close vicinity of this village, Coburn falls in with the troops above mentioned, and in order to open himself a passage is obliged to deploy his forces. This is precisely what his adversaries desired. After a trifling skirmish they fell back in the direction of Spring Hill. Van Dorn, having been informed of the movements of the Federals, starts to meet them on the morning of the 5th. Having been made fully acquainted with the nature of the ground by some officers, natives of this district, he determines to wait for Coburn a few miles above Spring Hill at a small station called Thompson's Station, situated on the railroad running alongside the turnpike.

In the mean time, Coburn, astonished at having met the enemy in force so near Franklin, has sent to Gilbert for fresh instructions. The latter directs him to send back his wagons and continue his march. But, being obliged to advance with caution, the Federals come to a halt for the purpose of encamping about eight miles from Franklin. During the night some fugitive negroes inform Coburn of the presence of Van Dorn at Spring Hill with a considerable force. Coburn immediately communicates the fact to his chief, but, notwithstanding the short distance which separates him from Franklin, he waits in vain for a reply. Finally, toward eight o'clock in the morning, having received no new instructions, he takes up his line of march. An

hour later his scouts fall in with those of the enemy about three-quarters of a mile north of Thompson's Station. The country into which he has penetrated is very rough. A range of parallel hills, the last link in the mountainous chain of the Cumberland plateau, runs east and west perpendicularly to the railroad and the turnpike. The hills, which are very steep and most of them covered with juniper-plants, obstruct the sight. Coburn, bound by his instructions, seeing no enemy before him, advances along the turnpike. The cavalry engaged in clearing his wings discovers no one, for Van Dorn has massed the whole of his troops near the station: these troops comprise the brigades of Forrest, Armstrong, and Whitfield and two batteries of artillery—about five thousand mounted men and eight pieces of cannon in all. It is therefore with a force twice as large as that of Coburn that Van Dorn is awaiting the latter in a well-chosen position.

In drawing near the station the railroad and the turnpike pass through a cultivated valley which forms a gap in one of the ridges of which we have just spoken. The station is thus commanded by two hillocks—one to eastward, the other westward—the principal slopes of which bear northward and southward. The eastern slope is rather narrow; the western slope, extending farther, is bounded at the north by a ravine, beyond which rises another acclivity. After passing the station the turnpike and the railroad traverse a valley of considerable width, cleared and intersected by wood and stone fences, before it reaches a new range of hills, extending, like those preceding, from east to west. It is upon the latter that Van Dorn has posted his division. Forrest, with a battery of artillery and his two thousand men, equally skilled in fighting on foot and on horseback, forms the right: a projecting part of the hill which he occupies on this side places him almost east of Thompson's Station and in advance of the rest of the Confederate line. On the left Van Dorn has posted King's battery along the turnpike, on the summit of the slope which it ascends after crossing the valley at its widest stretch: that portion of the railroad which ascends slantingly, bearing westward, covers the front of this position. The slope left of the turnpike is occupied by Whitfield's brigade, stationed behind a stone wall; on the



right by Armstrong's brigade, which forms a connection with that of Forrest. The two last-mentioned brigades have dismounted. The Confederate outposts occupy the station and the heights commanding it. Before long they are attacked by Coburn's advance-guard, whose infantry is supported by dismounted cavalry. After a brisk engagement they speedily fall back upon their line, and the Unionists remain masters of the position.

In the mean time, Van Dorn, who is steadily waiting for them, takes care to conceal the number of his forces in order to draw them upon the ground he has selected. The Federal cavalry, having met with no enemy around its wings, has fallen back, and at the first musket-shots fired from the station has massed itself close to the infantry. If it had continued to follow the Lewisburg road, which at this point runs nearly parallel to that to Columbia, and is not very far from it, it would have discovered Forrest's position, observed his movement, and reported in time the danger which was about to menace Coburn. But the latter, seeing only a few enemies in front, advances against them, as Gilbert had directed him. Just as his column appears at the entrance of the defile at the opposite extremity of which the station is located, King's battery opens fire upon it. Coburn immediately makes preparations for the fight. The two hillocks commanding the station are occupied—the one to westward, on the right, by the two Indiana regiments, the one to eastward, on the left, by the Nineteenth Michigan and the Twenty-second Wisconsin. The battery, reduced to five pieces by the breaking down of the sixth during the previous day's engagement, is divided between these two detachments. The One-hundred-and-twenty-fourth Ohio remains in the rear with the train; the cavalry has to cover the extreme left, two squadrons on foot stretching out the line on this side.

While the Federals are deploying, Forrest's battery, posted on the right of the Southerners, joins its fire to that of King's battery. Coburn, believing that he has only the forces he has met the previous day before him, orders the two Indiana regiments to cross the valley which separates them from the slopes occupied by this last battery, and to capture the enemy's guns. The Federals, advancing in double column, deploy above the station. Well

drilled in manœuvring, although never having been under fire, they have all the self-possession which the want of familiarity with danger sometimes imparts, and they march boldly under the fire of the enemy's battery. But the moment has arrived for the Confederates to show themselves. A portion of Armstrong's brigade bears to the left in order to support that of Whitfield, which, being strongly posted behind the wall, opens a terrific fire of musketry against the assailants. The latter do not yet allow themselves to be held in check, and get within one hundred and fifty yards of their adversaries without having responded to their fire. But they cannot proceed farther, and throw themselves flat upon the ground in order to offer a less conspicuous mark to the terrible fire that is being directed against them. The danger is not lessened, and their leaders, becoming convinced that the enemy's position is impregnable, give the order for retreat. The Confederates seize this opportunity to assume the offensive, and, pursuing the Unionists with shouts of victory, they press them close, trying to prevent them from forming again on the heights which they have so imprudently abandoned. But the Indiana soldiers reach these heights before them, and, turning round quickly, send them a few volleys of musketry which compel them to fall back behind the station to prepare for a new attack. Coburn, becoming aware of the numerical superiority of the enemy, decides to beat a retreat at once. He sends word to his train to proceed in the direction of Franklin, and orders Colonel Jordan to bring on his cavalry to sustain the movements of the infantry. But the Confederates hold their prey in hand, and are not disposed to let it escape. Forrest, as soon as he sees the enemy's right bring on the fight, is seized with a happy idea: he orders Colonel Starnes to attack the Unionists' left with two of his regiments at the extremity of the hillock situated east of the station, and, taking the five other regiments along with him, he makes a *détour* by way of the Lewisburg road in order to bar the retreat to the Federals. Starnes promptly executes the task assigned him. At the moment when Coburn is preparing to retire, the two regiments he has stationed on the left are vigorously attacked. The half-battery which supports them precipitately leaves the field of battle: its example is followed by

the pieces posted on the right. The dismounted cavalrymen, who form the extreme Federal left, are driven back: Forrest's artillery occupies their position and takes the Unionist regiments in flank. Colonel Jordan, seeing Coburn's lines thus broken, does not think it proper to execute the orders he has received: instead of going to the assistance of his brave comrades, he takes his cavalry and Aleshire's battery back to the place where the train and the regiment left in charge of it are waiting. The Nineteenth Michigan and the Twenty-second Wisconsin, thus turned and deprived of the support they had relied upon, form themselves *en potence*, facing east; but they cannot long defend themselves in this position, and are driven back west of the turnpike, upon the hillock which the Indiana regiments still hold. The hill situated north of this hillock affords an excellent position. The Federal cavalry, the artillery, and the One-hundred-and-twenty-fourth Ohio might, by posting themselves there, secure the retreat of the rest of the brigade, but the troops, influenced by Jordan's action, do not appear to think of anything else but to leave the battlefield, and they speedily follow the train along the Franklin road. These troops are soon joined by a portion of the Twenty-second Wisconsin, which during the recent change of front Lieutenant-colonel Bloodgood has separated from the rest of the regiment with untoward haste. Forrest's manœuvre, however, has not failed to attract Coburn's attention: he is trying to make his line fall back in order to gain the heights upon which he expects to give assistance to the rest of his troops. But this movement is interrupted by a general attack from all the enemy's forces. While Starnes is pressing Coburn's left, Armstrong and Whitfield charge him again in front and on his right. The Federals defend themselves bravely, and finally succeed in repulsing the persistent assaults of their adversaries. Coburn avails himself of the respite that this advantage gives him to bring all his forces to the rear. But Forrest soon makes his appearance, and again obliges him to stop. The combat is renewed with violence: the Federals, having the advantage of position, once more drive back the assailants. Forrest then, instead of persisting in attacking them on the flank, orders his mounted men to get back into the saddle, and, rapidly gaining



the rear of the enemy, reaches the hill which Jordan has not been able or is unwilling to occupy in advance of them. Leaving a portion of his forces in this position, he advances with the remainder against the small Federal band, reduced to about twelve hundred men, which, being pressed on other sides, has gained the summit of the ravine in the hope of forcing a passage toward the north. This time the Unionists are hemmed in. Coburn determines to make a desperate bayonet-charge upon the enemy in front of him, but Forrest, arriving in the midst of these valiant soldiers, who have not even a cartridge left to defend themselves with, prevents him. All further struggle is impossible. Coburn surrenders with all those who have not forsaken him. A few shots from King's battery still fall among the compact group of soldiers of both parties who have ceased fighting. Finally, the firing stops. Forrest at once sends forth his mounted men in pursuit of Jordan and those who had followed him, but they cannot be overtaken: Coburn's resistance has saved them by giving them the necessary start to reach Franklin, where they will carry the news of his disaster. The conflict has lasted for nearly seven hours. It is four o'clock in the afternoon. The Federal prisoners, numbering about thirteen hundred able-bodied men, speedily conveyed to Shelbyville, suffered much on that march, but the Confederate officers, who admired their courage, treated them with a degree of consideration which was not meted out to them afterward in the gloomy prisons of Richmond. The Confederate losses amounted to thirty killed and one hundred and twenty-five wounded. Those of the Unionists were in the neighborhood of three hundred.

The battle of Thompson's Station demonstrated what a numerous and well-handled cavalry can do against infantry when the latter comes in contact with it. If Forrest's soldiers, who fought so well on foot, had not been mounted, they would not have had time to surround their adversaries. This general, some of whose actions we have been obliged to denounce, as also his too-frequently manifested contempt for the usages of civilized nations, on that occasion exhibited the instinct of a true warrior.

The fatal result of Coburn's expedition seems to have produced the same effect upon Rosecrans that the disaster of Ball's Bluff.

fifteen months previously had upon McClellan. He appears to have been equally alarmed at the inexperience of the young troops that were sent to him in order to swell up his ranks, and by the large forces which the enemy had so unexpectedly displayed. If, as everything leads us to suppose, the movements he had just ordered were the prelude to an aggressive campaign, he relinquished his original design and reduced them to the proportions of simple reconnoissances. It was expedient, before all, however, not to remain passive under this check: it was necessary to prevent Van Dorn from taking advantage of his success, and to bring a sufficient force against him so as to drive him back upon Duck River.

While the Confederate general, not being ready to take the offensive, was falling back on the 6th of March from Thompson's Station upon Spring Hill, Gilbert, expecting to be attacked, was bringing all his forces into line south of Franklin. Granger hastened to join him, bringing Baird's brigade from Nashville and that of G. C. Smith from Brentwood. In short, Rosecrans, fearing lest the Confederate mounted men, henceforth free in their movements, might feel disposed to renew the attack on Dover, caused the garrison at this post to be reinforced by those of Fort Henry and Heiman, which were abandoned and dismantled.

In the mean time, Sheridan's and Steedman's columns on the 4th and 5th had accomplished without difficulty the task which had been assigned to them. The former, having arrived near Rover, halfway between Eagleville and Unionville, had on the right proceeded with his infantry toward the first of these two villages, and on the left had sent Minty's cavalry in the direction of the second. The latter had encountered the Southern outposts at Rover, had dislodged them, and driven them back upon their main body at Unionville. After a sharp engagement in this last-mentioned village, he had repulsed the Confederates in the direction of Shelbyville, inflicting upon them a loss of fifty-two prisoners, and had joined Sheridan on the evening of the 4th at Eagleville. Steedman, on his side, rapidly advancing by way of Triune and Harpeth, had finally overtaken Roddy's brigade of Confederate cavalry at Chapel Hill, near

Duck River, a village lying contiguous to Fulton, and forced him to retreat.

The Federal line, both on the left and in the centre, had therefore advanced with ease as far as Duck River on the 4th of March. The next day, when Coburn so unexpectedly encountered Van Dorn's corps, Sheridan and Steedman had continued their movements without difficulty. The former had deployed his whole division above Eagleville, only about seven or eight miles from Bolly Hill, where Coburn was to come to his assistance; the latter, making another attack upon Roddy, had driven him beyond Duck River, and, crossing in pursuit of him, had taken sixty prisoners.

Rosecrans has been informed of the destruction of Coburn's brigade on the same evening. He immediately adopts all necessary measures for protecting his right wing at Franklin and the approaches of Nashville, and for connecting, by means of a solid line, this position with that of Murfreesborough. While Granger is hastening to Franklin, Steedman, on the morning of the 6th, falls back upon Triune, where he hastily intrenches himself, while Sheridan, collecting his division together, brings it to the rear toward the north-west. Jones' and Heg's brigades are sent from Murfreesborough to cover his left, and they dislodge a Confederate detachment from the village of Middleton.

On the following day, the 7th, the movement ordered by Rosecrans is executed. One brigade from La Vergne Station reinforces Steedman at Triune, a central point important to occupy in force. Sheridan, on his side, arrives at Franklin with his entire division simultaneously with a second brigade brought from Nashville by Granger. Minty's cavalry closely follows, and joins him on the morning of the 8th.

During this time Van Dorn has merely caused the approaches of Franklin to be watched by Starnes, who, at the head of two regiments, captures a few Federal outposts. On the 8th, Granger, with six brigades of infantry and two of cavalry, resumes the offensive, marches upon Thompson's Station, and encounters Starnes, who tries to hold him in check at a distance of half a mile or thereabouts from the battlefield of the 5th: after a vigorous resistance the Confederates regain Spring Hill. Van



Dorn, being thoroughly informed regarding the forces of his adversaries, does not attempt, at such a distance from his base of operations, to make a stand: he falls back, with all his command, upon Rutherford Creek, a stream which runs almost parallel with Duck River a few miles north of Columbia.

As Duck River, swollen by the winter rains, threatens to carry away the bridge which alone can secure his retreat, and Rutherford Creek itself, ordinarily an insignificant rivulet, has become a considerable obstacle, he leaves to Forrest, with his brigade and four pieces of artillery, the task of holding the enemy in check along this stream, while all the rest of his troops, his artillery, and his trains, proceed to Columbia on the left bank. The Federals, delayed by the rains, advance slowly. On the 9th their heads of column arrive in front of Forrest's positions, and it is only on the 10th that Granger is enabled to make a serious effort to cross Rutherford Creek. The whole day passes without his succeeding in the attempt. During this time Rosecrans puts new forces in motion in order to strengthen his line, for fear of an aggressive return on the part of the enemy. Jefferson C. Davis' entire division, to which Heg's brigade belongs, is advancing from Salem and Middleton toward Eagleville for the purpose of covering Steedman's left, and on the following day he effects a junction with him, whilst R. S. Granger's\* brigade proceeds to Versailles to support him.

Finally, on the 11th of March, Gordon Granger, ascending Rutherford Creek in search of a ford, succeeds in getting his cavalry across; the infantry and artillery cannot follow—a fortunate circumstance for Forrest, as the rising of the waters in Duck River has just cut off his retreat upon Columbia by carrying away the bridge in front of this village. While the Unionists are affecting the passage of Rutherford Creek he reaches Chapel Hill, where he finds a ford which enables him to cross Duck River.

There are no Confederates left on the right bank of the last-mentioned river, but the season renders operations of any magni-

\* The reader must not confound the brigadier-general R. S. Granger with his namesake, the division general, who on this account we shall designate in future by his full name, Gordon Granger.

tude impossible, and Rosecrans is satisfied with the success obtained without any serious conflict—a fruitless success, for he is under the necessity of bringing back all his troops into the encampments they have left a few days before, and Van Dorn, having promptly reconstructed the Columbia bridge, returns on the 15th to station himself at Spring Hill with all his forces. The position of the two armies, therefore, is not in any way changed: Rosecrans will require three months to prepare for his aggressive campaign, during which the Confederates will continue to harass him with their numerous cavalry, whilst, as a compensation for his inferiority in this arm, he will oppose them with columns of infantry of extreme mobility.

On the 18th of March the Federals resume the offensive. This time their efforts are directed against Morgan, who is trying to press hard against their left wing. Colonel Hall\* is sent from Murfreesborough with thirteen hundred men and two guns belonging to Reynolds' division into the district which lies north-east of this town. His mission is to drive out the Confederate bands which infest it. He performs his task conscientiously, traversing the villages of Cainsville and Statesville, which these bands hasten to evacuate at his approach; he then proceeds toward the stream of Smith's Fork, and resumes his march in the direction of Murfreesborough by way of the Liberty and Auburn road. But Morgan, having been apprised of his march on the 19th, hastens with his brigade in pursuit, overtakes him near Auburn, and, trusting in his numerical superiority, proposes to attack him on the following day during his retreat. Hall, who has soon been made aware of the vicinity of his formidable adversary, cautiously falls back on the morning of the 20th, fully determined not to allow him the choice of ground, and to halt in order to bring on the action whenever he may find a favorable position. He naturally hopes that once in pursuit of him, Morgan would not hesitate to attack him, whatever that position might be. He finds such a position about three-quarters of a

\* Colonel Albert S. Hall, One-hundred-and-fifth Ohio. His force consisted of the Eightieth and One-hundred-and-twenty-third Illinois, One-hundred-and-first Indiana, and One-hundred-and-fifth Ohio infantry, with a section of the Nineteenth Indiana battery and one company of Tennessee cavalry.—Ed.

mile south of Milton, which he has just passed through in following the Murfreesborough road. This road, in emerging from the village at the south side, runs through a cultivated plain, then leaves the thick juniper-bushes to the right and left, beyond which the road winds around the bare slopes of a hill called Vaught's Hill, which extends for a considerable distance westward, and terminates eastward near the road. It is upon this hill that Hall has determined to wait for the enemy. He tries, first of all, to delay his march by stubbornly disputing his way across the woods with which the approaches of this position are covered. In the mean time, Morgan has ordered his men to dismount; the resistance offered by the Federals obliges him to deploy his forces and to bring his artillery to the front. Hall, who has four small battalions with him, masses them about the hill. He places two of them west of the road, one on his right, *en potence*, facing east, and the fourth in reserve along the southern declivity; his two guns command the gentle slopes which the enemy will soon have to climb in getting out of the bushes. This movement is performed with some difficulty under the fire of the Confederates. The latter closely press the Federals, charging them in the centre with the ardor and confidence of soldiers who are sure of success. They stagger the Unionists' line, but do not succeed in breaking it. Morgan re-forms his troops, and finding that he cannot effect a breach in his line in front, he tries to turn it from the rear. His forces, divided into two columns, attack Hall's position vigorously from the east and west at the same time. The Federal right, having fallen back upon the summit of the hill, repulses all assaults. The left has, most opportunely, made a backward movement which places it in an analogous position, facing west. But it is less favorably posted, and resists with difficulty; fortunately, a reinforcement taken from the centre restores its advantage. The Federals thus form a square, occupying the four sides of the hill, into which the Southern cavalry tries in vain to break. The projectiles plough the ground in every direction around Hall's position. The latter, however, holds out, and Morgan, irritated in consequence of his resistance, determines to bring matters to a close by a violent assault. He gets all his forces together, and charges once more the enemy's line in front.



But he is completely repulsed; the slopes of the hill are covered with his wounded, this imprudent attack having secured victory to the Federals, who have only about fifty men disabled, while the Confederates have lost more than three hundred. They fall back upon Auburn, enabling Hall to return to Murfreesborough without being molested. On the side of Franklin it is also the Unionists who resume the offensive. On the 21st they surprise a post of Texas cavalry at College Grove on Harpeth River, most of which they capture.

Forrest, however, has just obtained an important command, for Van Dorn's cavalry having been reorganized and divided into two divisions, Forrest receives one of them, while the other has been assigned to Jackson. The opportunity soon offers him a chance to signalize himself in this new command. He learns that the remnants of Coburn's brigade which had escaped the disaster of Thompson's Station have been left in charge of the railway from Nashville to Franklin. Colonel Bloodgood, with the remainder of the Twenty-second Wisconsin, occupies Brentwood; the Nineteenth Michigan, reduced to two hundred and thirty men, is stationed in a kind of block-house in the vicinity of a bridge on one of the tributaries of Harpeth River. Forrest naturally supposes that the remembrance of their defeat still weighs heavily upon these men and their leaders: he might easily get the better of them if he could reach them, and is desirous to complete the strategy of the 5th of March by their capture. But in order to reach them he must slip between Nashville and Granger's division, stationed at Franklin. Van Dorn allows him to make the attempt. He at once starts out on this expedition on the evening of the 24th of March. In order to avoid Franklin, he proceeds eastward of this point with six regiments of cavalry and one battery, while Starnes, with two regiments, takes the westward track, the rendezvous being in front of Brentwood. Forrest arrives at this place with a portion of his forces on the morning of the 25th. Without waiting for Armstrong, who is following him with the remainder, he takes such a position as to be able to cut off Bloodgood's retreat, who is on his way to join the Nineteenth Michigan. As soon as Armstrong has made his appearance the Confederates surround on every side the

small Federal force thus taken by surprise. A few minutes' fighting suffices to decide Bloodgood to capitulate with the five hundred men of his command, and to undergo the fate from which he had only escaped three weeks previously by a too-hasty retreat. Without losing a moment's time, Forrest, leaving Starnes, who had just joined him, to take care of the prisoners and to collect the booty, starts at a gallop in the direction of the block-house on the Franklin road which is occupied by the Nineteenth Michigan. He quickly surrounds it, and a few cannon-shots, fired into the palisade behind which the Federals are massed, prove sufficient to bring them also to terms.

The success is complete, but the Confederates must hasten to get away from the troops which Granger cannot fail to send against them as soon as he hears of this daring capture. Indeed, Smith's cavalry has already been despatched in pursuit of them. While a Confederate regiment has pushed forward to within sight of Nashville, spreading alarm in the capital of Tennessee, Forrest speedily resumes his march. Finding that his long line of prisoners and wagons loaded with booty cannot keep pace with him, he leaves them in charge of the Tenth Tennessee, and pushes forward with the rest of his cavalry in order to give his men time to make a long halt. But they have hardly dismounted when he learns that his train has been attacked. Smith, arriving with six hundred mounted men, has made a vigorous charge upon the Tenth Tennessee, which has defended itself with difficulty, having already had several of its wagons captured when the timely arrival of Forrest relieves it. Smith's forces are too inferior to those of his adversary to enable him to continue the fight; he pauses and falls back before Forrest's first charge, leaving him to take his booty to Spring Hill in peace.

Encouraged by this new success, and by the false rumor that the Federals were about to evacuate Franklin, Van Dorn determined at last to go and attack them in this position. He was in hopes of taking them by surprise, but, taught by experience, they kept good watch, and were informed of the design of their adversary as soon as he made a movement in that direction on the 9th of April. Granger, who had only five thousand infantry at Franklin, was on that day reinforced by Stanley's cavalry

division, which had been sent for from Triune, whilst Smith's division, about twenty-five hundred horses strong, proceeded to take position at Brentwood.

On the morning of the 10th, Van Dorn advances in two columns, taking the Columbia road with Jackson's division: Forrest's is on the right, along the Lewisburg road, Armstrong at the head, followed by Starnes' brigade and Freeman's battery at a distance of about two miles.

Jackson, having arrived in front of a wood which covers the approaches to Franklin, meets with a stubborn resistance on the part of the Fortieth Ohio. The three hundred men of this regiment, who are waiting in vain for assistance or an order to retreat, keep his head of column for a long time in check, and it becomes necessary to deploy the whole division in order to compel them at last to fall back upon the outer dwellings of Franklin. The Federals, having to traverse a vast open space, effect their retreat in *échelons* of companies without allowing their lines to be broken by the Southern cavalry, which is closely pressing them. In the mean while, Armstrong has advanced as far as the suburbs without encountering any resistance. But he is soon interrupted in his movement by the news that Starnes is being attacked in his rear. In fact, Stanley, with a portion of his cavalry, has made a wide *détour* eastward, suddenly falling upon the right flank of Forrest's second brigade, which was most imprudently marching without scouts. The Fourth regular cavalry arrives at a gallop, striking the battery on the march, overturning it, and cutting down the gunners. The captain is killed; the guns, with a considerable number of artillerymen, are captured. But Starnes, causing the rest of his troops to dismount, returns into line and wrests the prey from the regulars. The latter, taken in their turn both in front and in flank, are obliged to beat a retreat. Starnes, continuing his march, soon joins Armstrong in front of Franklin. But, notwithstanding the forces he has at his disposal, Van Dorn declines making an attack upon the town. At the entrance of every street his mounted men are received with murderous volleys of musketry, whilst shots from an unfinished fort situated on the right bank of Harpeth River, in a position which commands nearly all the approaches to the town, harass



his lines very seriously. He had anticipated surprising the Federals on their retreat; convinced of his error, he recalls his troops and leads them back to Spring Hill. The combat at Franklin had cost about one hundred men to each side.

On the same day, much more to the westward, a detachment of Van Dorn's cavalry which was making a reconnoissance between Duck River and the Tennessee, met and dispersed at Waverley a party of Union cavalry coming from Fort Donelson, who in search of horses had pushed their expedition as far as that place.

The attempt against the Federal right on the part of the Confederates, which had just miscarried before Franklin, was to be the last for a long time. Van Dorn would undoubtedly have endeavored to retrieve this defeat, but he perished a few days later, being stricken down in the midst of his officers by a husband whom he had offended. His death was a great loss to the cause of the South. We have criticised in severe terms his defection in Texas at the time of secession; we will endeavor now to do justice to his rare military talents. Stuart, Morgan, Fitzhugh Lee, Grierson, Kilpatrick, Kautz, and others were remarkable cavalry officers: Sheridan and Wilson in the armies of the North, Van Dorn in those of the South, were the only generals of mounted infantry; no one knew as they did how to handle this complex and difficult instrument. The latter was replaced by Forrest in his important command. Forrest possessed some of the qualities of his predecessor, but he lacked sound military education; he was not, like Van Dorn, an officer of the old regular army.

Up to the 1st of May we have no encounter to mention between the hostile forces which occupy Franklin on one side and Spring Hill on the other, with the exception of a slight skirmish at Carter's Creek, near the road from Nashville to Columbia, between a party of Federal cavalry coming from Murfreesborough and a detachment of Texas cavalry: some of the latter were taken prisoners.

The numerous forces that Morgan had displayed before Hall at the battle of Vaught's Hill were a menace to the Federal left wing, and Rosecrans a few days before the engagement at Franklin determined to drive away from his lines so venturesome an

adversary. In order to accomplish this result, the Federals required a decided numerical superiority. On the evening of the 1st of April the brigades of Cruft and Hazen, of Palmer's division, left Murfreesborough, accompanied by a detachment of cavalry, the former following the direct Woodbury route, the latter making a wide *détour* for the purpose of surrounding this village and preventing the retreat of a strong Confederate detachment which happened to be in the place. But the Southerners, who were completely on their guard, received timely notice of the movement, and succeeded in getting away, leaving about thirty prisoners in the hands of the Federals. While they were rapidly falling back upon McMinnville, the Federals attempted another bold stroke against the remainder of Morgan's forces, which had not left the valley of Smith's Creek since the 20th of March. This expedition was entrusted to Stanley's cavalry, which had not yet been sent to Granger's assistance, and to a brigade of infantry—about two thousand sabres and twelve hundred muskets. On the 2d of April, Stanley encounters Morgan's outposts at Auburn, and drives them before him in the direction of Liberty as far as Snow Hill, a point where Morgan had for some time past made his general head-quarters and assembled the bulk of his forces. The Confederates, being vigorously attacked, are soon obliged to beat a retreat, leaving about thirty men in the hands of the assailants. The two Federal columns had scarcely returned to Murfreesborough when General Mitchell, who was then in command at Nashville, learned that a detachment of Morgan's cavalry had had the audacity to establish a recruiting-dépôt only a few miles from the capital of Tennessee, on the Lebanon road. He started on the morning of the 6th of April with three hundred and fifty mounted men, surprised the dépôt at the village of Green Hill, between the Hermitage and Silver Spring, and dispersed it, taking about fifteen prisoners.

Van Dorn's attack upon Franklin, by drawing Rosecrans' attention to his right, had caused him to suspend the movement which was entirely to relieve his left. But as soon as he felt reassured regarding the fate of Granger he resumed his task, and was able to lead Stanley's cavalry back to Murfreesborough. On the 20th of April, General Reynolds left Mur-

freesborough with his whole division, one brigade of mounted infantry,\* and seventeen hundred of Minty's cavalry. This time the Federals pushed as far as McMinnville, to where Morgan had retired after the affair of Snow Hill, and which he occupied with about seven hundred men. He had no idea of offering any resistance to the powerful column sent against him; McMinnville was hastily evacuated. The Federals picked up nearly one hundred prisoners in the place and destroyed the Tullahoma railroad-bridge. This operation drove Morgan beyond Caney Fork along the Cumberland plateau, and cut off the supplies which Bragg's army was receiving from the country circumjacent to McMinnville.

The reinforcements which had reached Rosecrans' army during the month of March had weakened the Federal troops in Kentucky, that everlasting battlefield of partisans, who, to whichever army they might belong, were sure to find sympathizers among the sharply divided population of that unfortunate State. Consequently, the Confederates immediately thought of taking advantage of the opportunity to organize a new raid against the dépôts and lines of communication of the Army of the Cumberland.

General Pegram's troops, stationed in the south-eastern portion of the State, along the western slopes of the Cumberland Mountains, received some reinforcements from Knoxville. Toward the middle of March, in order to divide the attention of the Federals, he sent Colonel Cluke with two regiments to gather booty in the plain extending between Winchester and Rogersville. Cluke came down from the mountains where the Kentucky River takes its source, striking the Lexington road, which the Confederates had already followed the previous month, and, meeting with no resistance, imprudently came to a halt in the neighborhood of Owensville and Mount Sterling.

At the news of his incursion, Burnside—who, as we have stated, has been invested with the supreme command in Kentucky—prepares to make him pay dear for his audacity. Taking advantage of the time lost by the Confederates, two Federal regiments proceed to post themselves at Hazel Green in order to bar their passage, while other troops are sent from Lexington to assist

\* Under Colonel John T. Wilder.—Ed.

in surrounding them completely. But Cluke, seeing his retreat cut off, returns to Mount Sterling, captures the small Union garrison which occupied this point, and on the 20th of March, forcing his way through the troops that have been sent in pursuit of him, gains, by another route, the inaccessible plateau whence he had emerged.

In the mean while, Pegram, who has gathered together the remainder of his cavalry at Monticello, in the upper valley of the Cumberland, has advanced along the road followed the previous year by Zollicoffer, which leads to Danville and Lexington by way of Mill Springs and Somerset. Whilst the Federals are trying to surround Cluke he crosses Cumberland River, and rapidly passes through the village of Somerset, causing a portion of his cavalry to dismount in order to make the inhabitants believe that he has a brigade of infantry with him, and to deceive the Federal spies as to the number of his troops. On the 18th of March his scouts, who have preceded him, appear before Stanford. The Unionist force which occupies the village promptly falls back upon the garrison of Danville, consisting of a brigade of infantry and a regiment of cavalry under General Carter. The whole of Pegram's force, having once more got into the saddle, reaches the neighborhood of Danville by a forced march on the evening of the 19th, while the Federals are still watching Cluke's movements. Carter, unaware of the strength of his adversary, does not dare to wait for him, and after depositing the supplies gathered in Danville at Lexington, takes up his line of march for Camp Dick Robinson, in order to cross to the other side of the Kentucky River. But on the morning of the 20th, before this movement could have been completed, Pegram's head of column attacks a portion of the Federal forces which are still occupying Danville. They resist long enough in the streets to enable the trains to get away, and afterward join the rest of the brigade at the Dick River bridge. Carter is not disturbed any further, and whilst, posted behind the Kentucky, he is watching Pegram's movements, the latter overruns the whole left bank of this river with impunity. Finally, General Gillmore, commanding the division to which Carter belongs, having brought some reinforcements to the latter, they cross the Kentucky together on the 24th.



Pegram does not wait for them, and hastily resumes his march toward Monticello. On the morning of the 25th, Carter is on his track with two regiments of cavalry and two of mounted infantry, one thousand men in all. The pursuit is hot: the Confederates soon abandon most of their booty on the road, arriving at last near Somerset on the evening of the 29th, where they take a strong position a mile and a quarter north of this village in order to wait for the Federals. Gillmore, who has joined Carter with two hundred men, attacks them on the 30th, in the morning. After having driven back the Confederate outposts, he finds the latter posted upon a high wooded hill which stands crosswise of the road. Pegram, trusting in his numerical superiority—for he has more than two thousand men under his command—thinks that he has drawn his enemy into a trap, and tries to surround him. Whilst he holds him in check in front, his two best regiments, under Colonel Scott, make a *détour* to the left, and come to strike the Federal troop in the rear. But this troop has dismounted, and in spite of its numerical inferiority boldly rushes up to the assault; the Confederates, fatigued, discouraged, or maybe anxious for their booty, make but a faint resistance, and abandon the field with a considerable number of prisoners. This hasty retreat upsets all the daring plans of Pegram. When Scott, sabring the stragglers and already menacing the artillery, reaches the road which the Unionists have followed, the fighting has ceased on the other side, and Gillmore is able to concentrate his forces against him. Scott throws himself into a wood, where he dismounts and presents a bold front; finally, as he is on the point of being surrounded, he reaches the plain and escapes from the Federals. The latter have lost fifty men, Pegram about three hundred. Gillmore pursued him as far as the Cumberland. The State of Kentucky was free for some time. In fact, during the whole month of April we have but three insignificant skirmishes to notice between some Union detachments and Confederate partisans engaged in hunting for recruits or in picking up horses—one at Demasville on the 10th, one at Pikeville on the 15th, and the third at Helena on the 20th.

After having passed one month on the borders of the Cumberland, near the scene of the Somerset conflict, General Carter

was ordered to continue his aggressive movement and to cross the river in search of Pegram in a locality where he believed himself perfectly safe. In fact, new levies had arrived, increasing Burnside's forces, and the latter was already preparing the expedition he was about to undertake for the purpose of conquering East Tennessee. The bulk of Pegram's brigade, composed of four or five regiments and a battery of artillery, temporarily commanded by Colonel Morrison, was at Albany, a small village on the frontier of Tennessee. Colonel Chenault, with his regiment and Cluke's, was watching from Monticello the crossings of the Cumberland. During the night of the 30th of April, Carter, notwithstanding numerous difficulties, attempted to cross this river: the fords being submerged, several boats foundered or were upset. Finally, in the course of the morning, the passage was effected at three different points, and Carter pursued his way toward Monticello with three regiments of cavalry and five of infantry, two of which were mounted. Chenault, at the first notice of his approach, very imprudently caused a message to be sent to Morrison stating that he had now the opportunity of driving a detachment of the enemy into the river: then, when he saw more than two thousand Federals with artillery, instead of a small detachment, before him, he abandoned Monticello in such haste that he even neglected to apprise Morrison. There are two roads that start from this village, both running southward: one leads to Albany on the right; the other, on the left, to Jamestown, Tennessee: at about six or seven miles from Monticello a cross-road connects these two roads. Chenault, being hotly pursued by Carter, took the first, and finally halted in a very strong position near the cross-road, along the hills called Short Mountain. In the mean while, Morrison was advancing upon Monticello by the other road. Fortunately for him, he met with a party of Federals, which decided him to stop in time and endeavor to join Chenault by way of the cross-road. But the latter had again abandoned his position after a trifling skirmish, and Morrison found the Jamestown road occupied by Carter's troops. They at once attacked him, and he resisted them for a while, but was finally dislodged, and fell back upon Travisville, in the direction of Jamestown.

The losses were very small on both sides, but a considerable advantage had been gained by the Unionists: East Tennessee was free.

The other extremity of this State, Western Tennessee, lying between the river and the Mississippi, was at that time nearly forsaken by both parties. The Federals were satisfied with the control of the waters; the Confederates did not dare to venture in force on a peninsula hemmed in by the gunboats of the enemy. Consequently, we shall have no military exploit of any note to mention in this region during the months of March and April. We will only state, incidentally, that on the 10th of March, General Grierson, whose name is well known to the reader, had dispersed at Covington a strong band of Confederate guerillas commanded by Colonel Richardson, but that the latter, rallying his troops, had avenged himself on the 29th by falling suddenly upon a detachment of the Sixth Illinois at Somerville, upon which he inflicted severe losses.

On the 17th of April, Grierson has set out once more for the purpose of invading the Confederate territory in the rear of Pemberton. As we have stated, another expedition of the same character has been organized by Rosecrans against the communications of Bragg's army. In order that these hazardous enterprises may prove successful, they should be executed in the midst of heavy movements of troops calculated to distract the attention of the enemy and throw him on the wrong scent. Rosecrans and Grant understood each other in this respect. The latter causes a strong demonstration to be made by the Memphis garrison toward the south, in a direction parallel to that which Grierson has taken. On the 18th of April three regiments of cavalry and one of infantry\* take up the line of march, following the Grenada railroad: they drive some weak detachments of the enemy before them, and, passing through the village of Hernando on the 19th, they reach the Cold Water River bridge. The first encounter they have on this river is favorable to them; then successive reinforcements arrive, giving the advantage alternately to the

\* This force consisted of three regiments of infantry—viz. Twelfth and Thirty-third Wisconsin and Forty-first Illinois; also a detachment of the Fifth Ohio cavalry and the Fifteenth Ohio battery. It was commanded by Colonel George E. Bryant, Twelfth Wisconsin infantry.—Ed.



Confederates and the Federals, the latter of whom finally retire, satisfied at having fulfilled their mission of drawing upon themselves the attention of the enemy.

At the same time the troops stationed at Corinth were making a similar movement eastward, in order to aid the expedition which Rosecrans had just organized. On the 17th three brigades, commanded by General Dodge, advanced toward Tuscumbia by following the line of railroad from Memphis to Charleston. By a singular chance, Roddy's Confederate cavalry brigade of Bragg's army had just been sent by J. E. Johnston to join that of Pemberton, reaching Tuscumbia at the moment when Dodge was leaving Corinth. The latter immediately started to meet them. On the 18th of April the Federal advance-guard, consisting of three regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, and two batteries of artillery, which were marching rather incautiously, suddenly encountered Roddy, who was waiting for it along Bear Creek, between Iuka and Dickson. The Federals attacked him, and were repulsed, leaving about one hundred prisoners, with a piece of artillery, in his hands. This success of the Confederates was of short duration: in fact, the day following Dodge arrived at Bear Creek with his whole force, capturing the ford and driving Roddy before him in the direction of Tuscumbia. The Confederate general fell back, defending himself step by step; Dodge, on his part, deemed it expedient not to advance too fast, because the troops which were to accomplish the great raid projected by Rosecrans had not been able to communicate with him until the 20th, and they required a few days' time to complete their equipment. Streight's brigade, brought by rail to Nashville, had embarked, on the 11th of April, on a fleet of transports which had landed him at Palmyra on the Cumberland: thence he had proceeded by land to Fort Henry, while the fleet, descending the Cumberland and the Ohio, overtook the fleet of General Ellet at Paducah, together with the gunboat *Lexington*, and, thus convoyed, ascended the Tennessee. Finding Streight at Fort Henry, his brigade was again taken on board, and landed on the evening of the 19th at Eastport, at the very entrance of Bear Creek. It was impossible to be more promptly at the rendezvous; but Streight's troops were not mounted, it having been found



impossible to embark with them the seventeen or eighteen hundred horses which were indispensable for the projected expedition. Dodge had brought a number; more were wanting; it was expected that some might be picked up in the country, but few were found. Finally, at the end of two or three days, a portion of the brigade was mounted, and Streight ready to start. In the mean while, Dodge, gaining upon Roddy, had arrived before Tuscumbia, which he entered on the 24th; Streight closely followed him, and, having joined him, took position on his right, south of the town. It was of importance to confound the two troops in the eyes of the enemy for a few days, in order that at the moment of separation Dodge might lead him on the wrong track, thus giving Streight the necessary start to get away from him. But the time lost by the Federals between the first engagement at Bear Creek and the capture of Tuscumbia was fatal to them, for these four days enabled Bragg to bring on a formidable adversary to oppose them. On receipt of Roddy's despatches he had ordered Forrest to hasten to the aid of the latter with his whole brigade. The order, which was forwarded on the 23d, was promptly executed: a regiment of this brigade, sent direct toward Tuscumbia, arrives at Bainbridge on the 27th, where it crosses the Tennessee, while on the same day Forrest, with the remainder of his troops, crosses the river at Brown's Ferry, and promptly gains the village of Courtland, on the railroad from Tuscumbia to Decatur. He could not have arrived more opportunely: Dodge, leaving a few troops at Tuscumbia and in the village adjoining, South Florence, had resumed his march on the morning of the 27th, and was advancing along the railroad, while Streight was bearing southward in order to reach Russellville. The former was in hope of drawing all Roddy's attention to himself, thus enabling Streight to pass behind him unperceived. This plan would have succeeded if the Federals had had only Roddy and his twelve hundred men and four guns to cope with. But on the morning of the 17th he had been reinforced by the six hundred men that Forrest had sent to Bainbridge, and had posted his forces behind Town Creek, a small stream which empties into the Tennessee near the rapids called Muscle Shoals, where the fords had been entirely submerged by the recent rains.

The Federals had reached the opposite side during the evening, and on the morning of the 28th they attacked Roddy's strong positions. But Forrest, by a night-march, had reinforced the latter before daylight, and Dodge met with such a stubborn resistance along the whole line that he soon gave up the idea of dislodging his adversaries. Besides, the presence of a regiment in his rear, which Forrest had sent to make a demonstration at Florence by way of the right bank of the Tennessee, caused him uneasiness; it might be the advance-guard of the whole cavalry corps, which he still believed to be commanded by Van Dorn, and whose approach he had been apprised of by his spies. Finally, he learned that Streight had reached New Hope, a small village situated at the head-waters of Town Creek, during the day of the 28th, having thus passed beyond the enemy's line of defence. He imagined, somewhat too soon, that his mission was accomplished, and on the evening of the 28th he gave the order for retreat to his troops. He regained Corinth by traversing the rich district which lies south of the railroad, picking up a large amount of booty and destroying everything that he could not carry away. In order to cover this movement, Colonel Cornyn, who accompanied him with his cavalry, extended his lines still farther on his left, pillaging and burning even more than the former, and joined him at last at Corinth in the beginning of May, after a slight encounter on the 6th near Tupelo with the Confederate colonel Ruggles, who was trying to bar his way.

In another direction, the flotilla which had brought Streight over had left immediately after landing him, and the vessels convoying it had a small fight on the 25th at the entrance of Duck River with some light artillery posted along the bank in order to prevent the passage of the transports, whose return had been foreseen by the Confederates. The powerful naval guns soon silenced them.

Henceforth, Streight's small column was therefore left to its own resources for accomplishing the perilous task that had been assigned it. This task consisted in reaching and breaking up the Atlanta and Chattanooga Railroad, which alone connected Bragg's army with the rest of the Confederacy. Streight during

his passage was to destroy all the military establishments that the enemy possessed in the northern part of Georgia, especially those of Rome, where there was a large factory for moulding cannon and projectiles. He was then to select the best route for getting back into the Federal lines, avoiding as much as possible all encounter with the troops sent in pursuit of him. But in thus sending him into the heart of the enemy's country his superiors failed to give him, as we have already stated, the means for moving with all necessary speed in order to secure success. His column was composed almost exclusively of foot-soldiers, who had no knowledge whatever of horsemanship and were utterly ignorant of the art of managing horses. These animals, moreover, were very inferior, being either old mules or cast-off horses that had been found either at Eastport or Tuscumbia, and they were not in sufficient number: more than three hundred of Streight's soldiers were on foot at starting, the inhabitants of the neighborhood having prudently removed or hidden the horses which the Unionists had counted upon appropriating for their own use.

The Confederates were making much better preparations for the trial of speed which was about to take place and to decide the issue of the expedition. Their scouts had apprised them of Streight's movements as soon as the latter had reached Newburg. So long as the engagement on Town Creek lasted, Forrest had thought of nothing else but to hold Dodge in check: so soon, however, as he found his line of retreat safe, he concentrated all his attention upon the troops which had so boldly ventured in his rear. He had learned, in fact, that Streight had crossed the head-waters of Town Creek. Leaving only a small force along this stream, and directing Roddy to throw himself, with two regiments, between Dodge and Streight in order to definitely separate them, he fell back upon Courtland that very evening. In the morning of the next day he reached Moulton, where Roddy was not long in joining him. The two brigades he had with him were composed exclusively of experienced horsemen, mounted upon well-trained animals inured, like themselves, to every kind of fatigue. All sick men and jaded horses were discarded. The teams of his eight pieces of artillery were care-



fully selected and doubled. Everything was ready to give chase to the enemy.

Streight, after lingering a few hours at Moulton, had resumed his march at one o'clock in the morning in the direction of Blountsville; he had about twelve hours the start of the Confederate cavalry. It was very little. The country through which he was passing was, fortunately for him, very rough, affording him everywhere the means for delaying Forrest's march.

South of Chattanooga the chain of the Alleghanies soon loses itself in a range of hills which appear to have been thrown into the centre of the large and fertile plain of Georgia somewhat at haphazard, the ridge reaching farthest westward, known by the name of Lookout Mountain, being the only one which extends beyond Gadsden, separating the waters of Coosa River from those of the Black Warrior, one of its main tributaries. Beyond this latter water-course the ridge is prolonged eastward by a mountainous plateau which traverses the whole northern section of the State of Alabama, bordering the left bank of the Tennessee from Huntersville: there the river deflects to the westward as far as Eastport, where it finally takes a northerly direction. The waters descending both north and south from the plateau are massed into deep gorges, the passage of which is easy to defend. The road from Moulton to Blountsville crosses the dividing-line of these waters about halfway between the two villages, through a gap called Day's Gap. On the evening of the 29th, Streight halted the bulk of his column a few miles in advance of this pass, leaving a few troops behind him to hold the enemy in check, whom he expected to find on his tracks, for he had just been informed of Dodge's premature retreat.

Forrest, on arriving at Moulton, had promptly made arrangements for overtaking him. Whilst Roddy, with three regiments and one battery, was following the trail of the Federals, he turned north-eastward with the rest of his forces, in order to prevent Streight from gaining the banks of the Tennessee, and to cut off his retreat if he should attempt to retrace his steps. The night was already far advanced, but the Confederates were still urging on their horses, anxious to overtake their adversaries. The two columns had finally come to a halt—one at Danville, the other



more to the northward. But Forrest, learning that the enemy's rear-guard was at a short distance from this village, makes his mounted men resume their march, and goes in person to direct the movements of Roddy's column.

The Federals are on the march at daybreak on the 30th: feeling themselves closely pressed, they have burnt most of their wagons during the night, the provisions and ammunition being packed on the backs of beasts of burden that have been picked up in the country; all the foot-soldiers are mounted. The main column is in motion, but before the rear-guard has been able to fall back, Forrest's cavalry, led by his brother, falls upon it and drives it in disorder toward the defiles of Day's Gap, which Streight has had time to reach. The Union general takes advantage of this strong position to offer resistance and prepare for the combat. His soldiers, quickly dismounting, take possession of the slopes over which the road passes, the field-howitzers commanding all its approaches.

The Confederate advance-guard, which has lost time in gathering up the provisions scattered behind them by the Federals, is brought to a halt; Captain Forrest has been mortally wounded. His brother arrives at last with Roddy's column, which he immediately deploys for the attack; the centre is composed of a dismounted regiment and two pieces of artillery. Two mounted regiments on the right, Forrest's escort on the left, try to surround the enemy's position, as they did at Thompson's Station, but Streight does not allow himself to be intimidated by this demonstration. He masses all his forces upon the objective point of the Confederate centre. A murderous discharge drives back Roddy's dismounted cavalry in disorder. Streight takes advantage of this and charges them at the head of a portion of his forces. The assailants are completely routed; the two guns they had brought forward are captured. Forrest is obliged to bring his wings to the rear. Satisfied with the severe lesson he has administered to his adversaries, Streight returns to his position and waits for another attack. But Forrest does not dare to attempt it, and contents himself with keeping up a useless fire of musketry. He allows the Federals quietly to resume their march about two o'clock, and does not attempt any pursuit until fully assured of their retreat.

The departure of Streight after his victory at Day's Gap shows that he is desirous to avoid further conflict at any cost, and that the chase will be a long and difficult one. In order the more surely to overtake him, Forrest sends Roddy to Decatur with the wounded, the prisoners, and disabled, and two regiments intended to cover his rear. The remainder, consisting of three regiments, is again divided into two columns: the Eleventh Tennessee proceeds toward Somerville to watch the northern roads; the other two regiments follow the direction of Blountsville. Forrest takes the advance of them with his escort in order to attack the rear-guard of the enemy and to compel him to come to a halt. He overtakes him toward five o'clock about six or seven miles from Day's Gap, at the ford of Long Creek, one of the tributaries of the Black Warrior.

The Federals, surprised as they are crossing the stream, are at first driven back in disorder, but they soon form again and cover the ford. As soon as Forrest has been joined by his two regiments, he crosses Long Creek in his turn, and leads them on foot to attack the strong positions occupied by Streight back of this stream alongside of the mountain, which borders it at the east. Night has come; the two small bodies are fighting in close proximity, unable to distinguish their lines except through the light reflected by the fire of musketry. The echoes, repeating each shot a hundred times among the narrow gorges of the mountain, give to this engagement the sounds of a battle. The fighting thus continues for three hours; the two chieftains have each several horses killed under them. At last, about nine o'clock, whether he fears to be turned by a detachment of the enemy sent along his rear, or that he thinks the moment has arrived for resuming his march, Streight gives the order for retreat. The empty wagons are destroyed: the two pieces of cannon he has captured, being of no further use for want of ammunition, are spiked and abandoned; and the wounded remain on the ground. It is absolutely necessary to gain upon the enemy: notwithstanding the fatigue of his men, who have never halted except to fight, he compels them to march all night. On the 1st of May the sun finds them yet on the road, and it is eleven o'clock in the morning when they finally reach Blountsville.

Forrest has followed them so closely that twice during the night he has overtaken their rear-guard, pressing it very hard. The march is therefore extremely fatiguing for the Federals, whose chief is desirous to avoid an encounter at all risks. They have not been allowed to stop for an instant, even to let their exhausted animals quench their thirst. After two hours devoted to the destruction of the last wagons and to the comfort of the beasts of burden, they are obliged to leave Blountsville and resume their march toward Gadsden. Forrest, in fact, is approaching, being henceforth sure of the direction taken by the Federals: notwithstanding a halt of several hours, his men, better mounted than their adversaries, enter Blountsville just as the latter are leaving it. The inhabitants of this town, surprised by, first, the unexpected arrival of the enemy, then of the Confederate cavalry after them, are undecided whether to fly or remain, and, stricken with fear, look with amazement upon the passage of these hostile columns that are carrying war into the very heart of the Confederacy.

In the mean while, Forrest, after having given his soldiers at Blountsville the rest and food they stand in need of, forces them once more into the saddle, whilst Streight, still hastening the pace of his column, crosses the Black Warrior River, penetrates into that mountainous section of country called Sand Mountain, and does not come to a halt until midnight, after a march of nearly thirty miles. Forrest presses hard upon his rear, and overtakes it at the ford of the Black Warrior, but toward nine o'clock in the evening the pursuit is interrupted by an engagement in which he makes a few prisoners. The Federals thus gain an advance on him, which they soon lose by taking a rest from midnight until daylight on the 2d of May, Forrest having resumed his march at the very moment that his adversaries had come to a halt. It is in vain that they burn all the bridges behind them in order to retard his movements; in the course of the morning the Confederates overtake their rear-guard at Will's Creek at the very hour when their head of column has at last reached the banks of the Coosa at Gadsden.

Forrest's soldiers, however, seem to have exhausted their entire strength: the dread of falling into the hands of the enemy does



not stimulate them like their adversaries, and the number of stragglers is increasing every hour. A stop must be made. Forrest, in order to continue his pursuit, selects six hundred mounted men among the most active of his followers, takes two pieces of artillery, and orders the rest of his force to follow him the best way they can, while the disabled are sent back to Decatur.

Streight, on his part, having arrived at Gadsden about eleven o'clock, has only passed two hours in this village, where he has found a considerable number of horses, which he has distributed among the worst mounted of his cavalrymen, and, after destroying some important dépôts of provisions, has again struck the road to Rome, his objective point, toward one o'clock. But on arriving at the village of Turkey Town he is obliged to allow his soldiers to halt for a while. They have scarcely commenced making coffee when, about five o'clock in the evening, the approach of the enemy is again reported. Desirous to secure them some rest, he immediately sends one of his regiments, the Seventy-third Indiana, into the woods adjoining the road, displaying only a line of skirmishers in order to draw his adversaries unawares under the cross-fire of invisible combatants.

Forrest has closely followed the Federal rear-guard from Will's Creek, almost constantly exchanging shots with it. Being momentarily detained by the Black Creek stream, whose bridge has been destroyed, he succeeds in crossing a ford which a young girl of the country has pointed out to him by braving the enemy's fire, and he reaches Gadsden toward two o'clock. A messenger is immediately despatched to Rome by a by-road, in order to warn the inhabitants of this town of the danger which threatens them, and Forrest resumes his march along the road followed by the Federals. But he has only three hundred mounted men with him. With this force he charges the Seventy-third Indiana, avoiding the ambush, which his scouts have discovered in time. The encounter is a bloody one: Colonel Hathaway, who is in command of the Federals, is killed, with a considerable number of his men. A timely reinforcement, brought by Streight, restores the equilibrium between the combatants, and Forrest pauses to wait for the remainder of his column. The Unionists, on their side, are exhausted by fatigue and want of sleep: they can neither



continue the forward march nor make an aggressive effort to return against the handful of men that is harassing them : the two forces remain thus fronting each other until night. In the mean while, Streight, finding himself more and more closely pressed, has come to the conclusion that his safety depends upon the possession of Rome, and, while the bulk of his column is resting, he sends Captain Russell, with two hundred and fifty mounted men, selected among those the least affected by prostration, to surprise and occupy this town. However desirable this occupation might be, it is our belief that in this he committed a grave error ; for if, instead of depriving himself of the help of his best mounted men, he had hurled them upon the advance-guard which alone accompanied Forrest, he would probably have prevented him from continuing the pursuit until the arrival of the main body of his troops. But, deceived by appearances, he believes himself to be in the presence of forces superior to his own, and, instead of attacking them in order to get rid of them, he only thinks of making his escape. Consequently, as soon as night has come the Federal column is once more on the march : the rear-guard, after having waited until ten o'clock in the evening, falls back by way of the Round Mountain Forge, a vast establishment which the Confederate government had turned into a cannon-foundry, and which the flames have destroyed with all its machinery. This detachment joins the rest of the troops at the village of King's Hill, but it does not find that rest upon which it had counted, because Streight is determined to gain the Chattooga River, one of the tributaries of the Coosa, in all haste, in order to place its deep and rapid waters between him and the enemy who is pursuing him so eagerly. As the jaded horses are proceeding at a very slow pace, it becomes necessary to shorten, and even to suppress, all stoppages, in order to make up for this loss of time. Before daylight the column encounters the first water-course, called Little River. But at this place more time is lost in drinking. The ferry-boat which performs the service for the road is too small to convey the whole brigade in good time. It becomes necessary to ascend the river until a ford can be found and a passage effected—a long and painful operation, the consequences of which prove fatal to Streight, for in the midst of the

prevailing darkness the reserve of ammunition is submerged and consequently lost.

On the 3d of May, at daybreak, the Federal column, dragging painfully along on the road to Rome, reaches the village of Cedar Bluff: the men, who for the last seventy-two hours have travelled nearly one hundred and fifty miles and fought three important battles without more than six hours' rest, are overcome by fatigue: they slumber on their horses, and the want of sleep deadens their sense of obedience or the fear of the enemy: the bravest among them steal away to enjoy a moment's rest. Nevertheless, Streight is still pushing them forward toward the Chattooga. At last this much-coveted water-course is gained and crossed, and the Federals, after getting over the bridge, burn it behind them. This time they consider themselves safe. While the rear-guard remains alone in position on the left bank of the Chattooga, the rest of the troops scatter in search of provisions through the rich country which extends as far as the Coosa. Each man disposes of himself according to his fancy: the fires are kindled and the meal is being prepared, when, all of a sudden, about nine o'clock in the morning, the firing of musketry announces the arrival of the enemy. Forrest, who has been joined by his whole force during the night, has left Turkey Town with five hundred troopers: he has found a ford, and, forcing its passage, has already set foot on the other side of the obstacle upon which Streight relied for holding him in check.

Forming their ranks in haste, and upsetting their pots and pans, the Federals gather around their chief on an adjoining hill-ock. They are still ready to fight with him, but their strength fails them and their arms drop from their hands; isolated in an enemy's country, finding that each day's march takes them still farther from all help, they have become hopeless, and discouragement is portrayed on their countenances. With a wonderful perspicacity, Forrest has formed a correct idea of the exhausted condition of his adversaries. They are three times more numerous than his own troops, and he cannot attack them without betraying his own weakness: it is by craft that he must try to subdue them. He places his two guns and a portion of his soldiers in a conspicuous position, deployed like a line of skirmishers

covering some forces of great magnitude, and does not hesitate to detach the rest of his troops so as to make a show of surrounding the Federals both right and left. While the latter, intimidated, are watching this manœuvre, he sends them a flag of truce, boldly summoning them to surrender. Streight, who has valiantly led his troops during these trying times, spurns at first this proposal with indignation, but the condition to which his soldiers are reduced soon causes him to hesitate as to the expediency of fighting another battle. Besides, he is short of ammunition. Carried on the backs of mules, the cartridges that are not wet have been torn during the process of transportation. Caught between the deep waters of the Coosa and the extremity of the slopes of Look-out Mountain, he has before him an enemy whom he believes to be superior to himself in numbers; behind him, as the main issue, the town of Rome, which undoubtedly is in a state of defence. Being already staggered, he agrees to repair to Forrest's lines in order to ascertain the number of troops which the latter has at his disposal. The Confederate general, by dint of impudent mendacity, by giving the most fantastic orders to his aides-de-camp, and by adroitly disposing his small band, succeeds in magnifying his force tenfold to the dulled vision of his unfortunate adversary. The latter, having returned among his commanders, readily makes them share his impressions, and the capitulation is signed: 1466 men, six of whom are superior officers, surrender their arms to a force which numbers less than five hundred combatants. Consequently, in order that they might not be tempted to back out on discovering his weakness, Forrest is obliged to resort to new stratagems. The remainder of his forces has at last arrived, bringing him the reinforcement which he needed. It was time, for the Federal detachment of Captain Russell has also returned from its reconnoissance in the neighborhood of Rome, which he had found in a state of defence: if these two hundred and fifty men had arrived a little sooner, they might have changed the aspect of things; nothing was left for them but to submit to the capitulation which had been signed during their absence. The number of Federal prisoners amounted, in all, to seventeen hundred. They were well treated, and most of them promptly exchanged. But the governor of Georgia



made a demand on the military authorities for the detention of their chiefs, pretending that they had been guilty of conspiring to get up a servile insurrection, and as such they were amenable to the criminal courts of his State. This absurd demand prevented their release for a considerable time, as we will explain hereafter.

We have entered into the details of this strange race between Streight and Forrest because it presents the only example of the kind in the history we are narrating. In fact, it can only be compared to a regular hunt: once started in pursuit of their game, the Confederates are never thrown off the scent and never lose the trail. Like a tired pack of hounds, they only stop at times to shake themselves; the advance alone, consisting of three or four squadrons, closely presses the Federals. The latter might then assume an aggressive attitude and crush their impudent adversaries; but, having fought valiantly at the commencement of the chase, they only think of getting away. They exhaust themselves in vain efforts to escape the pursuit, taking no notice of the weakness of the enemy; so that, in the end, they fall panting into his hands, unable to defend themselves in spite of their number, vanquished by fatigue, or, to express it more forcibly, hunted down like a stag at bay.

It is true that the conquerors have purchased their success at the price of hardships the effects of which they feel as soon as the ardor of pursuit ceases to sustain them. They must make a halt of two days in order to obtain rest: at the end of that time five hundred and fifty mounted men are alone able to reach the town of Rome, and when they enter it, after a march of only ten or twelve miles, more than three hundred among them have their horses foundered. In the mean while, the false rumor of another Federal raid obliges Forrest quickly to return to Decatur. This new march completes the exhaustion of his animals, and when he reaches the borders of the Tennessee, on the 10th of May, his cavalry is entirely used up. He will require some time to recuperate. We shall leave him for a while, in order to say a few words relative to the battles fought during the first four months of the year on the right bank of the Mississippi in the States of Missouri and Arkansas.

In the preceding volume we left the Federal army under Blunt, after the victory of Prairie Grove, masters of the north-western part of the latter State, occupying a strong position among the Ozark Mountains, covering Missouri, into which State the Confederates dare no longer venture, and pushing reconnoissances as far as the borders of Arkansas. The Union general continues to menace his adversary in this direction, and on the 26th of January one of his detachments of infantry, scarcely numbering one hundred men, arrives suddenly at Van Buren, and succeeds in taking possession of a steamer with three hundred Confederate soldiers on board. Hindman, on his part, has fallen back upon Little Rock, where the largest portion of his army is concentrated. The forces he brings back from his unlucky campaign against Blunt only represent one-third of this army. Thanks to the venturesome disposition of Arkansas planters, accustomed to settle their difficulties with arms in hand, the Confederate ranks in this region are always well filled, and Hindman has nearly fifty-five thousand soldiers under his command. His army, more powerful than that of Bragg or that of Pemberton, seems lost in the immense section of country which it is ordered to occupy—we will not say defend, for the very extent of this country protects it against all attacks on the part of the small Federal bodies stationed at the two extremities of the State, at Cane Hill and Helena. As we have stated, Johnston, since the end of November, has requested in vain that the largest portion of Hindman's forces might be sent to Vicksburg. The campaign of Prairie Grove has shown that they could not serve the Confederate cause usefully in those distant regions. But Johnston's advice was not heeded: it was feared, perhaps, that the soldiers of the Far West might be disinclined to go beyond the Mississippi to fight, and in the beginning of January we find Hindman's army assembled on the borders of Arkansas.

Unable seriously to resume the offensive, he tries to starve out his adversary in order to compel him to evacuate the advanced position he occupies in the Ozark Mountains. At this season of the year the Army of the Frontier cannot subsist except through the aid of wagon-trains, which with difficulty bring it provisions by the mail-road from Rolla, passing through Marshfield, Spring-

field, and Cassville. Dépôts, écheloned in those towns and protected by a few detachments, facilitate this indispensable service. It is this line of nearly two hundred and twenty miles, the weaker on account of its length, that Marmaduke has been ordered by Hindman to break up. With two brigades of cavalry—say about twenty-five hundred horses—and four pieces of artillery he is to invade Missouri, destroy the provision-dépôts on the road, and advance as far as possible in the direction of St. Louis, thus compelling Blunt, who will be reduced to starvation, to evacuate Arkansas without striking a blow. Marmaduke starts from Clarksville in the early part of January, and speedily reaches the Missouri frontier, keeping sufficiently eastward of Blunt to escape from him altogether. On the 6th of January he gains the borders of White River, near Forsyth, without any suspicion of his approach having been entertained by the Federals. At last one of their patrols meets him south of Ozark village, and gives the alarm to the troops which occupy this place just in time to prevent their capture. On the evening of the 7th, Marmaduke takes up his quarters at Ozark, and the news of his invasion is conveyed to Springfield. Since the battle of Wilson Creek this little town has assumed great importance: besides the storehouses of which we have spoken, it contains hospitals of considerable size and a rendezvous of militia regiments from all parts of the country, most of whose soldiers have received temporary leaves of absence since the enemy has evacuated their State. Two generals—one commanding the Federal troops, the other the local militia—several officers, some sick and convalescents, three small cannon without carriages, and very few able-bodied combatants, were in this place, around which efforts had recently been made to erect a chain of earthworks. The town of Springfield, situated on the borders of a vast forest and the open prairie which extends south-westward, is intersected at right angles by two streets running toward the cardinal points. On the west side there stood two forts, designated as Nos. 1 and 2: the first, a vast pentagonal structure, with magazines and iron-clad trenches, was a perfect citadel. Fort No. 2, and another which was intended to cover the town on the east side, were unfinished. On the south side, across the mail-road, there was a double crown-work covering the



entrance of the town ; a little above this work the solid edifice of a college had been surrounded by a high palisade, thus forming an advance-post of importance.

At the news of the enemy's approach all necessary measures for receiving him are taken. The Federal general Brown sends back part of his stores, and locks up the remainder in Fort No. 1 ; during the entire night people have been at work building carriages for the purpose of mounting the pieces of cannon which were in the place ; all the convalescents request to be supplied with arms, and under the direction of the medical corps they organize a battalion which receives the appropriate appellation of the " Quinine Brigade ;" General Holland, on his part, hastily calls back his militia, and all those who are able eagerly respond to this appeal. On the morning of the 8th the Federals have fifteen hundred men under arms. The enemy does not keep them waiting long, for he marches quickly and with confidence, expecting to find a prey easy to capture. He has deployed his forces on the prairie, his centre on foot, his two wings mounted. His approach is reported about ten o'clock in the morning. The Federals fall at once into position, resting their centre upon the college, the right wing on Fort No. 1, and the left on the fort lying eastward. The Confederates, who are advancing cautiously, drive back the mounted scouts of the enemy, opening the fire of their artillery upon the town. At one o'clock the combat is general along the mail-road ; the Federals make a good defence, but they have very little shelter, and cannot long resist the well-trained troops of Marmaduke. Their centre is driven back upon the double crown-work, and by a vigorous effort the Confederates take possession of the college.

Instead of availing himself of this advantage to attack Springfield by the east side, Marmaduke merely makes a feeble demonstration on that side, which is the most vulnerable, and concentrates all his efforts upon the enemy's right. The Unionist line is driven back, but, supported by the fire of Fort No. 1, it soon rallies and resumes the fight from the houses on the outskirts of the town. The assailants can do nothing against the fort, whose elevation defies all attempts to storm it. Already fatigued and discouraged by their fruitless efforts, they return to the charge

against the Federal centre about four o'clock ; they effect a breach, but their efforts prove unavailing before the work which intersects the road. An aggressive return on the part of the Unionists, during which General Brown is wounded, drives them again upon the college, and night, soon supervening, puts an end to the conflict. They had lost about two hundred men, the Federals one hundred and fifty. The latter, who were greatly alarmed at the outset, had recovered confidence, and were unflinchingly waiting for another attack. Marmaduke did not dare to venture. On the morning of the 9th, covering his retreat by a strong demonstration against the enemy's left, he started eastward in the direction of Houston. On the evening of the same day the bulk of his troops encamped in the neighborhood of the stream of Wood's Fork, while Colonel Porter, with his advance-guard, reached the village of Hartville in the course of the same morning. At the first news of the attack on Springfield, Curtis, who was in command in Missouri, had telegraphed General F. H. Warren, who was stationed with his brigade at Houston, to send all the forces he could spare to Brown's assistance. A few hours later seven hundred men, most of them infantry, with a section of artillery under Colonel Merrill,\* were on the road, and by a forced march reached Hartville at daybreak on the 10th. Informed of their approach, Porter had fallen back during the night upon Marmaduke's column.

The Federals, after receiving a reinforcement of one hundred and fifty men, had continued their march toward Springfield, and had halted in the afternoon for the purpose of going into encampment only a few miles from the spot where Porter had just joined his chief. Learning during the night of the arrival of the enemy in his vicinity, Marmaduke sends a strong detachment to reconnoitre his position before daylight ; but knowing nothing as to the number of his forces, he dares not attack him openly, thus losing the opportunity of crushing him in the lowlands near Wood's Creek, where Merrill had stationed himself. On the contrary, he tries to get away in order to reach Hartville, thus entirely abandoning the aggressive campaign he had undertaken against Blunt's communications. Encouraged by his retreat, Merrill

\* Colonel Lewis Merrill, Second Missouri cavalry.—Ed.

immediately starts in pursuit of him, and about eleven o'clock on the 10th he arrives before Hartville, which the Confederates have occupied for the last hour only. Marmaduke opens the combat in the outskirts of the village as soon as he sees the Federals appear along the wooded ridge of a hill which commands the place. But their position is a good one, and all his efforts to carry it are fruitless. The Unionists, who have soon ascertained the numerical superiority of the enemy, forbear attacking him, merely repelling the charges of his cavalry and exchanging brisk volleys of musketry with his infantry, posted among the houses of Hartville. Finally, about four o'clock, discouragement seems to have seized upon both parties at once. Marmaduke, who has lost many men and several superior officers, gives the order for retreat to his exhausted troops, having no doubt but that Merrill, on his part, will do the same, and leaves a regiment of two hundred and fifty men in the centre of his line to which it was forgotten to give the order of departure. After having bravely repelled a last attack, this regiment thus remains, through accident, sole master of the battlefield. During the night Marmaduke falls back as far as the northern branch of White River, in the direction of Vera Cruz, whilst Merrill hastens to reach the village of Lebanon. On the following day, being apprised of the departure of the enemy, he returns to Hartville. Marmaduke had again struck the Arkansas route. A regiment of Federal cavalry followed his rear-guard step by step as far as Batesville, and did not return until after having compelled it to recross the White River in haste on the 4th of February.

The Confederates did not renew the attempt which had just failed before Springfield and Hartville. Although Hindman had declined to join Pemberton to fight Grant's army, he was solely occupied with the operations of this army, which was so placed as to menace alike both sides of the Mississippi.

Since the capture of the fort which bore his name he fancied himself menaced as far as Little Rock. The Unionists, on their part, could derive no advantage from a campaign which would have obliged them to reinforce Blunt's army at the expense of Grant's. Consequently, we have no warlike incidents to mention, either in Missouri or Arkansas, during the three months following



Marmaduke's retreat. The partisan bands which had devastated the former of these two States seem to have likewise disappeared. The last of them, after retiring to Bloomfield, among the impenetrable swamps lining the right bank of the Mississippi, was dislodged from this village on the 27th of January, and then dispersed by a bold stroke on the 3d of February in the vicinity of one of those marshes, called Mingo Swamp. It was only at the end of April that Hindman felt at last the necessity of taking advantage of the mild season to harass his adversaries, who passed their time in trying to amuse him by means of insignificant demonstrations. He was probably in hope of obliging them to send beyond the Mississippi some of the new regiments intended to augment Grant's army; but he did not think it expedient to bring his army into the field, leaving the offensive rôle to be played by his cavalry alone. Whilst General Cabell, with two thousand men, leaving the Boston Mountains, where he had spent the winter, should advance toward the encampments of the Federal army on the frontier, and endeavor to surprise some of its detachments, Marmaduke, taking an opposite direction, was again to invade Missouri, this time by following the line of marshes along the Mississippi, and carrying fire and sword among the dépôts located near the great river between St. Louis and Cape Girardeau, the richest section of the State.

Cabell, having only a short distance to travel, is the first to encounter the enemy. On the morning of the 18th of April he arrives suddenly before Fayetteville, a village occupied by Colonel Harrison with two regiments raised in Arkansas, one of cavalry, the other of infantry—less than one thousand men in all. The Confederates penetrate into the town before the Federals have been able to assemble to defend its approaches; the combat opens in the streets, but the assailants, being greatly exposed, sustain serious losses, and when, at last, finding themselves in possession of the houses, they emerge into the open country on the other side, they find the small Federal force re-formed, well posted, and steadily waiting for them. Their first attack is repulsed, and Cabell, dreading, no doubt, the arrival of Union reinforcements, decides upon a speedy retreat. That very evening he disappeared in the direction of the Boston Mountains,

leaving about fifty wounded in the hands of Colonel Harrison; the latter had forty men disabled.

In the mean while, Marmaduke was on the march at the head of four brigades of cavalry and several batteries of artillery. Ascending the right bank of Big Black River, he penetrated into Eastern Missouri. On the 20th of April his advance-guard was crossing the river of that name near Rives' Store and driving back the Federal scouts upon Patterson village, where was Colonel Stuart with about four hundred men of Davidson's Union brigade. Stuart evacuates the village and retires toward the north, escorting the trains of provisions and materials entrusted to his care. Toward evening, hotly pressed by the enemy, he reaches Big Creek (one of the tributaries of the river St. Francis), across which he forces a passage at the cost of about fifty men. While Stuart is continuing his retreat northward, toward Pilot Knob, Marmaduke, with all his forces, is marching direct upon Fredericktown, and on the 21st takes possession of this important position without striking a blow. He had thus penetrated into the heart of Missouri, piercing the Federal lines and leaving behind him the forces charged with the defence of that State—on the left, the garrisons of Springfield and Houston, before which he had failed three months previously; on the right, General McNeil's brigade, which, in order to cover the large dépôts that had accumulated along the borders of the Mississippi, had been stationed near Bloomfield, above the marshes extending east of the St. Francis River. From Fredericktown he could proceed either north-westward in order to destroy the railway line from St. Louis to Ironton, or south-eastward to take possession of the port of Cape Girardeau on the Mississippi, and endeavor to interrupt the navigation of the river. He adopted this latter plan. On the morning of the 23d he started for Jackson, a large village situated about seven miles north-west of Cape Girardeau.

In the mean while, the Union general Vandever, who commands the district, has recalled McNeil in great haste, ordering him on the evening of the 20th to post himself at Fredericktown in order to block the way to the invaders. McNeil, starting on the 21st at daybreak, reaches Dallas on the following day after a fatiguing

march across the great Mingo Swamp. On his arrival he learns that Marmaduke is already in possession of Fredericktown, and, quickly guessing at his intentions, he does not hesitate to violate the letter of his instructions in order to reach Cape Girardeau in advance of the enemy and dispute him its possession. During the day of the 23d he brings his brigade to Jackson by a forced march of nearly fourteen miles, and on that same evening he proceeds in person to organize the defence of Cape Girardeau. He finds about five hundred men at this post; the arrival of his brigade on the 24th runs up the number of its defenders to seventeen hundred men, with ten pieces of field-artillery. The three small forts covering the approaches of the town are put in order, notwithstanding their want of elevation, and armed with ten guns of heavy calibre. During the entire day steamers are busy in conveying the non-combatants to the other side of the river, as well as the *matériel* collected in the dépôts. McNeil soon discovers how happy was the idea which prompted him to act. In fact, Marmaduke's head of column has arrived at Jackson only a few hours after the departure of the Federals, and on the morning of the 25th, Colonel Carter, with two brigades, appears before Cape Girardeau. The town is immediately invested, and the Confederate artillery opens fire. But the Federals have taken a position which enables them to defend all the approaches: they rest upon the works and reply vigorously. Several times the Southern cavalry, dismounting, try to break through their line; they cannot succeed in approaching it, and at half-past two o'clock, on seeing steamers arriving from St. Louis with reinforcements, they abandon an attack which has been very clumsily conducted. After having vainly endeavored to intimidate his adversary by calling upon him to surrender, Marmaduke, who has arrived in the evening with the remainder of his column, makes another attack against his positions on the morning of the 26th, but fails, as Carter has failed the day before; and being no doubt unable to again bring his disheartened soldiers into action, he suddenly makes up his mind toward two o'clock to retreat. Fearing, perhaps, being driven into the Mississippi by the troops just arrived from the north, he abandons the idea of continuing the campaign, and speedily takes up his line of march for the south,



in order to reach Arkansas by way of Bloomfield and the swamps which McNeil has traversed a few days previously.

The latter, without losing a moment's time, starts in pursuit of him through that labyrinth, with all the windings of which he is well acquainted. On the morning of the 27th he is on the track of the Confederates, who, that they may avoid the impassable lagoons of Little River, are obliged to make a wide *détour* to the westward in order to reach Dallas. On his side, General Vandever tries to cut off their retreat, and on the same day inflicts some losses upon them at the passage of White Water River, one of the tributaries of Little River. But, afraid of venturing into this difficult region, he holds back and restrains the fiery McNeil, so that the latter arrives first at the ford of Castor River, then at Bloomfield, a few hours after the rear-guard of the enemy, and each time too late to attack him. On the evening of the 29th, McNeil, at the head of two brigades of cavalry, resumes the pursuit in the direction of St. Francisville, which Marmaduke has been following in order to reach, with the greatest possible speed, the river St. Francis, beyond which the Confederates will be safe. McNeil overtakes him on the morning of the 30th, and presses him sharply; several times his cavalry charges and drives the rear-guard of the enemy in disorder, but the latter finally succeeds in escaping him. On the 2d of May the last cannon-shots are exchanged between the two parties from both sides of the St. Francis; on the following day Marmaduke is once more in Arkansas. He never appeared again in Missouri, and the tranquillity of that State was scarcely ever disturbed afterward, the seat of war being gradually transferred far away from its frontiers. During the ensuing months, to which we shall have no occasion to recur, there is scarcely a mention of any skirmish between the small Union detachments and the Confederate partisan bands: one only took place in the districts which have been in dispute since the beginning of the war. On the 28th of May the Southerners obtained a slight advantage along the borders of Little Black River, between Martinsburg and Rives' Store. The other encounters took place north of the Missouri River, where, on all sides, as has already been shown, the inhabitants were organizing in companies of foot or mounted militia, who carried

on a petty warfare until the coming of the Federal troops restored peace. The principal Confederate band was formed in the middle of May; on the 19th it put to flight the Unionists of the little town of Richmond; on the 21st it pillaged that of Plattsburg; thence it pushed forward as far as Lincoln county, in the neighborhood of the Mississippi, where it again defeated the Northern militia; but at last, being harassed on all sides whilst trying to cross the Missouri, it was, in its turn, caught and dispersed at Rockport.

We will pause here for the purpose of returning to Louisiana, and follow for a while Banks' operations on the right bank of the Mississippi. They will naturally bring us back to Grant's operations, for they are identical in their object, and these two generals, by turning the two places which close the navigation of the river against them, are in hopes of assisting each other between Port Hudson and Vicksburg.

After the battle fought on the 14th of March by Farragut's fleet against the batteries of Port Hudson, Banks had returned to New Orleans with a portion of his troops, leaving only Augur's division at Baton Rouge, and intending to gather all his forces in order to take possession of Bayou Teché, and to try to reach the borders of Red River by this route. With Farragut's aid he calculated to return thence to the Mississippi, and to join Grant in investing Port Hudson by way of the north.

Arriving at New Orleans at the close of 1862, he had made some efforts to conciliate, as much as possible, the inhabitants of the great city which he was ordered to occupy, and to induce them to accept the Federal government by allowing the authority he was deputed to maintain there weigh lightly upon them. He also proposed to adopt some measures for reviving the prosperity of this city, and to prove that in taking possession of the key of the Mississippi the Washington government, not satisfied with conquering an important military post, aimed at restoring to the Union the principal mart of the South. The maritime blockade of the Federals, which had closed this great emporium of the cotton-trade, had been followed by the land-blockade of the Confederates, which surrounded it with an impassable barrier. Since the starry flag had again floated over the "Queen of the Missis-

issippi" her commerce was even less than at the period when the blockade-runners carried the precious bales of cotton to Nassau by avoiding the vigilance of Union cruisers.

In order to show America, and especially Europe, that the conquests of the national armies instead of destroying the cotton-trade were calculated to instil new life into it, the enemy's line, which isolated New Orleans, should have been kept at a distance, and a portion at least of the fertile country which formerly supplied her markets have been reconquered. The purely military interests were more than once sacrificed to this political object; and it is for this reason that Banks determined to occupy the region watered by the Atchafalaya and the Bayou Teché—an operation which would have been by far too eccentric if it had only been a question of imitating against Port Hudson the flank movement which Grant was preparing to execute around Vicksburg.

We have described elsewhere the section of country watered by the tributaries of the Mississippi, a portion of which Weitzel had already occupied at the close of 1862.

Since then he had made several expeditions for the purpose of extending his rule there. We have alluded elsewhere to the combat he fought on the borders of Bayou Teché in January, 1863. An attempt to open the Plaquemine Bayou and to reach Butte-à-la-Rose on the Atchafalaya had failed. But he had strongly posted himself with five thousand men in the little town of Brashear City, which occupied an important position at the entrance of Lake Chestimachee, a little below the junction of the Teché and the Atchafalaya. A line of railway connected this place with New Orleans, and it was accessible to vessels of heavy draught. Notwithstanding the accidental loss of one of his steamers, the *Kinsman*, which sank before Brashear on the 23d of February, Banks made this town his base of operations, and by the end of March he had collected in it all the troops he was able to bring into the field. Several vessels, detached from the blockading squadron, came to join him; and finally, on the 10th of April, after many delays, everything was ready for this campaign.

The Confederates, having been long aware of his movements, had assembled all the forces they could command west of the



Mississippi in order to dispute with him the possession of a country whose productions were so valuable. General Richard Taylor, an officer of wonderful energy, was in command. The *Queen of the West*, captured on Red River in February, had been brought to Lake Chestimachee by way of the Atchafalaya; several small steamers had been rigged as men-of-war and strengthened with cotton-bales; a few days previous a fortunate chance had delivered into the hands of the Southerners one of the best iron-clad advance-boats of the Federal navy. The *Diana*, having imprudently advanced up the Bayou Teché on the 29th of March, was suddenly attacked by a field-battery supported by infantry. The crew had been decimated by the musketry; the howitzers, fired at point-blank, had disabled the vessel, causing her to fall into the hands of the enemy.

The peninsula which separates Lake Chestimachee from the sea, terminating on the borders of the Atchafalaya, is bounded at the south by vast swamps, and is divided throughout into two narrow strips of land by Bayou Teché. It was at this place that Taylor was waiting for his adversaries with forces which were greatly inferior in number to theirs. The *Diana*, the *Hart*, and several transports supported his army along the bayou. Banks, throughout the whole extent of his department, had about thirty thousand men under his command, but one half of them were volunteers recently enlisted, whose engagements, being of very short duration, would soon expire, some in May, others in August. Being obliged to leave some troops in New Orleans, at Baton Rouge, and along the coast, he had only three divisions left—about fifteen thousand strong—with which to begin the campaign; five or six gunboats were to accompany him. On the 9th and 10th of April he landed Emory's and Weitzel's divisions at Berwick City, in front of Brashear, on the other side of the Atchafalaya. During this time Grover's division, which had embarked on board three transports and the four gunboats, the *Clifton*, the *Estella*, the *Calhoun*, and the *Arizona*, was to proceed to the south side, more to the westward, and by rapid sailing occupy, between the lake and the bayou, the only line of retreat open to the troops who might have resisted the attack made in front by Banks. But in order to secure complete

success this double operation should have been conducted with great speed; and Banks' army was not accustomed to rapid marches and sudden attacks. Much precious time was lost on both sides in long reconnoissances and useless skirmishing.

Banks began moving on the 11th of April. Emory was marching at the head of the column, following the right bank of the Teché. Like all the lands watered by the bayous of Louisiana, this section of country was early colonized, the water-courses affording cheap means of communication to the early settlers. Rich cotton- and sugar-fields extend all along the bayou, while the soil, confined between its waters and the wooded swamps which cover the shore of the Gulf of Mexico, is cultivated with great care. It is unnecessary to add that on this alluvial soil the eye cannot discover the slightest break in the ground. Between the two villages of Pattersonville and Centreville the peninsula was divided by a line of continuous works, on the right resting upon the wooded swamps, and extending on the left beyond the bayou as far as the lake. Some guns of heavy calibre, several field-batteries, and the armament of the *Diana* moored alongside of the bayou defended this strong position. The Federals came to reconnoitre it on the 12th, and exchanged a sharp cannonade with their adversaries, but without seriously attacking them. On the 13th a portion of Banks' army crossed over to the left bank of the bayou by restoring the bridge, which was half submerged, and around which the belligerents had already fought the preceding autumn: it was hoped by this means to turn a position which the Federals did not dare to approach in front, and to force some field-batteries, which had been posted to enfilade the troops stationed along the right bank, to move away.

In the mean while, Grover, who was delayed by the difficulties of navigation, had landed on the 12th a little higher up, opposite a place called Irish Bend, where the bayou, making an angle at the north, is only separated from the lake by a space of about three-quarters of a mile. The troops he had encountered had not been able to offer any serious resistance, and on the same evening he had complete control of both sides of the bayou. At the news of this movement, Taylor, leaving only such troops before Banks as were necessary to guarantee the safety of the forts, had

started to meet Grover with five thousand men. His object was to try to drive him into the lake, so as to reopen the passage of the bayou to his vessels: if he failed in the attempt, he expected at least to keep Grover long enough in check to enable him to evacuate his works during the night and save his little army, which was in danger of being caught between two fires. On the 13th, after a march of six or seven miles, he met the enemy's troops coming down the left bank. A fierce combat ensued. The Federals were several times repulsed; finally, Dwight's brigade succeeded in carrying one of the Confederate positions which had been warmly disputed. But night had come, and Grover had only gained a few hundred yards. During this time the troops which had been left in front of Banks had skilfully employed this general, who by a vigorous attack might have carried their works and fallen upon Taylor's reserves. The latter, in order to conceal their weakness, had assumed the offensive and engaged in numerous skirmishes in the woods; then, when night came, they had stolen away and joined Taylor, who, ascending the right bank of the Teché, had gained a considerable advance upon his adversaries by means of rapid marches. But the *Diana*, having been unable to force the passage of the bayou, was burned, together with several transports and an iron-clad vessel in process of construction, which was also caught between Banks and Grover.

On the 16th, the Federals, still following the bayou, arrived at New Iberia, where Taylor was again obliged to abandon three or four transports that could not follow him farther in his rapid retreat. Several Confederate factories, two of which were cannon-foundries, with a large number of salt-works, had fallen into the hands of the Federals by the same stroke. On the 17th, Grover resumed the pursuit, and encountered the Southern rear-guard on the borders of Bayou Vermillion, one of the sources of the Teché, which runs on the right toward the sea. The pass was carried after a brisk skirmish, but it required two days to reconstruct the bridges needed for the army; and it was only on the 20th of April that the latter occupied Opelousas, the chief place of this whole province.

Taylor's troops were not in a condition to offer any resistance.



Having reached the borders of Bayou Cocodue, north of Opelousas, they had divided. The Texans, refusing to proceed any farther toward Red River, had struck once more the road leading to their own State. The remainder, terribly disheartened, had remained with Taylor, who was falling back upon Alexandria. But the Confederate general knew very well that he would not be able to maintain himself in this town, and that in order to reorganize his army it was necessary to take it into the vast north-western solitudes of Louisiana, where it would not be molested by the Federals.

In the mean while, the gunboats, after landing Grover, had gone in search of the *Queen of the West*. This vessel was attacked and destroyed; then the flotilla, ascending as far as the extremity of the lake, carried, on the 20th of April—the day when Banks made his entrance into Opelousas—the Confederate works of Butte-à-la-Rose, which commanded the entrance of the Atchafalaya. Two gunboats, the *Arizona* and the *Estella*, took advantage of this to ascend the bayou as far as its source, and, entering the Mississippi, joined Admiral Farragut on the 2d of May. A sure and easy way was therefore open for turning the batteries of Port Hudson.

The political considerations which had prompted Banks' campaign did not allow of his traversing too rapidly the country which Taylor had just ceded to him: it was important to take permanent possession of it. Far from imitating his predecessor, who, on beholding the large proprietors desert their plantations, had confiscated the whole Lafourche district by a stroke of the pen, he endeavored by equitable proceedings to reassure all those who were disposed to accept the Federal authority as a fact and resume the cultivation of their lands. But at the same time he strictly enforced the Emancipation Proclamation, and omitted nothing to bring into operation the new resources it might offer for the war.

As we have already observed, this great political act, which imparted a new character to the conflict, and finally consecrated the true principles which were destined to triumph with the Federal armies, was calculated to open the way for the admission of negroes into the ranks of those armies. But there were many

prejudices to be overcome in order to reach this supreme consecration of the civil and political equality of the two races. Banks has the credit of being the first to meet this requirement on a large scale, and during his sojourn at Opelousas he formed the nucleus of a corps recruited among the black population of that country, which, under the name of *Corps d'Afrique*, rendered important services during the subsequent campaigns.

Banks' advance-guard had taken the road to Alexandria on the 22d of April. Taylor, on his side, had fallen back upon the banks of Red River, in the direction of a considerable earth-work called Fort De Russy, which commanded the course of the river below this town, and which until then had prevented the passage of vessels sent by Farragut to reconnoitre it. But, fearing to be cut in two, he had abandoned it at the approach of the Federals, thus leaving the route to Alexandria open to Porter's fleet, which, after passing Grand Gulf, as we have just mentioned, had entered Red River in the beginning of May. On the 6th it appeared before Alexandria, and a few moments later, by a fortunate coincidence, the heads of columns of Banks' army were seen entering this city. The campaign undertaken by this general was therefore ended.

Taylor was retiring toward Shreveport with a handful of men, pursued by Weitzel, who followed him as far as Grand Écore: all the resources of his army were destroyed; his war-vessels and transports had either been captured or burned; he had lost two thousand prisoners and twenty pieces of artillery. In short, Banks at Alexandria held the key of the whole country: the bayous were open to him; he had complete control of Red River, and was in communication with Porter and Farragut; he had only to descend the river with the larger portion of his army to be able, at his own option, either to assist Grant or to invest Port Hudson. But before we follow him in the new campaign he is about to undertake we must return to Grand Gulf, which the Federal fleet and army are preparing to attack on the 29th of April.

The cliffs of Grand Gulf are situated immediately below the mouth of Big Black River, which waters them at the north, and face an angle of the Mississippi, which, running from west to

east, laves their base, to follow afterward a southerly direction. The upper batteries enfiladed the river above. A little lower down the heights fade away from the bank upon which the little town of Grand Gulf is situated. Below this town Bowen had erected a second line of batteries, which commanded the railway from Grand Gulf to Port Gibson. At this angle the depth of the river is too great to admit of any anchorage. The current is extremely rapid: in the middle of the stream it attains a speed of six knots, while along the bank violent eddies render navigation very difficult. The Confederates, taught by their experience at Vicksburg, had erected no battery at the water's edge: all their cannons lined the summit of the cliffs at a height which it was difficult for the gunboats to reach, and where their simple recoil was sufficient to protect them against any direct fire.

The task of Porter, who was ordered to reduce these batteries, was therefore a difficult one. He despatched four vessels, the *Pittsburg*, the *Louisville*, the *Mound City*, and the *Carondelet*, to attack the lower batteries, whilst with the *Benton*, the *Tuscumbia*, and the *La Fayette* he opened fire upon the upper works. The vessels, finding it impossible to obtain a mooring, were obliged to fight under steam, while the current, driving them constantly among the eddies, imparted such irregularity to their motions as to affect the precision of their aim. In the mean while, the fire of the lower batteries, much less protected than the others, was silenced after a bombardment of three hours, the gunners being obliged to abandon their pieces, although they were not dismounted. The four ships which had attacked them then reascended the river in order to assist the rest of the squadron. In fact, the admiral had not met with the same success against the upper batteries, which, although riddled with balls, were still replying with great vigor. For a moment, it is true, they had ceased firing, and were thought to be silenced. The vessels with Osterhaus' division on board had even received from Grant the signal agreed upon, and had come forward for the purpose of landing his force upon the enemy's shore. Fortunately for the Federals, this imprudent manœuvre was promptly stopped by the renewal of hostilities, and the transports were able to get away with their precious cargo before being exposed to the projec-



tiles of the Southerners. They had thus escaped from certain destruction, for Porter's vessels, which had to face these projectiles, were beginning to sustain damages and to lose many men without obtaining any result. It was evident that they would never succeed in dismounting the enemy's guns, protected as they were by the batteries on the summit of the cliffs, and that the latter would be ready to bombard the transports whenever they should attempt to effect a landing. Under such circumstances this landing was impossible, and after a combat which lasted five hours and a half Porter took his fleet out of reach of Grand Gulf.

This fruitless attack, the uselessness of which was demonstrated a few hours later, had cost him eighteen men killed and fifty-six wounded. It had ended at two o'clock. Grant and Porter decided at once to renew before Grand Gulf the flank movement they had already performed in order to avoid attacking Vicksburg in front. The troops on board the transports were landed on the right bank, and, traversing the small peninsula which the Mississippi encircles opposite Grand Gulf, they marched from Hard Times to the De Schron plantation, where the whole of McClernand's corps and a portion of McPherson's were assembled on the morning of the 30th. At six o'clock in the evening Porter's ships, still riddled with balls—one of them had been struck forty-seven times—renewed the combat against the batteries of Grand Gulf. But this time it was solely for the purpose of drawing the enemy's attention while the transports were rapidly descending the river. When he saw them all safe and sound on the other side, the Union admiral followed them in his turn, and at daybreak on the 30th all the vessels were assembled at De Schron's. None of them had sustained serious injury, and they were ready to convey the army, which had reached this point at the same time they did, to the opposite side of the river.

The embarkation of troops began at once, although the place where they should be landed on the other side was not yet settled. It was well known that below Grand Gulf the enemy had no batteries, and could not offer any serious resistance against the crossing of the river; but it was important to find some solid ground for landing, and they could not go far in search of it

without stretching immeasurably the line which connected the Federal army with its base of operations. Below Grand Gulf the hills become separated from the river, and they only draw near again at Rodney, about nine or ten miles lower down: the marginal lowlands throughout this distance were so much submerged that Grant was afraid of not being able to find a landing-place. But on the morning of the 30th, just as the transports were about to start, he was informed by a negro that in the village of Bruinsburg, situated about four miles below Grand Gulf on the left bank of a river called Bayou Pierre, there was an excellent road leading across a dry and somewhat elevated piece of land as far as the hills situated at no great distance from the Mississippi, and from there to the village of Port Gibson. Bruinsburg was at once selected as the landing-place, and during the day of the 30th the larger portion of the Thirteenth corps occupied this village without having exchanged a single shot with the enemy. This left bank, which Grant had so long endeavored to gain, was finally trodden by his soldiers, and he was right in saying, when writing on that occasion, that the game was already half won. His position, however, was still very precarious. His army was distributed *en échelon* along a line extending from Milliken's, where Sherman was stationed, to Bruinsburg, where McClernand had landed, passing by Hard Times, which was occupied by McPherson. McClernand was separated from the rest of the army by the Mississippi. Pemberton, by getting together the troops stationed at Vicksburg, Grand Gulf, Jackson, and Grenada, could have organized an army of at least fifty thousand men, and endeavored to crush the Federal troops while they were yet kept asunder by the river. In short, the Confederate ships that were riding in the waters of the Yazoo could have attacked the few vessels left by Porter above Vicksburg, or passed them in order to take a position between the latter city and Grand Gulf in that part of the river which had been abandoned by Porter on the evening of the 29th, and proceeded to bombard the Federal encampments and dépôts at Perkins' and Hard Times.

In order to ward off these dangers, Grant had but one resource—speed. He knew how to act promptly, and had, moreover, the

good fortune to find himself facing an adversary who lost much precious time.

One battery was hastily constructed at Perkins', and armed with guns of heavy calibre brought over by ox-teams. But, as the land-route from Milliken's to De Schron's was so bad that it required several days for a wagon to go through, Grant ordered two transports exclusively loaded with rations to descend the Mississippi, by forcing the batteries of Vicksburg and Grand Gulf, with the necessary supplies for the army in the campaign it was about to undertake. In the mean time, three days' rations were distributed to the Thirteenth corps, which, without loss of time, was to proceed to the highlands, whose possession was indispensable in order to reach Port Gibson, and thus take the position of Grand Gulf in the rear. On the 30th, at sunset, one division occupied these heights. During this time the passage was being rapidly effected. The width of the Mississippi below Grand Gulf varies from fifteen hundred to two thousand yards, but the distance from De Schron's on the right bank to Bruinsburg on the left was over five miles. The number of transports was limited: the whole of Porter's fleet came to their assistance; the gun-boats were loaded with soldiers, all the baggage being left at De Schron's; the cavalry and artillery horses crossed over separately, after the infantry; Grant himself was on foot during two days. Finally, in twenty-four hours after the foremost soldiers had landed—that is to say, on the morning of the 1st of May—the whole of the Thirteenth corps, with one division of the Seventeenth, was planted on the left bank. The remainder of the latter corps was to follow as speedily as possible.

Although he had received almost hourly notice of Grant's movements along the Mississippi, of his presence at New Carthage, at Perkins', at Hard Times, and of his arrival at De Schron's—although the passage of nearly the whole Federal fleet before Vicksburg, Warrenton, and Grand Gulf clearly revealed the enemy's entire plan of campaign—yet Pemberton had only adopted very insufficient measures for concentrating his army near the point where Grant was likely to attempt a landing. At the last moment Sherman's demonstration on the Yazoo added still further to his hesitation, and decided him to recall a portion



of the troops he had sent to the relief of Bowen from Hankinson's Ferry, where they had already arrived; finally, the destruction of the Southern Railroad by Grierson caused a fatal delay in the concentration of his forces. It was only on the 28th of April that he issued the necessary orders for assembling at Jackson, under Loring's command, the troops scattered along the railroads and those he believed himself able to detach from Port Hudson and Grenada. But the bulk of his army remained immovable at Vicksburg. As he says himself in his report, he was anxious, above all, not to strip this place. Being solely occupied with the importance of the positions he had defended until then, he wanted to protect Jackson without abandoning Vicksburg, and, with this object in view, after having divided his forces, he was willing to sacrifice the first mentioned of these two cities in order to save the second. In this instance he followed the example of Halleck, who, by persisting in preserving certain posts of an entirely relative value, had brought on the disaster of Harper's Ferry in the preceding year. Grant, on the contrary, understood that a great victory, no matter where achieved, would eventually secure him the possession of Vicksburg and Jackson, whereas if vanquished he would not be able to preserve either of these places, even if he had succeeded in effecting an entrance into them. Consequently, he thought only of gathering his troops together, while Pemberton was dividing his own. It is only on the 30th of April, at the news of the landing at Bruinsburg, that the Confederate general, reassured as regards Haines' Bluff, sends considerable reinforcements to Bowen. The latter had only two brigades at Grand Gulf, his own and Tracy's, which had joined him the day previously—about five thousand men in all. Baldwin's brigade, detached from Vicksburg, reached Hankinson's Ferry on the Big Black on the evening of the 30th, and on the morning of the 1st of May it joined Bowen at Port Gibson. Loring was also ordered to march to his assistance, but the distance being great, he could not arrive in time. The Vicksburg garrison had not left its encampments.

Bowen was therefore obliged with his two brigades to hold out against the Federals, who were already in possession of the heights extending about two miles and a half around Bruinsburg.

He had been told that they numbered twenty thousand men: he would not believe it, and determined to risk everything to stop them. He was a brave and intelligent officer, and made the best possible disposition of his troops to atone for his numerical inferiority.

A branch of the railroad connects Grand Gulf with Port Gibson by crossing Bayou Pierre over a suspension-bridge. Below this bridge the river is deep, and yet not navigable, thus presenting an obstacle to the Federals difficult to surmount. It was evident, however, that Port Gibson, and not Grand Gulf, was the first point they intended to make for: thence they could gain the fords of Bayou Pierre above the bridge, and, following the line of the Big Black, cut off the retreat of the Grand Gulf garrison and march upon Jackson by way of Rocky Springs and Raymond. It was by way of this route that Bowen waited for the arrival of the reinforcements which Loring was to bring him. He decided, therefore, to defend Port Gibson, and to effect this he stationed himself about two miles in advance of this place, so as to be able to reach the railroad-bridge in case he should fail to maintain himself in his position. This position was decidedly well chosen. The Bruinsburg road becomes divided, forming two parallel roads nearly two miles apart, and joining again at Port Gibson. The ground is rough and covered with thick underwood. The two roads are separated by a deep and marshy ravine full of magnolias, vines, and reeds, forming an impenetrable thicket. Farther on, continuing in the direction of Port Gibson, these roads encounter a ridge which commands both and terminates the ravine. It was at this place that Bowen had posted his troops. His soldiers, resolute and well-trained men, with a few batteries of artillery steadily waited for the attack of the Federals, who, having arrived by way of two different routes separated by an impassable swamp, were unable to deploy and take advantage of their numerical superiority. McClelland's corps comprised four divisions, but it had been found necessary to leave so many men in the hospitals, the garrisons, and among the posts stationed *en échelon* along the route, that this corps was reduced to sixteen or seventeen thousand combatants. On the 30th of April, in their order as these divisions landed at

Bruinsburg, they took up the line of march, the Fourteenth, under Carr, taking the lead, followed by the Ninth, under Osterhaus, then by the Twelfth (comprising the old Army of Arkansas), under Hovey, and finally by the Tenth, under Smith. The troops had been on the march nearly the whole night, exchanging musket-shots with the enemy's skirmishers, and lighting up the woods by means of a number of shells thrown at random over the woods in the direction where the enemy was supposed to be lodged—quite a common practice in America. The night was warm and beautiful, and, notwithstanding their fatigue, the troops were full of ardor; for after four months of thankless labor in mud and water they found themselves at last upon solid ground and fronting that adversary whom they had so much trouble in overtaking. Consequently, at daybreak on the 1st of May they commenced the attack with vigor. Osterhaus' division takes the road to the left; McClernand, with the other three, that on the right. Carr's division, which is in advance on this side, having been received by a well-directed fire, fails to effect a breach in the position of the Confederates, and has even several of its guns dismounted by a battery posted on their extreme left. But Hovey soon comes to its assistance, detaching one brigade for the purpose of menacing the enemy's right across an almost impenetrable thicket; and, making a vigorous attack upon Bowen's left, he carries the battery which had checked the progress of Carr's soldiers. Four cannon, with several hundred prisoners, fall into his hands. But the Confederates retire upon a second ridge, where they find a still stronger position than the first. During this time Osterhaus is exhausting himself in fruitless efforts to dislodge them from the position they occupy on the other road, which forms their extreme right.

In the mean time, the booming of cannon has penetrated as far as Bruinsburg. Grant, borrowing a cavalry-horse, has repaired to the battlefield about ten o'clock, and after ascertaining the progress made by McClernand has proceeded to the left, where reinforcements are most needed. He has not long to wait for them, for McPherson, hastening his march, appears on the scene of action with two of his brigades before noon. The latter are immediately sent to Osterhaus' relief. But Bowen also receives



fresh troops. Baldwin's brigade, which had left Hankinson's Ferry the previous day, comes to swell the number of his troops to about seven thousand five hundred men. The Federals, on their side, who have nearly nineteen thousand men on the ground, can only bring a small portion of them into action at once. The arrival of McPherson, however, has changed the aspect of the battle on the left. While Osterhaus is renewing the attack in front, he has caused a diversion to be made by J. E. Smith's brigade, which, crossing a ravine, falls upon the right flank of the Confederates, throwing disorder into their ranks. On the other side McClernand is slowly gaining ground. Notwithstanding the number of men at his disposal, he asks for immediate and strong reinforcements, and at last Grant sends him Stevenson's brigade of Logan's division of the Seventeenth corps; but the latter only arrives in time to witness the retreat of the Confederates. Although staggered by this unequal and desperate struggle, Bowen's soldiers preserve their ranks nevertheless, and defend themselves most stubbornly.

Night supervenes at last. The Federal troops, worn out by successive watches, come to a halt within two miles of Port Gibson, where their victory secures them an easy entrance for the following day. This combat had cost them one hundred and thirty killed and seven hundred and eighteen wounded. Bowen had four hundred and forty-eight men disabled, leaving six pieces of cannon and all his wounded, with three hundred and eighty-four able-bodied prisoners, in the hands of Grant. The Confederate general Tracy was killed.

Bowen's movement upon Port Gibson, which would have been successful if sufficient reinforcements had reached him in the course of the day, was probably too rash: his defence had been excellently conducted, but his defeat, although an honorable one, was not the less complete. Thenceforth, Grant was firmly established upon the left bank of the river. After four months of effort and labor he had at last turned the positions of Vicksburg: the real campaign was about to commence in earnest. During the first three months, devoted to the expeditions of Yazoo Pass and Steele's Bayou, in the vain attempts to open the Williams channel and that of Lake Providence, nothing that

he undertook had proved successful. If the season of the year was not taken into account, one might almost accuse him of having too long persisted in the search of byways, to fall back at last upon the only effective means, the passage of the gunboats and transports before the batteries of Vicksburg, which plan had presented itself to him from the first. But the campaign which was opened on the 1st of May by the brilliant fight at Port Gibson would not have been practicable during the first three months of the year, for at that period the muddy roads would not have allowed Grant to put his army in motion and to supply it, as he did in the month of May. The mild weather had come, and both in the West and East people were preparing for a decisive struggle in the summer of 1863. Without bringing the war to a close as yet, this struggle was to establish definitively the superiority of one or the other belligerent.

## CHAPTER III.

### *CHAMPION'S HILL.*

GRANT had the choice of various plans of campaign. He might have tried to assist Banks with a portion of his army and reduce Port Hudson, whilst the remainder, stationed at Grand Gulf, could have prevented Pemberton from interfering with this operation. But Banks being still on the Bayou Teché, much time would have been lost in waiting for him. The land-route being impracticable, the small number of transports to be found below Grand Gulf limited to a very small figure the number of the forces which Grant could bring before Port Hudson. A large portion of the army would have remained inactive, and all Banks' troops coming to aid Grant in the attack upon Vicksburg after the capture of Port Hudson would scarcely have compensated for the advantages which this long delay would have given to the Confederates. Grant being, moreover, well aware that Port Hudson was only an advanced post of defence, whose fate was bound up with that of Vicksburg, resolved to attack the latter place at once, to the neglect of all posts of secondary importance. After having seen his slow movements become a subject of derision with the enemy, he was about to confound the latter by the boldness of his action and the rapidity of his blows.

On the very evening of the fight at Port Gibson, Bowen, with his brave little band, had recrossed the southern branch of Bayou Pierre, which runs east of the town, leaving a detachment at the north charged with the defence of the railway-bridge and with preventing the enemy from turning it at this point.

On the morning of the 2d, McClernand was upon his tracks. Aided by a diversion made by his left, he constructed a floating bridge over the southern branch of the bayou, whilst Logan's division, on his right, ascended its course, to cross it higher up



by fording. Crocker, who, like the latter, belonged to McPherson's corps, followed him closely. He had landed at Bruinsburg the previous day, when his soldiers, hastily placing three days' provisions in their haversacks, marched the whole night in order to join their comrades.

Bowen had halted on the 2d in the neighborhood of Grand Gulf with the greater portion of his troops. Loring, who was coming to his assistance, was at Rocky Springs when he learned of his defeat. He immediately despatched Tilghman's brigade to Grindstone Ford, on the northern branch of Bayou Pierre, in order to dispute its passage to the Federals, who were advancing on that side, and who might, by a forced march, have cut off the only line of retreat which Bowen had left, that of Hankinson's Ferry bridge on the Big Black. Leaving his troops near this bridge, he proceeded to Grand Gulf, the evacuation of which, ordered by Pemberton even before the combat at Port Gibson, was at once commenced. From the moment that Porter had braved its batteries and Grant had turned them by land, this place had ceased to possess any importance. The siege-guns, together with the magazines, were destroyed, and all the troops started for Hankinson's Ferry. Loring could not, in fact, with his limited resources, think of defending the passes of Bayou Pierre. After having made the best resistance he could, Tilghman had been compelled, on the morning of the 3d, to abandon Grindstone Ford to McPherson, whose troops formed the head of the Federal column, and shortly after the latter crossed the river over the bridge, which had been imperfectly destroyed. All the Confederate forces which happened to be south of the Big Black were already wending their way toward Hankinson's Ferry. The Federals were marching with all possible speed, and the rear-guard of the Confederates, in spite of its fatigue and want of ammunition, was several times obliged to face about to hold them in check. But Loring, with the bulk of his troops, had greatly the advance, and when the Federals finally reached Hankinson's Ferry on the evening of the 3d, there was not a single enemy left south of the Big Black. They had, however, pressed the Confederate rear-guard so hard that the latter had no time to destroy the bridge behind it.

In the course of this day some of Porter's sailors had occupied the abandoned works of Grand Gulf, and Grant, arriving there only with his escort a few hours later, at once took all the necessary measures for establishing his new base of operations at this point. He might yet have taken up once more his campaign project against Port Hudson, but Grand Gulf, to be occupied for any length of time by an army, was too difficult to supply; the transportation by land from Milliken's to Hard Times was too slow and insufficient, while the conveyance of provisions by water was extremely dangerous: on the morning of the 3d the Vicksburg batteries had sunk the two vessels loaded with supplies which Grant had so persistently demanded of the commissary department. A letter from Banks, dated from Opelousas, had informed him that he would not be able to appear before Port Hudson sooner than the 10th of May, and that, this place once captured, he could only spare him twelve thousand men to aid him in the siege of Vicksburg. In short, the larger portion of his army was already on the Big Black, and it was better to take advantage of a first success in order to push it forward than to retrograde for the purpose of beginning a new campaign.

From this moment Grant's resolution was irrevocably formed. His plan was based upon a new conception peculiar to the American war. His retreat from the Yallabusha to Holly Springs after the destruction of his stores by Van Dorn had taught him that his army might be separated from its base of operations during a certain period of time, and, by taking along a few provisions to be used during forced marches, be able to live for the most part upon the resources of the country through which it was passing. His sagacious mind had perfectly understood that what was not feasible in Virginia, a country impoverished by the culture of tobacco and with armies of a hundred thousand men moving slowly through it, might be undertaken in the State of Mississippi, a country rich in cattle, by an army of from thirty to forty thousand, which, being more easily put in motion, covered at the same time a much wider area of ground. He therefore took Grand Gulf, not as a base of operations, but simply as a point of departure, and determined to throw himself into the enemy's country in order to place himself between Vicksburg,

which he desired to reduce, and the rest of the Confederacy. In this way he would compel Pemberton either to come out of his fortifications to fight him in the open country, thus sacrificing all the advantages of his position, or to shut himself up in Vicksburg and allow himself to be invested.

The undertaking was a bold one, for the State of Mississippi is very unlike European countries, where resources of all kinds are concentrated in cities and towns, where numerous conveyances and well-kept roads render the requisitions for and the transportation of goods equally easy. Grant was destined to encounter but a few stray villages; he had to march almost at random, to scour forests in order to find out the *locale* of plantations, and to collect provisions scattered among the farms: in order to put that huge mass of humanity constituting an army in motion, he had to follow pathways scarcely defined. Finally, the number of soldiers he was able to take along with him did not amount to more than forty-five thousand men, whilst Pemberton in his department had nearly sixty thousand, without counting the numerous reinforcements which were on their way to join him.

But, having neither railway, road, nor *dépôt* to defend, Grant could unite all his forces to strike a decisive blow wherever he thought proper, and for preventing the concentration of troops which, as we will show presently, were scattered over a vast extent of country, he relied upon the confusion into which his sudden attack would throw the counsels of the enemy. Besides, contrary to the custom of most Union generals, he believed his forces to be numerically less than they were in reality: in his calculations he computed Pemberton's troops at thirty thousand combatants. Circumstances, the errors of his adversaries, and the care he took in keeping his army united, were equally serviceable to him and made his success certain.

We have already spoken in a previous chapter of the battleground where the fate of Vicksburg was about to be staked. We must, however, add a few details to that description. It is bounded on the east by Pearl River, which waters Jackson, the capital of Mississippi—on the west by the Yazoo and the Mississippi, one above and the other below Vicksburg. The Big Black, an important river, runs between the Pearl and the Yazoo, and



in a parallel direction with these two streams, but much nearer the second; it gradually inclines to the westward, emptying itself into the Mississippi above Grand Gulf. This water-course, navigable for small steamers and almost invariably leveed, presents a serious obstacle. It is nowhere fordable, but by following a few narrow roads leading to its banks one occasionally finds either a wooden bridge or a ferry-boat. The principal crossings, beginning from below, are—Hankinson's Ferry, about ten miles in a direct line above its mouth; Hall's Ferry, seventeen miles; Baldwin's Ferry, twenty-three miles; the railway-bridge, called Black River Bridge, thirty-one miles; and that of Bridgeport village, thirty-four miles. The space between the Big Black and the Mississippi forms a plateau of considerable elevation and very uneven; east of the Big Black the ground rises in gentler acclivities; consequently, it is overrun by numerous streams, such as the Big Sandy, Five-Mile Creek, Fourteen-Mile Creek, and Baker's Creek, a tributary of the last, all of which, after rain-storms, become impassable torrents. Only one railroad, about forty miles in length, passes through this section of country from east to west, connecting Vicksburg with Jackson, almost in a direct line; hence the important part which these two places have played during the war. The bridge called Black River Bridge is situated about eleven miles from Vicksburg. Along this line there are four principal stations, at nearly equal distances from each other: Bovina Station, first in going from west to east; Edwards' Station, beyond the Big Black; then Bolton's Station; and finally Clinton, the nearest to Jackson. The principal town of this district is Raymond, south of the railway, seven miles from Bolton and Clinton. It is the county-town, and the junction of a certain number of roads, which radiate thence toward Jackson at the east, New Auburn and Cayuga at the west-south-west, Utica at the south-west, and Bridgeport at the north-west.

As we have stated, the Confederate forces were very much divided. Pemberton had at first committed an almost irreparable error by remaining in Vicksburg with a considerable portion of his troops, instead of following, by a parallel movement, Grant's march when the latter descended the right bank of the

Mississippi, in order to oppose his landing. On the 3d of May, Loring, with his division and the three brigades that had fought under Bowen at Port Gibson, occupied the right bank of the Big Black in the vicinity of Hankinson's Ferry. A single brigade, under General Beall, had been left at Port Hudson, whilst the remainder of Gardner's division was on the march toward Jackson. In the early part of May, Gregg reached the latter town, where W. H. Walker's brigade was doing garrison-duty since his mission to Tennessee had been countermanded. Gardner followed Gregg at some distance with two brigades, numbering five thousand men; finally, Gist's brigade was coming from the east as rapidly as the condition of the Southern Railroad, which had just been cut by Grierson, would allow him. At the north, Grenada and Fort Pemberton were occupied by two brigades. The rest of the Confederate army was at Vicksburg and in its vicinity. Its total force was fifty-nine thousand four hundred and eleven men. Among this number, under command of Wirt Adams, there were scarcely two thousand mounted men.

From the moment he learned the issue of the fight at Port Gibson, Pemberton thought of nothing but to cover Vicksburg. To effect this, he determined to station his army along Big Black River, in order to prevent Grant from crossing it, counting upon the detachments he had ordered to unite at Jackson to protect the latter city from a sudden attack. But, however desirous he might be to protect this place, he feared above all to compromise Vicksburg, where, besides a considerable quantity of artillery, there were stores of provisions and clothing most precious to armies as poor as those of the Confederacy. The loss of these supplies, if they could not be carried off in time, would no doubt have been terrible; as to the place itself, it no longer possessed, in a strategic point of view, any value whatever since the Federal fleet had successfully passed its batteries, and Grant, crossing the river with impunity, had taken possession of Grand Gulf: these batteries no longer deserved the risking of an army for their defence. Their importance had been exaggerated: they had been called the Gibraltar of the Mississippi; President Davis had publicly declared that they would defy all the efforts of the Federals, and on the 7th of May, after the combat at Port Gib-

son, he still telegraphed to the unfortunate Pemberton to defend Vicksburg and Port Hudson at any cost. The latter, therefore, could not abandon those places without a fight. Instead of leaving small garrisons in each of them, and collecting all his forces in order to crush McClernand and McPherson at Hankinson's Ferry, he ordered Gardner to return two thousand men to Port Hudson after sending Maxey's brigade to Jackson, and placed all the troops he could conveniently detach from Vicksburg *en échelon* at crossings of the Big Black—Hall's Ferry and Baldwin's Ferry.

A glance at the map will suffice to show that the railway from Vicksburg to Jackson was the line which Grant would endeavor to seize before all, for he would thus have a chance of separating from Pemberton all the forces that were assembling in the latter town; whereas, if he marched direct upon Vicksburg, he would draw them upon himself and facilitate their concentration. To strike this line successfully he required to have all his troops around him: it was better, therefore, to expose his army to all the perils of isolation than to weaken it by placing a portion *en échelon* over a long line of communications.

Leaving Pemberton to keep a useless watch over the crossings of the Big Black, which he had no idea of disputing, Grant started to ascend the east side of this river, ready to turn either to the left or to the right according as the troops from Vicksburg or those from Jackson offered him a favorable opportunity for battle. He rested his left, formed by McPherson, upon Hankinson's Ferry; McClernand, on the right and in the rear, extended his lines from Bayou Pierre to the village of Willow Springs. The expedition he was about to undertake required considerable preparations. Supplies of every kind, especially of food, were forwarded from Milliken's Bend to Hard Times by a road about sixty-four miles in length, transported thence by water to Grand Gulf, then sent after the army in wagons which had crossed the river and upon conveyances picked up in the country. McArthur's division of the Seventeenth corps, which had remained on the right bank, was charged to protect the trains which carried these supplies as far as the point of embarkation.

But the troops stationed on the left bank of the Mississippi



would not suffice for the perilous campaign that Grant was about to undertake. On the day of his landing at Bruinsburg he had given orders to Sherman to join him with all the forces he could command. The latter had left the neighborhood of Chickasaw Bayou on the 1st of May, and, leaving Blair's division at Milliken's Bend to guard the dépôts of the army, started at once in the direction of Hard Times with his two other divisions, under Steele and Tuttle. He arrived there on the 6th of May, crossed the Mississippi as rapidly as he could, and joined the army on the 8th in the vicinity of Hankinson's Ferry. Hurlbut, who was in command at Memphis and at Corinth, had received orders to send Lauman's division to Milliken's and Hard Times by water, in order to relieve those under Blair and McArthur, so as to allow them to overtake their two corps commanders, Sherman and McPherson, before they reached the enemy.

Grant had left Grand Gulf on the evening of the 3d of May for Hankinson's Ferry, whilst Porter was proceeding with a portion of his fleet toward Red River, leaving at the entrance of the Big Black, under command of Captain Owen,\* such vessels as were necessary to watch the mouths of this river, where the Confederates had some small steamers, and to protect the transportation of troops and material from one side of the river to the other. While waiting for Sherman, Grant made all the necessary preparations for the march he was about to undertake; but, wishing to husband the rations that the soldiers carried in their haversacks, he determined to preserve his communications with Grand Gulf as long as possible, and only to break them off at the last extremity. He collected large supplies at this point, and abridged the distance which separated them from the stores located above Vicksburg. To effect this, a line of transports was established between Grand Gulf and the extreme end of a new road, much shorter than that of Raymond, leading to the right bank of the river from Young's Point, lower down than Warrenton. He thereby saved some of his supplies in the event of being obliged to retrace his steps by some untoward check.

It was only on the 7th of May that, having ascertained that Sherman was at Hard Times, Grant resumed his march. Dur-

\* Lieutenant-commander E. K. Owen, commanding the *Louisville*.—ED.

ing these few days he had pushed several reconnoissances along the right bank of the Big Black, but nowhere was the enemy found in force. Indeed, Pemberton, instead of utilizing these four days to attack him before he could seriously menace his communications, kept his forces massed near Vicksburg and along the Jackson railroad. He had fully understood that Grant intended to strike this line, which was of such importance to him, but being still beset by the fear of uncovering Vicksburg, he only made preparations for defending that section of it comprised between the latter city and the Big Black. He had selected Bovina Station as a point of concentration for his troops, not intending to cross the Big Black except for the purpose of fighting Grant at Edwards' Station, where he had persuaded himself that the latter, still following the course of the river, would come to seek him. It was to Grant's interest to encourage this idea, for he had heard of the concentration of troops that was taking place at Jackson. To the detachment already on the spot were to be added, by Pemberton's orders, regiments that had come from Tennessee and Mobile: it was already announced that Beauregard would assume command of these forces, but, in reality, they were about to be led by a much more formidable chieftain. Grant determined to disperse this force, yet far off, before the arrival of reinforcements would form it into an army, and to strike a blow in the direction of Jackson which should completely secure the safety of his rear and his right flank before attacking Pemberton on the side of Vicksburg. In order to accomplish this object, he proposed to leave an army corps on the left, which should slowly ascend the right bank of the Big Black, and, while avoiding an encounter, would make some demonstrations calculated to detain Pemberton between Bovina and Edwards' Stations. At the same time, while the centre of the army was marching in a direct line along the railroad, which it would destroy at Clinton, the other wing, bearing to the right by way of Raymond, was to look out for the troops assembled in the vicinity of Jackson, and, if possible, take possession of the capital of Mississippi in order to destroy this important network of railroads. If these operations were successfully accomplished, Pemberton would find himself cut off from the reinforcements

he was expecting. The three Federal corps were then to return toward the Big Black, keeping together as close as possible, attacking the enemy's troops that had remained on the right bank, and driving them back into Vicksburg with their commander.

The position taken by the latter at Bovina and Edwards' Stations, which left Jackson with the rest of the railroad entirely unprotected, was admirably calculated to favor this design. But besides the battlefield, obstacles might be encountered elsewhere. Grant, who knew the precise and methodical mind of General Halleck, with Mr. Stanton's ignorance of matters appertaining to the art of war, and their influence over Mr. Lincoln's mind, fully understood how his plans would be received at Washington. He took good care, therefore, not to make them known to the government until he was sure of being out of reach of reply. More fortunate than McClellan, he had no telegraph fastened to his flanks, the nearest telegraph-office to his head-quarters being at Memphis.

On the 8th of May, McClernand, who had taken position on the right of the army, arrived at Rocky Springs by the Grand Gulf and Jackson road. McPherson was skirting the Big Black and Sherman relieved him at Hankinson's Ferry with one of his divisions, while the other followed the road taken by McClernand. We have already mentioned several times the small amount of confidence with which the military abilities of the latter general inspired Grant: he feared to entrust him with the task of attacking the enemy's forces that were collecting in front of Jackson, and made him bear to the left and encamp, on the 9th, at Cayuga on the bank of Sandy Creek, along the Rocky Springs road, while McPherson, turning suddenly to the right, passed behind him, and took the road to Utica. On the 10th the latter took position about six miles beyond this town, in the direction of Raymond. McClernand was on the bank of Five-Mile Creek, on the road leading from Cayuga to Edwards' Station, and Sherman between the two, near the point where the road from Cayuga to Auburn crosses the same stream.

The moment had arrived for Grant to abandon his communications with Grand Gulf, and the road over which his wagons had to pass backward and forward to convey his supplies was constantly

obstructed. Sherman, in going over it, had been struck so forcibly with this confused state of things that he had written to Grant, alluding to the fact as constituting a serious danger, and Grant had replied by explaining to his lieutenant the project he had formed of pursuing his march without keeping up his communications with Grand Gulf, which would put an end to all these difficulties. Finally, on the 11th of May, the wagons, instead of being sent back empty, as usual, to the Grand Gulf dépôt for supplies, were loaded with biscuit, salt, coffee, and cooking utensils, and distributed among the various brigades; besides this, every man placed in his haversack three days' rations, which with care might suffice for five; and it was expected to find enough fresh meat in the country to make supplies last for three or four weeks. The plantations were to furnish the required amount of forage and corn for the animals. A large quantity of ammunition naturally accompanied the army. On this very day, just as Grant was writing to Halleck, telling him that he should not be able to communicate with him again, the latter was receiving the first despatch informing him of Grant's plan.

The excitement in Washington was very great, it being only a few days after the defeat at Chancellorsville. The President and his military advisers were frightened at Grant's rashness, and Halleck sent him at once a despatch in which he was directed to retrace his steps in order to carry out the first project of a junction with Banks. As Grant had foreseen, this despatch did not reach him in time to stop his movement; he only received it after victory had vindicated his course. The last courier sent out by him carried a letter intended for Banks: being unable to aid him in the reduction of Port Hudson, as the latter had requested, Grant proposed, in his turn, that he should come and join the Army of the Mississippi before Vicksburg.

On the 11th, Grant was rapidly pushing his right forward in the direction of Jackson, while his left was advancing cautiously, for fear of precipitating an engagement with Pemberton. He had been informed that the latter was waiting for him at Edwards' Station, where he was fortifying himself. It was of importance to the Federals that he should remain there until they had disposed of the enemies they were about to meet



at Jackson. To avoid drawing his attention toward himself, the Union general determined not to cross the line formed by Baker's and Fourteen-Mile Creeks after their confluence. On the 12th of May, McClelland was to take up his position along this water-course by resting his left on the Big Black, so as to watch Baldwin's Ferry, while Sherman would advance as far as Fourteen-Mile Creek on the road from Auburn to Raymond, and McPherson, by means of a long march, reach the latter place on the same evening. The cavalry, which was not very numerous, was to cover the rear of the army.

McClelland's left had exchanged a few musket-shots with Tilghman's brigade, posted at Baldwin's Ferry, while the presence of a large portion of the Federal army at Fourteen-Mile Creek confirmed Pemberton more and more in the opinion that the latter was marching upon Edwards' Station for the purpose of forcing the passage of the Big Black at the railroad-bridge. He therefore wrote to Gregg, who had arrived in Raymond from Port Hudson, saying that the city of Jackson was not menaced, and directing him to press the Federals close, in order to take them in flank, as soon as they attacked Edwards' Station.

In pursuance of this order or some previous instructions, this general had advanced beyond Raymond on the Utica road with his own and Walker's brigade, which had come from Jackson before him. His cavalry cleared the road for a considerable distance, and as soon as the enemy had been signalled he came to a halt on the borders of a stream called Farnden's Creek, about two miles and a half above Raymond. He had six or seven thousand men with him,\* and waited the attack of the Federals in an excellent position along the outskirts of a wood on the summit of a gentle declivity reaching down to the stream. This water-course, with high banks, presented an obstacle very difficult to overcome: Gregg's artillery commanded the road over which the Federals had to pass; his infantry was deployed on the left and occupied some clumps of trees along the borders of the stream. McPherson had but one division with him—Logan's,

\* Johnston in his report says that on the following day he found these two brigades at Jackson, presenting a total of six thousand men.

numbering about six thousand men—the other division, Crocker's, having remained at some distance in the rear. He deploys Leggett's brigade to the left and right of the road. A brisk engagement immediately follows: the Confederates having the advantage of position, their artillery brings Leggett to a full stop. Then McPherson sends one battery to his extreme right for the purpose of enfilading the line of battle of the enemy. The latter attempts an offensive movement in order to carry the battery which his guns have not been able to silence, but in vain: he is repulsed. Logan, wishing to avail himself of this advantage, orders Dennis' brigade, which has not yet been in action, to cross Farnden's Creek and to attack the enemy's positions. These troops advance boldly. But while the combat is thus raging on the right of the road, the left of the Federals is menaced by a flank attack on the other side. Dennis is already driven back toward the stream, when Logan's Third brigade, under Stevenson, comes to his assistance, and by a successful charge determines the retreat of the Confederates. The conflict was ended when Crocker arrived on the field of battle, and at five o'clock in the evening the conquerors entered Raymond. They had lost 69 killed, 341 wounded, and 30 prisoners. Gregg, who was falling back upon Jackson in great haste, had 100 killed, 305 wounded, and 415 prisoners, leaving two dismounted guns on the battlefield of Raymond.

On the evening of the same day, May 12th, while McPherson was encamped around Raymond, Sherman, who with the centre had crossed Fourteen-Mile Creek near its source, was at Dillon's. McClernand, very close to him and a little in the rear to the left, occupied the approaches of Montgomery's Bridge along the same stream: his mission was to impress the enemy with the idea that he was preparing to cross it and march upon Edwards' Station. Grant's army thus formed, from Raymond to Montgomery's Bridge, a line almost parallel with the railroad, from which it was separated by a distance of about seven and a half miles. But a considerable space intervened between the left wing, composed of McClernand's and Sherman's corps, and the right, formed of McPherson's.

The news of the battle of Raymond decided Grant to modify

his plans. In fact, Gregg would not have undertaken such a march to meet McPherson without feeling that he was well supported: the Federal commander had, moreover, just been informed that General Johnston, whose presence was worth a whole army, was expected at Jackson with the reinforcements sent from Tullahoma. He feared that McPherson was not strong enough alone to capture the capital of Mississippi, and he resolved to start eastward with all his forces in order to assist him. He fully relied upon his ability to conceal this movement from Pemberton and come back before this general had been able to make a diversion in favor of the troops assembled at Jackson. But this manœuvre was not to delay a still more urgent operation, such as the occupation of the railroad, which alone could effectually divide the two sections of the enemy's army. McPherson was ordered to march upon Jackson, not by the direct route, which passes near Mississippi Springs, but by reaching Clinton Station by way of the north, and by following the railroad from this point. Sherman, who was at Dillon's, was directed to proceed eastward toward Raymond, where he was to meet McPherson's columns and follow in their track. By this half-turn of the whole army to the right McClernand found himself, for a moment, forming the rear-guard; he had been instructed to follow Sherman in his turn, by way of Dillon's, as far as Raymond with three divisions; the fourth was detached for the purpose of joining, at Auburn, Blair's division of Sherman's corps, which had arrived from Grand Gulf by forced marches, bringing with it a train of considerable magnitude.

On the morning of the 13th, therefore, the whole Federal army was seen turning its back upon Pemberton, before whom it only left some cavalry squads, and proceeding eastward in a long single column. But it soon adopted an order of march which would enable it to concentrate itself and form more rapidly in battle-array. Sherman having reached Raymond before the last of McPherson's troops had left that place, Grant made him take the direct road to Jackson by way of Mississippi Springs. During this time, McClernand, deploying his division in sight of the enemy's outposts, quietly fell back under cover of this

demonstration. On the 13th, at two o'clock in the afternoon, McPherson struck the railroad at Clinton, destroying the track and telegraph-wires: the despatches intercepted by him proved that Pemberton was still waiting for the Federals at Edwards' Station. He proceeded in the direction of Jackson, and soon brought his troops to a halt for the night. This interruption of railway communications was an irreparable blow to the Confederates, and the loss of the telegraph caused the utmost confusion in their movements, despatches between Jackson and Vicksburg, being carried on horseback, instead of reaching their destination in an hour, only arrived at the expiration of one or two days. On the same evening, the 13th, Sherman had passed beyond Mississippi Springs; McClernand had two divisions at Raymond, and one between the two routes followed by McPherson and Sherman. The army was therefore united, and all its divisions, save those of Blair and Smith, which had not yet reached New Auburn, were sufficiently close to one another for mutual support in case of attack.

This movement had not been made a moment too soon, for, since the morning of the 13th, Grant had had a dangerous enemy before him: Johnston had arrived in Jackson. This illustrious chieftain, who had given evidence of his prowess at Bull Run and on the Virginia peninsula, had not exercised active command since the serious wound he had received in the preceding year on the battlefield of Fair Oaks. At the close of the year 1862, as we have stated, he had been invested with supreme authority, although purely nominal, over all the armies of the West. Mr. Davis was accused of not liking this general, so deservedly popular, but public opinion had imposed this choice upon him, which reduced Braxton Bragg and Pemberton, the supposed favorites of the President, to the rank of subordinates. Johnston, after having commanded *ad interim* Bragg's army for a few days in February, and inspected Vicksburg shortly after, had taken up his quarters at Chattanooga, where he very soon fell seriously ill, and had not yet quite recovered when the news of the battle of Port Gibson reached him. He understood at once the danger that Pemberton was incurring, and, judging of the situation from a wider and more correct point of view than the latter, telegraphed



to him, "Concentrate all your forces to beat Grant: success will restore you what you have sacrificed to obtain it." If Pemberton had followed this advice, the issue of the campaign would probably have been different. At the same time Johnston received the tardy instructions of Mr. Davis, ordering him to proceed in person and direct the campaign against Grant; but, being still sick, he was not able to reach Jackson until the 13th of May, too late to join Pemberton. In this city he found Bragg and Walker, who had arrived from Raymond during the night with six thousand men. These troops, worn out by a hard-fought battle in which they had borne a most honorable part, were alone within reach at this moment for defending the important position of Jackson. But Maxey's brigade was expected on the following day from Port Hudson; Gist's brigade, from the east, sent by Beauregard, was within only one day's march. Their arrival would place eleven thousand men at Johnston's disposal to occupy the works surrounding Jackson: other reinforcements were shortly expected. An order from President Davis had detached the infantry brigades of Ector and McNair from Bragg's army, and to Pemberton had restored Jackson's division of cavalry, which Van Dorn had recently brought with him. All these forces had been directed toward the capital of Mississippi. If Grant allowed him time, Johnston could therefore very soon place this city in a condition to resist all attacks. On his arrival he learned that Pemberton was waiting for the enemy at Edwards' Station with the larger portion of his troops, and shortly before the interruption of telegraphic communication he received a despatch from this general, dated the day previous, announcing that Grant was before him and preparing to force the passage of Baker's Creek with almost his entire army. The news received from Clinton informed him at the same time of the occupation of this point by a Federal corps, said to consist of four divisions, which he believed to be Sherman's corps, whereas in reality there were only two divisions from McPherson's corps. He understood at once that Pemberton, by persisting in linking the fate of his soldiers with that of Vicksburg, would eventually be cut to pieces and driven back into that place. Even if the latter had to be sacrificed, it was above all essential to save these thirty thousand combatants, whose

loss to the Confederate cause nothing could replace. It was therefore necessary to begin by effecting a junction of the two sections of the army between which Grant had just placed himself.

From the despatch of Pemberton, announcing that nearly all the enemy's forces were before him on Fourteen-Mile Creek and Baker's Creek near Dillon's—that is to say, south of Edwards' Station—Johnston must have believed that the corps occupying Clinton was at a considerable distance from the rest of the Federal troops. Consequently, on the 13th he wrote to Pemberton, directing him to abandon Edwards' Station with all his forces, and to march eastward in order to attack this corps near Clinton, while he would himself come out of Jackson and join him in the neighborhood of that town. Pemberton, by leaving the care of defending Vicksburg to the two divisions which garrisoned the place, would by this bold manœuvre have brought thirty or thirty-five thousand men to Clinton. It is true that Johnston had been deceived regarding the position of the Federal army, and that his lieutenant would have found it united, instead of surprising three or four isolated divisions, as he had hoped; but even if this attack had been repulsed, the manœuvre prescribed to Pemberton would, as it will be seen presently, have prevented the disasters which his obstinacy in covering Vicksburg was preparing.

While the latter remained inactive at Edwards' Station, without even noticing the enemy's departure and that Johnston had not the necessary forces about him to take the initiative, as was his wont, the Federal columns were advancing upon Jackson by the converging roads of Clinton and Raymond. On the evening of the 13th, Grant ordered McPherson and Sherman to attack Jackson at the same hour by these two roads, whilst McClernand was to remain in the rear, in order to hold Pemberton in check if the latter should attempt to cross Baker's Creek.

The morning of the 14th was stormy: the march, which had begun at four o'clock, was very painful, and when, about half-past nine o'clock, the head of McPherson's column, formed by Crocker's division, arrived in sight of the positions occupied by Johnston outside of the town, the storm was so violent that it became necessary to postpone the attack for fear of wetting the

cartridges, of which the Federals had to be very chary. Sherman, following the Raymond road, had deployed to the right on nearing Jackson, thus leaving a space of about two miles and a half between his left and McPherson's right; but the enemy was too weak to take advantage of this division of the forces of the assailants, and Grant was anxious to cut Johnston off from all retreat in the direction of the south—a useless precaution, however, for the Confederate general had taken measures to fall back in the direction of the north. McClernand occupied Clinton with one division, Mississippi Springs with another, and Raymond with a third; the fourth had remained at New Auburn, where Blair, having left Grand Gulf on the 12th, had joined it; finally, McArthur, who commanded the Third division of McPherson's corps, had brought on one of his brigades, under Ransom, and was marching toward Utica. These reinforcements swelled Grant's active force to twenty-four brigades, or about forty-eight thousand men. Thus distributed, McClernand had eight brigades, divided into four divisions; Sherman, nine brigades, forming three divisions; and McPherson, seven brigades, six of which composed two divisions, the seventh being upon detached service.

Johnston had received no reinforcements during the night except a few regiments from Georgia. When he found that the Federals were arriving in force by two routes, he realized the fact that he could no longer defend the city of Jackson, and immediate preparations were made for evacuating it. It was a delicate operation, but on this occasion he succeeded in deceiving Grant as completely as he had McClellan the preceding year at Yorktown. While the material of war, the money, and the archives of the State were being sent northward, in the direction of Canton, by the Mississippi Central Railroad, he placed nearly all his forces in an advantageous position along the road followed by McPherson, whose progress would have interrupted the evacuation, in order to hold this general in check as long as possible. A small body of skirmishers and a few field-pieces, which he had sacrificed, alone remained in the works adjoining the Raymond road, in order to delay Sherman's march.

The latter was waiting for the signal to attack these works

that McPherson's guns were to give him. Finally, about eleven o'clock, the rain having stopped, this general opened fire. The Confederates occupied a semicircular hill, over which the road followed by their adversaries passed—on the right, woods; in the centre and on the left, an undulating clearing which their artillery commanded; one battery enfiladed the road. McPherson had placed Crocker's division in the front; Logan was ready to support him with two of his brigades; the third, under Stevenson, masked by a wood, formed the extreme left, and was to outflank the right of the Confederates in order to strike a road which leads into Jackson by way of the north-west, and which would have brought it upon their rear. A ravine full of thickets separated the combatants. It is here that the conflict begins. The Federal skirmishers are driven from it. Then Crocker, pushing his whole line forward, takes possession of the place, not without experiencing severe losses, and dislodges the Confederates from the position they occupy. But the latter retire into their works, situated a little over a mile in the rear. McPherson follows them, and, not daring to attack them in front, shells them from a distance in order to wait for the effect of the movement undertaken by Stevenson. It is now two o'clock. During this time Sherman, on the right, has repulsed the Confederate skirmishers, crossed a stream the passage of which has not been seriously disputed, and arrives in front of some works occupied by numerous guns, which open a sharp and well-directed fire upon him. Grant, who is with him, allows himself to be checked for more than two hours by the weak detachment with which Johnston opposes his forces. He has sent one regiment to the right, to push on as far as Pearl River and endeavor to turn the enemy's positions. Time passes without his receiving any news: at last he proceeds in person to that side and joins this regiment, which, finding no one to oppose its progress, was about to enter Jackson. The city was deserted, Johnston having evacuated it with all his troops. One hundred and fifty artillerymen had alone remained, bravely sacrificing themselves in order to save their comrades, and continued to fire upon Sherman.

The latter then had only to come forward and capture them, with the ten pieces of cannon they were serving. At the same



moment the works which had checked McPherson's progress were abandoned. Seven pieces of artillery were found in them. Stevenson, who by his tardy movement had favored the retreat of the enemy, tries in vain to cut him off from the Canton road. It was too late, for the last Confederate soldiers had preceded him along this road. At the cost of five hundred men disabled, two hundred prisoners, and seventeen guns left in the hands of the enemy, Johnston had saved his army and nearly the whole of his *matériel*. The advantages secured by Grant were nevertheless considerable. The junction of the railway lines and the supplies found at Jackson were destroyed, while the army which was being organized for the purpose of assisting Pemberton had lost its point of concentration. The Federals had forty-one killed and two hundred and forty-nine wounded.

On the 14th, at three o'clock, the Federal flag was waving over the capitol at Jackson. The troops, fatigued by long marches, and for the last two days reduced to insufficient rations, found plenty of provisions in the city; but some of the soldiers tried to indemnify themselves to too great an extent for their past privations: having found a rum-shop, they got inebriated, and subsequently gave themselves up to acts of plunder which were suppressed with difficulty. The Catholic church was set on fire, and out of a spirit of revenge some old Federal prisoners applied the torch to a hotel where they had been ill-treated the previous year. All the Confederate stores, the cotton-warehouses, a large spinning-factory (whose machinery might have been employed in military arsenals), were likewise burned under Sherman's direction; finally and especially, the railroads leading from Jackson to the four cardinal points were systematically destroyed for a long distance from the city.

Johnston, with the troops that had fought in the morning, encamped on the evening of the 14th seven miles from Jackson, on the Canton road. His object in marching northward was to preserve some means for uniting his forces to those of Pemberton. But he left Maxey's brigade at the south, and Gist's, which had not arrived in time to follow him, at the east. He directed both of them to take up a position between Meridian and Jackson, and to join him as soon as they had united with the

reinforcements sent from the East, which would increase their forces to the number of thirteen thousand men: in the mean while, they were to protect the centre of the State against the incursions of the Federals. Finally, he sent another despatch to Pemberton, which did not reach him in time, recommending him not to hesitate before any sacrifice in order to secure the junction of their forces. But, astonished at seeing more than one-half of the Federal army appear before Jackson at the very moment when Pemberton had informed him that this same army was in front of him near Baker's Creek, he wrote to his lieutenant recommending him to menace Grant's communications with the Mississippi, thus hoping to renew the attempt which had proved so successful at Holly Springs. In fact, neither himself nor his lieutenant had as yet realized the fact that Grant, in order to manœuvre between them, had broken his communications, and was no longer restrained by the heavy chain which no Federal army up to this time had dared to throw off.

We left Pemberton on the 13th on the banks of Baker's Creek. He had placed Loring between this stream and Baldwin's Ferry; Bowen, who was at the head of a strong division, and Stevgenson, in command of another, were in the neighborhood of Edwards' Station; Vaughn's brigade occupied the Big Black River Bridge; Smith's and Forney's divisions did garrison-duty at Vicksburg, Haines' Bluff, and Warrenton. Pemberton estimated these last two divisions at seven thousand five hundred men, and the marching portion, composing the rest of his army, at nineteen thousand combatants. We will show farther on that one-third ought to be added to this number, and that the ten brigades he was able to put in motion, leaving Vaughn at Big Black River Bridge, should be reckoned at twenty-five thousand men. On the 14th he received Johnston's first despatch near Bovina, where he had his head-quarters. The instructions it contained upset all his plans; nevertheless, he wrote to his chief, saying that he should execute his orders, and started for Edwards' Station. But, having reached this place, he could not resign himself to thus give up the Vicksburg road. Instead of putting his army on the march, he summoned a council of war. The majority was in favor of instantly obeying Johnston's orders; the minor-

ity favored a move southward; Pemberton was in favor of remaining stationary; and, finding himself alone in this opinion, he thought of harmonizing all differences by siding with the minority. Therefore, instead of bearing to the left in order to get nearer Johnston, he decided to turn to the right, so as not to uncover Vicksburg, and to march upon Dillon's, to which, he had at last learned, Grant's rear-guard had fallen back. This movement was directly at variance with that he had been ordered to make, and was calculated to place the enemy's army between his own and Johnston's, thus rendering it more and more impossible to effect that junction which the latter had recommended as of paramount importance. In announcing his decision to his chief he requested the latter to meet him at Raymond, as if the enemy's whole army had not passed over that road. On the 14th he issued his order of march as follows: Wirt Adams' cavalry was to clear the road; Loring was to form the head of column, Bowen the centre, Stevenson the rear-guard. But he again lost much precious time, and his troops did not start for Dillon's until the afternoon of the 15th. On reaching the point where the Raymond road crosses Baker's Creek it was found that the bridge had been carried off and fording was impracticable, the rain of the previous day having swollen the smaller streams. It became necessary to turn back in order to find a crossing, and reascend Baker's Creek as far as the bridge of Edwards' Station road to Clinton. Fortune was therefore bringing back once more, although somewhat late, the Confederate general to that Clinton road where his chief had summoned him. But he did not avail himself of this last chance: after crossing the bridge he took the first cross-road to the right in order to get back to the Raymond road. In these marches and counter-marches much time had been lost and but little ground gained. It was past midnight when the troops took to their bivouacs, some along the Raymond road, others on the cross-road; the army was only five miles above Edwards' Station. Wishing to allow the soldiers some rest, and beginning to fear that he had ventured too far, Pemberton issued no marching orders for the following day. He could learn nothing relative to Grant's movements.

The latter, however, had not been idle, and was encamped that evening very near him. Johnston had addressed his despatch of the 14th to Pemberton in triplicate. One of his messengers was a spy, who carried the despatch that same evening to the Union head-quarters. Grant, having no doubt but that Johnston's orders would be executed, immediately took the necessary steps to meet Pemberton. He could not tell at what distance from Edwards' Station he should find him: if the latter had been expeditious, the meeting must take place during the day of the 15th; but even in that case he could yet prevent the junction of his two adversaries, who had placed him in a difficult position between their combined forces at the north and the Vicksburg works at the west. Bolton Station being the point toward which it was probable they would both direct their course, he resolved to forestall them, and ordered McClernand, who was now in the lead, to put his four divisions on the march toward this point, these divisions being *en échelon* as follows: Carr at Mississippi Springs, Hovey above Clinton, Osterhaus at Raymond, and Smith at New Auburn. Blair's division, which was near the latter, was directed to follow its movement, while McPherson would strike the Clinton road at daylight, and, if feasible, proceed as far as Bolton, situated at a distance of twenty miles from Jackson. The troops were to follow parallel roads as far as practicable, in order not to stretch out the columns. Sherman, who found himself thus forming the rear-guard, remained temporarily at Jackson, where he completed the destruction of the railroads and covered the army in its change of front.

At nine o'clock on the morning of the 15th, Osterhaus' cavalry, which had the shortest distance to travel, occupied Bolton. On the same evening, notwithstanding the difficulties and obstacles caused by the narrow and muddy roads, five divisions were encamped in the vicinity of this station, the two divisions of McPherson at a little distance in the rear, Hovey at the station itself, Osterhaus and Carr on his left, on the Raymond road. A little farther on the left, but within their reach, Smith bivouacked north of the town of Raymond, which Blair had just occupied. Grant therefore held his seven divisions on a front of small extension. It was a few hours later, as we have mentioned,



that Pemberton brought his soldiers, worn out by useless countermarches, to a halt on the road leading from Edwards' Station to Raymond. He intended to proceed toward this point in the course of the following day. Grant, on his part, had instructed McClelland to advance in the direction of Edwards' Station at daybreak, without, however, precipitating an engagement, for he believed his adversary to be farther north and on his way to Bolton. But during the night both generals received intelligence which modified their respective plans. Northern men, always industrious, had at all times provided engineers for Southern railroads. Two of these employés arrived at the Federal head-quarters in Bolton on the morning of the 16th at five o'clock. They came from Edwards' Station, where they had left the enemy's army united and preparing to move forward. Grant immediately sent a despatch to Sherman, who had spent the day of the 15th in completing the destruction of the railroads and dépôts at Jackson, ordering him to start at once for Bolton with his two divisions. This order was executed without delay: Steele's division left at an early hour on the 16th; Sherman, with Tuttle's division, followed it toward noon. Three roads, pursuing an almost parallel course, cross each other on the road from Raymond to Bolton, running eastward toward Edwards' Station. The southern route is the identical road leading from the latter point to Raymond; the middle one, which Pemberton had crossed the day before, leads directly to the bridge over Baker's Creek; the northern road connects Clinton with Edwards' Station. After following the course of Baker's Creek for some distance, the latter road turns abruptly southward, as if to avoid a high ridge called Champion's Hill, thus forming a junction with the second at the crossing of the road that Pemberton had taken in order to get back to the Raymond route after the *détour* he had been obliged to make, and along which Bowen's and Stevenson's divisions were encamped. Hovey was ordered to take the northern route, followed by McPherson's corps; Osterhaus and Carr, the middle one, which they were facing; Smith and Blair, that of the south. On the morning of the 16th the whole army was in motion: Grant accompanied Hovey.

At the same hour that the Union general was issuing his instructions Pemberton received another despatch from Johnston, dated on the morning of the 15th, in reply to the one in which he had informed him of his movement upon Dillon's. The commanding general positively disapproved of this movement, and ordered him to proceed in the direction of Clinton and to endeavor to unite their divided forces. This time Pemberton deemed it proper to obey. He thought, very justly, that the safest route was not that which passes south of the railroad, striking the latter at Bolton, but the route called the Brownsville road, which passes round the right bank of Baker's Creek and follows the railroad track north for a certain distance. By following this route he had a greater chance of avoiding the Federals during the flank movement which would bring him in the neighborhood of Clinton. To accomplish this, it was necessary to recross Baker's Creek. His whole army was ordered to face about, as Grant's army had done the previous day, and to take the road over which it had just marched; so that Stevenson led the advance, Bowen remained in the centre, and Loring followed him. Adams' cavalry was to cover this retreat.

But the movement had scarcely begun when, at seven o'clock in the morning, Adams was attacked by the skirmishers of Smith's division, which had left Raymond before daylight. The first encounter took place at a point situated within four miles of Edwards' Station. Smith, having speedily reached this point, opened fire with his artillery upon the enemy's rear-guard. During this time the rest of the Confederate army was continuing its march along the cross-road: it was advancing slowly, clearing its right flank, all the wagons having been sent forward in the direction of Baker's Creek bridge.

Pemberton's march is soon interrupted. In fact, at the booming of cannon on his left, Osterhaus, who is following the middle route, quickens his steps and strikes the enemy's column at the main crossing, where the cross-road connects with this route. A brisk combat immediately follows. Pemberton has no choice left. He cannot continue his retreat without running the risk of being cut in two; he must fight. Fortunately for him, the ground on which he has just been surprised offers some excellent defensive

positions. Stevenson, on reaching the crossing, instead of turning to the left in order to gain Baker's Creek bridge, continues straight forward along the road which follows the eastern declivity of Champion's Hill, and which, being somewhat steep, presents a formidable obstacle to the assailants. This declivity is covered with woods and is intersected by deep ravines; on the north side, on the contrary, the slopes which reach down toward Baker's Creek present some open spaces of ground under cultivation. In short, the summit of Champion's Hill, which is about seventy feet above the plain, is destitute of trees and offers a favorable position for posting field-pieces. Stevenson plants himself upon this hill; Bowen occupies the crossing at the foot of the southern declivity; Loring deploys to the right along the cross-road and as far as the Raymond road. Thus a strong position defends the Confederates' left, while a road running parallel with their front connects every part of it for a distance of nearly four miles. The Federals, on the contrary, are advancing by three different routes, which, near the enemy's line, pass through an impenetrable forest scarcely accessible to a single horseman. In emerging from these narrow defiles Grant's columns find themselves among clearings commanded on every side by the enemy's positions. Pemberton has at least twenty-two or twenty-three thousand men in line, and the advantages of the ground he occupies amply compensate him for his numerical inferiority. In fact, Grant will only have about thirty thousand men under his control when Crocker, of McPherson's corps, who brings up the rear on the Bolton road, shall have arrived on the field of battle.

Hovey, who precedes him, has not been long in encountering Stevenson's outposts north-west of Champion's Hill. Just before reaching the angle which the road makes in the direction of the south, he has made a halt, and his wagons, by obstructing the road behind him, delay the arrival of McPherson's corps for some time. Grant, having been apprised by the latter that a battle is imminent, immediately takes measures for attacking the enemy. McClernand, who is posted along the central road with Osterhaus and Carr, is ordered to push forward and to combine his movement with that of the left column that is following the Raymond road. Grant would have desired to wait until McCler-

nand was seriously engaged before beginning hostilities on the right; but, as we have stated, communications are not easy between the various Federal corps, and McClernand, embarrassed by the obstacles he encounters, is in no hurry to execute the orders of his chief. At eleven o'clock his cannon have not yet been heard, when the firing of musketry between Hovey and Stevenson, who are very close, culminates in a real battle. Grant, who is expecting every moment to see his two other columns fall into line, can no longer delay the signal of attack.

Hovey forms his two brigades into line on the left of the road, facing the eastern declivity of Champion's Hill. Logan, who supports him, deploys on his right, beyond the angle of the road, along the barren slopes which reach down toward Baker's Creek, and faces south, so that his line forms a right angle with that of Hovey. Two batteries placed at his extreme right open an enfilading fire upon Stevenson's division, which Hovey attacks in front. The latter climbs the slopes before him, and pushes forward for a distance of nearly six hundred yards, dislodging the enemy from all the positions he tries to defend: eleven pieces of artillery and three hundred prisoners fall into his hands. But his tired soldiers have reached an intrenchment halfway down the road, before which they are exposed, without shelter, to a murderous and plunging fire. They cannot get beyond it, and find themselves in a critical position. Grant sends Sanborn's brigade of Crocker's division, which had just arrived, to support them: it retrieves the fight, without, however, being able to get beyond the trenches, while Logan is menacing Stevenson's left flank.

The latter is compelled to place Barton's brigade in a triangular position: pressed on all sides, and having only Cummings' and Lee's brigades left to defend a position which was no doubt a fine one, but too extended for the forces at his command, he instantly calls for assistance. In order to relieve him, Pemberton orders Bowen and Loring to make a vigorous attack upon the Federal centre. But this order is not executed, and Loring remains fronting McClernand, as motionless as the latter. Notwithstanding the injunctions of the two generals-in-chief, the combat, therefore, is confined to the slopes of Champion's Hill.



The Federal left and the Confederate right are watching each other to no purpose, for Bowen is not to make the attack until Loring gives him the signal. But the road in front of the Confederate line gives Pemberton great advantages, while the Federal columns, shut up in the woods, cannot mutually support each other. He detaches Cockerell's and Green's brigades from Bowen's division, and hurls them upon Hovey and Sanborn. The Federals are driven back to the bottom of the hill, and lose at once both the ground and the cannon which they had conquered with so much difficulty.

The extreme left of the Confederates does not meet with the same success; a charge made against McPherson's two batteries is repulsed with great loss, while Logan is still advancing, threatening more and more to turn them on that side.

It is half-past twelve o'clock: Grant listens in vain, hoping to hear the sound of the cannon of McClernand, who should have come into line with his fifteen thousand men long ago. Hovey is completely repulsed, and Logan's movement has left an open space between their two divisions into which the enemy might throw himself. Fortunately, the last two brigades of Crocker arrive at this moment. Grant immediately orders them to fill the gap. Boomer begins the attack, Holmes follows, and Hovey's division, encouraged by this reinforcement, resumes the offensive. It again takes possession of the five guns, and for three-quarters of an hour the conflict is carried on along the slopes of Champion's Hill. Pemberton, on his side, in vain orders Loring to come to the relief of the left wing with all his force, leaving only Tilghman's brigade to hold McClernand in check. This manœuvre, which the road connecting all the Confederate positions rendered easy of execution, would perhaps have enabled Pemberton's army to retire in good order and to avoid the disaster which was in store for it. But Loring, who clearly saw McClernand's corps immovable in front of him, was particularly desirous to neutralize this general by keeping him in that position through a constant menace: he did not deem it proper to weaken his front, and failed to stir.

In the mean while, Logan takes advantage of Hovey's success to extend his lines more and more to the right, while Smith's

brigade completely envelops this position by way of the west: he thus reaches the extension of the central road which leads from the crossings to the bridge over which Pemberton had crossed Baker's Creek the previous day. The left wing of the Confederate army is completely turned, and the Federals are masters of the line of retreat. It is true that a single Union brigade has ventured so far alone, and that it may be crushed if not supported in time. But its presence has caused great confusion among Stevenson's soldiers, who thus find themselves taken in the rear: they disperse and run before Logan. It is four o'clock. Pemberton's personal efforts succeed, however, in rallying a portion of the fugitives. Bowen, on the other declivity of Champion's Hill, sustains the fight most energetically with his three brigades. Loring, who was preparing, but too late, to make an offensive movement, finally responds to the urgent appeals of his chief and sends Buford's brigade to the left. The latter comes to the relief of Stevenson, and for a moment retrieves the fortunes of the battle. Grant, who has remained near Hovey, not seeing McClernand appear, and ignorant of the decided attitude that Logan has just assumed, calls back the latter, whom he finds too much exposed. Logan, obeying this order with reluctance, brings back his troops a little to the rear, halting them soon after in order to wait for further instructions. He asks his commander to support him in a final effort which may secure the defeat, and probably the utter destruction, of the enemy's army. Upon this suggestion Grant orders him to resume his flank movement, whilst Hovey and Crocker attack the positions which they have already frequently lost and recovered on the front and left.

The enemy has forestalled them by a speedy retreat. Stevenson's division is, for the most part, dispersed: its commander believes he has eighty thousand men in front of him; Bowen's division is exhausted; Loring has sent but one brigade to the battlefield, and since then nothing has been heard of him. Pemberton orders Bowen to bring the *débris* of his command to the rear: all the corps that still preserve some organization, all the combatants who have not yet taken to flight, follow this movement and accelerate its action. Fortunately for this army, now

in a disordered condition, Logan has had no time to bar the way, and it finally reaches Baker's Creek bridge, leaving behind, it is true, a number of prisoners and guns. Loring, who was endeavoring to reach Champion's Hill through a by-road, finds nothing but enemies before him, and is obliged to throw himself abruptly upon the Raymond road. Grant, in fact, had occupied all the positions so long defended by Stevenson, while McClelland, finding no longer even fugitives in sight, had advanced as far as the crossing. Osterhaus was sent in pursuit of the enemy, a portion of the Seventeenth corps being ordered to follow him, while the two divisions under Blair and Smith, which happened to be on the Raymond road, and had been reinforced during the day by Ransom's brigade, were charged to press hard upon Loring's retreat. Hovey's, Logan's, and Crocker's divisions, having borne all the weight of the conflict, halted along the slopes of Champion's Hill, where the dead and wounded were piled together in such vast numbers that these soldiers, although tried on many a battlefield, called the place "the Hill of Death."

Bowen was directed by Pemberton to cover the bridge of Baker's Creek with two brigades, and to wait there for Loring, who was to form the rear-guard. But after a trifling engagement Bowen found himself turned by way of his left, a portion of Osterhaus' troops having crossed Baker's Creek higher up and menaced his flank. He rapidly fell back upon Big Black River Bridge, without waiting for Loring. The latter, with the rear-guard, had been obliged to fight a sharp battle on the Raymond road, during which General Tilghman was killed, and in the mean time the column formed by Osterhaus and Carr had cut him off from the approaches to Baker's Creek Bridge. Then Loring, despairing of his ability to clear another passage for himself to Big Black River Bridge, abandoned all his artillery and wagons, and flung himself into the woods at the head of six thousand men in order to escape south, and thus join Johnston. After wandering about during four days, he finally reached the city of Jackson on the 20th of May with the larger portion of these troops. On the evening of the battle the Confederate army was crossing Big Black River over the railroad-bridge. The skilful and intrepid Bowen had again received the post of honor,



being ordered to defend this important pass, while the other corps, continuing their march in a state of indescribable confusion, did not stop until one o'clock in the morning, in the vicinity of Bovina Station.

The battle of Champion's Hill, considering the number of troops engaged, could not compare with the great conflicts we have already mentioned, but it produced results far more important than most of those great hecatombs, like Shiloh, Fair Oaks, Murfreesborough, Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville, which left the two adversaries fronting each other, both unable to resume the fight. It was the most complete defeat the Confederates had sustained since the commencement of the war. They left on the field of battle from three to four thousand killed and wounded, three thousand able-bodied prisoners, and thirty pieces of artillery. But these figures can convey no idea of the magnitude of the check experienced by Pemberton, from which he could not again recover. The strongest of his divisions (Loring reached Jackson with 5778 men) had been isolated, and could not again get into line for some time. The others were so reduced in number as to envy the fate of the latter: driven beyond Big Black River, definitely separated from Johnston, they could not avoid total destruction except by seeking refuge in Vicksburg, which was destined to become their prison. They were no longer in a condition to attempt, even under a commander other than Pemberton, the bold march which alone could have saved them from the terrible fate of an army shut up in a strong place. Grant's losses, amounting to 426 killed, 1842 wounded, and 189 prisoners, were borne exclusively by the fifteen thousand men forming the two divisions under McPherson and Hovey; the latter had 1083 men disabled—that is to say, one-third of his effective force—while Osterhaus' division had only 90. Out of twenty-four men struck in Smith's division, on the extreme left, there was not a single man killed. The conduct of McClernand, who during the entire day failed to bring the fifteen thousand men under his command into action, despite the repeated orders of his chief, was very properly denounced by Grant. Loring remained motionless before him with only six or seven thousand Confederates, so that, in reality, the battle was fought by fifteen or sixteen thousand men on each side.



This battle was the crowning work of the operations conducted by Grant with equal audacity and skill since his landing at Bruinsburg. In outflanking Pemberton's left along the slopes of Champion's Hill he had completely cut off the latter from all retreat north. Notwithstanding the very excusable error he had committed in stopping Logan's movement for a short time, the latter had through this manœuvre secured victory to the Federal army.

Johnston had passed the whole of the 16th at Calhoun Station, waiting for news and resting his little army, worn out by conflicts that were always followed by speedy retreats. He had received in the evening at Livingston a despatch from Pemberton, written that very morning, in which the latter announced his determination of marching north, and minutely describing the route which his chief had to follow in order to bring about the much-desired junction near Edwards' Station. Upon the morning of the 17th, Johnston had put his troops in motion, leading the advance with two brigades. In spite of the fatigue of his men, he had already marched fifteen miles in the direction of Edwards' Station when a messenger from Pemberton brought him the fatal news of the battle of Champion's Hill, together with a letter containing a still more painful piece of intelligence—that of his retreat toward Vicksburg and the determination he had formed to shut himself up in this place and abandon Haines' Bluff. Johnston had no other alternative but to return to Livingston. He did not regret his inactivity on the 16th, for, had he obliged his soldiers to march for hours on that day, the distance to be travelled would not have allowed him to bring them in time to Champion's Hill to take part in the battle. He would have had but one chance, perhaps, of changing the issue of the struggle between his lieutenant and Grant: it would have been to have started in person on the 13th, the day of his arrival at Jackson, in order to join Pemberton and take command of his army; he would have saved it by abandoning Vicksburg. But, being yet very ill, he was unable to mount his horse. He had, besides, done all that was necessary to ward off the danger which menaced this army, and he would have succeeded if his instructions had been promptly and conscientiously carried out. In fact, Pemberton received them on the morning of the 14th: nearly his whole army was then at

Edwards' Station; he could have put it in motion during the day for Clinton by the Brownsville road, which passes about four miles north of Bolton; by marching from seven to nine miles on that day his heads of columns would have found themselves in the evening of the same day above this point. Now, it was only at nine o'clock in the morning on the following day that the first Federal mounted men made their appearance in that vicinity; Hovey's infantry only arrived toward noon, McPherson in the evening, and the rest of the Federal army was at that hour still near Jackson and Raymond. Pemberton, therefore, could have continued his march on the 15th. If he had advanced in the direction of Clinton, he would have fallen in with the Federal right; if, on the contrary, he had marched toward Calhoun, where Johnston was, he would have joined the latter without encountering the enemy. But even supposing that a battle had been fought either at Bolton or on the Clinton road, and that Pemberton had been as completely beaten as he was at Champion's Hill, he would, instead of finding himself shut up in Vicksburg, have been driven north, and would thus have given Johnston the means of causing the siege of Vicksburg to be raised, and at all events have preserved fifteen or eighteen thousand soldiers to his cause who were shortly after included in his fatal capitulation.

But he was so determined not to be separated from Vicksburg that, according to his own report, he would have fallen back upon this place even if he had repulsed Grant at Champion's Hill; and then his success would only have resulted in adding the six thousand men of Loring's division to the long list of prisoners whom six weeks later he surrendered to Grant.

The day of the 17th was the sequel and completion of the victory achieved by the Federals the day before. While a mass of fugitives who deserted their colors were hurrying along the Vicksburg road, and carrying to the inhabitants of Vicksburg the news of the disaster, with the prelude of the terrible scenes of which this city was to be the theatre, Pemberton was trying to cover his retreat as well as he could. All the trains had crossed the bridge of Big Black River, but nothing had been heard from Loring: it was necessary to wait for him in

order to secure his passage. Besides, the head of the bridge was so strong that it was of some advantage to make use of it in order to hold the enemy in check for a while longer. At the point where the railroad crosses the Big Black this river makes a considerable angle westward. The western shore is higher than the other, and open in that part which is encircled by the river. This part is divided by a bayou about three feet deep and from eighteen to twenty feet in width, which, communicating with the two extremities of the arc described by the Big Black, forms an island of less than sixteen hundred yards in width above the bridge. This island had been fortified by abatis and half-bastions, which Bowen undertook to defend. To these three brigades Pemberton added Vaughn's of Smith's division, which had not been in action the day before; Gates occupied the extreme left; Green took a position between him and Vaughn, who was placed in the centre near the railroad; the extreme right was entrusted to Cockerell. Twenty field-pieces fortified the intrenchments. The ground beyond the bayou was everywhere open, except on the Confederate left, where a row of willow trees along the borders of the still water extended as far as the front of Vaughn's left.

The Federal army resumed its march on the morning of the 17th. Sherman, having reached Clinton by a forced march, was directed to proceed to Bridgeport, where he was to cross the Big Black. In thus turning the left of the enemy he was in hopes of obliging the latter to evacuate the other passes and to separate him still more from Johnston; but his main object in this movement was to reach Haines' Bluff, to take the formidable works which had impeded his progress the preceding winter, and to come down upon the Yazoo in order to establish communications at last with the fleet. He had with him the only bridge-equipage of the army, composed of India-rubber floats. Blair was ordered to join him.

McClelland took the road leading to the Big Black River bridge, with Carr's and Osterhaus' divisions, followed close by McPherson. He had started at half-past three o'clock in the morning, and arrived early in front of the enemy's positions, which were invested by Osterhaus on the left and Carr on the

right, Lawler's brigade of this division forming the extremity of his line near the river.

These positions were so strong that McClernand hesitated to attack them, and for a long time confined himself to a simple cannonade. Finally, Colonel Kinsman of Lawler's brigade discovered, in that part of the line occupied by Vaughn, a point where the abatis constructed by the enemy appeared more accessible than elsewhere: he suggested to his chief that an attack be made, which was at once ordered. Notwithstanding a furious fire, fifteen hundred men crossed the open space which separated them from the bayou, while the rest of the brigade, advancing among the willow trees, attracted the attention of the extreme left of the Confederates farther off. Kinsman is killed at the head of the assailants, but his soldiers have crossed the water: those under Vaughn do not wait for them, but fly in disorder. All the other troops stationed along the bayou at once break their ranks and rush forward in order to reach the pass of the Big Black before the Federals. The latter, perceiving the rout of their adversaries, start at a full run in every direction, endeavoring to outspeed them. The railroad-bridge had been covered with new planks, so as to render it passable for infantry, while a steamer placed athwart the river also maintained connection between the two shores. But the soldiers who guarded these crossings, fearing lest they should fall into the hands of the enemy, set fire to the bridge and the steamer. The flames soon oppose an insurmountable barrier to those unfortunates who are trying to escape from the island upon which they have been thrown. Some of them jump into the river, where nearly all of them meet their death; most of them surrender without resistance. Out of four or five thousand men engaged in this battle, seventeen hundred were made prisoners; eighteen pieces of artillery and five stands of colors fell into the hands of the conquerors, who had only 29 killed and 242 wounded.

The destruction of the Big Black River bridge could not stop the progress of the Federals long, for the enemy was not in a condition to oppose its reconstruction; and, furthermore, Sherman was soon to cross the river higher up, at Bridgeport. Nevertheless, for want of a bridge-equipage, Grant's march was sufficiently delayed to give Pemberton time to speedily bring back into Vicks-



burg the remnants of those corps which had not yet found their way to that place. These soldiers, who up to that time had fought so valiantly, and who, for the most part, counted more than one brilliant victory in their record of service, had lost all confidence in their chief, and even in themselves. It required the protection of the guns of Vicksburg and the sight of the works which they had been taught to consider impregnable—it needed, above all, the presence of the eight or ten thousand fresh troops that Pemberton had left there—to restore order to this shattered army. The garrisons of Haines' Bluff, of Snyder's Mill, and of Warrenton were immediately recalled, with all the *matériel* that could be removed; the heavy artillery posted in these detached works was abandoned; and on the morning of the 18th, Pemberton, with all his troops, shut himself up inside of the vast fortifications constructed around Vicksburg. His forces, including the sick and a very small number of wounded—for those of Champion's Hill had all remained on the battlefield—amounted to thirty-three thousand men.

Toward noon on the 18th, while he was apportioning his soldiers among the lines of works he would have to defend, he received a despatch from Johnston dated on the evening of the 17th. The latter, on being apprised of his retreat and the abandonment of Haines' Bluff, had ordered him to evacuate Vicksburg with all the troops he could take with him. This despatch completely summed up the situation in few words: "If Haines' Bluff is untenable, Vicksburg is of no value and cannot be held. If, therefore, you are invested in Vicksburg, you must ultimately surrender. Under such circumstances, instead of losing both troops and place, we must, if possible, save the troops. If it is not too late, evacuate Vicksburg with its dependencies and march north-eastward." This order was a veritable thunderbolt for the unfortunate Pemberton. The council of war which he soon called together declared that the condition of the troops rendered the evacuation ordered by his chief impossible. Undoubtedly, in ordinary times, the thirty thousand soldiers composing the Army of the Mississippi would not have allowed themselves to be shut up by the forty-five thousand Federals who were marching against them, and we shall see that a few days only will suffice to enable

them to recover, behind the works of Vicksburg, all those military qualities for which they had been distinguished up to this period. But at this critical moment Pemberton could not have found ten thousand men to follow him. The council of war was still in session when the Federal artillery announced to him that the question was settled and that it was useless to discuss it any longer.

McClermand's and McPherson's soldiers had been at work all night throwing bridges over the Big Black, and at eight o'clock in the morning the Thirteenth and Seventeenth corps were again marching toward Vicksburg. At noon on the 17th, Sherman had joined Blair and the bridge-equipage at Bridgeport; the passage was effected without opposition, and the next day he found himself on the other side of the Big Black with the three divisions under his command. In the course of the day he reached Walnut Hills, between Haines' Bluff and Vicksburg: the northern route was thenceforth closed against Pemberton. Grant and Sherman ascended together an eminence which commanded the whole course of the Yazoo: it was the centre of that formidable position before which the last-mentioned general a few months before had seen all his efforts frustrated. Chickasaw Bayou, which had proved so fatal to him, wound its course at their feet. Those works which then bristled with cannon and bayonets were now silent and deserted. But in the distance, above the tops of the trees which overshadow the Yazoo in almost every direction, one could perceive the smoke of the Federal steamers. The army was therefore about to find a new base of operations. Sherman confessed to Grant that until this moment he had not believed in the success of his undertaking.

On the morning of the 19th the investment of Vicksburg was complete. McClermand on the left, McPherson in the centre, and Sherman on the right, surrounded the place from the Mississippi on the south to the Yazoo at the north. Pemberton had abandoned all the outer works without a fight. The army having established communications with the fleet, the bluffs of Chickasaw Bayou became one vast dépôt, where it found those supplies of which it stood most in need. Finally, Johnston, who had marched the entire day of the 17th in the hope of joining Pem-

berton, realized that it was too late, and once more took the road to Jackson, where he was going to try to form a new army.

The Confederates had committed great errors: the responsibility of a disaster which had from that moment become inevitable must be divided between President Davis and General Pemberton. The former did wrong in allowing Holmes to remain all winter in Arkansas with forces half of which would have sufficed to defend that State, whilst the other half would have secured to Pemberton the means of coping with Grant. All the measures he adopted for saving Vicksburg were too dilatory. Johnston, after being detained at Chattanooga by the will of the President, was only sent into Mississippi for the purpose of witnessing from a distance the defeat of a lieutenant who had rebelled against his orders. If the wounded hero of Fair Oaks had always been listened to, and if he had been charged in time with the task of frustrating Grant's operations, the Confederates, at the cost of painful but necessary sacrifices, would have been able to bring against him a truly formidable army. Holmes, abandoning the centre of Arkansas, would have come with about thirty thousand men to join Pemberton at Vicksburg or menace Milliken's Bend and prevent the Federal navy from blockading that city on the river-side. Gardner, evacuating Port Hudson, would have brought his little army to Jackson, instead of sending only a few regiments. Finally, since Lee could dispense with Longstreet's corps and gain the battle of Chancellorsville without him, instead of letting those choice troops waste their time and trouble in an operation of so little importance as the siege of Suffolk, they might have been sent to the borders of the Mississippi. The troops taken from Bragg and Beauregard in the early part of May should have been forwarded sooner in order to reinforce Pemberton, or all those whose departure had been ordered after the battle of Champion's Hill should have been sent with this first instalment, to place Johnston at once in possession of the elements for forming a real army.

Pemberton's mistakes are shown by the narrative of the campaign itself: it is sufficient, therefore, to sum them up in a few words. In a strategic point of view he committed a serious blun-

der in sacrificing everything, even the welfare of his army, to the exclusive idea of covering and protecting Vicksburg; he forgot that essential principle in war of which his illustrious adversary never lost sight: that the most important military positions have but a relative value, and that the object of all the operations of an army must be the destruction of the army opposed to it. In a tactical point of view he never knew how to dispose of his forces on the battlefield, and on the 16th he allowed himself to be toyed with for the space of four hours by Hovey, whom he could either have detained with a handful of troops while he continued his march in person, or have crushed by a sudden attack before the rest of the Federal army had arrived.

In order that we may not be obliged to interrupt at a later period the recital of the siege of Vicksburg, we will devote the balance of this chapter to the minor feats of arms during the months of May and June of which Tennessee, Kentucky, and Arkansas was the theatre.

In the first of these States the two armies of Bragg and Rosecrans remain facing each other, without leaving the positions they have occupied since the beginning of January. The Union general, despite the urgent request of Halleck, does not think it time as yet to attack his adversary, and the latter considers himself fortunate that this respite is thus granted him, for the reinforcements that have been sent into Mississippi have considerably reduced the effective force of his army. The Richmond government, after taking from him Stevenson's division in December, 1862, and the brigades of Ector and McNair at the end of April, for the benefit of Pemberton, has again ordered him, at the news of the battle of Champion's Hill, to send the old cavalry division of Van Dorn and Breckinridge's division of infantry to the city of Jackson. On both sides the belligerents are feeling each other by reconnoissances or sudden attacks, trying to surprise isolated posts without provoking any serious action. Forrest has returned from Georgia after Streight's defeat. As a reward for this exploit he is appointed to succeed Van Dorn: his five brigades of cavalry are separated into two divisions, but the departure soon after of Jackson's division leaves him with only two brigades, under Armstrong and Starnes. His forces, thus reduced, remain inac-



tive until the beginning of June. The Federal cavalry takes advantage of this to display a little more boldness.

On the 16th of May, General Palmer, at the head of his cavalry escort, charges and disperses a squadron of the Third Georgia at Bradyville on the Murfreesborough road. Five days later, on the 21st, General Stanley starts from Murfreesborough with two brigades of Turchin's cavalry division for the purpose of surprising two Confederate regiments whose presence had been reported at Middleton on the Shelbyville road. A night-march brings him in front of the enemy, whom he attacks suddenly on the 22d at daybreak: the Confederates are surprised before they have a chance to form, and most of them make their escape into the woods, while Stanley returns to Murfreesborough with seventy-three prisoners. A few days later Colonel Cornyn, who had already pillaged Tusculum on two occasions, left Corinth with the Tenth Missouri cavalry,\* and, moving once more toward that city, on the 27th of May attacked Florence, which was occupied by a portion of Roddy's cavalry brigade. He dislodged the defenders, and only left the city after he had destroyed its factories, together with the arms and ammunition that the enemy had accumulated in the place.

During this time, at the other extremity of the enemy's lines it was again the Federals who undertook to break the monotony of camp-life by some bold strokes. On the 26th one of their detachments advanced to within twelve miles of McMinnville, dispersing a squad of Southern cavalry: another rendezvous, formed at a short distance from Carthage, experienced the same fate on the 31st.

The return of mild weather, however, and the necessity of keeping Bragg's army busy in order to prevent it from assisting Pemberton, together with the arrival of important reinforcements, made it Rosecrans' duty soon to resume an aggressive campaign. He still withstood the urgent requests of his government, alleging that he was in want of artillery and cavalry horses, and that, besides, he could more effectively hold the enemy's forces in check by keeping them at Tullahoma than by driving them out of Ten-

\* Cornyn's command was composed of the Tenth Missouri, Seventh Kansas, Fifteenth Illinois cavalry, and Ninth Illinois (mounted) infantry.—ED.

nessee; but at the same time he was preparing for a forward movement by concentrating his army in the neighborhood of Murfreesborough. The troops that Granger had brought from Kentucky, which had been numerically increased by a reorganization of the various commands, formed a fourth corps under the name of a reserve. The largest portion of this corps, for the purpose of getting near the rest of the army, left Franklin and established its quarters at Triune.

Forrest, being informed of this movement, sought to take advantage of it and capture the small garrison of Franklin, which was reduced to two regiments—one of infantry, the other of cavalry. Granger had left this city on the 3d: early on the morning of the 4th the Confederates came to attack it. Starnes followed the Columbia road, and Armstrong, that of Lewisburg, on the right. The city, situated on the left bank of Harpeth River, which runs from south-east to north-west, was not intrenched, but commanded by a fort with a powerful armament which stood at the east, on the other side of the river, overlooking all the surrounding country. At the approach of the enemy the Federal cavalry proceeds to take position above the city, between the two roads, while the infantry, crossing the Harpeth, retires into the fort. Forrest's first attack is repulsed on the right and left, first by the fire of the dismounted Union cavalry, then by an aggressive charge which they make on horseback. But Armstrong, advancing with all his forces under the fire of the fort, which is cannonading him from across the river, penetrates into the city by way of the south, thus turning the positions of its defenders; at the same time the latter are again outflanked by Starnes and the artillery, which Forrest pushes forward by hand: they fall back upon the right bank, leaving Franklin in possession of the assailants. In order to render his success complete, Forrest has caused Armstrong to cross over to the same side a few miles higher up, so as to invest the Federals, cut them off from the Triune road, and possibly reduce them to surrender. But Granger, at the first news of the attack on Franklin, has sent Campbell's cavalry brigade, numbering four regiments, to succor the place. These troops arrive at the moment when Armstrong is preparing to surround the positions of the

Unionists on the right bank, and by a vigorous attack they compel him to regain the other side in great haste. Forrest, with the remainder of his troops, covers the passage, but the garrison of Franklin, seeing him come out of the city, crosses the bridge once more and resumes the offensive. The Confederates, being pressed on all sides, retire along the Columbia road, and come to a halt a few miles south of Franklin. The next day, almost without a fight, they abandon the position they have taken, and return to Spring Hill.

Their stay here did not last long, for six days later, General Bragg having determined to ascertain the strength of the Federals at Triune, Forrest despatched Starnes' brigade toward that point. On the 11th the latter made a vigorous attack upon the outposts of Mitchell's cavalry, which covered the encampments of Granger's corps, taking a few prisoners, but soon found himself in the presence of a numerous force, which compelled him to beat a speedy retreat, not without sustaining serious losses. Rather than retrace his steps, Starnes took advantage of the occasion to make an excursion to the rear of the Federal lines: he again pushed forward in the direction of Nashville, reached Brentwood, where he once more burned the railroad-bridge on the Little Harpeth River, and, passing west of Franklin, returned to Spring Hill. Not having found the results of this reconnoissance sufficiently remunerative, he determined to repeat it without delay and with a larger force. Leaving a few outposts in front of Franklin, he started eastward with his division, receiving, on the other side of the Harpeth, two regiments that had been detached from Wheeler's division, which covered the centre of Bragg's army, and on the 20th of June he marched upon Triune, driving before him a Union regiment which he encountered on the road. By a skilful disposition of his forces he made the Federals believe that they were about to be attacked by a corps composed of all arms, thus obliging them to shut themselves up in the fortified position of Triune and to deploy all their forces. Satisfied with this result, he quickly withdrew just as a combat was about to commence, the issue of which could not have been favorable to him.

Rosecrans' preparations rendered these reconnoissances more than ever necessary. The Union general, having been informed



of the numerous reinforcements that had been sent to Johnston's army from Bragg's lines, had resolved to resume the offensive, although the date of his movement had not yet been fixed. His corps commanders, having been consulted on the 15th, had asked for a further delay of eight days, and Rosecrans had readily granted their request, contrary to the advice of General Garfield,\* his chief of staff. With his forces reduced in number, Bragg was well aware that it would be difficult for him to maintain himself at Tullahoma, notwithstanding the strength of the positions he occupied. His desire to obtain reliable information relative to the designs of his adversary can alone explain a sad and melancholy incident of which the post of Franklin was the theatre. On the evening of the 8th there arrived at the quarters of Colonel Baird, commanding that post, two mounted officers wearing the uniform of the Federal staff, and provided with passes signed by Rosecrans accrediting them as inspectors under the names of Colonel Auton and Major Dunlap. Colonel Watkins, who was in command of the cavalry at Franklin, had some doubts as to the genuineness of their papers: while they were being detained under various pretexts, Baird hastily telegraphed to Murfreesborough for information, and received in reply the proof of the imposture. The two visitors were arrested, and on finding themselves detected acknowledged that they belonged to the enemy's army. Colonel Auton was an old officer of the regular army named Williams, who had served as a chief of squadron in the Sixth cavalry at the outbreak of the war, and after having been discharged had entered the service of the Confederate army. The deserter had become a spy: he was tried during the night, and, with his companion, was hung at nine o'clock in the morning.†

On the 23d of June, Rosecrans issued his marching orders. We shall defer to our fourth volume the recital of the campaign which brought him to Chattanooga.

Nothing of military importance had occurred in Kentucky during the two months which had just elapsed. A few engage-

\* In letter of June 12, 1863.—ED.

† A detailed account of this remarkable episode will be found in *The United Service* for March: Philadelphia, 1881.—ED.



ments only had taken place on the borders of the Cumberland between Pegram's Confederate troopers and Carter's Union men. After a few insignificant encounters—on the 25th of May at Fishing Creek; on the 28th near Somerset; and on the 31st more to the south, near Monticello—the Federals determined to send out a reconnoissance toward the latter point. Two mounted regiments left Somerset on the evening of the 8th of June, and overtook a third regiment which had arrived from Mill Springs on the left bank of the Cumberland. The column, under the command of Colonel Kautz, came up with Pegram's soldiers on the morning of the 9th, and drove them back in disorder beyond Monticello, taking possession of this village. But the Confederates, having promptly re-formed their ranks, attacked Kautz's troops, who, fortunately for them, had already started for the north. The Unionist rear-guard was very hard pressed; Kautz came back to its assistance and succeeded in relieving it, but only after a desperate and sanguinary struggle. Toward nightfall he was finally able to regain the banks of the Cumberland.

A few days later a Federal column commanded by Colonel Sanders crossed this river higher up for the purpose of attempting a much bolder and more important reconnoissance. Traversing the whole Cumberland plateau, Sanders had suddenly made his appearance in East Tennessee, passed between Kingston and Clinton, reached and destroyed the railroad at Lenoir Station; then, making a feint in the direction of Knoxville, had passed north of that city, cut the railroad once more at Strawberry Plains and at Mossy Creek, and finally re-entered Kentucky by way of Barton village. General Burnside had ordered these reconnoissances in order to pave the way for the army he was to lead during the summer into East Tennessee—a country which, as we have already stated, had remained faithful at heart to the Union, although in the power of the Confederates, and whose conquest, for this reason, appeared to be an easy task. But Sanders had found that the forces occupying that section of country were numerous, and, Burnside's army not being sufficiently organized, the projected expedition was postponed.

The Confederates, on their part, were trying to harass this army by sending out guerillas as far as those districts where the

Federal power appeared to be most firmly rooted. One of these guerilla bands had taken up its quarters in the neighborhood of Louisville, and committed serious depredations, until it was finally dispersed on the 13th of June near Wilsonville. Another band was organized near Maysville, higher up along the course of the Ohio: it became necessary to send against it the troops which occupied Mount Sterling under Colonel de Courey. The latter made such disposition of his forces as to cut off its retreat south, and while a detachment was menacing the Confederates in the direction of Flemingsburg, he proceeded toward the stream called Triplett's Creek to wait for them. The latter, in fact, came to look for a passage where he expected to meet them; a sharp action took place between them, and the Confederates had already lost some men when the two Federal forces which were to effect a junction having, by mistake, fired upon each other, the former availed themselves of the opportunity to make their escape. A third troop of Southern partisans exhibited still greater audacity. It consisted of about one hundred mounted men, who, passing through the small village of Elizabethtown, pursued their way north-west in the direction of the Ohio. Taking advantage of the state of the river, the waters of which were very low, they forded it on the 18th of June near Leavenworth, leaving some of the command on the left bank: these were to wait for them the next day a little higher up with a ferry-boat that was to take them back into Kentucky. It was their intention to employ these two days in making raids for horses in the State of Indiana; and they pushed forward as far as the town of Paoli, about twenty-eight miles in the interior, without meeting with any serious resistance. But the militia, having taken up arms everywhere along their route, soon compelled them to turn back. They arrived on the 19th at the point designated for the recrossing, when, instead of the friendly boat which was to carry them over, they found a small Federal steamer barring their passage, and were obliged to surrender, almost to a man, to the cavalry that had been sent in pursuit of them.

The war in Arkansas was reduced to the same insignificant proportions as in Kentucky. Marmaduke had hardly returned from his fruitless campaign against Cape Girardeau when the

garrison left by Grant at Helena, on the right bank of the Mississippi, was ordered to undertake an expedition into the western section of Arkansas, toward which the Southern general had retired, and whence the Confederate cavalry obtained nearly all its forage. Colonel Clayton left Helena on the 6th of May with about one thousand men, traversed the whole section of country between White River and the St. Francis, and finally proceeded northward as far as the village of Wittsburg on the last-mentioned stream. But Marmaduke, going to meet him, soon compelled him to withdraw. The Federal troops, divided into two columns, came near being captured on the 11th of May. Having reached Taylor's Creek, Clayton succeeded at last in repulsing the attacks of the enemy, and was thus enabled to cover his movements under shelter of L'Anguille River, while on his right Colonel Jenkins held General Carter likewise in check at Mount Vernon, inflicting upon him a loss of about one hundred men. The expedition returned to Helena the following day. Thenceforth, all the efforts of the belligerents in Arkansas were concentrated around the latter post and that of Milliken's Bend: the great conflict which was raging around Vicksburg drew them toward the Mississippi.

It is only beyond the western boundaries, in Indian Territory, that the war is still being prosecuted, but in a kind of independent way. Schofield, who superseded Curtis on the 24th of May in the supreme command of Missouri and Arkansas, has taken Herron's division from Blunt and sent it to increase the number of Grant's forces. The Army of the Frontier, reduced to a single division, confines itself to the task of preserving its positions; the Confederates who are watching it have also suffered a like diminution; consequently, they can attempt nothing serious against it, but endeavor at least to harass it. A detachment of eight hundred Federals, under Colonel Phillips, had been sent by Blunt to the neighborhood of Fort Gibson, on the Arkansas, for the purpose of recruiting volunteers for his regiments among the tribes of Cherokees and Creeks who occupy both sides of this river—one on the left, the other on the right: he was stationed in a small redoubt called Fort Blunt. A large flock of sheep which was to supply food for his men was grazing in the neighborhood. On the 20th of May a detachment of Southern troopers,



just arrived from Van Buren, crosses the Arkansas, approaches the Federal camp unperceived, and drives off the flock. Phillips starts immediately in pursuit, recaptures a portion of his sheep, and after a brisk engagement drives the Confederates beyond the Arkansas. A few weeks later, Phillips' troops being in want of provisions, a large train coming from Missouri under the escort of fifteen hundred men proceeded in the direction of Fort Blunt by following the valley of the Neosho. This force, composed of whites, negroes, and Indians, was attacked on the 1st of July near Cabin Creek by the Cherokee colonel Waitie at the head of four hundred mounted men, half of whom were Texans and the other half of his own nation. After a fight which lasted the whole day the Federals succeeded in dislodging their adversaries on the following day, and, having dispersed them, forced the passage of the river.

On the 3d of May, just as Grant was leaving Grand Gulf in order to throw himself into the enemy's open country, Porter, with four vessels, was turning his back upon this city and descending the stream as far as the mouth of Red River. Here he found Admiral Farragut, and, as we have already stated, reached Alexandria on the 6th, at the same time that Banks' advance-guard arrived, after taking possession of Fort De Russy on the way, which had been abandoned by the enemy. The Federal army, which had left Opelousas on the 5th of May, was concentrated at Alexandria on the 9th.

When, after the battle of Port Gibson, Grant decided to undertake an immediate campaign against Pemberton, he invited Banks, as we have mentioned, in a despatch forwarded on the 10th of May from Auburn, to join him before Vicksburg. It was impossible for Banks to respond to this invitation: he could not transport his whole army from Alexandria to Grand Gulf by water, and if he had been able to do so he would thereby have exposed New Orleans and all the neighboring districts of Louisiana to the incursions of Taylor on the one side and of the garrison of Port Hudson on the other. Besides, to leave Alexandria was to abandon the *matériel* of the army and the dépôts that had been established in the place, together with the five or six thousand negroes who had come to seek freedom under



the shelter of the Federal flag. Banks determined, therefore, to march upon Port Hudson with the forces at his command, and to invest that place. If he could not capture it by a sudden attack, he would wait for the reinforcements that Grant was to send him after the fall of Vicksburg. The latter was informed of this decision, which was certainly the best that could be arrived at.

The army left Alexandria on the 14th and 15th of May, a portion of it embarking upon transport-ships, while the remainder reached the Mississippi by land, crossing the Atchafalaya at Simpsport, and landing on the 23d of May in front of Bayou Sara, on the left bank of the river, about fifteen miles above Port Hudson. The Confederates should have abandoned this latter point after the Federal navy had found in the Atchafalaya the means of turning the batteries which alone imparted any value to the place, and sent the garrison which occupied it to Vicksburg. But we have seen how Mr. Davis had ordered Pemberton to defend Port Hudson at all hazards: he thought of being able thereby to preserve one means of communication with the States of the Far West; and this general, who had made every preparation for evacuating the place since the beginning of May, instructed Gardner, who was already on the march with most of his troops, to return to Port Hudson and to shut himself up in it if necessary. On being apprised of the landing of Banks at Bayou Sara, Johnston wrote to him again, ordering him to abandon Port Hudson immediately; but it was too late. On the 24th, Banks had appeared before the place, to which Augur and T. W. Sherman\* had brought him about thirty-five hundred men from Baton Rouge. Gardner sent a detachment, under Colonel Miles, to stop these last-mentioned troops, but he was defeated at Plain's Store in a combat where the Federals lost one hundred and fifty men and the Confederates seventy. On the 25th, Port Hudson was invested by a force of fifteen thousand men. Gardner had about seven thousand able-bodied soldiers with which to defend this place, and provisions for seven or eight weeks. The garrison was proportioned to the extent of the works entrusted to his charge: these encircled the hills forming the back part of the steep bluff

\* Not W. T. Sherman, but the general of whom we have already spoken in the expedition to Port Royal.

that overlooks the Mississippi, describing a semicircle, the two extremities of which rested on the river. A stream covered its approaches on the north side. The works consisted of a series of detached forts surrounded by a continuous line traced *en crémaillère* and redans of great strength, with parapets, ditches, batteries, and parade-ground. In front of this line there were bastions for infantry, with some abatis: it was divided into two parts by the short Clinton railroad, which ran eastward. The forts on the north side were three in number: two were of large dimensions—one of a pentagonal shape, the other square—with a small redoubt between the two: at the south, two successive lines of bastions, the left of which rested on the railroad; and more to the right, over the summit of a ridge, a large redoubt in the shape of a bastion, called the Citadel, which commanded all the surrounding localities. The Citadel was connected by lines of redans, flanking it on one side, to the batteries erected along the river; on the other side, to a redoubt forming the centre of the southern and eastern lines.

Banks, believing the garrison to be less numerous and the works not so strong as they were in reality, prepared to make a general assault upon the place on the 27th of May. The Federal army was composed of five divisions, but the effective force of these divisions was reduced to an average of less than three thousand men each. Weitzel occupied the extreme right, his troops comprising two negro regiments which were going to receive the baptism of fire; Grover came next; then Dwight, who had replaced Emory. The centre was formed by Augur, the left by Sherman. The Federal fleet, which had been watching Port Hudson from below since the fight of the 14th of March, consisted of four vessels—the *Monongahela*, the *Richmond*, the *Essex*, and the *Genesee*. The two ships that had forced the passage of the Confederate batteries with Farragut, the *Hartford* and the *Albatross*, had returned from Red River with Banks, and their mission was to cannonade the place from above. The attack was to take place at the same hour along the whole line, while the two naval divisions occupied the enemy with their fire. On the Confederate side three brigades occupied the line of defence: Steadman was stationed in the works of the left, or the north; Miles, in those

of the centre, or the east; Beall, in those of the right, or the south.

About ten o'clock the fleet opened fire, and at this signal Weitzel, Grover, and Dwight moved toward the abatis. The Confederates awaited them in their exterior lines. A desperate combat, which lasted the whole day, took place in front of these lines. Augur and Sherman did not put their troops in motion until later, thus allowing the enemy time to re-form his ranks, but their efforts were none the less energetic. The Confederates' line of defence, skilfully arranged, gave them an immense advantage, while the Federals, fully exposed to the enemy's fire from all directions, sustained fearful losses without being able to dislodge their opponents. They often gained the height of the parapet, but each time were repulsed. At the close of the day, however, Weitzel, who had crossed Sandy Creek, succeeded in maintaining his position in front of the abatis. But on the left the Federals were obliged to look for shelter in the woods situated at some distance from the advanced lines of the besieged. Notwithstanding the ground gained at the north, which contracted the dimensions of the place, the failure of the assault proved a serious check for Banks, in consequence of the heavy losses he had sustained, amounting to 293 killed and 1540 wounded. These figures afford sufficient proof of the courage displayed by the Federals in this conflict of more than ten hours' duration. The two negro regiments had particularly distinguished themselves: their behavior on this first trial produced a great impression in the army and in the Northern States, where so many people still denied these freedmen the right of shedding their blood in behalf of a cause which was truly their own. Colonel Paine was killed at their head, as also three other colonels, while Sherman lost a leg. The Confederates, sheltered behind their works, had only about three hundred men disabled.

The next day, after having asked for an armistice to bury the dead and gather up the wounded, Banks began erecting a countervallation line around the place. This general, who had displayed no great military qualities in his campaigns, was not, however, wanting either in courage or determination: his check did not discourage him. His troops were full of ardor, feeling



the importance of the task which had been assigned to them: for a whole fortnight they were busy in constructing works which extended for nearly two miles. The heat was intense, and constant watching and sickness had decimated the besiegers. They were at last menaced with being besieged in their turn, notwithstanding the efforts of Grierson, who had stationed himself at Clinton for the purpose of covering their movements, and who had succeeded on the 1st of June in defending this village against the attacks of the enemy. In fact, the Confederate cavalry completely blockaded them, and kept them constantly on the watch. Taylor, at the west, gathered his scattered troops together in order to come to the relief of the place. The latter was nevertheless completely hemmed in, and all its communications with the exterior entirely cut off. With the assistance of the navy, guns of heavy calibre were placed in position by the besiegers. A fierce fire was then opened upon Port Hudson by the fleet and land-batteries. The garrison, short of provisions, without medical stores, and worn out by the bombardment, was sustained only by a vague hope of the relief which Johnston or Taylor might bring. Nevertheless, it rejected all the propositions that were made to it. On the 11th of June, although he had received none of the reinforcements expected from Grant, Banks attempted to take possession of the exterior lines: he was afraid of losing too much time in regular approaches over the difficult ground that lay before him. The attack was made at three o'clock in the morning, but the Confederates were on their guard and repulsed the assailants at every point. The latter, far from being discouraged, immediately applied themselves to the task of making new preparations, and during two days the artillery, having been reinforced, hotly engaged the enemy's batteries, and finally succeeded in dismounting a few guns. Every preparation was made by the garrison for the reception of the assaulting columns, which had managed to draw nearer the intrenched lines.

On the 14th of June, at daybreak, the Federals made the assault from every point, and, although unable to carry any of the works, nevertheless succeeded in making themselves masters of important positions, thus gaining along the whole line from three to six hundred feet of ground. On the left the column



led by General Dwight, favored by a ravine, reached the ridge on which the Citadel stood: it succeeded in obtaining a foothold on it, and fortified itself so as to command all the approaches. On the right the main attack had been entrusted to the four brigades of Paine's division, which, at the signal of their chief, bravely rushed forward against the enemy's works. The Federals, who had about three hundred yards to traverse under the cross-fire of these works, found themselves suddenly checked by a small ravine bristling with abatis of whose existence they had no suspicion: compelled to turn back, they left a large number of wounded on the ground, among whom was their general.

This new assault had cost Banks in the neighborhood of seven hundred and fifty men. The results obtained were not proportionate to the price paid for them. Consequently, their fatiguing labors and struggles, so frequently unsuccessful, had demoralized these somewhat inexperienced troops. The time of service of a number of regiments had expired, and they were unwilling to expose themselves to new dangers, considering their engagements as no longer binding: the Fourth Massachusetts was in open rebellion. Banks was obliged to resort to a more methodical course of proceeding, and the trenches were regularly opened against the Citadel. We shall leave him busy hemming in the garrison—whose hopes, with the scanty provisions that are left them, are growing less each day—to go in search of Grant, who had undertaken similar operations against Vicksburg, but on a larger scale.





DE SOTO

MISSISSIPPI RIVER

VICKSBURG

VICKSBURG

Scale 40,000'

Scale  $\frac{1}{32}$  of inch 1 Mile

1 Miles

2 Kilom

## CHAPTER IV.

### VICKSBURG.

AS we have stated in the preceding chapter, on the 18th of May, the day following the battle of Big Black River Bridge, Pemberton had brought back his demoralized army into the works of Vicksburg; the abandonment of Haines' Bluff and Walnut Hills had given the Federals a new and easy base of operations. The siege of Vicksburg, which the Confederate general seems to have done everything in his power to render inevitable, was about to commence.

The Federals knew nothing of the place except the long line of bluffs which rises from Chickasaw Bayou for a distance of about four miles and a half below Vicksburg, gradually receding from the Mississippi below this small town, and leaving between it and the river a low and marshy space, to break off at the border of a stream called the Big Bayou, beyond which the line of bluffs rises once more. This bluff forms the extremity of a plateau from one and a quarter to two and a half miles in width, the entire surface of which is intersected by deep valleys. The Big Bayou encircles it south and east. Along the eastern declivity of the plateau the rains, descending toward the stream, have penetrated the soft clayish soil so as to form ravines whose banks are almost perpendicular, and whose windings constitute impassable ditches flanked by natural bastions. The largest of them have a development of from twenty-one hundred to thirty-two hundred yards; the others, only a few hundred. One main fissure traverses the plateau in its widest extent, from north to south, for a distance of about six miles and a half; at the bottom of this valley flows a little stream called Stout's Bayou, which connects with Big Bayou a little above the gap that the latter stream has opened for itself in the bluff. North-east



of Vicksburg is the culminating point of the plateau, forming the continuation of the heights which separate Stout's Bayou from Big Bayou. A ridge, running westward toward Vicksburg, becomes detached from it to form a junction with the summit of the cliffs which line the borders of the river below the town, thus encircling the whole of the small basin of Stout's Bayou. A deep ravine with steep banks which pours its stream into the very city of Vicksburg, and whose bottom is covered in certain places with an impenetrable thicket, separates at the north this first ridge from a second, which follows a parallel course as far as the river. They are connected, for a certain distance north-eastward by a succession of hillocks which describe a semicircle around the head of the ravine too extensive to be comprised in the system of defences of these heights. But fronting the culminating point of the first ridge there is a steep hill almost as high, forming part of the second ridge, and separated from this point by the ravine only which at this place is quite impassable. Beyond the second ridge there is another ravine as difficult as the first, which empties into the river precisely in front of the angle it describes before Vicksburg: it is commanded at the north by some heights connected with the sides of Walnut Hills, which Sherman had taken possession of on the morning of the 19th.

The Confederate engineers had laid out a vast intrenched camp along these various ridges, whose irregular form was adapted to the character of the ground, and which, by encircling the whole plateau, presented a line of fortifications of nearly eight miles in extent on the land-side and about four miles on the river-side. It was a series of detached lunettes and redans with a strong profile, flanking each other mutually, some being only separated by two or three hundred feet, the others being placed at a distance of twelve or fifteen hundred feet, where the steep acclivity of some ravine rendered it unnecessary to place them nearer. A continuous line of half-bastions, protected by large abatis, formed a connection between all these works. The enclosure extended from the batteries erected along the river by following the northernmost of the two parallel ridges as far as the hill situated in front of the culminating point; then it descended into the ravine to connect directly with this point, whence it pursued a south-

westerly course, clinging to the summit of the ridge which separates the slope of Big Bayou from that of Stout's Bayou to within one mile and three-quarters of their confluence. Having reached this locality, it plunged into the valley of this last-mentioned bayou, traversing it in order to ascend the acclivity on the other side and join the batteries crowning the bluff above the river. North-eastward, the forests which covered all the approaches of the works, the steepness of the ravines, and the copse-wood that filled them, imparted strength to the positions of the Confederates. South-eastward, the soil was more cultivated and presented gentler acclivities. The works, therefore, were more approachable on this side; consequently, their number had been multiplied, and each ridge which stretched above the principal line was crowned with two or three redans or redoubts.

The roads which branched out of Vicksburg were—south-south-west, that to Warrenton, which followed the summit of the bluff; south-south-east, that to Hall's Ferry, which, after traversing the enclosure, descended by very gentle declivities between two ravines as far as Big Bayou; eastward, that to Baldwin's Ferry and the railroad, which passed the works at the point where they lay closest to the city at a distance of about sixteen hundred yards from the nearest houses; north-eastward, the Jackson road and the one named the Cemetery road, which followed the two parallel ridges above mentioned; and finally, northward, the road to Yazoo City, which skirted the foot of the bluff.

As far as one may judge by an examination of the map, this sketch gave Vicksburg the appearance of a great intrenched camp. The Confederates, as usual, had yielded to the natural temptation of inexperienced armies, believing that they are adding to the strength of a position by multiplying to excess the works defending it. This defect had not escaped the observation of the sagacious Johnston upon his visit to the Army of the Mississippi in December, 1862; but, as we have already remarked in regard to the batteries commanding the river, he had pointed out this defect in vain: his advice was not heeded. Experience has shown how well founded were his criticisms. If these works had been so constructed as to afford shelter only to a garrison of from

seven to eight thousand men, they would have been quite sufficient to secure to Vicksburg the rôle belonging to that place by not allowing the batteries intended to block the passage of the river to be taken in the rear; they could have sustained a siege long enough to allow an army of relief time to come to deliver the garrison, and Pemberton would never have thought of shutting himself up in it with all his troops. The extent of the space they occupied, on the contrary, neutralized their value unless defended by an army. It was the fear of disgarnishing them which influenced Pemberton during the whole campaign, not allowing him to quit the place lest it should be left without a sufficient garrison.

When all his troops were collected together, he found himself, as we have stated, with about thirty-three thousand men; but besides the sick and wounded the number of non-combatants was still further increased by the addition of a mass of soldiers who, smarting under their late defeat, refused to be brought again under fire, for, if we may believe the report of this general, the combatants he had then at his disposal did not amount to more than ten thousand five hundred men.

Grant's army, reduced by fighting and rapid marching, did not reach forty thousand men. Intersected for a long distance by deep ravines and covered with forests, the ground on which it was about to operate rendered his task extremely difficult. But the Union generals were far from foreseeing the difficulty, believing they had only ten or fifteen thousand men to contend with. The ease with which they had carried the intrenchments at the Big Black River bridge made it almost a duty on their part to try and carry these by assault, the success of which the discouragement of the enemy rendered possible, thereby sparing the army the labors and fatigues of a long siege. Grant decided to cut the matter short on the 19th of May, and not to appear before the place except for the purpose of storming it. The right, formed by Sherman, had been pushed forward in order to intercept all communications between Pemberton and Johnston; and it had taken possession on the morning of the 19th of some outer works which had been abandoned by the enemy. McPherson, who occupied the centre, had bivouacked at a distance from these

works, on the Jackson road, and McClermand, who followed him, bearing to the left, was ordered to attack the Confederate line south of the Baldwin's Ferry road. The three corps were to carve out a passage for themselves across forests and ravines, drive before them all detachments of the enemy's forces they might meet outside of the intrenchments, and to halt in sight of the latter; then, at two o'clock, on a signal agreed upon, to make a simultaneous assault along the whole line. But, whilst Sherman, having only a small space of ground to traverse, arrived in position with the larger portion of his troops before the time agreed upon, McPherson and McClermand, in spite of all their efforts, found themselves delayed by the difficulties of the ground. Sherman himself had seen his division of the right, commanded by Steele, compelled to halt upon a height where it had occupied some works. He nevertheless commenced the attack with Blair's division.

The summit of the ravine is traversed, but the abatis obstruct the march of the Federal soldiers. Finally, the Thirteenth regulars,\* which we have already seen sustaining the honor of the old American army in many battles, succeed in surmounting this obstacle, and, led by Captain Washington, they rush upon the Confederate intrenchments. Two regiments only can come to their assistance: they maintain their ground at the foot of the parapet, but are unable to scale it. Washington has been mortally wounded in the act of hoisting a flag, which falls into the hands of the Confederates; his battalion has lost one-third of its effective force. The assault has failed, but the two brigades under Giles A. Smith and Thomas Kilby Smith, of Blair's division, remain in the woods nearest to the enemy's line until evening. In the centre, McPherson has only been able to cause a fruitless demonstration to be made by Ransom's brigade; on the left, McClermand has not succeeded in forming his line before night, and has satisfied himself with a useless cannonade.

The Federal losses amounted to four or five hundred men. Grant, however, did not consider this trial sufficient, and deter-

\*The Thirteenth U. S. infantry here mentioned was one of the new regiments authorized by the act of Congress of July 29, 1861. William T. Sherman was its colonel.—ED.



mined to renew it on the 22d. But he had first to give some rest to his troops, rectify their positions, extend them southward in order to invest the place, open easy communications between them, and, above all, secure them regular supplies of provisions. In fact, if, while traversing a new district each day, they had been able to find in it some resources, this was no longer the case as soon as they came to a halt. Besides, the supplies of hard bread, of salt and coffee, as well as the ammunition which they had carried from Grand Gulf, were exhausted. The 20th and 21st were devoted to these various requirements. In order to feed the army with greater facility, two large dépôts were established—one at the north, on Chickasaw Bayou, and the other south, at Warrenton; the latter replaced all those that had been temporarily established at Grand Gulf.

During this time Pemberton was making active preparations for the siege and reorganizing his army. The assaults of the 19th had been repulsed solely by Smith's and Forney's troops, which had not left Vicksburg during the whole campaign. The former had been posted on the left from the river to the other side of the Cemetery road. These were the troops that had offered resistance to Blair. The others were stationed across the Jackson and Baldwin's Ferry roads. Stevenson's division occupied the whole space on the right, together with the Hall's Ferry and Warrenton roads; they had only exchanged a few artillery-shots with McClernand's extreme left. Smith's division was reinforced by detachments from Loring's division, which had followed the rest of the army; a regiment five hundred strong was given to Stevenson, while Bowen's division was held in reserve to enable it to afford relief at any of the menaced points. The works on the land-side were mounted with one hundred and two guns, most of them field-pieces. An almost equal number, of heavier calibre, commanded the course of the river. Notwithstanding the extreme difficulty of transportation over muddy roads, half-dilapidated railways, and rivers incessantly menaced by the Federal fleet, Pemberton had succeeded in collecting for his army inside of Vicksburg two months' provisions, together with a considerable quantity of ammunition. But there was a scarcity of percussion-caps; consequently, he forbade all firing on the

part of skirmishers and recommended the artillerymen to be sparing of their powder. In his situation this was a necessary precaution, but it enabled Grant's army during the days of the 20th and 21st to draw closer to the works and rectify its positions with impunity.

The Federal fleet, on the contrary, never ceased firing shells and bombs, which killed many people, dismounted several guns, and caused much damage to the city. Yet the inhabitants refused to leave it, preferring to make their homes in caves cut in the sides of the ravines, after the manner of the Egyptian tombs, where they were sheltered from the enemy's projectiles. A large number of horses and mules, having become useless, were driven out of the works, but the Federal soldiers amused themselves with shooting them between the two lines, and their carcasses, being exposed to a torrid sun, soon poisoned the air that was breathed by both besieged and besiegers alike.

The general assault was fixed for the 22d at ten o'clock in the morning: the corps commanders had regulated their watches so as to secure greater unanimity to the movement. They were to make their troops advance at once in columns of platoons over all the roads leading to Vicksburg, north-east, east, and south-east. Believing that they had failed on the 19th because the attacks had been limited to those portions of the enemy's line adjoining the roads, they had carefully examined all this line during the two following days, and selected new points of attack. The crews of the vessels which had remained above planted six mortars on large rafts moored close to the bank, so as to be able to fire into the works over the strip of land and the turning-point in the river. These mortars fired bombshells during the entire night, and at seven o'clock in the morning Porter came with the iron-clads\* that were lying below Vicksburg to place himself within four hundred and forty yards of the lower batteries, upon which he poured a shower of shot. From three o'clock in the morning Grant's artillery had made Pemberton aware of the attack that was preparing against him. When daylight appeared the skirmishers, advancing as close as possible along the edge of the woods and among the ravines, which afforded them some shelter,

\* The *Benton*, *Mound City*, *Carondelet*, and *Tuscomb*.—ED.

came to mingle the sharp crack of their rifles with the louder booming of the cannon. During four hours the Confederates, surrounded by a circle of fire, were exposed to the most terrible bombardment that can possibly be conceived. Their firing, at first brisk and precise, soon began to slacken in that part of the line facing the river, while on the land-side the balls of Grant's sharpshooters finally prevented the gunners from serving their pieces.

At last, at the hour agreed upon, the assaulting columns were formed, and the three Federal corps moved forward at the same moment.

Sherman had become convinced that he could not attack the enemy except by following, by way of the Cemetery road, the line of hillocks connecting the northern ridge and the hill which commanded it to the neighboring heights. Everywhere else it was necessary to traverse either of the two ravines, and the difficulties of the ground did not admit of a sufficient number of troops being brought forward at once for the purpose of storming the works. The Confederates were fully aware of this, and had taken particular care to fortify the bare approaches of the Cemetery road. A strong bastion surrounded by a ditch commanded them the more easily that this road wound along a narrow ridge, and after following the ditch of the bastion it entered the enclosure of the inside walls. More to the right, the fortified front extended along the ravine, lowering at a point where the latter became more narrow. Blair's division was ordered to attack the bastion, and while waiting for the decisive moment it took position as near as possible to the enemy's defences without exposing itself to their fire. A detachment of one hundred and fifty resolute men led the march with planks to bridge the ditch; Ewing's brigade followed it in column by flank, a formation rendered necessary by the narrowness of the road. The two other brigades, not being able to deploy alongside of the latter, were held in reserve. On the Confederate side, Shoup's brigade of Smith's division defended the bastion, while a brigade of Forney's division was posted on the right of the road. At ten o'clock precisely Ewing pushes his column forward at a double-quick through the open space that has to be traversed,



and the entire artillery of the division, covering with projectiles that portion of the enemy's line which it is sought to carry, does not allow its defenders to interrupt the march of the assailants. The latter cross the ridge and climb the gentle slope along which the road ascends as far as the bastion; they are about passing beyond this work and reaching the inside wall at the point where the road penetrates, when the Confederates open upon them such a terrific fire from all the fronts commanding this point that the assaulting column hesitates and halts. The Federal soldiers, unable to advance and unwilling to fall back, throw themselves into the ditch of the bastion, planting their colors on the parapet, and quickly throw up a small breast-work in order to shelter themselves from the fire by flank. The two other brigades protect them by firing upon every Confederate who shows his head above the parapet. But they cannot penetrate the fiery circle which Ewing was unable to enter without unnecessarily exposing themselves to inevitable destruction. The latter, therefore, is recalled, and Blair, hoping to find less formidable obstacles elsewhere, orders Giles A. Smith, in conjunction with Ransom's brigade of McPherson's corps, to cross the ravine into which he has descended on the left for the purpose of attacking the works extending south of the Cemetery road. Notwithstanding the steepness of the acclivity, the copse-wood, and the abatis which obstruct their march, the Federal soldiers draw near the enemy's intrenchments, but they have lost that cohesiveness which is so necessary in delivering an assault, and, being divided into small groups, they emerge successively in sight of these works in proportion as the ground has more or less retarded their movements. Being received by a regular and well-sustained fire, they become engaged in a useless musketry-duel with a portion of Forney's division. Finally, the boldest among them rush upon the parapet, dragging a number of their comrades after them. But at this moment Forney receives a timely reinforcement. Bowen has sent him two brigades, which double the number of his forces, and the defenders of the point attacked by Ransom find themselves, like those on the Cemetery road, stronger numerically than the assailants. At the expiration of half an hour this new attempt



in its turn proves a failure; at about two o'clock in the afternoon the Federals are driven back into the woods from whence they had emerged.

On the right of Sherman, Steele has finally taken a position whence he has advanced against the extreme left of the enemy's line near the river. But for a distance of more than four hundred yards he had to ascend slopes under cultivation, commanded by the works forming this line. The Confederate division under Smith, which occupied these works, had opened a destructive fire upon him: he had vainly gathered together his forces for the purpose of carrying the battery nearest the river. His efforts proved fruitless, and before two o'clock he was obliged to abandon the idea of a new attack against these formidable positions.

In the mean time, McPherson was approaching, by way of the Jackson road, the culminating point before mentioned, which stood in front of him. His soldiers had displayed the same courage as those of Sherman, but, being obliged to follow a narrow and open ridge like those on the Cemetery road, they were equally unsuccessful. His line extended beyond the Jackson road on the right, and on the left as far as within half a mile of the railroad. Ransom's brigade, which alone represented McArthur's division, formed the extreme right. Logan, in the centre, had placed the two brigades under Leggett and J. E. Smith along the Jackson road, while his third brigade, under Stevenson, was deployed on the left over the slopes which reach down toward the ravine whence the Big Bayou derives its source. Finally, Quinby's division extended on his left, separated by this ravine from the enemy's works, which at this point made a deep salient angle; this condition of the ground did not allow him to attack them vigorously, and his action was confined to some trifling demonstrations.

Logan, on the contrary, had given the signal of attack at ten o'clock, and Leggett had advanced while the firing of the Federal guns was increasing in intensity. But he had not been able to reach the enemy's works, and Smith, who had come to his assistance, had, like him, been driven out of the open space, of which the Confederate cannon had complete command. Stevenson,

protected by the sinuosities of the ground, succeeded in climbing the slopes that stood before him, but, his line being thinned, he found himself too weak to approach the bastions which crowned their summits, and was likewise repulsed. The attack of which we have already spoken, and which Ransom led against the right of Forney's division, took place a little later.

McClernand formed the left of the Federal army. Before him the works of the place, following the summit of the hills, receded more and more from the borders of Big Bayou, so that he had been able to take a position on the other side of this stream along the counterforts of the slopes, the summit of which was occupied by Stevenson's Confederate division. A. J. Smith and Carr were deployed right and left of the railroad, along a ravine of small depth which the road formerly crossed by a wooden bridge, before penetrating a deep trench on the other side.

The only battery of heavy artillery brought over by Grant, consisting of six thirty-pounder Parrott guns, was posted in the rear of Carr's right, and its fire succeeded in effecting a breach in the salient angle of one of the principal redoubts of the enemy, where two guns were dismounted. At a distance on the left there was, first of all, Osterhaus, separated from Carr by the prolongation of the valley, which trended eastward in the direction of the bayou, and beyond it Hovey, who was at a greater distance from the enemy's line than the others. There was between Hovey's left and the river a space of more than three thousand yards which the Federals had not been able to invest. Grant had merely sought to cover this space by placing on the Warrenton road two brigades of McArthur's division, recently landed, which were ordered to join their fire to that of the fleet against the batteries erected on the summit of the bluff at the southern extremity of the enclosure.

McClernand's attack takes place at the same hour as that of the two other corps. Smith and Carr cross the valley at a double-quick under the cross-fire of the enemy's batteries. Lawler's brigade of Carr's division, which had achieved distinction at the Big Black River bridge, and Landram's brigade of Smith's division, reach the works with great quickness, while a detachment of the Twenty-second Iowa scales the parapet of a lunette, of

which it finally takes possession. But the rest of the line has been broken, and cannot take advantage of this first success. The lunette itself is commanded by the main line of the Confederates: a hand-to-hand fight follows, grenades are hurled in every direction, and men fire upon each other at close range. The defenders, who would not abandon their post, and the assailants, who have penetrated into the work, are nearly all killed or wounded within this narrow space. The survivors, being exposed on all sides to the projectiles of both friends and foes, throw themselves flat upon the ground, and remain in that position for several hours, almost motionless side by side. One man only among the Federals, Sergeant Griffith,\* found the means of making his escape by jumping the parapet; and he had even the good luck of taking several prisoners with him.

The two other brigades of Smith and Carr have been held in reserve. Their commanders, Burbridge and Benton, lead them to the relief of their comrades: they are decimated in their turn while traversing the valley, but they do not allow themselves to be checked by their losses nor by the sight of the dead and wounded which the preceding attack has scattered all along their route. They even take with them a small howitzer, which Captain White† bravely plants in front of an embrasure of the enemy. The salient angle, which had been struck in the morning by the projectiles of the heavy artillery, is reached; about sixty men enter the redoubt, hoisting a flag upon the parapet. The rest of the two brigades find shelter in the ditch, where they defend themselves. The point thus secured was of the highest importance, and if the Federals had taken immediate advantage of this first success, the enemy's line would have been pierced. But they were too much scattered and weakened to be able to do this. Stevenson, who is in command of the defenders, calls for volunteers to recover the position lost. Two companies of Waul's Legion, from Texas, undertake this task and rush upon the Federals who occupy

\* Joseph E. Griffith, company I, Twenty-second Iowa infantry. For his gallantry he was promoted by Grant to a first lieutenancy. Soon afterward he received an appointment to the West Point Academy, from which he was graduated June 17, 1867, and appointed to the engineer corps.—ED.

† Patrick H. White of the Chicago Mercantile battery.—ED.

the angle of the redoubt: the latter, surrounded on all sides, are taken prisoners. The combat, however, is continued between those of the assailants who are in the ditch and the defenders who are masters of the interior of the work. Two Federal flags float for a considerable length of time between them, until at last each party carries off one of them. But this conflict is without results for Grant's soldiers. Hovey and Osterhaus cannot give them any assistance, because, having been repulsed in all their attacks, they cannot occupy the enemy except by keeping up a sharp fire of musketry against him. McClermand, seeing the two flags still floating on the enemy's parapet, believes that his soldiers are in possession of the work, and sends for McArthur to come to him. The latter was about to attack a battery which the fleet had silenced when this message was received: he started at once, but the distance being great, he could not arrive in time, and subsequent instructions made him take another direction before he had reached this section of the battlefield. After resisting the enemy, who was pouring shell into their midst, for a considerable length of time, Carr's and Smith's soldiers have been compelled to seek a less dangerous position in the rear, and have abandoned the ditch, full of dead and wounded, which they have so valiantly disputed to the Texans. In the mean while, McClermand has apprised Grant that he has taken possession of two works, asking him both for reinforcements to complete the victory and a diversion in his favor along the rest of the line. The Federals, repulsed everywhere, have abandoned the idea of murderous assaults the uselessness of which has been fully demonstrated. The general-in-chief has gone to join Sherman at the post of observation which the latter occupies at a distance of only two hundred yards from the enemy's line; the dead are gathered up and the wounded cared for. Up to this time, all his troops being engaged, Grant, who has but little confidence in McClermand's judgment, has not sent him the reinforcements which the latter has been asking for since the beginning of the action. Nevertheless, upon his repeated assertions that he is in possession of two of the enemy's works, he determines to gratify him. While he is proceeding in person to the latter's headquarters, he leaves directions with Sherman and McPherson to



renew the attack unless they receive counter-orders in due time: the latter was also to send one of *Quinby's* brigades to complete the success announced by *McClermand*. Toward four o'clock the Federals renew the fight—with less unanimity and dash, although with as much courage as in the morning. *Steele*, on the right, descends once more into the ravine, leaving again within it several hundreds of killed and wounded. He is repulsed. *Mower's* brigade of *Tuttle's* division attacks the bastion before which *Ewing* has sustained such cruel losses: it reaches the parapet, but is driven back in its turn upon *Blair's* division, which has deployed for the purpose of sustaining it. *McPherson* receives another check along the *Jackson* road. He is obliged to bring back to the charge *Logan's* division, which has already been severely tried, and which the concentric fire of the enemy is decimating for the second time. *Quinby* has sent *Boomer's* brigade, which has fought so valiantly at *Champion's Hill*, to *McClermand*. But the difficulties of the ground delay it on the road, and it is almost dark when it arrives in front of the works which no one is any longer disputing to the enemy. The latter, on the contrary, has assumed the offensive, and the brave *Boomer* is killed while protecting the retreat of *Smith's* division, which is taken back to a less exposed position.

This bloody and fruitless conflict cost the Federals three thousand men, among whom was an unusual proportion of killed. The Confederates had only eight hundred men disabled. The check which *Grant* had just experienced was complete and decisive. This check was due, in the first instance, to the error committed by *Grant* in believing the enemy's army to be reduced to twelve or fifteen thousand men, in counting upon its discouragement, and in not estimating the strength of the works erected before him at their true value. We must also attribute this disaster to the extreme difficulty of the ground, which obliged the assaulting columns to advance in a long narrow line against some points which were in no other way approachable—a formation which rendered the attack ineffective and prevented the timely arrival of reserves; in short, it did not admit of rapid communications from point to point in the line of assailants.

This severe lesson taught *Grant* that it would require some

other means to reduce the place. It did not, however, set him permanently against this system of simultaneous attacks against positions too strong to be carried by assault; for, as we shall see shortly, he tried the same thing again, although with another army, in the disastrous battle of Cold Harbor, which was an exact repetition of the assault on Vicksburg.

Important results, however, had been accomplished. The energy displayed by the aggressors made Pemberton believe that he was surrounded by more than sixty thousand men, and prevented him from attempting a sortie *en masse*, which might possibly have secured the escape of the best portion of his troops. Grant, who had brought all his men into action, had not, however, been able to put more than from thirty-two to thirty-five thousand men in line. Besides, notwithstanding the failure of the assault, he had gained much ground and occupied positions which shortened to a great extent the operations of a regular siege. The Federal navy had fought the batteries which commanded the river for the space of four hours, silencing several of them, and a force of considerable magnitude was thus turned from the defence of the lines which Grant was attacking. But the din of battle not reaching as far as Porter's position, the latter had retired about half-past eleven o'clock. He had brought back his vessels in a tolerably good condition, in spite of the large number of shots that had been fired into them, while his losses were insignificant.

During two days Grant would not ask for a suspension of hostilities, leaving a large number of uncared-for wounded exposed to the most excruciating sufferings between the two armies. Finally, Pemberton, more humane than the latter, proposed an armistice: the conflict was suspended for a few hours on the 24th of May, and the victims of the struggle who were yet alive were carried off amid the manifestations of regard which the two armies interchanged on this solemn occasion.

The siege of Vicksburg presents a singular example, not only in the war we are now describing, but, in some respects, in the military history of modern times prior to the events of 1870. From the nature of the works of the place, their development over a space of nearly thirteen miles, the calibre of the guns

used on both sides except near the river—in short, from the relative numerical strength of the besiegers and that of the besieged, it was a conflict between two intrenched armies rather than a siege in the strictest acceptation of the term. But what made it differ from the operations of the same character which had previously taken place in Europe, such as the siege of Sebastopol, is that the Confederate army was completely invested in the intrenched camp where it had retired after its defeat while a new army was forming outside for the purpose of breaking its blockade. Consequently, one may ask if the German officers, who have shown so much discernment in selecting in the American war all that was applicable to the European continent, have not derived some useful information from the siege of Vicksburg for the campaign of 1870. The conqueror of Champion's Hill, in order to gather the fruits of his splendid campaign, had a triple task to accomplish: to render the investment of the place complete, and to surround it with lines sufficiently strong not only for preventing the enemy from introducing into it supplies that would have prolonged the defence, but also for driving back any sortie in case Pemberton, with the available portion of his army, should have attempted to force a passage out; to undertake regular siege-operations against several points at once, in order that the defenders, being menaced on all sides, might not be able to concentrate their defence on the day of the assault; finally, to make every preparation for keeping Johnston away from the place, and to drive him back if he attempted to succor it.

The forces at Grant's disposal on the 23d of May, reduced to thirty-five thousand men at the utmost by the assault of the previous day, were not sufficient for such a task. By deploying his whole army he could not even completely envelop the place. But besides the troops which were under his immediate control at Memphis and Corinth, and which he hastened to send for, the prestige of victory and the importance of the results to be obtained secured him the prompt despatch of the reinforcements he asked for from the government at Washington. The latter, stimulated by public opinion, even anticipated his request, and omitted nothing to furnish him with all the resources he might need.



Lauman's division had already been shipped from Memphis, where it was stationed a few days previously. It arrived below Vicksburg on the 24th of May, and proceeded to take McArthur's place on the left of the Federal army, the latter going to the centre to join the Seventeenth corps, of which it formed a part. Two other divisions, under the auspices of Hurlbut, were organized in Memphis, and forwarded to Grant under the command of Kimball and Sooy Smith. The former arrived before Vicksburg on the 3d of June, and the latter on the 8th of the same month. In the mean while, Schofield, who commanded the Army of the Missouri, sent a strong division to Grant under Herron, who joined the besiegers on the 11th of June. Finally, some troops which up to that period had been waging hostilities in the East came to take part in the labors and success of the Army of the Tennessee. The Ninth corps, organized in Washington under Burnside, was on the way to Kentucky, whence it was to operate against Knoxville. Two divisions were temporarily detached from it, and General Parke took them to Vicksburg, where he arrived on the 14th of June. The six divisions which in three weeks thus swelled Grant's army presented an effective force of forty thousand men. This army, therefore, was more than doubled, reaching the figure of seventy-five thousand combatants.

Grant did not wait for the arrival of these reinforcements to begin his siege-operations. The intrenchment was opened at various points on the 23d of May. But the most pressing work was the construction of passable roads to form a connection between all the sections of the line of the besiegers—their camps, in order to secure a supply of provisions, and their approaches, so as to be able to concentrate considerable forces with rapidity at any given point on the day of assault, and to enable them mutually to assist each other. The dépôts established within the lines only received supplies to last three or four days, so that they might be easily evacuated if the army should suddenly raise the siege and take the field against Johnston. The best sites, those nearest to the water, which had become very scarce at that season, were selected for camping-grounds of the troops, who soon covered them with huts made of the branches of trees. The very obstacles



presented by the peculiar formation of the ground, however, which militated against an attack by main force, favored the methodical operations of a siege. The deep ravines which had checked the assaulting columns afforded an excellent shelter and admirable covered ways when there was time to use the axe for cutting a practicable road through the dense thickets with which the bottom was covered. The woods which had broken the ranks of the assailants masked their first approaches, while the slopes they had found it so difficult to climb in order to reach the works situated on the summit made it easy, from their very inclination, to cut off the trenches which had been dug along the sides. The positions of which the Federals had remained masters after the attacks of the 19th and 22d were within from four to six hundred yards of the enemy's works; batteries and drilling-places, connected by means of strong bastions which took the place of the second parallel, were erected: in this way much time and trouble was saved. The works relating to the approaches and circumvallation undertaken by each division were naturally adapted to the irregularities of the ground before it.

Steele's division formed the extreme right of the Federal army: the heights it occupied, bordered by the ravine where it had lost so many men on the 22d, presented slopes of too great inclination in front of the enemy's positions to admit of trenches being constructed in that locality. These slopes, however, gradually become gentler in the vicinity of the river. Woods' brigade began building approaches along these acclivities against a strong battery which commanded both the Mississippi and the Yazoo City road, of which we have already spoken. Sherman, believing that the enemy had taken away the heavy guns with which this battery was mounted in order to strengthen his defences on the land-side, imagined that a vessel could easily silence the few pieces which he supposed to have been left in the work, and that he might support Woods' labors by enfilading the enemy's lines. He asked for Porter's co-operation, and on the 27th of May the *Cincinnati*, which lay above Vicksburg, came down the river and opened fire at short range upon the point designated. But the enemy's heavy guns were still in position, and soon covered her with shot: her weak armor and the bales of hay that encircled

her could not sufficiently protect her, and she soon began to leak in every part; her commander had barely time to take her back toward the right bank, when she sank before the eyes of the inhabitants of the town, who had come out of their shelters to witness this exciting spectacle. Fifteen men were drowned and twenty-five killed or wounded. Nevertheless, Woods succeeded in pushing his trench forward as far as the border of the stream, and posted himself on a small hillock, whence his sharpshooters commanded the battery. He thus compelled the enemy to abandon it; but the stream did not allow him to go any farther, and he confined himself to the construction of some batteries which were armed with eight-inch guns supplied by the navy.

Thanks to a bend in the ground, Tuttle, who was on the left of Steele, succeeded in descending into the valley which separated him from the enemy; he traversed it, bringing with him, perpendicularly to his works, a double sap, covered with blinds and fascines of cane; then, ascending the opposite slopes, where he was concealed by the inclination of the ground, he succeeded in taking position at a distance of thirty yards from the enemy.

Sherman entrusted his principal approach to Blair: it was directed against the bastion which the latter had already attacked on the 22d of May on the Cemetery road. He succeeded in planting twenty-four pieces of artillery within four hundred yards of this work. Thence a trench was pushed as far as a solitary tree where the road passes nine hundred feet farther along the ridge: a strong drilling-place was constructed at this point, connected with the batteries by means of several approaches. A double sap prolonged the approaches by following, on the right, the flank of the last hillock, which was crowned by the bastion: coming round again upon the latter, it brought the besiegers within fifteen yards of the ditch.

Ransom's brigade occupied the front of McArthur's division, forming McPherson's right. As we have stated, it had before it ravines difficult of access. Roads were built which enabled it to communicate with Blair and a line of bastions constructed on the opposite slope without difficulty. It could come out of these fortifications to support the principal attack directed against the bastion on the Cemetery road.

Logan's division, in the centre, was stationed on the Jackson road. Following the ridge traversed by this road where he had lost so many men on the day of the assault, Logan opened against the works situated along the culminating point a strongly-constructed parallel trench, furnished with small causeways and battlements formed of sacks of earth.

Quinby on the left, as well as Ransom on the right, was confined by the character of the ground to labors of secondary importance: the former constructed roads to facilitate communications in the event of an assault, and the defence of the lines in case of sorties.

McClermand's principal approaches were made on his right against the works which Smith's and Carr's soldiers had already disputed with so much obstinacy to the defenders of Vicksburg. These two division commanders were separated from each other by a deep ravine. The former directed his approaches along the Baldwin's Ferry road; the latter kept close to the trench through which the railroad intersected the ridge that the Confederates had fortified: he proceeded to within ten yards of their principal work, and established, at a distance of less than sixty yards, a strong parallel with drilling-quarters, where he could assemble his troops for the purpose of making the assault.

During the early stages of the siege the Federals did not extend their lines farther on the left, but concentrated all their efforts against that section of the place situated north of the railroad: it was this section upon which the Confederates had expended less labor, because up to this time they had only made provision against an attack by main force, and they relied as much upon Nature as upon science to protect them on that side. But when the regular operations had once commenced they set actively to work to increase their defences along this portion of their front.

From the 24th of May to the 11th of June all the works at the south were only invested by Hovey's and Lauman's divisions, Osterhaus having been sent to the Big Black River bridge to cover the rear of the army: their rôle was confined to the maintenance of an effective blockade. But the arrival of Heron with nearly ten thousand men enabled them at last to under-



take more active operations. Hovey marched to within a short distance of the enemy's line, and joined his labors to those of Carr. Lauman, supported by a battery of which the navy had supplied both guns and gunners, opened a trench on the right of the Hall's Ferry road against a most salient angle of the Confederate works, and notwithstanding the frequent sorties of the enemy he pushed his excavations to within a few feet of the ditch. Heron toward the close of the siege conducted two approaches, one on the left of Hall's Ferry road, the other on the Warrenton road, within a short distance of the works, but his main task was to establish lines that would secure the complete investment of the place.

This enumeration will convey an idea of the magnitude of the works undertaken by the Federal army on the Vicksburg plateau. Many appliances considered necessary in an ordinary siege were, however, wanting. With the exception of a battery of thirty-pounders and some guns contributed by the navy, it did not possess any guns of heavy calibre: there were none to be found in the arsenals of the West, and it would have required too much time to get them from Washington, New York, or Pittsburg. It became a matter of necessity to arm all the siege-batteries with field-pieces, which could cause no serious damage to the earthworks of the enemy, and were only able to throw shells into them and protect the works of approach. The Coehorn mortars were also wanting: they were replaced by wooden mortars, cut out of the heavy trunks of trees, bound with iron; which produced excellent results. In short, the Army of the Tennessee was without a corps of engineers. There was not a single company of sappers, and among the whole general staff there were but four officers of this arm: the old pupils of West Point—who, as is well known, had all followed special courses of instruction in this school—were obliged to teach their comrades in the very trenches the first rudiments in the art of laying sieges and to organize sappers selected from among the most intelligent men of each army corps.

In return, the fugitive negroes, armed with pickaxes and shovels, afforded much assistance to the soldiers in their labors of excavation. The latter appear to have been less skilful in



digging than their comrades of the Army of the Potomac. But their inventive genius and the dexterity acquired by most of them, either as pioneers or in the trades they exercised prior to enlisting, greatly facilitated the task of their officers. They found ready at hand all the materials necessary for the work of a siege—wood for the construction of platforms and the interior repairs of causeways; wild grapevines, which, although somewhat heavy, formed excellent gabions; cane was used for fascines; bales of cotton from the neighboring plantations, covered with a coating of earth, constituted an almost impenetrable armor; the skins of oxen killed for the army were used in many places for covering the outside of the parapets; the barrels which had contained provisions for the army were filled with earth and surrounded by large fascines of cane, which afforded complete protection against Minié balls. In the ravines enfiladed by the enemy which the parallels had to traverse trunks of trees placed on top of each other formed a series of blinds which entirely protected the troops that were obliged to follow these pathways. The soil itself favored the deepest excavations, but the enemy having only field-pieces with which to answer the besiegers, the thickness of the parapets did not exceed six or seven feet.

The defence of the garrison was courageous and stubborn, but almost invariably passive. The length of the lines it had to occupy rendered its service excessively arduous. In no narrative of the siege has any mention been made of *abris blindés*. The Federals were able to use their ammunition lavishly, constantly throwing shells into the works, and from time to time opening the fire of all their batteries as if they were preparing for an assault: they thus kept the besieged on the alert, compelling them to concentrate all their forces near the points most exposed, where they inflicted considerable losses upon them. The labor of repairing the works and the dismounted guns occupied the Confederates all the time. The mortars planted by the Federal navy above the peninsula never ceased firing shells, against which no point in the place was protected.

To the incessant labors and watches of the besieged were added privations of all kinds. The plateau of Vicksburg having but few springs, the tepid, muddy, and unwholesome water of the

Mississippi had to be brought to the troops in barrels. Their rations were insufficient and of bad quality. The salt pork which constitutes the staple food of American armies fell short toward the middle of the siege: this want was supplied for some time by the cattle that had been collected a few days before the investment, together with such animals as could be found in the city: at a later period this lean meat had to be replaced by the flesh of mules, which many people preferred. As is the case in all sieges, cats and rats figured largely at the mess-tables, and the accounts given by the besieged show that the Louisiana soldiers, the inheritors of the traditions of French cookery, were alone able to find means to disguise the character of the least appetizing meats. Horses being scarce and necessary to the army, they were only eaten when they fell victims to the ravages of the siege. For instance, back of a portion of the line there was a pleasant green hill covered with the richest kind of grass, but incessantly ploughed by the projectiles of the Federals. Almost daily some unfortunate animal which had been left free would climb the slope step by step, nibbling at the fresh grass, but it had scarcely reached the summit when it fell down wounded or slain. In the night the Confederate soldiers would go to pick up their meal among these slaughtered animals, and occasionally a fortunate chance would throw a fine stray cow in their way instead of an emaciated horse. These, however, were but trifling resources. The bread and biscuit rations were reduced to the smallest quantity: at the end of the siege, as it appears, there was only half a biscuit distributed daily to each man. The defenders of Vicksburg had large supplies of sugar, salt, and chewing tobacco—that comforter for so many ills in the New World—but they had neither tea, coffee, spirituous liquors, nor any other kind of stimulant. Consequently, the sick soon filled the principal dwellings of Vicksburg, which had been converted into hospitals.

Alongside of the soldiers there was a civic population of three thousand five hundred inhabitants or refugees, whom the love of country, that sentiment so deep seated and so legitimate, had kept at home and doomed to all the horrors of the siege, or who had been driven into Vicksburg in spite of themselves from fear of the enemy. These unfortunate people knew nothing of the war except

its sufferings and anxieties. The town, built in terraces above the Mississippi, was particularly exposed to the shells which the Federal fleet was constantly throwing in every direction to harass the defenders. The houses soon became untenable. People took refuge in caves, which were enlarged by cutting into the gravel of the bluff. The construction of these underground dwellings became a species of traffic: the negroes who built them sold them for thirty to fifty dollars apiece, their value varying according to the amount of security they afforded.

It was also necessary to economize the ammunition and keep it for an assault or a sortie. Pemberton had a million more cartridges than percussion-caps, which discrepancy rendered the former quite useless. Every expedient was resorted to in order to supply this want. The cartridge-boxes of the killed and wounded among the Federals were carefully examined, while some daring individuals would undertake secretly to introduce these indispensable articles of ammunition into the place. Some, carrying them around their waists, would slip during the night across the thousand ravines which intersected the Federal lines, climbing acclivities in the dark which in the daytime would have given one the vertigo, and bringing to the besieged from outside, besides their precious freight, news and words of encouragement; others, disguised as Federal soldiers, would wander through the enemy's lines, carrying a canteen filled with percussion-caps appended to their shoulder-belts, which they dexterously threw at the Confederate skirmishers whenever an opportunity offered: nearly three hundred thousand caps were thus introduced.

The strict economy to which they were subjected paralyzed the defenders, especially during the early stages of the siege. Most of the Union batteries, once established, silenced almost entirely the fire of the besieged. As soon as a Confederate gun tried to break this silence fifteen or twenty cannon concentrated their fire upon it, and those serving it became a target for the balls of a swarm of Federal skirmishers, who were always on the lookout. In closing their embrasures the besiegers were soon able to make use of wooden blinds with impunity, which would only have been an additional danger if a bullet had struck them. The Confederates were, moreover, in a most disadvantageous position for the

use of the rifle, for, having to fire from an elevated site upon those below, they were obliged at each shot to expose almost half their bodies above the parapet; consequently, they seldom ventured to engage in this kind of unequal warfare with the trenches.

The labors of the besiegers, therefore, were seldom seriously interrupted, and their losses in the trenches were very trifling. We can mention but one vigorous sortie in the whole course of these operations. In the night of the 22d of June, Cummings' brigade of Stevenson's division surprised Herron's men at work near the Hall's Ferry road, destroying their trenches and making twelve prisoners. But this was an isolated exploit, and the Confederates did not actively interfere to delay the works of approach until the end of the siege, when they felt themselves too closely hemmed in.

The Southern generals frequently carried their anxiety to spare their men and ammunition too far, and by constantly forbidding the useless firing of muskets they allowed actual periods of truce to take place between the outposts of the two armies; which were all in the interest of the assailants, because these temporary suspensions of hostilities enabled them to prosecute their works in safety. Favored by these intervals of truce (generally nocturnal), the two lines of skirmishers would begin with an interchange of news at a short distance; then they drew nearer in order to converse more at ease and enter into political discussions; at times they would become so thoroughly mixed up that the officers of both parties were obliged to come to an understanding for the purpose of drawing a line of demarcation between their respective forces. But after having thus yielded to the cravings of humanity and forgotten for an instant their cruel trade, these same men would take up their muskets again, ready at the least alarm to resume the fight.

The sufferings and privations, however, were not the exclusive lot of the besieged. The want of water and extreme heat distressed the Federals exceedingly, giving rise to numerous diseases among them. The danger of an attack from Johnston, which might have compelled them to raise the siege, also entailed much anxious solicitude upon the generals and a considerable increase of labor on the soldiers.



In fact, it was not without cause that Pemberton relied for his deliverance upon the intervention of the chief from whom his errors and misfortunes had separated him. The latter, as we have stated, having no knowledge of the battle which had just been fought at Champion's Hill, had started on the 17th of May for Brownsville, in the hope of meeting Pemberton on the road from Edwards' Station to Clinton, north of the railroad; and on receiving the despatch in which his lieutenant announced the defeat he had sustained the day before, he had immediately sent him the order above mentioned, directing him to evacuate Vicksburg. On the 18th, having been apprised of the combat at the Big Black River bridge, he fell back north-westward upon Vernon, a village situated near the Big Black, twenty-six miles above Bridgeport: he thereby kept a passage open for Pemberton, in the hope that the latter, in obedience to his orders, would have ascended the right bank of this stream instead of falling back upon Vicksburg. But the next day, on being informed of the investment of the place, he thought of nothing else but to collect his scattered forces, giving them as a rallying-point Canton and the town of Jackson, which the Federals had abandoned since the morning of the 16th. His first care was, in fact, to reorganize the army intended to deliver Vicksburg. The Confederate government had determined to spare no effort to afford him the means to accomplish this object. Whilst Taylor, on the right bank of the Mississippi, was ordered to gather all his forces for marching from west to east to the relief of the besieged city, several brigades started from Mobile and Tullahoma to join Johnston. Finally, the latter sent Gardner a message ordering him to abandon Port Hudson and to bring all his forces over to him—a message, as we have seen, which did not reach this general, Port Hudson being already invested. Johnston, however, had not long to wait for the first reinforcements. On the 20th and 21st of May he hailed the arrival at Jackson of Gist's, Ector's, and McNair's brigades, detached from Tullahoma, and also Loring, who, with his six thousand soldiers, had been wandering about since the battle of Champion's Hill. Maxey joined him on the 23d. Finally, on the 3d of June, Breckinridge's division and Evans' brigade swelled the total amount of John-

ston's army to twenty-seven thousand men, three thousand of whom, under Jackson's command, were mounted.

It is true, this army was badly equipped for taking the field: it had but little material and scarcely any horses. The troops that had come from Tullahoma and Mobile by railroad had brought neither artillery nor wagons. Yet the town of Jackson was not sufficiently distant from Vicksburg to render these difficulties insurmountable, and if Johnston, by starting immediately after Evans' arrival, had attacked Grant before Vicksburg on the 7th or 8th of June, the position of the latter would have been extremely critical. In fact, previous to the landing of Herron, which took place on the 11th of June, the reinforcements he had received from Hurlbut did not increase the number of his army to more than fifty-two thousand men. Pemberton had at least twenty or twenty-two thousand in fighting condition, which, with Johnston's twenty-seven thousand, would have made a difference of only three or four thousand men between the Confederates and their adversaries. At this date the communications between the two Southern armies were yet sufficiently open to enable them to act in concert and carry out the plan which Pemberton suggested to his chief at a later period. This plan was to make Johnston menace the Federal lines at the north and draw Grant's forces to that side, while the garrison would take advantage of their absence to cut themselves a passage by way of the Warrenton road. But Johnston, on the faith of his lieutenant's reports, had persuaded himself that the Federals numbered more than sixty thousand men on the day that Vicksburg was invested. He had come to the conclusion that Grant's army would not be sensibly increased during the siege. Pemberton himself in his last despatch, dated the 22d of June, which crossed the Federal lines, told him that he could not attempt to deliver the place with less than forty thousand men: he had but twenty thousand in a condition to take the field. The Richmond government was always promising him reinforcements, which only came in small detachments, and was no doubt urging him to take the offensive, either against Grant or against Banks; which latter plan was altogether impracticable. Before starting, Johnston desired to wait

for the men and material that had been promised him. He thus allowed an opportunity to escape which never occurred again.

Grant, however, did not conceal from himself the danger to which he might be exposed. Since the 22d all his cavalry had been sent out to clear the country as far as the Big Black River, to destroy the bridges that had been thrown over this stream and its tributaries, and to pick up as many cattle as possible; Osterhaus had followed it and occupied the railroad-bridge; a corps of twelve thousand men, temporarily formed of detachments taken from various divisions, was sent on the 26th of May, under Blair's command, to oppose an expected movement of Johnston. At the end of one week this corps returned to Vicksburg, after having followed the course of the Yazoo for a distance of forty-four miles.

A few days previously Porter had sent five ships\* to visit this river and to destroy all the enemy's vessels that might happen to be lying there. The Federal fleet, arriving at Haines' Bluff on the 20th, had been the first to occupy this position, which had been abandoned by the enemy, and on the following day it reached Yazoo City at the very moment when a fire kindled by the Confederates was consuming the arsenal, together with three powerful vessels far advanced toward construction. When Blair took up his line of march a new expedition ascended the Yazoo: it proceeded as far as the vicinity of Fort Pemberton, penetrated into most of the tributaries of the river, and destroyed nine transport-ships of the enemy. These movements, however, were not sufficient to protect the Federal army, which, as we have stated, was only as yet forty thousand strong. The key to all Grant's positions was at Haines' Bluff. He knew that if Johnston succeeded in taking possession of this point, he would be compelled to raise the siege in order to recapture it. The naval force was temporarily entrusted with the task of guarding it. The naval brigade, still under the direction of the valiant family of Ellets, was charged with this important mission. At the same time, Mower's brigade, with twelve hundred mounted men, was detached from Sherman's corps for the purpose of keep-

\* The *De Kalb*, *Choctaw*, *Linden*, *Petrel*, and *Forest Rose*, under the command of Lieutenant-commander John. G. Walker.—Ed.

ing a watch over the crossings of the Big Black; and Kimball's division, which had landed on the 3d of June, was immediately sent after it. It was not on this side, however, that the Confederates directed their first efforts to relieve Vicksburg, but against Milliken's Bend, where there were large dépôts in charge of a single Federal brigade under General Dennis. This prey was the more tempting because several regiments of this brigade were composed of negroes, who were thought by the Confederates to be incapable of fighting. On the 7th of June a detachment from the Army of the Arkansas, about three thousand strong, attempted to surprise Milliken's Bend. But the Federals, white and black, vied with each other in exhibitions of courage, and the gunboats soon came down to aid them in repulsing the assailants. After this occurrence Mower's brigade was sent to reinforce the garrison of Milliken's Bend.

This diversion, however, did not deceive Grant in regard to the point where he was to expect the principal attack of the enemy: he knew that it was between the Yazoo and the Big Black. Consequently, Sooy Smith's division, which had just landed on the 8th, was stationed at Haines' Bluff, where it relieved the naval brigade. In the course of three days it created on these heights a vast intrenched camp capable of sheltering more than forty thousand men. It was, in fact, the point on which Grant intended to rest in case of a check or a defeat. At Haines' Bluff he was master of the Yazoo, kept up his communications with the Mississippi, and always menaced Vicksburg, the siege of which place he could resume at the first opportunity. From the 14th of June, the successive arrivals of Herron and Parke having swelled his forces to the number of seventy-five thousand men, he felt sure of being able to hold Johnston in check. One-half of his army was to take charge of this matter. Sooy Smith's and Kimball's divisions formed a corps of twelve thousand men, which occupied Haines' Bluff under General Washburne. Other detachments were stationed *en échelon* from this point as far as the Yazoo, while the divisions under A. J. Smith and Herron were ready to join them at the first signal. The command of this army of observation was given to Sherman. An almost continuous line of half-bastions, interspersed with redoubts for the field-artillery,



from Haines' Bluff to Big Black River, was completed by the 22d of June. This enormous work of circumvallation, which had a development equal to that of the lines of countervallation, enabled Sherman to hold in check all the forces that Johnston could bring against him, by allowing him time to concentrate the troops for repulsing an attack, whatever might be the point manaced.

This epoch, from the 22d to the 25th of June, marks the termination of the first period of the siege. The situation of the two adversaries may be summed up in a few words: Grant's army, which on the 22d of May only numbered thirty thousand combatants, has now reached seventy-five thousand. It has erected around Vicksburg from twelve to thirteen miles of fortifications, and constructed eighty-nine batteries, in which, a few days later, two hundred and twenty pieces of artillery were placed in position. Eight approaches have been directed against the place by Woods, Tuttle, Blair, Logan, A. J. Smith, Carr, Lauman, and Herron; at some points the foremost saps are within only ten or fifteen yards of the enemy's works. Finally, a corps of observation is located between the Yazoo and the Big Black; it keeps watch over a long line of circumvallation extending from river to river and resting its left upon the intrenched camp of Haines' Bluff.

Meanwhile, Johnston has gradually formed an army of twenty-six thousand men: he has gathered the material and the means of transportation, and is preparing to take the field. In Vicksburg the scarcity of provisions is beginning to be felt; the ammunition is used sparingly, and the health of the able-bodied men, whose numbers are daily reduced by sickness, is attended to. The artillery-fire has ceased completely, and the combatants are so near each other that they are obliged to fight at short range. The Confederates are throwing grenades into the trenches of the besiegers, which cause much damage: they try to undermine their works, and the Federals reply by resorting to the same means. This kind of warfare soon gives rise to fresh incidents. Logan's soldiers succeed in mining the great redan situated on the Jackson road, which was guarded by a portion of Forney's division. On the 25th of June, at half-past three o'clock in the afternoon, a violent explosion was heard, and the air was filled

with the fragments of the salient angle of this work, leaving a vast crater in its place; the whole interior was laid in ruins; a few sappers engaged in digging a countermine were crushed; nearly all the soldiers—few in number, however—who guarded the redan were killed, and it is even asserted that some among them were thrown alive into the Federal lines, where they found themselves prisoners as a result of this strange mode of travelling. A column of infantry soon climbs over the *débris* which the explosion has piled up in heaps, but the enemy is not taken unawares: he has erected a second line at the entrance of the work. The Sixth Missouri rushes forward in its turn to dispute the redan to the Unionists; being repulsed in this attack, it nevertheless succeeds in maintaining its position behind the new obstacle and pours a perfect torrent of grenades and packages of lighted cartridges upon the assailants, who are crowded within the crater. Cockerell's brigade comes to its assistance, and the combat is thus continued the whole night. In the morning the interior of the redan is abandoned by both parties, and the Federals plant themselves upon the remnants of the exterior parapet. They had lost about thirty men, and had only gained a few feet of ground, but they had weakened the enemy's line of defence.

In order to add to his discomfiture, a new mine was begun under another redan, situated on the left of the Jackson road, and on the 1st of July its explosion entirely destroyed this work, killing and wounding a large number of Confederates: some of them were buried under the *débris*, but disinterred safe and sound several hours after. In consequence of the position of this mine, the greater portion of the earth was thrown to the side of the besiegers, who quickly took possession of this kind of parapet and planted themselves on it, but did not try to carry the second line of the defences. Thenceforth the shovel and the pickaxe were no longer sufficient: it was necessary to prepare for the assault which was to give the final blow to the garrison. The parallels were enlarged and the drilling-grounds widened: all the necessary materials—ladders, planks, fascines, gabions—were got together near the points of attack, and the batteries so arranged as to concentrate their fire at a given signal. The solemn hour was approaching.

After a resistance which challenges the admiration of their enemies the defenders have reached the end of their resources. At the North as well as at the South the whole country follows with emotion the struggle of which Vicksburg is the price, and which is to have a decisive influence over the issue of the war. Consequently, the Confederates make a final effort to win a game which seems to be irrevocably lost.

Whilst Johnston is at last putting his army in motion the Confederate troops which occupy the vast territories west of the Mississippi are making vigorous efforts in order to oblige Grant to detach a portion of the forces encamped before Vicksburg, in hopes that Pemberton would be able to take advantage of this weakening to pierce the lines that are drawing close about him. Kirby Smith, who is exercising supreme command in this immense district, similar to that which Johnston exercised between the Alleghanies and the Mississippi, has organized two expeditions, to which the sudden attack on Milliken's Bend on the 7th of June was but a faint prelude. One of these expeditions, which Schofield and Blunt, paralyzed by Herron's departure, cannot disturb, is entrusted to the Army of the Arkansas. This army, too long inactive under Holmes, is to attack Helena, the only point that the Federals possess in East Arkansas, from which place they constantly menace Little Rock and all the centre of the State. If Vicksburg is to fall, Helena may probably replace it. The other expedition, commanded by the energetic Taylor, is to reconquer the Louisiana districts that Banks took possession of in April, capture Brashear City, try to interrupt the navigation of the Lower Mississippi, and even menace New Orleans, thus obliging the Army of Louisiana to raise the siege of Port Hudson.

The fifty-five thousand men that Holmes had under his command at the beginning of the year had seen their number diminish since then. As soon as Banks had taken the field it became necessary to detach a portion of them to hold him in check. In order to undertake new operations in Louisiana, Taylor was again obliged to borrow from Holmes a portion of the forces which occupied Arkansas. Holmes was left, therefore, with only the troops stationed *en échelon* at the various posts which marked the

limits of his occupation over a territory which stretched from the Mississippi to the deserts. On the 16th of June these troops were ordered to furnish some detachments which were to meet at Clarendon on the 26th. But heavy rains swelled the streams and broke up the roads to such a degree that, after unparalleled efforts, the whole of the forces only reached the point of concentration on the evening of the 30th. The army intended to be formed was composed of Price's division of infantry, comprising Parsons' and McRae's two brigades, one 1868 strong, and the other numbering 1227 men; of Fagan's brigade, with about eighteen hundred men; of Marmaduke's division of cavalry, 1750 strong; and of Walker's brigade of cavalry, numbering one thousand horses—in all, two thousand eight hundred mounted men and nearly five thousand infantry, with two or three batteries of artillery. On the 3d of July, Holmes arrived within five miles of Helena. But the information he obtained led him to the conclusion that the task he had proposed to accomplish would be beyond his strength.

The little town of Helena is situated upon low ground on the right bank of the Mississippi. At a distance of a little more than half a mile from the river, and in a parallel direction, there is a chain of hills, which at the east take the form of gentle and open slopes, but whose approaches on the west side abound in timber and deep ravines. When Curtis occupied Helena in July, 1862, he constructed a large and solid work, to which his name was given, between the town and the hills, near the Clarendon road, which in that region is called the Cemetery road: the guns of this fort commanded the gentle slopes of the hills, the ravines which divided them into three hillocks, and all the surrounding plain. After the capture of Arkansas Post, in January, 1863, Grant had stationed at Helena a large portion of the Thirteenth corps. When this general was called to Milliken's Bend, McClernand left in it a small division, numbering about three thousand men, under Prentiss. The better to defend this important position, the latter had erected redoubts on the three hillocks situated on the other side of Fort Curtis: that of the centre was near the Cemetery road; that of the right, or at the north, was on the hill called Reiter's Hill; and that at the



south was known by the name of Fort Hindman. Several lines of bastions formed a connection between them and defended their approaches; on the right of Reiter's Hill, on the plain and near the river, there was a fourth work which blockaded the Sterling road.

The slow movements of the Confederates had deprived them of every chance of a surprise: the garrison had been on its guard for the last two days. Holmes called a council of war. Price advised against making an attack, stating that the demonstration had already produced all its effects by compelling the enemy to leave one division at Helena, and that even if they should succeed in capturing the place, which was doubtful, they would not be able to hold it, the low grounds adjoining the river being always at the mercy of the Federal gunboats. Holmes would not listen to this sensible advice, and put his army on the march during the night. The attack was to be made at daybreak—by Price in the centre, against the redoubt on the Cemetery road; by Fagan on the right, against Fort Hindman. The cavalry formed the left of the army; Marmaduke was to dismount the larger portion of his division and make an assault upon the work which crowned the summit of Reiter's Hill, whilst Walker's brigade would try and slip between this work and the one situated on the bank of the river.

The roads which the Confederates had to traverse were in such a bad condition that they had to leave their artillery behind them. At four o'clock in the morning Fagan, on the right, opened the fight. The Unionists were ready to receive him, his approach having been signalled two hours before. A deep ravine, then a series of abatis, and three successive lines of half-bastions, separate Fagan from Fort Hindman: none of these obstacles, however, can stop him; his soldiers climb the steep acclivities of the ravine, cross the abatis, and carry the nearest works. But on arriving, out of breath, in close range of the guns of the redoubt, and being received by a volley of grape-shot, they are obliged fall back: they find shelter behind the third bastion and begin firing upon the fort. The whole brigade is engaged, and unless it is reinforced it will be impossible for it to carry the immense work before which its first effort has failed.

In the centre, Price, having arrived before daylight in front of the enemy's positions, has lost some time in placing McRae's brigade on his left, which is to take the Federal redoubt in the rear whilst Parsons attacks it in front. At last, about five o'clock, these two brigades rush forward: the Union artillery cannot stop them; the work is captured, with most of its defenders. Several pieces of artillery fall into the hands of the Confederates, but their muzzles having been choked with balls, they are rendered useless. On the left Marmaduke merely makes a faint demonstration, and does not even attempt to attack the redoubt of Reiter's Hill; whilst Walker, allowing himself to be checked by a small Federal detachment, gives him no assistance.

The Union line is pierced, but the assailants are exhausted by the very effort they have made, for they have no reserves to take advantage of this first success. The freshness of the morning has been succeeded by an oppressive heat. Price's troops are in a state of disorder impossible to describe. The Federals, on the contrary, in spite of the smallness of their number, have not lost courage: Fort Curtis and the three redoubts they still occupy concentrate their fire upon the work which the enemy has captured. Holmes hastens to the spot and makes one supreme effort. He hurls Parsons' brigade against Fort Curtis, ordering McRae to rally his scattered troops as much as possible and to attack Fort Hindman, before which Fagan's brigade is still to be found. But this double movement is productive of disastrous results. Parsons' soldiers, in coming down the hill with more dash than order, are cut down by the guns of Fort Curtis and those of the gunboat *Tyler*, which is lying at anchor in the river. The Confederates, unable to approach the fort, scatter among the gardens which surround it, and are soon dispersed. More than one-half of them are killed, wounded, or captured. The remainder make their escape in the best manner possible. In the mean while, McRae has been able to collect only two hundred and fifty men: he has to cross a ravine which is enfiladed by the guns of Fort Curtis, and when, at the head of this small band, he ventures to approach Fort Hindman, he is brought to a halt by a terrific fire; finally, after sustaining serious losses, he finds himself obliged to look for refuge near the position occupied by Fagan.

The attack has been a failure. At ten o'clock Holmes gives the signal for retreat. The remnants of Price's division, stationed in the work of the centre, evacuate it under a fire which causes great ravages among them, and toward evening the whole army sadly winds its way in the direction of Clarendon. On the same day, the 4th of July, as we will see presently, Grant was making his entry into Vicksburg.

The Federals were unable to pursue the enemy: they were scarcely three thousand strong, and the latter had left eleven hundred prisoners in their hands, among whom there was a large number of wounded. Holmes' losses amounted to 1636 men; those of Price,\* to hardly 250.

After this combat the Army of the Arkansas plunged into the interior of this State as quickly as it had come out, whilst Walker's cavalry brigade descended the Mississippi in the direction of Milliken's Bend. It roamed for a long time around the Federal dépôts, seizing every occasion to capture such detachments as were imprudent enough to stray too far from them, and preventing the enemy from occupying the rich plantations of the interior whence he could have procured both provisions and cotton.

The expedition led by Taylor into Lower Louisiana made a better beginning than that of Holmes.

The necessities of the war had finally prevailed over political considerations among Banks' advisers. As soon as this general was able to ship the material, the wagons, the sick, and the fugitive negroes that had gathered in Alexandria, he evacuated this place in order to assemble all his forces in front of Port Hudson. In the beginning of June he had abandoned all the country between Bayou Teché, the Mississippi, and Red River—a country he had taken possession of six weeks before. Taylor, collecting his forces, soon made his appearance there, occupying Alexandria, Opelousas, and even Fort De Russy, without striking a blow. The Lafourche district alone remained in the hands of the Federals. But its defence was entrusted to troops numerically weak and greatly scattered, to invalid soldiers and officers affected by the prostrating climate of Louisiana, to regiments newly formed and badly disciplined. Since the cam-

\* Prentiss.—Ed.

paign of April, no one among these small garrisons had expected to see the enemy appear. No preparation had been made to receive him, and everybody was leading a life of the greatest unconcern amid the camps of the sick and of fugitive negroes and the immense dépôts of supplies, ammunition, and material which offered a prey to be coveted by the Confederates. Brashear City continued to be the centre of Federal establishments in that district. Protected by a gunboat and a large fortification mounted with heavy guns on the side of Atchafalaya, covered at the north and south by marshes which extended on one side to the lake, and on the other side, as far as the eye could reach, toward the shore of the Gulf of Mexico, this town seemed to be protected against any sudden attack. A few small posts were *écheloned* along the New Orleans railroad, the Bayou Lafourche, Thibodeaux, and Lafourche. Finally, at Donaldsonville, a point where this bayou emerges from the Mississippi, a fort had been constructed along the edge of the river, which was in charge of Major Bullen,\* an intelligent, energetic officer, with two hundred and twenty-five men.

At the news of Taylor's return to Alexandria and Opelousas, the Texans, most of whom had left him, hastened to join his force again. These daring partisans were admirable soldiers for such an expedition as he was about to undertake. Inured to the hardest modes of life, sober, active, excellent horsemen, always ready to dismount and fight on foot or on the water—but little amenable to rigorous discipline, it must be allowed, and as quick in picking quarrels as they were eager in battle, but without rancor and full of devotion to the chiefs who knew how to make themselves loved by them—they hastened the more readily to dispute the rich provinces of Louisiana to the abolitionists because, full of undeserved contempt for the Creoles whom they were coming to defend, they relied on this opportunity for showing how vastly superior they were to them.

Taylor had about six or seven thousand men under his command, most of them mounted. He divided them into two columns. One, formed by Colonel Major's brigade, was ordered to descend the river in the direction of Bayou Lafourche by passing

\* Of the Twenty-eighth Maine.—ED.



between the Atchafalaya and the Mississippi. He himself, with Mouton's and Green's brigades, followed the Bayou Teché. He proposed to make an assault upon Brashear City from the front, whilst Major would attack this place in the rear after having cut off its communications with New Orleans. This bold plan met with complete success.

On the 10th of June, Major crossed the Atchafalaya at Morgan's Ferry with two regiments of cavalry and one of infantry, and after making a demonstration in front of Port Hudson, proceeded with great speed toward Plaquemine, of which he took possession. Here he captured a detachment of invalids and destroyed three small Federal transports. At Bayou Coula, on the 10th, he recaptured, to use his own expression, about one thousand stolen negroes. On the 20th, avoiding Donaldsonville, he passed through Thibodeaux, which had been abandoned by the enemy; then he continued his march along the right bank of Bayou Lafourche in order to reach Terrebonne and destroy the railroad at this point, the only line of retreat for the garrison of Brashear City. At the news of his approach Colonel Stickney, who commanded the garrison, brought all the able-bodied men he was able to get together to Terrebonne—say, about three or four hundred. He had posted himself with this small band in a work forming the entrance to the bridge on the right side of the bayou, and repulsed the attacks which Major directed against him on the 21st. But, in the meanwhile, a Confederate detachment had taken possession of the railroad west of this work, which was thereby turned. Major hastened to take advantage of it: leaving Stickney and his troops behind him, he pushed his heads of column toward Brashear City, whose weakened garrison became thenceforth isolated: he was to meet Taylor's two brigades in front of this place. On the evening of the 23d he was only a short distance from it, having reached a canal called Bayou Bœuf, whose crossing was defended by a small Federal fort.

During this time, Taylor, assembling his troops at Pattersonville on the Bayou Teché, had marched in the direction of Brashear City, and on the 22d he occupied Berwick City, situated in front of this town on the other side of the Atchafalaya. His artillery, having been placed in position, caused much confusion among the

garrison, which was not expecting such an attack, and drove off the Federal gunboats guarding the river, which at this point separates the two towns. During the night three regiments of dismounted Texan cavalry crossed the Atchafalaya in boats they had found in the Bayou Teché, and posted themselves in the vicinity of the Federal works behind a canal which had protected their landing. In the mean time, three hundred more mounted Texans got into small boats, whose oars were muffled that their strokes might not be heard on board any Federal vessels that should happen to be on the lake. Launching boldly upon its waters in these frail boats, they traversed it for a distance of nearly thirteen miles to go to the relief of Major, east of Brashear City. In the morning they landed in the midst of marshes filled with dwarfish palm trees, inhabited by alligators, and considered by the Federals as impassable. A few hours later they suddenly debouched upon the mainland, and their appearance threw the defenders of Brashear City into great confusion. The other troops of Taylor, who had crossed the Atchafalaya the day before, had only to enter the place to take possession of it. It was at this moment that Major, whose cannon had been the signal of attack across the marshes, opened fire upon the fort of Bayou Bœuf. This work immediately surrendered, and in the evening Taylor's small army was united in Brashear City. It was the mistress of the whole of West Louisiana. The key of this province had fallen into its hands, with storehouses whose value was estimated at more than two millions of dollars. During this brief campaign it had captured about twenty pieces of artillery, nearly eighteen hundred soldiers of the enemy—most of whom, it is true, were either sick or convalescent—and more than five thousand negroes, who were remanded into slavery.

Stickney had fallen back upon New Orleans, the garrison of which did not number more than seven hundred men. Taylor did not venture to follow him: he knew that he would find Farragut's fleet alongside of the levees of this great city. But, encouraged by his success, he sent out Green's and Major's brigades to attack Donaldsonville, which the latter had not dared to approach a few days previously with his scanty troops. These two brigades of cavalry numbered nearly three thousand men.

During the night of the 26th, Green made them dismount and attack the fort with great vigor. But the two hundred and twenty-five men in charge of it, assisted by three Federal gunboats, repulsed all his attacks, and he was compelled to beat a retreat, after losing one hundred and seven men taken prisoners and one hundred and fifty-three disabled. He was not even able to save a detachment of considerable size which was caught between two fires, except through the not very honorable expedient of bringing them back under the protection of a flag of truce. After this check he contented himself with merely erecting a few batteries along the river-side, intended to intercept the passage of transports laden with provisions for Banks' army.

The latter, notwithstanding Taylor's success, had no idea of raising the siege of Port Hudson: he knew that, once master of this place, he would soon be able to recapture what he had just lost. The fate of the whole Mississippi Valley depended, in fact, on the great struggle that was going on before Vicksburg, and it may be said that, so far as regards their mutual designs, Taylor was not more successful than Holmes, inasmuch as neither of them had been able to divert the Federals from the siege they had undertaken. Grant expressed the sentiments not only of his army, but of the entire North, in announcing that he should remain before Vicksburg until he was able to enter it, if he had to wait thirty years.

In concluding our account of the subordinate operations in the game of which Vicksburg was the stake, we must say a few words concerning the cavalry encounters which took place in the northern part of the State of Mississippi. After Grierson's expedition, which took him as far as Louisiana, the Federal cavalry which had remained around Corinth found itself much weakened. Reinforcements, however, soon arrived, which enabled it to take the field once more. On the 25th of May this body of cavalry resumed the offensive, and, pushing forward as far as Senatobia, after a brief engagement drove the Confederates beyond the Tallahatchie. During the month of June the latter, anxious to conceal their real weakness, showed themselves very active. On the 4th, Wirt Adams' troopers, who covered Johnston's small army, advanced as far as Satartia on the

Yazoo River, and did not retire until after meeting the superior forces of Colonel Kimball. A fortnight later the Confederate Ruggles undertook to cut the railroad from Memphis to Corinth at Pocahtontas, but the Federals having been warned of his movements, Colonel Phillips proceeded as far as Ripley to meet him, and repulsed him on the 16th of June at Rocky Crossing on the Tallahatchie, taking about thirty prisoners. Another Federal detachment, under Major Henry, was less fortunate. He was surprised on the same day at Hernando by a second Confederate column, under General Chalmers, who, in order to support Ruggles' movement, was advancing directly upon Memphis: Henry was taken prisoner, with nearly the whole of his force, numbering four hundred men. In order to avenge this disaster, Colonel Mizner was immediately sent, with one regiment, in pursuit of Chalmers. He reached Panola, destroyed the railroad-bridges in the neighborhood of this village, and then, striking in the rear Chalmers' troops, which had taken a position farther north, on the borders of Cold Water River, he drove them back so vigorously as to compel them to disperse in order to avoid Henry's fate. These trifling engagements evidently did not exercise any serious influence over the campaign.

Will Johnston be more fortunate than Holmes and Taylor? Will he be able to overcome the tenacity of the Federal general? Such were the questions propounded by every one. He did not possess the means for doing what was expected of him. In order to afford him these means, the Confederate government should have taken away from Bragg a portion of his army, abandoning Tennessee, and by that same act opening the gates of Atlanta to Rosecrans. It would have been a great risk, but it might probably have been rewarded for this bold determination. Johnston did not dare the responsibility of taking it, and the reinforcements that were forwarded to the town of Jackson could not compare with those which doubled Grant's army in three weeks.

Nevertheless, Johnston, having finally received the material he was expecting, set out for Big Black River on the 29th of June at the head of twenty-six thousand men, and encamped on the 1st of July between Brownsville and that stream. He was still



in hope of being able to make a diversion which should enable Pemberton to make his escape. But he was too late. If he had crossed the river, he would necessarily have come in contact with the works which Sherman occupied with an army superior to his own. Conscious of his inferiority, he made useless reconnaissances during two days in order to find a favorable crossing. Pemberton, on his part, was so completely surrounded that none of Johnston's messages reached him. He was aware that everything in the Federal camp was ready for an assault, and that he would probably not be able to repulse it, and that, even if he should succeed in doing so, the want of provisions and ammunition would oblige him to capitulate a few days after. The idea he had entertained for a moment of crossing the river in hastily-constructed boats was impracticable: he could not have effected such a passage secretly. On the 2d of July he consulted his four division commanders, who replied that under no circumstances were their men in a condition to bear the fatigues of an active campaign.

Even if Johnston had made a diversion in their favor, they would not have had the strength to make their escape, and they should only have come out of their intrenchments to be captured or destroyed a little farther on. There was nothing else to be done, therefore, but to obtain the best possible conditions from the enemy, and on that account it was important not to wait until the last ration of food was exhausted.

On the 3d of July, the very day on which the battle of Gettysburg was ended, General Bowen, accompanied by a flag of truce, presented himself before the Federal outposts, asking for the appointment of a commission to discuss the terms of capitulation. Grant having declared that he could only treat personally with Pemberton, the two generals met at three o'clock at the foot of a solitary tree which stood within two hundred feet of the Confederate lines.

The white flag was floating over all the fortifications. The incessant roar of the cannon had been followed by a silence which was the more solemn because it was unusual, the siege having now lasted forty-five days. The weather was oppressively warm; a pending storm seemed to hesitate whether to burst or

not, as if it desired to imitate the combatants, whose suspended strife was ready to be renewed at the slightest signal. The parapets, battered by cannon-shot, were covered with an anxious crowd of Confederate soldiers watching the two individuals whose conference was about to decide their fate. Pemberton and Grant shook hands, but after an hour's talk they separated without having arrived at any conclusion, because the former insisted upon leaving the place free with all the honors of war. General Bowen, who, with other officers, witnessed from a distance this interview, and who appreciated, better than Pemberton perhaps, the necessity for yielding in time, then came forward and proposed to have a preliminary talk with some Federal officers for the purpose of ascertaining what conditions would be likely to be accepted by the two generals-in-chief. He appears even to have tried to enter upon this discussion at once. But Grant, who knew the rights and duties of a commander, soon broke off this conference. The armistice was prolonged until the following morning. In the course of the evening the Federal commander made known his ultimatum to Pemberton.\* The latter should deliver into his hands the town and the material, himself and all his army remaining as prisoners of war; but inasmuch as Vicksburg was the point where, by the convention of September 25, 1862, prisoners were to be liberated on parole, they should all enjoy this privilege. As soon as each man had inscribed his name in the prisoners' register and signed his parole-papers, Pemberton and his army should leave Vicksburg, accompanied by thirty wagons, the soldiers taking nothing but their personal effects in their knapsacks, the officers keeping their swords and one horse each. The convention of the 25th of September stipulated that all prisoners taken by either party without any conditions should be liberated on parole within ten days after their capture: in according this treatment to Pemberton's soldiers, Grant, in the first place, secured an entire freedom of movement for his army, hoping, in the second place, that the vanquished soldiers of Vicksburg, by carrying their recriminations against the leaders

\* *Progress* (Philadelphia, July 30, 1881) contains a letter from Lieutenant-general Pemberton, giving in detail the preliminaries and circumstances of the surrender, which differs materially from any other account.—ED.

who had betrayed them, with the recital of their sufferings, through the Confederacy, would spread therein the fruitful seeds of discouragement.

On the morning of the 4th of July—a day when the whole of America celebrates the anniversary of the Declaration of its independence—the white flags reappeared upon the Confederate works: they made known to both parties that Grant's conditions had been accepted by Pemberton after consultation with all his generals. At ten o'clock precisely the Federals beheld long columns of men, dressed in brown or in gray, emerging from those works which until then they had not been able to approach except at the peril of their lives. Some defile by way of the postern-gates, others jump over the parapets, which are thenceforth useless: they stack their muskets, and, silently planting their colors upon that soil which has been watered by the blood of their comrades, range themselves in front of their lines. These troops number thirty-two thousand six hundred men, of whom twenty-one hundred and thirty-eight are officers and fifteen are generals; the artillery consisted of seventy-two guns, more than half of which were field-pieces.

Logan's division was the first to enter Vicksburg: it had fully deserved this honor. Grant rode at the head. He immediately repaired to the head-quarters of Pemberton, where the latter, seated under a verandah, was watching, with his staff, the entry of the conquerors. At his approach this group of officers did not rise to salute him; but, victory having given him the right not to be too fastidious, he pretended not to have noticed the slight, and, addressing himself to Pemberton, asked him how many rations were wanted for his army, the Federals being obliged to feed it until its departure. On Pemberton replying that his forces numbered more than thirty-two thousand men, Grant could scarcely conceal his astonishment, for since the beginning of the siege he had been under the impression that he had only fifteen or twenty thousand men before him.

On that same day Sherman took his departure in order to place himself at the head of the Army of Observation: he took with him Steele's division, and was joined by the Thirteenth corps, commanded by General Ord. A fortnight before, McClelland

had been relieved of the command of this corps. Subsequent to the assault of May 22d, Grant had accused him of having, through exaggerated statements contained in his despatches, caused great and useless sacrifices to the army by obliging it to renew the attack. McClelland aggravated his faults by publishing, in an irregular manner, a congratulatory order in which he criticised the other army corps, and Grant availed himself of this violation of discipline to relieve him at once. Sherman's army consisted of his own corps, the Fifteenth, commanded by Steele; of the Thirteenth, under Ord, reinforced by Lauman's division; and of the Ninth, commanded by Parke, to which was added Sooy Smith's division—more than forty thousand men in all.

It was important to drive back, as far as possible, Johnston, whose presence had been signalled along the Big Black. Since the 30th of June this general had been vainly endeavoring to find the flaw in the armor of his opponent: the reconnoissances he had pushed forward between Haines' Bluff and the Big Black having convinced him that the Federal positions north of the railroad were impregnable, he decided to approach them from the south; and was about starting in that direction on the 5th of July when he heard of the capitulation of Vicksburg. He immediately fell back to Jackson, which he reached with his army on the evening of the 7th. On the 5th, Sherman had gathered his three corps together on the Big Black, crossing this river at three different points—Ord on the right, at the railroad-bridge; Steele in the centre, at Messenger's Ferry; and the Ninth corps on the left, at Birdsong Ferry. The passage of the two first-mentioned corps was completed by the 6th of July, the Ninth corps not reaching the other side of the river until the 7th. On the following day the whole army was assembled at Bolton, and on the 9th it appeared before Jackson. The heat was stifling, and the troops suffered terribly during the march.

Johnston did not possess the means of holding the Federals in check in an open country, but he found a solid support in the works surrounding Jackson. For the last two months he had labored to develop them, with very insufficient resources at his command, and had formed a continuous line describing a semi-circle around the city, the two extremities of which rested on



Pearl River. Unfortunately for him, this line was weak in itself, consisting of half-bastions or simple rifle-pits, forming a connection between batteries of too little prominence; and, moreover, it was commanded by the enemy's guns at many points. An army of thirty thousand men, still full of ardor and supported by numerous artillery, occupied these lines. This army was composed of four strong divisions: that of Loring was at the extreme right, and Walker's in the right centre; the left centre was formed by French, and the extreme left by Breckinridge; Jackson, with his cavalry, covered the two wings as far as Pearl River above and below the place.

Sherman, not deeming it feasible to carry this position by assault, resolved to compel his adversary to abandon it without a fight or to assume the offensive. The place was partially invested by the Thirteenth corps on the right, the Fifteenth in the centre, and the Ninth on the left. Lines of countervallation were immediately made: the bales of cotton which had been found in the neighborhood constituted excellent parapets; and the two wings were gradually extended far enough to enable their works to rest on Pearl River above and below Jackson. While a musketry and artillery fire kept the besieged on the alert, detachments of cavalry traversed the country north and south. Some of them, advancing as far as sixty miles, destroyed the important railway called the Mississippi Central Railroad, thus reducing Johnston to a single line of communication with the exterior, that of the Southern Railroad. By extending his lines as far as Pearl River, Sherman was in hope of being able to turn Johnston's position by degrees, and to thus menace this second line.

On the 12th of July, Lauman, who formed the extreme right of the army, sustained a bloody check while endeavoring to execute this movement. On that side the railroad follows a parallel direction with Pearl River for some distance west of this water-course. The Confederate works made a salient angle at the point where they intersected the road, and the line comprised between the railroad and the river again pursued its course south-eastward in an oblique direction. Not being cognizant of this disposition of the ground, which the woods prevented him from noticing, and ignoring, as it appears, the instructions of his chief,

Lauman, after passing beyond the railroad line, on which Hovey rested his right, marched directly eastward in order to reach Pearl River. During this march he struck the enemy's works, and, taking them for mere advanced intrenchments, tried to capture them. Breckinridge was there in full force waiting for him, and he was repulsed with a loss of nearly five hundred men and three stands of colors. The next day he succeeded in taking a position a little lower down on the Pearl, out of reach of the enemy's guns, whilst Parke, on the left, reached the river above Jackson almost at the same time. Grant did not forgive him for his imprudence, and deprived him of the command of his division. In the mean while, the Federal force had been increased, and a heavy fire directed upon the place since twelve o'clock in the morning. But the ammunition was beginning to fail, and it became necessary to await the trains that brought fresh supplies, which were not due until the 16th: after receiving them Sherman intended to resume operations with vigor, and, if he discovered a weak point in the enemy's line, to attack it immediately.

Johnston did not allow him time to carry out his project. He had supposed that the want of water for cooking purposes in the neighborhood would not have permitted the Federals to take a position in front of the place and make regular attacks upon it. He felt strong enough to repulse a sudden attack, but not for sustaining a siege: the works were not in a condition to resist a bombardment, his guns were of too small calibre, and the Federal batteries, posted in commanding positions, covered all the camps of his army with projectiles. Finding that, notwithstanding the difficulties of the operation, Sherman was beginning to invest him, he made immediate preparations for a retreat which had become necessary; but he would wait until the last moment. He finally learned that Sherman had received the ammunition he was expecting, and the evacuation was accomplished during the night of the 16th with that success and precision which marked all similar operations made under the direction of this skilful general. The army crossed the Pearl River over ponton-bridges which had been prepared for the passage of the Big Black River, and, proceeding eastward, it reached Brandon on the 17th. When the Federals entered Jackson on the morning of the same day, they found

nothing but insignificant trophies: the bridges of Pearl River were on fire, and the enemy, following the line of the Southern Railroad, which he destroyed behind him, was already out of reach of their guns. After stopping for a few days at Morton, Johnston finally reached Meridian. On the 18th, Sherman sent out after him Steele's division, which proceeded as far as Brandon, but he had no idea of pursuing the Confederates beyond that point: he returned to Vicksburg on the 25th of July, after accomplishing the destruction of railroads, dépôts, and a portion of the fortifications around Jackson, and making liberal distribution of provisions among the inhabitants of this wretched country, whom the war had reduced to the most abject poverty. He had lost about one thousand men, and Johnston six hundred, in the siege of Jackson. But, notwithstanding the insignificance of this loss, the Confederate army was doomed for some time through this campaign to utter helplessness.

At the same time an expedition made up of military and naval forces was sent against Yazoo City. The place had been occupied on the 13th of July. The Twenty-ninth North Carolina, which was doing garrison-duty there, had surrendered almost without a fight; but the Federal gunboat *De Kalb* had previously been sunk by the explosion of a torpedo while ascending the river.

The effects of the capture of Vicksburg were soon felt throughout the entire lower valley of the Mississippi. Since the assault he had delivered against the works of Port Hudson on the 14th of June, Banks had adopted the same system of attack that Grant had pursued against Vicksburg. But, with the exception of Grierson's cavalry, which in spite of its activity was scarcely sufficient to clear him, no reinforcement had reached the small Federal army. The latter was then reduced to ten thousand men. Nevertheless, instead of sending him reinforcements, Grant was asking Banks to bring troops over to him, which would have left the whole Lower Mississippi and New Orleans utterly defenceless and exposed to the combined attacks of Gardner and Taylor.

Notwithstanding their numerical weakness, the besiegers had vigorously pushed forward the approaches against the citadel of Port Hudson along the ridge captured by their left in the assault

of the 14th of June. These approaches were within ten yards of the enemy's works, under which a mine had been sprung. To apply the match, they only waited for the completion of a trench on the extreme right, which would have enabled them to make the assault at two points simultaneously.

On its own part, the garrison, reduced to twenty-five hundred able-bodied men by a siege of forty-five days' duration, had exhausted all its provisions. The hope that Johnston would come to deliver them after causing the siege of Vicksburg to be raised alone sustained those valiant soldiers. But Banks on the 6th of July is apprised of Pemberton's capitulation: the news is spread at once through all the camps; a cry of joy goes up from all the trenches of the besiegers, while all the Federal soldiers who occupy the lines nearest to the place hasten to communicate the news to their opponents. On that same evening the bearer of a flag of truce presented himself at Banks' head-quarters, asking, on the part of Gardner, for an official confirmation of this event. He was handed a copy of Grant's despatch, and on the following day the place capitulated. The garrison, numbering 6408 men, like that of Vicksburg, were taken prisoners, and released on parole a few days later, excepting the officers, who were sent to New Orleans. Banks took possession of Port Hudson on the 9th, and immediately set about the task of recovering from Taylor the section of country the latter had just seized. Finally, even before the surrender of the place, seven transports were getting under way, having Grover and Weitzel on board, with the largest portion of Banks' army; the remainder were left at Port Hudson and Baton Rouge. These two divisions arrived at Donaldsonville on the same day, and began landing. At once, Green, who had remained in the neighborhood, assembled his forces on the 12th of July, and, falling suddenly upon the advance-guard of Grover, put it to flight, after capturing three pieces of artillery and three hundred prisoners. He was, however, soon compelled to retire before the small Federal army, which, striking the route followed by Major a month before, took possession of the whole Lafourche district without striking a blow. On the 22d of July, Taylor evacuated Brashear City, and retired toward the interior by ascending the Bayou Teché.



On the 16th of July, for the first time since the beginning of the strife, a vessel coming direct from Cairo was moored at the wharves of New Orleans. The Federal flag which floated at her mast's head had not drawn a single cannon-shot upon her during the whole voyage. The Mississippi was open, the Confederacy was split in two, and the States of the Far West, being no longer able to supply the Southern armies with the resources they so much needed, had but an insignificant part to play for the remainder of the war.

A few days previously Vicksburg had witnessed the last act in the great drama which we have followed in all its various phases. The registration of prisoners and the signing of parole-tickets had occupied a week. In the mean time, the two armies, encamping together, lived on the most friendly terms. They had learned to respect each other. Seven hundred Confederates refused to return South; others openly announced their intention of not again joining the army. Pemberton wanted to compel them all to follow him, and requested Grant to supply him with arms to prevent his soldiers from deserting before they had reached the camps where they had to wait for an exchange. The Federal general naturally refused, the police of the Confederacy being none of his business.

Finally, on the 11th of July all the preliminary arrangements were completed. All the able-bodied men of the Confederate army assembled in companies, regiments, brigades, and divisions, as if about to undergo an unarmed inspection, and, led by their chiefs, took up the line of march along the Baldwin's Ferry road, by which they were to reach the Big Black River bridge and Raymond. The Federal soldiers were drawn up in line on both sides of the road. Their chiefs had strictly enjoined them to observe silence and to manifest the utmost regard for the feelings of the vanquished—a superfluous injunction, for the two armies were full of kindly feeling for each other, and during the eight days they had passed side by side the Unionists seemed to have taken upon themselves the task of making their adversaries forget the painful situation in which they were placed. Grant did not make his appearance: satisfied with the victory he had achieved, the approbation of his country, and the respect of his enemies, like a true

citizen of a free country he attached no importance whatever to the insolent pomp of a capitulation. He despised those formalities so humiliating to brave though unfortunate soldiers, and which are the supreme delight of men with whom military genius is associated with vulgar souls. Neither salvoes of artillery nor shouts of joy on this occasion formed a contrast with the grief of those brave Confederate soldiers who, with tears in their eyes, cast a last lingering glance upon the place whose ramparts they had so heroically defended. In passing the intrenchments the roll-call was formally gone through, and that was the end of it. On the evening of this mournful day their column disappeared behind the woods which surround Vicksburg. Shortly after it crossed the Big Black River bridge, and then the battlefield of Champion's Hill. It is easy to imagine what must have been the feelings of these soldiers and their unhappy leaders in again beholding the mournful scene of their defeat. Must they not have envied the fate of those who had perished with arms in hand during these fatal encounters, and who had thus been spared the spectacle of this grievous issue of a long campaign?

They had not, however, reached the end of their troubles. The heat was suffocating, the road dusty, the water scarce and of bad quality, the men worn out by watching and privations. The country they were traversing was ravaged by the war and abandoned by its inhabitants. They were made to avoid the town of Jackson, which Johnston had but recently evacuated, so that until their arrival at Brandon they did not see a single house nor was there a friendly hand held out to them by way of encouragement. Physical sufferings and discouragement soon engendered irritability and insubordination among these men, who had been so well disciplined up to the present time. As Pemberton had predicted, their dissatisfaction broke out when, instead of being sent home, they were told that they were about to be taken to distant camps and wait to be exchanged, so that they might again join the armies in the field. The government, knowing how difficult it would be to again pick them up when once inside of their homesteads, had decided to grant them no leave of absence. A large number deserted immediately: the remainder, having arrived at Brandon, mutinied when it was sought to force them on

board trains of cars which were ready for them. They loudly demanded the body of the unfortunate Pemberton, that they might hang him. The officers, who alone had preserved their arms, had to draw their swords in order to compel obedience. When they landed at Demopolis, whence they were to be sent into the interior, exasperated by the insulting remarks of women who crowded around all the stations to reproach them for their capitulation, they attacked the guard who had charge of them, and were only brought to submission with great difficulty. Grant had shown much political sagacity in predicting that the return of this vanquished army, by disseminating discouragement everywhere, would do more serious damage to the cause of the South than even the loss of Vicksburg.

The 3d and 4th of July, 1863, mark a decided epoch in the war, and it may be said that they divide the history of it into two parts. In the first the amount of success is rather in favor of the Confederates, despite the loss of Kentucky, Missouri, a portion of Tennessee, and Louisiana. The progress of the Federals is so slow that unless one has a thorough knowledge of their tenacity and resources the impression would be that the slaveholding Confederacy is certain of obtaining recognition at the end of a few years.

In the West, Rosecrans has remained inactive near the battlefield of Murfreesborough for the last six months; Arkansas is abandoned and New Orleans menaced; finally, during the last year Vicksburg has been holding the Federal fleets and armies in check.

At the East, the Southern soldiers have met with success after success. As will be seen in the latter part of this volume, it is no longer Richmond, but Washington, Baltimore, and Philadelphia that are menaced in the beginning of the summer of 1863. In the course of five months the Army of the Potomac has sustained two sanguinary defeats, and Lee has transferred the war to the soil of the free States. But Lee's invasion has been brought abruptly to a stop before the heights of Gettysburg on the day preceding the capitulation of Vicksburg, which changed the whole aspect of the war in the West. From this moment, notwithstanding the desperate courage of their opponents, the defeats

of the Federals will be promptly repaired, while their victories will be productive of decisive results.

"The Mississippi should belong to a single nation." Such had been the first cry of the volunteers from the North-western States at the news of secession. This wish was realized, and by the same stroke slavery, the cause of the war, received its death-blow. The conquest of the mighty river, which had so unfortunately begun with the combat at Belmont, was completed two years later by the same general who had sustained this first reverse. Columbus and Island No. 10, the forts of New Orleans and Memphis, Vicksburg and Port Hudson, have successively fallen. The cannon which bristled over the battlements of these citadels have been silenced for the remainder of the war.

Before closing we may sum up in a few words the six months' campaign which has led to this great result. In January, 1863, we find Vicksburg stronger than it had ever been: Grant has not succeeded in reaching the place by land, and Sherman has sustained a bloody check amid the surrounding marshes. Haines' Bluff covers this town on the Yazoo—Port Hudson forbids an approach from the south. During three months Grant has been vainly trying to turn these positions: Porter and Farragut are not more fortunate. The ships which force the passes of Vicksburg and Port Hudson find themselves blockaded between these two citadels. Finally, by a bold movement, Grant places his army south of Vicksburg, while Porter's fleet comes to aid its passage to the other side of the Mississippi. The battle of Port Gibson secures him the possession of this bank. At Raymond and Jackson he divides his adversaries into two parts, thus interfering with the movements of Johnston. At Champion's Hill and at Big Black River Bridge he fights Pemberton and compels him to shut himself up in Vicksburg. Haines' Bluff is occupied on the 18th of May, and the place invested on the 19th. A useless assault is attempted on the 22d, and the labors of the siege at once commence.

In the mean time, Banks has marched from New Orleans upon Alexandria, and, embarking on Red River, has come to invest Port Hudson. He tries in vain to carry this place on the 27th of May and the 14th of June, but the ground gained during



these two days enables him to invest the garrison a little closer. Holmes and Taylor west of the Mississippi, and Johnston at the east, make fruitless demonstrations to relieve the besieged fortresses. Fresh reinforcements have doubled Grant's army, which, in addition to its siege-labors, has constructed a line of fortifications intended to put a stop to Johnston's attack. Finally, on the 4th of July, Pemberton capitulates, and three days later Gardner surrenders the works at Port Hudson to Banks.

Since the 1st of May, Grant's army had taken 42,059 prisoners, and that of Banks 10,584 from the time it took the field in the middle of April. Grant had bought his victory at the cost of 1243 killed, 7095 wounded, and 535 prisoners, or 8873 men in all;\* Banks had lost three or four thousand. But the number of killed and wounded in the armies that were opposed to them amounted to nearly twelve or thirteen thousand; which number, being added to the prisoners taken by these two generals, gives a total of sixty-five thousand combatants taken from the Confederate ranks in the course of three months—a loss still more difficult to be repaired than that of the fortresses and provinces which the sacrifices made by these soldiers were unable to save.

\* A revised statement of casualties during the operations against Vicksburg, from May 1 to July 4, 1863, prepared in the office of the adjutant-general of the army, shows 1511 killed, 7396 wounded, and 453 captured or missing—a total of 9360.—ED.

## BOOK III.—PENNSYLVANIA.

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### CHAPTER I.

#### *LEGISLATION.*

WE have reached the most critical period of the war, and a collective glance at the situation of the two sections of the American people armed against each other is necessary to an understanding of the importance of the military events we are about to narrate in this book. The war has been progressing for the last two years, and its continuation has destroyed those illusions with which both parties had begun the struggle. The South, encouraged by its early successes, had arrived at the conclusion that the North, unable to undergo heavy sacrifices for any length of time, would consent to the dismemberment of the federation of States or to the formation of a new government guaranteeing the maintenance and expansion of slavery. The North had imagined that it had only a simple insurrection to deal with, and was in hope that a single victory would suffice to restore the Union without effecting any change in the Federal status, and without touching the social question which had just shaken this status to its very foundation. We have shown how the battle-ground had been gradually widened, how the deep-seated causes of the antagonism between the North and the South had been developed with irresistible force, in spite of the constitutional euphemisms which had hitherto concealed them. In issuing his proclamation emancipating the slaves, Mr. Lincoln had been influenced much more by the provocations of slaveholders than by the pressure of abolitionists. At the beginning of the year 1863 the question was therefore clearly drawn between the two hostile governments of Washington and Richmond. It was a struggle between two social conditions thenceforth incompatible under the same laws. The original quarrel regarding

State Sovereignty was forgotten. After having cleverly turned it to account, the iron hand of Jefferson Davis had crushed out this pretended sovereignty in the network of a centralized despotism a thousand times more powerful than the authority exercised by his opponent. All the advantages of the military and political position were in favor of the Confederates. During the last two years they had been inured to the hardships of war and the voids made in their ranks had been promptly filled. Notwithstanding the extraordinary efforts of the free States, they had held their numerous soldiers in check everywhere. The year 1862 was brought to a close in the West by Sherman's disaster before Vicksburg and Grant's retreat; in the centre, by the indecisive battle of Murfreesborough; and in the East, by Burnside's disaster in front of Fredericksburg. The Confederates, forming one compact state notwithstanding the extent of their territory, remained masters of Richmond and the Mississippi; they had not, therefore, been seriously damaged. They had only to maintain this position to accomplish the object they had in view—the recognition of their independence. Time was on their side, whether the war should be prolonged without any decisive success for either party, until the North should herself acknowledge her weakness, or whether some unforeseen incident should occur to alter the course of events and make a diversion in their favor, as had nearly happened in regard to the Trent affair. It was for this reason that they clamored so persistently for recognition by Europe. This diplomatic act in itself would have made no change in their military condition, in the blockade which fettered their movements, or in the privileges enjoyed by their ships of war as belligerents; but it would have caused much irritation in the North, and perhaps finally involved it in a war with some of the powers of the Old World. The political situation of the free States at this period seemed to encourage the hopes of those who thought that the South was indebted for success to the weariness of the war felt by the North. The restoration of the Union pure and simple, without touching the question of slavery, had been the common programme which united men of the most opposite views in a patriotic effort to sustain Mr. Lincoln. It having been demonstrated that this programme was impracticable,

each party had resumed its own view of affairs, taking advantage of the proclamation abolishing slavery to put it in circulation. All Republicans had joined the abolitionists in support of the President. The latter had seen arrayed in opposition to him, with the same differences as were exhibited two years before, the two parties which we have already mentioned as having in 1861 taken the names of War Democrats and Peace Democrats. The former party, still pretending to fight for the restoration of the Union, was resorting to all sorts of expedients to conciliate the South while waging war against her, and debating the question of slavery without attempting a radical solution of it, ready to accept the most opposite propositions in order to encompass this end—from gradual emancipation extending to some remote, undefined period to the adoption of all the compromise measures which had vainly been proposed two years previously. The latter party, which had been silent during these two years, was no longer afraid to speak. The War Democrats taunted Mr. Lincoln with having been beaten, and the Peace Democrats taunted him for making war. The latter, to whom their adversaries had given the name of “Copperheads,” were suspected, very naturally, to be the accomplices of the South. A large number of them, in fact, as the sequel will show, were included in that category. In a war between two nations, citizens may counsel peace while serving their government loyally, and without their fidelity being called into question; in a civil war, when one of the two contending parties finds in the ranks of its opponents men ready to approve and to support verbally the demands the enemy is resolved to make at the point of the sword, the position of such men is, to say the least, a very false and dangerous one so far as their honor is concerned. At the beginning of 1863 we find, then, a “peace party,” to which every new check, every new tax, and every new levy, imparts more strength and assurance—to which the stringent measures adopted by the government at Washington against some of its political adversaries, the burden of military rule in certain sections, financial disturbance, and disappointed ambition, bring each day some new recruits. The orators of this party are those who in 1861 defended the right of holding public meetings, the men of action whom physical force alone had prevented at that period from making



common cause with the insurgents. But, whilst opposition to the Republican party and the President's policy is gaining strength with the public, it has as yet exercised no direct influence upon Congress, where it is only represented by a weak minority. The composition of this body, in fact, cannot be modified until the electors shall be called upon to choose the Thirty-eighth Congress. The Thirty-seventh, whose labors we have followed since the extra session of July, 1861, began, as we have seen, its third and last session on December 1, 1862; it came to a close, together with its powers, on the 4th of March, 1863. The principal measures which characterized this session, inspired by the policy which had guided its action since the day of its first meeting, must be briefly enumerated here, for they exercised a powerful influence over the situation we have to describe.

In our first volume we explained the state of legislation in regard to questions relating to slaves, the army, the finances, and individual liberty at the opening of the session. The President's message was almost exclusively devoted to the first of these questions. It was natural for Mr. Lincoln to desire to connect the legislative power with the abolition policy which he had adopted. Up to this period the acts of Congress had no object in view except the treatment of slaves coming from the States at war with the Union. The Presidential proclamation of September 22d also aimed at this class of slaves exclusively: these various acts and proclamations were simply war-measures justified by the insurrectionary condition of certain States, but utterly inapplicable to the Union collectively.

We have mentioned elsewhere the fruitless efforts made by Mr. Lincoln to induce those of the slave States that had remained loyal to the Federal cause to enact some laws guaranteeing gradual emancipation. Fully convinced of the importance of such legislation, he asked Congress to make it the subject of a constitutional amendment. But this sage advice was not listened to. The fate of war must be the arbiter: it was imperative that the victorious Union troops should destroy slavery, together with the armies enlisted under its banner, before its defenders in the North could be prevailed upon to abandon the institution. All

the measures proposed by the President were thus rendered useless. Besides, if in proposing these measures he was inspired by a wise foresight, it may be said that the representatives of the American people reasoned logically in postponing their consideration of the subject: the occasion was not favorable for carrying out a constitutional reform. War was the only thing that absorbed the thoughts of the nation, and the abolition of slavery in the rebel States could only be urged as a military measure until the restoration of peace should permit of its being constitutionally sanctioned. All the attention of Congress, therefore, was concentrated on devising laws to confer upon the executive power the means for carrying on the war.

The most important among these was undoubtedly the conscription law, to which we made some allusion in the first volume. The moment had arrived when the principle of obligatory service had to be reduced to practice. The soldiers who had enlisted for three years in 1861 still constituted the principal nucleus and the most solid element of the Federal armies, but their number, which at the outset ranged as high as six hundred and forty thousand men, had been greatly reduced by sickness, desertion, and the bullets of the enemy. The regiments that had been raised in response to the call of 1862 were only enlisted for a period of nine or twelve months: their term of service expired in May, 1863.\* These two calls for volunteers had nearly exhausted that portion of the population disposed to rally spontaneously under the Federal flag, nor would the second call have proved successful but for the fact that the duration of service had been shortened. The results of this measure were injurious to the army. The scarcity of labor had brought about an increase in the rate of wages, which proved a new obstacle against enlistments. To neutralize this, the government, the States, and the cities resorted

\* There were two principal calls made in 1862—the first, dated July 2d, for 300,000 three years' men, and the second, August 4th, for 300,000 militia for nine months.

Under the call of July 2d, 421,465 men were furnished, and under that of August 4th, 87,588 were obtained. It was the latter whose terms of service expired in May, 1863.

Besides these, 15,007 men for three months' service were, by special authority, furnished in May and June, 1862.—Ed.

to the system of bounties, which, as we have stated, had only the effect of encouraging desertion through the advantages which re-enlistment offered. The sufferings and privations of a soldier's life had cooled the enthusiasm of the most zealous. The volunteers were waiting patiently for the day of their discharge, fully determined to leave the service unless their able-bodied fellow-citizens were compelled to share their labors and their dangers. Those who had not responded to the first call of their country when in danger were less anxious than ever to don the uniform. It was easy, therefore, to foresee the hour when the Federal armies would be broken up if voluntary enlistments were alone relied upon for maintaining them. The obligatory service which for more than one year had been imposed upon the Southern States by the government at Richmond had therefore become a necessity in the North. This principle once established and applied, a considerable renewal of enlistments might be expected, because those who were unwilling to continue in the service as long as their neighbors remained at home were all disposed to anticipate a forced levy in order to secure the advantages of the volunteer system. At the end of January, when this proposed law was under consideration, everybody understood that the continuation or cessation of hostilities depended upon the vote of Congress. To reject the law was to give up the struggle; to vote for it was to assert openly before the South and to Europe a determination to carry on the conflict to the bitter end at the cost of the most cruel sacrifices. It was this consideration which caused it to be accepted by the majority, in spite of the serious revolution it would effect in the manners and customs of the American people. It was stubbornly opposed by the Democrats, who, although numerically weak on the floor of Congress, felt themselves sustained by a powerful party in the country. Some abolitionists were desirous to substitute an amendment providing for the enlistment of all negroes, free or slave, until a black army of one hundred and fifty thousand men should thus have been organized.

It required the impending dissolution of Congress to harmonize the two houses on the text of this law. Having been voted for

on the 28th of February, three days before the closing of the session, and promulgated on the 3d of March, it had the effect of a political bequest from the Thirty-seventh Congress. In imposing this law upon the American people it subjected their patriotism to a severe test. If the annual conscription of a class of young men seems a very heavy burden in a country accustomed to obligatory service like that of France, one may imagine the effect upon a population used to the greatest amount of immunity in regard to such matters, by a law placing at a single stroke all the able-bodied men composing it at the disposal of the military power. It effectually established the principle that, with certain exceptions, all men from the age of twenty to forty-five were liable to be forced into the military service. According to a statistical calculation not very reliable, the twenty-four districts thus formed in the States loyal to the Union comprised a little more than three million one hundred thousand men capable of bearing arms, without counting those already in the field. The exemptions were limited to the high officers of the Federal government, to the governors of States, and the supports of families. The functionaries of the different States, judges, clergymen, and even members of Congress, were not exempted. The law made no distinction as to color. It called for all citizens of the United States, and very properly considered as such all foreigners who, although without regular naturalization-papers, had exercised electoral rights. It excluded, as a matter of course, all persons who had been branded with infamy, and it provided for a new census to be taken of the entire population of able-bodied men, and its subsequent division into two classes. The first embraced all persons between the ages of twenty and thirty-five, and all unmarried men above the age of thirty-five and under forty-five; the second, all married persons between the ages of thirty-five and forty-five. All men thus included in the new census were liable to be drafted from the 1st of July, 1863, to the 1st of July, 1865, and to continue in the service during three years, while the mere fact of having been included in the new census placed them under military rule in regard to all infringements of this law. This severe enactment was the one most repugnant to American habits, and had called forth the bitterest opposition



in both houses of Congress, because it deprived a considerable portion of the nation of the privileges of the *habeas corpus* act. But the majority had properly retained it in the body of the law of which it was the only effective feature and without which it would have been a dead letter. The privilege of procuring substitutes, so indispensable in a system which admitted of so few exemptions, had naturally been adopted. But, by a strange anomaly, there was added to it the system of exemption, which was so different in its scope and purposes: any individual who had been drafted could procure his freedom by the payment of the sum of three hundred dollars into the Federal treasury.

A considerable number of enrolling-officers were required to take the new census and place the system of drafting—which we will explain presently—in force. The Congressional districts were taken as the basis of this organization: a provost-marshal was appointed in each district to direct, with the aid of a board, the operations of the new census and the drawing by lot. It constituted, with the co-operation of a physician and a commissioner, a revising board. A provost-marshal-general was established at Washington for the purpose of centralizing all the labor through the medium of assistant provost-marshals-general, directed to take post at State capitals.\* Exemptions could only be decided upon by the revising board. The new census—which for this reason admitted of no exceptions—was made to serve as the basis of conscription from July 2, 1863, whenever, to complete the levies voted by Congress, a deficiency in the number of volunteers rendered drafting necessary. It will be remembered that up to this time these levies could only take effect through voluntary enlistments. The quota of each State had been fixed in proportion to its entire population. At first, the required number of these contingents had been exceeded, but such was not the case in regard to the great levies of 1862. Certain States, although fully credited with the above-mentioned excesses over the first calls, were found to have not yet completed the quota which had been assigned to them. These differences were due not only to the greater or less amount of military zeal which animated the population of these States, but also to great differ-

\* Principal cities.—ED.

ences in the relative proportions between women and men, the latter being far more numerous in the newly-settled States of the West. It was an error not to have taken this proportion into account in establishing the quotas required from each State. However that may be, it was found in 1863 that out of the States which had remained loyal to the Union, nine were still in advance, while twelve States and the District of Columbia were behindhand in regard to their quotas. While waiting for a new call this deficiency could not be filled except by conscription, the burden of which was to be borne by those States alone. As the drawing by lot did not take place until the month of July, we will defer noticing the results of this first effort at obligatory service to the latter part of this volume. We shall only mention in this place the main features of the law, and a few words will suffice to state them in full.

The new census once concluded, the drawing by lot was to classify all the men belonging to the first class. As the subdivision of the quotas between the districts depended upon the number of volunteers which each had already furnished, and required, consequently, a long time to settle, it was decided to enroll temporarily three-tenths of those included in the new census, and to proceed immediately to their revision, leaving the rectification of the contingent figures until such time as the necessary data could be procured for that purpose. It was thought that the exemptions would only diminish the number of men thus drafted by one-third: experience has shown that this calculation was incorrect. The drafting once completed, it was the duty of the provost-m Marshals to forward the conscripts to the various dépôts, to examine and approve the substitutes, to receive the price of exemption, and to go in pursuit of refractory conscripts.

We shall see presently that this initiatory law was not productive of the direct results that were expected from it, for the number of men whom it forced into service was altogether insignificant. Still, it was very useful in stimulating voluntary enlistments and re-enlistments *en masse* of the old regiments; in putting an end to the formation of new regiments, which weakened the armies and depleted the treasury; in establishing a strict supervision

over the physical condition of the new soldiers, the want of which had already compelled the authorities to discharge nearly two hundred thousand men after they had been equipped; and, finally, in affording the general government the means for strengthening its armies in a direct manner, without depending solely upon the good pleasure of the functionaries in the various States.

We have now a few words to say concerning the financial measures adopted during this same session of Congress. We have shown what was the condition of the Federal Treasury when this session was opened in December, 1862. It was necessary to provide for the deficiencies in the appropriations made for the current year, which expired on the 30th of June, 1863, and, as Congress was to adjourn from the 3d of March to the 8th of December, to make the estimates meet the wants of the ensuing year.

Up to the 1st of July, 1862, the Treasury had already paid out the sum of \$220,175,370, other than for principal of public debt; and the accumulated requisitions beyond resources amounted to \$48,354,701. On the other hand, the following was the condition of its paper: The notes in circulation, including the gold-notes, represented the sum of \$222,932,111; those which had been received by the government and exchanged for certificates of deposit amounted to \$80,798,650; the fractional currency, to \$3,884,800; the contractors had accepted \$87,363,241 of certificates of indebtedness; lastly, the Treasury had been able to place in the market, at the current rate of 66, the sum of \$23,750,000 of the 5-20 six per-cent. bonds authorized by the act of 25th of February, 1862.

Finally, the existing laws placed at the disposal of the government various sources of credit of considerable importance. It could issue notes, or "greenbacks," to the amount of \$27,067,889, and, moreover, receive \$20,201,350 (the total amount of deposits being limited to five hundred millions) in exchange for certificates of deposit, and place them again in circulation. No restriction having been imposed upon the issue of small notes, it was thought that their issue could be increased to the amount of \$36,115,200. The amount of certificates of indebtedness being limited to one hundred millions, it still left a margin



of \$12,636,758 over and above that amount. It was also hoped to place on the market about \$35,000,000 in five-twenty bonds before the 30th of June, 1863. These resources amounted altogether to \$131,021,197: added to those which had been realized since the 1st of July and the regular sources of revenue, they presented an aggregate of over five hundred millions. According to the calculations of the Secretary of the Treasury, the excess of expenses over these receipts was, on the 30th of June, 1863, \$276,912,517, and the estimates for the twelve succeeding months, deducting the available sources of revenue, was \$627,388,183. He had therefore to ask Congress to grant him, by some new financial measures, the means of obtaining the enormous sum of \$904,300,700 in the course of eighteen months.

We have shown what difficulties the government had to encounter in placing its bonds on the market, and in what small proportion it had been able, up to that time, to fund its debt. How was it to ask for the loan of additional thousands of millions which the war would so quickly swallow up? It was not enough to enact a law authorizing the issue of such bonds; it was necessary to find means to induce the public to purchase them. It was, however, of the utmost importance to avoid, at any cost, the dangerous temptation of increasing the circulation of paper money beyond limitation.\* Mr. Chase, a man of clear and vigorous intellect, foresaw this danger, and pointed it out to Congress. The aim of his whole financial policy was to convert the greenbacks into interest-bearing bonds, either directly or through some intermediate process, such as the issue of certificates of deposit. From the day of his entrance into the Treasury Department he fully understood that the funded debt alone could supply him with permanent resources—that the creation of this debt depended solely upon the credit of the government, and this same credit upon the guarantee that could be given to the creditors of the Treasury for the payment of the interest in specie. He had secured this guarantee by the act of Congress imposing new taxes which more than doubled the

\* In this brief statement we have followed the very thorough and interesting work of the anonymous author who has edited the article on "Federal Finances" in the volume of the *American Cyclopædia* for 1863.



actual revenue of the Federal Treasury during that year. The rise in the price of all commodities in consequence of former issues of paper money had brought about some important modifications in trade, which, for fear of a sudden depreciation at the end of the war, had a tendency to bear upon the Federal funds. Mr. Chase was right in believing that the difficulties experienced in 1862 in finding subscribers to the Federal loan would not again occur in 1863, provided that a certain clause in the law which at that period had rendered this placing of bonds almost impossible was expunged, because this clause directed that the five-twenty bonds, when bought with greenbacks, should be received at par, although there was considerable difference between the depreciation of bonds and that of paper money. The debt, however, could not be funded as fast as he had desired: in order to meet the most urgent expenses he was obliged to resort temporarily to other sources besides the loan. As we have stated before, the army could not wait: the pay of the soldiers had been delayed for more than a month. In order to provide for this payment it was necessary to resort to a new issue of paper money. But at the same time prudence required that measures should be adopted to prevent a glutting of the market with the paper of the Treasury. In the preceding year, prior to the suspension of specie payments by the banks, the latter had in circulation notes to the amount of \$130,000,000, whilst the specie circulation, including the metallic reserve of the banks in the States loyal to the Union, represented the sum of \$210,104,000. In December, 1862, the circulation of bank-notes amounted to \$167,000,000, whilst that of greenbacks was \$210,000,000, the gold and silver having almost entirely disappeared. It will therefore be seen that the Federal paper had purely and simply been substituted for the latter, without doing any injury to the paper of the banks, which had increased to the extent of thirty-seven millions. In order to make room for a new issue of greenbacks without increasing to excess the total amount of paper in circulation, it was therefore necessary to reduce that of the banks. In order to bring about this result, and to facilitate the funding of the debt at the same time, Mr. Chase proposed quite a new system, which, after a long discussion, was adopted

by Congress on the 25th of February, under the name of the "National Currency Act." This law authorized the formation of corporations under the name of "national banks," with a capital of at least \$100,000. These corporations, constantly under the control of a special bureau in the Treasury Department, had to deposit Federal bonds in this bureau equivalent to one-third of their paid-up capital, at the current rate of interest, and to increase the number of these bonds whenever their value had depreciated in the market. In exchange for this deposit, for which it paid the banks interest, the Treasury Department furnished them with bank-notes for nine-tenths of the amount deposited: these notes were identical in character, and were signed by the officers of the bank to which they were issued. An annual tax of two per cent. upon these bank-notes was assessed, but as the law applied this tax to all bank-notes, whether in circulation, on deposit, or in the vaults, the supply might be considered as gratuitous. If any of these notes were protested, their value was to be reimbursed by the Treasury Department, provided a sufficient guarantee was given: they were received in payment of all taxes, with the exception of custom-house duties, the same as greenbacks; they were therefore of precisely the same current rate of value. The total amount of these notes was limited to three hundred and seventy-five millions. Finally, each bank was compelled to have in its vaults greenbacks equivalent in value to one-fourth of its circulation. In the mind of the legislator this law was to bring about the conversion of private banks, which encumbered the pathways of trade with inconvertible paper which was refused by the Federal Treasury, into national banks with a uniform and regular circulation. The first effect of their creation was to compel them to purchase large quantities of Federal bonds, and thus to assist in placing the loan on the market by raising its value; the second effect was to withdraw a certain amount of greenbacks from circulation; the third was to gradually replace the paper, more or less depreciated, which the banks had formerly thrown upon the market without stint, and without troubling themselves about the position in which they appeared to stand toward the government as its competitors, by issuing a uniform currency analogous to the greenbacks and easily convertible either into

Federal bank-notes or bonds. It was not long before the effects of this law made themselves felt. The circulation of the private banks, which on the 1st of January, 1863, had been \$180,637,000, fell on the 30th of June to \$158,576,400. At this period there were already in existence 134 national banks, which had deposited Federal bonds to the amount of \$3,676,000.

The other financial measures adopted by Congress can be easily enumerated. On the 17th of January, driven by necessity, it passed a resolution authorizing the President to issue notes to the amount of \$100,000,000 to pay the arrears due to the soldiers. But it was only on the 3d of March, just as it was about to adjourn, that Congress voted the laws required by the Secretary of the Treasury in order to meet the current expenses until the 1st of July, 1864. We have stated that the deficiency of 1862-63 was estimated at \$300,000,000—that of 1863-64, at \$600,000,000. Congress authorized a double issue of six per-cent. bonds, corresponding with these two figures, the total amount being \$900,000,000. These bonds, being payable after ten years and before the expiration of the fortieth year, were commonly known by the name of “ten-forties.”

But at this date, the 3d of March, the arrears amounted to \$72,171,189: they increased much more rapidly than the returns from the loan placed on the market. It was necessary, therefore, to procure temporary relief while waiting for the negotiation of the loan. Through this same law Congress authorized the creation of four hundred millions of Treasury notes bearing six per-cent. interest, payable in greenbacks at the expiration of three years—a reimbursement in view of which the issue authorized by the act of 17th of January was increased by fifty millions: it was hoped that these Treasury notes would be gradually converted into interest-bearing Federal bonds, their circulation being but an anticipated loan destined to be promptly funded.

We have mentioned that a portion of the loan called five-twenties had been taken up; there yet remained \$476,250,000 to be disposed of on the 3d of March. Out of this amount we have apportioned \$35,000,000 to the resources which it was hoped to realize before the 30th of June, 1863. The Secretary



at this date must still have had \$441,250,000 at his disposal. If we add to these figures the sum of \$3,000,000, representing the certificates issued on gold deposits, we shall have, as a total of the resources created but not realized, for the period intervening till the 1st of July, 1864, the sum of \$2,055,271,197.

It must be acknowledged, to the honor of the American people and the statesmen who had to bear the heavy burden of these financial questions, that this almost fabulous sum did not destroy the national credit. The bold but just calculations of Mr. Chase were realized. A contract made with a large Philadelphia firm—Messrs. Jay Cooke & Co.—who in consideration of a commission of three-eighths of one per cent. undertook to place the Federal bonds on the market, greatly facilitated the consolidation of the debt. The revenue derived from the tax encouraged lenders. Notwithstanding the issues of bank-notes, in spite of the defeats of the Federal armies during the early part of 1863, the natural reaction against excessive stockjobbing caused the price of gold to fall forty-seven per cent.—that is to say, to the rate of 125—in the early part of July. From the 1st of May the Federal bonds were sold at the rate of \$50,000,000 per month until the supply was entirely exhausted.

Consequently, when the fiscal year was ended, the situation, notwithstanding the enormous burdens that weighed upon the Federal Treasury, was much better than could possibly have been expected, for the national credit had been strengthened in the midst of the greatest trials. Thanks to the wise policy which had resolutely imposed the new taxes, the ordinary receipts had more than doubled. They amounted to \$111,399,766—without counting the contributions in kind furnished by the States—\$69,059,642 of which were from custom-house duties and \$37,640,787 for internal revenue. A large increase could be anticipated for the ensuing year—an increase, it must be acknowledged, that weighed heavily upon producers and consumers, causing much dissatisfaction. In the general statement of receipts the sale of five-twenty bonds figured to the amount of one hundred and seventy-five millions, the issue of United States notes and fractional currency to more than three hundred millions, certificates of deposit to \$115,226,762, and certificates of indebt-



edness to \$157,479,261. The aggregate of these receipts, together with the funds remaining in the Treasury vaults on the 1st of July, 1863, amounted to \$901,125,674.86. The expenditures were \$895,796,630.65; thus leaving, with all accounts settled, a balance in the Treasury of \$5,329,044.21; but in this exhibit the redemption and reimbursement under every form figured to the amount of \$181,086,635.07. The real expenses, therefore, amounted to \$714,709,995.58, of which \$599,298,600.80 were for the War Department and \$63,211,105.27 for the Navy Department.

We have only one word to say in regard to questions relating to individual liberty, which, as was the case with the preceding sessions, afforded the opposition during the debate on military and financial matters an opportunity to attack openly the policy of the government. As we have already mentioned above, these protests against arbitrary imprisonments led to important discussions, without, however, altering the determination of the majority on this subject. The military authorities scarcely exercised any of that power which the President had conferred upon them, except for the purpose of going in pursuit of deserters and their accomplices. Sometimes, driven to extremes by the virulence of newspaper attacks, they made use of this power to intimidate the most daring offenders; but these severe measures were seldom resorted to. Thus it happened with Mr. Boileau, the editor of a Philadelphia newspaper, who, having been arrested in the month of January in consequence of some articles openly favoring the South, was restored to liberty and the use of his printing-presses at the end of eight days on his promise to be more guarded in the future. In the month of December, after laying on the table all propositions censuring the government, Congress proceeded to discuss, and finally adopted on the 3d of March, 1863, so memorable in legislative history, an indemnity act, or a law endorsing the measures taken by the President for the purpose of suspending the writ of *habeas corpus*, and confirming explicitly the powers which, in the absence of a positive constitutional enactment, he had deemed it his duty to exercise on his own responsibility.

He soon made use of this power in a striking manner, and in

connection with a matter which caused more excitement throughout the country than all the arrests of the preceding year. The party known as "Peace Democrats" had as a recognized leader in the House of Representatives Mr. Vallandigham, a member from Ohio. Of an ardent temperament, endowed with brilliant powers of eloquence, he had managed with consummate art, in his defence of the secession theory, to reach without ever overstepping the extreme limits beyond which his language would have constituted an act of high treason. The citizens of Ohio, among whom were many Democrats, but few advocates of peace at any price, elected General Schenck in his place in December, 1862. But Mr. Vallandigham, still holding his seat at the Capitol until the end of the session, took advantage of it to introduce certain resolutions in favor of the absolute recognition of the Southern Confederacy, which were naturally rejected; later he came forward as a candidate for the office of governor of Ohio, and during the ensuing election campaign harangued more vehemently than ever against the policy of the government. General Burnside, who in the command of the territorial department of Cincinnati\* had found some temporary compensation for the disfavor which had fallen upon him after his defeat, having published an order† threatening to have any person shot who should give aid and comfort to the enemy in the State of Ohio, Vallandigham made an open attack upon this order. Five days later, on the 5th of May, he was arrested and tried before a military tribunal. Serious troubles broke out after his arrest in the little town of Dayton, where he resided. The writ of *habeas corpus* issued in his behalf by a Cincinnati judge was presented to the military authority without effect; but, despite the increasing excitement produced in this town by the arrest of a man of such high distinction, the cause was publicly prosecuted and with the ordinary guarantees of the law. Mr. Vallandigham defended himself with great ability and force. He was nevertheless adjudged guilty—so said the sentence—of having openly

\* General Burnside was in command of the Department of the Ohio, with headquarters at Cincinnati.—ED.

† General Orders, No. 33, Head-quarters Department of the Ohio, April 13, 1863.—ED.

expressed his sympathies in favor of the enemy, and condemned to be imprisoned during the war. This penalty, entirely political in its character, inasmuch as its duration depended upon the chances of war, was commuted by Mr. Lincoln into another penalty still more political in its character—that of banishment; and in enforcing it the President adopted the strange expedient of sending Mr. Vallandigham into the enemy's lines. Thus transported into the midst of the Confederates, he had the sagacity not to compromise himself with them, and repaired to Canada, whence he finally returned to his home without being molested. In thus prosecuting him the Federal government committed a great error. Right or wrong, this action was viewed as a manœuvre to prevent the election of a political opponent, an advocate of an unpopular cause. Mr. Vallandigham soon became a victim, a martyr, and if he had otherwise possessed the slightest chance his prosecution would have secured his election. The War Democrats, who before had spurned him, were loud in his defence, and the support they found in public opinion in censuring this action of the government gave President Lincoln much cause for reflection. Consequently, he manifested a great deal of regard and deference for the representations that were made to him by some of the leaders of this party, and he went so far, we believe, as to express a tardy but sincere regret for the arrest of Mr. Vallandigham, which, as it appears, was ordered by Burnside without his knowledge.

After enumerating the measures adopted by Congress to complete the effective force of the Federal armies, to meet the expenses of their maintenance, and to enable the executive power to break down all the resistance that might be encountered in recruiting them, we must, before resuming the recital of their operations, point out what were the military resources and the organization of the forces at the disposal of the government at Washington after two years of war.

In the month of November, 1862, the Federal army numbered 775,336 men armed and equipped, and in December the Secretary of War, in his report to Congress, estimated their number at more than 800,000—332,000 of whom, in conformity with the law of July 17, 1862, were enlisted for three years. These forces were

divided into more than one thousand regiments. The term of service of a great many volunteers, as we have before stated, expired in the spring of 1863, but the government, being aware that Congress would not refuse it the means to maintain, and even to increase, the effective force of its armies, had prepared its estimates in the anticipation that during the summer there would be one million of men under arms.

It was not enough, however, that these men should be carried on the muster-rolls of the army: they had to be effectively maintained on it, and the number of absentees reduced as much as possible. We have shown elsewhere how large was the list of absentees from the Army of the Potomac in the beginning of 1863, and mentioned some of the measures adopted for the purpose of reducing it. The conscription law, by placing everywhere provost-marshals charged with the duty of pursuing and arresting refractory conscripts, enabled them likewise to look out for deserters, whom the Federal authority had not previously possessed sufficient means for capturing: this law contributed more to filling up the skeletons of regiments in this indirect way than could have been done directly by drafting. During the first six months which followed the creation of provost-marshals, from the 1st of May to the 1st of November, 1863, the latter arrested not less than 22,000 deserters or refractory conscripts, the reports making no distinction between these two classes of offenders. The bad example, however, was too often set by the officers in prolonging their leaves of absence without permission: in order to correct these abuses, two examining boards were established at Annapolis and Cincinnati, before which all officers on sick leave were ordered to report in person as soon as they were in a condition to travel, and where questions regarding the extension of leaves, admission to hospitals, or return to the armies in the field were settled. Finally, a law was enacted on the 18th of April, 1863, creating an invalid corps,\* which, by affording some honorable employment to men who had been wounded or overtaken by sickness in the line of duty, made it

\* Organization announced in General Orders, No. 105, War Department, A.-G. O., April 23, 1863, and designation changed to "Veteran Reserve Corps" by General Orders, No. 111, War Department, A.-G. O., March 18, 1864.—ED.



possible at the same time to utilize their services, instead of discharging them with a pension, which was an onerous burden for the appropriations to carry. Six months later, on the 1st of November, this corps numbered 491 officers and 17,764 soldiers: more than three-fourths of them were already organized into regiments of two battalions. The first battalion, with six companies, comprised the ablest-bodied men, armed with muskets, who had to do garrison-duty in the towns, the arsenals, the various posts in the interior, and perform the functions of the provost-marshal's police; the second battalion, with four companies, composed of the most infirm, was employed in the hospitals and the various offices. The formation of this corps was the means of restoring to active service in the field an almost equal number of soldiers capable of bearing the fatigues of war, and of furnishing men capable of performing, at the same time and in a regular manner, the services of the interior, which was its special charge.

A brief analysis of the reports presented to Congress in 1862 and 1863 by the quartermaster-general will suffice to explain the enormous amount of the military estimates, and the reader will excuse these few technical details, as they will enable him to thoroughly understand the magnitude of the means employed in carrying on the war. It will be remembered that the quartermaster's department had charge of furnishing all the *matériel* of the army: as we have described it in the first volume, it formed, at the outset of the struggle, a modest bureau, which it was found necessary to transform suddenly into a vast department. In each of the years 1861, 1862, and 1863 the Secretary of War is asking for the necessary funds to increase the *personnel* of this department by more than one hundred clerks, both men and women, and a special law is enacted to this effect on the 7th of February, 1863. Their number, however, is still insufficient, the number of accounts rendered exceeding the calculation. A statement of the *matériel* on hand in each body has to be furnished monthly by each brigade and regiment, and in every quarter by each company. Now, in November, 1862, there were 300 brigades, 1000 regiments, and 10,000 companies, which makes 55,600 accounts to verify for this year; in 1863 each company commander has to furnish monthly statements of the *matériel*

declared unfit for service, together with an account of the fresh *matériel* he has received; the number of these accounts, which must all be audited, amounts, therefore, for this new year, to 120,000. One may form an idea from these figures to what magnitude the accountability of this department had attained. A verification still more important and difficult was that of the articles supplied, the amount of which was settled by the paymaster's department. On the 1st of December, 1862, the unsettled accounts for articles furnished amounted to \$105,000,000; seven months later, on the 30th of June, 1863, their number was 4884, representing \$193,289,247.14, and the settled accounts, 2342 in number only, amounted to \$118,463,312.03.

But if the Treasury suffered from these difficulties and delays, which, in the end, added to its expenses, they did not prevent the armies from being provisioned and the government from augmenting its immense *matériel* in order to supply the constantly increasing necessities of the war. It will be easy to form an idea of the importance of this *matériel* when it is known that it comprised not only the equipment of troops, hospital supplies, forage, and fuel, but even horses, wagons, locomotives, and cars; and, finally, even all the steamers used for the army. The river-fleet, whose operations in 1862 we have described, and which Foote had commanded with so much ability, was equipped by the quartermaster's department; it consisted of 45 vessels and 38 mortar-boats, measuring altogether 19,494 tons. On the 16th of July it was transferred to the Navy Department, but the quartermaster-general still retained control of the nine iron-clad rams, armed under the direction of Colonel Ellet, which had rendered such important services on the Mississippi.

At the breaking out of the war the task of organizing transportation by rail was one of the greatest difficulties the military administration had to overcome. On the one hand, it had to employ the railroad lines of the Northern States without interfering with their ordinary business; on the other hand, it had to manage those running among the localities of the seat of war whose traffic had been suspended by the conflict. The companies which controlled the former had different schedules of rates, and in consequence of the interruption of travel over the

great commercial highway they were crowded with the produce of the Western States, which had no other outlet. A paramount interest demanded that the independence of the companies, as well as the convenience of travellers and trade, should be made subservient to the necessities of the war. Congress understood this, and by a law enacted on the 31st of January, 1862, it authorized the President to seize upon railroads, and to use them for military purposes, whenever he deemed it necessary. But the patriotism of the railroad officials rendered this extreme measure useless. A few months later they entered into an agreement with the Secretary of War, establishing a uniform schedule of prices for the transportation of soldiers on the basis of two cents per mile for each man; afterward their resources were placed at the service of the government without reservation, whenever the latter stood in need of them, without causing any conflict or giving rise to serious difficulties. The government therefore had only direct charge of the lines located within the radius of military operations—a very heavy burden, it is true, for we have already shown by numerous examples that the fate of the armies in the field depended upon the manner in which those lines were managed. In order to derive any benefit from so delicate an instrument it required a *personnel* of experienced officers and chiefs endowed with special aptitude for the business, because the least error committed in this service might be attended with disastrous consequences. These chiefs, therefore, were always selected with care; and under the direction of Colonels McCallum and Swords, of Mr. Anderson, the young and illustrious McPherson, and especially General Haupt, the task of placing the railroads and their management in a condition for the service of the army became a real science, to which we propose referring again at the close of this history. The report for 1863 gives us some curious figures concerning the transportation by land, and by water which complemented it. To secure this double service the department, on the one hand, purchased 64 locomotives and 899 cars during that single year; on the other hand, it hired 632 sailing vessels (32 of which were large three-masters), 695 tenders, and 1407 steamers of all dimensions, at the cost of \$13,788,044.

The following statement will convey an idea of the aggregate amount of transportation by the quartermaster in the course of that year, both through the resources directly at his disposal and by contracts concluded with the railroad companies and the owners of vessels, from the 1st of July, 1862, to June 30, 1863:

	Transporta- tion by land.	Weight (tons).	Transporta- tion by water.	Weight (tons).
Subsistence stores (in barrels and kegs)....	784,833	146,594	4,478,143	174,217
Cattle.....	17,654		102,914	
Ordnance stores (in barrels and kegs).....	354,659	72,776	386,756	78,088
Guns, etc.....	833		1,093	
Ordnance stores (in barrels and packages).	430,666	437,354	753,569	753,144
Animals.....	126,584		109,009	
Forage, fuel, etc. (tons).....	39,354		88,438	
Soldiers.....	1,264,602		567,397	

The cost of this transportation was—by land, \$8,030,003.03; by lakes and rivers, \$9,476,681.73; and by ocean, \$4,798,385.02.

A few words upon the most important supplies furnished to the armies will close our sketch; and in order that we may complete two official reports, both incomplete, we shall embrace in this summary the two years comprised between the 1st of July, 1861, and the 30th of June, 1863: the figures we append herewith were considered by the Secretary of War as below the real amount. During the year 1861–62 the government bought 109,799 horses and 83,720 mules: what disposition was made of them is not stated, but at the beginning of the fiscal year, July 1, 1862, we find in the dépôts 14,842 and 16,899 respectively of these animals. During that year the purchases amount to 174,832 horses and 86,254 mules, of which, 45,755 horses and 46,226 mules are still to be found in the dépôts on the 30th of June, 1863. The horses captured from the enemy, numbering 7783, and mules, 6915, afforded no compensation for the losses sustained from all causes, amounting to 57,476 horses and 17,170 mules. When it is known that the new census of 1860 credited the Northern States with a total of 4,688,678 horses and 454,081 mules, it will be understood how heavily the war weighed upon the production of the horse-breeding States.



With regard to the *matériel*, we shall confine ourselves to the selection of a few figures among the most important. Thus, the number of army wagons purchased in 1861-62 was about 20,000; the following year, 12,730; the number of ambulances was 2500 the first year and 3511 the second. The number of tents bought or manufactured in 1861-62, besides 85,656 shelter-tents, footed up as follows: 42,392 Sibley tents and 70,735 common tents, capable of sheltering altogether 989,555 men; moreover, 5518 hospital-tents and 24,500 wall-tents, intended for the use of officers. The hard experience of the war soon demonstrated the worthlessness of most of these 143,145 tents, intended to afford shelter to one million of soldiers and a hundred thousand officers: it was impossible to transport them during an active campaign, and when the armies were stationary it was better to substitute in their place auxiliary tents for summer made of the branches of trees, and in winter log cabins, better ventilated, and consequently better heated and less liable to breed typhoid fevers.

Among the articles manufactured during the first year for the equipment of the troops we find 1,281,522 greatcoats, 1,446,811 uniform coats, 3,029,286 pairs of trousers, 1,458,808 blankets, and 3,446,520 pairs of shoes. The manufacture of goods for the following year, of which we have no details, must have been about the same, if we may judge from the aggregate cost, which amounted respectively to \$54,589,984 and \$55,887,510. The year 1862-63 gives us more details in regard to other supplies, such as 373,348,246 pounds oats; 335,812,088 pounds corn; 629,173,124 pounds hay and fodder; 95,829,799 pounds mixed grain; 186,615 pounds of leather, and horseshoes to the number of more than two million.

Among the arms and ammunition furnished by the ordnance department we will mention 1373 field-pieces during the first year and 1108 during the second; and also 653 and 188 siege-guns, and finally 1206 and 41 sea-coast guns and mortars, amounting in all to the enormous figure of 4569 cannon and mortars; 7284, then 3465, gun-carriages, caissons, etc.; 987,291, then 991,387, infantry and cavalry accoutrements; 968,840, then 582,736, small-arms for foot-soldiers; 213,991,127 cartridges for the first year, and 166,867,457 for the second; finally,

during the latter year, 373,192,870 percussion-caps. As it will be seen, while the armament of the fortifications mounting heavy guns was completed during the first year, the losses, repairs, and disuses on the one hand, and on the other hand the larger number of combatants, necessitated enormous deliveries of accoutrements, field-pieces, and muskets. Notwithstanding the increase of the effective force of the armies and the greater degree of animosity exhibited in the struggle during this second year, the consumption of cartridges had diminished by nearly one-fourth, showing that the soldier had become more careful of his ammunition while on the march and less wasteful on the field of battle. Nevertheless, he still consumed more than two percussion-caps to every cartridge.

It must also be acknowledged that his arms and ammunition are of much better quality than in the preceding year—a progress indirectly implied by the character of the supplies furnished during this second year, the object of which was, above all, to replace the worthless *matériel* that the armies had received at the commencement of the war. National industry, rapidly developed and perfected, had gradually substituted its own products for the refuse which Europe had been sending across the Atlantic. Stimulated by the pressing demands of the government, great improvements were then made in the manufacture of steel and iron which have not been subsequently lost. The Secretary of War, leaving the manufacture of cannon exclusively to private establishments, applied himself during this time to the task of increasing the number and importance of home factories for the production of small-arms; so that, whilst out of the 2481 field-pieces delivered to the armies 2250 had been purchased since the commencement of the war, the difference of 231 pieces representing the wretched material lying in the arsenals, we find that the national factory at Springfield has manufactured in the course of the first two years not less than 327,592 muskets, and 250,000 during the following year. On the other hand, the government at the outset of the war had 437,433 stored away, but, as we have stated elsewhere, a considerable portion of these last-mentioned arms were of an antiquated pattern, and had even been condemned for some years. The number of muskets bought with-

in the last two years amounted to 1,622,552, of which 836,000 were kept in reserve in the various dépôts—a reserve, part of which was indeed unfit for use, seeing that it comprised, besides the old material, the refuse of all the arms procured in Europe.

Among the numerous laws enacted on the 3d of March by the Thirty-seventh Congress a few hours previous to adjournment was one organizing in a definite manner, and establishing as a special branch of the military service, the signal corps. Those composing it had different grades of rank conferred upon them. The corps thus consisted of about two hundred officers attached to the staffs of various armies, under whose command was placed a certain number of soldiers who had received private instruction. An examining board was instituted for the purpose of selecting the officers. This new organization, added to the vast improvements introduced in the system of day and night signals, enabled this corps to render service to the armies in the field even more important than those rendered in the past—services the more valuable in that they combined the employment of the portable electric telegraph with the aërial telegraph. These two systems, which were the mutual complement of each other, had naturally to be united: they could not have been entrusted to better hands. We have stated that at the commencement of the war use had been made of portable electric apparatus intended to follow the generals as far as the battlefield. The experience of two years had wrought vast improvements in this apparatus, which had reached that point of perfection that enabled it to work easily a line from five to seven miles long, and whose maximum effect, thanks to powerful electro-magnets, reached twenty miles. In the hands of experienced soldiers this telegraph could, with great facility, be constructed at the rate of nearly two miles per hour, thus combining the two essential conditions which were to render it effective—rapidity of construction and the transmission of matter over considerable distances. Consequently, the experience obtained at the battles of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville having proved its usefulness, the number of telegraphic equipages was increased from thirteen to twenty in the month of May, 1863: the Army of the Potomac had in its employ no less than five.



The importance of this portable system, however, was a small matter compared with the ordinary electric telegraph, whose immense network formed a connecting link between all the armies in the field from the shores of the Atlantic to the prairies of the Far West, the signal corps performing a secondary part alongside of the one that had charge of all this network. We have spoken of its organization at the beginning of this history. Since then we have shown by numerous examples the services it rendered in the hands of skilful and honest operators—the dangers to which the armies were exposed when this powerful instrument was entrusted to agents who were wanting in intelligence or honesty. We shall confine ourselves to saying, in addition, that under the management of Colonel Stager, Major Eckert, and a few other distinguished officers the telegraphic establishment intended solely for the service of the armies soon acquired an immense importance. On the 1st of July, 1862, the lines represented a length of over three thousand five hundred miles. In the following year there were constructed eighteen hundred miles more, which made the total length of wires used by the army a little over five thousand miles. In the course of this year the network of wires thus extended transmitted no less than twelve hundred thousand despatches, being at the rate of thirty-three hundred daily.

We shall conclude this sketch by saying a few words on the organization of the medical service. A military history would not be complete, in our opinion, if after enumerating the movements of those large bodies of troops called armies we were not to let the reader see the interior organization which gives them life and keeps up their activity. We must speak of the care taken of the wounded, of the colossal task which consists in repairing, as much as possible, on the day after the conflict, the ills which humanity has inflicted upon itself. It will be some atonement for such a sad exhibition to show the salutary experience acquired during the war, and the progress made among the military hospitals by what is perhaps the most useful of all sciences—medicine. The Federal armies could not escape those peculiar diseases which develop themselves under the combined influence of a large agglomeration of men, of excessive fatigues,



and of a certain degree of excitement—of a climate tending generally to extremes, and a soil prolific in fever-breeding exhalations. But if these armies suffered from the effects of lung diseases, and especially typhoid and swamp fevers, they knew nothing of those terrible epidemics which in spite of the progress of science have ravaged our European armies in nearly all the wars that have taken place during late years. When we take into account the total absence of cholera on the American continent during these four years of war, one is tempted to exclaim, with its inhabitants, that there is a special Providence for the United States; but when we find the scurvy everywhere crushed out in its incipency, and the yellow fever, after having invaded Hilton Head in the fall of 1862, being promptly isolated and subdued, we must do full justice to the wise precautions of the medical corps, whose advice was seldom controverted by the executive authorities.

During the first year of the war the medical department was organized with a full knowledge of the experience acquired in Europe by a physician whose name will ever be famous—Surgeon-general Hammond. The American armies were soon deprived of his services in consequence of certain incidents about which we have nothing to say, but which gave rise to discussions that were probably pushed to bitter extremes by party spirit. Fortunately, the impetus had been given, and Hammond's successors had only to follow the path traced out by him. They generally met with a cordial co-operation on the part of the generals and the various executive officers; nevertheless, as it happens with all armies, their relations with these officers occasioned some difficulties, and they sometimes complained with considerable warmth of the state of dependence on the quartermaster for field materials in which they found themselves, and on the military engineers for the construction of permanent hospitals.

In voting for the first volunteer calls Congress had naturally intended to provide for a medical corps, but the law was not adopted till the 2d of July, 1862, by which this corps was definitely organized, it having been temporarily in active service since the early days of the war. It still bore evidence of the haste in which it had been drafted. Consequently, in granting

one surgeon to each regiment of infantry it was forgotten to make a similar provision for the cavalry and artillery, while the number of those attached to the hospitals was altogether insufficient. The examining boards appointed for the purpose of directing the choice of brigade and regimental surgeons were not, and could not be, very strict; in the year 1861-62 they had declared in favor of admitting two hundred physicians with the rank of major, and two hundred and fifty assistants. The surgeon-general asked for fifty more of the first grade and two hundred and fifty of the second, with the addition of sixty for the regular army. Two years later these provisions are singularly exceeded, for we find the medical staff numbering not less than three thousand surgeons and fifteen thousand nurses. Fortunately, the system of inspection, which was strongly developed from the beginning, corrected most of the imperfections prevailing in the medical corps: practical advice, simple and direct instructions, and some rare instances of severity, enabled the inspectors, with the aid of corps commanders, to remedy the chief abuses caused by ignorance or the inexperience of beginners.

Consequently, at the end of the second year many improvements may be noticed. In November, 1862, there were 151 general hospitals, capable of accommodating 58,715 sick and wounded; the total number of the latter, both in the general and field hospitals, was then nearly ninety thousand. The number increased in September, after the Antietam campaign. At the same period in the following year we find 182 hospitals, containing 84,472 beds: these figures, however, do not express all the progress that was made during this time, for a certain number of hospitals, organized the year previous under unfavorable circumstances, were closed and replaced by establishments infinitely superior in every respect. The latter were supplied with large steam-laundries, combining usefulness with economy. Finally, the second battalions of the invalid corps not only restored to active service, as we have remarked, a certain number of healthy soldiers previously employed in the service of the hospitals, but also replaced a large number of civil nurses who could not furnish any of the necessary guarantees for the performance of the work of devotion of which they had charge. On the other hand, in the examination

of volunteers the new appliances introduced by the medical corps also contributed to the amelioration of the sanitary condition of the army. When it was thought that the war would not last more than a few weeks, or some months at the utmost, it seemed unfair to close the ranks of the army against invalids who were willing to risk being killed for the sake of the national honor: people appeared to think that they would have no time to be sick. The lowest limitation as to age in regard to enlistments was eighteen years; but although this was a very low figure, the rule was frequently violated in favor of youths of sixteen and seventeen. The winter of 1861-62 soon demonstrated that the government was the first to suffer from this injudicious toleration, for the sickly men and youths it had equipped at a great cost only entered the ranks to fill up the hospitals soon after. These abuses ceased to a great extent during the second year. The reports in connection with this period do not give us the total number of men under treatment, but they show that on the 30th of June, 1863, this number represented 145 per 1000 of the total effective force of the armies, computed as follows: out of 1000 soldiers, 110 sick and 25 wounded, 91 of whom were in the general and 54 in the field hospitals. Supposing a total of one million men under arms, it would be sufficient to multiply each of these figures by the thousand to find out the total number it represents, or nearly so.

Let us conclude with an exhibit which shows in the most striking manner the progress made in the sanitary condition of the armies. The mortality from sickness, which in June, 1862, was 4.7 per 1000, fell in June, 1863, to 3.9 per 1000.

Before proceeding to the consideration of another subject, we must mention those private institutions which, under the inspiration of charitable zeal, played an important rôle during the war: their place in our work is naturally by the side of the official medical corps whose efficient auxiliaries they were. We desire to speak chiefly of the Sanitary Commissions. We shall wait till the conclusion of this history to form an estimate of the indisputable advantages and point out the inconveniences of this kind of institution, and we shall show, relying upon the evidence of most competent men, all the benefit to be derived from them in



times of war. But the moment has arrived for us to give a brief sketch of their origin and development.

The national movement in response to the first call of the President caused volunteers to rally around the flag of the Union and aroused the charitable zeal of non-combatants among all classes of society. They could not serve the Federal cause better than by preparing to alleviate the sufferings of those who were about to take up arms in its defence. There was a place alongside of the official organization which properly belonged to private enterprise, and in which the latter could render the greatest services. From the beginning of May there was formed in the principal cities of the Union, and especially in New York, aid societies, some composed of women, others of physicians. Feeling that their isolated efforts would be fruitless, some of these societies selected delegates in order to give their labors a common direction by acting in accord with the government. Fortunately for the success of the work at the outset, a man was found particularly well adapted for the task of organizing and conducting such labors, in the person of Dr. Bellows, who, by his zealous labors in sanitary matters, was naturally designated to assume its management. His authority and his experience dispelled many prejudices and saved the great association which was forming under his presidency from much trouble. The first communication from the delegates to the Secretary of War, written on the 18th of May, was followed by another five days later with more distinct propositions. It asked for the appointment of a consulting commission composed of employés of the government and of persons not connected with the administration, to act independently and gratuitously, whose only privilege should be to visit the armies and to penetrate into camps and hospitals in order to ascertain whatever might be found useful to the health of the soldiers, to communicate confidentially to the medical corps the results of their researches, and to give a practical direction to the efforts of private charity. The labors of this commission embraced—first, the condition of the material, clothing, etc., of the volunteers; second, their diet and the preventive measures to be taken against sickness; third, the manner in which the hospitals, ambulances, and medical stores were or-



ganized; or, in a few words, what assistance sick men received. After some hesitation the Secretary of War, on recommendation of the surgeon-general, approved this project, and on the 9th June, 1861, appointed the commission, which shortly after took the name, thenceforth celebrated, of the United States Sanitary Commission.

The latter had scarcely been constituted when it addressed its first appeal to the public, calling for all well-disposed persons to co-operate in its labors, and suggesting the formation of committees for the purpose of collecting contributions in money and in supplies. It addressed itself more particularly to life-insurance companies, as being directly interested in diminishing the chance of mortality among volunteers, who before leaving for the seat of war insured their lives at premiums that were naturally very high. At the same time, to members of the Commission, whose number was rapidly increasing, was assigned the task of visiting the armies without delay for the purpose of setting on foot the inquiry which was the immediate object of its creation. Finally, an order of the 13th of June, as a sequel to that of the 9th, gave this Commission a definite organization. Its labors consisted in instituting inquiries, giving advice, exercising a surveillance, and, in short, in collecting and forwarding relief through direct channels. In order to facilitate this labor, the Commission was divided into three committees, whose duty was to establish relations—first, with the Secretary of War; second, with the officers and surgeons of the armies; third, with the authorities of the various States and local societies. They thus became a powerful medium between the official organization and the private charities which it centralized.

We have stated that the dependence in which the medical department was placed toward the military authorities for all supplies of materials, and especially for the means of transportation, had involved this service in frequent difficulties. The Commission, as soon as it had set to work, having relied upon the means of transportation used by the government, encountered the same difficulties, which should be attributed to the novelty of the situation, and not to any hostility on the part of the military administration. In order to solve these

difficulties the Commission struck out at once into a new path : its intervention, instead of being advisory, became really auxiliary through the organization of a special transportation service, at first of material, then, a short time after, of the sick themselves. Beginning with ambulances, wagons, and coaches, it gradually embraced special cars on railroads and steamboats for the rivers, which brought in provisions and carried out men, the whole being naturally under the personal care of special attendants, whose numbers increased constantly. Thanks to these resources, the Commission was really able to perform the task it had undertaken, that of filling the voids that were found to exist in the medical service. While the latter had sometimes to wait for weeks before it could receive the medicines and articles of food it had requested for the use of the soldiers, whose arrival was delayed by administrative formalities, the Sanitary Commission, free from all obstacles and always ready to act promptly, came to its assistance. Its intervention was especially effective in combating the scurvy, which appeared in South Carolina and also along the Mississippi during the summer of 1863 ; and it may be said, without great exaggeration, that Vicksburg was captured by the fresh onions and potatoes of the Sanitary Commission.

At the period we have now reached the Commission, although not having as yet attained all the development it will have at a later date, is completely organized ; its powerful network extends over all the Northern States ; its abundant relief reaches the Federal armies in every direction ; we can therefore specify, in advance of the statistical figures to be given hereafter, what was then its organization.

The labors of the Commission were divided between four departments, the functions of which were briefly as follows : *First*, the inspection department, composed of a corps of physicians, whose duty it was to visit the armies and to prosecute constantly the inquiry which was originally almost the sole object of the organization. *Second*, the department of general relief, comprising all the adjuncts of the Commission, and a bureau, serving as a link between the Commission and them. These adjuncts consisted of twelve societies or branches, dividing

among themselves, under different names, all the territory of the Northern States, and serving, each in its own district, as a centre to local associations established in every town and village. To these associations, whose number varied from one hundred and fifty to twelve hundred per district, was assigned the task of collecting donations in money and in kind, which were forwarded to their respective branch societies. The latter transmitted weekly, along with the former, an account of the goods or effects it had registered and deposited at the central bureau of the Commission. This bureau, in its turn, according to these accounts and the reports of the inspectors, directed the transmission of the goods—either directly to the armies, if that was necessary, or to the eleven general dépôts of the Commission, which were supplied either in this way or by the purchase of medicines and other commodities of value. *Third*, the department of field relief, charged with the distribution of all that the former had collected. Controlled by two chief inspectors, one for the East and the other for the West, it comprised a superintendent attached to each army corps, who, with a complete *personnel* and ample material, had charge of, and relieved the wants of, the soldiers. Avoiding all interference with the duties of the medical service, it distributed its relief to all alike, without showing favor to any particular State or corps, whatever might be the place the articles it had to distribute came from—a considerable advantage over the local associations, which could not avoid a certain degree of partiality, so fatal to discipline, and of which the generals had frequently occasion to complain. Its agents, going to help and relieve the wounded even on the battlefield, and conducting them afterward to their ambulances when those of the medical service were crowded, paid equal attention and bestowed the same care without distinction on both parties. This did not prevent the Confederates from treating those who fell into their hands as prisoners of war: four of them captured at Gettysburg underwent a terrible captivity at Richmond. *Fourth*, the department of private relief, under the direction of two general secretaries—one for the East and the other for the West—charged with giving aid to the soldiers outside of the armies. Under their auspices places of shelter were established in all the large cities, where lodgings, with board and medical



advice, were secured to all those who had not yet entered the ranks, who were on their way to the hospitals or returning from them, who were on convalescent leave of absence, or for some cause or other had wandered away from their corps. During the year 1864 these establishments afforded shelter to an average of seven thousand five hundred soldiers. Six dépôts (homes) had likewise been founded, affording shelter, for a longer period of time than the above-mentioned establishments, to sick or helpless soldiers who were waiting for the settlement of their accounts; and sometimes they had long to wait, as is well known. Two other establishments of a similar character—one in Washington, the other at Annapolis—gave shelter to the families of soldiers, with regular permits, on their way to visit their relatives in the armies; and refreshment-saloons in all the principal cities and at railroad-stations, always, like the rest, gratuitously supplied, secured food for the soldiers on their way to join their regiments. The hospital-wagons and boats already alluded to, which received the wounded and the sick in the very centre of the armies, and which saved them much suffering by conveying them without delays, and almost without jolting, to the large establishments of the North, were also dependent upon this department. It was through its agency that clothing, provisions, and medicines were forwarded, with more or less chance of reaching their destination, to the unfortunate prisoners who were perishing from want in the hands of the Confederates; and when the Richmond government, having adopted a more rigorous policy, objected to the transmission of such articles, they were sent to the exchanged prisoners, who, for want of immediate relief, would frequently have died before reaching their homes. Finally, not satisfied with affording soldiers material aid, this department assumed toward the soldiers the rôle of guide and protector. On the one hand, five offices—at Washington, Philadelphia, New York, Louisville, and New Orleans—took charge of collecting the money due to them, of assisting them in making out their papers and accounts, and of protecting them against swindlers; while, on the other hand, in the four first-mentioned cities there were offices connected with the hospitals which centralized the information that could be obtained con-



cerning all soldiers who had been at any time, even for the briefest period, under the care of the medical department. These offices enabled families to find out, almost without fail, those among their relatives who seemed lost in the midst of these immense bodies of armed men, and thus relieved much suffering and put an end to a great deal of anxiety.

The figures we have given demonstrate more eloquently than any comment that could be made what private charity can accomplish when properly directed. We shall only add one instance, by way of conclusion, in anticipation of the chronological order of this history. In the month of October, 1864, the society whose organization and achievements we have just related had already received \$5,000,000 in cash, one-third of which was contributed by the Pacific States, although very remote from the seat of war.

The other societies having the same object in view are only entitled to a brief notice, for the rôle they played was of secondary importance. We can only mention the Western Sanitary Commission, which, being entirely independent of the former, though equally national—that is to say, intended for the relief of soldiers of all the States without distinction—had but a limited field of action. Created on the 5th of September, 1861, by General Fremont, and reconstituted by the Secretary of War on the 16th of December, 1862, its special mission was to carry relief into hospitals. It would be impossible for us to give the names of the local independent societies, all of which were of more or less service, especially in assisting the sick and wounded soldiers in the interior, but whose unfortunate partiality we have already mentioned wherever they penetrated into army-centres.

Before resuming the recital of military events, which we have interrupted, let us cast another rapid glance over the interior situation of the Southern States at the period we have now reached. No military measure of importance having marked the session of Congress, which lasted about four months from the 12th of January, 1863, and the consideration of the Confederate finances having brought us down to the second volume, closing with the end of the said session, in order to complete this

sketch it only remains for us to speak about two questions which occupied the attention of the government, of Congress, and of the public—the questions relating to retaliation and impressments. The importance which these two questions then assumed shows, without any comment, how critical the situation of the Confederacy had already become—how easy it was, despite the assurances of Mr. Davis, to foresee the impending exhaustion of its resources.

The President's message calling the attention of the Congress at Richmond to the Emancipation Proclamation of Mr. Lincoln contained one reflection which, with the exception of a few fanatics, no one could have taken in earnest. He invoked the commiseration of his fellow-citizens for the sad fate of those thousands of beings belonging to an inferior race, till then peaceful and contented with their life of labor, whom the proclamation would doom to certain destruction. Presuming that the only object of the Federal government was to kindle a servile war, he announced his intention of delivering thenceforth all prisoners with the rank of commissioned officers to the authorities of the various States, to be punished as accomplices in this crime. By promising compliance with the demands of the most noisy portion of the public for terrible retaliations, he was thus shrewd enough to shift the responsibility of their execution upon other shoulders. Notwithstanding its docility, the Congress did not humor this manœuvre. It insisted, on the contrary, that the President should carry out this threat of retaliation in a direct manner, authorizing him to establish courts-martial in the armies for the purpose of summarily trying such officers of the enemy who should, by their exactions or their violence against non-combatants or prisoners, have acted in contravention of the ordinary rules of war, or who should have commanded colored soldiers or induced a servile insurrection. Negroes caught alone with arms in hand were to be given up to the local authorities, to be sold for the benefit of the latter. We will see presently that these orders, without being carried into effect by the Confederate government for fear of provoking new retaliations upon their own officers, interrupted the exchanges and exposed Union prisoners to cruel suffering.

The impressment law was one of the inevitable consequences of the financial and economical crisis. The producers, who saw the Confederate paper depreciating with frightful rapidity, would no longer sell their commodities, even at the most exorbitant rates, fearing to be soon left with nothing but worthless bank-notes in their hands—worthless, however large their number. The consumers, the government being the chief among them, were thus threatened with absolute famine. In order to avoid this disaster, Congress decided that the government had a right to seize, by means of impressments and by payment in paper-money, all such commodities as it might need wherever it should think proper to get them, leaving only to each individual a quantity strictly necessary for family consumption. By this method it sought not only to facilitate the circulation of food-supplies, but also to oblige agriculturists, through the fear of these impressments, to throw their products on the market. The fixing of prices was the essential and most delicate feature of this measure: certain provisions softened its despotic character. Under the superintendence of a central board the law provided for the appointment of two commissioners in each State, one to be named by the President, the other by the governor of the State; these commissioners to be clothed with authority to fix every two months the price to be paid by the administration for each commodity. It was the law of *maximum*, but it was only applicable to those middlemen who had not themselves produced the articles demanded by the impressments: when these articles were seized on the very spot of their production, their valuation was left to the free estimate of two or three arbiters selected from among the neighboring farmers, who acted in the capacity of an expropriation jury. The consequences of this restriction, which favored producers, went beyond the intentions of the legislator. The farmers kept their commodities exclusively for the government, but they invariably agreed among themselves to fix a value on these commodities which the latter deemed excessive. The law had to be modified. Having once abandoned ordinary methods, the government had to push arbitrary means to their utmost limit. It needed the commodities, and it was determined to have them at its own price: it could not tolerate

any resistance, open or disguised. It was therefore stipulated that if the officer making the impressment did not approve of the price fixed by the arbiters, he could always appeal to the commissioners, who caused their own schedule of prices to be applied; and the superintendent having directed these officers never to accept higher prices than those contained in this schedule, the rôle of the arbiters became nullified by this fact. The government was thenceforth able to regulate the maximum at its own pleasure. Finally, another maximum was determined upon for manufactured goods, limiting the benefits which might accrue to contractors for the government from such traffic.

Such a system could not fail to give rise to great abuses: the impressments bore heavily upon certain sections of the country and their farmers, while they spared others; and the administration agents took advantage of their arbitrary power to procure cheap food for their families and friends. These abuses, however, were mere trifles compared with the vexations inherent in the system itself. Consequently, there was much dissatisfaction: complaints and protests broke out in every direction. If these were not more violent, it was because the people were afraid lest by attacking the government too vehemently they might weaken the cause in behalf of which every family had sent its sons into the army.

It had to be acknowledged at once that the rise in the price of articles of food was due not only to the depreciation of government paper, but also to two other causes still more serious—the diminution of the amount of these commodities and the difficulty in the way of transportation. Those districts of the Southern States which produced the largest quantity of cereals, Central and Western Tennessee and the Valley of Virginia, were in possession of the enemy; the latter also occupied the coast of North Carolina, whose fisheries formerly furnished the principal food of the black population. The harvest for the year 1862 had everywhere been very poor: it had been much worse in the Southern States, because the negroes had taken advantage of their masters' absence to do little work, and that carelessly; the institution, shaken to its very foundation, was no longer in force, in spite of



appearances. The few white people who had remained on the plantations, having cause to dread a servile insurrection, resorted oftener to entreaties than to force to compel their slaves to work. On the other hand, the difficulty of transportation caused the scarcity of food to be still more sensibly felt. The want of horses, which had been taken for the use of the army, and the wretched condition of the roads, impeded local travel. But it was chiefly owing to the bad management of the railroads that the equilibrium could not be established between the abundance of certain districts and the poverty of others, that the armies could not be regularly supplied with provisions, and that meat from Texas did not arrive in sufficient quantities. The speed of the trains on the Virginia lines had been reduced to ten miles per hour. For want of iron the worn-out rails could not be renewed, nor the rotten cross-ties be replaced for want of workmen. Consequently, the government had the greatest trouble in building the two branches of railway running from Selma, Alabama, to Meridian in Mississippi, and from Danville to Greensborough in North Carolina, although it had concentrated all its efforts upon this work, the strategic importance of which we have indicated elsewhere.

Under the influence of these complicated causes the spring of 1863 ushered in a veritable famine, with its melancholy train of suffering and violence. It was feared at one time that the blockade would oblige the Confederacy to succumb before the famine like a besieged city. Immense quantities of cotton and tobacco were rotting on the soil, which, through a fatal shortsighted policy, was still worked so as to be made to yield products which were thenceforth useless. The armies were at times short of provisions. The most important places, like Vicksburg, were insufficiently supplied with food. Finally, disturbances among women who were clamoring for bread—disturbances which were directed, as always happens everywhere under similar circumstances, against monopolists—broke out first at Salisbury in North Carolina on the 19th of March and at Raleigh on the 26th; then even at Richmond on the 2d of April, and on the 15th at Mobile. In order to ward off the evil, at least for the future, the government conceived the idea of prohibiting the

cultivation of the soil except for cereals. It was guided, however, by its advisers. On the 10th of April, Mr. Davis through an official proclamation appealed to the patriotism of all planters, conjuring them to devote themselves exclusively to the production of articles of food: the local authorities followed his example. This appeal was the more thoroughly appreciated inasmuch as the change in the cultivation of the soil so persistently demanded was, so to say, rendered imperative by the laws of political economy. The culture of the soil had necessarily to be adapted to the wants of consumers. The area of fields sown with cereals was considerably increased; attention was given to the raising of cattle and hogs. This transformation, which at a later period brought abundance to the Confederacy in the very hour of its military reverses, had the immediate effect of driving away famine by throwing all the provisions that could yet be found on the market. But, as we have already observed, it finally brought about a result quite unexpected by those who had so eagerly clamored for the change. In fact, if in the winter of 1862-63 the Confederacy was almost starved out, this very famine was a bulwark as effective as its armies against invasion, and we have seen how at this period the loss of the *dépôts* of Holly Springs compelled Grant to beat a speedy retreat; whereas in the winter of 1864-65 the resources accumulated in Georgia enabled Sherman to accomplish his march to the coast, which two years previously would have been impossible.

In the midst of these great difficulties the statesmen of the South found some encouragement and strong ground for hope in contemplating the difficulties which had likewise overtaken the government against which they were waging war. As we have stated elsewhere, the first Emancipation Proclamation of the President, that of September 22, 1862, by rendering the rupture between the Democratic party and the executive power irrevocable, had placed the latter, for the first time, face to face with a powerful constitutional opposition. It is true that its leaders had adopted a programme difficult to execute. Blaming Mr. Lincoln for the defeats of the Federal armies, they promised victory if they should attain power, and proposed to prosecute the war with greater vigor, while renouncing all restrictive

measures, which they denounced as tyrannical, and by seeking to conciliate those even whom they pretended to be able to conquer on the battlefield by means of concessions regarding constitutional questions. But the arbitrary acts, the unjust favors, the most necessary measures for defence even, the suspension of the *habeas corpus*, the increasing rates of taxation, added daily to the number of discontents who joined the ranks of this opposition.

The elections that took place during the autumn of 1862 in ten of the States, either for the office of governor or for Representatives in Congress, soon revealed the strength of this opposition. Mr. Horatio Seymour, who had distinguished himself by the vehemence of his attacks upon the administration, was elected governor of New York. Out of one hundred and twenty-four Representatives elected, the opposition succeeded in obtaining sixty-seven, thus gaining thirty seats over the delegation elected two years before—an advantage which reduced, but did not destroy, the preponderance of the Republican party, which could always count upon the suffrages of the New England States. The returns of these local elections gave to the Democrats a small majority of 35,000 votes out of 2,422,000 voters, whilst in the same States Mr. Lincoln had received in 1860 a majority of more than two hundred thousand votes over his competitors. Public opinion was therefore shaken: the most zealous partisans of the President's policy acknowledged that a general vote on the question of emancipation, and even on the war, might not perhaps be in his favor. It is true that a close analysis of this ballot would have enabled a judicious observer to foresee how shortlived was likely to be the reaction which had produced it. The vote of soldiers under arms—a fatal and dangerous institution in itself, which ended in being generally practised by the volunteers—was at this time a privilege only exercised in a few States: this portion of the suffrages gave an enormous majority to the government. So that, far from being discouraged, the men who fought the war insisted upon its continuation, and, enlightened by experience, they judged the slavery question with far more sagacity than their fellow-citizens who remained at home. For however short a period the struggle might be prolonged, they were destined to

exercise an immense influence over the latter, and gradually modify their opinions.

These local manifestations could not compel Mr. Lincoln to change his policy, which was endorsed by both houses of Congress. It was in response to the threats of the opposition that, mixing up, like the latter—most unfortunately for the army—civil affairs with military matters, he had deprived McClellan of his command. We have seen that the emancipation announced on the 22d of September was proclaimed on the 1st of January, 1863.

The leaders of the Democratic party found themselves, in the mean while, in the situation, painful for sincere patriots, of all oppositions which lay aside their arms in times of war. The disaster of Fredericksburg, the check of Chickasaw Bayou, the inaction of Rosecrans after Murfreesborough, were so many political victories for their cause. The vote of three North-eastern States—where the Republicans, hitherto all-powerful, had considerable trouble in electing their candidates—showed in the months of March and April what progress the Democratic party had made. Shortly afterward the arrest and banishment of Mr. Vallandigham caused a greater excitement throughout the country, inasmuch as these acts of summary justice were coincident with the defeat at Chancellorsville. Finally, to all these causes of discontent were added the preliminary operations of the conscription law. All those who were opposed to the war either from conviction or interest, those even who approved it, but on condition of not being forced to take part in it in person, were terribly alarmed when they saw their names on draft-lists, and from that moment became bitter adversaries of the government.

The leaders of the opposition, thus sustained, became every day bolder, and, as always happens in similar cases, the heat of the conflict caused them to modify by degrees their programme. Convinced that the South could not be conquered, they only sought for a plausible pretext to treat with, and recognize the independence of, the Confederacy. The party of War Democrats disappeared and was merged into that of Peace Democrats, which two years before was only a very weak minority. Europe, with the exception of Russia, almost unanimously espoused the cause



of the Peace Democrats. It looked upon the efforts and perseverance of the Federal government as the effect of blind infatuation, of sanguinary obstinacy, while the government of the Tuileries, despising the healthy traditions of the French monarchy, proposed to England to interfere for the purpose of imposing a mediation. It is true that France had not the courage to follow out the policy it had adopted in regard to Mexico. Taking its wishes for reality, it became so thoroughly convinced of the impending defeat of the North that it deemed it wiser to let the destruction of the Union be accomplished without interference, an essential result of the success which has attended its Transatlantic combinations. Nevertheless, the French despatch of the 9th of January, 1863, was a menace which might be realized at any moment.

Let us sum up in a few words the situation of the two adversaries. The South saw her finances ruined, her paper worthless; the conscription and the impressments could alone fill up the ranks of her armies and feed them. The total number of her able-bodied population did not admit of any hope that her effective forces could be increased in the future, while famine threatened to paralyze her military operations. The word "famine," in fact, is not an exaggeration when speaking of the difficulty of feeding the best-organized army, that of Lee, even when it lay inactive on the Rappahannock. A general officer would sometimes be reduced to the necessity of abstracting a few handfuls of corn from his horses, which he roasted, so as to add to his meagre allowance of food. An idea may be formed from this of the distress everywhere prevailing among other troops where they could not live exclusively on the resources of the country they occupied. The Confederate soldiers, inured to the hardships of war by two years' campaigning, and commanded by experienced leaders, were full of confidence in their superiority over the Federals. The Army of Northern Virginia, victorious at Chancellorsville in spite of its numerical weakness, had been reinforced by the return of Longstreet with three divisions, and if it was not quite as strong as it was ten months before, it may be asserted that it had never been more formidable, more capable of a great effort. In the West, Grant was detained before

Vicksburg, whose defences were then considered impregnable, but the Secretary of War was aware that the resistance of this place was limited to the extent of its provisions, and that famine would win the day within a few weeks.

It was therefore largely in the interest of the Confederate government to strike a decisive blow on the battlefield: it possessed an instrument in its armies as perfect as could possibly be desired, while the difficulties in the interior, as well as military considerations, made it then a duty on its part to risk everything to end the war by a final victory.

Moreover, the political situation of her adversaries afforded to the South the only chance for accomplishing the object she had pursued from the day she had assumed the position of a sovereign power. This object, the independence of the slave States, simple in appearance, was not so in reality. We have shown elsewhere that the political and social institution of slavery could not be maintained except on condition of its being respected beyond the boundaries of its own domain. Its advocates, after having long controlled the Union, had drawn back from the moment that the central executive power slipped from their hands. But as to this fundamental institution of the new Confederacy, the vicinity of a great hostile power comprising all the free States, the real master of the continent and spreading rapidly over the vast territories open to colonization, would have been still more fatal than the maintenance of the Union as it was in 1861. In order that a slaveholding community may expand and prosper it must have nothing to fear from its neighbors: if independence was the object of the Confederacy, supremacy was therefore the indispensable means to guarantee it. If the soldiers who were lavish of their blood on the battlefields thought that they were only fighting to repel an invasion from the North, the sagacious men who directed their movements knew full well that a purely defensive policy would not suffice. After having abandoned the Union, might they not prevent its reconstruction to their injury? There was nothing chimerical in this hope: its realization depended on the fate of battles. One secession might bring on another. Many interests, both political and commercial, were bound to divide the Western States, the Central and Eastern States, as soon as

the governing principle, the national bond which had hitherto kept them united, was repudiated. This new crisis seemed to be approaching. The parties which in 1861 had set aside their quarrels in order to defend the Constitution were again in open conflict. Those in favor of peace, whose number had rapidly increased, no longer concealed their hopes, and scarcely disguised their sympathies for the South. In the large cities popular discontent, muttering in secret, only asked to make common cause with those who, arms in hand, were fighting the lawful government. The sequel proved that formidable insurrections were ready to break out: they would have incited new seceding movements, dragging along the timid and the wavering, paralyzing the action of the government, and breaking the Union into a thousand fragments. The latter disappearing with the authority that represented it, the Confederacy, strongly constituted, founded on the common interest of all its members, would become the dominating power by the side of States greatly divided, it may be torn to pieces by a new civil war, among which it could select allies, or rather *protégés*, without fear of rivals.

In order to make the Federal edifice, already so terribly shaken, thus to crumble, a single great victory was perhaps sufficient; but this victory had to be achieved on the enemy's territory: a defensive success was not enough to accomplish the object, nor was it expedient to wait until the North had given up the game through sheer exhaustion. By invading the free States the Confederate armies would not only afford some relief to the populations of the South, which had been sorely tried for the last two years; they would show to Europe that the moment had arrived for reaching out a friendly hand to a power capable of maintaining its independence by such efforts. To Lee's army was awarded the great and perilous honor of performing this task. Pemberton had been shut up in Vicksburg with the remnants of his army since the 18th of May. Bragg's only care at Tullahoma was to free himself, without troubling himself about gaining the distant shores of the Ohio unless powerfully reinforced.

It is true that Longstreet had proposed to Lee to go and reinforce Bragg with his army corps, in order to undertake, by way

of Kentucky, the campaign of invasion which was to decide the fate of the war. But this campaign could not have produced the same results as that of which Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia, and the mines of Pennsylvania were the immediate objective points. Indeed, on that side the Army of Northern Virginia had but a few days' march to accomplish in order to cross the Potomac: it knew all its fords. Taught by experience, it could renew the campaign of the preceding year under better auspices. If, as was the case after the two battles of Manassas, the capture of Washington itself should seem above its power, it need not run against the fortifications of the capital in order to succeed. It could either occupy the large cities of Pennsylvania, cut the Northern States almost in two and paralyze them, or by delivering Baltimore from Federal rule isolate the capital of the Union and force Mr. Lincoln and his government to abandon it in disgrace or allow himself to be blockaded within its walls. Above all, it could by threatening either of these operations drive the Army of the Potomac from the formidable positions it occupied along the Rappahannock, and either draw it away from the fortifications of Washington, its base of operations and its refuge in case of defeat, or oblige it to resume the offensive under the most unfavorable circumstances. Between the armies which invaded the Confederacy in every direction Lee could thus choose his adversary in order to strike him a decisive blow. If this blow should not suffice to end the war, if the Army of Northern Virginia should even be compelled to recross the Potomac, it would have succeeded in breaking up the plans of the hostile generals, turned the tide of war during the mild season, and thus made a gain of one year. It was better to attempt this invasion, notwithstanding all its risks, than to continue making the heaviest sacrifices for such victories as that of Chancellorsville—a fruitless victory, for if it had reduced the ranks of both parties in the same proportion, the Federals alone could have been able to fill up the voids, while summer, by opening all the roads to Richmond, would probably have obliged Lee to leave Fredericksburg for the defence of the capital.

In the mean while, several officers—including the commander-in-chief of the Army of Northern Virginia, according to some



accounts—were busy in calculating the losses that an aggressive campaign might inflict upon this army, whose ranks it was so difficult to fill through the process of recruiting. They would have preferred that the army had confined itself to the task of repulsing the Federals, of keeping them away from Richmond, in using its strength in fruitless efforts, rather than compromise, in such a venture, all the advantages they had gained with so much trouble during the last two years. Some politicians also feared—without cause, in our opinion—that an invasion, even a successful one at the outset, so far from shaking the determination of their adversaries, might be the means of putting an end to party struggles in the North and unite all men once more in defence of the Federal power. One of the most enlightened among them, Vice-President Stephens, on being informed that the campaign we are about to describe had opened, wrote to Mr. Davis on the 12th of June, proposing to go to Washington with words of peace before the Confederate soldiers had crossed the Potomac. But the confidence and zeal of the latter put an end to all hesitation on the part of their leaders: public opinion, excited almost to frenzy by success, imperatively demanded that the seat of war should be transferred to the soil of the free States. “If the general wants provisions, let him go and look for them in Pennsylvania,” said the chief of the bureau of subsistence, it is reported, in reply to a demand for rations addressed to that department by General Lee. In a purely military point of view this step was perhaps imprudent; but in the situation of the two adversaries, policy, being for once in perfect accord with the popular sentiment, counselled the attempt.

## CHAPTER II.

### *BRANDY STATION.*

ON the 3d of June, 1863, Lee put his army in motion. The future of America was about to be decided for ever.

This army bore but little resemblance to the brave but undisciplined troops that had defended the Manassas plains two years before. It had even become, through its organization and discipline, its experience in fighting and marching, much superior to what it was the preceding year, when its chieftain led it into Maryland for the first time. The extreme confidence that animated it, as we have observed, imparted to it immense strength on the field of battle, but it also inspired it with an imprudent contempt for its adversaries. From the day following the battle of Chancellorsville the government and the generals had applied themselves to the task of reinforcing and reorganizing it. The return of the three divisions that had been besieging Suffolk, the forwarding of new regiments which had been withdrawn from points of least importance for defence, and, finally, the arrival of a large number of recruits, had during the latter part of May carried its effective force to eighty thousand men, 68,352 of whom were infantry. The latter had been divided into three army corps, each comprising three divisions. Up to this time the nine divisions of the Army of Northern Virginia had been partitioned between Longstreet and Jackson, to whom Lee allowed great freedom of action over the whole extent of the battlefield where each happened to be in command. Being deprived of the services of him who, of his two lieutenants, was most accustomed to exercise independent command, and obliged thenceforth to give more personal attention to the management of battles, Lee felt that it was necessary to reduce the size of his army corps in order to render them more manageable. Longstreet retained the

First; Ewell and A. P. Hill were placed at the head of the Second and Third, and each of them had the rank of lieutenant-general conferred upon him. If these last two officers, to recall the comparison made after the death of Turenne, were the "small change" for Stonewall Jackson, it might be said with truth that the minor coins were of sterling value.

No one could dispute to Ewell the honor of succeeding Jackson in the command of the Second corps. We have seen him at his brilliant début charging the gate of Mexico in 1847 with Kearny's squadron. A Virginian by birth, like Lee and Jackson, he possessed on that soil, so fruitful in valiant soldiers, a beautiful residence near the city of Williamsburg, in the heart of the old colony of English Cavaliers. This dwelling, of brick and wood, square built, with a lofty flight of steps, of sombre aspect, and standing alone in the centre of a vast clearing, surrounded by a magnificent forest, had been for a year in possession of the Federals. After having almost invariably played the principal rôle in the operations directed by Jackson, Ewell, severely wounded at Chantilly, had not been able to look on his domain for rest and health. Finally, after nine months' absence, he rejoined on crutches the army which had not forgotten his services. More fortunate than his old chief, he had, thanks to his robust and active temperament, successfully borne the sufferings consequent upon amputation, and seemed to be sufficiently restored to health to fight for the recovery of his patrimony. Having lost one leg, he had himself fastened to his saddle and resumed his command. He had the required energy, firmness, and activity to be the leader of soldiers who, knowing their own value, were severe judges of the qualities possessed by their chiefs; but he lacked the unerring quickness of perception of his predecessor, which could discover instantaneously the weak point of an adversary.

A. P. Hill, like Ewell, was a Virginian. Having also participated in all the labors of Jackson, he had been slightly wounded, almost at the same time as the latter, in the terrible affair of Dowdall's Tavern. Gifted with a degree of perseverance equal to any emergency, he was always ready to take charge of the most difficult undertakings, and inspired his chiefs, his comrades,

and his subordinates with equal confidence. His force of will overcame the weakness of a shattered constitution, which had emaciated his manly face. He was never sick on the day of battle. We have stated that his name was the last uttered by Jackson's lips as he lay on his deathbed. He waited for the completion of his task to respond to this call and to join his chief. The latter had fallen in the midst of victory; A. P. Hill perished in the last hour of the war, when all hope was lost save the privilege of dying like a soldier with sword in hand.

The reorganization of the artillery completed the changes effected by Lee in the distribution of his forces. Up to this time the batteries were divided between the divisions, sometimes even specially attached to some particular brigade: they had to be detached in order to employ them singly or unite them in groups, hence a miserable scattering on the battlefield. They were all now placed under the command of General Pendleton, a brave and energetic officer who had been tried under fire. Some of these batteries formed an independent reserve; the rest, while still remaining under his control, were assigned temporarily to the army corps. The artillery consisted of fifteen battalions, each composed of four batteries of four pieces—sixteen guns in all. These battalions, commanded by experienced officers, while remaining under the controlling direction of General Pendleton, were divided between the three corps, each receiving five—making eighty pieces of artillery. Three of the battalions were each specially attached to a division, while the other two formed a reserve. Five mounted batteries of six pieces each composed the light artillery of Stuart's cavalry division.

The cavalry, reinforced and newly mounted under the supervision of Stuart, had, after Chancellorsville, taken up its old quarters at Culpeper, and occupied the triangle comprised between the Rapidan and the Rappahannock, watching the right wing of the Federals along this latter river, and still menacing their lines of communication. In this position it covered the roads that the Confederate army had to follow if it desired to advance in the direction of the North. In fact, as Lee could not think of crossing the Rappahannock by main force in the face of



Hooker's army, he had only two plans of campaign to follow if he assumed the offensive: either to turn his right wing in order to forestall him at Manassas and before Washington, or to push forward toward Maryland by the valley of the Shenandoah, masking his movement behind the Blue Ridge. The first plan, which had proved successful the preceding year against Pope, was too hazardous to be tried again a second time in the face of an adversary taught by experience. Lee adopted the second, which left the enemy in a state of uncertainty for a longer space of time and enabled him to outvie the latter in speed.

This movement was not without danger, for it consisted in turning the right wing of the Federals; and in order to accomplish this the latter had to be detained before Fredericksburg by a large display of troops while Lee's heads of column reached the banks of the Shenandoah. His army was thus stretched along a line which throughout its entire length exposed its flank to the attacks of the enemy. The utmost secrecy could alone ward off the danger of these attacks.

The forest of the Wilderness had resumed its wonted stillness, disturbed only by the footsteps of Confederate scouts; the grass had covered the corpses and the débris of every kind which lay scattered among the woods; the Federal trenches, the torn and shattered trees, and the vestiges of fires, alone recalled to mind the conflict of the 3d of May. Precisely one month to a day had elapsed since this battle when Longstreet's First division, under McLaws, penetrated this henceforth historical Wilderness. Another division followed it closely; the Third, under Hood, was already on the banks of the Rapidan, and the whole army corps, crossing this river, reached the neighborhood of Culpeper Courthouse on the evening of the 7th.

A portion of Ewell's corps had started in the same direction on the 4th; the remainder moved forward on the morning of the 5th: Hill's corps, therefore, was the only one left to occupy the positions from Taylor's Hill to Hamilton's Crossing in which the army had passed the winter, and it had to be deployed along this line in order to conceal the departure of two-thirds of the army. The vigilance of the outposts had, in fact, prevented Hooker's spies from reporting this departure to him: no one had been able

to cross the river for several days. But the movements of troops caused by the removal of Hill's divisions could not altogether avoid attracting the attention of the Federals. Besides, they knew their adversaries too well not to anticipate an attack the moment that they did not resume the aggressive themselves.

A few words on the situation of the Army of the Potomac for the last month will enable the reader to understand why, contrary to its tactics of the preceding year, it lay waiting, inactive in its positions, for the Confederates to take the initiative of a new campaign.

Whilst the latter saw their ranks filling up, those of the Union army were thinning out in an alarming manner. The expiration of their terms of service carried off five thousand well-trying men in the month of May, and ten thousand in June; the fatigues of a short but distressing campaign and the first heats of summer increased the number of sick; desertions had not been entirely stopped; and the recruiting of regiments already organized was almost at a standstill.

The active infantry force that Hooker had at his disposal was thus reduced to eighty thousand men. The artillery was thenceforth too numerous, and out of proportion to the above figures. The cavalry, on the other hand, worn out by Stoneman's raid, needed a few weeks' rest to recuperate. The authorities at Washington might have reinforced the Army of the Potomac by discontinuing or reducing the number of useless posts and garrisons, but the most sad experience had failed to induce them to abandon this system of scattering the troops. At the very moment when all the Confederate forces were leaving the coast to join Johnston in the West or Lee in Virginia, a whole army corps was left at Port Royal, one division at New Berne, two at Suffolk, and one in the peninsula of Virginia, to waste away without a purpose, without any plan of campaign; whilst in the district which the Army of the Potomac was called upon to defend, entire corps, such as the Washington garrison under Heintzelman, Stahel's six thousand cavalry in the neighborhood of Manassas, and Milroy's division in the Valley of Virginia, acted independently of Hooker and under the immediate direction of Halleck; the commander-in-chief of the Army of the

Potomac not being even informed of the orders these officers received. Lee's projects could not have been more effectually subverted.

Hooker no longer inspired his army with the same confidence as before Chancellorsville: the council of war that was held prior to the retreat had given rise to some painful retrospective discussions among some of his generals, the knowledge of which had reached Washington. Halleck, without daring to request Hooker's dismissal, shared the opinion of those who believed that the burden of command was too heavy for his shoulders, and, far from being urged to act, it was recommended to him to wait for a favorable opportunity.

It was during this state of expectancy, about the end of May, that vague rumors got afloat foreshadowing the impending movement of the Confederates. The Federals were not alone to suffer from the indiscretions of politicians and journalists: there were also men in the South who, for the silly satisfaction of being considered well informed, worked incessantly in their endeavors to fathom military secrets, and hastened to divulge them. The Richmond papers published that Lee was about to undertake an aggressive movement, and it was openly announced in the streets of the capital that he would invade Maryland at the head of eighty-five thousand men. Hooker thought justly that his adversaries were not likely to come to attack him in his positions at Falmouth, and try to turn him; but he was under the impression that they were about to resume the campaign plan of the preceding year, and proceed toward Manassas by crossing the Rappahannock near its source. He was confirmed in this opinion by the gathering of Stuart's cavalry at Culpeper and the increasing boldness of the guerillas who infested the country in his rear; for one of these bands even attempted, at Greenwich on the 31st of May, to capture a train intended for his army. It required, however, the removal of the encampments of Hill's corps on the 4th of June to induce him to suspect a serious movement on the part of the enemy, and to decide to emerge from his inactivity in order to make sure of the fact. On the morning of the 5th the pontonniers were ordered to throw two bridges over the Rappahannock at the point known by the name of Franklin's

Crossing. The Sixth corps, which was encamped in the neighborhood, sustained them and held itself ready to cross the river. This movement might be only a simple demonstration; it might also be the beginning of an operation which would have proved very dangerous for the enemy. Hooker, with the same sagacity he had shown in planning the battle of Chancellorsville, was fully convinced that an attack upon the weakened lines of Fredericksburg while a portion of Lee's army was probably pushing forward along the Culpeper road was the best means for preventing the invasion projected by his adversary. If the movement of the latter was not yet fully defined, he could thus stop him. If, on the contrary, he allowed him time to advance farther toward the North and to further separate his columns, he could then make a sudden attack with superior forces upon the troops which his presence at Falmouth detained on the Lower Rappahannock, and crush in its isolation one of the army corps whose co-operation was indispensable to Lee for an aggressive campaign.

Such a project was at once bold and well conceived: it had, in our opinion, great chances of success; but there was one obstacle, more difficult to overcome than rivers, or even hostile batteries, which did not allow Hooker to execute it: this was the instructions he had received along with the command of the army. These instructions formally directed him to cover Washington and Harper's Ferry. Washington, surrounded by formidable fortifications perfectly armed, had a numerous garrison, while Stahel's cavalry division, by clearing the approaches for a considerable distance, did not permit the enemy to attempt a surprise against the place. Harper's Ferry, we have already shown, had no strategic importance whatever; nevertheless, if it was desired to preserve this position, which had been very unnecessarily fortified, there could have been brought to the place five or six thousand men who under Milroy occupied Winchester and the lower part of the Valley of Virginia. But the requirements of General Halleck for the defence of these two points, after having fettered the movements of McClellan on the Chickahominy and in the Antietam campaign, were not likely to yield to Hooker's representations. On the 5th of June the latter had asked for permission to act independently of these instructions, and to manœuvre



his army as he thought proper, in order to be able to strike the enemy wherever he could find the occasion to fight him to advantage were he to let him advance northward, while he himself should menace the Confederate capital. This permission was refused. Halleck tried to prove to him that it would be better to follow in the wake of Lee's heads of column, whose direction no one could as yet exactly foresee; while Mr. Lincoln, recapitulating the scientific demonstration of his military director by a homely comparison, gave the form of an apologue to a telegram addressed to the commander of the Army of the Potomac: "I would not take any risk of being entangled upon the river, like an ox jumped half over a fence, and liable to be torn by dogs front and rear, without a fair chance to gore one way or to kick the other."

These instructions were positive and formal. Hooker had no other alternative but to conform to them. He had asked that all the forces which might have to operate against Lee should be united under one single command in order to combine their efforts. General Halleck deemed the superior control exercised by him from his office at Washington as quite sufficient for that purpose. The Army of the Potomac, doomed to act on the defensive, could not thenceforth prevent the enemy from accomplishing his design.

Hooker did his best not to allow himself to be surprised or forestalled by Lee. The bridges had been thrown over the river in the afternoon of June 5th, after a pretty sharp engagement with the Confederate skirmishers. As the latter were harassing the pontonniers a great deal, a Federal detachment had crossed the river in boats and dispersed them, after taking about one hundred prisoners. On the morning of the 6th, Hooker made Howe's division cross over to the right side of the Rappahannock. Lee, alarmed at this movement, caused a portion of Hill's corps to advance, holding himself ready to recall Ewell, who had been on the march since the day previous. But Hooker had his hands tied: when he saw the display of forces Howe provoked, he stopped the latter, without having been able to ascertain whether he had the enemy's whole army before him or only a portion of it. As to Lee, he soon discovered the weakness

of this demonstration. Perfectly at ease on the point, he made preparations to join Longstreet, instructing Hill to follow him as soon as the movements of which he was about to take the direction had compelled the enemy to abandon the banks of the Rappahannock.

Hooker had determined to feel the enemy at both extremities of his line at once. Whilst Howe was crossing the river he made preparations for a large cavalry reconnoissance in the direction of Culpeper. He was not aware, as we have remarked, that Lee's army was itself on the march toward this point. But he knew that the enemy's whole cavalry was gathered there; that Stuart, reinforced on all sides, had nearly ten thousand sabres at his command; and, even if the signs and rumors had not informed him, he was too well acquainted with the character of this young general not to feel convinced that he would not remain long inactive with such forces at his disposal. In what direction would he strike? Was he about to undertake a simple raid or to cover the movements of the enemy's infantry? It was necessary to make sure of this, and if possible to baffle his plans by a sudden attack. Unfortunately, the Federal cavalry had not yet entirely recovered from the long march it had made in the beginning of May. In spite of the efforts of its new chief, General Pleasonton, who had deserved this position by his brilliant behavior at Chancellorsville, the three divisions composing it scarcely numbered seven thousand five hundred sabres. In order to make up for Pleasonton's numerical inferiority, it became necessary to add to his command the two infantry brigades under Ames and Russell, detached from the Eleventh and Sixth corps, which counted about three thousand men under arms. Notwithstanding the excellent qualities of these foot-soldiers, their co-operation interfered with the mobility of the column of cavalry, and consequently destroyed part of its chances of success. The troops under Pleasonton's command were all scattered: in order to afford them time to concentrate, Hooker directed him not to cross the Rappahannock until nine in the morning. While he was preparing to strike a sudden blow in the direction of Culpeper, Longstreet, unknown to him, had reached this village with all his infantry on the evening of the 7th. The arrival of Lee,

who joined him before evening, was hailed by every one as sure proof that the hour for important operations had arrived. The general-in-chief found his cavalry thoroughly prepared for the rôle it was about to play.

Stuart, justly proud of this splendid force, had some time before asked Lee to come with some friends and review it. "Here I am," said the general-in-chief to him, pointing with his finger to the bivouacs of the First corps,—“here I am with my friends, according to your invitation.” It was agreed that on the following day Lee and his “friends”—that is to say, all of Longstreet’s soldiers—should witness the cavalry review.

With the exception of some regiments detached on outpost-duty, all Stuart’s cavalry was assembled on the 8th in a beautiful open plain between Culpeper and Brandy Station. General Lee, motionless on his horse, his head covered with a broad-brimmed hat, occupied an elevated position near a pole upon which was flying a large Confederate flag. For the army assembled around him, this man with a long gray beard, as wise as he was brave, of dignified mien, whose profile stood out in fine relief under a dazzling sky, brought by his mere presence a certain pledge of victory to the symbol of the Southern cause which floated by his side. The simplicity of attire, the immobility and serious countenance, of the general-in-chief, who no doubt was already revolving in his mind the chances of his new campaign, were in strong contrast with the brilliant uniform, the gay deportment, and cheerful looks of Stuart as he passed, sword in hand, with his troopers before their companions-in-arms. As if real war, with its sufferings and risks, had not been enough for him, Stuart omitted none of the features which in times of peace constitute a sham fight, with its conventions and improbabilities, such as dashing, headlong charges suddenly stopped, cannonading against a fictitious enemy—for even powder, so precious in warfare, was not spared—while the distant sounds of this pretended battle reached the very banks of the Rappahannock, to the astonishment of the Union scouts who were watching along the course of the river.

The campaign was about to commence. Stuart was to menace the Federals in the vicinity of Warrenton in order to conceal

from them the movements of the infantry, which was about to turn its back almost completely upon them as it proceeded north-westward, by way of Sperryville and Thornton's Gap, to reach the valley of the Shenandoah. On the evening of the 8th the Confederate cavalry bivouacked in the neighborhood of Brandy Station, halfway between Culpeper and the Rappahannock. Stuart established his head-quarters upon a barren hill of considerable height, which under the name of Fleetwood Hill stretches out north-east of Brandy Station perpendicularly to the railroad, and overlooks the wooded country surrounding it. Jones' brigade, composed of Virginia partisans recently attached to Stuart's corps, watched the fords of the Rappahannock, while Fitzhugh Lee's brigade, commanded by Colonel Munford, its chief being sick, had gone to encamp at Oak Shade on the other side of Hazel River, along the road which all the cavalry had to follow. The other three brigades, under the respective commands of Generals Robertson, Hampton, and W. H. F. Lee, as well as the mounted artillery, were assembled at Fleetwood. Never had Lee's young and brilliant lieutenant been in command of a finer or more numerous body of men: these brigades contained each from four to five regiments, almost equivalent to the Federal divisions, constituting a total effective force of more than nine thousand five hundred troopers, well mounted, well accoutred, and accompanied by thirty pieces of artillery perfectly equipped and well served.

This time, however, it was the Federals' turn to outspeed and surprise their adversaries. They had able and experienced commanders to lead them. Unassuming in his deportment, reserved and reticent, Pleasonton possessed correct judgment, quickness of perception, decision of character, and great determination of purpose. The cavalry was divided into three divisions, under Generals Buford, Gregg, and Colonel Duffié. The two first mentioned had already been accustomed to independent commands: being fully acquainted with the kind of warfare they were called upon to wage, they had succeeded in inspiring their soldiers with the fullest confidence. Since the battle of Kelly's Ford the Federal troopers had ceased to believe in the superiority of their adversaries. This was one great advantage in their favor.



Pleasanton, although fully aware that the bulk of the enemy's forces was assembled at Brandy Station, knew nothing of the disposition that Stuart had made of his troops: he had therefore to clear the principal movement directed against this point, and to hold himself ready either to push forward and disperse the hostile cavalry on every side if he should succeed in surprising it, or to fall back in case of his not being able to dislodge it. He formed two columns: with the first, composed of Buford's division and Ames' infantry, he proposed to cross the Rappahannock at Beverly Ford, about two miles above Rappahannock Station, and march directly upon Brandy Station, situated at a distance of four and a half miles. The second column, comprising the other two divisions of cavalry and Russell's brigade, under Gregg's command, was to cross the river at Kelly's Ford, much lower down, and to divide afterward. Duffié, taking a south-westerly direction, was ordered to push as far as Stevensburg, to find out whether the enemy occupied the road between Chancellorsville and Culpeper, and whether he had any troops on the march along that road, and to cover the left against any offensive movement on their part. In the mean while, Gregg, with his division, was to proceed toward Brandy Station in order to strike the rear of the cavalry which Buford was to attack in front, while Russell, bearing to the right in order to make short work with his infantry, would endeavor to assist the latter between the railroad and Beverly Ford.

At daybreak on the 9th the two Federal columns crossed the river, which was enveloped in a dense morning mist. The Confederates, solely occupied with their own projects, had abandoned the Rappahannock below the railroad line, and Gregg was able to cross it not only without encountering any resistance, but even without Stuart being informed of his presence on the right bank. At Beverly Ford, Buford's head of column, formed by Colonel Grimes\* Davis' brigade, took advantage of the fog to surprise and disperse Jones' outposts, stationed along the river. It came near capturing by the same stroke the whole of Stuart's artillery, four mounted batteries, which the latter, while preparing for

\* Colonel Benjamin F. Davis, Eighth New York cavalry. By his army associates he was familiarly called "Grimes" Davis.—ED.

the projected passage of the river, had imprudently caused to be placed about half a mile in advance of the encampments occupied by the brigade of Virginia partisans. These encampments were located back of a wood, the edge of which extended twelve hundred yards from the ford. No one suspected the approach of the enemy: the horses were picketed, the men at work on fatigue-duty, and the entire troop would have been captured but for the protection of the wood, which enabled the skirmishers who had been driven from the bank to form again on foot and to pour a sharp fire into the Federals, which brought the foremost squadrons to a halt. Jumping quickly into the saddle, a portion of Jones' troopers come up at full gallop, and vigorously resume the offensive against the Eighth New York. The two bodies of troops become mixed up, a combat with sabre and pistol follows, and the Federals are repulsed. Colonel Davis, in trying to rally them, falls mortally wounded. This premature death deprived the Federal cavalry of one of its best and most brilliant officers. A captain in the regular army, highly esteemed by his superiors and comrades, Davis had already distinguished himself by his daring and sagacity in coming out of Harper's Ferry a few days\* before Miles' capitulation, thus saving the brigade placed under his command. He is promptly avenged: the Eighth Illinois, coming up in its turn, throws the Confederates into disorder, carries off a portion of Stuart's baggage, and drives the fugitives across the wood and the remainder of their bivouacs upon the main body of Jones' brigade, which the latter has been forming in haste about two miles from the river. The artillery, which, after the first discharge, has promptly fallen back, supports the line. This time Jones steadily waits for the assailants, for it is only a question of detaining them long enough to enable Stuart to come up with reinforcements. The Confederates are not accustomed to see their adversaries assume the offensive with so much spirit. Ames' brigade, which has crossed the river, is deployed along the edge of the wood and occupies it in front, while Buford's second brigade, inclining to the right, prepares to attack them in flank. But the fire of the Confederate artillery is imme-

\* Colonel Davis led the Union cavalry out of Harper's Ferry during the night immediately preceding the surrender.—ED.

diately directed against the latter. The Fifth and Sixth regulars succeed in relieving the rest of the brigade, without being able to recover their advantage; for Stuart, who has just arrived from Fleetwood with a portion of his forces, in his turn hurls two regiments upon its flank, which compel the Federals to beat a speedy retreat.

At the first news of the passage of Beverly Ford by the enemy, the commander of the Confederate cavalry had hastened with most of the forces at his disposal, W. H. F. Lee's and Hampton's brigades: Fitzhugh Lee's brigade, under Munford, was hastily recalled from Oak Shade, while Robertson remained watching Brandy Station. The forces so promptly gathered before Buford enabled Stuart to resume the offensive at once. It was about ten o'clock in the morning. But the Federals, strongly posted along the edge of the wood and sustained by the fire of infantry, kept him at a distance, while Munford vainly endeavored to turn them by menacing the river-crossing. The combatants, instead of coming to close quarters and crossing swords, remained thus watching each other and exchanging a fire of artillery and small-arms.

Pleasanton had already secured the information which Hooker had charged him to obtain on the right bank of the Rappahannock. He had found in Stuart's baggage certain instructions addressed to the latter which could admit of no doubt as to the movement of the enemy's whole army toward the Valley of Virginia; he had learned from these that the Confederate cavalry was to attempt a descent upon the Manassas and Fredericksburg Railroad\* in order to cover this movement. But, finding the occasion favorable, he determined to strike a blow which should paralyze this cavalry and prevent it from carrying out its projected plan. Besides, he could not forsake his other two divisions, and, seeing that he had to do with a strong force, he decided to wait for the termination of the manœuvre they had commenced.

Stuart, on his part, was preparing to attack him vigorously, when unexpected news was brought him which stopped him abruptly. The signal-station established on Fleetwood Hill

\* Orange and Alexandria Railroad.—ED.

apprised him of the approach of a large Federal column which was coming up on his rear and was already menacing Brandy Station. This was Gregg, faithfully performing the task which had been assigned to him. Stuart's situation was a dangerous one: having a numerous and enterprising enemy before him, he saw himself threatened in his rear by a new adversary, who, finding but a single brigade in his way, would not fail to place him between two fires before long. It would soon be out of his power to prevent Gregg and Buford from joining their forces on the battlefield, and thus inflicting upon him a complete defeat. There was no time to be lost to prevent this junction. Following Lee's example at Chancellorsville, Stuart does not hesitate for a moment. Availing himself of a slight advantage he has just obtained over Buford to leave only W. H. F. Lee's brigade and that of Fitzhugh Lee before him, he hastens with Hampton's and Jones' troops and a portion of his light artillery to meet Gregg.

In the mean while, the latter had become engaged in a desperate struggle, and if the contrary wind prevented the Federals near Beverly Ford from catching the sound of the combat that was raging in that direction, its echoes reached him the more distinctly and hastened his march. His scouts have penetrated unawares into Brandy Station, nearly capturing a train as it was entering the place. But Robertson, having formed his brigade, again takes possession of it: for a short time, however, for one of Gregg's two brigades, commanded by a brave English officer whom we have already had occasion to mention, Colonel Percy Wyndham, comes promptly to dispute it with him. While one section of the Federal artillery is cannonading some of the enemy's pieces posted back of Fleetwood Hill, Wyndham hurls the First Maryland against the station on the left. The Federal troopers rush into it at a gallop, picking up a number of prisoners and dislodging the Confederates from it. Wyndham's whole brigade, supported on the right by Kilpatrick's, then rapidly advances upon Fleetwood Hill. Robertson charges them in vain. After a brisk combat the Southern troopers are dispersed. Wyndham captures three of the enemy's guns, as also a cluster of buildings constituting Mr. Barbour's residence, which stands on the summit



of the hill where Stuart had passed the night. It is at this critical moment that the latter makes his appearance on this new battlefield. He must, at any cost, recapture Fleetwood Hill from the enemy, who, master of this position, commands the whole country. He hurls all the troops under his command against Wyndham, whose squadrons have been somewhat scattered during the fight. The Federals are at first driven back, but they form again, return to the charge, and recover their vantage-ground.

The Confederate troopers are astonished at this unwonted display of audacity on the part of their adversaries, but they promptly recover themselves, and close upon them in their turn. Swords soon take the place of pistols, which the combatants have no time to reload. Wyndham, pressed by superior forces, has fallen back near the station, taking with him his two guns, together with the three pieces he has captured from the enemy. Gregg, in order to relieve him, orders Kilpatrick's brigade to fall upon the left flank of the Confederates. The latter, strong in numbers, do not yield one inch of ground. Their leaders perform prodigies of valor, for this is a decisive moment. Along all the slopes of Fleetwood Hill and around Brandy Station the hostile lines are mixed in such a *mêlée* as was never before witnessed in America: cannon are wrenched from each other's possession, changing hands several times. On both sides the losses are heavy; Colonels Hampton, Butler, and Young are wounded on the Confederate side, and three superior officers in Wyndham's brigade alone.

Yet in the presence of forces twice as numerous as its own Gregg's division maintained itself with difficulty north of the railroad. There was no assistance within reach. On the left, Duffié, who had been sent in an opposite direction, had found one of the enemy's regiments at Stevensburg, and put it to flight after a sharp engagement, during which he made a number of prisoners; but, although only within three or four miles of Brandy Station, it does not appear that he thought of going to take part in the combat which was fought by the Third division, and to which he might have secured victory: at all events, he did not join it in time, and only made his appearance in the evening on the

banks of the Rappahannock.\* On the right, Russell's infantry, notwithstanding their efforts to keep up with the cavalry, are still too far behind to be able to sustain it. Finally, still more to the right, Buford has indeed resumed the offensive, and is slowly driving W. H. F. Lee before him, who, while exposing himself in order to conceal the weakness of his force, is seriously wounded. But Lee's efforts are not in vain, for he has delayed the march of Pleasonton, and the combat at Brandy Station will come to an end without the latter being cognizant of the fact. A final charge by General Young has driven Kilpatrick's brigade beyond the railroad, and almost at the same time Wyndham, after having lost the five pieces of artillery so long disputed, has been obliged to abandon Brandy Station. Kilpatrick's regiments return several times to the charge, but this is only done to cover the movements of the rest of the division. The Federals, moreover, have soon cause to consider themselves fortunate in having got out of the struggle in which they were engaged. Just as they are leaving Brandy Station they see before them long trains of cars which stop to unload, first one battalion, then several others. Swarms of infantry, whose bayonets from afar are glistening in the sun, form into line close to the road, and soon present an imposing force. It is, in fact, the head of column of Ewell's corps, which at the first news of the battle Lee has sent in great haste from Culpeper to Brandy Station. Rodes' division is already deployed, Early's follows it close; but Gregg does not allow them time to overtake him. He falls back by way of his right in order to find Russell and assist Buford, whom he has not been able to meet in passing over the ground occupied by the enemy.

During this time the forces of W. H. F. Lee had retired before Buford, who was pressing them closer and closer, abandoning all

\* Colonel Duffié arrived on the battlefield near Brandy Station about, 4 o'clock in the afternoon, in time to cover with his division the return of the other two divisions to the north bank of the Rappahannock. In his report, dated June 12, 1863, Colonel Duffié says: "Upon my arrival near Beverly Ford, General Pleasonton directed me to move with one brigade to support General Buford, and send the Second brigade on the road leading to Rappahannock Ford to cover the crossing of the Third division. My command crossed Beverly Ford at about five P. M."—ED.

the positions they had defended until then; so that Pleasonton and himself soon united with both Russell's infantry and Kilpatrick's cavalry. Stuart, on his part, following the movement of the latter, had joined that portion of his forces which he had left in order to repair to Brandy Station. The two hostile army corps were therefore fronting each other, mutually watching and cannonading. But Pleasonton, satisfied with the results he had obtained and the ground he had gained, and not hearing anything from Duffié, did not wish to renew the combat. He had proved to the Confederates that his cavalry were fully as good as theirs. His sudden attack, the close fighting with small-arms, and the losses he had inflicted upon the enemy, made Stuart relinquish his design, if he had entertained such, of attempting a raid upon the rear of the Federal army. On the other hand, Pleasonton's reconnoissance had not only revealed to him the strength of the Confederate cavalry, but also the presence of a numerous infantry force at Culpeper. This was the most important result for the future of the campaign: he was not, then, confronted by a mere squadron of cavalry, but by a portion of the Army of Northern Virginia. Lee's movement was unmasked. Pleasonton could not communicate to his chief more important or more reliable information: he hastened to forward it to him. It arrived in time to enlighten Hooker and decide him to follow his adversary.

About five o'clock Pleasonton gave the order for retreat, which was effected without difficulty. Before dark all the troops had recrossed the Rappahannock. The losses on both sides were serious, amounting to nearly six hundred men for each of the two adversaries, between two hundred and fifty and three hundred of whom were prisoners, and most of them wounded. The Confederates had captured two dismounted guns; the Federals carried off a stand of colors. But the importance of the battle of Brandy Station cannot be measured by these figures, for it opens a new era in the war we are describing. For the first time the Federal cavalry, confiding in its own resources, has gone *en masse* to attack that of the enemy. For the first time these two bodies of troops have fought a regular pitched battle, in which the infantry and artillery have played but an insignificant part; and, as a



natural consequence of this change of tactics, sabres and pistols have in these encounters taken the place of the musket; for the first time the sabre has made a large number of victims.

The conflict of the 9th of June could not thwart Lee's plans nor seriously embarrass Stuart as to the *rôle* which had been assigned to him, as it was his duty, above all, to cover the movements of the infantry; but he foresaw that this *rôle* would be a difficult one in the presence of so stubborn an adversary. It was a serious warning to the Confederate cavalry to be on its guard and keep close together, in order that the veil which it was charged to draw between the two armies might not be pierced again.

With regard to Hooker, he knew on the morning of the 10th that General Lee, with a portion of his infantry, was at Culpeper the day before. But the information obtained by his troopers at the cost of their blood not being under control like the news gathered by the enemy through their intercourse with the inhabitants, all in sympathy with the cause of the South, was naturally very imperfect. Thus, while the two army corps of Longstreet and Ewell were at Culpeper on the 9th, the Union general believed that the latter was still on the right bank of the Rapidan in the neighborhood of Chancellorsville. Consequently, he could not yet fathom the designs of his adversary. Did the latter intend to make a descent into the Valley of Virginia, supporting his cavalry with a corps of infantry, or did he propose to renew the movement which had secured him the victory of Manassas the previous year, by boldly throwing himself between Washington and the Army of the Potomac? Such were the two eventualities which Hooker asked his government to be prepared for. Without attempting to form an idea of the bold and brilliant conception by which Lee, with all his army, was going to slip through his hands in order to reach Pennsylvania before him, he had fully understood that the valley of the Shenandoah might be the scene of an expedition after Jackson's fashion. We have stated that he had notified his superiors of the fact since the 5th: he renewed this warning on the 10th in announcing the battle of Brandy Station. No notice was taken of it at Washington: we shall see presently the consequences of this neglect.



It was evident that the enemy, whatever might be his ulterior plan, had commenced an aggressive campaign, and that by extending his left as far as Culpeper he weakened his right at Fredericksburg. Hooker, being master of the Rappahannock fords, had only to march upon the positions at Hamilton's to capture all the famous defences of Marye's Hill, which he had already caused to be evacuated once by his manœuvres. His army, admirably concentrated, possessed every advantage over the Confederates, who were even more scattered than he had imagined. He would have had only Hill's single corps to fight. Ewell, although he was still unaware of the fact, was too far away to be able to harass him during this operation. It is true that Longstreet could have struck his rear from Culpeper and separated him from Washington, but such a desperate attempt could neither have afforded relief to Hill's corps, which a speedy retreat alone could save, nor have seriously menaced the true base of operations of the Army of the Potomac, which was upon the river at Aquia Creek.

Hill once dislodged, the road to Richmond was open. Hooker, with that unerring judgment for which, unfortunately, he was more distinguished in the council than on the battlefield, appreciated all the benefit that could be derived from the movement of his adversary. Why not march directly upon the capital of the enemy? It was an almost infallible means of cutting short Lee's projects of invasion; and if the latter, to use a comparison which it is said he had just employed in talking with his generals, should attempt to play "queen for queen," if he should sacrifice Richmond in order to march upon Washington, all the advantage would have redounded in favor of the Federals. In war, as well as at chess, such play always benefits him who has most resources. The game was not equal, for Washington with its immense fortifications, its formidable artillery, its garrison of thirty-six thousand men, which Schenck's troops, coming from Harper's Ferry and Baltimore, would have increased to fifty thousand, could have defied all Lee's efforts; whilst without an army to cover Richmond, President Davis could not have defended his capital for five minutes, completely disgarnished as it was at that time. The fifteen thousand men that General

Halleek had unnecessarily left under Keyes' command in the peninsula of Virginia since the siege of Suffolk had been raised would then have swelled the ranks of the Army of the Potomac, while the latter, as Hooker himself said, would have been greatly the gainer by being farther away from Washington.

But, putting the capture of Washington out of the question, the game would not have been equal. In fact, between the invasion of the North by the Southern armies and that of the South by the armies of the North there was a difference about which too much cannot be said when all the features of the war are taken into consideration. The Federal armies could attempt the conquest of the Southern States systematically. In Virginia especially the coast afforded everywhere bases of operation which enabled them to establish themselves with more or less strength throughout one-half of that State. The resources of the Confederacy were limited in men, material, and means of transportation. Being limited in men, Mr. Davis was not able to improvise any kind of defence if Lee's army, upon which the safety of the Confederacy depended, should be engaged in waging war in the Northern States. Limited in material, there was not enough on hand to repair, as his adversaries could do, the losses which he might have sustained in that region. Limited in means of transportation, these would have been found completely wanting on the first serious trouble caused by the enemy in the disarrangement of railroad lines, while the damage, which in the North would only have proved an insignificant trifle, would paralyze all the railroad service necessary to the continuation of the war. Lee's army, freed for a while from the Army of the Potomac, could undoubtedly have caused incalculable injury to the Northern States; but there was too much to destroy, too many immense spaces of ground to traverse, a hostile population too numerous to get through, for such injury to compensate for the harm which his adversaries would have been able to inflict upon the Confederacy during the same period of time. In order that the invasion might produce decisive results, Lee should have been able, by a brilliant victory previously achieved, to cripple the Army of the Potomac for some time. We shall refer again to this subject, to show how much the

Confederates had cause to regret having believed for a moment that matters could have turned out differently.

All that we propose to demonstrate at present is that Hooker's idea was correct and suggestive. He did not succeed in convincing either the President or General Halleck. He was told in reply not to mind Richmond, but to attend to Lee's army, and to pursue or attack the latter either on the march or in its encampments; as if the movement against Hill was not the best way to strike at the weak point of this army and to thwart all the projects of its chief!

Hooker had nothing to do but to manœuvre so as to follow his adversary—to cover Washington and, if possible, Harper's Ferry. He had to avoid, on the one hand, being taken in the rear, as Pope had been; on the other, not to allow himself to be drawn too far from the capital in some position where the enemy might be able to concentrate all his forces against him.

Such was, in fact, Lee's secret desire: his own report proves it; and if Hooker had followed the advice of Halleck and Lincoln, recommending him to try to cut the enemy's column in two, he would have done precisely what his adversary most earnestly wished. We will prove this when we shall have shown the positions subsequently occupied by the Confederate army. Thenceforth, to accomplish this thankless and difficult task, Hooker had to use as much vigilance as prudence. Allowing Lee to assume the offensive rôle, he had to guess his movements, to follow him, to be everywhere on his guard, and to prepare for a great battle which circumstances might either hasten or delay; in short, he had to learn not to dispute any apparent advantages to the enemy, nor to allow himself to be disconcerted by the commotion that such advantages might rouse in the North.

Unfortunately, the position in which Hooker was placed by his government rendered this task still more difficult. The chieftain who had to hold such an adversary as Lee in check should have had direct and entire control of all the troops that could be called upon to take part in the campaign. Such was not Hooker's case. We have stated elsewhere that a small army occupied the mouths of the James and York Rivers. Since the raising of the siege of

Suffolk this force should have been reduced to such garrisons as were necessary for the defence of strategic positions; but whereas Longstreet had brought back his army corps to Fredericksburg, Keyes was left at Yorktown with forces too small to exercise any serious influence over military operations, and yet sufficiently numerous to make the Army of the Potomac bitterly regret their absence. We have seen that Keyes, besides the garrison, had about fifteen thousand available men: since the early part of June he had formed the project of marching them against Richmond, thinking that he would thus oblige the enemy to retain a portion of the reinforcements intended for Lee in that city, or that, finding the capital disgarnished, he might surprise and capture it. The Washington authorities, who had encouraged this scheme, acknowledged that it was impracticable, but only after Keyes had returned to Yorktown without having encountered a solitary enemy or attempted aught against Richmond. As will be seen presently, this fruitless expedition was brought to an end on the very day when the fate of the nation was being decided in Pennsylvania. At the North a body of troops of the same strength found itself in a similar position: it consisted of Milroy's and Tyler's divisions—one about six thousand nine hundred strong, and the other numbering nine thousand men—stationed at Winchester and Harper's Ferry.

Since McClellan's departure for the Virginia peninsula in the month of March, 1862, we have witnessed a continuation of the quarrel which broke out at that time between the commander of the Army of the Potomac and the authorities at Washington concerning the occupation of the Valley of Virginia: the latter still desired to keep a small independent army on the borders of the Shenandoah in order to close the outlet of this stream against the enemy, as it afforded the easiest way for invading the Northern States.

Fremont's defeats and Miles' disaster, which had caused this valley to be dubbed in the North with the name of the "Valley of Humiliation," had not enlightened the Secretary of War regarding the danger of his plan. It was undoubtedly necessary to protect the rich counties of Western Maryland and Southern Pennsylvania against the incursions of Virginia partisans; the



Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, which possessed a vast strategic importance, had to be secured against their depredations; but these troopers, so swift in their movements, and yet so few in number, should have been opposed, as was done in the West, by small posts *écheloned* in block-houses connected by active and well-mounted regiments of cavalry. Amply sufficient for keeping partisans in check, the troops in these posts, instead of offering a tempting prey to the enemy, could have been withdrawn without loss whenever a real invasion took place. Instead of this, Harper's Ferry had been converted into a stronghold comprising a vast range of fortifications to defend this crossing of the Potomac, although the river was fordable in summer at various points a short distance higher up: then, in order to protect the railroad, Winchester had been fortified in the same manner. Large quantities of *matériel* had been subsequently deposited in these two places when it was found necessary to place strong garrisons in them; so that the sixteen thousand men under Tyler and Milroy found themselves attached to two points which possessed no strategic value whatever in themselves, and which were only thus guarded on account of their artificial importance. Of cavalry, which alone could have been useful to him, Milroy had absolutely none: he could not clear his way for any distance along the road which had once led Jackson's soldiers to victory. Surrounded by a network of hostile partisans who defied capture, he did not extend his rule south beyond the junction of the two branches of the Shenandoah. On the other hand, he exercised his power, it is said, with extreme severity: his exactions and rigorous measures against the inhabitants who refused to take the oath of allegiance had been made the subject of protests on the part of the Confederate government.

Milroy, Tyler, the Baltimore garrison, and General Kelley's division, which occupied West Virginia, were subordinate to General Schenck. In Washington itself General Heintzelman was in command, who, besides the *dépôts*, the regiments under instruction, and the artillery of the forts, had under his control several thousand infantry ready to take the field, and Stahel's division of cavalry, numbering six thousand horses, whose only task was to pursue Mosby and the few hundred partisans led by

this daring chief. Heintzelman's total forces amounted to no less than thirty-six thousand men.

Keyes, Schenck, and Heintzelman acted under the immediate authority of Halleck, who sought thereby to add the command of these detached corps to the supreme direction of the various armies—a command which he did not relinquish even when he seemingly allowed Hooker to exercise its functions for a while. The latter, therefore, was in the same situation in which McClellan was placed one year previously.

On the 11th of June the commander of the Army of the Potomac began the movement which was rendered necessary by that of his adversary. The presence of Lee with a portion of his army at Culpeper obliged Hooker to extend his right wing along the Upper Rappahannock, which his cavalry was no longer strong enough to defend. His army had to prepare to face westward, whether Lee's intention was to cross this river or to ascend it, in order to reach the valleys which stretch out along the two slopes of the Blue Ridge.

On the 11th the Third corps was ordered to take a position along the Rappahannock between Beverly Ford and Rappahannock Station. On the 12th two other corps were sent to occupy positions whence they could afford him speedy relief or dispute the passes of the Bull Run Mountains to the enemy if the latter should follow the road which Jackson had traced out the preceding year. The First corps proceeded to establish itself at Bealeton Station, and the Second,\* more in the rear, at Catlett's Station: they reached these points on the 13th. The right wing, thus composed of three corps, was placed under Reynolds, commanding the First corps, an officer in whom Hooker justly placed the utmost confidence. *Écheloned* along the railroad, this wing could easily concentrate itself either on the Rappahannock or at Warrenton, or at Manassas if Washington itself was menaced. Hooker remained with the left wing, composed of the other four corps, near Falmouth, facing south.

In the mean while, Lee, being under no obligation to discuss his plan of campaign with his government, and exercising absolute authority over the various bodies of troops which had to

\* It was the Eleventh.—Ed.

co-operate in its execution, pursued it with his wonted zeal. The invasion of the Northern States being his object, he had selected from the very outset the way he intended to follow, from which he did not deviate until he had reached the banks of the Susquehanna. We have described the valley of the Shenandoah at sufficient length to obviate the necessity of pointing out in this place the advantages it offered him. The ridges running parallel to the Blue Ridge and the Bull Run Mountains, intersected by a few defiles easily occupied, formed, at the east, a species of screen, which entirely masked his movements, while the valley itself, wide and possessing good roads, afforded him great facilities for the performance of those long marches which constituted the chief element of the superiority of his soldiers over their adversaries. It is true that by following this valley he got away from Washington, but this was, in our opinion, the best reason for choosing this route. The position of Washington on the border of Virginia may at times have been a source of anxiety to the Federal government: owing to this exaggerated and thoughtless anxiety, it had proved a serious obstacle in all aggressive campaigns undertaken against Richmond, but at the same time it has been an incalculable advantage in a strategic point of view. Washington, barely defended, had prevented Johnston's victorious army from advancing as far as the Susquehanna in July, 1861, and enlisting the whole of Maryland in support of the Confederate cause. A few months later, the Federal capital, surrounded by powerful works, became an impregnable base of operations for the Army of the Potomac on the very boundary of the enemy's territory. When Lee had driven Pope's troops, conquered at Manassas, back into these works, he became convinced that his great victory did not open to him the gates of Washington, and the next day he turned his back upon this city and pushed his way into Maryland. The position of the capital, located near the seaboard and connected with the coast by a line of railway to Annapolis and Baltimore, enabled the Federals to keep it as a base of operations, even though the invader should pass beyond it to the north: the latter could only invest it and isolate it by making a complete circuit in order to take a position along Chesapeake Bay. This manœuvre exposed him to attack in flank by the Federal army, which, remaining near



the capital, occupied the interior of the circle he would have to describe. If, on the other hand, he passed near Washington without stopping to lay siege to the place, he ran the risk of seeing this army fall upon his rear. It was therefore in Lee's interest not to go near it, and to endeavor, while moving away from it, to draw his adversaries after him. In fact, the more he separated them from their base the more he weakened them, thereby increasing his chances in the decisive battle he had to deliver either south or north of the Potomac before he could make the free States seriously feel the weight of the invasion.

We have stated elsewhere that the Blue Ridge and the Valley of Virginia extended from the left bank of the Potomac under the name of South Mountain and Cumberland Valley. From Chambersburg the waters of the last-mentioned valley flow south toward the Potomac: at about the same elevation as this village the general direction of the adjacent mountains inclines strongly to the north-eastward, while a slope trending in a contrary direction from the preceding one conducts the water-courses which have its base toward the great Susquehanna River, into which they empty in the vicinity of Harrisburg, the capital of Pennsylvania. The Virginia Valley route had also the advantage, therefore, of conducting the Confederates by the most direct route, enabling them to cross the Potomac where it is always fordable in summer, and masking their movements behind the South Mountain ridge, to the very heart of the powerful commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Harrisburg, in fact, is not only the political superior of wealthy Philadelphia: it is also one of the capitals of the iron and coal trade, one of the centres of the large Carboniferous basin which supplies all the workshops, as well as all the steamships of the United States, with anthracite coal. The destruction of the railway lines which radiate from this basin, of the machinery which extracts the combustible material, and of the forges that consume it, would have dealt a terrible blow to the aggressive power of the North.

It was again the Second corps which was ordered to precede the rest of the army into the Valley of Virginia, where nearly every village reminded it of some glorious combat. The memory of Jackson sustained his old soldiers in this new campaign, and



the brave officer who had the honor to succeed him was about to show himself worthy of being their leader. The Federals thought that the bloody conflict of Brandy Station would not allow Lee to extend his columns, and that he would hesitate to expose his flank to an adversary who had just crossed the Rappahannock in order to attack him near Culpeper. But he did not allow himself to be embarrassed for an instant by this demonstration. Stuart, with four of the brigades that had fought at Brandy Station, was directed to watch the enemy's cavalry. If he had intended to cross the Rappahannock, that project was abandoned: the task of masking the movements of the infantry was sufficient occupation for him, preventing a thought of undertaking a raid on his own account. Longstreet remained at Culpeper with his corps, to form the centre of the long column which was to extend from Fredericksburg to within sight of the Maryland mountains; and on the morning of the 10th, Ewell resumed his line of march. Two brigades of cavalry were ordered to clear his way. Imboden's brigade, which was already among the upper valleys of the Alleghanies above Romney, was instructed to cover his left and destroy the track of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, in order to prevent Milroy from receiving reinforcements from the West. Jenkins' brigade preceded the infantry into the valley of the Shenandoah, which it had left only a few days before. These two brigades, which had but recently been really attached to the Army of Northern Virginia,\* were admirably adapted for the performance of such a task: not only did every soldier know the ground he was about to travel over, but, as the event demonstrated, their presence caused no alarm to the Federals, who for many months past had been in the habit of coming in contact with them.

Accustomed to marching, not burdened with heavy loads—for they carried only a blanket, some cartridges, and a little bread—sleeping in the open air, relying upon the resources of the country for food, Ewell's soldiers advanced rapidly toward the Valley of Virginia. His three divisions and twenty batteries, which had left Culpeper on the 10th, passed through Sperryville, Gaines'

\* Jones' brigade is reported as "attached" in the returns of this army for the month of May. Imboden's brigade was never officially connected with it.

Cross-roads, and Flint Hill, crossing the Blue Ridge at Chester Gap, and, pushing beyond Front Royal, reached the banks of the Shenandoah at Cedarville on the evening of the 12th. Ewell immediately made all necessary arrangements for reaping the greatest possible benefit from the ignorance which his adversaries were still laboring under in regard to his movements. Although he had already marched fifty miles since the day previous, Rodes led his division as far as Stone Ridge, five miles farther on the direct road to Berryville. It was, in fact, a question of surprising McReynolds' Federal brigade, which Milroy had posted in this village for the purpose of connecting Winchester with Harper's Ferry. Jenkins was directed to precede Rodes in this movement. Ewell, with the rest of his corps, proposed to gain the main road from Woodstock to Winchester at the west, in order to reach that city by the front. Thoroughly informed concerning the slightest details of the enemy's positions by partisans who were constantly penetrating the Federal lines, and particularly by an officer as bold as he was intelligent—Major Harry Gilmore, whose military career was full of adventures—Ewell was enabled to form his whole plan of attack in advance.

We have already described the configuration of the neighborhood of Winchester on the occasion of the fight at Kernstown. Between this village and the town itself, south-east of the latter, stand the hills which the Federals occupied when Jackson received a check: the highest of them is called Bower's Hill. The position is covered by Abraham's Creek, which afterward turns north-eastward, encircling a portion of the town. Bower's Hill is only the extremity of a range of hillocks, similar to those to be found in that country, which, under the name of Applepie Ridge, extends for a distance of about twelve miles in the direction of Martinsburg and the Potomac. North-west of Winchester, Applepie Ridge is composed of three parallel ridges, the farthest one commanding the other two, and the nearest being almost within a stone's throw of the city. It was upon this last-mentioned ridge that the Federals had erected their system of defences the preceding year. This consisted of a continuous enclosure and a fortification forming a large redoubt. The intervening ridge, called Flint Hill, had remained unoccupied during the whole

winter. It was only within the last few weeks that the Federals had begun to fortify it: the works, scarcely laid out, only mounted a few field-pieces. This new fortification was the only one of which Ewell had no knowledge; consequently, his plan was to send the Third division, under Early, to take possession of Flint Hill, while Rodes cut off the enemy's line of retreat toward the Potomac, and Johnson, with one division, detained them on the old battlefield of Kernstown, so that they would find themselves invested in Winchester as Miles had been the year before at Harper's Ferry.

On the morning of the 13th, Early reached the main road near Newtown, and pushed on toward Winchester, whilst Johnson was marching in the same direction, following the Front Royal road on his right. Milroy did not as yet have the least suspicion that a force fully three times as large as his own, and composed of the élite of the Confederate army, would make an attack upon him within a few hours. In order to obtain all available information he had taken every precaution which the nature of the task entrusted to him required. He had organized a band of guerillas, known by the name of "Jessie Scouts," whose members, disguised as Confederate soldiers, overran the country and enacted the part of spies as much as that of warriors. On the 12th he sent out two strong reconnoissances on the Woodstock and Front Royal roads. The first encountered a portion of Jenkins' brigade in the vicinity of Newtown, and even succeeded in drawing these troopers into an ambush where they sustained serious losses; but their presence in those localities was nothing unusual. The second expedition was not pushed far enough, and Milroy committed the error of attaching too little importance to the intelligence it brought him regarding the arrival at Front Royal of one of the enemy's corps. He could not imagine how a portion of Lee's army should have been able to leave the banks of the Rappahannock and come in search of him at Winchester without General Halleck being informed of the fact, and notifying him accordingly, with his instructions in regard to the matter. In fact, we have shown that the general-in-chief had been apprised since the 10th of the presence of Lee with an army corps at Culpeper—that Hooker, after vainly requesting to be allowed the



control of all the troops in Virginia, had pointed out the valley of the Shenandoah, to the authorities at Washington, as being the point particularly menaced by this concentration of the enemy's forces; and the reports that Pleasonton sent him from the Upper Rappahannock concerning the probable movements of the enemy, all of which contained the same information, were forwarded directly to Halleck. Yet the latter never gave the unfortunate Milroy any intimation of these facts, and left him in utter ignorance of the danger that menaced him. It is true that at a later period, the 11th, when he was better informed, he sent a despatch to General Schenck indicating Harper's Ferry as the only point to be defended, and directing him to leave nothing more in Winchester, either in material or troops, than he needed to watch the valley; but, by a still stranger oversight, he issued his instructions in a general form, without alluding to the possible approach of an army corps of the enemy or particularizing in any way how those instructions were to be carried out. Consequently, Schenck did not deem it necessary to direct Milroy to evacuate Winchester. He revoked the order issued to that effect by his chief of staff, who had received the despatch during his absence, and, while preparing to leave the place himself, recommended his lieutenant to remain there and defend it until he received further instructions; which instructions were never destined to reach him.

Such was the situation of the Federals on the morning of the 13th. From daybreak, Milroy, conforming to his instructions, prepared to make a stand against what he believed to be a mere incursion of the enemy's cavalry. McReynolds was recalled from Berryville; his two other brigades advanced south of Winchester and took position—that of General Elliott on the right, and Colonel Ely's brigade on the left—on the battlefield of Kernstown: being obliged to leave a portion of their effective force in the forts, these troops did not number altogether more than five thousand men. Notwithstanding their numerical weakness, they made a bold stand before the imposing forces which Ewell deployed in front of them.

Elliott occupied the hills on the other side of Abraham's Creek: Early had to bring his whole division into line and outflank his



right in order to dislodge him. The Federals, recrossing the stream, occupied Bower's Hill in great force. Night was approaching; Early's soldiers, who had marched nearly seventy-five miles in three days, were fatigued, and did not molest them in this new position. On their right, Johnson encountered Colonel Ely's line about two miles and a half from Winchester, and after a brisk engagement drove it slowly before him.

One may form an idea of the astonishment of Milroy and his officers on finding themselves attacked by such forces: the mystery was soon unravelled. The first prisoner who fell into their hands informed them that he belonged to Hays' brigade of the Second corps of Lee's army. Milroy might have evacuated Winchester during the night—he could undoubtedly have saved the largest portion of his division and his artillery—but the instructions of his chief were explicit, and he was naturally ignorant of the fact that at the very moment when Jenkins cut off his retreat in the afternoon of the 13th the telegraph was bringing him instructions of a different character. He thought that the Army of the Potomac would follow close upon that of Lee, and that the defence of Winchester would not be without effect. Besides, his retreat would have seriously compromised the fate of McReynolds' brigade, which was then on the march, and which only joined him at ten o'clock in the evening. He decided to remain. It was a misfortune for him, but he should not be blamed for it.

During this time Rodes had been marching upon Berryville, but the prey he had hoped to find there had escaped. McReynolds was on his way to Winchester, not by the direct road, which he knew to be too much exposed, except by making a large circuit to the north. The Confederate cavalry alone was able to follow him. Rodes, deceived as to the direction he had taken, and having entirely lost his track, went to look for him toward Martinsburg, and bivouacked on the evening of the 13th at Summit Station, between Winchester and Charlestown.

The day of the 14th was to decide Milroy's fate and that of his troops. Daylight having appeared, he could no longer think of evacuating the place in the presence of the enemy's forces that were menacing him; but he had taken advantage of the night

to abandon the positions he had occupied the day before, and to concentrate his small band among the forts and in the northern part of the city. Early in the morning Ewell had reconnoitred the ground from the heights of Bower's Hill: he had noticed the new works erected on Flint Hill. It was decided that Early should carry them by assault whilst Johnson drew the enemy's attention in the direction of the south. The former started at once with three brigades, beginning with a retrograde movement in order the better to conceal his object, and by describing a large arc of a circle west of Winchester through devious roads which the inhabitants hastened to point out to him.

In order to avoid the enemy's patrols, and to keep constantly hidden behind the swells in the ground, he thus retrograded three miles from Winchester, traversed the Romney road unperceived, and finally reached the foot of the third hillock, Applepie Ridge, the highest and most distant from Winchester, at four o'clock in the afternoon. The summit of this ridge, situated a little more than a mile from the works of Flint Hill, was crowned with a wood which admitted of its being secretly occupied. After having reconnoitred the place, the heat being intense, Early gave his troops some rest. In the mean time, Ewell was directing attacks upon the Federal positions from Bower's Hill—attacks which his numerical superiority rendered most effective—but, hobbling about on his crutches, without noticing the projectiles that were falling around him, he paid but little attention to these attacks, turning all the time his field-glass toward the heights which Early was to storm. As to Milroy, posted upon a kind of observatory which stood in the centre of the fort, he watched attentively the combat that was taking place at the south, and, turning his back upon Flint Hill, seemed to have no suspicion of the danger which menaced him on that side. He had sent out a reconnoitring party on the Pughtown and Romney roads, which, having no doubt gone a little ahead of Early's column, returned without having encountered a single enemy. Deceived by this report, he committed the error—the only one for which he could be severely blamed—of not clearing the approaches of Flint Hill and of not placing a single post upon the surrounding heights. In other respects he

could do nothing but wait passively for the moment when it should please the enemy to make a decisive attack.

In the mean while, the day is lingering out slowly in the midst of partial engagements, though every one felt that some severe blow would soon be struck. Finally, at six o'clock a discharge of artillery is heard north-west of Flint Hill. Ewell has recognized Early's twenty pieces of artillery, which had been hauled up the hill and placed in battery along the edge of the wood fronting the enemy's works, without the latter having noticed the circumstance. Milroy has only to turn round to see the unfinished works of Flint Hill covered with shells and the fire of their guns speedily silenced: he issues an order to reinforce the garrison and to attack the enemy's batteries; but too late. In less than half an hour after the latter have opened fire Hays' brigade, emerging from the wood, rushes forward to the assault, scales the acclivity of Flint Hill, and penetrates the works at the moment when the defenders, too few in number to offer any serious resistance, are falling back upon the place, protected by the fire from the fort. Hays immediately directs the fire of the guns he has just captured against this fort, and Milroy is compelled to acknowledge the impossibility of repairing this disaster by an aggressive return.

The Confederates, on their part, satisfied with the results obtained, and seeing night approaching, deemed it unnecessary to attack the forts in which Milroy had gathered his troops. From the position they occupied they could have demolished these forts and covered the Federals with shot wherever they might be looking for shelter: the latter, to fill up the measure of their misfortune, had neither provisions nor ammunition left. The investment of the place, therefore, could only result in an immediate capture.

Fortunately, Milroy had the night before him to avoid—at the cost of painful sacrifices, it is true—the disgrace of a capitulation similar to that of Miles. Sustained by the advice of a council of war—quite superfluous, however—he made immediate preparations for evacuating the place. Leaving his sick, wounded, artillery, and wagons behind him, he set out with his cavalry and infantry, avoiding the town of Winchester, whose inhabit-

ants would not have failed to betray his movements, and gained the Martinsburg road without being perceived by the enemy. The Confederates seemed to have somewhat slackened in their wonted vigilance, for the Union column had already marched five miles in the stillness and darkness of the night when, just as they were reaching Rocktown, General Elliott, who was at the head, was received by a sudden volley of musketry fired at close range from a wood and fields on the right of the road. This time the Federals were again unlucky, for they did not succeed in avoiding their adversaries. Ewell had wisely thought that they would probably make an effort to get away from him; but as he was desirous, while barring their way to Harper's Ferry, to hold his forces ready to invest them if they should remain in the place, he directed Johnson to take position during the night, with three brigades, about two miles and a half east of Winchester. Johnson, finding the road, which had been indicated to him as being very rough, made a wide *détour* in order to plant himself along the railroad at Stevenson's Dépôt, near Rocktown. He had reached this point about half-past three o'clock in the morning with two brigades—the third, under Walker, having been delayed by some misunderstanding—when from the station he heard the Federal column passing along the Martinsburg road, only a few hundred yards from the railroad. He started at once to attack it in flank. But the Federals were sufficiently strong in numbers to hold him in check: they were stimulated by the necessity of forcing a passage, and, the column having promptly closed up its lines at the point which had been attacked, Milroy assumed the offensive, trying at first to break the centre, then to effect a breach successively into both of the enemy's wings. The Confederates, being hard pressed, resisted with difficulty. This was the time for the Federals to have continued their march. Milroy gave orders to that effect: unfortunately, the darkness and confusion prevented their execution. He waited in vain for McReynolds' brigade, which formed the rear-guard, and which had no doubt already been scattered. This delay was ruinous. In fact, it gave Walker's brigade time to join Johnson and to fall upon the left flank of his forces, whilst Gordon, with one of Early's brigades, hastened at the sound of battle toward the road they had just followed. Milroy, finding



himself menaced on all sides, directed all the troops which yet remained under his control to follow the Martinsburg road, which was yet free, trying to delay the pursuit of the enemy in order that he might then push forward to the right in the direction of Harper's Ferry. But the column soon became divided. The largest portion gained the Alleghany ridges on the left in great disorder: it finally reached the Potomac at Hancock without being pursued, but still continued its precipitate retreat as far as Pennsylvania, where it caused consternation and alarm everywhere. Other bands of fugitives, among whom was Milroy, arrived at Harper's Ferry without having been molested. They had thus avoided Rodes, who, following an imaginary enemy, had pushed as far as Martinsburg, whence he had dislodged a detachment of Tyler's division in the evening. He had captured from the latter six guns and two hundred prisoners, but in consequence of this march he had not been able to receive Ewell's instructions in time to completely cut off Milroy's retreat. The victory of Winchester delivered into the hands of the Confederates, according to their own reports, 3358 able-bodied prisoners, 700 sick and wounded, 23 pieces of artillery, and 300 wagons: the small amount of provisions left behind by the Federals was seized by the foremost soldiers who entered the forts. These various engagements cost the Second corps only 47 killed, 219 wounded, and 3 prisoners. It was a brilliant commencement of the campaign which was about to open: it was the more fortunate because it struck the Federals at a point about which they were particularly sensitive. From the manner in which he had directed their marches, combined their attacks, and gathered the fruit of their manœuvres, Ewell won the confidence of Jackson's old soldiers.

No one, however, at the North, when telegraphic communications with Winchester were cut off in the afternoon of the 13th, suspected the fate which menaced this place, and the Washington authorities did not believe in the presence of Ewell in the Valley of Virginia until the 14th, when Milroy's fate had already been virtually settled.

On the 12th, however, Hooker, always vigilant, having learned from a negro that Ewell's corps had passed by Sperryville, concluded that, not being able to attack Hill near Fredericksburg,

he ought not allow himself to be detained any longer by him on the Lower Rappahannock, and that it was time to follow the movements of the enemy toward the North with all his forces. On the 13th the several corps of his army were on the march. The Second, Sixth and Twelfth corps, which he had kept within reach of Falmouth, were directed toward Dumfries, and thence to Fairfax Court-house, with the reserve artillery, the trains, and all the *matériel* which had not been shipped on the Potomac, it having been decided to abandon the Aquia Creek dépôt. The three corps stationed along the Upper Rappahannock, and Sykes, who with the Fifth was watching the junction of the two rivers, being thus placed between the enemy and the route followed by the bulk of the army, were ordered to cover this movement, to follow it, and to halt at Manassas. Once in these new positions, facing west, Hooker's right and left became inverted. It was a retreat which could not be disguised, but which circumstances rendered unavoidable: the initiative belonged thenceforth to the Confederates; and without taking into consideration the marches he might have to perform, either forward or backward, nor the ground he might be obliged to relinquish, Hooker thought of no other duty but to hold himself ready to ward off the blows which Lee was about to strike against the most vulnerable points.

The programme laid out by Lee was carried out in every particular. On the 13th his army was deployed over a stretch of ground exceeding one hundred miles in length, or rather divided into three parts, separated by thirty-five miles on one side and about sixty-six on the other. In this disposition, apparently so dangerous, Hill's corps, as we have shown, was the only one exposed. This corps, added to that of Longstreet, would have been sufficiently strong to fight a defensive battle against Hooker, but it would have found it difficult to resist long enough, single-handed, to allow the First corps time to return from Culpeper. Longstreet, on the contrary, was not menaced as Hill, who was watching the movements of his adversaries along the left bank of the river, and holding himself ready to follow them; so that on the morning of the 14th, when he saw that the latter had abandoned the Falmouth heights, he promptly set out to join Longstreet.

On the 15th the situation of the two armies was therefore considerably changed. The movement of the Federals was being completed: the Army of the Potomac, concentrated at Manassas and at Fairfax, covered Washington, ready to fight the enemy if he should advance against the capital. This movement was accomplished very quietly. The Second and Sixth corps, which closed up the march, reached the positions assigned them in the evening. The army thus occupied the territory which up to that time had been under the surveillance of Stahel's division, which had been added to Hooker's cavalry: at this moment it was a useful reinforcement. Pleasonton was watching at the west, along the Rappahannock and near Warrenton, the point of contact with Jones' cavalry.

The news of Milroy's disaster, spreading like wild-fire, had caused a profound sensation in the North. People saw in it the sure sign of an impending invasion. On being informed of the investment of Winchester the day before, the President, General Halleck, and the Secretary of War, in a series of despatches bearing evidence of the confusion into which this news had thrown them, had asked Hooker either to go to the relief of Milroy or to adopt their favorite plan of cutting the enemy's column in two. "If the head of Lee's army is at Martinsburg and the tail of it on the plank-road between Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville," said the President, "the animal must be very slim somewhere." On the 15th, Milroy's fate was known, and his conduct more severely criticised than it deserved to be. This time, however, it was Harper's Ferry itself, the object of Halleck's predilections, which was thought to be menaced by the larger portion of Lee's army, and the general-in-chief immediately advised Hooker to march upon Leesburg in order to prevent Lee from crossing the Potomac. North of this river, General Couch, having been ordered in great haste to Harrisburg, was trying to organize the Pennsylvania militia; but the calls of the governor did not meet as yet with many responses, and Couch's zeal could not compensate for the ignorance of his recruits. Terror already prevailed throughout the whole Cumberland Valley. In fact, Jenkins' troopers followed the fugitives so close that on the evening of the 14th he compelled them to cross the Potomac at Williamsport, after dislodging them from Martinsburg. The substantial population

of all the neighboring towns in Maryland, remembering the incursions of the previous year, fled in crowds, with all they could carry off with them; horses, mules, and especially cattle, which they knew the Confederates were greatly in need of, were driven northward in large herds, and these caravans, increasing in size at every step by the fear they created on all sides, finally reached Harrisburg.

On the 16th the capital of Pennsylvania was in a great state of excitement, and while the people worked day and night in raising barricades and regular fortifications, which they would probably have had no means of defending, a solid mass of fugitives was hurrying along the left bank of the Susquehanna, thinking there was no safety except north of that river. Never, it is stated, had the bridge-toll produced such heavy receipts. It was precisely in the hope of not finding Cumberland Valley completely deserted that Jenkins was pushing northward so rapidly. On the morning of the 16th he entered Greencastle, the first Pennsylvania village, and reached Chambersburg during the night. He seized all the horses, cattle, forage, provisions, and medical stores he found there, paying in Confederate paper for part, and confiscating the rest; but his soldiers did not commit any act of plunder, and the inhabitants themselves were obliged to do justice to their discipline and good behavior. It is asserted, however, that he took a number of free negroes, whom he sent South to be sold as slaves. On the 17th, while people were expecting to see him continue his raid, and the Federals already believed that the whole of Lee's army was at his back, he suddenly retraced his steps and joined General Rodes, who with three brigades had taken position at Williamsport on the left bank of the Potomac. In fact, Ewell's soldiers had to wait for the two other corps, which they had left so far behind. Lee was obliged to concentrate his forces before entering Pennsylvania, and to hold them always ready for battle. Ewell's three divisions, therefore, remained between Williamsport and Winchester until the 19th, the day of Longstreet's arrival within reach of the latter city. Imboden, at the west, had made a movement on the 16th similar to that of Jenkins, and, occupying Cumberland on the 17th, had cut off General Kelley's communications with Maryland.



As soon as Lee, who had remained at Culpeper, was apprised that Hill was on the way to join him, feeling thenceforth at ease on that point, he put all the troops about him in motion. To deceive the Federals and cover the march of Hill, who was to follow the route traced out by Ewell as far as Winchester, he ordered Longstreet to cross the eastern slope of the Blue Ridge as if he was marching upon Leesburg, and not to return west of this chain except through Ashby's Gap and Snicker's Gap. The First corps—whose effective force Pickett had raised to three divisions by his arrival from North Carolina with three brigades—took up the line of march on the 15th. Stuart was ordered to cover this movement by keeping on his right. The cavalry division, reduced to four brigades by the departure of Imboden and Jenkins, had been watching the Upper Rappahannock since the combat of Brandy Station, carefully noting all the movements of the Federals on this side. Stuart left Hampton's brigade along this river to continue watching it; one regiment of W. H. F. Lee's brigade remained a little lower down to accompany Hill; that of Fitzhugh Lee, commanded by Colonel Munford, clearing the route which Longstreet had to follow, proceeded toward Barbree's Cross-roads; while Stuart, bearing more to the right, crossed the Rappahannock at Hinson's Mills with Robertson and Colonel Chambliss, the latter of whom commanded W. H. F. Lee's brigade since the latter had been wounded at Brandy Station. Jones was directed to watch Estham River, and to join the rest of the division after the whole army had crossed this water-course. The next day Stuart struck the railroad from Manassas to Salem and Piedmont without having met the enemy.

Pleasanton had followed the movement of the Federal infantry in the direction of Washington, while Longstreet quietly planted himself at the foot of the eastern slopes of the Blue Ridge, without having succeeded, as he had hoped, in drawing the attention of the Federals, who did not even suspect his presence in that locality.

As we have stated, Milroy's defeat had alarmed General Halleck about the safety of Harper's Ferry. Believing every rumor that was set afloat among the frightened population along the left bank of the Potomac, he sent several despatches to Hooker,

urging him to relieve that place, which he already fancied to be besieged and about to surrender. Consequently, the commander of the Army of the Potomac, who appreciated the danger of dividing his forces so near the enemy, issued the necessary orders on the 16th (a day of rest granted to his troops) for putting all his army corps in motion on the morning of the 17th, *en échelon*, by the right bank of the river which waters Washington, in the direction of Harper's Ferry, which place he expected to reach in two forced marches. But as soon as General Halleck was apprised of this, being now enlightened in regard to Tyler's real position, he disapproved of this movement, and Hooker had to halt his army just as it was about to move. The Federals were not only ignorant of the projects, but also of the real position, of their adversaries. They knew that Lee's army was between Culpeper and Winchester, but was it preparing to march upon Manassas in order to compel the Army of the Potomac to resume the same position it had occupied in 1861, or did it contemplate the invasion of Pennsylvania? Nothing as yet foreshadowed the solution of this question.

Hooker wondered at the inactivity of the conquerors of Winchester, and although he thought, justly, that Lee would probably march northward instead of eastward, he sometimes believed that the only object of all this great movement was to cover a cavalry raid beyond the Potomac. It is true that the government, far from aiding him to solve this mystery, worried him by making itself the echo of the most extravagant rumors, and by giving him orders—let us rather say vague and contradictory instructions, as we have just seen. In what concerned him, being exclusively occupied with the idea of not allowing himself to be cut off from Washington, he did wrong, in our opinion, in moving away too quickly from the enemy by a divergent march, and by bringing back his cavalry as far as Manassas, rendering it impossible for him to follow and watch Lee's movements. A fortunate chance, without relieving him from this state of uncertainty, enabled him at last to obtain some knowledge regarding the positions of the enemy.

During the night of the 16th and 17th he had decided to wait between Manassas and Centreville until Lee had defined his

movements, thinking that as he could not prevent him from crossing the Potomac, it was therefore better to wait to attack him until he had separated himself from his base of operations. In order to watch and thwart his movements he would have desired that Pleasonton, with his entire corps, had passed along the right bank of the Potomac, and that a column of fifteen thousand men, taken from the garrisons of Washington and Baltimore, might come to form a junction with him when, following Lee's march, he should have reached the eastern slope of South Mountain. The first project was not relished by the President; the second met with all kinds of obstacles, which we will explain hereafter.

The counter-order issued to the army, however, did not reach Pleasonton in time, as he had set off at daybreak for the purpose of clearing his march. He was already on his way to Aldie when ordered to come back. The country he was passing through was very rough, covered with woods, and consequently favorable to sudden attacks and any secret movements which the enemy might attempt: in front of him lay the range of high hills which Aldie Gap divides. Appreciating the importance of having the other slope reconnoitred, he asked and obtained permission to continue his march as far as the foot of the Blue Ridge: if he did not encounter the enemy, he was to push forward, by way of Leesburg, as far as the neighborhood of Harper's Ferry. Gregg's division was at the head, the Second brigade, under Kilpatrick, forming the advance. Three regiments of this brigade, followed very closely by a portion of the First, proceeded toward Aldie. Colonel Duffié, with the First Rhode Island, detached by Kilpatrick, had been at Thoroughfare Gap since morning, and was to join him at Middleburg.

On the same day, Stuart, after receiving some detailed information from Mosby regarding the positions which the Federals had occupied the day before, and believing them still far distant from the Bull Run Mountains, left his bivouacs along the Manassas Railroad to occupy the passes of these mountains. Chambliss, following the road which crosses Thoroughfare Gap, was ordered to post himself at Salem in order to watch this defile; Munford to pass through Middleburg and occupy Aldie; and Robertson to



stop at Rectortown, so as to be able to support either of them. Men and horses were alike worn out, and the generals, believing themselves to be far away from the enemy, abated somewhat of that vigilance for which they were ordinarily noted. Munford, who alone had a long road to travel, halted his column at Dover, and only sent a few squadrons to occupy the village of Aldie. Stuart had remained with his staff at Middleburg, where old friends and new admirers vied with each other in entertaining the young and brilliant general.

About two o'clock, however, the Federal scouts suddenly encountered those of Munford at a short distance from Aldie. Kilpatrick, with the Second New York, his old regiment, at once charges and pursues them, and takes possession of the village. But, having been warned in time of the approach of the enemy, Munford has hastened from Dover with his brigade. This encounter was a complete surprise on both sides. Their forces were about equal, consisting of four regiments of cavalry and a battery of artillery to each party. While Kilpatrick, coming out of the village, deploys his brigade, Munford makes immediate preparations for the fight. After traversing the village of Aldie, situated on a stream which flows through one of the gaps of the Bull Run Mountains, the road divides, one branch of it running westward toward Middleburg and Ashby's Gap, the other north-westward in the direction of Snicker's Gap. Between the two there is a hill, at the foot of which winds the Middleburg road, while the other ascends the northern slope: it is upon this barren hill that Munford plants himself, placing his artillery on the summit and filling an enclosure, composed of a fence and a ditch back of the dividing-point in the road, with dismounted cavalymen.

The Federals attack this strong position with wonderful vigor: the Second New York makes a rush against the enclosure, and, dismounting, sabre in hand drives in the line of skirmishers, taking a large number of prisoners, while the Federal artillery, without noticing that of the enemy, directs its fire upon the cavalry reserve. But it is on the Snicker's Gap road that the struggle is to be decided, for this road, ascending the hill, leads to the culminating point of the position. Munford has fully understood this, and unites all his forces on this side to fall upon the



Federal right. The latter offers resistance, the officers setting an example to their soldiers: Colonel di Cesnola of the Fourth New York, who had been placed under arrest, charges unarmed at the head of his troops, and Kilpatrick, to reward him, hands him his own sabre in the very midst of the fight. But, seriously wounded, he falls into the hands of the Confederates, and on this side the Union cavalry is brought back in disorder. In the mean while, the First Maine, belonging to the First brigade, has been sent by Gregg to the relief of Kilpatrick. The latter, with the aid of this reinforcement, rallies his men and resumes the offensive on the right. The two forces become intermingled; they fight with small-arms, and considerable losses are sustained on both sides. Finally, supported by his battery, which is firing grapeshot, Kilpatrick succeeds in making the enemy's column give way. The Confederates fall back: on seeing this, the Federals press them on all sides, taking possession of the position they have occupied. At the same time, Munford learns from a despatch sent by Stuart that he is menaced in the rear, and quickly falls back upon Middleburg. Kilpatrick, feeling satisfied, halts on the field of battle: he has lost a large number of soldiers and officers in this desperate conflict; he has taken about one hundred prisoners, and left as many in the hands of the enemy.

It is the movement of Colonel Duffié by way of Thoroughfare Gap, which was accomplished in the midst of the greatest dangers and with wonderful daring, but also with heavy loss, which finally led to the retreat of Munford. Duffié, with his two hundred and eighty men, had unexpectedly made his appearance in front of Chambliss' brigade, but he had succeeded in disguising his numerical weakness from the Confederates, who were entirely worn out and little desirous, undoubtedly, to bring on an action; so that, while Chambliss was under the impression that he had a superior force to deal with, Duffié, stealing away in the night, was rapidly marching upon Middleburg. Stuart, who happened to be in this place, had barely time to make his escape and join Robertson, sending Munford the information which determined him to give up the game. Shortly after Duffié was in possession of Middleburg, and hastened to barricade its approaches. The Confederates soon came to attack him. Stuart, burning with desire to revenge

himself for the precipitate race he had been compelled to run, attacked him at dusk with Robertson's entire brigade. After a strong resistance, Duffié's small band was obliged to retire by the same road it had come. Then it encountered Chambliss, and only succeeded in effecting its escape after having again sustained very serious loss. These two combats cost Duffié two-thirds of his effective force. During the night Munford joined Stuart at Middleburg, where the three Confederate brigades of cavalry found themselves united.

At the news of these engagements, which clearly indicated the direction followed by the bulk of the enemy's forces, Hooker resolved to cause his whole army, which he would not divide upon any consideration, to make a movement westward in order to hold it ready to cross either the defiles of the Blue Ridge or the fords of the Potomac as circumstances might require. He sent the Fifth corps to Aldie, with instructions to place Barnes' division at Pleasonton's disposal in order to sustain him in his operations against Stuart near the Blue Ridge. On the 18th the other army corps were directed to take the following positions, which they occupied that same evening or the next morning: the Twelfth corps in the vicinity of Leesburg; the Eleventh in the rear, along the Aldie road, near Goose Creek; the First near Herndon Station; the Third at Gum Springs; the Second remained at Centreville, and the Sixth at Germantown. All these army corps were thus drawn within a sector of a circle resting on the Potomac, facing west, and all within mutual helping-distance.

In the mean while, the two bodies of cavalry were preparing for a new conflict. Stuart, making Munford, whose troops had been much under fire, pass to the rear at Union, had, in conjunction with Robertson and Chambliss, taken position at Middleburg, where he hoped to see Jones' brigade, coming from the Rappahannock, make its appearance during the day of the 18th. Pleasonton, on his part, while waiting for the infantry reinforcement promised, but which had not yet been able to join him, was preparing to attack Stuart with his two divisions. He made his appearance before Middleburg on the morning of the 18th: after a few skirmishes it was sufficient for him to menace Stuart's left flank to compel the latter to evacuate the village and retire west-

ward toward Rector's Cross-roads. Jones not having yet arrived, and Hampton being expected on the following day, the Confederate general did not wish to provoke a serious engagement. Pleasonton, on his part, being desirous to allow the infantry time to join him, did not push matters to extremes.

On the 19th, having deployed his divisions, Buford on the right and Gregg on the left, Pleasonton resumed his aggressive movement. Stuart, although he had not yet received the reinforcement he was expecting, determined to make a stand against him, and, whether he relied on the valor of his soldiers, or that, encouraged by the slowness of the enemy's movements during the preceding day, he underrated his strength, he even thought of attacking in his turn and planting himself in Middleburg. He had taken position, with Chambliss and Robertson, about fifteen hundred yards back of Middleburg, resting his centre on an isolated wood in the middle of the plain: back of this wood rose a hill upon which he had posted his artillery. Gregg, with his two brigades deployed, makes a vigorous attack upon this position early in the morning. His dismounted troopers, outflanking the enemy's line, direct their fire upon that portion of the line which is unprotected, and make it give way: then the Federal centre rushes forward to charge the wood, dislodging the Southerners from it, who fly in disorder to the other side. Stuart's defeat would have been complete if the Ninth Virginia, which had remained in reserve, had not rushed to the front to check the Union troops, while the Confederate artillery poured a cross-fire upon them. They are obliged to fall back into the wood; but they take a strong position in it, and from this place of shelter deliver a severe fire upon the unprotected position of their adversaries. The latter make fruitless efforts to recapture the wood. Stuart at last gives the signal of retreat, which is effected in good order, and comes to a halt within a short distance of Middleburg in a new and stronger position, where the Federals did not come to look for him on that day. The combat had been bloody, the heaviest losses being on Stuart's side. As usual when the situation became critical, he performed prodigies of valor: his chief of staff, Major von Boreke, a Prussian officer, had been seriously wounded by his side. Fortunately, he recovered, as his death

would have deprived us of one of the most interesting books that has been written about the war.

In the course of this day, Munford, who was watching the road between Aldie and Snicker's Gap from the other side of Union, had been obliged to fall back toward the village before the superior forces brought on by Buford along that route. We have stated that in coming out of Aldie the road divides: both branches, after crossing Goose Creek Valley, the chain of the Blue Ridge, and the swift current of the Shenandoah, lead to Winchester. But, whereas the former crosses the defile of Snicker's Gap, the latter, more to the south, crosses Ashby's Gap after having successively passed through Dover, Middleburg, Rector's Cross-roads, Upperville, where several roads converge, and finally Paris, located in the very gorge of the mountain. It is this last-mentioned road that Stuart was following.

Jones' arrival on the 19th, and Hampton's on the following day, gave the latter a numerical superiority over the enemy's cavalry, of which he was fully determined to take advantage. The day of the 20th, however, passed without any serious encounter, because the last reinforcements that were expected on both sides did not arrive until evening. On the side of the Federals these reinforcements consisted of the infantry division of General Barnes. Stuart had sent Jones to support Munford at Union, thus extending his left as far as the Snicker's Gap road, and had kept Hampton, with his other two brigades, near Rector's Cross-roads.

The Federals did not allow him time to assume the offensive, most fortunately for him, for he has acknowledged since that he would thereby have been exposed to a serious disaster. Leaving Barnes with two brigades at Middleburg to cover his communications, Pleasonton only took along with him one brigade of infantry under General Vincent, which he added to Gregg's division. While the latter, supported by a battery of artillery under the immediate direction of the corps commander, was to push the enemy along the Ashby's Gap road, Buford, who was on the right, was ordered to menace his flank, so as to compel him to fall back upon the defile. Before eight o'clock, Vincent's bri-



gade and the artillery, taking the advance, attacked the positions that Stuart had occupied with his three brigades for the last two days on a small stream called Cromwell Creek. Pleasonton's artillery soon silenced the Confederate guns, and the latter, finding themselves attacked by infantry, abandoned their positions so precipitately that they left two dismounted pieces in the hands of the assailants—trophies which were the more precious to them as being the first that had thus been captured by main force from Stuart's batteries. Then Kilpatrick, with his fine brigade of cavalry, pushing forward to the front, presses close upon the enemy and takes possession of the bridge over Goose Creek before the latter has been able to destroy it. Stuart, who has rallied his men, checks him a little farther off in front of an excellent position; but the Union infantry having soon made its appearance, he gives once more the order of retreat. He has sent word to Jones and Munford on his left, directing them to fall back upon Upperville, making the best resistance they could against the forces in front of them. His troops having lost all hope of success since they found themselves confronting the infantry, his only care is to delay the march of the Federals long enough to give his brigades on the left time to join him at Upperville before he has been driven back upon Ashby's Gap. A large open plain extends from Goose Creek to this village. Stuart, who has twelve or thirteen regiments under his control, makes them fall back by *échelon*—a manœuvre which the nature of the ground seldom admits of being performed in America, and which was executed in order and coolness under the fire of the Federal guns. It is true that this manœuvre was made easy by the absence of the Union infantry, which was readily kept at a distance, so that Pleasonton had only his two cavalry brigades left to follow an enemy superior in numbers.

In the mean while, Buford with his division had attacked both Munford and Jones, and, although both parties were nearly of equal strength, the Federals soon obtained a marked advantage. When the Confederates were ordered to fall back upon Upperville, their retreat once more emboldened the assailants, while Gamble's brigade, returning constantly to the charge, inflicted upon them severe losses. It pressed them so closely that

Stuart, dreading to see Buford's column come up after them between Upperville and Paris, and thus cut off his retreat in the direction of the defile, determined to continue it at once, without stopping at Upperville.

As his head of column was leaving this village, Hampton, who had just entered it with the rear-guard, was again attacked by Kilpatrick. He immediately wheeled about, charged the enemy, and drove him back so vigorously that the Union general came near being captured. But the rest of his brigade soon comes to his assistance. A combat with small-arms follows between the two forces, that are becoming more and more mixed up. They push and jostle each other along a road bordered by fences, behind which are posted Confederate skirmishers on the Upperville side, while the other side also presents an array of dismounted Federal troopers. Hampton finally falls back, and, rapidly pushing forward in advance of Robertson's brigade, leaves to the latter the task of covering the retreat. This brigade is soon attacked by the Federals, who are emerging from Upperville, and is obliged to gain the approaches of Paris in great haste. The efforts it makes to delay the march of the enemy cost it dear, one of its colonels being left wounded on the field. Chambliss, who has come to its assistance on the left, also loses one of his colonels, Lewis, who two days before had so valiantly led the charge of the Ninth Virginia.

By thus falling back Stuart had lost about eight miles of ground: he could not retrograde farther without abandoning the defile and exposing Jones and Munford to be surrounded and captured. Fortunately, the positions where he had placed his artillery were good. Pleasonton's infantry was far away and his cavalry worn out. He halted and installed himself in the village of Upperville. On his right, Buford had continued his hot pursuit of Munford and Jones, who joined Stuart at Paris. While the former was skirting the foot of the Blue Ridge slopes with his division, his scouts climbed up the ridges. From the summit of this natural observatory they had a full view of the whole lower valley of the Shenandoah: from Winchester to the Bolivar Heights near Harper's Ferry nothing escaped their observation. They saw long columns of infantry marching

northward in the direction of the Potomac, while others were approaching Ashby's Gap. The former, as we shall explain presently, comprised Ewell's corps, which was on the march toward Pennsylvania, the others being the reinforcements sent by Longstreet to Stuart. The information that Pleasonton had gathered was thus confirmed: the movements of the enemy's infantry, which Stuart had, up to this time, so successfully concealed, stood revealed. The success of the Union cavalry was now complete, the moral advantages being as great as the material results. It had attacked the enemy's cavalry wherever it was found, and always came out victorious in the end. The highest praise bestowed on the new attributes it had just displayed is to be found in the reports of its adversaries, who were all the time under the impression that they had to cope with forces double their own, whereas, in reality, the number of combatants was about equal. The Federal troopers, after being taught experience in the hard school of defeat, feel thenceforth their own worth, and, thanks to the confidence which these latter successes have inspired them with, they will hereafter be a match for their adversaries.

The combats fought between Aldie and Ashby's Gap cost the Confederates 510 men, and the Unionists about the same number.

While Stuart was engaged at Middleburg, Longstreet had followed the route which Lee had traced out for him. On the 19th he passed through Upperville, while his columns occupied defiles of the Blue Ridge—McLaws at Ashby's Gap, Hood at Snicker's Gap, a connection being formed between them by Pickett, who was posted on the summit of the ridge. On the 20th, Longstreet, having been ordered to hold himself in readiness to cross the Potomac, deemed it expedient to draw near this river, and, abandoning the Blue Ridge, he crossed the Shenandoah. The next day, on learning that Stuart was in full retreat and pressed on every side by the enemy, he hastened to send McLaws back to Ashby's Gap. The latter arrived toward evening, and took the place of Stuart's troopers, who fell back to the second line in search of that rest of which they stood greatly in need. Besides, they had no longer any cause for trouble in that direction. Unwilling to allow himself to be drawn too far away from

Washington, Hooker's instructions to Pleasonton were explicit. The latter, satisfied with the information he had obtained, fell back upon Aldie the following day, followed, or rather watched, by some of the enemy's scouts.

The moment had arrived for Lee to give his impatient soldiers the order of invasion. His forces were assembled along both banks of the Potomac, and, since he could not draw Hooker toward him in the Valley of Virginia, it was necessary for him to march boldly northward in order to compel the Army of the Potomac to change its tactics or make the free States pay heavily for its wariness. He was at the head of an army even more numerous, better disciplined and equipped, than that with which he had penetrated into Maryland the preceding year; but, on the other hand, the enemy was also much more formidable than then. Instead of having only to cope with the vanquished troops of Manassas, driven back helter-skelter into Washington, he felt that he was watched by an army ready for battle which a vigilant chieftain handled with ease. Consequently, he could not altogether get rid of many apprehensions on leaving the soil of Virginia, in whose defence he had hitherto met only with success. The proof of this will be found in the letter he wrote to Mr. Davis on the 23d, just as he was ordering his army to cross the Potomac. He was asking him earnestly to send on the last available man that could be spared, and to assemble at Culpeper, under Beauregard's command, all the forces that were to remain in Virginia: the army thus formed, more formidable on account of its chieftain's name than for its numerical strength, would have made a show of menacing Washington and effected a useful diversion in favor of that other army which was about to invade the Northern States. Lee's idea was correct: it could not be realized for want of troops, as all the generals of the Confederacy were asking for reinforcements at the same time; and the reply of the President, which was intercepted in the early part of July by the Federals, revealed to them this scarcity of men at the very moment when it would have been of the utmost importance to the Confederates to have been able to conceal the fact.

In the mean while, Ewell was already in full march toward the North. Lee, believing himself still strong enough, with the rest



of his troops, to hold Hooker's army in check if the latter should attack him upon ground of his own selection, had caused a portion of the Second corps to cross to the left bank of the Potomac, without, however, moving it away from the river. On the 20th of June, Early, leaving Winchester, took position along the right bank at Shepherdstown, as if for the purpose of menacing Harper's Ferry and watching its garrison; Johnson, crossing the river, had posted himself at Sharpsburg, on that bloody battlefield which contained the bones of so many Confederate soldiers; while Rodes, who was already on the other side, had advanced as far as Hagerstown. This time Maryland was effectually occupied, and the uneasiness which took possession of the public in the North was justified. On the 21st, before knowing the result of the battle of Ashby's Gap, Lee, wishing to take advantage of this uneasiness in order to throw confusion in the ranks of his adversaries, adopted a bold resolve. He ordered Ewell to march as far as Harrisburg and take possession of this capital if possible. By striking Harrisburg his object was to reach the White House and disturb the deliberations of the Federal government. Rodes arrived on the 22d, and Johnson on the 23d, at Greencastle, whilst Jenkins, preceding them, entered Chambersburg, and Early, bearing to the right, occupied Cavetown at the foot of the Blue Ridge. It was on this same day, the 23d, that Lee, being apprised of Pleasanton's retreat, issued marching orders to his other two army corps.

Hill, crossing the Potomac first, reached Chambersburg on the 27th; Longstreet, moving toward the Williamsport ford, and forming the rear-guard on this occasion, crossed the river on the 25th and 26th, and on the evening of the 27th brought his three divisions together a little south of Chambersburg. Lee, therefore, had two-thirds of his army massed near this village, while Ewell was pushing rapidly forward, covering as much ground as possible, driving his troops across the rich section of open country before him with a degree of audacity which was justified by the weakness of the small number of adversaries he was likely to encounter in that direction.

Imboden, who had extended his lines westward as far as the Cumberland Mountains, returned to Hancock to operate on his left and lay other districts in Pennsylvania under contribution:

he occupied McConnellsburg, then brought his booty to Chambersburg, a central point, whence it was forwarded south with that of the rest of the army. Jenkins, on his part, was raiding along the Harrisburg road. Ewell, having given one day's rest to his troops at Chambersburg, had resumed his march, with Johnson and Rodes, in the direction of this latter city; Early, on the other hand, after rounding the west side of the mountains from Cavetown to Greenwood, turned abruptly to the right to cross them and descend upon Gettysburg, so as to fill Stuart's place, whose absence we will soon explain.

The section of country thus invaded by Ewell was one of the richest agricultural districts in Pennsylvania, and consequently in the United States. For the first time the Confederate soldiers found themselves in the enemy's open country. This country had known nothing of the war except through the visits of purchasing agents and the departure of large bodies of volunteers who responded to Mr. Lincoln's call. Abundance reigned everywhere, striking the Southern troops with astonishment, who had been accustomed to all sorts of privations in the valleys of Virginia, so long since devastated.

The requisitions of their chiefs, regularly imposed upon the villages they occupied, soon satisfied their wants. They made the Northern population pay largely this time the costs of the war which had so long weighed upon them and their families, but no disorder was added to these exactions in the country thus occupied: there was neither plundering nor incendiarism. Most of the Southern papers, however, forgetting the good behavior of the Army of the Potomac in Virginia, exaggerating the unavoidable sufferings which the war had entailed upon the Southern States, and magnifying the excesses committed under the Federal uniform (for the most part by partisans or isolated detachments), demanded that Pennsylvania should be laid in ashes and blood. But the Confederate generals, understanding much better the true interests of the policy they were subserving, and not wishing to exasperate the people of the North, were desirous to confront them under the most favorable auspices. The strictest orders were issued by the commander-in-chief, prohibiting pillage under any form whatever: his injunctions were even too rigorous

to be scrupulously carried out. In fact, government officers were alone authorized to make such requisitions upon the inhabitants of the country as were necessary to the sustenance of the soldiers—requisitions which were paid in Confederate bonds or notes: the regimental officers, who, under certain restrictions, should have been invested with this privilege, only exercised it among isolated detachments. Following the same idea, the sale of spiritous liquors was prohibited in all the towns occupied by the Confederates. Finally, his orders having been occasionally violated or criticised, General Lee, when he saw his whole army gathered together on the soil of Pennsylvania, issued a proclamation from Chambersburg on the 27th recommending moderation, respect for non-combatants, and the discarding of all thoughts of revenge—a proclamation teeming with the loftiest sentiments, which the biographers of this Christian soldier may always quote as a model for such chieftains as may be called upon to lead an army of invasion.

These injunctions did not prevent the Southern generals from going in search of and collecting all the resources that could be useful to the army: requisitions, laying all the small towns of that part of Pennsylvania under contribution, supplied them with shoes, hats, and goods of all kinds to replace their wornout habiliments; large supply-trains filled with provisions and cattle were sent into Virginia; finally, in a few days, Jenkins and Imboden had supplied all their troopers with fresh horses. It is said that the latter found that Pennsylvania horses, much larger and better fed, had less blood, and consequently less stamina, than those of Virginia, which are so remarkable for their docility and powers of endurance.

The mountains, a continuation of the Blue Ridge, which border the Cumberland Valley at the east, incline, as we have observed, north-eastward from Chambersburg, terminating at the elevation of the town of Carlisle before reaching the Susquehanna. A parallel chain of less importance, which is a continuation of the Bull Run and Catoctin Mountains, extends east of the former, forming between the Potomac and the Susquehanna a much larger valley than the Cumberland. It is watered at the north by a large number of small tributaries of the Susquehanna, and at

the south by the Monocacy, which gets its source in the vicinity of Gettysburg, and which, after passing near Frederick, empties into the Potomac at Nolan's Ferry, below Point of Rocks. These two valleys, which Nature had fashioned like those of Virginia, have been greatly improved by man, especially in the northern section of Pennsylvania. They are in a high state of cultivation: neither impenetrable forests, like those of the Wilderness, nor even large wooded areas, such as surround Washington, are to be met; villages abound; the roads are numerous and generally well kept. Two lines of railroad traverse this section of country—one, that of the Cumberland Valley, between Harrisburg, Chambersburg, and Shippensburg, by way of Carlisle; the other, the Northern Central, connecting Baltimore with Harrisburg, with two branches—one running west from Hanover Junction, by way of Hanover, to Gettysburg; the other eastward, from York to Wrightsville, where it crosses the Susquehanna over an immense wooden bridge about one mile and a quarter long, to connect again with the Philadelphia line. This bridge, available for vehicles, was the only one to be found at that time on the river below Harrisburg. A third line of railroad passes through the lower part of the valley of the Monocacy: it is a part of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, which, passing close by Frederick, runs down to Point of Rocks and thence follows the course of the Potomac as far as Harper's Ferry.

Ewell, by a forced march, reached Carlisle with his two divisions on the 27th: the next day a band of scouts, with some officers, proceeded to reconnoitre the approaches of Harrisburg. Despite all the efforts of the inhabitants of this city to put it in a state of defence, the Confederates could probably have easily taken possession of the suburbs on the left bank. Ewell was preparing for this operation when an order from Lee suddenly put a stop to his movement.

Early had been sent east of the mountains to cover the right wing of the army and to watch the roads north of Baltimore and west of Philadelphia. A glance at the map will show that the Confederate army assembled in the Cumberland Valley in proportion as it advanced northward moved farther away from Washington, and finally turned its back entirely upon the base



of operations on which the Federal army rested: it therefore behoved Lee to cause all the avenues through which detachments of the enemy's troops might fall upon his flank, from either Washington or Baltimore, to be carefully reconnoitred. It was for the cavalry to perform this duty, but Stuart having remained in Virginia to keep a close watch over Hooker's movements, this task was assigned to Early. Lee had not been able to add more than one regiment to his division, comprising a few hundred sabres, and his infantry, long inured to forced marches, had to make up for the absence of cavalry by their own activity. They left Greenwood on the 26th of June in two columns, and reaching Gettysburg in the evening dislodged from it, after a slight skirmish, about a thousand Pennsylvania militia,\* brought there in haste, who could not offer any serious resistance. The division, after having bivouacked at Gettysburg and Mummasburg, reached the neighborhood of Berlin on the 27th and York on the 28th. Gordon's brigade, following the railroad, had marched with greater speed than the others, and arrived at York at an early hour. Early immediately directed it to proceed to Wrightsville, where the great bridge of the Susquehanna crossed that stream. Lee had ordered Early to burn it, but the latter general, meeting with no resistance, conceived the bold plan of crossing the river over this bridge and ascending the left bank in order to assist Ewell at Harrisburg. Consequently, Gordon was instructed to take possession of it if possible. When within a short distance of the village he encountered a detachment of Unionists, which a few shells sufficed to disperse; but his soldiers, worn out with fatigue, could not vie with the enemy in speed, and they had scarcely started in pursuit over the bridge when they were driven back by the flames. The Federals, not having succeeded in cutting the bridge, had determined to burn it: in a few hours it was entirely destroyed, together with a portion of the village, and the flames from this immense blazing pile, lighting up the atmosphere on the evening of the 28th of June, announced to the alarmed population on the right bank of the Susquehanna that the enemy had reached the river. In the mean time, Early was levying contributions upon York and

\* The Twenty-sixth militia regiment, under Colonel Jennings.—ED.

sending detachments to destroy the Northern Central Railroad and its branches to the largest practicable extent.

We shall leave him now to return to Virginia, where, on the 22d, we left the Federal army and Stuart's cavalry, which is watching it, along the line of the Bull Run Mountains. On his arrival at Fairfax, Hooker, foreseeing that he would have to go through a campaign in Maryland, had sent two bridge-equipages, under proper escort, to the mouth of the Monocacy, and on the 18th everything was ready for throwing these bridges over the Potomac at Nolan's Ferry. The Second corps, in taking position at Leesburg the next day, as we have stated, was only within ten miles of this point. Hooker, however, was yet ignorant whether Lee, by not marching either upon Manassas or Washington, would decide to push northward; and as he intended to assume the offensive against his line of retreat if the occasion offered, he did not wish to be drawn to the left bank of the Potomac before being fully convinced that the whole Confederate army had left the soil of Virginia. Consequently, he was waiting in the positions taken on the 19th for positive information upon this point, without allowing himself to be disturbed by the cries of distress coming from Pennsylvania blaming him for his inaction. He took advantage of this waiting-spell to organize reinforcements destined to join his army as soon as it had entered Maryland: in fact, from this moment it covered Washington and Baltimore so completely that the garrisons of these two places could have been safely reduced so as to form a column which would have increased the effective force of the Army of the Potomac.

The authorities at Washington threw all kinds of obstacles in the way of this project: General Butterfield, who had been sent to organize this column, could only secure twenty-five hundred men that General Lockwood brought from Baltimore,\* instead of fifteen thousand upon whom he had counted; and Hooker, having sent for a brigade of Crawford's division which had been assigned to him, General Slough, military governor of Alexandria, where this brigade was uselessly stationed, detained it in

\* Lockwood's brigade was brought from the lower counties of Maryland, bordering on Chesapeake Bay and the Potomac River.—ED.

defiance of the orders that had been received, and was sustained by Halleck in this act of insubordination.

The movements of the Southern cavalry north of the Potomac had given rise, as we have stated, to the most extravagant rumors, and the Federal authorities had great difficulty in distinguishing truth from fiction. As soon as Lee's battalions had set foot on the soil of Maryland the Southern general experienced in his turn some of those difficulties against which his adversaries had hitherto to struggle. Instead of being wrapped up, thanks to the connivance of an entire population, in an impenetrable veil, through which he could perceive all the movements of his opponents, he found himself surrounded with voluntary spies, who, after counting his regiments and talking with his soldiers, who were constantly asking for something to drink, proceeded, as soon as the latter had departed, to report to the enemy all they had seen and heard. On the other hand, soldiers disgusted with the profession of arms, who in Virginia would not have dared to leave the ranks for fear of being betrayed by the inhabitants, finding now a good opportunity for deserting, carried much valuable information to the enemy; so that Ewell's movement upon Hagerstown, which was executed on the 22d, was known to Hooker on the 23d, and on the 25th the latter was fully informed of the passage of the Potomac by Hill's corps at Shepherdstown.

Two bridges had been thrown over the river by the Union general at Edwards' Ferry, near the mouth of Goose Creek, and in rear of the positions occupied by the Second corps at Leesburg. On learning of the arrival of Ewell at Hagerstown, he at once despatched three army corps to hold the left bank of the Potomac and to cover Washington. These were the First, the Third, and the Eleventh, which happened to be nearest the bridges, and which Hooker had placed temporarily under Reynolds' command. On the 25th they stationed themselves around Poolesville, a village in Maryland situated not far from the river, at the intersection of several roads, and at an equal distance from Washington, Harper's Ferry, and Frederick.

That same day, on receipt of fresh intelligence, the commander-in-chief determined to follow the Confederates into Maryland with the remainder of his army. Reynolds led his three army

corps toward the defiles of South Mountain, making some detachments occupy Turner's Gap and Crampton's Gap, while the bulk of his forces took position in the village of Middletown, on the road between Frederick and Boonesboro'. The reader, by bearing in mind the campaign of 1862, will appreciate the importance of this movement, which shut out Lee from all access to Eastern Maryland, while it opened to the Unionists a passage leading to the communications of the Confederate army with Virginia.

During this time the other four army corps, the reserve artillery, and the cavalry, converging in their turn toward Edwards' Ferry, crossed the Potomac during the day of the 26th: the Sixth corps, which had arrived from Centreville, having bivouacked at Dranesville, was the last to cross during the morning of the 27th, and entered the valley of the Monocacy *en échelon* near its mouth and below Frederick; the Twelfth corps, which had arrived from Leesburg, pushed farther on in the direction of Harper's Ferry. The Army of the Potomac thus took, in June, 1863, the same position it had occupied under McClellan before the battle of Antietam. Hooker could not have made a better choice to harass his adversary. The operation had been well conceived and admirably executed. The seven army corps, with the artillery, cavalry, and the immense supply-trains, had effected the passage of the Potomac over two bridges of boats in two days and a half: thanks to their celerity, the movement ordered upon receipt of the news that Lee's army had begun crossing the river was accomplished in twenty-four hours after the last of the enemy's battalions had left the Virginia shore. The two adversaries, although separated by more than forty miles, followed each other very closely.

From the first day the Confederates experienced all the difficulties to which an army of invasion is necessarily exposed—difficulties that were new to them, for in the preceding year they had not advanced far enough into the hostile country to encounter them. On the one hand, being obliged to extend their lines in order to occupy the country, destroy the resources of the enemy, and gather provisions, they had nevertheless to be always ready to concentrate for battle; on the other hand, they were not so well informed as their adversaries. In fact, whilst Hooker, as



we have seen, was fully posted as to their march, Lee was completely ignorant of the crossing of the Potomac by the Federal army. On the 27th of June, when this passage had been in operation for two days, and the Federal army was already massed at the foot of South Mountain, he believed it to be still in Virginia. He trusted to Stuart's vigilance to apprise him of the movements of the enemy, and if he had received from the latter the information he was expecting, he would certainly not have committed the imprudence of despatching Ewell's corps in the direction of the Susquehanna. But the vigor with which Pleasanton had driven the Confederate cavalry beyond the Blue Ridge had completely masked the passage of the Unionists to the left bank of the river. To make up for lost time, Stuart should have thrown himself between the two armies, and thus dispelled the uncertainty under which Lee had been laboring for some days. It was at this moment that an unfortunate misunderstanding deprived the general-in-chief of the useful co-operation of his too-zealous lieutenant.

Stuart was burning with desire to avenge the checks that Pleasanton had just made him suffer. He could not think of attacking the Federals, firmly posted as they were along the Bull Run Mountains, whence they overlooked the plains and watched all his movements. The Second army corps having arrived from Centreville on the 20th to take position at Thoroughfare Gap, he thought that the whole Federal army was stretched behind this range of hills, and that between it and Washington there were only some storehouses, dépôts, and detached posts. He conceived the idea of repeating the manœuvre which had twice proved successful in the preceding year, and to make a complete circuit of this army by passing between it and Washington. He intended, by following a southern direction, to outflank its left wing, then to proceed northward, leaving Centreville on his right, reach Dranesville, cross the Potomac, and join Lee in Maryland. This plan had one serious defect: it was like an intermediate act in a play without any connection with the principal piece. The two operations of this kind performed by Stuart the year previous on the Chickahominy and along the Potomac were undertaken while the two armies were both stationary: they consequently partook of the

character of extensive reconnoissances. Until then, during the active campaigns, Stuart's rôle had been either to cover or to clear the army. This time he was undertaking a dangerous movement at a moment when he must have expected to find the enemy on the march; consequently, he could not foresee what *détours* he would have to make to avoid him, and from the very first he started in a contrary direction to that followed by the Confederate army. He submitted his plan to Lee, and has stated in his report that the latter authorized him to execute it, even pointing out to him the contemplated movements of Ewell's corps, that he might join Early's division between Gettysburg and the Susquehanna. The official account of the general-in-chief, no less positive, is directly at variance with this statement. According to this account, Stuart did not propose the movement on the enemy's rear except as a means for delaying his passage over to the left bank of the Potomac. This consideration alone influenced Lee in allowing him to penetrate into Maryland east of the Blue Ridge, but upon the express condition that the cavalry should resume its natural place on the right flank of the army as soon as the enemy had started for the North. This, as it will be seen, was a concession made by Lee to the views of his lieutenant and, as almost always happens in such cases, the somewhat vague terms used by the former were no doubt interpreted by the latter in a sense most suitable to his wishes. Hence a misunderstanding which raised a question of veracity between them, the consequences of which proved fatal to their cause. In fact, when Lee alluded to the rear of the Federal army as he was talking to his lieutenant, the latter did not suppose that he meant the rear of his columns on the march northward, but rather his base of operations at the east; when he mentioned York as the point near which he might encounter Early and join the head of the Confederate army by following its right flank without ceasing to cover it, Stuart looked upon this last-mentioned city as a mere point of rendezvous to be reached after he had accomplished the raid he contemplated.

Lee thought that he should only be deprived of the important services his cavalry had rendered him since the beginning of the campaign for a few days; consequently, he had soon cause to regret the authorization he had too easily given to Stuart. The

latter lost not a single moment in taking advantage of it. He left about four thousand cavalry with Generals Robertson and Jones, with the charge of watching the Blue Ridge and the front of the enemy's army: then, without paying the least attention to Longstreet's directions, who had requested him to remain within his reach, he set off during the night of the 24th with the brigades of Fitzhugh Lee and W. H. F. Lee, commanded by Colonels Munford and Chambliss, together with Hampton's brigade. The troopers carried three days' rations for themselves and one day's forage for the horses: six guns and a few ambulances were the only vehicles that accompanied the division. In coming out of Salem, where the latter had assembled, Stuart, who headed the column in person, took the northern route; then, darting suddenly across the fields, he struck the eastern route and reached one of the mountain-passes south of Thoroughfare Gap, called Glascock's Gap. Turning north-eastward, he proceeded toward Haymarket. But here commenced the difficulties he had not foreseen. Before reaching Haymarket he found a whole Federal army corps on the march along the road he had proposed to follow. It was the Second, on its way from Thoroughfare Gap to Gum Springs to relieve the Third, on the march toward Maryland. Stuart, placing his artillery in position, had the satisfaction of cannonading the column and of throwing considerable disorder into the ranks; but he did it no harm, and to disguise his movement he was obliged to make a large circuit southward. His horses having but little to eat, he had to halt and let them graze. A single brigade pushed on as far as Gainesville. Centreville was occupied: the whole section of country which separated this point from the front of the enemy's army was overrun by columns of troops which he might meet at any moment. The plan he had formed could not therefore be carried out: if he had relinquished it and retraced his steps, he would have returned in time to discover the passage of the Federals into Maryland, apprise Lee of the fact, and join Early in Pennsylvania. He persisted in his project, and, not being able to effect a passage west of Centreville, determined to force his way at the east. Delayed by the necessity of letting his horses graze again, he was unable to get beyond the Ocoquan, which

he reached at Wolf Run Shoals on the 26th, and arrived in two columns on the 27th at Burke's and Fairfax Stations. He found everywhere traces of the departure of the Federal army, gathered some provisions that had been left behind, and had no encounter except with a regiment of cavalry, which he quickly drove back into Washington after capturing two hundred men. Pursuing his route in the track of the Unionists, he arrived at Dranesville, which place the Sixth corps had left in the morning. He had not succeeded, therefore, in turning the Federal army, which had crossed the Potomac before him, and he simply found himself in its rear. He had only to push on as far as Leesburg to ascertain the fact, and by ascending the right bank of the Potomac he could, without encountering any obstacle, have promptly carried the news of this passage to Lee, with the valuable co-operation of his cavalry. But, mistakenly, he thought that the whole Federal army was marching upon Leesburg along this bank, and fancied that he could quietly join his chief by passing through Maryland. A ford which was not watched by any of the enemy's posts was pointed out to him near Dranesville: he determined at once to avail himself of it.

It was at a short distance from the magnificent falls of the Potomac, at a place where the river, rushing down a precipitous declivity, spreads out among stones and rocks which break the force of its current. But this ford, which was easy for horses, seemed impassable for artillery. Stuart did not allow himself to be thwarted. The caissons were emptied; the gun-cartridges and shells were divided among the troopers, and the submerged cannon and wagons were dragged across the river. Night had supervened, and the watery moon threw but a faint and uncertain light over the agitated surface of the stream: the long line of horses, sunk up to their breasts in the water, oscillated to and fro under the pressure of the current and kept on their course with difficulty. Nevertheless, at the end of a few hours the huge shadows that were silently flitting across the river had all climbed up to the other side. Thus, without firing a single shot, did Stuart enter Maryland, and he hastened to destroy the canal adjacent to the river. On the 28th, after a few hours' rest, in two



columns he resumed his march in the direction of Rockville. He had, in fact, been informed of the movement of the Army of the Potomac, the whole of which lay between himself and that of Lee, and was marching northward, being greatly in advance of his own troops. It will thus be seen that Lee, Hooker, and Stuart were all three pursuing a parallel course, the second being between the two bodies of the enemy and separated from each of them by a range of hills. There was no means of conveying any intelligence to Lee: the passes by which Stuart had calculated to join him were blocked; there was nothing else to be done but to beat the Federals in speed in order to find Early along the Susquehanna. The Southern troopers were undoubtedly able to throw the rear of the enemy's army into some confusion, but these ephemeral and barren successes could not compensate for the injury which their absence from the flank of the Confederate army caused the latter at such a critical moment.

From their first entrance into Maryland, Stuart's men had picked up isolated soldiers and wagons belonging to the administrative departments of the enemy, putting some small detachments to flight, and, after trifling a while with one of them, entered the town of Rockville, situated on the direct road connecting the Federal capital with Hooker's head-quarters at Poolesville,\* without striking a blow. They had scarcely dismounted when they were informed of the approach of a supply-train loaded with forage, coming from Washington. Chambliss, with his brigade, in order to capture this rich prey, immediately gets back into the saddle; Stuart, who would not have missed such a feast for anything in the world, leads the chase at a gallop. The supply-train, composed of one hundred and fifty wagons, extends a distance of nearly two miles, and is within only one mile of Rockville when the troopers who are clearing its march, rushing suddenly to the rear with the cry, "The enemy is upon us!" scatter alarm and confusion through the long line of wagons. Each driver is endeavoring to turn his team around: some get entangled, others are upset across the road; those who have been able to recover the track leading straight to Washington dash

\* At this time Meade was in command, with head-quarters at Frederick. Rockville is on the main road from Washington to Frederick.—ED.

forward at a frantic rate of speed, each trying to outstrip his fellow-teamster in the race. The Confederates, flourishing their sabres, arrive in the midst of this panic, and, cutting their way through the wagons, reach those farthest off, which they stop almost within sight of the forts of Washington. From this moment the whole train is in their power: the wagons already broken are burned; about one hundred of them are carried off. The troopers who accompanied the train never stopped until they had reached the capital. For a moment Stuart was tempted to follow them, and by a bold dash between the forts heighten the commotion which his presence at Rockville could not fail to create. But night was approaching, his horses were tired, and the necessity of speedily rejoining his chief prevailed over every other consideration.

In spite of the exhaustion of both men and animals, it became therefore necessary to resume the march during the night, and on the morning of the 29th the two columns struck the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad at Hood's Mill and Sykesville. They had thus followed the eastern slope of the hills which form the boundary of the Monocacy basin at the east. The occupation of the railroad connecting Washington and Baltimore with the town of Frederick, where the centre of the enemy's army was located, might have proved a serious source of trouble to the latter if it had intended to remain there, and if Stuart had had time to destroy the track entirely. He only set fire to two small bridges, being unable to capture any train, and having gathered new information regarding the movement of the enemy toward the north, he gave up the idea of continuing his work of destruction to concentrate his thoughts in finding means of joining Early. In the afternoon of the 29th he was on the march, pursuing a north-westerly course toward Westminster, where he intended to cross the hills and take the Gettysburg road. His advance-guard met with a hot reception in this town from a squadron of the First Delaware, and did not succeed in taking possession of it until after an engagement in which it sustained some losses.

On the morning of the 30th of June the whole division was marching in the direction of Hanover, where Stuart hoped to find Early, or at least some reliable information concerning his

position, and to be able to communicate with head-quarters. Six days of constant marching, nearly all that time without sleep, food, or news from the rest of the army, were beginning to impair the strength of this fine body of troops.

The last night had to be employed in distributing hay to the horses, which until then had eaten scarcely anything except green grass: there were to be escorted four hundred prisoners and more than two hundred wagons picked up on the road. This train was a great encumbrance, but Stuart would not be separated from it. The ammunition was rapidly diminishing, and finally it was known that a division of the enemy's cavalry had encamped the night before at Littlestown. The leaders felt uneasy on finding that, no matter how rapidly they pushed northward, they could not succeed in getting ahead of that enemy in whose rear they had so imprudently slipped. Chambliss led the march with his brigade, followed by all the artillery; Hampton formed the rear-guard, separated from the first by a space of about two miles and a half, which was occupied by teams; Fitzhugh Lee covered the left flank of the route traversed.

On reaching the hillocks which overlook Hanover, the Confederates perceived coming from Littlestown a long column of the enemy's cavalry, which was passing through the village in a northerly direction, and thus occupying the road which they were themselves so anxious to follow. The situation was a trying one: retreat was becoming impossible; audacity was the only resort. Chambliss began the attack. A few words will suffice to explain this new encounter between Kilpatrick and Stuart, as unexpected to them as was that of Aldie two weeks before. Stahel's cavalry, added to Pleasonton's corps, had been reorganized and divided into two brigades under the command of two officers of great distinction—Farnsworth, a man who had already acquired much experience, and who perished within a few days without an opportunity to show the full measure of his worth; and young Custer, who, after having successfully passed through all the perils of the great war, fell a victim thirteen years later to the tomahawk of the red-skins. Kilpatrick, whom the late conflicts had brought conspicuously to the front, was assigned to

the command. This new division was at Frederick when, on the 28th, the news of Stuart's arrival at Rockville was promulgated. Pleasonton, who had unsuccessfully hunted the latter the preceding year, adopted different tactics on this occasion against him. Instead of sending his cavalry on his track in order to harass him, he resolved to let him load himself with booty, which could not fail to slacken his movements, and to manœuvre between him and the Confederate army, so as to keep him away from it as long as possible. He could not have adopted a better plan. This task was entrusted to Kilpatrick. The new division commander set off on the same day, and, following the Middleburg and Taneytown road, he encamped at Littlestown on the 29th, while Stuart, as we have remarked, had brought his head of column to a halt a few miles from this village. Whether it was that Kilpatrick had been too quick in his movements for the inhabitants to come forward and supply him with information, or that they had been struck with terror by the arrival of the Confederates, he was not apprised of the vicinity of the enemy's cavalry. Thinking only of maintaining his position on the right flank of Early, who, as we have seen, was at York the day before, he started for the latter place. Custer bore to the left with his brigade toward Abbottsville, while Farnsworth followed the direct route by way of Hanover. It was at this place that the two antagonists, marching in a different direction, found themselves face to face about ten o'clock in the morning.

On perceiving the enemy the Federals sent a detachment forward to reconnoitre; but Chambliss came up at a gallop, drove it before him, penetrated into the town, and cut the Unionist column in two before it had time to form again. If the length of the train behind which Hampton was marching had not detained the latter at too great a distance for him to join his comrade in time, the Federal brigade would have been annihilated. But the prompt arrival of help soon extricated it from the dangerous situation in which it was placed. Kilpatrick and Farnsworth, returning with the Fifth New York, charge the Confederates in turn, who are occupied in picking up prisoners, and after a sanguinary engagement drive them



out of the town. Colonel Payne, at the head of the Second North Carolina, tries in vain to resume the offensive by a flank movement: this attack is repulsed, and he is taken prisoner. Stuart takes position on a height south of the town, whence his artillery keeps the enemy at a distance, and waits for his other two brigades—not for the purpose of forcing a passage, but to cover the movement by means of which he wants to get away, with his train, from a struggle which he considers unequal.

Fitzhugh Lee is the first to arrive, and attacks the rear of the enemy's column, which, by its formation in line of battle, has become Kilpatrick's right. But the latter, who wishes, above all, to cut off his adversaries from the Gettysburg road, concentrates his forces upon this point, while Custer, coming to his assistance, soon gains ground over the Southerners. Stuart, on his part, hoping to find Early on the Susquehanna, and not daring to venture between the bulk of the enemy's infantry and cavalry, has decided to proceed eastward, by way of Jefferson, in order to reach the neighborhood of York. This is precisely the direction that Kilpatrick is most anxious to see him take, so that he is in no way uneasy on account of this movement. Hampton, who with scarcely any opposition, has entered the town, which the Federals have abandoned for the purpose of strengthening their right, covers once more the march of the train. While Kilpatrick is giving some rest to his worn-out troops, deferring till next day their departure for Heidlersburg, where he hopes to intercept Stuart, the latter has not lost a moment's time in getting in advance of him. It was indispensable, in fact, that by one of those extraordinary efforts which select troops alone are capable of making he should succeed in passing between his adversary and the insurmountable barrier of the Susquehanna before daylight. This night-march was terrible: whole regiments, says Stuart, were dozing on horseback, and men, tottering in their saddles, fell off like so many masses of inert matter. Finally, at day-break on the 1st of July, the column reaches Dover, but only to experience a new and bitter disappointment. Stuart learns that Early, after having occupied that whole section of country,

has left it suddenly for the east. It becomes therefore necessary to take up the line of march once more, in pursuit, not of the enemy, but of that friendly infantry which seems the more rapidly to vanish like a phantom as the efforts that are made to approach it increase. Finally, in the afternoon of July 1st, Stuart arrives at Carlisle with one brigade, after having ridden more than one hundred and twenty-five miles since the previous morning, having halted only long enough to fight the battle of Hanover. There, again, instead of Ewell's soldiers, he merely finds traces of their march, without any cue to aid him in fathoming the mystery of their precipitate retreat. In the mean time, his provisions are giving out, his ammunition is nearly exhausted, and the town of Carlisle refuses to receive him. Uneasy, irritated, having only a portion of his forces about him, and deprived of his supply-train, which has remained far in the rear, Stuart, in order to compel the town to yield, fires into it the last shells which remain in the caissons; but to no purpose. Besides, new anxieties soon demand his attention and occupy his thoughts.

He receives at last instructions from his chief, from whom he had been separated seven whole days. The information he was able to give him taught him nothing, for the damages he had caused to Hooker's rear had been of no assistance to the Confederate army. Instead of bringing news, it was he who was coming in search of it, and that which reached him was of a serious character. A battle was imminent; he had failed to perform the proper *rôle* of the cavalry toward the infantry before the encounter; he must at least be near it at the critical moment. The three brigades were immediately ordered to march separately upon Gettysburg.

We have left Hooker on the 27th of June concentrating his army along the left bank of the Potomac between the Monocacy and the slopes of South Mountain. Reynolds is at the head of three army corps at the foot of these slopes, near Middletown; three other corps are in the rear, stationed around the town of Frederick; while Slocum, with the Twelfth, following the course of the Potomac, has already reached Knoxville, and is within only three miles of Harper's Ferry, where there are nearly

twelve thousand men under General French; the mountain-defiles which had cost McClellan so dear the year previously are under Hooker's control. He can therefore either repeat the manœuvre of the latter, and, marching upon Harper's Ferry and Sharpsburg, menace Lee's line of communication, or follow still the movement of this general toward the North, and by keeping him as much as possible west of the mountains oblige him to extend his line still farther. The first of these two plans is the boldest and most effective. It is, in fact, calculated to put a stop to the invasion at once, and restores to the Federals the double advantage of strategic aggression and the choice of ground upon which they can compel their adversaries to come and fight them. Slocum, having once reached Harper's Ferry, will find his army corps increased by the addition of twelve thousand men, whom he can lead into the Cumberland Valley by way of Sharpsburg, while Reynolds has only a day's march to accomplish to enter this valley by way of Boonesboro'. Finally, the bridges which Lee may have on the Potomac, the supply-trains he is sending South, the ammunition he must be expecting, will all fall into Hooker's hands by the same blow. Consequently, this is the plan he has adopted, at least until fuller information regarding the movements of the enemy can be obtained: he has even begun to put it into execution by sending Slocum to Harper's Ferry, and by going there himself on the 27th, when an unforeseen occurrence suddenly puts a stop to this delicate operation.

The troops gathered at Harper's Ferry, as we have just stated, were placed under his command. Thinking, very properly, that the safety of the army and the cause he was defending might depend upon the presence of an additional division on the field of battle, he determined to sacrifice all secondary considerations to the concentration of active forces, and was therefore desirous of taking French with his army. In pursuit of this idea he had ordered preparations to be made for carrying off all the *matériel* at Harper's Ferry and in the fortifications on Maryland Heights. We have already stated how greatly General Halleck had exaggerated in 1862 the importance of this point, which guarded neither the Potomac fords nor the entrance into Maryland: Miles' disaster, brought on by his obstinacy in not evac-



uating the place at that time, had not enlightened him in the least. Consequently, when, on the evening of the 26th, Hooker telegraphed him that he intended to abandon this post, whose garrison, wanted elsewhere, was only a useless bait for the enemy, and asked him if he had any objection to this plan, he replied at once, formally refusing his consent except in a case of absolute necessity. This refusal was not prompted alone by military considerations more or less plausible. Inasmuch as Halleck immediately granted to Hooker's successor what he had refused to the former, we have a right to believe that the commander-in-chief had seized this opportunity to compel the commander of the Army of the Potomac to resign by depriving him of all freedom of action, without which he could not continue to perform the arduous task imposed upon him. Halleck's mistrust of Hooker was indeed no secret. The latter was fully aware of it, and, being unwilling that the personal animosity of which he was the victim should again compromise the fate of the army, on receipt of Halleck's reply—which he found at Frederick on his return from Harper's Ferry—he requested to be relieved of his command.

While waiting for the President's decision he made the new dispositions which Halleck's instructions rendered necessary. Unable to take French along with him, he relinquished his project of attacking Lee's rear in the Cumberland Valley. Slocum was recalled to Middletown,\* and all the marching orders prepared to put the army on the march toward the North, following the eastern slopes of the mountains.

On the morning of the 28th, General Hardie arrived at Frederick with an order appointing General Meade to the command of the Army of the Potomac in place of Hooker. For the second time within the space of a year President Lincoln had selected the worst possible moment for making a change in the chief command of this army. This change might have been reasonable on the day following the battle of Chancellorsville; it was singularly inopportune at present, when the two armies were about to be engaged in a decisive conflict.

Far from justifying it, the manner in which Hooker had handled his army for the last fortnight deserved nothing but

\* Slocum was ordered to Frederick (not Middletown) by Hooker.—ED.



praise: if the relations of the latter with some of the corps commanders were unpleasant, they had never done any injury to the service; and, on the other hand, the confidence with which he inspired the soldiers was of itself a power for his army. More fortunate than McClellan, Hooker was afforded new opportunities to serve his country, and we shall soon again find this brave soldier upon other battlefields.

General Meade, who is to command the Army of the Potomac until the close of the war, was an officer of the engineer corps. Simple, modest, reticent, but possessing a correct judgment, a mind clear and precise, together with a coolness which never faltered in the midst of danger, he had risen by his own merit from the grade of brigadier-general in the Pennsylvania Reserves to the command of the Fifth army corps. He was but little known except to his subordinates and some other generals, for neither his deliberate and methodical mind nor his tall, thin figure, with eyes whose somewhat sad expression his glasses but half concealed, was calculated to make a strong impression on the masses and inspire enthusiasm. But he was esteemed by his companions-in-arms and respected by his adversaries: when his old comrades who wore the Confederate uniform, and who, since the battle of Chancellorsville, professed a profound contempt for Hooker, were told of his appointment, they said to each other that they would have to look sharp after their new adversary.

The day Hooker transferred the Army of the Potomac to his successor, this army, comprising French's forces, Lockwood's brigade, which had arrived at Frederick on the 26th\*, and all available detachments, numbered little less than one hundred and five thousand men under arms. Meade, who had not aspired to his new position, was himself conscious how ill-timed was the displacement of Hooker, and had the good sense to make no changes in the *personnel* of his head-quarters, even retaining his chief of staff, General Butterfield. With his appointment he received the most unlimited power to dispose of all the troops assembled in Maryland, without taking into consideration those imaginary divisions in departments which had

\* Lockwood's brigade reached the vicinity of Frederick on the evening of June 27th.—ED.

so frequently embarrassed his predecessors. The first despatch he received from Halleck authorized him to remove at his pleasure the garrison of Harper's Ferry: the forces of Schenck and Couch were also placed under his command.

His successor at the head of the Fifth corps was General Sykes, an energetic officer who had particularly distinguished himself at Gaines' Mill. Meade set to work at once on the 28th, without allowing the army time to feel the interregnum. Hooker had informed him that Lee, not having brought along his bridge-equipages, could certainly not think of crossing the Susquehanna with his army, and that, consequently, after having reached that river, his design must be to follow the right bank, so as to cut off Baltimore and Washington from the Northern States. While the enemy was describing this large arc of a circle, the Federal army could, by keeping within an interior arc, follow him, fall upon his flank whenever it pleased, and at the same time cover these two cities without having to fight a battle at their gates. Meade did not agree with Hooker on this point; and very justly, for it now appears that Lee, taking advantage of the shallow waters of the Susquehanna, was ready to make a portion of his army cross to the other side of the river to seize Harrisburg: the possession of this city would in fact have secured him a permanent pass, together with the means of penetrating to the very heart of Pennsylvania. But, although he could freely dispose of French's troops, Meade did not dare to follow out the bolder and more promising plan his predecessor had conceived, the execution of which Halleck had prevented. He had no intention of crossing South Mountain for the purpose of placing himself between Lee and Virginia, for fear, no doubt, of leaving Baltimore unprotected and Philadelphia itself exposed. Whatever might have been the plans of the enemy, he thought it necessary, before all, to follow Lee northward, and to harass him sufficiently to oblige him to come and engage the battle himself. He had nothing to do, therefore, but to indorse and carry out the orders issued by Hooker for the march of the 29th.\*

We have stated that the valley situated east of South Mountain parallel with the Cumberland Valley enlarges at the north,

\* Hooker issued no orders for the march of the 29th.—Ed.

and almost assumes the form of a triangle whose base lies on the Susquehanna and the upper part at the mouth of the Monocacy on the Potomac. From Frederick, which is situated in the narrow section, several roads diverging from this point follow a northerly and north-easterly direction: the main roads are the Harrisburg road, by way of Emmettsburg, Gettysburg, and Heidlersburg, at the north; the York road, by way of Middleburg, Taneytown, Littlestown, and Hanover, at the north-east, which separate in coming out of Frederick; and the turn-pike, already mentioned, which at Gettysburg branches off from the first to the eastward to form a junction with the second at York. These roads are intersected almost perpendicularly by a large number of other roads, forming something like the radius of a sector whose arc is the railroad of Cumberland Valley, with Baltimore for its centre. All the roads in which we are now interested start from Westminster. In 1863 this village formed the extremity of a branch railroad running from Baltimore as far as the foot of the hills of which we have spoken. The various roads starting from this point form each a connection with one of the South Mountain passes: the one running farthest south, by way of New Windsor and Frederick, reaches Crampton's Gap; the next one, by way of Union, Middleburg, and Mechanicstown, the pass of Cavetown; the third, by way of Frizzellburg, Taneytown, and Emmettsburg, that of Waynesboro'; finally, the last, passing by Littlestown, Two Taverns, and Gettysburg, crosses the mountains west of Cashtown and descends toward Chambersburg by way of Greenwood and Fayetteville. A glance at the map will show much better than this explanation that the two centres of communication in this valley are Gettysburg and Westminster: each of these two villages forms the terminus of a railway line, and the former, besides the roads already enumerated, possesses four or five others of less importance, which lead to Hanover at the eastward, south-westward to Fairfield, north-westward to Mummasburg, and thence to Shippensburg by way of the mountain, and north-eastward to Hunterstown. The town of Gettysburg, as we have shown, is situated almost at the dividing-point between the waters of the Susquehanna and those of the Potomac, but



it still belongs to the basin of the latter river. The small streams of Rock Creek and Marsh Creek, which flow from north to south within a few miles west and east of the town, unite to form one of the branches of the Monocacy; a third is the Big Pipe Creek, which, descending from the Manchester hills, passing between Taneytown and Frizzellburg and watering Middleburg, flows west-south-west as far as its confluence with Marsh Creek. The rich valley which is intersected by so many roads presents at the centre a compact layer of fertile land; on approaching South Mountain one finds an undulating ground with a substratum of slate, the roughness of which has been smoothed away by the action of time. Still nearer the mountain, along a line which passes by Emmetsburg and Gettysburg, there rises a long range of ridges running parallel with the general direction of the chain. The very hard rocks of which they are composed, having resisted the ravages of time better than the slaty material which was their original covering, form a series of groups of abrupt ridges and isolated peaks which frequently assume the most fantastic shapes, and present alternately, as in the vicinity of Gettysburg, actual strongholds constructed by Nature, or, as at Emmetsburg, a confused mixture, a veritable chaos, of natural ruins.

When Meade assumed command, his first idea, while waiting for the enemy's intentions to be more clearly developed, was to prevent him from crossing the Susquehanna and marching upon Baltimore. With this view he put his troops on the march in three columns, pursuing divergent routes. The army was thereby to be so distributed as to be able to deploy rapidly along the line from Westminster to Waynesboro', and hold the whole breadth of the valley by resting on South Mountain on the left, whose passes it would guard, and with the right on the hills, across which it would communicate with Baltimore and Washington. Two forced marches, which left too many stragglers behind, brought him into these positions, some of which were only occupied late in the evening of the 30th of June.

The left column,\* under Reynolds, was composed of the First

\* By the change of front executed after leaving the line of the Rappahannock the right wing of the army, under Reynolds, had become the left wing.—ED.



and Eleventh corps: the former reached Emmettsburg on the 29th, and encamped the next day a few miles beyond the Gettysburg road on Marsh Creek, while the Eleventh took its place at Emmettsburg. The Third and Twelfth army corps formed the central column: the latter established itself, with general headquarters, at Taneytown; the former, leaving this point in the afternoon of the 30th, on receiving intelligence of the appearance of the enemy at Fairfield turned round to the left and proceeded to take position near Emmettsburg, in order to strengthen the wing commanded by Reynolds. Finally, the Second, Fifth, and Sixth army corps, composing the right, encamped at Frizzellburg, Union, and New Windsor: the long distance they had to travel not allowing the two last-mentioned corps to strike the road from Westminster to Waynesboro', this wing found itself a little out of range. Gregg's division of cavalry, which was to clear the way, was not even able to reach the first of these last two villages, through which, as we have stated, Stuart had passed the day before.

Meade's plan being once adopted, these dispositions were wise; but it is difficult to account for the instructions given by him to French, whom a strange caprice of Halleck had just restored to the Army of the Potomac with his eleven thousand men. It seems that a reinforcement of so much importance should have been immediately incorporated into this army: Meade did not decide either to take it with him or to leave it at Harper's Ferry. He ordered French to evacuate this position, to send all the material found in it, with four thousand men as escort, to Washington, and to plant himself with his other seven thousand men at Frederick. This half measure was a great mistake: if its object was to avoid displeasing Halleck, it was taken in vain, for the evacuation of Harper's Ferry caused much excitement at Washington, and deprived the Army of the Potomac of a fine division which might have played an important rôle on the field of battle.\*

Pleasanton had distributed his cavalry very judiciously for the purpose of covering the movement of the army and clearing it on all sides, without following Stuart's example, who, through

\* For instructions from Meade to French relative to the movements of the latter, see despatches of June 29 and July 1, in Addenda, by ED.

his indiscreet zeal, had put it out of his power to render the same service to his chief. It has been stated that Meade wished Pleasonton to undertake an expedition of the same character, and that the latter had pointed out its dangers: if such was the case, he had no great difficulty in persuading him. His real merit consisted in handling his cavalry during the few days intervening between the passage of the Potomac and the close of the battle of Gettysburg with a degree of skill, foresight, and decision which contributed largely to the victory of the Federals.

Whilst Gregg was bearing to the right, and Kilpatrick performing the double task of keeping Stuart at the east and clearing the advance, Pleasonton had placed Buford's division on his left. It was the strongest of the three, and its chief, a thorough soldier, justly inspired it with entire confidence. Kilpatrick, as we have stated, after having pushed rapidly as far as Littlestown on the 29th, had on the 30th remained at Hanover, the scene of the bloody combat he had fought with Stuart. Buford, on his part, after having sent General Merritt, with his new command (the regular cavalry brigade) to watch the outlet of the Hagerstown road in the valley of the Monocacy at Mechanicstown, made a bold dash along the western slope of South Mountain in order to ascertain if the enemy had lingered on the borders of the Antietam on the left flank of the Army of the Potomac. Leaving Middletown\* at daybreak on the 29th, and descending toward Boonesboro', he followed the range of the mountains in a northerly direction as far as Waynesboro', and, crossing them again at the Monterey defile without having encountered the enemy, halted at Fountain Dale, situated halfway. It was scarcely dark when this vigilant chief perceived in the distance, along the Fairfield road, the bivouac-fires of a hostile body of troops, probably Davis' brigade of Heth's division. Before daylight on the 30th he bore down upon Fairfield for the purpose of attacking it, but after a few shots he became convinced that he could not accomplish his object without artillery; and while the enemy was falling back toward the north, Buford, not daring to engage in an artillery-fight whose echoes might arouse the Confederate

\* With Gamble's and Devin's brigades.—Ed.

columns, left the direct Gettysburg road, and, following his instructions, overtook Pleasonton\* at Emmettsburg.

Several indications made the latter believe that the enemy was preparing a movement against the Army of the Potomac, and being aware that it was to push its left wing as far as Gettysburg the next day, he could not allow the Confederates to establish themselves in the place. He therefore ordered Buford to repair speedily to that city, take possession of it, and maintain himself in it until the arrival of the First corps. This order was executed in the afternoon. On reaching Gettysburg, Buford learned that a brigade of the enemy, coming from Cash-town, had appeared in front of the place one hour before him, but that at his approach it had suddenly retired in the same direction.

Information of a somewhat vague character gathered by Meade seemed to show that for the last two days Ewell had made no farther advance northward, and that the rest of the Southern army lay between Chambersburg and Cashtown. The speedy retreat of the enemy corroborated this intelligence in the mind of the general-in-chief, leading him to think that Lee, apprised of his movement, was about to give up the invasion in order to devote his attention exclusively to the Army of the Potomac. He did not know, however, upon which of the mountain-slopes, and with what intentions, Lee was going to concentrate his forces. Buford's encounter seemed of itself to indicate that this concentration would take place on the eastern slope. From this moment, thinking that Harrisburg and Philadelphia were no longer in danger, and that the first object of his rapid march northward was consequently attained, he determined not to manœuvre any further except in preparing for the battle which was thenceforth inevitable. His troops were tired; some army corps of new formation had been unable to keep up with the pace of the soldiers experienced in marching for the last year or two; the regular supplies had failed in consequence of the interruption of travel on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad; it was necessary to re-establish communications with Baltimore, first by

\* Reynolds.—Ed.

the Westminster line, then by that of Hanover. For all these reasons combined, Meade decided upon continuing to advance slowly until he was fully posted in regard to the designs of the enemy, and, in case the latter should come to meet him, to take a defensive position which might secure him all tactical advantages in the fight, either by speedily concentrating his forces upon the point most menaced, or by bringing his columns one day's march to the rear. His marching-orders were issued to this effect on the evening of June 30th, to be executed the following day at daybreak. They directed Reynolds to proceed with the left column to Gettysburg, making the First corps occupy this village, while the Eleventh remained somewhat in the rear, leaving the Third at Emmettsburg for the purpose of covering his rear along the Greencastle road. The Twelfth, which alone has remained in the centre at Taneytown, is to march toward Two Taverns in order to connect Reynolds with the right, whilst the Second will leave Frizzellburg to form, in conjunction with the latter, the central column, and relieve him at Taneytown. Finally, the Fifth and Sixth have each a long march to perform—the one from Union to Hanover, where it will form the first line on the right; the other from New Windsor to Manchester, where it will occupy the second line, within supporting-distance of the latter. The army will thus present a broken line to the enemy—who may be stationed either west or north—facing in both these directions, the upper part of the angle resting upon Gettysburg. The position of the roads converging upon this town makes it especially the capital point of this line, and Meade has very judiciously stationed three army corps out of seven in the neighborhood. This movement, however, is only ordered as a new step in the advance which he is pursuing cautiously, intending to push as far as the Susquehanna if necessary. He does not know at this hour that the larger portion of Lee's army has crossed South Mountain, and if he occupies Gettysburg it is not with the intention of blocking the principal outlets along the eastern slope of this chain against him. In fact, foreseeing the possibility of the enemy coming to attack him on this slope, he advises Reynolds to assemble all his forces



either at Gettysburg or at Emmettsburg, in order to delay his march ; but he holds himself ready, by a rapid concentration in the rear, to take a position, selected in advance, which will enable him to cover Washington and Baltimore, and to wait steadily for the assaults of the Confederate army. The occupation of Emmettsburg, Gettysburg, and Hanover has no other object but to cover this concentration and to detain the enemy until it is accomplished. The position thus selected extends along the left bank of Pipe Creek from Manchester to Middleburg. Having no knowledge of the topographic details of the country, nor of the remarkable position to which chance was about to lead him at Gettysburg, he makes a judicious choice upon a simple examination of the map.

On the morning of the 1st of July he addressed detailed instructions to his corps commanders, indicating the positions they were to take along Pipe Creek in case circumstances should oblige him to remain on the defensive. Some of them objected to this backward movement on the first encounter with the enemy, alleging that it might have the effect of demoralizing the soldiers ; others, with more plausibility, remarked that the position was too exclusively defensive, that Lee would certainly not come in search of the Army of the Potomac, and that the only way to compel Lee to fight an aggressive battle was to throw themselves boldly across his path. The fortune of war cut short all these discussions by bringing the two combatants into a field which neither of them had chosen.

We will therefore leave the various Federal columns which on the 1st of July were occupied in executing the movements that had been prescribed to them, in order to show what were the movements of the Confederate army at the same time. We have mentioned the positions it occupied during the 28th. In the evening a spy brought Longstreet news of the passage of the Potomac by the enemy's army : it was the first intelligence the Confederates had received of such an important movement executed behind them during the last two days. Lee, knowing nothing of Stuart's imprudent venture, believed him to be still occupied in watching Hooker, and concluded from his silence that the latter had not stirred since the battle of Ashby's Gap.

The presence of the Federal army in the valley of the Monocacy cut short his invading march northward: he understood, as well as his adversary, the danger to which he was exposed if this army crossed South Mountain to fall upon his rear in the Cumberland Valley and cut him off from Virginia. Ewell, being already near the banks of the Susquehanna, could not come back quick enough to defend his communications directly. He adopted a course which was both daring and wise (the merit of which Longstreet in his report arrogated to himself), and decided either to forestall or to impede this manœuvre of the enemy by crossing the eastern slope of the mountain himself. In this way he menaced Baltimore, and even Washington, by way of the north, making it impossible for the Federals to move westward away from their capital, and obliging them to come back to defend the communications of the latter city with the free States. The Army of the Potomac being once brought back in pursuit of him, he hoped to be able to draw it northward behind him, and probably not be obliged to fight it except within sight of Philadelphia. Therefore, on the 29th, just as Meade was taking up his line of march, he ordered his several army corps to assemble between Cashtown and Gettysburg.

An examination of the map will show that this latter town, being at about an equal distance from York, Chambersburg, and Carlisle, and located at the intersection of nearly all the roads traversing South Mountain, was the point around which the Confederate army would naturally concentrate itself. It presented, it is true, the serious inconvenience of being outside of the territory the army then occupied, but this inconvenience was the almost inevitable consequence of the relative positions of the two armies. Indeed, the Confederates in pushing their invasion northward almost turned their backs upon their adversaries, and consequently, if they faced about in order to concentrate by getting near their base of operations, they were forcibly taken out of this territory. Besides, Lee, not knowing the direction that Meade had just given to his columns, could not foresee that the latter was going to Gettysburg for the precise purpose of intercepting the road from Chambersburg to York. Early had passed over it two days before without encountering any serious resistance; con-

sequently, the general-in-chief, attaching no importance at that time to the occupation of this town, gave no positive instructions to his generals in regard to the matter: intending to concentrate his forces a little nearer the mountains, he gave them no precise directions either for taking possession of it or to come to a halt before reaching the place. Lee's instructions reached Ewell early on the 29th, just as he was preparing to attack Harrisburg. In order to gather all his troops in front of the capital of Pennsylvania, he had called Early back to Carlisle; and the latter, promptly obeying orders, encamped on the 30th about three miles east of Heidlersburg. A fortunate chance made him fall in with his chief, who had arrived with Rodes' division, near this village. This and Johnson's division had started on the 29th for the purpose of reaching the neighborhood of Cashtown and Gettysburg in pursuance of instructions from the general-in-chief: while the former marched directly southward, leaving South Mountain on the right, the latter was retracing its steps along the Cumberland Valley from Carlisle to the vicinity of Chambersburg, and, turning to the left at Green Village, halted on the evening of the 30th not far from Scotland, at the foot of the western slope of the mountain, on a road connecting with the Gettysburg turnpike at the entrance of the Cashtown defile. Johnson intended to cross this defile the next morning, in order to join the remainder of the Second corps near the sources of the Monocacy.

The movements prescribed to the rest of the army were much slower. The whole of Longstreet's corps being at Chambersburg, and Hill's a few miles farther east, near Fayetteville, Lee determined to make both of them debouch through the same pass upon Cashtown and Gettysburg by placing them *en échelon* along the road which Johnson was looking for on his side. In order to avoid throwing this enormous column of more than sixty thousand men into confusion, it was necessary to regulate and shorten the stages of the march, and to advance with the greater precaution because there was not a single regiment of cavalry left to clear the march. Heth's division of Hill's corps took the lead, and encamped at Cashtown on the 29th; on the 30th, Heth ordered Pettigrew's brigade to push on as far as Gettysburg, in order to make a requisition for shoes, of which, it was said,



this town still possessed large supplies, notwithstanding Ewell's recent visit.

This brigade, having no suspicion of the proximity of the Federals, was about to enter the place with the numerous wagons that followed in its wake, and was preparing quietly to take possession of it, when its scouts signalled the approach of Buford's column. The latter, after the interruption to his march, as we have seen, had quickened the pace of his horses in order to make up for lost time, and entered Gettysburg before eleven o'clock in the morning. Pettigrew had not looked for him: surprised at this unexpected encounter, ignorant of the enemy's forces, and finding himself too much exposed eight miles away from the rest of his division, he fell back upon Marsh Creek, halfway to Cashtown. He halted his troops near this stream, and hastened to apprise his chiefs of the presence of the enemy in Gettysburg; so that the two parties, which had an equal interest in being first to take possession of this town, had successively neglected to do so during the morning of the 30th of June; but, thanks to Buford's promptness, the Federals still retained the advantage. Pettigrew's forces were too small numerically for him to take advantage of his position on Marsh Creek and attack the Union cavalry at Gettysburg without waiting for the arrival of Heth's division, which had remained at Cashtown.

Pender, on his part, had reached this village during the evening of the 30th. Anderson, who was following him, did not arrive till the next day. Finally, Longstreet, leaving Pickett's division at Chambersburg, made a march with the other two, and halted at Greenwood at the entrance of the mountains. The march of the column, therefore, had been very slow, and on the evening of the 30th, forty-eight hours after Lee had determined upon his movement, he was not yet master of the point of concentration he had chosen. It was even a strange circumstance, at variance with his instructions, which put on the march the troops that were to dispute the possession of the place with the Federals. In fact, General Hill, having received Pettigrew's report, understood at once that the latter had encountered a mounted advance-guard, not infantry troops, and thought it would be easy to dislodge it. Being obliged, on the one hand, in the absence of



Stuart, to employ infantry to clear his march, and desirous, on the other hand, to secure the distribution of shoes to his men, of which they stood so much in want, he ordered Heth to march upon Gettysburg at daybreak on the 1st of July with his whole division—a remarkable instance of the influence which the most trifling incidents frequently exercise over the fate of war. Lee, in his turn, as soon as he was informed of the presence at Gettysburg of Meade's cavalry in force, without suspecting as yet that he was going to encounter his infantry there, felt the importance of this point. He ordered Hill with his Second division, under Pender, and the eight batteries of the Third corps, to follow Heth. Anderson, Hood, and McLaws, posted *en échelon* behind him, were directed to follow his movement. Ewell, on his part, knowing Hill to be at Cashtown, and not having been informed in time of the movement of his entire corps upon Gettysburg, led his columns, according to the instructions he had received on the 29th, toward the first mentioned of these two villages. Rodes took the most direct route, while Early was ordered to make a *détour* south-eastward, in order to strike a road passing by Hunterstown and Mummasburg, a village situated only about five miles north of Gettysburg. With regard to Johnson, separated from his chief by the massive proportions of the mountains, he could not receive his instructions; and, besides, he had no choice as to the route to be followed: he had to come to Greenwood to take his place in the rear of the rest of the army along the turnpike. Ewell bitterly regretted the *détour* he had caused it to make in order to reach this route, instead of taking it along with him over the eastern slope of the mountains. He would thus have reached the battlefield half a day's march sooner, in time to decide the victory.

This summary, which the reader may find somewhat long, was necessary to show how the two armies, each marching in ignorance of the movements of the other, both suddenly changing their direction, while their cavalry crossed their paths, alternately missing each other or meeting unexpectedly, had finally on the 1st of July taken a direction which brought them face to face at Gettysburg. The recital of the battle they are about to fight will form the subject of the next two chapters. Before closing the present

one we will mention in a few words what was done during those few days by the detachments of Federal troops which, without belonging directly to the Army of the Potomac, were nevertheless within its sphere of action.

We left General Couch at Harrisburg, busy in preparing, to the best of his ability, for the defence of that city, and endeavoring, with the aid of another general whose name is equally familiar to us (W. F. Smith), to organize the Pennsylvania militia. He did not pretend to oppose the march of the Confederates with these troops, but by pressing them and watching them closely wherever they went he could, without ever being drawn into a fight, keep the run of their movements and furnish the Federal authorities with valuable information. This is what he did. On the 29th he apprised Halleck of the time when the stoppage in Ewell's march occurred; on the morning of the 30th, as soon as the latter had commenced his backward movement, he also sent word to the authorities at Washington, and despatched Smith at the same time in pursuit with all the cavalry he could muster. It is this detachment, following Ewell's track, which had just occupied Carlisle when Stuart made his appearance before that city on the 1st of July. Through his firmness and excellent defensive arrangement Smith succeeded in organizing a resistance which, as we have stated, deceived the Confederate general: after having withstood the fire of the enemy's artillery without being able to reply to it, he managed with his raw troops to hold the *élite* of the Southern cavalry in check.

The communications between Halleck and Meade, frequently interrupted by Stuart, were often slow and difficult; nevertheless, on the evening of the 30th the chief of the Army of the Potomac received the first intelligence of Ewell's movement. Chambersburg was mentioned as the probable point of concentration of the Confederates. Upon this information, Meade, thinking that they would assemble west of South Mountain, made all his arrangements for the 1st of July. In the mean time, a director of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, Mr. Scott, who subsequently became Assistant Secretary of War,\* and who had organized a

\* Thomas A. Scott was appointed Assistant Secretary of War by Secretary Cameron in 1861.—ED.

thorough system for gaining information in the country occupied by the Confederates, told Couch on the night of the 30th that they were concentrating on Gettysburg instead of Chambersburg. It was impossible to be more promptly or more correctly informed. Unfortunately, this intelligence, forwarded by a courier from Frederick, did not reach Meade until the evening of the 1st, when it was no longer of any value, for the events of that day had but too clearly revealed the intentions of the enemy.

While preparations were thus being made for the decisive conflict in Pennsylvania, and all the forces that the Federals were able to raise north of the Potomac were at last animated by a common impulse, and while French himself, abandoning Harper's Ferry on the 30th with all its garrison,\* was proceeding toward Frederick to take an active part in Meade's operations, the troops that Halleck had so improperly left in the peninsula of Virginia had likewise taken the field. The Fourth army corps, assembled at Yorktown and Williamsburg under Keyes, was transported by water about the 20th of June to White House, where a brigade of cavalry had preceded it by land. The instructions given to Keyes directed him to start from this point for the purpose of cutting the railroads running from Richmond northward, and to menace the enemy's capital. Many people had hoped that by a bold stroke the Fourth army corps might be placed in possession of this city. The Confederate government had sent all the troops it could dispose of to Lee, reducing those which guarded the capital and the coast to a figure which, compared with the garrison of Washington, was indeed insignificant, but less so than the clamors of the inhabitants of Richmond had led the Federals to suppose. Only three brigades had been left in North Carolina: Clingman at Washington, Colquitt at Kinston, and Martin at Weldon. But five brigades were stationed at Richmond and in its vicinity: Ransom and Jenkins, at the south, extended their lines as far as Petersburg; Wise and Cook along the suburbs of the city; finally, Corse at Hanover Junction. It is true that on the 24th the latter was

\* French moved to Frederick with only two brigades (Kenly's and Morris'), while the others (Elliott's and Smith's) guarded the *matériel* taken from the fortifications of Maryland Heights to Washington.—Ed.

sent to Gordonsville, leaving only one regiment behind him ; but notwithstanding his departure the Confederates could yet muster eight or nine thousand men in the works which surrounded the capital : it was more than was necessary to protect it from any sudden attack.

On the 25th, Colonel Spear was sent by Keyes, with about one thousand cavalry, to destroy the railroad-bridge over the South Anna near Hanover, to which allusion has already frequently been made. Crossing the river by fording, he attacked at once, on both sides, the regiment that Corse had left to guard the crossing : dispersing it, after having inflicted upon it some heavy losses, he burned the bridge and returned to White House on the 28th. This operation, well conducted, but without any importance, inasmuch as Lee was no longer at Fredericksburg or Culpeper at the end of the railroad line, was the only incident of the campaign. After Spear's return Keyes despatched General Getty on the 1st of July, with eight thousand men, to Hanover Court-house, and on the same day he started himself, with five thousand, in the direction of Richmond as far as Baltimore Cross-roads. But these two columns advanced very cautiously. While the city of Richmond was in a state of excitement, Keyes, after a skirmish in which he lost about twenty men, seeing the uselessness of the campaign he had been made to undertake, fell back upon White House on the 3d. Here he found Getty, whose venture had been productive of no other result than the capture of the Confederate general W. H. F. Lee, wounded at Brandy Station, in a farm-house where he was being cared for. After this expedition the Federal government did at last what it should have done before : the largest portion of the Fourth army corps was incorporated with the Army of the Potomac.



## CHAPTER III.

### OAK HILL.

ON the 1st of July, 1863, the whole Southern army, as we have seen, was on the march since morning to concentrate itself at Gettysburg. Ewell, who had at first proceeded in the direction of Cashtown by cross-roads, having learned that Hill was going beyond this village, immediately took the direct roads converging upon Gettysburg, where he intended to assist the Third corps. Lee's army, which had been divided for the last eight days, was then about to be massed, either on that or the next day, east of South Mountain, thus menacing Baltimore and Washington: its chief relied upon this demonstration to bring back the Army of the Potomac, which he believed to be yet at a considerable distance in pursuit of him, and oblige it to attack him in a defensive position which he thought he had ample time to select and occupy. It is stated that he had assured his lieutenants that he should not take the offensive on the field of battle.

The Federal army was arrayed *en échelon* at greater distances, and Meade, equally desirous of securing the advantages of a defensive position, held himself ready to assemble it by a concentrating movement in the rear; but, whatever might have been his final determination, it was necessary for him to occupy Gettysburg, either for the purpose of covering this movement or for advancing. We have seen that his cavalry, forestalling the enemy, had established itself in this village on the previous evening, while the First and Eleventh army corps, starting at the same hour with Hill's and Ewell's soldiers, were marching, like them, toward this point. Fortunately, being fully acquainted with the character of his former comrades, who had become

his subordinates within the last three days, Meade entrusted the task of clearing and directing his left to two men equally noted for quickness of perception, promptness of decision, and gallantry on the battlefield—Buford and Reynolds. So that, by one of those singular chances which play so important a part in war, at the very moment when the Southern general, believing that he was mustering his army at a considerable distance from the enemy, had selected for this purpose a point which one of his army corps had just crossed without difficulty, this point was precisely the one selected by his adversary, while the latter, who did not wish to expose himself to the dangers of a concentration in front of his lines, had so conducted the march of his troops that his left wing was about to rush unexpectedly against the heads of column of the whole Confederate army.

The end of June had been rainy, with frequent storms, which, while imparting the freshness of spring to the leaves of the forest and the grass of the meadows, had at the same time broken up the roads over which the combatants of both armies were marching in close column. Before bringing them face to face in hostile array we will leave them for a while, pursuing their way with the carelessness of the soldier, who is too familiar with the multitudinous risks of war to ponder over them, and devote a few lines to the description of the surroundings of Gettysburg, a rich and beautiful country, whose atmosphere at this early morning hour was so strongly surcharged with warm vapors that the sun found it difficult to dispel them, while its slanting rays, piercing through heavy, opaque clouds, flashed over the long and solid wall of South Mountain, a lofty barrier which shuts out the whole horizon at the west.

The irregularities of the ground, as we had occasion to remark in regard to the entire region of country adjoining this chain, are due to the prevalence of rocky ridges lying parallel to its general direction, sometimes emerging from the soil in steep, ragged notches resembling ruined castles or fantastic pyramids. A hard-working population settled upon this fertile land has almost entirely cleared it, so that the woods, much more scarce than in Maryland, and the rocks, less numerous than at Emmetsburg, only constitute isolated points of support in the

centre of a territory adapted for deploying armies and the evolutions of artillery.

The streams which traverse this section of country were at this season altogether insignificant. The principal ones, Willoughby Run and Rock Creek, pursue a parallel course from north to south, one west and the other east of Gettysburg, emptying themselves lower down into Marsh Creek. The banks of these two resemble each other. Covered with woods, those of Rock Creek, as its name implies, are bristling with rocks, which, rising as high as one hundred and twenty, and even one hundred and fifty feet, above its bed, have prevented the woods from being cleared. Those of Willoughby Run are not so high nor so steep, and are less wooded. The battlefield is comprised between the right bank of the former and the left bank of the latter. The hills that are met on this ground may be divided into two groups, disposed in analogous fashion, whose formation reveals a geological law which is common to the whole section of this country. Each group forms a combination of three ridges starting from a common point, alike in elevation and abruptness. The central ridge, the highest and longest, follows a southerly direction; another, equally straight, but less elevated, south-south-westward; the third, extending east-south-eastward, is short, and split into two sections, as if, by the general direction in the upheaving of the ground, it had been thwarted in its formation. The starting-point of the first group is a ridge situated one and a quarter miles north-west of Gettysburg, in the direction of Mummasburg, called Oak Hill, on account of the thick forest of oaks which covered it. Its central ridge is about two miles long and very narrow, with considerable elevation for two-thirds of that distance, being throughout interspersed with small woods, farms, and country-houses. Among these habitations there is a Lutheran seminary (which has given it the appellation of Seminary Hill), the belfry of which, located on the culminating-point, overlooks the whole surrounding country. The south-western ridge is, at first, only separated from the one last mentioned by a narrow strip of land which deepens in proportion as they diverge. It borders the course of Willoughby Run. The third consists of several round hillocks which grad-

ually decrease in size as far as Rock Creek. Amid the vast cultivated fields covering these hillocks there may be seen a few farm-houses, the Crawford farm-house among the rest, and at six hundred feet from Rock Creek the almshouse. The second group is situated south-east of the first; its starting-point is twenty-eight hundred yards from Oak Hill. It was well known before the battle by the name of Cemetery Hill, on account of the cemetery which crowns the summit, as if in advance, by some ominous forethought, it had been placed there upon a point where so many victims were to perish at once. This rock-girded pinnacle rises abruptly about eighty feet above a large valley which is watered by Stevens' Run, a small stream that flows from west to east and connects with Rock Creek after having wound around the foot of the hillock occupied by the Crawford farm-house. The small town of Gettysburg is situated in this valley on the south side of Stevens' Run, and its streets, lined with houses behind which some fine orchards are seen stretching out, rise in gentle acclivities to the base of Cemetery Hill. The principal ridge, which starts from this point with a southerly direction, soon decreases in size; the rocks disappear; the slopes, bare at the west, became less rugged on this side: at the east, on the contrary, the bed of Rock Creek deepens still more rapidly between declivities that are covered with thick forests. At a distance of sixteen hundred yards from the extremity of Cemetery Hill the line of elevation has lessened by about twenty yards; then it rises again to the length of two-thirds of a mile, to terminate at last in the shape of two hills with bold outlines which proudly command all the neighboring localities, and whose fantastic rocks seem, from a distance, absolutely inaccessible to man. That farthest south, which is the highest, rises to a height of not less than two hundred and ten feet above Gettysburg; it is known by the name of Round Top; the other called Little Round Top, separated from the first by a distance of five hundred and fifty yards, is less in height by one hundred and five feet. Both of them, connected by a narrow defile, form at the west a declivity, at the foot of which flows a small marshy stream, Plum Run, whose bed is more than three hundred feet below the summit of Round Top. The opposite



bank of this stream, although not so high, is as wild and steep as the sides of the Round Tops, and the colonists, jealous, no doubt, of the legends of the mother-country, in the middle of the eighteenth century gave the name of Devil's Den to one of the numerous caverns that are to be found there. On both sides a strong vegetation, which derives its sustenance from the fertile soil that is fed by the decomposition of syenite rocks, penetrates through the blocks of stone that are piled up in every direction, while gnarled and knotty oaks cover the irregularities of the ground with their thick foliage. This wood extends westward as far as the undulating plateau, where it stretches out, zigzag fashion, to the very centre of the cultivated fields. The eastern ridge, very short, as in the other group, and terminating likewise on the banks of Rock Creek at a distance of about seventeen hundred yards south of the almshouse, presents the same features as the heights of the Round Tops. It is a ridge which, possessing steep acclivities at the north, connects Cemetery Hill with the wood-covered rocks of Culp's Hill, then, suddenly decreasing in altitude without losing any of its steepness, inclines toward the south by following the course of Rock Creek, which the equally wooded slopes of Wolf's Hill command from the opposite side. A large gap separates Culp's Hill from an eminence situated two-thirds of a mile farther south, called Power's Hill. The third ridge, still resembling that of the other group by its direction and paucity of elevation, detaches itself from the first at a distance of about five hundred and fifty yards from the central point, and pursuing a south-westerly course, gradually diminishes in size and spreads out like the latter. At about one thousand or fifteen hundred yards from this place these ridges are reduced to an almost imperceptible rise in the ground, the one at the west attaining a height of from forty to fifty feet, and the other from twenty to thirty, above the depression which separates them, and in which Plum Run takes its source. The first, therefore, commands the second for a distance of about seven or eight hundred yards; which is not enough, in an artillerist's point of view, to impart to it a tangible superiority in an open country. It is in the midst of these slight undulations that the link of connection between the two groups is to be found: the central section of the first,

which prolongs the ridge of Seminary Hill by its depression, becomes amalgamated with the eastern section of the second near the point where the latter has less elevation. Eight or nine hundred yards more to the south, at a point which has become historical under the name of Peach Orchard—which we will call “the Orchard”—the line of altitude turns suddenly westward, forming a slight gap, and at the end of four hundred yards pursues a southerly direction by following a narrow ridge almost entirely covered with woods, the eastern slope of which commands Wiloughby Run as far as its confluence with Marsh Creek.

The town of Gettysburg is naturally the centre of all the roads traversing this section of country. At the north three roads become separated even before having crossed Stevens' Run: the first, at the north-west, leads to Mummasburg by crossing the prolongation of Oak Hill ridge; the second, at the north, leads to Carlisle, leaving the almshouse on the right; the third, at the north-east, which passes in front of this institution and crosses Rock Creek shortly after, bears toward Harrisburg. The Hanover railroad approaches the town from the east, following the right bank of Stevens' Creek: it was not running beyond Gettysburg, but the work intended for its extension toward Chambersburg was progressing outside of the town, west-north-westward, intersecting, by means of deep trenches, the two ridges which descend from Oak Hill toward the south and south-west. Two roads also cross these two ridges: the first is the turnpike, which follows the unfinished railroad-track very closely; the other is a common cross-road, which at the west-south-west runs in the direction of Fairfield and Hagerstown, crossing Marsh Creek at the ford called Black Horse Tavern. The seminary stands between the two, above their dividing-line. As at the north and west, three roads start south and two east of Gettysburg. The latter are those of Hunterstown, north-eastward, and of Hanover, south-eastward, which Early had followed in his march upon York. The highways southward are, in the first place, the Baltimore turnpike, south-south-east, which on leaving Gettysburg ascends the summit of Cemetery Hill, leaving Culp's Hill on the left, and descends upon Rock Creek between the base of this hill and the slopes of Power's Hill; then, at the south, the

Taneytown road, which crosses the main section of the second group above Cemetery Hill, and follows halfway the eastern slope of this section, leaving the summits of the Round Tops on its right; finally, at the south-south-west, the Emmettsburg road, which follows precisely the line of elevation of the third ridge across vast cultivated fields only divided by fences, and interspersed with farms as far as the Orchard, where it pursues its original direction by crossing a ravine which connects with Plum Creek below Devil's Den.

This enumeration would not suffice to make the reader understand the importance which so many converging roads must have given to Gettysburg if we were not to add that in times of war in the United States the turnpikes play a rôle similar to that of the highways which traversed France and the Flemish provinces during the wars of the seventeenth century; in fact, the other roads, being miserably constructed and poorly kept, are not available for heavy transportation, and the macadamized highways—necessarily attract armies, which in order to move with rapidity are obliged to follow them; therefore, as we have seen, three of these highways—those of Chambersburg, Baltimore, and York—centred at Gettysburg.

Such is the ground upon which unforeseen circumstances were about to bring the two armies in hostile contact. Neither Meade nor Lee had any personal knowledge of it; and if, by examining the maps, they had some idea of the importance which the combination of ten roads and one railway imparted to Gettysburg, they had no information concerning the strong positions that Nature had created at will, as it were, all around this town. Ewell and Early, who had passed through it a few days before, do not appear to have made any report to their chief on the subject. Buford, who, when he arrived on the evening of the 30th, had guessed at one glance the advantage to be derived from these positions, did not have time to give a description of them to Meade and receive his instructions.

The unfailing indications to an officer of so much experience, however, revealed to Buford the approach of the enemy. Knowing that Reynolds was within supporting-distance of him, he boldly resolved to risk everything in order to allow the latter



time to reach Gettysburg in advance of the Confederate army. This first inspiration of a cavalry officer and a true soldier decided in every respect the fate of the campaign. It was Buford who selected the battlefield where the two armies were about to measure their strength: it must be granted that he was sure of the approbation of his two immediate commanders, both being animated by the same zeal which prompted his own action—Pleasanton, who had sent him from Emmetsburg to Gettysburg at the first news of the enemy's appearance on the Cashtown road, and Reynolds, whom he knew to be determined to provoke the conflict as soon as he should find an opportunity. Buford did not deceive himself in regard to the perils of his situation. The unexpected encounter he had with Pettigrew's brigade the day before in sight of Gettysburg, the information obtained from stragglers who had been left in his hands by the latter, convinced him that he stood in the presence not of detached parties, but of infantry columns of the enemy marching with the confidence imparted by superiority of numbers. It was easy to arrive at the conclusion that at least a large portion of the Confederate army was about to concentrate at Gettysburg. This is what made it at once so important and difficult for him to retain possession of this point with the two brigades of cavalry which constituted all his force. "Rest assured," he said in the evening to General Devin, who commanded one of his brigades, "that the enemy will attack us in the morning. Their skirmishers will come thundering along three lines deep, and we shall have to fight like devils to maintain ourselves until the arrival of the infantry."

It was with this forethought that Buford took advantage of the last hours of daylight to post his small force in such a manner as to conceal his weakness as much as possible. He had not at that time more than forty-two hundred mounted men with him: to cope with the enemy's infantry the latter had to be fought on foot, while the necessity of holding the horses by the bridle necessarily reduced by one-fourth his effective force on the battlefield. Disposing of his troops in a circular arc from west to north-east of Gettysburg, Gamble's brigade on the left, Devin's on the right, he pushed his scouts far ahead along all the roads the intersection of which he held. After having apprised Meade and Reynolds



of the dispositions he had made and of the supposed movements of the enemy, he waited for daylight, whose dawn was to mark the great battle for which preparations were being made on both sides.

His anticipations were soon realized, and from six o'clock in the morning his scouts along the Cashtown road reported the presence of the heads of column of Heth's division, which, after overtaking Pettigrew's brigade, was rapidly advancing upon Gettysburg. Buford hastened to make the final arrangements for the battle. Devin, having no one before him at the north, left only a few patrols on that side, and took position between the Mummasburg road and the railway-cut. Gamble, on his left, pushed his first line to the banks of Willoughby Run, extending his lines as far as the Hagerstown road; the reserve troops, dismounted like the rest and ready to take part in the combat, were massed along the ridge which descends from Oak Hill at the west, and consequently in advance of Seminary Hill. The mounted artillery which accompanies the division has taken a position so as to enfilade three roads: it opens fire a little before nine o'clock. Heth immediately deploys his two advance brigades, Davis' on the left and Archer's on the right, both of them south of the Chambersburg road. About eight o'clock in the morning this first line, preceded by a close column of skirmishers, openly descends the slopes of the right bank of Willoughby Run, confirming Buford's prediction by the vigor with which its attack is made. The Federal cavalry, well ambushed, reply by a well-sustained fire, which stops the assailants, making their leaders believe that they have an infantry corps to cope with. This is the first serious encounter of the two armies upon the soil of the free States. A murderous struggle takes place at once on the banks of the stream. The Union cavalry is less numerous than that of their adversaries, for they have to deal with two strong brigades; but they are as solid and determined, with carbine in hand, as well-trained infantry, while their artillery, perfectly well served, sustains them by means of a most effective fire. In the mean time, Buford, who is aware that Hill's whole corps has encamped at Cashtown, and who perceives in the distance the long columns of the enemy along the road, calculates with anx-

ity the length of time during which his small band may be able to check the march of the enemy. Fortunately, the latter has no idea of the immense advantages he might secure at a small cost by taking possession of the town of Gettysburg and the heights that command it before the arrival of the Federal infantry. Heth has been ordered by Lee not to press the enemy if he finds him in force, in order to give the other divisions time to come up: in view of the unexpected resistance he has encountered, he leaves Archer and Davis fighting with the Federals, unwilling to engage the rest of his division until Pender's troops are within supporting-distance of him. Buford, on his part, causes his last reserves to advance up to the first line, which is beginning to suffer seriously from the enemy's fire: he directs the fire of his artillery in person and encourages the combatants by his example, thus prolonging the struggle while preparing to lead back his small band to the natural citadel of Cemetery Hill whenever the conflict becomes too unequal. This moment is drawing near: A. P. Hill, although sick, has hastened forward at the sound of the cannon. Pender's column follows him close; the combat is about to assume a new aspect.

It is, however, at the very moment when the sacrifices made by Buford in order to preserve his position appear to be useless that he reaps the reward of his tenacity. Reynolds' soldiers have marched as rapidly as those of Hill, and the officer of the signal corps, who, stationed in the belfry of the seminary, turns his anxious looks from the Cashtown road, which is covered with hostile troops, to that of Emmetsburg, finally discovers in the distance a large column of infantry. In that direction none but friendly troops could be expected. Buford, having come up in full haste in order to verify this glorious news, which will preclude him from giving the order of retreat, has scarcely reached the observatory when he hears his name called by a well-known voice. It is Reynolds, who, having been informed of the enemy's attack half an hour before, proceeded in advance of his columns, and following the sound of battle has come at full gallop to bring the assurance of speedy relief to the Federal cavalry and its valiant chieftain. Wadsworth's division, encamped upon Marsh Creek, about five miles from Gettysburg, had been the

first to start at eight o'clock in the morning on receiving the news forwarded by Buford to Pleasonton the previous evening: the two other divisions of the First corps, commanded by Rowley and Robinson, got under way half an hour later, under the direction of Doubleday, making a forced march to join him. The Federal soldiers and their leaders are fired by extraordinary zeal: like Antæus, who gathered new strength whenever he touched the earth, it seems that the idea of fighting on the soil of the free States, in the midst of a friendly population threatened with a terrible invasion, doubles their energy and their activity. The hesitations, the delays, and the frequent discouragements which seemed to paralyze the best-conceived plans in Virginia have given place to a noble emulation which urges them to dispute with each other the honor of dealing the swiftest and heaviest blows to the enemy. Without taking any account of their numbers, Reynolds himself, notwithstanding the immense responsibility weighing upon him, gives them an example of this zeal by contributing more than any one else to inspire them with it. Sad and dejected, it is said, before the meeting of the two armies, he has become invigorated as soon as he has felt his proximity to the adversaries with whom he desired to come to blows since the opening of the campaign.

We have already mentioned what were Meade's intentions and the instructions he had sent to his lieutenants on the evening of the 30th. Before beginning a narrative which we shall not again be able to interrupt before the close of the day, we must say a word about the dispositions he made on the morning of the 1st of July, although they were speedily modified by subsequent events. The news of the encounter between Buford and Pettigrew's brigade at Gettysburg, which had been sent by the former on the evening of the 30th to Reynolds, his immediate chief, had not yet reached head-quarters. Buford in his despatch conveyed positive information regarding the positions of the enemy's three corps, which no longer admitted of any doubt that their concentration was to be effected at Gettysburg by way of the northern and western routes. The information his army had picked up to the present hour, and the advices which Couch had forwarded from Harrisburg, already clearly revealed to Meade the move-

ment by which Lee, collecting his scattered columns in the valley of the Susquehanna, was preparing to fight the Army of the Potomac; but the bloody conflict in which Stuart had just been engaged with Kilpatrick in the village of Hanover induced him to think that the concentration would take place in the district occupied by Ewell, north-east of Gettysburg, which would render it impossible for his army to sustain itself in this latter position. He felt, therefore, that the formidable adversary who had already so frequently snatched the victory from his predecessors was approaching him, without being able to guess on which side his blows would fall. Having only been invested with the supreme command within the last three days, he felt disposed to act with the utmost circumspection. He had already obtained an important result. Lee, had he been able to ignore the Army of the Potomac, would hitherto have preferred an aggressive campaign in the free States rather than a veritable invasion. Adopting the latter course, he now finds himself menaced by this army, and comes to a halt, forced to preserve on the field of battle the rôle of assailant which he had assumed in crossing the Potomac. Meade, extremely perplexed, feared that he had advanced too far by pushing his left to Gettysburg and his right to Hanover. He would not, however, countermand the movement already in progress, nor order a retrograde march for the morrow upon Baltimore. He confined himself, therefore, to the task of sending detailed instructions to his corps commanders regarding the manner of performing, as soon as he should order it, this march as far as the line of Pipe Creek. Believing the enemy to be far more distant than he was in reality, he thought that he had time to make his choice and to determine either upon a retrograde movement or an aggressive manœuvre. His despatch to Reynolds especially showed distinctly the state of uncertainty he was laboring under, manifesting at the same time the confidence he had in the judgment of his old comrade,\* to whom he allowed great latitude in the direction of the left wing. It is probable that Reynolds did not receive this last despatch, which was forwarded too late to

\* At the breaking out of the war Meade and Reynolds each commanded a brigade in McCall's division, where the author had the good fortune to make their acquaintance.



reach him before his departure from Marsh Creek. He had started, therefore, in compliance with the orders received the day previous. These orders directed him to station himself at Gettysburg or in its vicinity with the First and Eleventh corps, but contained no instructions as to what he should do in the presence of the enemy. Meade merely told him that he did not contemplate advancing beyond the positions indicated for the march of July 1st, and that he should wait for the movements of the enemy to determine his own. In view of the intelligence which Reynolds had received from Buford in the morning, these indications were no longer of any account to him, for it was evident that hostilities would commence at some point or other before Meade would be able to accomplish all the movements he had projected. But his cavalry was menaced on the very ground he had been formally ordered to occupy. All hesitation, therefore, was impossible for him: he must reach Gettysburg in advance of the Confederate column which had been reported by Buford, compel his adversaries to show their strength, and, if possible, preserve the important strategic position he had been ordered to occupy, until Meade should otherwise determine. It appears that on approaching Gettysburg he immediately noticed the magnificent position of Cemetery Hill, which has been described above: it could not, in fact, have escaped his trained military eye, and it may be that, on seeing it, he understood that by maintaining himself there he would secure for the Army of the Potomac the most favorable battlefield that it could have possibly desired. The confidence reposed in him by Meade and the absence of any positive instructions justified him in making the attempt. Although death did not allow him time to explain his views to his chief, we may be permitted to believe that this idea prompted the dispositions he adopted on his arrival.

It is three-quarters past nine: while rapidly descending the stairs of the belfry to go meet Reynolds, Buford cries out to him, "The devil is to pay;"—"But we can hold on till the arrival of the First corps;" and the two chieftains, starting at a gallop; rush into the midst of a shower of balls to revive the zeal of Gamble's men, who have been struggling on foot for the last hour and a half. Finding their position a good one, Reynolds sends

an order to Wadsworth's division to come up and relieve them. At the same time he sends a message to the other two divisions of the First corps, urging them to push forward, and also to Howard, who has left Emmettsburg with the Eleventh corps after the latter, requesting him not to stop on the road, as he had been directed, but to come and take position near them at Gettysburg.\* In a few hours two army corps will therefore be assembled at Gettysburg. In the mean time, the enemy must be imposed upon and held in check with the few troops that are already on the ground. The First division of the First corps, commanded by Wadsworth, following the direction that Reynolds had marked out before leaving it, has not entered Gettysburg. It has turned to the left, and at ten o'clock has ascended the eastern slope of Seminary Hill. Wadsworth, who at an advanced age had joined McDowell's staff as a volunteer, and whom we shall see fall gloriously in the Wilderness the following year, has acquired through practice some of the necessary qualities for the command he is exercising. Doubleday, to whom Reynolds has transferred the command of the First corps, and who in the course of this day will exhibit as much tenacity as presence of mind, has come to join him, leaving behind him the other two divisions, which are making a forced march. But Wadsworth has only two small brigades under him—one commanded by Cutler; the other, called the "Iron Brigade," by Meredith.

The Federal cavalry still occupy the slopes bordering Willoughby Run on the west between the two roads to Hagerstown and Cashtown: north of the latter they maintain their position on horseback along the cutting of the unfinished railroad, about fifty yards back of the stream, along the ridge which descends south-west of Oak Hill. This ridge, of which we have already spoken, and which will play an important part in the battle, extends far beyond the Hagerstown road: being entirely bare and only interspersed here and there with fences, it is not so

\* One of Reynolds' aides-de-camp, Captain Rosengarten, has even asserted that Reynolds had designated Cemetery Hill as the point which Howard was to occupy, but the latter has formally denied it, claiming all the honor of having selected this historical plateau for the purpose of placing there his reserves.

high as the ridge of Seminary Hill, and forms something like a first line of defence in advance of the latter, from which it is only separated by a strip of land sufficiently deep to afford shelter to reserves. There is but a single obstacle to be met with along its western slope: it is a small wood, triangularly shaped, whose base rests upon Willoughby Run, and rises, by following a slight depression in the ground, almost to the summit of the ridge, the extremity of which, on this side, is about one hundred yards south of the Cashtown road. It is called McPherson's Wood, after the name of the owner of the adjacent farm. The infantry has not a moment to lose, for, north of this road and the railway, Davis' Confederate brigade is advancing in good order, and its well-sustained fire is having a crushing effect upon the weak line of Federal skirmishers, who can find no shelter in this direction. South of the road Archer has crossed the stream with his brigade, the larger portion of which rushes into the wood in order to reach under its cover the summit of the slope it has to carry. Cutler's brigade is at the head of the Federal column. Reynolds leads it in person on the Cashtown road, which must be absolutely barred against the enemy, advising Doubleday to place Meredith's brigade, which is following the first, on the left, and to extend his line as far as the Hagerstown road. The division artillery, relieving Calef's mounted battery, takes a position along the Cashtown road, which it enfilades, while Cutler deploys his brigade to the right under the very fire of the enemy.\* The infantry finds itself engaged along the whole line even before it has got into position, for on the left Doubleday, understanding at a single glance the importance of the wood into which Archer has just penetrated, has ordered Meredith to take possession of it. This wood, in fact, if it remains in the hands of the assailants, gives them a foothold in the centre of the Union line, which it cuts in two; whereas if the Federals are masters of it they will find in it a point of support which, like a bastion, will flank this line both north and south. At the moment that Meredith

\* General Cutler, writing November 5, 1863, to the governor of Pennsylvania, accords the honor of the opening fire to the Fifty-sixth Pennsylvania infantry, Colonel J. Wm. Hofmann commanding, and requests that the fact be recorded in the archives of the State.—ED.

begins his attack, Reynolds, leaving to Wadsworth the task of leading the right, recrosses the road, and, seeing the extreme right of the Iron brigade approach the point of the wood, advances with its chief under the well-sustained fire of the enemy's skirmishers hidden in the bushes. While he is encouraging his soldiers by his own example, at a distance of less than sixty paces from the latter he is struck in the head by a ball, and expires without uttering a word.

Reynolds was undoubtedly the most remarkable man among all the officers that the Army of the Potomac saw fall on the battlefield during the four years of its existence; and Meade could say of him that he was the noblest and bravest of them all. A graduate of West Point, he had early distinguished himself in that Mexican army which was destined to become the nursery of staff officers both North and South. His former comrades, who had become either his colleagues or his adversaries, held him in the greatest estimation on account of his military talents, for under a cold exterior he concealed an ardent soul; and it was not the slowness, but rather the clearness, of his judgment that enabled him to preserve his coolness at the most critical moments. The confidence he inspired, alike in his inferiors, his equals, and his commanders, would no doubt soon have designated him for the command of one of the Union armies. It would have been a fortunate thing for the cause he was serving with devotion and earnestness without having ever sought to elicit appreciation of his merits. His untimely death—he was forty-three years old—was not without some benefit to that cause, for by making a vigorous fight in the battle which cost him his life he secured the possession of Cemetery Hill to the Army of the Potomac, against which the full tide of Southern invasion broke. We will cite, in conclusion, as the most beautiful homage paid to his character, the unanimous regrets of the inhabitants of Fredericksburg, of which town he had been the military governor, who, although passionately devoted to the cause of the South, mourned him as if he had been one of their own people.

Reynolds is struck at a quarter-past ten. Fortunately, the Federal soldiers, carried away by the excitement of battle, do not perceive the loss they have just sustained. Meredith has pushed



forward into the wood at the head of his first regiment, without even waiting for the rest; the latter follow him *en échelon*. His soldiers push forward with a dash which astonishes the Confederates, and, breaking their line, capture more than one thousand prisoners—among whom is General Archer himself—drive the remnants of the enemy's brigade beyond the stream, and, pushing these disorganized troops at the bayonet's point, plant themselves along the slopes bordering the opposite bank.

This is a brilliant beginning for the Federals, but this success is counterbalanced by the check which Cutler, at the same time, has just experienced at the other extremity of the line. In fact, Wadsworth has scarcely placed three regiments\* of this brigade to the right of the railroad, when the latter are obliged to sustain Davis' entire effort on ground, which, as we have stated, affords them no support at all. Consequently, in a very short space of time they are obliged to abandon the first line of the heights to Davis, and to fall back from two to three hundred yards on the main ridge which connects Oak Hill with Seminary Hill. They find shelter in a thick wood, which at this point covers the two acclivities of the ridge; their retreat, however, has been effected with so much haste that one of these regiments, the One-hundred-and-forty-seventh New York, which was nearest to the railway-cut, delayed by the death of its colonel,† finds itself almost surrounded; the other two regiments, the Fourteenth‡ and Ninety-fifth New York, which Reynolds had posted between the Cashtown road and the wood, remain isolated, while the battery stationed on the road cannot be withdrawn except by sacrificing one of its pieces. This retreat, however, does not stop here, and a portion of Cutler's soldiers are brought back to the rear, almost to the very outskirts of Gettysburg. Doubleday, on being informed of Reynolds' death, which throws all the responsibility of the command on his own shoulders, hastens in this direction in order to redeem the fortunes of the day. The Sixth Wisconsin, which has been left by Meredith in reserve at the seminary,

\* The Fifty-sixth Pennsylvania, Seventy-sixth and One-hundred-and-forty-seventh New York.—Ed.

† Lieutenant-colonel Francis C. Miller, commanding the One-hundred-and-forty-seventh New York, was severely wounded, not killed.—Ed.

‡ State militia (Fourteenth Brooklyn).—Ed.

eagerly rushes to the front, bears to the right, overtakes that portion of Cutler's brigade which has remained on the left of the railroad, and with the aid of a piece of artillery opens a murderous fire upon Davis' brigade. The latter, which is advancing in line against the wood where the Fourteenth and Ninety-fifth New York have taken refuge, is thrown into confusion by his enfilading fire. The Confederates try to front about to the right and cross the railway-track, in order to face this new enemy, but they are driven back into the cut, almost two entire regiments being surrounded and captured with their colors. This new success might have been still more complete if Cutler's whole brigade had remained within reach. However that may be, the *débris* of the One-hundred-and-forty-seventh New York are freed and the enemy driven back in the direction of Willoughby Run.

It is about eleven o'clock. The combined attacks of Davis and Archer have completely failed. These two brigades have lost more than one-half of their effective force. Heth has come to a halt in order to replace these vanquished troops with his two other brigades, under Pettigrew and Brockenbrough, which, being deployed to the right, have not, up to the present time, been much under fire. The energy of the Federals and the losses they have inflicted upon him have led him to exaggerate their numbers and to act with greater circumspection.

The Confederates are beginning to find out that their sudden attacks *en masse* are more dangerous and more difficult of execution along the open, hilly country of Pennsylvania than among the thickly-wooded settlements of Virginia, where they did not stand in dread of slanting fires. Doubleday avails himself of this respite to rectify and strengthen his line; Meredith, under the orders of the latter, resumes his position east of the stream, and occupies the edge of McPherson's Wood; Cutler is brought back by him to his former position, and he causes the division battery to be relieved by a mounted battery. He knows that the remainder of his corps is approaching, and impatiently waits its arrival.

Fortunately, while the Confederates are contenting themselves with a very fruitless cannonade, Doubleday, about half-past eleven o'clock, at last sees in the distance Rowley's and Robinson's divisions, each containing two brigades and presenting a total

of between five and six thousand men. For the purpose of reinforcing the line of battle, the first is divided and posted on both sides of the wood conquered by Meredith—Stone's brigade on the right, and Biddle's on the left, with a portion of the army corps' artillery. The other division remains in reserve near the seminary, around which it hastily digs a few trenches. The arrival of this reinforcement is opportune, for Heth will soon renew the attack, and this time with all his forces combined. While Brockenbrough is trying to outflank Biddle's right and to capture the Herbst farm, where the latter has stationed an advance detachment, Pettigrew, taking with him all that is left of Davis' brigade, makes an impetuous assault upon Stone's soldiers: the latter, recruited from among the sturdy lumbermen of the great forests of Pennsylvania, form one of the finest brigades in the Federal army, and are known by the name of "Bucktails," in consequence of the ornament appended to their caps. Animated by the idea that they are defending the soil of their native State, they all cry out with one accord in planting themselves in the position to which they have been assigned, "We have come to stay!" "And," adds General Doubleday while narrating this incident of the battle, "they kept their word; for the ground was an open one, the position extremely exposed, and a large number of them fell upon that spot, never to leave it again."

Their first check has deprived the Confederates of some of their daring, and after an hour's fighting they give up the idea of carrying the Unionists' positions. Hill has Pender's division of four brigades under his control, which, with Heth's other four, would secure him a considerable numerical superiority over the six brigades of the First Federal corps. He is supported by a formidable artillery, for, besides the two division battalions, he brings with him all his reserve pieces—ten batteries in all. The battle, however, has been brought on in so strange and unusual a manner that Hill, knowing nothing of the strength of his adversary and the designs of his chief, hesitates, no doubt, to bring all his troops into line, and merely concentrates the fire of his eighty guns upon the positions of the Federals, on whom he inflicts some heavy losses.

The latter, however, soon receive new reinforcements. Howard, with Barlow's division, has left Emmettsburg soon after the First corps, sending his other two divisions, under Schurz and Steinwehr, in order to expedite the movement, by way of the Taneytown road. On receipt of Reynolds' first message he ordered each of these divisions to press forward, and, following the example of those who have preceded him, he hastens to Gettysburg in person. At half-past eleven we find him on the top of one of the houses of the town observing the localities in order to select positions for his troops, when he hears of Reynolds' death, and finds himself by right of seniority called upon to succeed him in the command of all the forces assembled on the battlefield.

It was a heavy task for an officer who had not even yet made his appearance on that battlefield, and who possessed no information regarding the movements of the enemy and the preliminaries of the fight. But from his observatory he perceives a number of roads converging toward him from every point in the horizon, and may therefore arrive at the conclusion that these roads will soon be crowded with a large portion of Lee's army marching upon him, whilst no other corps from the Union army can, according to given orders, come to join him at Gettysburg. Seeing that the First corps keeps the enemy well in check, he very wisely allows Doubleday to complete the task in the performance of which he has been so successful up to this moment, and occupies himself with the measures to be taken in order to support him. He has no more hesitation than Buford and Reynolds regarding the necessity of defending Gettysburg as long as possible, and of bringing together for that purpose all the forces within reach. As Buford called upon Reynolds, and he upon Howard, so the latter calls in his turn upon Sickles, who is to reach Emmettsburg in the morning with the Third corps, and to stop there, for Reynolds has been killed before sending him any message, intending no doubt to have done so at a later period. Now urgent instructions are forwarded to the division commanders of the Eleventh corps, with a verbal report addressed to Meade. The combatants of the First corps are unacquainted with these details, but soon the occupant of the



observatory, precisely as he had signalled the opportune arrival of Reynolds, informs Buford of the approach of the Eleventh corps, the corps flags which bear its distinguishing mark having enabled him to recognize it with certainty. In fact, at a quarter before one Schurz enters Gettysburg with his division. Howard, who leaves him in command of the Eleventh corps, directs him to take this division, henceforth under the command of Schimmelpfennig, and Barlow's, by the Mummasburg road to the right of Doubleday, and to leave Steinwehr's division, with the corps' artillery, on the heights of Cemetery Hill.

But the approach of a new adversary does not allow Schurz to afford the assistance to the First corps which he was preparing to bring it. Devin's cavalry, who are clearing the roads at the north for a considerable distance, see looming in sight several columns of the enemy, but find it difficult to delay the march of their advance-guard. It is Rodes' division, which, after having marched during the morning in the direction of Cashtown, has received instructions from Hill at Middletown directing it to proceed to Gettysburg. This *détour* has caused Rodes to lose two precious hours. Ewell, who accompanies him, astonished at finding the enemy at Gettysburg, becomes still slower and more circumspect in his movements than Hill, and allows himself to be detained for a while by the Federal cavalry. He does not wish to be drawn fully into the fight before hearing from Early, whom he has directed to march upon Gettysburg from Heidlersburg. Nevertheless, at the first glance he has recognized the importance of the position of Oak Hill, and has directed Rodes to plant himself there. Nothing could have been more dangerous for the Unionists, and the arrival of Ewell by way of the northern routes, changing as it does all the conditions of the fight, is in no way compensated by the reinforcement which Howard has just brought upon the ground.

Two parallel ridges which intersect west of Gettysburg the Mummasburg, Cashtown, and Hagerstown roads offer, it is true, some excellent defensive positions against any enemy coming from that direction; and the number of combatants with which Hill attacks Doubleday might be doubled if Howard could hold them in check by extending his line to the right as far as the culminating height

of Oak Hill. But the roads followed by Ewell take the whole of this line precisely in flank and in the rear, and would lead him to Gettysburg in the rear of Doubleday while the latter would be engaged in front by Hill. In order to avoid this danger the two Federal corps should either be taken back to the rear of Gettysburg and led to the summit of Cemetery Hill, where they will present a formidable front on every side without the risk of being turned, or form a line sufficiently strong to stop Ewell before Gettysburg, and *en potence* above Doubleday. The first manœuvre would be premature, for Howard cannot yet foresee what forces he is about to encounter, and, knowing that Sickles is on the way to join him, he must try to maintain his position until the arrival of this important reinforcement. The second alternative does not yet occupy his mind, for at the moment when Rodes is preparing to take position on Oak Hill he is ignorant of the danger that threatens him on the north side, believing that he has only to cope with the troops that are fighting on Doubleday's right near the Cashtown road. Consequently, he has ordered Schurz to post Schimmelpfennig's division among the oak-coppices from which Oak Hill derives its name, and two batteries of artillery between this division and the extremity of the line of the First corps. As to Barlow, he no doubt intends to leave him on the second line, or place him on the right along the prolongation of Schimmelpfennig's line. After having taken his measures and addressed an urgent request for assistance to Slocum, he finally leaves the height on which he had tarried back of Gettysburg, and toward two o'clock visits the line formed by the First corps; but his only instructions consisted in recommending Doubleday to hold fast in his positions, assuring him that the Eleventh corps would take care to repulse all the attacks of the enemy on the right. This encouraging promise will not be so easily carried out as Howard imagines.

In fact, Rodes is already advancing to occupy Oak Hill. It is a quarter-past two o'clock. In order to seize upon this position with more certainty, and to command the whole of the enemy's line, he has left the Newville road and deployed his division across the ridge whose direction he is following. O'Neal's brigade is in the centre; Doles' line extends to the left as far as

the road ; Iverson is on the right, sustained in the second line by Ramseur and Daniel, who are ready to prolong his front in order to give assistance to Hill's left. The five batteries of this division, having gone into position at once, concentrate the fire of one hundred guns upon the battle-front of the Federals. Oak Hill is thus occupied at the very moment that Schimmelpfennig's skirmishers are starting in the direction of this hill. Howard, returning from the left, learns at this juncture that the enemy is reported as almost on his rear in the direction of Heidlersburg. Whether it is fear of this new danger or that he deems the position naturally too strong, he does not venture to attack it with his infantry. He merely causes his two batteries to open a not very murderous fire from a distance against Ewell's artillery, which has taken immediate possession of the most commanding point and is beginning to rake Doubleday's line by a slanting fire. Since he declined to occupy Oak Hill, Howard should have brought back the Eleventh corps to the rear in order to form a strong connection between his left and the right of the First corps. He could thus on this side have rested it upon the railway-cut, and by keeping his right more and more disengaged as far as Rock Creek have covered it by the stream which flows at the foot of the almshouse. Instead of this, he leaves unoccupied between these two corps a space battered by the guns of Oak Hill, to which his two batteries cannot reply effectively, and instead of closing up his line by a retrograde movement of Schimmelpfennig, divides it by carrying forward his extreme right, formed by Barlow's division. Being no longer able, as he had at first intended, to place it in position along the extension of Doubleday's front, he tries to post it perpendicularly to the latter. This manœuvre has become necessary in order to check the march of Doles, who is making his appearance on the eastern slope of Oak Hill. But the ground he has to defend, comprised between this ridge and the course of Rock Creek, presents no strong position to which he can cling ; it slopes down in gentle undulations from the hills to the stream, while the character of the soil, thoroughly open, under excellent cultivation, and traversed by numerous roads, will favor whichever of the two adversaries has the superiority of numbers and guns. Seeing but few enemies before him,

inasmuch as Doles' brigade is the only one that happens to be on this side at the moment, and entirely forgetting the danger that threatens him in the direction of Heidlersburg, Schurz endeavors to push his line as far as the border of a small stream which derives its source from Oak Hill, intersects the Carlisle road near the dividing-line of the Newville road, and empties into Rock Creek below Blocker's farm. This position is marked on the right by a small wood which commands the last-mentioned water-course, but it has no real strength, and, being more than thirteen hundred yards distant from Gettysburg, it has the inconvenience of being exposed on both sides: taken in flank on the left by the extremity, Oak Hill and the Mummasburg road, it is equally liable to be turned on the right by way of the Heidlersburg road, which passes back of the wood, and along which the enemy has already been reported to Howard.

But before Schurz has completed his movements a new and violent attack on the part of the Confederates against all Doubleday's positions invites our attention to this point. It is half-past two: four of Rodes' five brigades and five batteries of artillery posted along the summit and the western slope of Oak Hill menace, not the Eleventh corps, but rather the flank of the First. At the sight of this reinforcement Hill determines to renew the fight with Heth's soldiers, who have had time to recover breath, while Pender's troops are ready to yield support. Rodes, on his part, deploys his right in order to form connection with him. Iverson, Ramseur, and Daniel, crossing the Mummasburg road, make a semi-diversion to the left for the purpose of attacking Cutler's troops in front. These troops, in fact, are facing west along the edge of the coppice situated north of the railway, in which they have taken refuge early in the day. This manœuvre is almost entirely accomplished under shelter of the woods which for a long distance extend along the western slope of Oak Hill. During this time Rodes' artillery is crushing with its projectiles the guns that Doubleday has posted along the Cash-town road, and, after having compelled them to take refuge near the seminary, he opens fire upon Cutler's right flank.

Doubleday, finding his line menaced on this side, and the enemy about to penetrate within the space which separates him from the



Eleventh corps, calls for his reserves, and sends one of the two brigades of Robinson's division, which has remained on the Seminary heights up to the present moment, to prolong this line on Cutler's right. These troops, under General Baxter's command, proceeded beyond the wood, and, following the ridge of the hill, reached the Mummasburg road at its culminating point despite the fire of the enemy's artillery. Rodes, who sees them thus advancing openly, deems the occasion favorable for driving them back, and hurls O'Neal's brigade upon their flank. But this body of troops, under bad management, and already shattered by the fire of Howard's two batteries, ventures, while in a disordered state, to attack the Federals, who, making a rapid change of front to the right, wait for it steadily behind a stone wall running parallel to the road. The Confederates are repulsed with heavy loss, and the remnants of O'Neal's brigade, thrown into the greatest confusion, find it very difficult to rally beyond reach of the Unionists' fire. Nevertheless, the movement of Rodes' right is accomplished, and Iverson comes in his turn to assail Cutler's and Baxter's positions from the west. If these manœuvres had been less desultory and unconnected, the simultaneous attack of Rodes' troops would certainly have been crowned with success; but on this occasion he seems to have been very poorly supported by his subordinates. Baxter, who sees Iverson coming, has had time to face about to the left again, and he fortunately finds another wall perpendicular to the first, which affords his soldiers a solid protection. Doubleday, who is attentively watching the much-contested battlefield, sends him at this moment a timely reinforcement. By his order General Robinson pushes his second brigade, under General Paul, to the right, and takes a position with Baxter in the angle of the two walls. South of the Cashtown road Doubleday has maintained the positions conquered in the early part of the day on Willoughby Run. Meredith, covered on the left by Biddle, still occupies McPherson's wood, and Stone, more to the north, extends his lines as far as the Cashtown road; and, as his right at this point is placed at about two hundred and fifty yards in advance of Cutler's left, he has drawn up this right triangularly, or *en potence*, making it face Oak Hill. Cooper's battery, posted behind the ridge occupied by Meredith so as to enfilade the entire slopes of

Seminary Ridge from south to north, batters Cutler's front from a distance of about one thousand yards.

Iverson's attack falls upon Robinson's two brigades; but, whilst the latter check him in front, Cutler, supported by Stone's fire and Cooper's guns, emerges from the wood and takes him in flank. The small Confederate force makes a vigorous defence, but is almost annihilated, leaving a large number of men upon the fatal threshold of the wood where it had become engaged, together with about one thousand prisoners—that is to say, two-thirds of its effective force—in the hands of the Unionists. Daniel, who has a larger space of ground to traverse, arrives too late to save Robinson. He pushes forward, however, toward Stone, whose salient position is more exposed, approaching him by way of the north. A desperate combat takes place near the railway-cut: Daniel takes possession of it, for Stone, who has only three regiments in hand, is menaced at the same time on his left by Pettigrew, whom Heth has posted in front of him for several hours. Daniel, however, gains but a small space of ground, and the two antagonistic forces continue to fire at each other, without being able to effect a break into each other's lines.

It is about a quarter to three. The three brigades, engaged without concert of action by Rodes, have not been successful. More to the right, Heth, taking advantage of the renewal of the conflict, has made a fresh attempt against McPherson's wood, but Brockenbrough's brigade, to which he entrusted the execution of this task, has been, after a vigorous attack, repulsed with losses by Meredith.

The combat, however, is soon to assume a different aspect. Ramseur comes up to Daniel's assistance, and Hill determines at last to support the hitherto fruitless efforts of Heth with three brigades of Pender's division, which has not as yet been under fire, keeping only Thomas' in reserve.

While the Confederates are thus preparing for a concerted movement which their numerical superiority renders certain of success, they obtain an easily-achieved advantage on their left which renders the situation of the First corps more and more dangerous.

In fact, the two brigades of Schimmelpfennig's division, as

they are advancing between the Oak Hill slopes and the Carlisle road, are taken in flank by Rodes' artillery, and so fearfully shaken by the fire that Doles has only to push forward against the first, commanded by Colonel von Amsberg, to drive it back upon the second. He thus compels the whole division to fall back as far as a cross-road connecting the Carlisle road with that of Mummasburg—a road lined with fences, which enable Schimmelpfennig momentarily to re-form his troops. To the right of the Carlisle road Von Gilsa's Federal brigade has promptly dislodged the enemy's skirmishers from a small wood upon which Barlow has to rest, and the latter loses no time in sustaining him with his second brigade. But the decisive moment has arrived; the battle, which began at the west, then reached the north, is now about to extend north-eastward. While Ewell, from the summit of the ridge whence he overlooks the whole country, is watching Rodes' brigades wasting their energies in vain efforts against Doubleday's right, he finally discovers eastward Early's division coming up by way of the Heidlersburg road, and deploying along the slightly wooded hills whose bases are washed by the waters of Rock Creek. Three brigades are drawn up in front line—Hays in the centre, along the road; Hoke on the left; Gordon on the right; the fourth brigade, under Smith, is held in reserve. The division artillery opens fire against Barlow, who at this moment is manœuvring to relieve Schimmelpfennig by taking Doles in flank. Gordon, on his part, is advancing for the purpose of crossing Rock Creek, and attacks the position which Gilsa has just occupied. His Georgian soldiers, marching in battle-array and in perfect order, disappear for an instant among the large groves of willow trees which line the banks of the stream: the firing of musketry follows, but this does not prevent them from reappearing, still in the same order, on the other side of the stream. Their bayonets form a dazzling line amid the sheaves of golden wheat which they trample under foot in their passage. At last they fire a volley and rush to the assault. After an energetic resistance the Federals, finding themselves about to be surrounded by Doles on one side and Early's troops on the other, are obliged to yield ground, leaving a large number of killed and wounded behind them, the valiant Barlow among the rest.

Notwithstanding this reverse, his division forms again upon his reserves, at about four or five hundred yards distance. His left, reaching as far as the Carlisle road, is endeavoring to form connection with Schimmelpfennig; his right is drawn across the Heildersburg road, while its centre rests upon the massive masonry of the almshouse buildings.

This position, better than the former one, might have been defended for a greater length of time if the Eleventh corps had intrenched itself within it at once; but the already vanquished troops which sought a tardy refuge there could not hope to preserve it long in the presence of the superior forces of the enemy. In fact, Hays and Hoke have crossed Rock Creek in their turn, and take the defenders of the almshouse in flank, while Gordon attacks them in front. Everything gives way before them. Doles, following Early's movement and encouraged by his example, drives before him the whole of Schimmelpfennig's division, which has not been able to withstand the attack of this single brigade, and which in its precipitate flight outvies in speed the runaways of the other division. It is about half-past three o'clock, and it is only at this moment that Howard thinks of ordering the retreat of the Eleventh corps. If he had not delayed so long in giving this order, the retrograde movement in the presence of an enemy who had shown but little enterprise could have been executed without difficulty or any serious loss, and consequently the position of Cemetery Hill would have been more strongly occupied.

The Eleventh corps, already so unfortunate at Chancellorsville, was once more completely routed, so that the order of retreat in its present existing condition must have appeared to those who received it a perfect mockery. Such was not the case with the First corps, which could have executed this movement in good order, and thus have avoided useless loss, if the notice had been forwarded to it a little sooner. Unfortunately, this notice did not reach Doubleday, who sent to Howard for instructions several times, but in vain. The officer despatched by the latter either lost his way or did not properly deliver the verbal message with which he had been entrusted, probably confounding the two almost homonymous elevations of Seminary and Cemetery Hill.



Be that as it may, at half-past three o'clock, when the Eleventh corps was already completely routed, the First was still continuing the struggle in the positions it had been defending since morning. But Doubleday, who appreciated the new danger to which he was about to be exposed, sent his chief of staff to Howard to ask either for an immediate reinforcement or the order of retreat. Howard, who from the summit of Cemetery Hill beheld all the phases of the conflict at a glance, and saw the enemy's battalions on all sides preparing to surround the First corps was not willing, it is said, to issue this necessary order,\* at the risk of sacrificing all that yet remained of Reynolds' brave soldiers; and the only reinforcement he offered to Doubleday was Buford's cavalry. He knew, however, that a portion of this division was already engaged on the left of the First corps, and that the remainder, under Devin, was covering with difficulty the retreat of his own corps on the extreme right. The task of the Union cavalry in this direction was the more hard because they were not only exposed to the fire of the enemy's artillery, but also to the Federal guns posted on Cemetery Hill, whose projectiles fell into their midst. Buford—who, like Howard, was surveying the whole battlefield, but whose quick and energetic mind was not hampered in its judgment by the weight of responsibility—had much sooner recognized the magnitude of the danger, and was at that very moment addressing a despatch to Meade urging him to send reinforcements, adding that, in his opinion, the troops were without leaders. Howard himself, however, was soon made to realize the perilous condition of the First corps.

In fact, whilst Pender, after having replaced the exhausted and discouraged troops of Heth, falls with his whole division upon the three small brigades of Stone, Meredith, and Biddle, now reduced to less than five hundred men each, Rodes, finding his left disengaged by Schurz's defeat, gives the order for a general attack. The remnants of Iverson's and O'Neal's brigades

\* See Bates' *Battle of Gettysburg*, pp. 87, 88. Some persons have thought that, seeing from a distance the line of the Second Confederate corps advancing in good order, and having lost sight of his own troops, he mistook the enemy's line for that of the Eleventh corps in retreat, believing that the First was sufficiently protected to obviate the necessity of its immediate recall.

form again upon that of Ramseur, and these troops, supported by the fire of more than thirty pieces of artillery, make a rapid descent upon the stone wall behind which Robinson's division is posted. The latter defends itself to the best of its ability: its chiefs—one of whom, General Paul, is seriously wounded—set the men a good example; but the retreat of the Eleventh corps has left Robinson completely isolated. Consequently, it is unjust on the part of Howard, after having neglected to assume the proper direction of the First corps, to have accused it, in his first despatch to Meade, of having allowed its left to be turned, and by yielding ground to have forced the Eleventh to a premature retreat. On the contrary, it was the disorderly disbanding of this latter corps, and especially of Schimmelpfennig's division, which compelled Robinson to abandon the position which until then he had so bravely defended, thereby involving the loss of Doubleday's position. In fact, Robinson, hemmed in on three sides, is obliged to fall back upon the wood occupied by Cutler. This retreat is executed in good order, and, although sorely pressed, the Federals succeed in maintaining their position in the wood. But the conflict sustained by his right against superior forces having exhausted all his reserves, Doubleday can no longer advantageously resist the new assault which Hill has just directed against his centre and left. At four o'clock the three brigades which Pender has pushed forward occupy the first line, leaving Heth's worn-out troops behind them. These are deployed south of the Chambersburg road—Lane on the right; McGowan's brigade, commanded by Colonel Perrin, in the centre; Scales on the left, near the road. The latter, after having relieved Brockenbrough's brigade, boldly descends the slopes facing McPherson's wood, in the direction of Willoughby Run. But Meredith's soldiers, hidden in the bush, receive the assailants at eighty paces with a fire which carries consternation into their ranks. Pender and Scales are slightly wounded; the soldiers of the latter retreat in disorder, their chiefs being unable to bring them back to the combat. On the right Lane has allowed himself to be intimidated by the fire of a Union detachment of cavalry which General Gamble has caused to dismount: he has halted, thus leaving Perrin to continue the movement alone.

But the latter is more fortunate than the rest of Pender's division. Biddle's Federal brigade, which is opposed to him, has not, like Meredith, found a wood to rest upon so as to disguise its weakness. Exposed in an open country without any reserve, in vain it riddles the assailants with bullets, sustaining an equal amount of losses with them and utterly unable to check them. Perrin, after having re-formed his line on the other side of Willoughby Run, advances against it without paying the least attention either to Lane or Scales. Biddle is obliged to fall back in great haste before him, and to find a refuge among the slopes of Seminary Hill. The defenders of McPherson's wood, finding themselves taken in flank, evacuate a portion of the wood in order to face the enemy who is threatening to turn their lines. On perceiving this movement Scales' soldiers gather fresh courage: throwing themselves upon Meredith and Stone with renewed eagerness, the latter are taken between two fires, and sustain terrible losses, for Perrin's left is already manœuvring to cut off their retreat.

Fortunately, Doubleday, although he has not yet received any instructions, understands that he has not a moment to lose in withdrawing if he does not wish to see the retreat degenerate into a rout. He hastily recalls Meredith and Stone to Seminary Hill, which affords him an excellent support for covering this retreat. While Robinson occupied the seminary he surrounded it with improvised trenches. Doubleday gathers the decimated battalions of Meredith, Stone, and Biddle behind these defences, although these troops have lost two-thirds of their effective force, and places a few cannon near them: he thus, by a well-directed fire of infantry and artillery, succeeds in checking the enemy, who is cautiously advancing. The energetic defence of Robinson and Cutler in the wood north of the railroad has enabled all the Federal batteries, which were in extremely exposed positions, to withdraw, leaving behind them only a dismounted piece. On the extreme left, south of the Hagerstown road, Gamble still holds Lane in check, who is trying to turn Doubleday's line by way of the south; but the stalwart resistance around the seminary cannot be prolonged before the united efforts of Pender's division: it could have no effect but

to facilitate the retreat. It is near four o'clock when the extremely attenuated lines of the First corps descend the eastern slopes of Seminary Hill, the possession of which is abandoned. it being deemed useless to make any further sacrifices to retain it. Hill, after having taken possession of it, has no serious intention of going in pursuit of the Federals, whose excellent behavior brings Perrin to a halt, he alone having ventured to follow in their track. Doubleday thus succeeds in crossing Stevens' Run by following the convergent roads of Cashtown and Hagerstown, and he soon finds himself inside of Gettysburg. The disorderly crowd of the two divisions under Barlow and Schimmelpfennig has preceded him, and is crowding the streets of this little town, which are fortunately both wide and straight. Ewell, more enterprising than Hill, has closely followed his adversaries. Ramseur and Doles have kept pace with the movements of the First corps; Hays and Hoke, driving before them Devin's troopers, who are vainly endeavoring to check their course, approach the city on the eastern side. Fortunately, Howard, who is performing feats of valor at this critical moment, has caused Costar's brigade of Steinwehr's division to come down from Cemetery Hill, posting it in front of the town. He thus succeeds, with the aid of a few troops of the First corps, in holding the enemy in check for a short time. But at last, notwithstanding all their efforts, Howard and Doubleday are obliged to abandon the place, where they are in great danger of being hemmed in. All the troops that have preserved good order fall back on Cemetery Hill. The whole of the First corps reaches the place, with the exception of Stone's brigade—which has witnessed successively the fall of two commanders and a large number of its officers—the remnants of which, being the last to penetrate the streets of Gettysburg, are lost among the crowd of fugitives with which they are encumbered. The Confederates, who enter the town by two sides at once, fall in the midst of this crowd, picking up nearly four thousand prisoners. The remainder scatter about the country, reaching the Federal bivouacs the best way they can. General Schimmelpfennig himself, mixed up with the crowd, had barely time to conceal himself under a load of wood, and kept out of sight in Gettysburg for three days before he was



able to join his corps. Two cannon were abandoned in the streets and fell into Ewell's possession.

The situation of the Federals was critical in the extreme. They had brought into action ten brigades of infantry, two of cavalry, and ten batteries, about sixteen thousand five hundred men in all, against fourteen brigades of the enemy's infantry and twenty batteries of artillery, aggregating more than twenty-two thousand men, for the Confederate brigades were much stronger than those of the Federals. Of these they had no more than five thousand men left in a fighting condition. The First corps was reduced to twenty-four hundred and fifty men. Out of the eleven thousand missing, nearly four thousand had been left on the field of battle and about five thousand were taken prisoners; the rest had scattered. The fugitives crowded the road leading out of Gettysburg for the purpose of scaling the slopes situated south of the city, and without pausing near their leaders along the ridge of Cemetery Hill they hurried in the direction of Taneytown and Westminster, carrying confusion and discouragement into the ranks of the regiments that were coming to their assistance. It is true that on the heights of Cemetery Hill there was a nucleus of troops still fresh which would not have abandoned this position without a fight, and which could have served as a rallying-point to the *débris* of the First and Eleventh corps. These were Von Steinwehr's two brigades and a few reserve batteries of the latter corps. While in the occupancy of Cemetery Hill, General von Steinwehr had not allowed himself to be distracted by the grand and thrilling spectacle of the battle which he witnessed from a distance: taught in the thoroughly practical school of the Prussian army, he had understood that this position would soon afford a last rallying-point to his comrades fighting in front, and he had applied himself to the study of its strength and weakness. Slopes of considerable ruggedness, overtopped here and there by sharp acclivities, rendered this position easy to defend against any direct attack from infantry; but the open plateau which these slopes encompassed on three sides was visible to and dominated by the neighboring heights within reach of cannon-shot; consequently, he had made good use of his soldiers in constructing bastions and earthworks, behind which he

had posted his artillery. Despite these wise precautions, however, there were still wanting sufficient forces to occupy the position thus prepared, and troops determined to defend it.

The reinforcements that could be relied upon were yet far away. But sometimes at a critical moment a single individual may bring a moral force on the battlefield worth a multitude of battalions. This individual arrived opportunely, just as Howard, after performing prodigies of valor, was slowly leaving Gettysburg. This was General Hancock. It was, we believe, a few minutes to four o'clock; according to Hancock's testimony, it was only half-past three; Howard, in his despatch to Meade, written on that very day, and consequently more authentic than the articles published by him since, says that it was four o'clock. There is but little difference in the affirmations of the two most important witnesses thereon. It was one o'clock in the afternoon when Meade, at his head-quarters in Taneytown, was successively informed of the battles fought by Buford against Hill's corps, of Reynolds' arrival on the battlefield, and of his death. During the entire morning he had received numerous despatches apprising him in a positive manner of the approach of the enemy, and, not knowing as yet on which side he would make his appearance, he had made every preparation for bringing back his various columns to Pipe Creek. In the event of Reynolds coming back to Taneytown with the three corps under his command, which were the most exposed, positive instructions had been given to the Second and Twelfth, directing them to support him in his retreat by advancing toward Gettysburg. The route to be followed by each corps had been designated. This early news, therefore, had decided Meade to fall back upon the line selected by him a few days previously. But presently, on being made acquainted with the gravity of the struggle going on at Seminary Hill, he saw that it was too late to draw back. His concentrative movement upon Pipe Creek was greatly compromised by the sudden appearance of the enemy at a point which his left was to occupy before beginning the movement. The strategic position of Gettysburg had to be defended by a whole army, or simply occupied by a squad of soldiers ready to retire at the first serious attack. From the moment that Meade hesitated about taking the

advance of Lee with all his forces, the despatch of two army corps to near this town was an error which could only be excused on the score of his ignorance of the latest movements of the enemy. Buford and Reynolds, in provoking the battle for the possession of Gettysburg, had obeyed the spirit of the instructions he had given them, but they would certainly not have done so if they had not found ground admirably suited for delivering the decisive battle which was impending. Meade, although a native of Pennsylvania, was not aware of the advantages of this ground, which he had never visited. It was, however, necessary for him to decide at once either to bring back the troops that were engaged, and concentrate all the other corps upon Pipe Creek or some adjacent position, or, as he had himself intimated to Reynolds in a despatch written the day previous, take the whole army to Gettysburg, concentrating his forces upon the point of attack selected by the enemy. In order to take so serious a step, Meade should have gone in person to reconnoitre the localities around which the conflict was carried on, being only separated from it by about thirteen miles. But, as we have already stated, the Union generals-in-chief, notwithstanding their activity and courage, left their head-quarters reluctantly, for, making constant use of the telegraph for the transmission of their orders, they found it inconvenient to be at any great distance from the office. Unwilling to go to Gettysburg himself, Meade, upon the advice of Butterfield, his chief of staff, sent General Hancock in his place. The latter had just arrived at Taneytown with the Second corps from Frizzellburg, where he had passed the night. Meade, who reposed a well-deserved confidence in this chieftain, had just explained all his plans to him: he had selected him, although the junior of Howard and Sickles, to replace Reynolds in the command of the left wing, requesting him to decide, after an inspection of the ground, whether it was expedient to deliver a battle either at Gettysburg or at some neighboring point back of the town, or to fall back upon Pipe Creek. From the moment that Meade declined assuming the responsibility of this decision he could not have selected a more competent officer to act in his place than Hancock. Howard was no doubt endowed with as much coolness as

courage, but he had not yet exhibited all those military qualities which at a later period distinguished him as Sherman's lieutenant. He had almost always been unlucky: the remembrances of the recent rout of the Eleventh corps—a rout for which he was wrongfully held alone responsible—still weighed heavily upon him; in short, he did not possess that indescribable gift, that ardor and contagious self-reliance, which imparts to a chieftain a boundless authority over those surrounding him—qualities for which General Hancock was especially distinguished.

The latter as soon as he arrived assumed the command and applied himself to the task of restoring order among the troops who were hurrying in great confusion toward Cemetery Hill. The Eleventh corps, under the personal direction of Howard, reforms around Von Steinwehr, whose forces are drawn up across the Taneytown and Baltimore roads: the fugitives who cover these roads are brought back into the ranks. Howard had ordered Doubleday to place himself on his left; Hancock points out to him with precision the position which two of his divisions are to occupy on the heights at the foot of which the Emmettsburg road winds, taking from him Wadsworth's division in order to place it over the dominating hillock of Culp's Hill. As we have already mentioned, this wooded hill commands the valley of Rock Creek, faces the heights of Wolf Hill and Benner's Hill, and completely flanks the plateau of Cemetery Hill, with which it is connected by a ridge with steep acclivities. About five o'clock Wadsworth was taking possession of this important position. Order had gradually been restored in the Federal lines. The soldiers, encouraged by the sight of a powerful artillery firmly planted, got back to their ranks. They were again ready to wait for the enemy without flinching and to make an energetic defence.

But it had taken them one hour thus to re-form under the eyes of the Confederates; and the historian will now ask, as the Unionists themselves were then asking each other in astonishment, How is it that these adversaries, generally so prompt in striking blow after blow and to take advantage of the first success, have allowed them this precious respite, instead of gathering by a final effort the fruits of their victory? When Ewell entered Gettysburg in



the midst of a mass of fugitives disarmed by fear, and was picking up prisoners by the thousand, the sun, which was still high in the heavens, promised him more than three hours of daylight: he had time, therefore, to deliver and to win a new battle. The two divisions of Early and Pender—that is to say, one-half of the Confederate forces—had not been in action more than one hour; two of their brigades had not been at all engaged; victory, moreover, imparted strength and confidence to the most exhausted. In short, more fortunate than their adversaries, the Confederates had in their midst the respected chieftain whose slightest wishes had hitherto been eagerly obeyed. Lee was on the ridge of Seminary Hill before half-past four, whence he surveyed the battlefield around him so stubbornly disputed by Hill—at his feet the town of Gettysburg, which Ewell had just entered, and in front of him the slopes of Cemetery Hill, which the Federals were scaling in great confusion. Hill and Longstreet were at his side, Ewell only two-thirds of a mile from his post of observation. Hill's corps, as we have stated, had not seriously harassed Doubleday's retreat. Lee did not order him to cross the wide and open valley which separates the heights of Seminary Hill from those of Cemetery Hill in order to attack the Federals in the position along which they were forming with so much difficulty. This valley and the opposite slopes, which the next day were to be so thoroughly drenched in blood, did not, however, present any formidable obstacle. It is true that the Southern general, on perceiving that Ewell was pressing the enemy closer, sent him an order by Colonel Taylor to attack the hill, if he could do so with any chance of success, as soon as he saw his troops in the town; but he had himself very serious doubts on the subject, Colonel Long, whom he had charged to make as thorough an examination of the enemy's positions as possible, having reported that they were very strong. So that, while ordering Ewell to make the attack, he recommended him at the same time, according to the language of his report, to avoid a general engagement so long as the army had not arrived on the ground. According to Colonel Taylor, who was the bearer of the despatch, the order to attack the enemy was much more peremptory, and Johnson has since stated to the latter that he did

not understand why it was not carried out. Lee would seem to have been disposed to aim at a partial success by dislodging the Federals from their last retreat, but in order to achieve this result he did not wish at this moment to risk a new battle with the only forces under his control. It was for this reason that he had not pushed the Third corps forward. This extreme caution may be condemned, but the motives can be easily understood.

Lee had not in the heart of Pennsylvania the same freedom of movement as in Virginia. He had to think of his communications and a possible retreat. Stuart, from whom he had not heard for the last eight days, was no longer at his side to keep him acquainted with the strength of the enemy's forces and to trace out the route for his battalions to follow. The latter had so suddenly come in contact with the enemy in the morning that the Confederate generals were in constant expectation of some new surprises. They perceived, along the ridge of Cemetery Hill, by the side of the fugitives who were still in great confusion, other soldiers in serried ranks supported by heavy artillery, and supposed that Howard had just been reinforced on coming out of Gettysburg. Good order having been fully restored in all the Union ranks completed the deception.

It has been said, and very justly, we think, that if Jackson had been alive and in command of his army corps on the 1st of July, he would not on that day have left Cemetery Hill in the hands of the Federals. The fact is, that Lee, having the utmost confidence in his lieutenant, would not have hesitated to risk a great deal in order to afford him the means of striking a decisive blow: he would not probably have waited for Jackson to ask him to direct Hill to make a useful diversion to the direct attack on Cemetery Hill.

Early, however, who had penetrated into Gettysburg at the head of Hays' brigade, had an idea to undertake this attack as soon as he found himself master of the town; but, notwithstanding Hays' solicitations, he did not dare to take the responsibility. He referred the matter to Ewell, sending at the same time a message to Hill requesting the latter to sustain him; which message, being received in Lee's presence, did not naturally determine any serious movement of the Third corps. But while he

was waiting for instructions from his immediate chief his attention was directed elsewhere. General Smith, whose brigade had not been in action, and who, consequently, should have passed to the first line, had halted on the left in the rear, close to the York road, upon the mere rumor that a new corps of the enemy was coming up by way of that road. Although he did not put much faith in this news, Early sent Gordon with a second brigade in that direction, less for the purpose of stopping this imaginary enemy than to take command of the two united brigades. Thus deprived of one-half of his division, Early by himself could no longer attempt anything against Cemetery Hill. Matters would not have proceeded thus under Jackson. Ewell did not exercise the same influence over his lieutenants as Jackson did, and on this occasion was poorly served by some of them. O'Neal had allowed his brigade to take part in the fight without his personal direction. Iverson, in the heat of the struggle, had caused his chief to be informed that he had seen one of his own regiments pass over to the enemy: finally, Smith, through his credulity, paralyzed Early's movements.

Rodes' troops having suffered fearfully, and his artillery not being yet in position, Ewell had really only two brigades at his disposal; consequently, he thought he was acting in conformity with Lee's instructions by waiting for Johnson's arrival with the Third division to make the attack. Hill's immobility and the very text of his own instructions convinced him that Lee was less anxious to take possession of Cemetery Hill than to avoid a general engagement at that time. Johnson, who had passed the night with the corps artillery, not far from Chambersburg, between Scotland and Greenwood, had had about eighteen miles to travel over a road encumbered with vehicles of every description, and notwithstanding his speed he only reached Gettysburg a little before sunset. He had been preceded on this road by Anderson's division of the Third corps, which being hastily sent for in the morning by Hill from Fayetteville, where it had bivouacked, reached the borders of Willoughby Run before six o'clock, when it was brought to a halt by an order from its chief.

Lee, having determined not to provoke a decisive battle until the concentration of his army was accomplished, must naturally

have resorted to every device in order to complete this concentration before that of his adversary. This was easy for him to do; for, as we perceive, two of his three army corps were entirely under his control at the close of the day. Longstreet was still absent. Pickett's division had remained at Chambersburg for the purpose of covering the defiles of South Mountain: an order to join the army was forwarded to him, but it could not reach him before the next day. The other two divisions, under McLaws and Hood, had started from Greenwood in the morning, after having successively aided in the passage of Johnson's division, all the supply-trains of the Third corps, which occupied a space of no less than thirteen miles, together with Anderson's troops. They followed the same road as the latter at a certain distance from each other. Messengers were sent to expedite their movements, but the extraordinary order which had directed the supply-train to pass before them had caused a great loss of time which could not be repaired; in fact, the road, muddy and broken up, was encumbered by vehicles loaded with provisions and ammunition that were proceeding in the direction of the battlefield, and by others that were already returning with some of the wounded. Consequently, McLaws' head of column did not reach Marsh Creek till nine o'clock in the evening, when it halted, while Hood's division was unable to establish its bivouac near it until midnight.

From five o'clock in the evening the position of the Federals had been greatly improved; Culp's Hill, which Early could have taken possession of without striking a blow, and whence he could have struck them in the rear, was occupied by Wadsworth. A quarter of an hour later the arrival of the first fresh troops, so impatiently looked for, was finally communicated to Hancock. It was Sickles and Birney, who were coming from Emmettsburg with a brigade of the Third corps. The urgent call that Howard had addressed him about half-past twelve o'clock was the first intimation that Sickles had received of the battle that was being fought at Gettysburg. His marching orders, dated the day previous, directed him to make preparations to occupy this town; Meade's instructions, on the contrary, forwarded in the morning, marked out for him a retrograde march toward Pipe



Creek. In short, he learned that subsequently to the sending of these instructions a battle had commenced in which two corps might have to struggle against the whole of the enemy's army. Among so many contradictory statements, Sickles, always eager for a fight, could not hesitate: he determined to hasten to the assistance of his comrades. The corps, the command of which he had resumed during the last three days, was only two divisions strong. Leaving one brigade from each division at Emmetsburg under De Trobriand and Burling to cover the outlet of the mountains, he set out about three o'clock. He brought along Birney's, Graham's, and Ward's brigades, sending Humphreys, who was then engaged in reconnoitring, an order to follow with the rest of the Second division. The latter, without waiting for its chief, started before four o'clock, but it was delayed by the supply-trains of the First and Eleventh corps, and, taking the wrong road, came near falling in with the rear of the Confederates near Marsh Creek at Black-Horse-Tavern, and, in short, only reached Cemetery Hill about one o'clock in the morning. But scarcely had Graham fallen into position on the left of the First corps when a new reinforcement—a most important one this time—enabled Hancock to give more extension and solidity to his line. Slocum, according to the general plan, had led the Twelfth corps from Taneytown to Two Taverns since morning. He had hardly reached this point, which is only five miles from Gettysburg, when he received Howard's despatch asking for assistance, and had immediately made his whole corps resume the line of march in the direction of Gettysburg. Reaching the borders of Rock Creek about half-past four o'clock, he had noticed the wooded heights along the left bank of this stream, which, under the name of Wolf Hill, dominate all the neighboring localities; and not knowing on which side the battle was raging, the sound of whose cannon he heard, he had ordered his First division, under Williams, to take possession of it. The latter, ascending the left bank of the stream, soon fell in with Ewell's scouts, and was preparing for an attack when he was informed that the enemy being master of Gettysburg, the possession of Wolf Hill was no longer of any importance. He halted on the banks of the stream a little below Culp's Hill, the slopes of which Wads-

worth had just escalated. In the mean while, Geary's division, which was following Williams, had continued its march upon Gettysburg, arriving near Cemetery Hill at about half-past five. In compliance with Hancock's directions, it occupied the immense space extending between Graham's small brigade and the lofty hillock of Round Top, whose importance had not failed to attract the notice of the commander of the Second corps. Half an hour later, Slocum, who had left Williams as soon as he understood the situation of the combatants, arrived in person at Cemetery Hill. Hancock, in compliance with Meade's orders, turned over the command to him. His task was accomplished. From the moment of his arrival on the ground he saw that the position of Cemetery Hill, completed, in a tactical point of view, the strategic advantages presented by Gettysburg: it commanded the town and all the roads adjoining it. Instead, therefore, of falling back, at the risk of greatly discouraging the soldiers, for the purpose of taking a defensive position before which Lee would probably not appear, another and much better position was found, inasmuch as it was more compact and that this time the enemy could not avoid making an attack without implicitly avowing himself vanquished. About half-past four o'clock Hancock sent a message to Meade, telling him that he believed the position easy to defend with good troops, although on the left it was not very strong. At a quarter past five he sent him the same message in writing; finally, at seven o'clock he started himself for Taneytown in order to give him a verbal account of the situation.

Meade had not waited for his arrival to determine what course to pursue. At last clearly divining the play of his adversary, he had not allowed himself to be disconcerted about the unforeseen incidents of that day; and as soon as he had been able to appreciate the gravity of the situation, toward five o'clock—that is to say, even before receiving Hancock's first report—he had deliberately adopted the simplest course of action, which was also most in conformity with the principles of war: this was to concentrate his army between Gettysburg and Taneytown. He had at once sent for the Sixth corps, which was entering Manchester at that very moment. From very proper prudential reasons he had merely directed Sedgwick, who was in command

of this corps, to halt on the borders of Willoway Creek, a strong intermediate position between Pipe Creek and Gettysburg, if he should hear that the troops engaged at that point had been obliged to beat a retreat. About half-past six he received Hancock's two messages, and decided at once in favor of Gettysburg. Since two o'clock in the afternoon the Second corps had been on the march toward this point, so that Hancock met it only a few miles from the battlefield: he brought it to a halt, in order that his troops might protect, in case of need, the rear of the army against any flank movement on the part of the enemy. There was no necessity of making any changes in the orders already issued to enable the whole army to march upon Gettysburg, except in two instances: the Fifth and the Sixth corps. One had left Union in the morning, and could not fail to be in the neighborhood of Hanover; the other must already have left Manchester. The concentration thus commenced by the initiative action of the several chiefs, even before it had been decided upon by Meade, was then much easier to accomplish than a retrograde movement of any kind.

As will be seen, the night-time was considered on both sides as the favorable moment, not for rest, but for preparing for the great struggle that was to take place the next day. If darkness had prevented Johnson from delivering the assault on Cemetery Hill, it could, on the other hand, aid him in taking possession of a position favorable to the projected attack. This position was Culp's Hill, which some Confederate officers had escalated when it was not yet occupied by Wadsworth. He was desirous to plant himself in it before daylight, but the detachment which reconnoitred the place having fallen among Federals and been almost entirely captured, he gave up his project. These incidents exercised a powerful influence over the battle of the following day.

In fact, Lee, finding a portion of the Federal army in front of him, and arriving on a battlefield that had been gained in a manner which was as glorious as it was unexpected, had no idea either of planting himself in a defensive position or of manœuvring so as to compel his adversary to attack him. He had discarded the plan—a most dangerous one in our opinion—which Longstreet had suggested to him, of turning the left of the Federals: he held his adversary before him, and was anxious to strike him. It was

upon the right of the latter that he proposed to direct his decisive blow. The obstacles were greater than on the other side, but the wooded country was also much more favorable to a bold manœuvre and a sudden attack like that of Jackson at Chancellorsville: the wood neutralized the superiority of the Federal artillery. Lee, however, having visited Ewell during the evening, the latter explained to his chief that the principal forces of the enemy were massed in front of him, and that he should certainly avail himself of the night to intrench on that side. Lee, impressed by these arguments, determined to look out for a point of attack along the Federal left. He even thought for a moment of abandoning Gettysburg, in order to bring back the Second corps to his right and concentrate all his forces in that direction; it would have been the wisest and most skilful course to pursue. He discarded this idea upon the assurances given by Ewell that his troops could attack and carry Cemetery Hill as soon as Longstreet had broken the lines of the Federal left. He moreover attached great importance to the capture of this height, which seemed to him to be the key to all the enemy's positions. The objective point was all marked out and designated to his soldiers on the right. It was the Round Tops, whose uneven summits were seen rising like two dark towers over the valley lighted by the rays of the moon, which was then at her full.

This light favored the march of the Federal soldiers, who were hastening by every road in the direction of the town (almost unknown till then) where the destinies of America were about to be decided. It threw a lurid glare over the cemetery, surrounded by tall pines, which the vanquished of the previous day occupied around Hancock, and which Meade, arriving at last from Taneytown to assume the direction of the battle, was traversing with his numerous staff about one o'clock in the morning. The cold rays of the moon, flitting playfully across the trees, whitened the large tombstones in the shadow of which the living, oppressed by fatigue, were lying like dead men for whom a powerful magical influence had, by the waving of a wand, conjured these mournful monuments into existence. Occasionally a soldier would rise up, his eyes haggard, abruptly wakened by the tramping of horses' feet, or some wounded man turned on his side with a groan on



the damp ground which was absorbing his blood. Then everything was still again, waiting for the sun to revive the energies of the combatants, a large number of whom were destined to see him rise for the last time.

The critical hour had arrived. The battle was about to be fought under different conditions from any of those that had preceded it; and, if it should accrue to the advantage of the Confederates a new phase of the war would be inaugurated. For the first time the Federals found themselves reduced to play a purely defensive rôle along the northern bank of the Potomac. When, during the preceding year, the clashing of arms had been heard along this bank, it was McClellan attacking his adversary, already driven back to the river and ready to recross it. This time, on the contrary, the Army of the Potomac was the only barrier which still interposed obstacles between the large Northern cities and an invader stimulated by the hope of seizing so rich a prey. Everything seemed to conspire against it, even the government whose last hope it was. The chieftain that the government had just given to this army had only been in command for the last three days: how could one expect of him that quickness of perception, that precision in his orders, and from his subordinates that blind confidence so necessary on the battlefield? Lee, who had exercised the supreme command for the last thirteen months, and had already won four great victories, possessed on that very account a superiority which was worth many battalions to him. The superiority of numbers was undoubtedly on the side of the Federals, but it was not sufficient to guarantee them success; and Meade, deceived by exaggerated reports regarding the strength of his adversaries, was even ignorant of this advantage. Consequently, during this night, full of anxiety, how much must he have regretted the scattering of the Federal forces against which all his predecessors had vainly protested! Out of the sixty thousand men, more or less well organized, who were in Washington, the Federal government could easily have detached ten thousand to reinforce the Army of the Potomac: the same thing may be said of the fourteen thousand under Peck, who since the 1st of May had scarcely had an enemy before them.

at Suffolk, and from eight to ten thousand of the twelve thousand who under Keyes were occupying their leisure hours in the lines of Yorktown in projecting a sudden descent upon Richmond. In short, by leaving in Baltimore the thirty-five hundred men charged with holding the Secession element in check, and by employing a thousand men in escorting the *matériel* of Harper's Ferry as far as Washington, General Halleck might have ordered French to join Meade, instead of leaving him at Frederick, where his presence would have been henceforth purposeless. Out of the ninety-seven thousand men thus divided, there were at least sixty thousand in a condition to take part in the campaign, thirty-eight or forty thousand of whom, perfectly useless where they were stationed, could have been added to the Army of the Potomac before the 1st of July. Thus reinforced, the Union general would have been certain of conquering his adversary, who was too much compromised to fall back, and even to inflict upon him an irreparable disaster. But Lee was right in relying upon the military sluggishness of the Federal government. Meade, without wasting his time in vain regrets, had not a moment to lose in preparing, with the resources placed in his hands, for the supreme struggle, of which the battle of the 1st of July was only the prelude.

Let us see what was, on the morning of the 2d of July, the distribution of these forces, of which only a portion, as we have seen, was collected near Gettysburg when Meade reached Cemetery Hill at one o'clock in the morning. The Eleventh corps occupied this hill, along which it had rallied—Schurz's division across the Baltimore road; Steinwehr's on the left; on the right and rear that of Barlow, then commanded by Ames. The First corps was divided: Wadsworth, on the right of Ames, held Culp's Hill; Robinson, on the left of Steinwehr and across the Taneytown road, extended as far as a clump of trees called Zeigler's Grove; Doubleday, who had transferred the command of the corps to General Newton, was in reserve with his division in the rear of Schurz. The combined artillery of these two corps covered their front, sheltered to a great extent by the light earthworks constructed on Cemetery Hill the previous day. South of Zeigler's Grove, Hancock had, since the evening of the 1st, pro-

longed the Federal left with the troops he had at his disposal as far as the sugar-loaves of the Round Tops, so as to present a solid line to the enemy's troops, which he then perceived on Seminary Hill. Birney, with Graham's and Ward's brigades of the Third corps, bearing to the left of Robinson, extended along the ridge which prolongs Cemetery Hill as far as the depression where the latter seems to lose itself for a while, to rise again afterward toward the Round Tops. Geary, in this direction, with a division of the Twelfth corps, was developing on Birney's left as far as the smallest of these two hills, which he had caused to be occupied by two regiments.\* Williams, with the other division of the same corps, had halted within a mile and a quarter in the rear of Cemetery Hill, on the left bank of Rock Creek, near the point where the Baltimore road crosses this stream. Finally, Humphreys, who had been on the march since four o'clock in the afternoon, arrived on the ground, and the darkness not allowing him to select his place, he massed his two brigades a little in the rear and to the left of Birney's line.

In the mean while, after a long conference with Hancock, Howard, and some generals of his staff, Meade had not waited for daylight to reconnoitre the position where the fortune of war had just brought him. Being very near-sighted, he required considerable time to study the ground. The moonlight enabled him to visit the positions of his soldiers with ease, but it was only toward four o'clock, when the early rays of the sun imparted to the objects around their natural appearance, that he could form a correct idea of the whole. He was at once struck with the weak points they presented: being convinced, however, that it was too late to look for others, he thought only of drawing the best possible advantage from those which circumstances had placed within his reach. At this moment, in fact, all the troops that had not already gathered around him were about to start for the purpose of joining him.

The Second corps, which had come to a halt a few miles from Gettysburg, on the Taneytown road, resumed its march; De Trobriand's and Burling's brigades left Emmettsburg; and the Fifth corps had arrived the day before at Bonaughtown, a village

\* Fifth Ohio and One-hundred-and-forty-seventh Pennsylvania.—Ed.

about six miles on the Hanover turnpike. In the course of three consecutive days, from the 29th of June to the 1st of July, this corps had marched over sixty-two miles from Frederick, Maryland, but notwithstanding the fatigue of his men, General Sykes had pushed them forward in the direction of Gettysburg since break of day. The Sixth corps, which, on the 1st of July, was stationed at Manchester, more than thirty miles from Gettysburg, had been on the march since seven o'clock in the evening, and, thanks to this forced march, was expected to arrive in the afternoon. The cavalry, on its part, was preparing to cover the positions which the army had first occupied: Buford, with Gamble's brigade, cleared it on the left, along the Emmettsburg road; but on the right Devin's brigade, not being able to maintain its ground before Ewell, near Gettysburg, had passed to the second line on the Taneytown road. Merritt, with the regular cavalry brigade, had been hastily called from Mechanicstown; Kilpatrick, who followed Stuart as far as the neighborhood of Heidlersburg, had been ordered to fall back on Two Taverns; Gregg, who was at Westminster with his division, had left Huey's brigade to protect the dépôts and the line of the railway, and was advancing with the other two brigades in order to take position on the right of the army. The reserve artillery, which had halted at Taneytown on the morning of the 1st of July, had been placed on the march by Meade, and was to join him on the morning of the 2d.

These night-marches were extremely trying to the soldiers, reducing, to a great extent, the bodies of troops that were dragging along in the rear, the darkness of the night crowding the roads with stragglers. Those who had halted during the night had, for the most part, as will be seen, long distances to travel. Consequently, the troops reached Gettysburg very much exhausted—a bad condition to be in for fighting; but the first thing to be done was to reach the place, and it was not paying too dear for such an important result. Thanks to these forced marches, the whole army was assembled by nine o'clock in the morning, with the exception of fifteen thousand men of the Sixth corps, and even the latter were sure to arrive in time if the conflict lasted a few hours. This concentration, effected with so much rapidity, was as creditable to Meade as to his soldiers.



Lee, on his part, was also gathering his forces, the following being the positions they occupied at daybreak: Ewell's entire corps was drawn up on the battlefield, with Johnson on the left, resting on Rock Creek, upon Benner's Hill; Early, in the centre, facing the ridge which connects Culp's Hill with Cemetery Hill; Rodes, on the right, at the foot of the last-mentioned hill, his main force occupying the town of Gettysburg, while his right formed a connection with the Third corps on Seminary Hill. The two divisions of the latter corps, which had fought on the previous day, retained the positions that had been taken before sunset. Pender was on the left, above the seminary; Heth, on the right, along the ridge; Hill's third division, under Anderson, was posted about one and a half miles in the rear, on the Cashtown road, between Marsh Creek and Willoughby Run. A large portion of the First corps—that is to say, McLaws' and Hood's divisions, with the exception of Law's brigade—had followed close upon Anderson along the same road, and had halted three-quarters of a mile on the right bank of Marsh Creek; before four o'clock Anderson was proceeding toward Seminary Hill; Hood and McLaws, after giving their soldiers only two hours' rest, had, like Anderson, put their columns in motion also, and were advancing toward Gettysburg while waiting for orders assigning them their proper place on the battlefield. At the same time, Pickett was leaving Chambersburg, and Law the village of New Guilford, where Longstreet had sent him the day before. We have seen that Stuart, having at last received his instructions, was leaving the neighborhood of Carlisle in great haste for the purpose of joining his chief at Gettysburg. By nine o'clock in the morning the whole Confederate army was therefore assembled around the town, with the exception of Stuart's cavalry and the six thousand infantry which Pickett and Law could bring into line. The opportunity of attacking the Federal army while still divided had vanished with the last glimmer of daylight on the 1st of July; but in resuming the battle on the morning of the 2d, Lee had the great advantage of finding his adversaries scarcely recovered from the combat of the previous day and the rapid marches they had undergone—of surprising soldiers worn out by fatigue, and officers utterly unac-

quainted with the ground, within lines still wretchedly formed, and in positions miserably selected, and deprived of the support of a large portion of their own artillery. In bringing his troops into action at nine o'clock in the morning he could hardly have exacted from them an effort similar to those he had obtained at Manassas and Chancellorsville.

We must pause at the juncture when Meade, after examining the ground, has issued his orders. The Federals are beginning to rectify their positions. The First and the Eleventh corps have not altered theirs, but the Second, having arrived at seven o'clock, has been placed by Hancock, in pursuance of Meade's instructions, to the left of the First; Hays' division, on the right, is resting upon Ziegler's Grove; Gibbon's division is in the centre; on the left Caldwell's reaches out along the dividing water-line between Plum Run and Rock Creek, as far as the height on which stood the Hammelsbach house, his skirmishers occupying the Golori house on the Emmettsburg road: each of these three divisions possesses a front of two deployed brigades, the third being kept in reserve. In order to make room for them, the Third corps has closed its ranks, and is bearing to the left. The ground upon which it is about to take position will be the scene of so important and desperate a struggle that it is necessary to complete the general description we have heretofore given by details the usefulness of which the reader will at once acknowledge.

We have stated that a line from the upper strata of rocks formed by a slight convulsion of the earth eight hundred feet in length, much less elevated than the ridge of which it is the continuation, rises gradually as far as the commanding point occupied by the farms of Want and Sherfy—to which we have given the appellation of "*orchard*"—where it is suddenly interrupted by declivities of considerable steepness. The line of rocks, broken at the west, becomes again united, through a depression in the ground of only a few yards, to a new ridge which, by its direction, its declivity to eastward, and the wooded character of its western front, resembles that of Seminary Hill. The culminating point of this ridge is occupied by a few houses which we shall designate by the name of Warfield, one of their proprietors. Willoughby Run waters the foot of the hill at the west. The road from Gettysburg to

Emmettsburg, after passing below Ziegler's Grove as far as the Want house, with the exception of a strip of land about nine hundred yards in length between the houses of Godori and Smith, inclines to westward and intersects directly the head of the little valley where it derives its source. The hillock, as its English name of "Peach Orchard" implies, is thickly covered with peach trees, which are largely cultivated in that country, where the fruit is distilled. It is a commanding position, possessing extensive views, but was covered by the position of Seminary Hill; consequently, strong at the east, weak at the west, and commanded for a distance of over five hundred yards by the Warfield ridge, behind which the enemy could make preparations for his attacks with impunity. A road, called the Millerstown road, branching off from the Hagerstown road near Marsh Run, at the Black Horse Tavern, crosses Willoughby Run, ascends the left bank until it strikes an isolated schoolhouse, when, winding up to the Warfield farm, it intersects the Emmettsburg road at the Peach Orchard, and subsequently pursues a south-easterly course to cross Plum Run, and finally to connect with the Taneytown road north of the Little Round Top; the road skirts the Peach Orchard hillock by following the base as far as Plum Run. This stream, after taking its source near the Trostle brick house, runs from north to south through a valley interspersed with isolated trees and bushes: before striking the road it passes between two woods, one of which, at the east, rests upon the Weikart house, while the other, at the west, triangularly shaped, skirting the north side of the road, runs as far as the Trostle house. Below the crossing the stream, being marshy, rushes into the wild gorge comprised between the Round Tops and the rocky hill of the Devil's Den. This hill forms the continuation, at the south, of the rocky line which the road follows after leaving Peach Orchard, and which it abandons to cross Plum Run. The woods by which it is covered are separated from this road by a large field of wheat, adjoining on one side the wood of the Trostle house, which stretches down as far as a little valley where an insignificant tributary of Plum Run flows from north-west to south-east. That portion of the Devil's Den facing this valley is more woody and less rocky than that fronting Round Tops. At the extreme end of the wheat-field two

branches of the small tributary form a junction, one of them running through the field itself; the other, taking its source west of the Emmetsburg road and following the base of the Peach Orchard, leaves the Rose farm on the right and crosses, before reaching the above-mentioned wheat-field, a wood which covers both its sides. This wood, bounded at the east by said wheat-field, at the west by these identical slopes, extends, at the point of its longest distance, from the borders of the road above mentioned as far as the neighborhood of the Timber farm; south of this tributary of Plum Run there are open fields and fenced-in meadows sloping down by gentle gradations in front of Round Top, and which a by-road traverses, forming a junction between the Slyder farm on the borders of the stream and the Emmetsburg road near the point where the latter intersects the Warfield ridge, below the gorge by means of which Plum Run works out a passage through the rocks of which we have just spoken—a country easy of access and under general cultivation, stretching out as far as the Taneytown road, completely enveloping this rocky section on the south side.

By following this description on the map it will be seen that the Round Tops were to serve as a resting-point for the left of the Federal army, like Culp's Hill on its right and Cemetery Hill in its centre. The direct line connecting them with this last hill passed through the lower flat country, and was but little adapted to artillery manœuvres. The commanding hillock of the orchard seemed from its very position to invite the Federals to plant themselves there. It covered their left, preventing the enemy from approaching them in front or from disguising any flank movement; in short, the stream which watered the base of the hill at the south constituted a considerably strong line as far as the Devil's Den. But, notwithstanding these apparent advantages, the occupation of the orchard presented many inconveniences to the Federals; it allured them through the collective attractions of positions which they could not dispute to the enemy without endangering the whole battlefield.

Entirely isolated at the north and north-west from the line adopted by Meade, indifferently connected with the latter at the west, the orchard presented a salient angle which was the more difficult to



defend, being commanded on one side, while its elevation on the other side rendered it impossible for the Federals to recapture it when they had once lost it. It would have been necessary, therefore, in order to take practical possession of the place, either to occupy it with a considerable portion of the army, and surround it with intrenchments, as Steinwehr had done at Cemetery Hill, or simply to place a few troops with instructions to fall back as soon as they had compelled the enemy to disclose his forces.

At four o'clock in the morning, Meade, being desirous to reinforce his right, which, being nearer the enemy, seemed to him destined to play the principal part, had ordered Geary to abandon his position near Sickles in order to occupy the eastern slopes of Culp's Hill to the right of Wadsworth. Williams being already at Rock Creek, the whole of the Twelfth corps was to be thus assembled on this side. Geary had taken up the line of march at five o'clock, leaving vacant all that portion of the line he had occupied, from Sickles' left to the Little Round Top. The arrival of the Second corps, which came to take position between the First and the Third, enabled the latter to bear to the left in this direction. Between six and seven o'clock in the morning Meade sent his son to Sickles with orders to take the position which Geary had just left. This position, as we have stated, extended as far as the slopes of the Little Round Top, which Geary had strongly occupied since the previous evening. The order was most positive, and Meade has been blamed for not having attended to the execution of said order in person; nor did he endeavor to ascertain if the occupation of the summit of Culp's Hill had been effected, relying upon Slocum and Wadsworth to do that; besides, the commanding aspect of this hill indicated it sufficiently as the most important point to hold along the Federal left. But, Geary having started at an early hour, Sickles, entirely occupied with his own troops, had no knowledge of the position held by Geary, nor of the extent of his line, and, as no one had been left behind to supply the necessary explanations, Meade's order no longer possessed the same clearness in his estimation that it did when received. The Little Round Top, which he perceived at a considerable distance, was separated from him by low grounds which offered no advan-

tage for posting his four brigades, no commanding point for placing his artillery. Consequently, when Colonel Meade arrived, between eight and nine o'clock, to ascertain if the order which he had brought from his father had been executed, Sickles answered him that he could not distinguish the position in which he was to replace Geary. Nevertheless, like an obedient lieutenant, he had not waited for fresh orders to extend his line to the left, and before nine o'clock Birney was deploying Graham's and Ward's brigades in the direction of Little Round Top. At the same time, he saw the two other brigades of his own corps arriving. De Trobriand and Burling, who had left Emmetsburg at daybreak, being still ignorant of the situation of the two armies near Gettysburg, had followed the direct road leading to this town, and thus passed between the lines of skirmishers of both armies over the hillock of the orchard; they had exchanged a few shots with the Confederate skirmishers, leaving a certain number of stragglers, who had not been able to keep up with their pace, in their hands; but they arrived without encountering any serious resistance. De Trobriand took position between Graham on the right and Ward, who had been resting upon the base of the Little Round Top, on his left. Burling joined Humphreys' division, which had remained massed with the artillery of the Third corps on the left and a little in the rear of the Second, which was posted on the hill of Ziegler's Grove. So that, toward nine o'clock, Sickles occupied the position designated by Meade; but, as he had only deployed one of his two divisions, he could not reach beyond the base of the Little Round Top, and did not set foot upon the hill itself. The blame which may be attached to the Union general-in-chief does not consist in his having designated in an insufficient manner a position which the character of this hill clearly indicated, but in having entrusted a line of too great extent to a single corps. In fact, this line, which required a stronger force in consequence of its presenting points extremely vulnerable, should have possessed a development of at least one and a quarter miles, even if the Little Round Top had been occupied; whilst on the right of Sickles the Second corps had only a front of a little over twelve hundred yards to defend. But Meade, believing that the

decisive struggle would take place on his right, was not disposed to weaken either this wing or his centre for the benefit of the left, and did not seem to attach sufficient importance to the defensive dispositions which the latter might adopt. Sickles, however, after having deployed Birney's troops, sought to complete the formation of his corps from the moment that the arrival of Burling's brigade had filled up the ranks of Humphreys' division: not being entirely satisfied with the position where the latter was massed, although it was sufficiently flanked both on the right and left, he only left Burling in it, and caused the other brigades to advance about four hundred yards along the direct prolongation of the Second corps. This new position was much worse than the preceding one; for Humphreys was located at the very extremity of the valley of Plum Run, and was commanded still closer by the ridge which the Emmettsburg road follows. Leaving a second line, composed of five regiments massed, at an equal distance between Burling and his first line, he formed the latter by deploying the seven regiments which were left him, and pushed forward his advance-posts at once as far as this road, which he was anxious to clear. The Federal skirmishers, after having occupied the Rogers mansion, pulled down all the fences which occupied the ground on that side—a precaution which, at a later period, facilitated the movements of the division.

During this time the Federal right was taking a firm position and receiving important reinforcements. The Fifth corps, having arrived before six o'clock in the morning on Rock Creek, had temporarily taken position on the right of Williams' division; but at eight o'clock, when Geary came to post his troops on Culp's Hill, Slocum, who was in command of these two corps, brought back all his forces on the west bank of the stream. Geary planted himself upon the wooded flank of Culp's Hill, which commanded this side of the creek as far as the streamlet flowing from Spangler's Spring. Williams prolonged his line in the same direction by resting his right on the conical hillock called McAllister's Hill, taking advantage of the natural roughness of the ground, which we will describe in detail presently. These two divisions speedily made intrenchments along their front. The Fifth corps took position near the main road, in sight of

the bridge of Rock Creek, thus forming a reserve which, while supporting the right, could, by means of direct paths, hasten with equal rapidity to the assistance of the left or the centre of the line. Finally, the reserve artillery, which arrived at the same time, was parked, by Meade's orders, in a position not less central between the Taneytown and the Baltimore roads.

By nine o'clock in the morning the Federal line was therefore rectified. All the corps save one had arrived, and, notwithstanding their exhausted condition, each had taken the positions assigned by the general-in-chief. Through the one which he had designated for the Fifth corps he was already prepared to take great advantage of the very form of this line, the two extremities of which had fallen to the rear. The enemy had not, during these first five important hours of the day, fired a single cannon-shot to annoy the Federals or to interrupt their preparations. Astonished at this inexplicable silence on the part of an adversary ordinarily so active, Meade concluded that Lee had not finished his concentration, and had only the forces engaged the previous day about him. He at once conceived the idea of taking the offensive in his turn, and of anticipating him by attacking the positions of Ewell on Benner's Hill with the Twelfth and Fifth corps. This bold project was justified by appearances, and the point of attack well chosen: the Confederate Second corps was, in fact, the easiest of approach, the open country extending between the rest of the Southern army and the Federal positions being an obstacle in the way of such an attack, the importance of which Lee was soon to experience in turn. But appearances alone were favorable; for Longstreet's two divisions, being at that moment within reach of Gettysburg along the Cashtown road, could have formed a junction with Hill in order to defend Ewell. Fortunately for Meade, Generals Slocum and Warren having deemed the country very difficult to be traversed, he decided to wait for the arrival of the Sixth corps. The enemy did not allow him to resume his project.

Lee, in fact, has the greatest interest in striking quick and heavy. We must now see how he is employing the morning of the 2d of July, during which the Federals are preparing to



receive him, to present the various plans he can adopt, and examine the motives which determine his choice. We have shown that before continuing his march northward he had been obliged to measure strength with the Federal army. In order to preserve his communications, to receive ammunition, to send back his booty and sick, and to transform his movement into a positive invasion, it was necessary as soon as practicable to render it impossible for this army to attack him. He has drawn it into a pursuit, and then has suddenly turned against it, while the simultaneous arrival of Hill and Ewell before Gettysburg has enabled him to crush two Federal corps. Lee, however, was not able to gather the fruits of his victory that same evening, and on the morning of the 2d of July he found the greater portion of the Union army in front of him. He has four alternatives to select from: he has the choice to retire into the gaps of the South Mountain in order to compel Meade to come after him; or to wait steadily in his present positions for the attack of the Federals; or, again, to manœuvre in order to dislodge them from those they occupy by menacing their communications by the right or the left; or, finally, to storm these positions in front, in the hope of carrying them by main force. The best plan would undoubtedly have been the first, because by preserving the strategic offensive Lee would thus secure all the advantages of the tactical defensive. Once master of the mountain-passes, he covers his retreat upon Hagerstown or Hancock on one side, while still menacing the very heart of Pennsylvania on the other. Meade, being hard pressed by public opinion, will be compelled to attack him in as formidable positions as those of Crampton's and Turner's Gaps, where the preceding year a handful of men so long resisted McClellan's assaults. Lee, by way of excuse for not having adopted this plan, has alleged the impossibility of bringing to the rear in time the supply-trains which were crowding on the road from Chambersburg to Gettysburg: this excuse does not seem to us to be admissible, for the same trains were able to retrograde, without obstruction, during the night of the 4th and 5th, and such a movement would have been less dangerous after the victory of the 1st than after the defeat of the 3d. The truth is, that the ardor and assurance of the Confederate army, the mutual confi-

dence of the chieftains and soldiers, together with their contempt for their adversaries, do not allow Lee to take a step backward which would have the appearance of a retreat. To wait unflinchingly for Meade's attack in the position which the chances of war have just delivered to the Confederates is a middle course, full of inconveniences and without any advantages. The position of Seminary Hill is a very strong one, it is true, but it is isolated; it cannot mask a movement either toward the Potomac or the Susquehanna, and may be easily turned. Besides, Lee could not remain motionless upon these hills, for, drawing as he does his resources from the country, he cannot supply his army with rations except by scattering it: to wait would therefore be fatal to him; it would redound entirely to Meade's advantage, who can promptly receive the supplies he requires, and the reinforcements which are increasing daily his numerical superiority. In short, in the midst of an offensive campaign suddenly interrupted the temper of the Confederate army would not brook inaction any better than retreat. It is expedient, therefore, either to manœuvre for the purpose of dislodging the enemy or to attack him in his positions. He adopts the second of these plans: he will fail, but that is not a sufficient reason for believing that he has made a bad choice. The principal survivors among Lee's lieutenants have publicly made known their opinions regarding the advantages and disadvantages of these two plans, and are divided in their preferences. In order to carry out the first, so as to compel Meade to abandon his positions without wrenching them from him by main force, it would have been necessary to menace his base of operations at Westminster, east-south-east of Gettysburg; but this cannot be done in turning it by way of the north without becoming absolutely isolated and abandoning the entire line of retreat, and consequently without encountering more dangers than the Federals would be subjected to. It is therefore by way of the south that the Confederates are obliged to manœuvre; but on this side the difficulties are equally great. In order to strike the Westminster line it is necessary, first of all, to deliver the town of Gettysburg to the enemy—an important position and dearly bought; afterward a change of base must be effected in order to rest upon the Fairfield and Emmettsburg roads, and to describe

at least one-third of a complete circuit around the Federal army—a flank march the more dangerous because it would be undertaken in a hostile and open country; finally, it is necessary to wait for the cavalry, whose co-operation is indispensable. It is true that Meade, who must be acquainted with his weak points, greatly dreads this movement, but it is also true that he has taken every necessary measure to avert the most serious consequences to himself. In fact, if the positions he occupies near Gettysburg were impregnable, everything should be tried to drive him out of them, rather than to storm them in front; but they are not better than those of Willoway and Pipe Creeks, upon which he is ready to fall back. Lee therefore cannot be blamed for having preferred a direct attack. His whole army, with the exception of some generals, demand that this attack shall be made; a resistless impulse seems to spur it on to battle. It believes itself invincible—a powerful element of success when this blind confidence, which makes it forget all thoughts of retreat, neglect all calculations of numerical force, and scorn the adversary, is not shared by the leaders. But in the Confederate army nearly all these generals have undergone the contagion. Lee himself, the grave and impassive man, will some day acknowledge that he has allowed himself to be influenced by these common illusions. It seems that the God of armies has designated for the Confederates the lists where the supreme conflict must take place: they cheerfully accept the alternative, without seeking for any other.

If Lee cannot be blamed for the decision he has adopted, it is impossible not to recognize the faults he commits when this determination has once been settled. We have seen how important it is for him to carry out this determination without delay; yet when he returns from his conference with Ewell on the evening of the 1st of July he does not appear to have as yet clearly decided upon his plan of battle for the following day. He no doubt desires to wait for daylight in order to reconnoitre the ground, but this uncertainty causes him to lose much precious time. At daybreak of the 2d he is in the saddle: he has decided to make the attack on the right, and orders Longstreet to place his two divisions on that side, along the prolongation of

Hill's line, so as to be able to begin it at once. But he does not appear to have as yet determined either upon the hour when it is to be made, the point against which it is to be directed, or the number of troops to take part in it. Accustomed to find in Jackson a lieutenant to whom it was not necessary to give any precise instructions—who upon a mere suggestion would adopt all necessary measures for striking the point designated for his attack with the greatest rapidity and with the utmost possible vigor—Lee on this occasion did not take into consideration Longstreet's character, with whose strong and weak points, his energy and tardiness, he must, however, have been well acquainted. It is evident to us that from the evening of the 1st of July there was a misunderstanding between these two generals. On his return from his conference with Ewell, Lee, having decided to entrust the main attack to Longstreet, had made him some suggestions, but had given him no orders.

Instead of making himself thoroughly acquainted with the wishes of his chief, and preparing for making the attack at an early hour, the commander of the First corps only thinks of suggesting a new plan of battle. At dawn, with this object in view, he has hastily repaired to head-quarters. This time he has received orders, although still of a very vague character; Lee did not give his instructions the precise and peremptory form which should characterize all that emanates from a general-in-chief. Consequently Longstreet, not seeing any advantage in pressing the attack, loses much precious time, either through design or mental sluggishness, while his chief, relying entirely upon his promptness, proceeds to examine in person the Federal right, which Ewell is still preparing to attack.

Lee does not return from this errand until nine o'clock in the morning, and we must believe that he finds Longstreet still delayed in his preparations by difficulties of execution which add to his own reluctance, for the rest of the morning is devoted to reconnoitring with him the ground upon which the First corps is to advance, as far as the Warfield ridge. It is not until eleven o'clock, therefore, that he gives him formal instructions. He, however, merely directs Longstreet, according to a statement of the latter, to envelop the enemy's left, and to begin the attack



against this point by following as much as possible the Emmettsburg road. If these assertions are correct, he must have been enlightened by means of verbal explanations, because the Emmettsburg road runs almost parallel with the front of the two armies, and it was then only occupied by a few Federal pickets; consequently, we shall find Longstreet deviating in a singular manner from the letter of his instructions. It is evident, however, that Lee, convinced of how much the position of the orchard will be useful for the decisive attack, has been under the impression that he should begin by taking possession of it, inasmuch as it would be the first point to be met on the Emmettsburg road. The Round Tops are no doubt too prominent for the general-in-chief to deem it necessary to call the attention of his lieutenant to this double sugar-loaf, the profile of which Ewell had shown him by moonlight the day before, where on the tops the flags of Meade's signal corps were seen flying; but he had not the least suspicion that such a position was at that moment only occupied by a dozen men, and what an easy prey it would be for Longstreet to seize if he could reach the place unnoticed.

By directing the First corps to storm the extreme left of the enemy, Lee assigns Longstreet, therefore, a rôle analogous to that which Jackson had so well performed at Chancellorsville. But the ground being more open than in the forest of the Wilderness, renders the manœuvre more difficult and less effective, inasmuch as it cannot altogether escape the enemy's notice. Besides, Lee has not placed in the hands of Longstreet the means of action which two months previously had secured Jackson's success. In fact, having at that time only five divisions with him, he gave his lieutenant three of them, and kept but two to hold Hooker in check. There is no doubt that in order to occupy the attention of the adversary a larger display of force is required on the cultivated hills of Gettysburg than around Chancellorsville; but it must also be said that, thanks to the nature of the ground, the artillery could supply the absence of a numerous force of infantry. The very disposition of the two lines of the enemy ought to decide Lee to concentrate all his means of action upon a single point in order to strike a decisive blow, should he be obliged even to strip the rest of his front to accomplish this purpose. In fact, from Benner's Hill,

along the left bank of Rock Creek, as far as the extremity of Seminary Hill, the Confederates form an extensive and concave line, which will be still further lengthened when Longstreet, deploying beyond the Emmettsburg road, shall try to outflank the Federal left: this line will possess a development of about five and a half miles, and its extremities, placed face to face at a distance of about three miles, will be separated by the whole mass of the enemy's army. This army occupies, therefore, an inverse and convex position along an arc of little less than four miles, the chord of which is only two thousand two hundred yards in length. If it be always dangerous for the smallest army to approach the adversary by two wings at once, the form of the Union line renders the execution of such a plan particularly difficult for the Confederates. Yet Lee has not dared to diminish the too-extended front occupied by his left wing, and still less to strip it under the very eyes of the enemy in order to reinforce his right. He has therefore left three divisions of the Confederate Second corps on this side, although he has declined to assign it the first rôle in this day's work. He cannot, however, doom the entire corps to absolute inaction, and before leaving Ewell has directed him to attack the enemy with vigor when the sound of cannon shall announce the commencement of the battle on the right wing. The Confederate Third corps, placed in the centre, will have to support its two neighbors as soon as the Federal lines shall appear to be shaken by either attack. So that, by a train of errors intimately connected with each other, Lee deploys his army upon a more extended front than that of Meade, without concentrating anywhere the necessary force for breaking up the enemy's lines. The first attack is to be made on the right with only two divisions; then, without any other notification than the clashing of arms in this battle—a sign always unreliable—three divisions will undertake the second attack at the other extremity of the line; finally, if success appears to favor them, the right centre, by connecting these two attacks, shall take part in the battle. Shall we find in these dispositions a proof of Lee's hesitations regarding the point where it is expedient for him to strike his adversary, or should we rather think that he does not dare entrust to anybody a mission fully as important as those which Jackson had

so well performed at Manassas and Chancellorsville? This last supposition is justified by the part which Lee will take in the direction of the battle, and which we should be tempted to designate as insignificant, if we could do so without intending to cast blame upon him. Once the game opened, just as if Jackson was still living he continues to leave an extraordinary latitude to his lieutenants: the absence of a sufficient general staff—the great defect of American armies—made this, perhaps, a matter of necessity on his part. After having allotted to each man his separate *rôle* in the action which is about to take place, he will remain, so to say, a spectator of the struggle, receiving hardly any message and scarcely issuing any order. The intricacies of the machine he has to manœuvre make it too difficult for him to guide it properly when it is on the march.

The plan adopted by Lee has the inconvenience of increasing this very defect by making success dependent upon the combined action of several corps between which there is absolutely no connection; thus he commits, in his turn, the fault he made Hooker and Sedgwick pay so dearly for on the banks of the Rappahannock; and this fault, the consequences of which we shall see developed during each phase of the battle, will be aggravated, as it frequently happens, by the hesitations of his lieutenants, who are obliged, for the first time, to manœuvre in sight and under the fire of the enemy: this will prove to be the principal cause of his defeat.

Longstreet, as we have stated, did not approve of the plan of attack which he was charged to execute, and, before receiving detailed instructions, did not display much alacrity in preparing himself for it: he found his forces reduced, at that time, to six brigades, altogether insufficient for such a task, and he was in hopes that the attack would be deferred till next day, in order to allow time for Pickett's division and Law's brigade to join him. If Lee had given him a formal order, or if he had himself felt the necessity of beginning the action as soon as possible, he could have brought seven brigades into line by nine o'clock in the morning. At this hour, indeed, the sixteen pieces of cannon composing his artillery corps, which had left Greenwood under the direction of Colonel Alexander, arrived at Seminary Hill, while

Wilcox's brigade, which had been left by Hill on Marsh Creek, behind the bivouacs of the First corps, had reached the adjoining woods of Warfield without being seen by the enemy, where McLaws came to relieve it toward four o'clock in the afternoon. Longstreet preferred to wait, finding, no doubt, that through one of those long days of July he had no need of hurrying in order to conquer and gather the fruits of victory. It is true that Lee, beginning to be impatient, directs him to attack without Law's brigade, which can only arrive at noon; but the general-in-chief soon yields to his pressing request, and allows him to wait for Law. Three-quarters of an hour have scarcely elapsed when Law joins Hood's other brigades, which are massed back of Seminary Hill at the west, behind the right of the Third corps. The latter, as well as Alexander's batteries, has long been in position: Ewell is waiting for the signal agreed upon.

The sun, the burning sun of July, has already crossed the zenith, and the same silence continues to prevail along both armies. Meade, becoming more and more astonished at the inaction of the enemy, tries in vain to guess the cause. The post of observation placed on Little Round Top signals the movements of troops toward the south. The Union general suspects, not without some cause, that the Confederates are seeking to disguise a flank march, their object being to turn his position between Taneytown and Gettysburg; for he cannot otherwise account for their delay in making the attack. Having abandoned the idea of taking the offensive, he must foresee all that can tempt the enemy. If the latter succeeds in turning him, it will be necessary to make the army fall back, either upon Willoway or Pipe Creek. He therefore directs his staff to examine the position of each corps and the roads by which they can fall back; the chief of staff, General Butterfield, is preparing at the same time a general order indicating the direction which each of these corps will have to take. Finally, wishing to be informed by his lieutenants regarding the condition of his troops, and the character of the ground which each of them will have to defend, as well as the various measures to be adopted according to what the enemy may do, Meade, who is still treating them as confidants, summons them to meet in council at his head-quarters near Ziegler's Grove. It has been



since attempted to find in these measures a proof that Meade was preparing to abandon the positions of Gettysburg, and also pretended that on that very day he would have executed this project, which was already settled in his mind, if he had not been prevented by the attack of which we shall speak presently. Meade, on the other hand, has asserted that the order, drawn up by Butterfield and shown to several officers, had been written without his knowledge. But if the reverse had been the fact, we could only see in these preparations the proof of an extremely wise forethought: the measures adopted on the ground by the Union general-in-chief formally contradict the idea attributed to him.

Nevertheless, one of those blunders that frequently occur on the battlefield was the means of compromising the safety of the Federal line just in that part which will be the first to be menaced. Meade, believing that Gregg's division of cavalry had joined him and was clearing his left flank, had authorized Pleasonton to send back to Westminster Buford's two brigades, which had been so severely tried the day before. He had been wrongly informed: Buford alone covered this flank. Meade only learned this fact at one o'clock; he immediately directed Pleasonton not to strip him entirely; but it is too late. Buford is gone; Merritt, who is coming from Emmetsburg, is still far away, and Sickles has therefore only the skirmishers of his infantry to watch the movements of the enemy, whose numerous indications reveal his presence in force on that side. In fact, since nine o'clock in the morning Birney's skirmishers have been attacked by those of Wilcox from among the trees with which the Warfield farm is covered at the east, and the whole Confederate brigade comes forward for the purpose of supporting them. When, shortly after, Sickles, being apprised of the untimely departure of Buford, decided, in order to ward off all surprise, to replace him, by causing his whole line of skirmishers to advance as far as the Emmetsburg road. This general, whose military instinct has fathomed the enemy's intentions, justly suspecting that Lee's main effort would shortly be directed against that portion of the Federal line which has been entrusted to him, is not satisfied with this movement. In order to protect the important position of the orchard, he has charged Colonel Berdan to push forward a reconnoissance

with two regiments along the Millerstown road as far as the small wood, where musket-shots have been exchanged with the enemy. Toward noon he penetrates into the midst of these clusters of trees, but being soon attacked by Wilcox's brigade and badly punished by Poague's battery of Hill's corps, he is obliged to fall back upon the orchard. This engagement cost him severely, but it has revealed the presence of a numerous enemy, who is masking his movements and seems disposed to turn the Federal left. In the mean while, Sickles, thinking only of the attack with which he believes himself menaced, has requested Meade to send him fresh instructions: finally, about eleven o'clock, receiving no reply, he repairs to head-quarters for the purpose of obtaining them. He informs Meade that Geary has left him no clearly-defined position to defend: not finding any standpoint along the line which he occupies, he would desire to advance with all his forces as far as the Emmettsburg road; and he immediately requests his chief either to ascertain for himself the necessity for making this movement or to send General Warren to settle the matter in his place. Meade, being under the impression, no doubt, that the attack of the enemy would not be aimed at his left, and probably also kept back by the vicinity of the telegraph-office, declined either to leave his head-quarters or to separate himself from General Warren. He merely repeated to Sickles the order to remain in the positions taken the day before by Geary, and, according to an eyewitness, he even pointed out to him with his finger the hillocks of the Round Tops as the point on which he should align himself. This was an error on his part, for if he entertained any confidence in Sickles' sagacity he should have taken his objections into consideration, and, in the contrary case, to control them without delay. In fact, whether the commander of the Third corps was or was not mistaken in his estimates, he simply desired to receive positive instructions, instead of mere suggestions which allowed him a latitude the limits of which seemed to him very vague. Finally, he obtains permission to take along with him General Hunt, chief of artillery, and, quickly returning, makes a reconnoissance of the line along which he would have liked to place his troops. Hunt points out the positions which appear to him the best for his arm of the service, but, in consideration of the plan

of the general-in-chief, he refuses to pronounce a formal opinion regarding the occupation of this new line, which modifies the entire order of battle. He returns to head-quarters, completing the examination of the ground as far as the Little Round Top, and requests Meade to go himself to the left before approving the proposed movement. Several hours have thus elapsed; Meade, who has summoned all his corps commanders, and is waiting for Sickles among the rest, expects, no doubt, to have then a better understanding with him. But the latter, on learning the result of Berdan's reconnoissance, has no longer any doubt regarding the projects of the enemy, and becomes more and more uneasy at having to receive his attack upon the ground which he actually occupies. Being left in a state of uncertainty by Hunt's departure, he determines at last to take possession of the Emmettsburg road as far as the orchard with his whole corps a little before two o'clock.

He thus finds himself, as we have stated, in a more commanding position than if he had remained within the line from Ziegler's Grove to Little Round Top, especially if he had left Humphreys in the low grounds which descend toward Plum Run. Nevertheless, it presents such serious difficulties that one cannot approve of the initiative steps taken by General Sickles in planting himself there. On one side, in fact, the Emmettsburg road plunging into a piece of ground between the Godori and Smith houses, it would be necessary to reach out as far as the ridge within two hundred yards more to the west in order to prevent the line from being commanded at this point; on the other side, the position of the orchard presents a very salient angle, easy to attack on both sides, having no morasses, and being situated about four hundred yards from a wooded ridge a little more elevated, behind which the enemy can prepare for his attacks; finally, this curved line, running from Ziegler's Grove to the Little Round Top by way of the orchard, has a development nearly double the preceding one, which is already too long: the result will be that the front of the Third corps, thus extended, will lose its power of resistance, while it will be impossible to fall back sufficiently with the two wings in order to reach their natural resting-points both on the right and left. If the enemy, as there is reason to fear, attempts a flank

movement by way of the south, and seeks to conceal his march behind the Warfield ridge, it is this very ridge that should be occupied, because it completely masks the view of the orchard. But it is on his front, and not on his extreme left, that Sickles seems to have anticipated an attack. Consequently, he causes the line of battle of Birney's division to advance about five hundred yards, thus abandoning the left bank of Plum Run and the slopes of the Little Round Top, the importance of which he does not appear to have then fully appreciated, in order to place himself on a line with Humphreys: subsequently, he makes the whole division perform a left half-wheel by taking Ward as a pivot, so that Graham with the marching wing may come to occupy the orchard; the three brigades, with the exception of the extreme right of the latter, find themselves facing south. It is not without regret that the soldiers of Birney's left leave the positions they occupy to go into action upon ground which affords much greater facilities to the enemy for approaching them. This general, wishing to occupy the line of the stream running from the Rose house to Plum Run, pushes them forward without allowing them to complete the conversion entirely. Ward takes position in the wood which covers the flank of Devil's Den above this stream; his left rests upon the left of Plum Run, thus finding itself separated from the Little Round Top, which remains exposed without means of defence to a surprise on the part of the enemy; his right extends as far as the summit of the triangular wheat-field of which we have already spoken. De Trobriand, coming to his assistance in this field, forms his line across the wood situated up the stream, along the slope adjoining the left bank of the tributary, prolonging it through the fields by ascending in the direction of the Peach Orchard hillock, upon which Graham is posted; but in order to connect with this position he is obliged to deploy a whole regiment, the Third Michigan, as skirmishers. Birney's division, thus formed, presents its right flank to the enemy along the Emmettsburg road: in order to cover it as much as possible, Humphreys, by Sickles' order, proceeds in the direction of this same road, with all his force, a little before three o'clock. But the position which is thus assigned to him presents serious dangers in its turn. In fact, to strengthen the too-extended line of Bir-



ney, Sickles takes from him Burling's brigade, which he places in reserve in the rear of Ward and De Trobriand; Humphreys, leaving to his two other brigades the formation which he has given them in the morning, rests his left on Graham, near the Sherfy house, his right resting, without any connection, on the patch of ground where the road is commanded from the enemy's side, while his line having already nearly eight hundred and fifty yards of development, he cannot even extend it as far as the Godori house on the other side of the valley. Gibbon, who commands the division on the left of the Second corps, finding himself thus separated from Humphreys' right by a space of over five hundred yards, naturally does not follow this movement, the object of which he cannot understand. This break in the battle-front of the Federals is the more dangerous because the Godori house and the surrounding farms situated upon a commanding point are easily accessible to the enemy, owing to a large cluster of trees adjacent thereto within a few hundred yards. Gibbon, feeling the danger, and yet unable to prolong his line as far as the road without exposing it to be enfiladed, directs two regiments to occupy the house, so as to serve as a connecting-link between the two corps. Humphreys, on his part, sends his skirmishers to free the ground in his front of the fences and trunks of trees which might intercept his fire and harass his movements. Finally, the five batteries of the Third corps, soon reinforced by three others taken from the reserve artillery, are placed in such a manner as to cover the weak points of the line as much as possible. On the right Seeley's battery is posted near the Smith house, commanding the valley into which the Emmetsburg road descends; Turnbull comes shortly after to take position on the left. Randolph occupies the front of the western angle itself, behind the Sherfy house, while the south front bristles with the batteries of Clark and Bigelow, that are posted over an intrenchment dug out along the road which runs in the direction of Plum Run: thirty pieces of cannon thus defend the position of the orchard. Winslow, with twelve howitzers, very formidable at short range, is planted in the wheat-field behind De Trobriand; finally, Smith has succeeded in scaling the hill of Devil's Den with his battery, whence he commands the gorge of Plum Run and all the wooded slopes extending as

far as the Emmettsburg road. Sickles, having been summoned to head-quarters, has left the command of his troops to Birney. But at the very moment when the generals are about to assemble, the cannon's voice, which is heard on the left, calls each of them to his post. Sickles has had no time to dismount from his horse. Meade on this occasion does not hesitate to follow him. It is half-past three o'clock: the battle is at last about to commence.

The interminable preparations of the Confederates are therefore completed. We have seen how much precious time has been lost up to noon. At this hour Law joins Hood and McLaws, who have stacked arms and are waiting for him on the right bank of Willoughby Run, between the roads to Chambersburg and Hagerstown, fronting the battlefield of the previous day. The two divisions take up the line of march. McLaws at the head, under the lead of Colonel Johnston of the general staff, proceeds toward the schoolhouse of Willoughby Run. Thence a road winding through the woods will lead him to the Emmettsburg road beyond the orchard, thus enabling him to surround the Federal left. But, having reached a halfway point, the Confederates perceive the summit of the Little Round Top between two hills, as also the flags that are being waved by the Federals on the lookout who occupy it. As Lee has given formal instructions to disguise the march of the First corps, McLaws is brought to a halt while waiting for orders; finally, the column makes a retrograde movement in the direction of the Hagerstown road, to follow it as far as the Black Horse Tavern, and there to take the Millers-town road, in order to reach the schoolhouse by a deviation of about five miles.\*

\* Longstreet has blamed Colonel Johnston for having caused his first division to make this long and useless *détour*. McLaws and Johnston assert, on the contrary, that the direction of the Black Horse Tavern was given by Longstreet himself. We cannot reconcile these different allegations; but we will observe that, in either case, the responsibility belongs to the commander of the First corps, who should have been near the head of his column in order to direct its movements. Johnston adds that the *détour* imposed upon McLaws' division was an insignificant one, which did not cause him to lose much time. An examination of the map is sufficient to prove that this assertion is inadmissible. But the consequences of the delay in Longstreet's attack were so serious that we have not desired to withhold any of the excuses alleged by the various interested parties.

This countermarch causes McLaws to lose more than two hours. Lee, who for the last hour has been expecting to see him emerge every moment, does not understand the cause for this delay, and becomes impatient to no purpose. On his own part, Ewell, who receives no instructions, wishing to make the most of his time, plants his artillery upon Benner's Hill, fires a few shots against Culp's Hill, and sends forward reconnoissances to feel the Federal positions. Longstreet, who has proceeded by a more direct road with his columns to the spot where they are to form, finally shares this impatience on the part of his chief, and repairs to the front of his troops in order to accelerate their march. He can cause McLaws to turn back from the road which he has so unfortunately taken, but he still finds Hood at the point where the latter has been brought to a halt. The commander of the First corps, finding that there is no longer any reason for concealing his march, inasmuch as the whole column must have been signalled a long time since from the summit of the Little Round Top, orders Hood to strike the Emmetsburg road direct by passing behind the Warfield ridge. Hood thus precedes McLaws along this road, and by taking his right wing he may begin the attack even before the latter has fallen into line. Lee, to whom Longstreet has hastened to announce his speedy entrance into line, has caused Ewell to be told to hold himself in readiness to support him about four o'clock. Hood, on his own part, leaving on his left the wood which Wilcox occupies in front of the orchard, where McLaws will have to form, has drawn up his four brigades in line of battle west of the Emmetsburg road, Law on the right, with Benning behind him; Robertson on the left in the first line, with Anderson in the second line. At three o'clock he receives the order to attack in conformity with Lee's instructions; that is to say, by keeping his left near the road. But the reports of his skirmishers make known to Hood the difficulties of the road he has been directed to follow. It is known, in fact, that the left of the Federals, instead of terminating, as the Southern general-in-chief had thought, in the neighborhood of the orchard, was prolonged in return from this point as far as Plum Run, thus forming a convex line of great strength and difficult of access. More to the south the open fields which extend from the Emmetsburg road,

by winding around the rocky base of the Round Tops as far as the Taneytown road, where the enemy's supply-trains are parked, seemed to invite the Confederates to surround the extremity of the Union line on that side. The ground is favorable for a flank movement of this limited character, which would not compromise the whole army into making a flank march. Hood has been asking from his immediate chief permission to make the attempt. But Lee's order is peremptory: the plan of battle cannot be changed without his consent; and Longstreet has already lost so much time that he dares not assume the responsibility of further delay. Although it is not within the conditions foreseen by Lee, he applies himself to cause the instructions given by the latter to be executed literally, and comes to show Hood the direction he is to follow. The objective point is the Devil's Den hill, and the task of attacking the orchard both in front and in flank falls again upon McLaws. At half-past three o'clock the four brigades of the former take up the line of march by descending toward Plum Run, their right extending in the direction of the road connecting the Slyder house with the Emmettsburg road. The two armies facing each other are about coming to blows at last.



## CHAPTER IV.

### GETTYSBURG.

THE importance of the battle of Gettysburg has compelled us to divide its narrative into two chapters, but this second part is only a continuation of the first. The great struggle has been going on since the morning of the 1st of July, notwithstanding the temporary cessation which occurred during the earlier part of the 2d. The movements of Longstreet's corps which we have just described have been noticed by the Federals posted at the orchard; their artillery opens fire upon the adjoining woods of Warfield; several batteries of Longstreet's which have taken position near this farm reply to them; Wilcox on one side, Graham on the other, cause skirmishers to advance, and the musketry-fire becomes rapidly intense. It is at this moment that Meade, accompanied by Sickles, reaches the new line which the latter has caused his troops to occupy. Struck with its extension, he sees that a single corps is not sufficient to defend it; he prepares at once to reinforce it, and sends General Warren, whose quickness of perception inspires him with the utmost confidence, to select the points which stand most in need of assistance. Sickles, finding that his chief does not approve of his recent movement, proposes to fall back. But Meade, showing him the woods on their left, answers that it is too late: in fact, while the artillery-fire against the orchard is increasing, the volleys of musketry announce that more to eastward Hood has opened the fight. The latter was to have caused his front to make a half-wheel to the left in order to attack that portion of the Federal line occupied by De Trobriand and Ward; but while advancing beyond the Emmettsburg road he has at once recognized the importance of Little Round Top, and, directing Law to bear no longer to the left, but to the right, he orders

him toward this point. Robertson, perceiving this movement, imitates it at once in order not to break up the line, and, crossing the tributary of Plum Run in front of the western part of the Devil's Den, he dashes forward to attack this position a few minutes before four o'clock, preceded by a swarm of skirmishers. The Federals, who have seen on the opposite slopes the serried lines of the assailants advancing with their flags flying and shouting their war-cry, are ready to receive them. Ward waits for their attack in good positions and without flinching, but as he has sent Berdan with the Third Maine to the orchard, his brigade is reduced to five regiments. A desperate struggle takes place along the rocky slopes which the Confederates are beginning to climb: fortunately for Ward, Robertson, in extending his left for the purpose of surrounding him, exposes his flank to De Trobriand, and on this side his soldiers begin to fall back. He is obliged to take the remainder of his force to their assistance, and Ward, thus freed, recovers the ground he has just lost. The First Texas, which was trying to seize the nearest guns of Smith's battery, redeems the combat on the left, but the Federal guns, being thenceforth free, inflict severe losses upon the assailants, who are trying in vain to capture them. During this time, Anderson, who was to support Robertson, has not followed his movement on the right, and is about to strike the centre of De Trobriand's line, which is its strongest part. Being obliged to cross the ravine under the enemy's fire, he has been repulsed with great loss. Besides, two regiments having become separated from Robertson's brigade, and continuing to march with Law's troops, this brigade would find itself isolated and in a most critical position but for the timely arrival of Benning. This general, having, like Anderson, adhered to his original direction, thus finds himself in the rear of Robertson. These three brigades at the same time renew the attack. De Trobriand and Ward offer the most desperate resistance; Smith's and Winslow's batteries support them as much as the nature of the ground will allow. The woods, the rocks, and the slopes give the defenders great advantage, but they are much weaker numerically than the Southerners, who rush to the attack with desperate energy; consequently, their losses follow in quick succession, and their line is speedily

thinned, there being no reserve to reinforce it. The combat thus begun does not cause Hood to lose sight of the Round Tops. The highest seems inaccessible, and, moreover, the view of the enfilading Federal line is hidden from him by the smallest; it is this one, together with the surrounding slopes, that it is necessary to take possession of. Law, entrusted with this task, penetrates into the small valley of Plum Run, to ascend it again between the slopes of Devil's Den and those of the Round Tops; his brigade is reinforced by the two regiments that have been detached from that of Robertson; he has under his command soldiers from Texas and Alabama, tried in various combats, ardent as the sun under which they were born, indefatigable and insensible to danger,—resembling, in one word, the brilliant Hood, who has long been training them and is encouraging them by his presence. Ward had only placed a single regiment, the Fourth Maine, before Little Round Top in the bottom of the valley where the Plum Run flows, but he has had time to reinforce it with the Fortieth New York, which De Trobriand has sent to his assistance when attacked by Robertson, and the Sixth New Jersey, detached from Burling's brigade. The three regiments, soon increased to four by a new contribution from this brigade, go into ambuscade behind the rocks and resist Law's furious attack; nevertheless, they lose ground and uncover the approaches of the Little Round Top. In order to support their retreat, Ward is obliged to strip his right; De Trobriand, compelled, in his turn, to extend his left in order to fill up the space thus formed, places the Seventeenth Maine in the wheat-field behind the wall which at the south separates this field from that portion of the wood abandoned by Ward. Winslow fires his guns against this wood. By thus increasing the length of his line De Trobriand only keeps two small regiments in the centre, for he cannot call in the Third Michigan without breaking all connection with Graham. He, however, holds out against Anderson's second assault; the latter is wounded and his troops are repulsed. But Benning's arrival has dealt a fatal blow at Ward. The Confederates once more climb the hill, driving the Federals, who defend themselves foot by foot, ending by taking possession of three pieces of Smith's artillery. The Federal infantry in falling back leaves

almost without support the rest of the battery, posted more in the rear upon a steep hillock whence it commands the Plum Run gorge.

At the same time, a portion of McLaws' division falls into line. Longstreet's orders directed this division, once out of the wood it occupied, to deploy in two lines across the Emmettsburg road, with Kershaw, then Semmes, on the right, Barksdale on the left, and Wofford behind him: it was thus to follow this road in order to attack the position of the orchard as soon as Hood had turned it. But the latter, having extended his line to the right at a great distance from the road, McLaws cannot follow this direction without exposing his own flank. After waiting for some time, he decides to modify his dispositions. About five o'clock Kershaw is ordered to cross the Emmettsburg road, instead of following it in a northerly direction, to support Hood's left; Semmes is to march in his wake. Kershaw soon reaches the Rose house, but from this point forward the nature of the ground retards his movements; finally, he crosses the upper part of the tributary of Plum Run, and shortly after half-past five o'clock he attacks the wooded hill occupied by De Trobriand's centre; he extends his left against the weak line connecting the latter with Graham and covering Clark's and Bigelow's batteries. Near the Emmettsburg road the Confederates, not having yet brought their infantry into action, direct the fire of all the guns which they can place on the Warfield ridge against Humphreys' two brigades and that of Graham. Finally, a portion of the artillery of Hill's corps cannonades the positions of the Second corps of the Army of the Potomac. The Union batteries reply to them with great vigor.

As we have stated, Meade, being convinced since his arrival upon the ground that Sickles could not defend his position single-handed, had promised him immediate reinforcements. He had authorized him to ask Hancock for a division from his right, and had informed him of the approaching arrival of the Fifth corps. In fact, before leaving his head-quarters he had ordered Sykes to come with this corps to the support of the left of the Third, which seemed to him thenceforth to be especially menaced. Sykes, going in search of his troops to a distance of over



one mile back of the Round Tops, had put them at once on the march. He was ordered to place them on the extreme left, along the prolongation of Birney's line; so that when the latter, seeing Hood's attack foreshadowed, asked him with great earnestness for some immediate help, he would not at first allow any of his regiments to be turned from the direction he had given them. But having crossed Plum Run with Barnes' division, he was able to reconnoitre the ground in person: soon after, about half-past four o'clock, he proposed to Birney to have the centre of his line reinforced by Barnes, provided that this line, extending to the left, should cover Smith's battery, which was at the time greatly exposed, and the valley of Plum Run. Birney readily accepts the proposition, and sends Burling's two regiments, with that of De Trobriand, which we have seen opportunely arrive in this new position. Sykes, on his part, pushes forward Tilton's and Sweitzer's brigades of Barnes' division, which he had halted in the rear of De Trobriand. Sweitzer takes position on the right of the latter in the wood where the combat is going on, his left adjoining the ravine and facing south, the rest of the line forming a right angle and facing west; Tilton prolongs his front in this direction along the cleared slope which rises as far as the orchard.

While this movement is being executed, Kershaw, crossing the ravine, as we have mentioned, advances against these very positions. His attack is at first directed against Sweitzer, but the latter, being posted on favorable ground, offers resistance. He then turns against Tilton's brigade, which is much more exposed. It has no support, its right is unprotected, and it falls back. Its retreat is followed by that of Sweitzer, despite the energy with which it defends itself in the wood. The troops of the Third corps that are fighting on the left of these two brigades, whose arrival had brought them assistance, are again compromised. Still farther on the extreme left the combat has extended its area and assumed greater importance; all the troops at Sykes' disposal are successively directed toward that portion of the line which Meade has entrusted to his care.

In order to show how the slopes of Little Round Top, but lately stripped, are rapidly swarming with defenders, we must

go back to the condition of affairs two hours before. About a quarter to four o'clock, Warren, following Meade's instructions, had reached this hill, and was climbing it for the purpose of surveying the country. The officers of the signal corps stationed on the top having informed him that they thought they had seen the enemy's lines in the woods between Plum Run and the Emmettsburg road, he had ordered Smith's battery to fire a shot in that direction. Just as the projectile passed whistling above the trees all the Confederate soldiers had instinctively raised their heads, and this simultaneous movement being communicated to the polished arms they held in their hands, Warren had caught their reflection, like a streak of lightning, winding with a long trail among the leaves. This momentary apparition had been a revelation to him; he had divined the danger which menaced Little Round Top, and understood, by the same token, the importance of this position. It was necessary to hasten in order to find defenders for it. Following in the wake of Sykes, who had just crossed the hill on foot with Barnes' division, he had found him near the wheat-field completing the reconnoissance of which we have spoken. The commander of the Fifth corps had immediately ordered Colonel Vincent, who was in command of Barnes' Third brigade, to proceed to occupy the foot of Little Round Top; Hazlett's battery was to co-operate with him. Warren, going in advance of them, had reached his post of observation to witness the first attack of Law against the four regiments which alone are defending the gorge of Plum Run. One moment later the bulk of these troops was falling back upon the flank of the Devil's Den hill, while a party of sharpshooters was trying to find shelter among the rocks scattered along the western flank of Little Round Top. The Confederates were hastening in pursuit of them; their projectiles already reached the elevated post whence Warren was watching this exciting scene. He could not, however, see Vincent's brigade, which, encompassing the hill at the west, had disappeared in the woods. This position, easy to defend and impossible to recapture, whose importance Warren alone seems to have then understood, was therefore about to fall into the hands of the enemy without striking a blow. The young general of engineers makes a last

effort to save it. He directs the officers of the signal corps, who are preparing to abandon a post without defenders, to continue waving their flags, in spite of the enemy's fire, in order to deceive him and detain him for a few moments while he is going to ask for assistance from a body of troops whose column he sees moving along the road followed a short time since by Barnes. It is the Third brigade of Ayres' division of the Fifth corps, under command of General Weed, and is preceding the rest of the division at a considerable distance. Weed has gone forward in advance to ask for instructions from Sickles; but the first regiment that Warren encounters is commanded by Colonel O'Rorke, his friend, and during a certain period of time his subordinate, who does not hesitate to respond to the pressing demands of his former chief. While the rest of the brigade is continuing its march, O'Rorke causes the column of the One-hundred-and-fortieth New York, which, fortunately, is of considerable strength, to scale directly the acclivities of Little Round Top.

During this time, Vincent, hastening the pace of his soldiers, has reached the southern extremity of this same hill. On this side it is not so steep as on the other sides, being prolonged by a ridge which about halfway presents a horizontal stretch of nearly one hundred yards in length, descending thence by gentle gradations as far as the foot of the large Round Top. This ridge affords an excellent position to Vincent for barring the passage to Law's soldiers, who are rapidly advancing in his direction. He posts himself along the western slope, with the Sixteenth Michigan on the right, below the very summit of the hill, the Forty-fourth New York and the Eighty-third Pennsylvania in the centre, and the Twentieth Maine, under Colonel Chamberlain, on the left, along the extremity of the ridge. These troops could not have arrived more opportunely. Hood, after being for some time held stationary by the difficulty of keeping his soldiers in the ranks under the fire of a Federal battery posted at the bottom of the gorge, has at last reached the foot of Little Round Top, which he points out to them as a prey thenceforth easily captured. A great yell goes up from the ranks of the assailants, who rush with impetuosity upon the centre of Vincent's brigade. But upon this

ground all the advantages are in favor of the defence, while the fire of the Unionists, sheltered among its inaccessible recesses, stops the Confederates, who stumble at every step they take in their efforts to reach them. They do not turn back on that account, but, posting themselves in their turn behind the rocks, engage in a murderous encounter with Vincent's brigade, which defends itself almost at the point of the muzzle. Law, seeing the resistance which this small band makes in front of him, determines to turn it. He extends his left for the purpose of outflanking the Sixteenth Michigan, and attacks it with so much vigor that it cannot resist the onslaught. The situation is becoming serious for the Federals: Vincent is entirely isolated from the rest of the army, and no longer protects the principal point of the position, the summit of Little Round Top, on which the officers of the signal corps are bravely continuing to wave their colors.

At the very moment when the Sixteenth Michigan is succumbing, O'Rourke's soldiers, by a really providential coincidence, reach at a full run this summit, which Warren points out to them as the citadel to be preserved at any cost. At their feet lies the vast battlefield, whence are heard vague noises and savage cries, the rattling of musketry, the cannon's roar, and where all the incidents of the combat are seen through a cloud of smoke; but they have no leisure to contemplate this spectacle, for they find themselves face to face with Law's soldiers, who are climbing the hill on the opposite side. A few minutes' delay among the Federals would have sufficed to put the Confederates in possession of the summit. Never perhaps was seen the winner of a race secure such a prize at so little cost. The Unionists, although surprised, do not, however, hesitate. They have time neither to form in line of battle nor even to load their guns or fix bayonets. O'Rourke calls them and pushes them forward. A large number of them fall at the first fire of the enemy; the rest rush down upon the latter at a run, brandishing their muskets aloft; and this movement suffices to stop the Confederates. The Federals take prisoners those among the assailants who had been foremost in the race, and open a brisk fire of musketry upon the others. Vincent's right, having recovered from its check, comes to their assistance. Hazlett's battery has scaled Little Round



Top with the One-hundred-and-fortieth New York; the most extraordinary efforts, together with the co-operation of a portion of the regiment, have been required to haul the pieces of artillery as far as the summit. Although the position is very dangerous, for showers of bullets are falling around the guns, which cannot be depressed enough to reach the enemy along the slope which he is scaling, Hazlett boldly takes his position and directs his fire against the Confederate reserve in the valley: he knows that the presence of his guns encourages the Union infantry. The Federal line, thus strengthened, presents an impregnable front to Hood's assaults; the position of Little Round Top is safe for the present. But this advantage has been dearly bought: in a few minutes the One-hundred-and-fortieth New York has lost more than one hundred men, a large number of officers being wounded. The valiant O'Rourke has paid with his life for the example of bravery which he set to his soldiers. Having left West Point two years previously with the highest honors, he had been destined, in the judgment of all his comrades, for the most elevated positions in the army.

A personal and desperate struggle takes place along the whole front of the two bodies of troops. They watch each other, and aim from behind the rocks and bushes; some of the combatants are seen here and there climbing trees in order to secure a better shot; the balls whistle in every direction; two pieces of Smith's Federal battery take the line of the assailants obliquely, throwing shells into their midst. The dead and wounded disappear among the rocks. On both sides the officers perform prodigies of valor, for they feel the importance of the disputed position. Law is not satisfied with musketry-fire, which may be prolonged without any decisive success: he wishes to pierce the enemy's line, and brings back against the One-hundred-and-fortieth New York the soldiers of his command who had been stopped by the unexpected arrival of this regiment; but Vincent, who had assumed command of the whole line, hastens with a few reinforcements, and the attack is repulsed. The combatants are beginning to be exhausted on both sides; the Federals have seen Vincent fall gloriously with a large number of his men; the losses of the Confederates are also

heavy ; the most serious one is that of Hood, who, being always at the post of danger, has been badly wounded in the arm.

We have reached a period when, on the other side of Plum Run, Kershaw's arrival causes Barnes' two brigades to lose the ground they had recovered, and compromises once more the positions so stubbornly defended by Ward and De Trobriand. The former, weakened by his struggle with Robertson, can no longer resist Benning, who is pressing him on the right and left at the same time ; Smith with great difficulty saves the three guns remaining in his possession ; the entire hill of Devil's Den is abandoned by the remnant of Ward's brigade and the three regiments that had joined it. The Confederates, crowding the wood, take the Seventeenth Maine, posted behind the wall, in flank, and, proceeding to the wheat-field, force Winslow to remove his guns to the rear, and menace the flank of De Trobriand's weak line. The latter is assailed at the same time in front by Anderson's troops, and outflanked on the right by Kershaw, who, driving back Tilton and Sweitzer, advances in the wood until close upon their rear. De Trobriand is compelled to give ground in turn, his brigade being reduced to a handful of men. The troops posted on his right, near the orchard, cannot afford him any assistance, for the artillery which they defend, long exposed to the fire of Longstreet's batteries, which take him almost in flank, is seriously threatened by Kershaw's left. On this side the Eighth South Carolina bravely advances against the guns of Clark and Bigelow, who appear to be poorly supported ; but just as it approaches, the One-hundred-and-forty-first Pennsylvania, which was hidden in a sunken road, rises suddenly and stops it by a murderous fire. Notwithstanding this success, the Unionists, anxious about their artillery, take it back beyond the sunken road, thus still further uncovering De Trobriand's right. Fortunately, Caldwell's strong division, which Meade has detached from the Second corps as soon as he had realized the importance of Longstreet's attack, arrives in time to relieve the soldiers of Birney and Barnes. One of his brigades, commanded by the valiant Cross, supports the remnants of De Trobriand's command. Another, under Kelly, which forms the left of the division, and has crossed Plum Run near the road, supports Ward

along the slopes bordering on the right bank of this stream a little lower down. It is the Irish brigade, which, organized by Meagher, has already followed through many a battlefield the old golden harp embroidered on the green flag of Erin. It will fight with its wonted gallantry, for each soldier is ready to sacrifice his life with the more readiness that he has been prepared to die as a Christian. As the moment is drawing near for marching against the enemy all the ranks are kneeling, and the chaplain, mounted upon a rock which affords him a natural pulpit, has pronounced a general absolution to the whole brigade in the midst of a religious silence only interrupted by the fire of artillery. The command "Forward!" immediately follows the sacred word of the priest, and the Irish have at once rushed into the thickest of the fight. They suddenly stop Anderson's brigade in its advance.

In the mean while, Birney, rallying around Cross a portion of De Trobriand's soldiers and Burling's two regiments, which have been driven back on that side, places himself at their head and leads them against Kershaw, whose long line cannot sustain this shock. It is forcibly driven back upon Semmes' brigade, which has followed Kershaw very closely, and, fortunately for him, is within one hundred and fifty yards in the rear of his right. These fresh troops advance against the first line of Caldwell's division, which has only achieved this success against Kershaw and Anderson at a great sacrifice, Cross being among the first to be killed. But they soon encounter new adversaries; for Caldwell, seeing the losses of his first line, has caused the second, composed of Zook's and Brooke's brigades, to advance. Semmes' troops are driven back to the other side of the ravine before they have been able to set foot upon the hill, whence Kershaw, on the left, is likewise dislodged. The latter, persisting in not giving the order of retreat, sees his brigade divided into squads fighting isolated on a rough and wooded ground; the Confederates, almost surrounded in their turn, retire toward the Rose house, where Kershaw is rallying the largest portion of his brigade: his left wing maintains its ground and has not been shaken. Reinforcements, equally needful, arrive about the same time on the extreme Federal left, in front of Little Round Top. Before the combat had begun at this point Sykes had directed Ayres' division



toward this position: Weed's brigade, which preceded the other two at a considerable distance, had been turned aside, without the knowledge of the commander of the Fifth corps, by a pressing call from Sickles, and it was going to the assistance of the Third corps when Warren went to seek O'Rorke and his regiment. As soon as Sykes was informed of this fact, he ordered Weed, who had not yet fallen into line, to return with all possible haste to take the position already occupied by the One-hundred-and-fortieth New York. This order was promptly executed. Weed reached Little Round Top at the moment when Vincent was mortally wounded, and when both sides were preparing to renew the struggle which had been temporarily suspended. He takes position on the right of Vincent's brigade, of which Colonel Rice has assumed the command, thus enabling him to reinforce his left. Chamberlain, on his part, in order to keep the enemy in check, has been obliged to place a portion of the Twentieth Maine *en potence* above the defile which separates the two summits. It is, in fact, against this point that Law directs all his efforts, and the combat is resumed with fresh vigor, without allowing Weed time to deploy his battalions. His soldiers, having speedily recovered, rush to the assault with the earnestness of men who have never encountered an obstacle without breaking it down. He strives to outflank the Federal line in order to reach Little Round Top by way of the eastern side of the ridge: his troops have been under less fire on this side, but they have to do with the Twentieth Maine, which defends its position with all the vigor of the strong race of backwoodsmen among whom it has been recruited: again they fight hand to hand, the assailants still trying to turn their adversaries during the combat, the latter prolonging their line and bringing it more and more to the rear in order to frustrate this manœuvre.

In the mean while, the battle, confined up to this moment to the ground comprised between Plum Run and its tributary, rapidly assumes extensive dimensions. Meade has ordered all the force at his disposal to take position on his left. The Sixth corps, whose heads of column have arrived at about two o'clock at the Rock Creek bridge, and are resting after a long and fatiguing march, has relieved the Fifth in this position. We have already



seen Sykes hastening to throw four brigades of this latter corps into the fight; the other five brigades, under Ayres and Crawford, are on the way to join them. From the left his position fortunately approaches the extreme Federal right, which in its turn is stripped for his benefit. At five o'clock Williams' division has moved from the banks of Rock Creek, and is following in the tracks of the Fifth corps; half an hour later a despatch to Geary also puts him in motion with the brigades of Kane and Candy, leaving only Greene's brigade to cover the front which was lately occupied by the Twelfth corps. Humphreys has long since sent Burling to the left; Sickles takes away from him two more regiments, and borrows one from De Trobriand, in order to reinforce the position of the orchard, which the enemy's artillery and Barksdale's skirmishers are riddling with balls. The Second corps has furnished Caldwell's division to defend the line occupied by Ward and De Trobriand. The latter, by making so long a resistance, have thus enabled Meade finally to place on his left much more numerous forces than those of the assailants.

In fact, Hood's division has for a long time alone sustained the burden of the attack. It is exhausted. Robertson has been wounded, together with all the superior officers of his brigade; Benning, menaced in flank by Caldwell, dares not go beyond the summit of Devil's Den; McLaws, who has been in position since four o'clock, has as yet only brought into action in front of the orchard two of his brigades to support Hood, and one of them only within the last quarter of an hour. The other two have not attacked the orchard, expecting that the defenders of this position had either been turned or that Colonel Alexander's artillery had broken their lines by his fire. It is six o'clock, and Hill, in order to follow, is waiting in vain for the troops posted on his right to take up the line of march: the large open space which separates him from the enemy will not permit him to advance except by a collective movement, when his right flank would be protected. Besides, as we have stated, McLaws, who is to follow Hood's movement, must, on the contrary, according to Lee's orders, determine that of Anderson;\* and the

\* The reader must not confound Anderson's division of Hill's corps with Anderson's brigade of Hood's division.

latter will be followed by Pender if the opportunity is favorable, Heth, with Hill's third division, remaining then alone in reserve.

At last, McLaws, seeing Semmes and Kershaw forced back in disorder by Caldwell, decides to attack the orchard. Sickles has given to Graham the effectives of two brigades to defend it, but it would require strong intrenchments to cover a position so destitute of natural shelter on its two flanks. The Confederates slacken the fire of their artillery; the infantry is in motion. Barksdale advances against that one of these two flanks which lies opposite to the west. Wofford, placed in the rear of his right, comes by a half-wheel to attack the south front by assisting some of the battalions of Kershaw's brigade which have not joined in his retreat. Graham, wrapped in a vortex of fire, sees his troops rapidly diminish around him. It is in vain that a regular battery has come to relieve that of Ames at the point most exposed—that Randolph has silenced some of the enemy's guns—that all the Federal guns are firing grapeshot into the ranks of the assailants, for the Confederate infantry penetrates into the orchard and takes possession of it; Graham is wounded and taken prisoner; his soldiers share his fate or are dispersed along the slopes of the hillock, which they rapidly descend; Sickles hastens from the Trostle house, but a bullet breaks his leg, and he is obliged to transfer the command to Birney. The batteries posted on the right along the Emmettsburg road abandon positions which it is no longer possible to defend. Those on the left continue to fire almost at short range, causing the guns after each fire to be drawn back a few paces. But nothing can prevent the defeat of Birney's division, which, out of scarcely five thousand men, has lost two thousand. Barksdale, followed closely by several batteries, rushes into the open breach between Humphreys' left and Barnes' right, and, leaving to the troops that are to support him the task of striking these divisions in the rear, he still pushes forward. The grapeshot thins the ranks of his soldiers, but his example sustains their courage. On his right, Wofford, following his success, bears to eastward in order to take in flank the enemy's regiments that are holding Kershaw in check. It requires less than an hour for the Confederates to achieve this success, which changes

the aspect of the combat; they have two hours of daylight to take advantage of it.

In the centre, Hill, following strictly Lee's instructions, hastens to push forward in rapid succession Anderson's three brigades, commanded by Wilcox, Perry, and Wright, against Humphreys. The first-mentioned commander, who has been shown by the general-in-chief himself since four o'clock what direction to take, inclines at first to the left, in order to avoid meeting at the orchard McLaws' line, running almost perpendicularly to his own; then he faces to the right in line of battle, for the purpose of attacking in front that portion of the Emmettsburg road occupied by Humphreys. The other two brigades form on his left.

At the extreme left Ewell has at last put his columns in motion against Culp's Hill, whose defenders can certainly receive no further assistance. As we have stated, he was to begin the attack as soon as he should hear the sound of Longstreet's guns; but he found how imprudent it was to put any trust in such a signal: the contrary wind did not allow the sound of the cannonade—which had been in progress against the orchard since half-past three o'clock—to reach him. He has only heard Hill's artillery, which opened fire about five o'clock; he immediately prepares for battle. Six batteries posted on Benner's Hill support the attack of Johnson's division against the slopes of Culp's Hill. But at the end of one hour these guns, utterly unprotected, are silenced by those of the Unionists, sheltered inside of the works constructed the day before; the young and gallant Major Latimer, who commands them, is killed; a single battery still sustains the fire. Johnson, finding the north and north-east fronts of Culp's Hill too strongly defended, determines to attack the Federals in the very gorges of Rock Creek in order to turn their positions by the way of the south-east. He requires some time to bear to the left and reach these gorges. When, finally, about half-past six o'clock, the firing of musketry is heard among the rocks, whose loud echoes repeat for the first time such sounds, the battle is in progress along the whole front of the two armies. Between Johnson on the left and Anderson on the right the Confederate infantry, it is true, has not yet taken part in the combat; but

Ewell's and Hill's guns, encompassing the heights of Cemetery Hill and Ziegler's Grove on both sides, cover them with projectiles, thus connecting the two attacks.

Before describing Johnson's attack we must follow Longstreet's progress. Whilst Barksdale leaves Humphreys almost behind him, Wilcox and Perry advance directly against the front of the latter, while farther on Wright menaces his flank. It is near seven o'clock. Humphreys has only two brigades with him; his left is turned; his right, poorly connected with the Second corps, which Caldwell's departure has weakened, is only covered by two regiments of Harrow's brigade, and three strong brigades are on the march to attack him. In order to anticipate them, Humphreys, like a true warrior, desires to go forward to meet them. But Birney, foreseeing a disaster to his own division, orders him to fall back, keeping his left from participating in the movement and bringing his right back to the Second corps. This movement, difficult of execution in the midst of the tumultuous sounds of battle, is accomplished with wonderful precision: the battalions are massing in double column, and execute a backward march in line; then, making a quarter-wheel without accelerating their pace, and, halting at the point indicated to them by their chief, they resume the line of battle, and open at once a well-sustained fire of musketry against the assailants, who are almost upon them. Humphreys also succeeds in taking position along the line which it is important above all to preserve. But the trial was a hard one; he will himself acknowledge hereafter that he thought at one time all was lost. He has left one-half of his effective force upon the battlefield, and it is necessary to count the flags that are floating along his line in order to realize the fact that it represents ten regiments. The detachment from the Second corps, under Colonel Devereux, which covered his right, has found no less difficulty in retiring in good order among the wounded lying on the ground and stragglers wandering over the field of battle.

The consequences of the loss of the orchard are, however, as fatal to Barnes as to Humphreys. Sweitzer has posted himself on the right of Zook in that part of the road which has just been recaptured from Kershaw. Tilton has again formed his line, farther up on the ground which the latter has already cap-



tered from him: as on that occasion, his right wing is without support. It is against this wing that Wofford, after the capture of the orchard, descends with all the intrepidity that recent success has given to his soldiers. Tilton's brigade, not yet recovered from the combat in which it has been engaged, succumbs under their effort. Kershaw immediately takes advantage of it in order to resume the offensive against Sweitzer and Zook; Semmes joins him. Barnes' two brigades, hard pushed in front and in flank, are driven out of the wood. Caldwell's soldiers, who in their turn are placed in the same position, and are moreover menaced on the left by Hood's troops, evacuate the wood and the wheat-field, the bloody soil of which is covered with the dead and dying. Zook is killed; the losses are enormous. The Confederates, posted in the wood, command all its approaches; their artillery, descending the slopes of the hillock of the orchard, takes the Unionists in flank. Brooke charges it with his brigade in vain; he is repulsed and seriously wounded.\* The Federal line is irrevocably broken, and all the forces which have until then held Longstreet in check on the left are unable to re-form it. Out of eight brigades brought into action by the commander of the First Confederate corps, six are making desperate attacks upon them. The Union troops, most of them in complete disorder, fall back on the wooded hillocks which line the left bank of Plum Run. But Kershaw and Semmes, exhausted in their turn, have halted in the wood whence Barnes and De Trobriand have just been dislodged. Only two brigades have passed over the Millerstown road: on the left, that of Wofford pushes forward in order to support Barksdale on the right; that of Anderson, who has just been wounded, occupies the wood beyond the road, bringing several of the enemy's guns which it has captured back of the Trostle house, and even tries to cross Plum Run, but in vain.

In the mean while, Hancock, who on the news of Sickles' wounds has been entrusted by Meade with the command of the entire left, is endeavoring to unite the two parts of the Federal line. Humphreys has just completed his movement. Most of the guns attached to his division, having lost all

\* Colonel Brooke was severely bruised, but did not relinquish his command.—ED.

their horses, have been abandoned in the patch of ground behind which he has posted himself, but they remain within the circle of his fire as a tempting prize for the enemy. Bigelow's battery, having no longer a single soldier to support it, takes position in front of the Trostle house and fires grapeshot upon the Confederates, who are advancing from every direction against it: one after the other the gunners fall near their wounded chief, their pieces being sacrificed; but they have succeeded in delaying the march of the enemy on the left. These examples of bravery would not, however, have sufficed to save the Federals if at this critical moment they had not been firmly established on Little Round Top, the real point of support for all their left. Ayres, bringing the two regular brigades of Day and Burbank, has crossed Plum Run and occupies the crest of Devil's Den on the right bank with a portion of Ward's soldiers, who have not been dislodged from it. The retreat of Barnes and Caldwell uncovers his right flank, thus leaving him isolated in advance of the rest of the line; but, although attacked on three sides by Hood's and McLaws' troops, he forces a passage through their oblique fires. His regular troops once more justify their old reputation; not a single man has left the ranks, and they allow themselves to be decimated without flinching. Eleven hundred combatants only out of an effective force of two thousand are left standing when, falling back gradually, they finally take position on the right of Weed, east of Plum Run, along the northern base of Little Round Top.

About an hour since we left the two parties in conflict along the flank opposite to this elevated position, and Law's soldiers, in spite of their reduced number, rushing against the Twentieth Maine. The firing of musketry is again heard along the whole line. Weed, who sets an example to all around him, is mortally wounded near Hazlett's battery, whose commander, stooping to receive his last words, is struck in his turn, and falls lifeless upon the body of his chief; nearly all the superior officers are either killed or wounded. But the enemy is also exhausted: in order to surround the left of the Federals he has prolonged his line to too great an extent. Colonel Chamberlain takes advantage of it to charge the enemy in his turn. The Confederates, surprised by

this attack, are repulsed, leaving behind them more than three hundred wounded and prisoners. It is at this moment that General Ayres takes position, with his two brigades of regulars, on the right bank of Plum Run. Although he cannot long maintain himself in this position, his presence, which closes entirely the gorge of the stream, is sufficient to deter the Confederates from making any fresh attack against Little Round Top. At the very moment when he is obliged to fall back, General Crawford, bringing McCandless' brigade on the hill that Vincent and Weed have saved at the cost of their lives, assists its brave defenders in driving back the assailants to the other side of Plum Run. The remainder of this small division is not long in joining its chief. The latter, placing McCandless on the right of Barnes' soldiers, and Fisher with his second brigade on the left, forms a solid line on the western slope of the hill, which the regulars prolong across the Millerstown road. On this side, therefore, Plum Run separates the combatants. Longstreet, satisfied with the advantage he has obtained, does not display so much eagerness in attacking positions so strongly occupied by the left of the Unionists.

But Barksdale and Wofford threaten to separate this left from all the rest of the Federal army, and thereby to demolish the defences upon which it rests. These two brigades, that have as yet suffered but little, advance rapidly, driving before them stragglers and groups of soldiers belonging to all the corps, over an open country which secures a vast field of action to the Confederate artillery. The latter has taken advantage of it: while Hill's guns, with a portion of those belonging to Longstreet, are endeavoring to absorb the attention of the Federal pieces, the five batteries of Alexander follow the Southern infantry step by step, and are beginning to riddle Humphreys' weak division with balls. In order to fill up the gap that has been made in their line, the Unionists are obliged to re-form along the very positions that Sickles had abandoned a few hours before. If he thought them unsuitable in the morning, how will they be able to maintain themselves in them after the check they have just experienced? Although commanded by the Emmetsburg road, these positions nevertheless present advantages of which the soldiers eagerly avail themselves. The little valley of Plum Run, which sepa-

rates them from this road, is, as has been stated, full of bushes and trees. The Confederates have found there a shelter against the fire of the artillery of the Second corps, which, in proportion as they advance, takes them more and more in flank. In order to get out of the place they will have to climb an acclivity of about thirty feet. Although very gentle, this acclivity affords a certain advantage to the Federals. It is a last chance, of which they must avail themselves if they do not wish to see the enemy take possession of their communications with Baltimore. The more the position they have taken favors the defence so long as they maintain it, the more irreparable will be the loss if they happen to lose it. Consequently, Hancock brings all the forces at his disposal to the point thus menaced. Although the Second corps is already deprived of Caldwell's division, which, being extremely weakened, has not been able to resume the place it occupied in the morning, as Meade had directed, he detaches two regiments from Hays' division for the purpose of supporting Humphreys, and, taking with him Willard's brigade of the same division, pushes it more to the left, to the very centre of the open space it is sought to fill. Finally, General Hunt brings forward thirty or forty pieces of reserve artillery, forming the brigade of Major McGilvery, which, having been hastily called at the time of the attack upon the orchard, have not been able to arrive in time to defend this point, but render a still greater service by taking position along the left bank of Plum Run. This formidable battery, the centre of which faces the Trostle house, commands, along a front of about six hundred yards, all the slopes of this bank, and is able to cross fire with Hancock's artillery: it covers the remnant of the three divisions that Longstreet has just driven back beyond the stream, and closes like a solid bastion one-half of the breach which they have left open. Meade also hastens forward, his abrupt departure from the central point where he was stationed even causing a certain panic at his head-quarters. In the mean while, the troops he has summoned from the right are already in motion. Williams' division has struck the cross-road which directly connects the Taneytown and Baltimore roads near the field of conflict: this division is closely followed by one of Geary's brigades under Candy,



but the other strays off, and finally comes to a halt beyond Rock Creek. General Lockwood, who has arrived from Baltimore and joined the Twelfth corps with two regiments on that day, has gone in advance of Williams, affording a useful support to McGilvery's guns. More to the south, Bartlett's brigade of the Sixth corps is marching on the track of Crawford, and two other brigades, forwarded by Sedgwick, will soon follow in the same direction. Finally, Meade, seeing the danger increase, calls upon Newton to weaken Cemetery Hill as much as possible in order to assist Humphreys.

All these troops, once assembled upon the field, will be greatly superior in numbers to those of the assailants; but will they arrive in time to check the progress of the enemy, or will they be beaten in detail? This is what Meade at half-past seven o'clock is anxiously asking. In the mean time, it would be the very moment for the Confederates to attack him simultaneously at all points. If the discharges of the artillery posted on Seminary Hill were not an obstacle to both sight and hearing, Hill and Lee would perceive the smoke and hear the sound of the conflict that Johnson is prosecuting upon Culp's Hill. Two brigades of Anderson's and the whole of Pender's division are only waiting an order to continue the attack which is progressing from the right to the left, and make an attempt to carry Ziegler's Grove by assault, the success of which would be decisive. This order is not given, and the troops which might perhaps achieve a victory remain motionless. Generals Posey and Mahone, who, being on the left of Wright, ought to be the first to follow him, have, as it appears, received instructions not to advance unless the success of the attack seems to them certain: they wait in vain for an order from Anderson, their immediate chief. Pender, being posted more to the left, hastens to the right of his line for the purpose undoubtedly of leading it against the enemy, but he is mortally wounded by the bursting of a shell, and General Lane, who succeeds him, only takes command after the fight is over. In the mean while, the three brigades led by Anderson, seeing nothing but stragglers before them, and dead and wounded men and spiked guns around them, believe that victory is sure, and boldly advance to reap the fruits. In this rapid movement the

lines are broken and all directions confused : they follow Humphreys, and although, according to Hill's orders, they ought to take the right as their guide, they soon find themselves separated from Barksdale, whose objective point is the breach that Willard is endeavoring to close. These three brigades no longer march at the same pace. At the moment when they pass beyond the strip of wooded land back of which Humphreys has taken position their ardor is increased by the sight of the abandoned guns, which the latter has not been able to drag after him ; but Perry's Floridians come to a halt near these pieces, and cannot afterward recover their dash. Anderson's front is therefore reduced to two brigades ; he extends it for the purpose of forming a junction with that of McLaws, thus weakening it at the very moment when he has most need to be strengthened. The confusion over the battlefield increases ; the contending lines become mixed amid the smoke which envelops them. One of Wilcox's regiments reaches Humphreys' left unperceived : Hancock encounters it, and hurls against it the First Minnesota, which stops its progress, but at a great sacrifice. Willard, whose two wings are equally deprived of all support, sees his brigade decimated ; he soon falls dead among the corpses that surround him. Hancock prodigiously exerts himself in order to restore the line. More to the left, Meade places himself at the head of Lockwood's soldiers. These two regiments penetrate into the wood situated north of the Millers-town road, on the other side of Plum Run, and attack Anderson's brigade. McCandless supports them, so as to connect them with the rest of Sykes' troops. Finally, Bartlett's, Nevin's, and Eustis' brigades of the Sixth corps arrive in time to reinforce the line formed by the Fifth from Little Round Top to McGilvery's batteries : they take the place which Lockwood occupied on the right near these guns, relieve the troops that have suffered most on the left, assist them in repulsing the last attempts of Law, and protect the whole of this wing from a new attack.

The day is waning. The sun darts its oblique rays across Seminary Hill and over the smoke-wrapped slopes of Cemetery Hill and the Round Tops. Without feeling at all disconcerted, the brigades of McLaws and Anderson, which form the left of the Confederate attack, make a last effort almost at the same moment.

Their leaders feel that it is necessary to break the new line of the enemy before he has had time to look around him, but they are too much divided to strike a heavy blow. McLaws, with two brigades, is separated on his right from Hood, who can no longer advance, and on his left from Anderson, who is inclining northward.

During this time their adversaries are rapidly re-forming and fortifying themselves. Chamberlain has scaled the slopes of the Great Round Top with a few soldiers, and captured a squad of the enemy which had come to reconnoitre. Fisher's brigade joins him in occupying this commanding position, thus closing all access to the Confederates at this point. At the extreme left Sedgwick has placed himself behind this rocky eminence, ready to support the three brigades he has sent toward Plum Run. On his right, Williams finally strikes the Taneytown road and masses his troops behind McGilvery's artillery. Finally, Newton, promptly responding to Meade's call, has brought Doubleday's division, with a portion of Robinson's, to the weak point at the depression in the ridge connecting the Round Tops with Cemetery Hill. He covers the right of Willard's brigade, and gathers around him the batteries and scattered troops that cannot maintain themselves without assistance, thus forming a line capable of frustrating McLaws' efforts. The fiery Barksdale, still young despite his long white hair, seems to brave death on his horse, which is plunging through the thickest of the fight, but he falls at last under the fire of one of Burling's regiments. His soldiers, who, carried away by his example, rush upon the Federals, are too few in number, and, being repulsed, leave their dying chief in the hands of the enemy. Wofford, who supports them on the right, cannot go beyond the flats of Plum Run; Anderson's brigade is not within reach. Longstreet, who directs the combat in person, is waiting in vain for the brigades of Kershaw and Semmes, that have suffered too much to abandon the ground they have captured from Caldwell, to renew the attack. At this juncture Anderson's division scales at last the slopes along which Humphreys and Gibbon are posted. Wilcox, on the right, followed at a considerable distance by Perry, is the first to make the attack. On the left, Wright, receiving the oblique fire of several guns posted on

the edge of a small wood above Gibbon's front, rushes forward and captures them; but Webb's brigade emerges from its position to dispute their possession: a desperate struggle ensues at this point.

A timely reinforcement would probably suffice to secure the possession of Ziegler's Grove to Anderson's two brigades, and, consequently, of the very centre of the Federal line. The remainder of Hill's corps is watching all the incidents of the conflict from the summit of Seminary Hill, and is anxious to participate in it; Lee, Hill, and Anderson are spectators of this exciting scene; and yet nobody stirs. Anderson does not summon Posey and Mahone to come to him; Hill does not give the order for the attack to Pender's division: he waits for the night, and then only causes it to advance, as if he were yielding to a kind of tardy and useless remorse. Finally, Lee, who for some time had been in the vicinity of Posey's brigade, approves of this inaction by his silence, and assumes all its responsibility before history. Wright, encouraged by the sight of the crowds that are encumbering the Baltimore road, and believing himself already master of the northern ridge of Cemetery Hill, fights with desperate energy; but in the space of a quarter of an hour he loses nearly two-thirds of his effective force, and falls back before Gibbon's division, which is arrayed against him. Wilcox, taken in flank by McGilvery's artillery, instead of the retreating soldiers he was pursuing meets Humphreys in good order on one side and Hancock's reserves on the other, thus finding himself within a circle of fire where he leaves five hundred men out of the sixteen hundred which composed his command. Rather forsaken than vanquished, these two brigades strike once more the Emmettsburg road. The last effort of the Confederates against the Federal left wing has failed. Twilight has come; the firing of musketry ceases; that of the artillery languishes; the smoke clears away. But in proportion as silence prevails there, the sound of the battle which is progressing along the opposite wing is more distinctly heard.

We left Johnson at six o'clock preparing to attack Culp's Hill through the gorges of Rock Creek. Neither of the contending parties can bring artillery to this point, which is an



advantage to their respective infantry. Early and Rodes, posted at the foot of the open slopes of Cemetery Hill, must wait until the Federal left has been broken in order to attack in their turn. If this movement is not effected at the same time as that of Longstreet's, it is not a preconcerted omission, as has been pretended, for the purpose of making Meade strip his right, but because Ewell, as we have stated, has not heard the booming of the guns of the First corps. Perhaps it may also be proper to attribute his delay to the absence of Smith's and Gordon's two brigades of Early's division, detached the previous evening along the York road for the purpose of fighting an imaginary enemy: they have remained during the night in their peculiar position. Ewell, having committed the error of believing a rumor which no doubt originated with the movements of Kilpatrick's Federal cavalry, does not decide to summon Smith's and Gordon's brigades until the very moment he should have begun the attack, and is obliged to wait for them before giving Johnson the order of attack. We must, before all, describe in this place the ground the possession of which Ewell is about to dispute with the Federals, and the manner in which it is occupied by the latter. Howard and a portion of Robinson's division are posted on Cemetery Hill with a numerous artillery. This height is connected by a continuous ridge with the rocky and wooded summit of Culp's Hill, of which Wadsworth holds the north front: he has erected a little below the summit strong breastworks, composed of trunks of trees, stones, and earth. The culminating point of Culp's Hill does not exceed in height by more than two yards that of Cemetery Hill; it commands by thirteen yards the lowest point of the ridge, and by more than fifty the waters of Rock Creek. At the foot of this hill this stream winds eastwardly, then resumes its course southerly. The wooded and rocky slopes are gentler toward the east than toward the north; they extend farther at the south, forming a small plateau, cleared at the west, intersected by a ridge, and terminating at the south-east, above the stream, in a steep hillock. Two small valleys descend from the lowest point of this ridge—one eastwardly, toward Rock Creek, the other southerly. The last-mentioned crosses a field bounded by a stone wall, then penetrates the flank of an acclivity covered with bushes, meeting with a marshy swale which descends in the

direction of Rock Creek from the Spangler house by following the base of Culp's Hill. A fresh and shady spring, called Spangler's Spring, spouts out at the base of the hillock, presently losing itself in this marsh.

Before Meade had stripped his right, Geary's division, and more to the south that of McDougall\* of the Twelfth corps, occupied the east front of Culp's Hill to the right of Wadsworth, as far as Spangler's Spring. They have erected intrenchments which follow this front as far as the edge of the valley, descending in the direction of Rock Creek, are continued on the other side south-eastward by skirting, for a distance of about fifty yards, the stone wall above mentioned, and terminate finally between Rock Creek and the spring. On the other side of the swamp, which is almost impassable at this point, the Colgrove and Lockwood brigades had intrenched themselves along the stream, extending their right as far as the vicinity of the Baltimore turnpike. This position is a strong one, but too much extended, and too near the turnpike, which it is important to defend at any cost, it being the line of retreat of the army. At the south it is covered by Power's and McAllister's Hills, which are occupied by Slocum's artillery; but more to the north a triangular wood, intervening between the marshy swale, the small valley which descends at the south, and a cross-road, would enable the enemy to reach the Spangler house by surprise, and thence the road itself. At this juncture Lockwood's and Williams' brigades are summoned to the left. Two of Geary's brigades that have followed them do not arrive in time to participate in the fight on this side, and their absence is sensibly felt on the right, for the third, under Greene, being left alone, cannot furnish with troops the whole line of intrenchments, extending to a distance of nearly sixteen hundred yards.

It is at the moment when nearly the whole Twelfth corps is abandoning this position that Johnson puts his columns in motion to attack it. Leaving the open slopes which he occupied, he descends in the direction of Rock Creek, and soon finds himself masked by the woods that are lining the right bank: his division, drawn up in two lines, the left resting on the Taney house, crosses without opposition the numerous fords of the stream. His artil-

\* McDougall commanded the First brigade of Ruger's division.—ED.

lery has been left on Benner's Hill; the infantry penetrates the wood and advances in the direction of the plateau, Jones' brigade on the right, followed by that of Nichols; Steuart on the left, followed by Walker. The intrenchments constructed by McDougall from the ravine to Spangler's Spring are no longer defended except by the small detachments of Greene's brigade. Steuart, driving back the Federal skirmishers, carries all that part extending south of the ravine; but he is taken obliquely by the Federals who have remained in the other portion of the works. Greene, seeing the right wing thus turned, prolongs the line which he still occupies toward the west, and posts his right on the other side of the ravine, which descends at the south toward the triangular wood. He thus affords it a point of support, covering on the most dangerous side the approaches to the turnpike. He immediately asks the generals who occupy Cemetery Hill for reinforcements; but his dispositions are scarcely completed when the Confederates advance against him on all sides at once. Steuart and Walker reach the stone wall, and take possession of the entire southern portion of the plateau extending as far as the front of the small wood on which Greene's right is resting. The latter could not offer them any resistance; but the approaching nightfall having rendered them cautious, and being ignorant of the proximity of the Baltimore turnpike, Steuart and Walker remain in the works that have been captured, exchanging from thence useless volleys of musketry with the enemy. Jones, supported by Nichols, precipitates himself upon Greene's left. The Federals are greatly inferior to them in number, but the intrenchments they occupy crown a real wall of rocks: lying in ambush behind the highest blocks and the knotty trunks whose roots are interwoven with the stone, they firmly wait for their adversaries. The latter, being obliged to climb the slopes of Culp's Hill in line of battle, have been unable to keep within their ranks among the rocks and gaping holes hidden by the foliage. Their efforts break down before the obstacle, from the summit of which their adversaries receive them with a well-sustained fire. The Federals, being completely sheltered, lose but few men; the assailants, on the contrary, make immense though useless sacrifices. Jones is wounded; Nichols comes to relieve

his troops, despite the darkness. But Greene has been reinforced by one brigade from Schurz's division; Wadsworth has extended his right to sustain him; finally, Kane returns in time from his unfortunate march over the Baltimore turnpike to check Stuart's skirmishers on the other side. Nichols' assault is repulsed; all the efforts of the Confederates are frustrated; and, although a few musket-shots are still exchanged, the conflict is ended about ten o'clock in the evening.

Ewell's attack has not been confined to this part of the Federal line, and if the order of the narrative obliges us to give successive descriptions, the reader will not forget that these separate combats take place at the same time on the left, on the right, and in the centre. In fact, the commander of the Second Confederate corps has scarcely seen Johnson plunge into the thick copsewood with which Culp's Hill is covered than he gives the order of attack to Early and Rodes. But again the Southern generals cannot execute their movements with that collective energy indispensable to success. Nothing is easier, apparently, than to combine Early's movements with those of Rodes: the former has deployed his troops to the left of Gettysburg, in the direction of Rock Creek; the latter is posted in the town itself; no obstacle intervenes either between themselves or along their front. Yet while the two brigades of Hoke and Hays are advancing in magnificent order on the left of the city, Rodes has not yet deployed his division on the other side. This last-mentioned general has either been too slow or Early too quick, and the orders transmitted by Ewell to these two generals have not been issued or construed in the same manner. Rodes was under the impression that he was to use his own judgment concerning the opportunity for making the attack, while Early, going fully into action, relies upon his immediate co-operation. The result is that Cemetery Hill is only attacked by two brigades, Smith having remained on the Hanover road for the purpose of assisting Stuart, who has at last made his appearance: Gordon alone has responded to Early's summons, who keeps him in reserve.

At seven o'clock in the evening Hoke and Avery (who is in command of Hays' troops) scale the eastern front of Cemetery Hill under a terrific fire of artillery. They are soon received by



a brisk discharge of musketry, but nothing stops their progress; they pierce the lines of Barlow's two small brigades. These, commanded by General Ames, have not yet fully recovered from their check of the previous day; the assailants drive them back in disorder upon the intrenchments mounted with cannon which form the second line along the ridge of the hill, and, passing almost without any effort in the midst of the disordered Federals, they penetrate the works. The remainder of the Eleventh corps, reduced to three brigades, is posted along the west front of Cemetery Hill, back to back with Barlow's division. Finding themselves thus menaced in the rear, Steinwehr and Schurz cause a portion of their troops to about-face and come to the assistance of this division. They find the enemy in possession of the northern extremity of the hill, which stretches toward Gettysburg, and disputing to the Union artillerists the works which constitute the key to the whole position. For the space of one hour the two Confederate brigades are stubbornly struggling against the Federals, who, being superior in number, are endeavoring to drive them back to the foot of the hill. But no one comes to their assistance, while their adversaries receive new reinforcements. It is near nine o'clock in the evening. A short time before, Hancock, hearing the sound of Early's attack, has spontaneously sent two regiments of the Second corps to Wadsworth, with Carroll's brigade to Howard's assistance. The latter brigade arrives just at the moment when the issue of the desperate struggle that is going on around the guns seems exceedingly doubtful. After vainly soliciting Lane's co-operation, Rodes has at last deployed his division; his skirmishers scale the west flank of Cemetery Hill, which Steinwehr and Schurz have just stripped, and are already opening fire, when Ramseur, who commands the brigade on the right, comes suddenly to a halt, thus interrupting the whole movement.

It appears that, seeing Lane's troops, which have also got near the enemy, remain motionless, Ramseur has been unwilling to push beyond their lines without fresh instructions. During the time thus wasted Carroll captures the position conquered by Hoke and Avery; the latter is killed. Early, not finding himself supported by Rodes, dares not put his last brigade in jeopardy, and the

assailants are finally obliged to fall back. It is only then that Rodes is ready to take part in the combat; but finding, in his turn, no one to support him, he allows himself to be overtaken by the night without leaving his deployed position east of Gettysburg. The attack directed against the Federal centre has completely failed, because out of seven brigades that were present on the field of battle two only have been engaged.

While the two armies were thus contending, Stuart's and Kilpatrick's cavalry, which had been pressing close upon each other for some days, were getting near the field of battle. On the evening of the 1st, Stuart, as we are aware, has finally received Lee's orders in the neighborhood of Carlisle. His several detachments are at once directed upon Gettysburg from all the points they occupy. Kilpatrick, who has been unable to go beyond Berlin, guessing Stuart's intentions, hastens to Heidlersburg for the purpose of getting in advance of him; but he arrives too late, and night overtakes him in the vicinity of this village. Horses and men are both in want of rest, and only start southward at a late hour the following day for the purpose of covering the right of the Union army, in conformity with Pleasonton's orders. Their route leads them in the track of Stuart, who, knowing himself to be pursued, has left Hampton's brigade in the suburb of Hunterstown in order to prevent them from falling upon Ewell's rear. About four o'clock in the afternoon Kilpatrick finds Hampton drawn up in line of battle back of this village, across the Gettysburg road: he immediately deploys his two brigades. Farnsworth is on the right; Custer is forming in front of the enemy, and soon assumes the offensive. He is promptly driven back by Hampton, who, charging in his turn, is likewise repulsed. The Confederates, satisfied with having blocked the way to the Federals, do not renew the struggle, and the latter, having received new instructions, resume the march after losing about thirty men. They will arrive toward three o'clock in the morning at Two Taverns, whence they will go and take the position on the extreme left which Buford has prematurely abandoned, by making the tour of the army. The last-mentioned general encamps on the evening of the 2d at Taneytown, whence he will start on the following day for Westminster.

Gregg, who commands the second division of cavalry, has left Huey's brigade in this village to guard the supply-trains. He had left Hanover, with the other two brigades, at daybreak, and has already taken up the position on the right of the army which Pleasonton had assigned to Kilpatrick.

This position will be the scene of an important battle the next day; it is proper therefore to describe it in a few words. The space comprised between the York and Baltimore turnpikes forms a triangle, having Gettysburg for its apex, and for its base a road called the Dutch road,\* which connects these two highways at distances respectively of six and four miles from the city. The Hanover road divides the apex of the triangle, and crosses the base about three miles east of Gettysburg, near the Reever house. In this triangle the ridge of Benner's Hill prolongs that of Culp's Hill, while the defile of Rock Creek alone separates McAllister's Hill from Wolf Hill. This eminence becomes more extended toward the north, forming terraces from west to east, of which the highest, called Brinkerhoff's Ridge, commands a view of Gettysburg, and even Cemetery Hill, and terminates in an abrupt incline studded with woods and rocks. The traveller who, following the Hanover road, reaches this summit, sees before him an undulating and cultivated plain which extends eastward as far as the eye can reach. At his feet a narrow and deep valley is separated from this plain by a smaller range which does not intercept his view. This range and the creek which waters the valley bear the same name: one is called Cress' Ridge, the other Cress' Run. The open country situated west of these elevations offers an easy passage to the cavalry, and allows Stuart to gain the Baltimore road by concealing himself behind Brinkerhoff's Ridge. A cross-road branching off from the York road at about two miles and a half from Gettysburg envelops the extremity of this ridge, crosses Cress' Run, passes over Cress' Ridge, and, striking the Dutch road a little to the north of the Reever house, seems to be expressly built for the purpose of facilitating the march of his squadrons and artillery. The Federals understand this perfectly. Gregg, therefore, on arriving from Hanover, has not halted at the village of Bonaugh-

\* Its local designation is the Low Dutch (or Salem Church) road.—Ed.

town. He has pursued his way as far as the vicinity of the Reeve house, situated on a hill whence a very extended view can be obtained: his pickets are posted on Cress' Ridge, while he extends his line south-west, in order to join Slocum's right near Rock Creek. Stuart is yet some distance off, but Lee, justly fearing that the Union cavalry, whose presence has been revealed at Hanover, may harass his left, has ordered Jenkins to cover this wing. When Johnson advances in the afternoon for the purpose of attacking Culp's Hill, he is instructed to make a reconnoissance with his brigade as far as the summit of Brinkerhoff's Ridge. But Gregg, apprised of his approach in time, sends some of McIntosh's cavalry to oppose him. The latter reach the ridge at the same time as their adversaries, and after a short fight, in which Jenkins is seriously wounded, they remain masters of the position. In the mean time, the Confederate cavalry, so imprudently scattered by Lee, are hastening from every direction—to precede him if he should push forward, or to cover his retreat if he should be vanquished. Imboden has left McConnellsburg, after destroying the bridges of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad; Jones and Robertson, left by Lee among the defiles of the Blue Ridge, have at last been summoned by him, and cross the Potomac at Williamsport. They are all to join him in the course of the following day.

As two electric clouds, driven by contrary winds, are attracted toward each other by an irresistible force until the lightning, flashing at the point of their contact, gives the signal of the approaching storm, so in the same way the two hostile armies, both marching somewhat at random, find themselves forcibly drawn toward the spot which a fortuitous encounter had designated, and the spark ignited on the morning of the 1st of July near Gettysburg has speedily brought about the terrible storm of the 2d. We have stated the reason why the Confederates have not given up the aggressive rôle. They have acquitted themselves during its performance with the courage and ardor that have so frequently secured victory to them. Nevertheless, they have not achieved the results which they thought themselves entitled to expect from their enormous sacrifices. The condition of the battlefield has been against them, and in favor of the Fed-



erals, whose artillery and infantry, being placed on the defensive, have had the advantage of firing steadily, frustrating the attacks of the Confederates, which were frequently disconnected when not directed by the great Jackson, their principal element of success; but it must also be acknowledged that serious faults have been committed—faults calculated to astonish the individual who, after having followed the Army of Northern Virginia through all its great struggles, is studying the manner in which it has been handled at Gettysburg during the 2d of July.

Lee's first error was in giving too excessive a development to his line. He justly abandons the idea of making his principal attack on the left, because Cemetery Hill is too much exposed and too well fortified, while Culp's Hill, too rocky, is inaccessible to artillery; but he should from that moment have confined his efforts on that side to a simple feint, and, instead of extending that wing to the valley of Rock Creek, have rested it on Gettysburg, in order to be able to place the most potent means of action in the hands of Longstreet.

The attack made by the latter was too long delayed. If he had commenced sooner, he would have found the Federals not so well posted on the ground, not having yet located all their artillery nor received the reinforcements of the Sixth corps. After Hood's delay comes that of a portion of McLaws' division: the position of the orchard, which the latter is to carry, is at once the most accessible and the most important. If he had pushed all his troops forward at the moment when Kershaw, single-handed, brought on the conflict on his right, the success achieved on that side would have been less dearly bought and more decisive for the assailants.

The inaction of Anderson's two brigades and of Pender's division has been productive of still more serious consequences. General Hill has testified to the fact in his report, without giving any explanation. Must we conclude from his silence that at the time of giving the order of attack to this division he finds it yet too much disordered from the losses of the previous day to be engaged in such an assault? Lane having been relieved of his temporary command by General Trimble on the following day, it may be supposed that his discontented chieftains held him respon-

sible for the inaction of his troops. Anderson and his two lieutenants, Posey and Mahone, have declared that their instructions left them full latitude to judge of the chances of an attack, and that they had not deemed them sufficiently favorable to justify them in giving the order for making it. Whoever takes into consideration the efforts made by their neighbors at the same time will no doubt look upon this excuse as insufficient, revealing, on the other hand, a want of harmony in the orders issued by the general-in-chief. Whoever may be blamable, the error cannot be repaired. At last, Ewell has been enabled to secure better harmony in the movements of Early and Rodes; the latter, however, has not been better able to sustain the troops fighting by his side than Lane.

In the course of this day, which should have been a decisive one, Lee has only brought into action seventeen brigades out of the thirty-seven composing his infantry. It is true that among the other twenty there are three of them yet absent, and fourteen that have been in action the day before; but the Confederate veterans would have considered themselves insulted if they had been told that they could not fight two days in succession. Hood has scaled the slopes of Little Round Top; McLaws has struck the weakest point of the enemy's line; Anderson has scaled Ziegler's Grove; Early has disputed the possession of the intrenchments of Cemetery Hill to the Federal artillerists; Johnson occupies a portion of Culp's Hill; and, to use Lee's own language, the advantages gained are of sufficient magnitude to induce him to renew the struggle on the following day. In short, if the Confederates have not penetrated into the really defensive positions of the enemy, they have been so near proving successful that Lee cannot be blamed for having assumed the offensive on that day.

In fact, the situation of Meade at the close of the battle is alarming, in spite of the advantages he has obtained. Sickles' movement has brought on a conflict outside of the line he had chosen in the morning. The occupation of Devil's Den has undoubtedly postponed the hour when the Confederates might be able to strike this line, but the reinforcements that are constantly arriving in these eccentric positions have been exhausted without succeeding in their efforts to preserve the orchard from

the moment that Lee made a resolute attack upon it. If the Federals had waited for him, massed between the Round Tops and Cemetery Hill, supported by two powerful batteries of artillery, they would have inflicted upon him, on the 2d of July, the check which he experienced the next day. Meade, however, has taken full advantage of the condition of the ground to concentrate his forces upon the point menaced. Out of fifty-two brigades, forty-two of which have been engaged, thirty-six of them seriously, the general-in-chief cannot be blamed for having stripped his right so much in his anxiety to reinforce the left. The losses of the army are, unfortunately, very great. They amount to more than twenty thousand for the two days' fighting, without counting the stragglers that are crowding the Baltimore road and the men dispersed by the combat who have not been able to rejoin their commands. The enemy has not spoken his last word, and Meade has cause to fear that another day's fighting, equally as murderous, may cause his whole army literally to melt away. Without ordering a retreat, his duty is therefore to anticipate and to prepare for it. In the evening, before the combat has ended on the right, he summons a council of war at his headquarters for the purpose of ascertaining the opinions of the corps commanders, the condition of their troops, and taking measures for the morrow. He asks them, "1. Under existing circumstances is it advisable for this army to remain in its present position, or to retire to another nearer its base of supplies? 2. It being determined to remain in present position, shall the army attack or wait the attack of the enemy?" While maintaining certain mental reservations, they declare against any aggressive movement, impossible at this hour, and against retreat, which was alone in question. Meade, while adding, it is said, that the actual position of the army seemed bad to him, coincides with this opinion. If he had found that his lieutenants inclined to the opinion that their troops had suffered too much to continue the struggle, he would undoubtedly have given the order of retreat. But it is of no consequence, for, whatever may be the opinion of a council of war, the general-in-chief, being alone responsible, should, if the decision is a good one, receive all the credit of it.

Every one, therefore, is preparing for the battle that is to be

fought on the following day. The moon seems to be shining with the same splendor as on the previous night, for the purpose of favoring those soldiers who are overrunning the field of carnage to carry off the wounded. The Federals are re-forming their ranks among the dead, too numerous to occupy their attention at this moment. Each man takes his position in silence, for the exaltation of victory is not felt to cause men to forget their fatigue, the suffering of their comrades, and their own chances of being killed the next day. "I wish I were already dead," said the gallant Birney, whispering to one of his lieutenants, at the sight of the small number of determined soldiers who surrounded him. In the mean while, Meade's orders are being promptly executed. The four brigades of the Twelfth corps, marched from the left to the right, reach the Baltimore turnpike about eleven o'clock at night, but they find the enemy in the woods they occupied before their departure. Kane's brigade, making a détour, goes to join Geary in the positions defended by Greene. Williams' division, increased to three brigades by the arrival of Lockwood, is waiting for daylight in order to dispute to Johnson the intrenchments in which he had planted himself, without striking a blow, on the previous evening. The Sixth corps supplies reserves to portions of the line that are most seriously menaced, and sends Shaler's and Neill's brigades to the extreme right, along the east side of Rock Creek. On the left, the Fifth corps, which happens to be alone in the first line, extends itself so as to occupy the steep acclivities of the Great Round Top and to anticipate any flank movement on the part of the enemy. The Third, which is the most disabled corps, is kept in reserve: its officers stop the progress of the stragglers, bringing together all isolated commands and picking up those that have strayed from the ranks. Caldwell's division has resumed its position on the left of the Second corps, but it is greatly weakened; and Hancock, deprived of Carroll's brigade, which has remained on Cemetery Hill between Ames and Wadsworth, can scarcely arm the front, which was easily occupied in the morning with strong reserves, by deploying all his men. The three divisions of the First corps are separated: Wadsworth is on the right, upon Culp's Hill; Robinson, with all his force, on Cemetery Hill, between the Eleventh and



Second corps. Doubleday, who was posted between Gibbon and the Fifth corps, having been relieved during the evening by Caldwell, is bearing to the right, and places Stannard, who has just joined him with a strong brigade from Vermont, between Caldwell and Gibbon, a little in advance of the line of the Second corps. He occupies the small wood in which Webb and Perry have been contending over a few pieces of artillery. Pleasanton's orders are to wait for Kilpatrick at Two Taverns. He will send back Custer to the right in order to form a junction with Gregg's division, and will go with Farnsworth's brigade to take position on the left, where Merritt will join him with his regular troopers: once united, they will cause much trouble by watching the right of the enemy. Buford remains at Westminster.

The Confederates, on their side, are preparing to renew the battle. They can neither retreat—for that would be to acknowledge themselves beaten—nor wait for the attack of the Federals along Seminary Ridge, as it would be necessary to abandon all the positions they have just secured. The flank movement is as impracticable on the 3d as on the 2d, but without making a flank march the Federal left wing might be outflanked. It would require, it is true, to contract the line of battle, to reinforce it on the right, which would involve the evacuation of Culp's Hill: it is a sacrifice the more necessary because the army would thus abandon the concave line which has paralyzed its operations; besides, any other attack would be attended by great difficulties. The advantages obtained on the left are more apparent than real, for Johnson cannot take his artillery on the plateau he is about to reach, and which is swept by the Federal guns. At the centre, from Cemetery Hill to the vicinity of Little Round Top, the ground is open and swept by the cross-fire of the Union artillery. On the right the rocks of the Round Tops are impregnable citadels which could not have been carried except by a surprise; a little more to the south, on the contrary, the ground, rough yet passable, would perfectly suit the tactics of the Confederates: Longstreet, master of the banks of Plum Run, could easily cross it below the Round Tops for the purpose of surrounding them, as Hood had proposed to do before the battle of the 2d. Although this manœuvre would be somewhat lengthy, all the

necessary forces could be brought together in order to execute it during the afternoon. It appears that Lee had at first adopted this plan, but, influenced by the advantages obtained over the Third Federal corps, he decided simply to resume on the 3d the movement he had performed the day before. A fatal and inexplicable resolution! He thus persisted in adhering to the tactics of a double attack by way of the two wings, without thinking that the more ground they gained the easier it would be for Meade to lead his forces from one wing to the other in order to repulse them successively. The instructions he gave to his lieutenants were, moreover, so vague that he seemed to leave to each commander the task of fighting a separate battle according to his own fancy. In fact, he apprised Ewell that the battle would commence on the right at daybreak, directing him to take the offensive at the same hour, and yet it was only on the morning of the 3d, long after the hour specified, that Longstreet received the necessary orders to put his troops in motion.

Ewell, in the mean while, is concentrating all his efforts upon his left. Johnson is reinforced by Smith's brigade, which has been detached from Early's division since the 1st; Rodes sends his old brigade and Daniel's to support him on the extreme left, thus enabling Johnson to resume the offensive with seven brigades; the remainder of the Second corps, thus reduced to five brigades, will only support him in case of his succeeding in dislodging the Federal right and turning Cemetery Hill. These movements have been promptly executed; but at the other extremity of the line there is nothing ready for an early morning attack. Pickett, coming from Chambersburg by a forced march, has halted at a distance from the field of battle on the evening of the 2d; Longstreet, informed of his arrival, has given him no information regarding the operations of the next day; consequently, he only comes at seven o'clock in the morning to announce in person the approach of his head of column, which he has forestalled. It is only at this juncture that Lee issues positive orders for the attack which Longstreet is to direct. In order that this attack might be executed by the extreme right, it would be necessary to reinforce the two divisions that have been so much under fire on this side the day

before. If the general-in-chief has thought of doing so, he gives up the idea, and designates the heights which Anderson has attacked on the evening of the 2d as the most favorable point for breaking the Federal line. Several hours of the morning thus pass before any measure has been adopted on the right for renewing the struggle.

Ewell was not apprised of this delay: he has urged Johnson to attack as soon as he has received the three brigades that have been assigned to him. But even if Lee had ordered him to wait he could not have postponed the battle, for the darkness of the night alone prevents the Federals assuming the offensive on that side: they cannot allow the enemy to remain in the works he has just taken; he must be dislodged before he discovers how near he is to the Baltimore turnpike. Williams, with whom Slocum, commanding the entire right wing, has left the Twelfth corps, plants his artillery on the Power and McAllister Hills, whence it sweeps the distant front of the wooded plateau occupied by Johnson. Ruger's division menaces the Confederate left by way of the south along the banks of Spangler's streamlet. During this time, Geary, resting his right on the triangular wood, strikes in the rear with his left that portion of the intrenchments occupied by the enemy. At early dawn the fire of the Union artillery demolishes these weak intrenchments, stopping at the end of a quarter of an hour to allow the infantry to advance. But Johnson forestalls the Federals, hurling his battalions against them. The Confederates come up in three lines, scarcely separated from each other, and attack their adversaries with vigor. They have at last obtained a view of the Baltimore road covered with wagons, troopers, and straggling infantry, who are pushing toward the south in crowds, seized with a foolish terror in spite of the efforts of several squadrons of Union cavalry to preserve order along this important highway. This sight stimulates their ardor. The shock is terrific, and a desperate struggle takes place among the rocks with which the ground is thickly covered. All the batteries of Meade's reserve that have not been summoned to the left concentrate their fire upon the slopes occupied by the assailants. Sedgwick, south of the road, is preparing to co-operate in case the enemy should succeed in obtaining a foothold upon the open

ground which extends to the right of Geary. The marshy stream which runs down from the Spangler house stops Ruger's progress, but Lockwood, who has just been joined by the rest of his brigade, proceeds to assist Geary. The conflict is prolonged without losing any portion of its desperate character. Cannon-balls and shells pour upon the Confederates, who have not a single gun with which to reply. The Unionists, being reinforced, present to them an impenetrable front on all sides. The hours are slipping away ; the sun, which is rising higher and higher, is absolutely scorching. At times the combat languishes, then is renewed again with fresh violence. During the intervals of silence Johnson tries in vain to catch the sound of Longstreet's attack, which would relieve him by distracting the attention of the enemy. He alone sustains all the brunt of the struggle—a terrible struggle, hand to hand, man to man, impossible to describe, for it is made up of incidents as numerous as the combatants themselves. But Jackson's soldiers, accustomed never to back out, are still unwilling to give up the hope of victory. On the right, Jones and Nichols maintain their position without gaining or losing ground. Walker has been detached at the extreme left on the banks of Rock Creek to watch Ruger's movements. Steuart and the largest part of the reinforcements sent to Johnson occupy the position which is at once the most menacing and the most exposed at the entrance of the wood, for if Ruger becomes entirely separated from Geary they receive the cross-fire of artillery and musketry without shelter. Finally, after seven hours' fighting, the Confederates, feeling that they are wasting their resources in vain, make one last effort to break the right of Geary so as to reach the Baltimore pike. But Kane, having been reinforced by Shaler's brigade, is ready to receive them. Steuart, wishing to outflank his right, extends his line as far as the stream, and after having re-formed it leads his men to the charge. The bravest among them would perhaps have hesitated if he had not set them an example, for they know that they are called to perform a desperate act ; but they all follow him with a rush into the circle of fire where the enemy is awaiting them. Useless heroism, for the skirmishers that Ruger has thrown across the stream open a murderous fire of musketry against their left flank



while they are fighting Geary's troops in front, and after a stubborn resistance they are finally repulsed. Ruger immediately crosses the stream, Geary penetrating the wood with him. The Southerners, exhausted, cannot withstand this combined movement of the Twelfth corps; they are driven out of the intrenchments thrown up on the slopes of Culp's Hill, and pushed back on the left bank of Rock Creek, leaving three stand of colors and about five hundred prisoners in the hands of the enemy: the success of the Federals on the right wing is complete. It is eleven o'clock, and the combat is over on that side; it has not yet commenced along the rest of the line.\*

It is now the hottest time of day; a strange silence reigns over the battlefield, causing the Federal soldiers, worn out by fatigue, to look upon the impending general attack, which they have anticipated since early dawn, as extremely long in coming. General Lee says in his report that by harmonizing the action of his several corps he had reason to rely upon success; but it is precisely this concert of action that he was not able to establish. In fact, between seven and eight o'clock in the morning, when the conflict had been progressing along the left for at least four hours, he is still occupied in assigning places to the troops that are to make an attack upon Ziegler's Grove. Moreover, he does not even appear to have come to any positive decision regarding this attack; Longstreet is endeavoring to make him resort to a flank movement against the extreme left of the enemy. During the long examination which absorbs the attention of the two generals Pickett's fresh troops, which have long since reached Seminary Hill, and are destined to play the first *rôle* in the combat at whichever point it may be delivered, remain with their arms at rest, vainly waiting for their orders. It is only at ten o'clock that they take position in the vicinity of the orchard, a little in the rear of the Emmettsburg road.

The troops engaged the day before have abandoned a large portion of the open space extending in front of the new position of the enemy. Their pickets are on the left, along the Emmettsburg road; they stretch beyond it on the right for a distance of a few hundred yards. Anderson occupies the Smith and Rodgers houses with the commanding ground on this side of the Godori

house ; but, leaving only some detachments on the ridge, he has brought back the bulk of his forces to the western slope and to the woods, which afford them some shelter. Longstreet's left holds the orchard ; Wofford, at the centre, has re-entered the wood situated west of the wheat-field which he had abandoned the evening of the previous day ; the right joins the Millerstown road, resting on Devil's Den, and extending along the east bank of Plum Run in front of the Round Tops, at the foot of which Robertson and Law have passed the night. The Confederates thus occupy the line along which the Third Federal corps had formed the day before. At daybreak Colonel Alexander places the six reserve batteries of the First corps along the Emmettsburg road ; the rest of the artillery of this corps is presently posted in their vicinity by Colonel Walton, forming a slight concave line of seventy-five pieces of artillery from the orchard to the point which commands the road east of the Godori house, arming all the ridge from which Humphreys was dislodged the day before, at a distance of from nine hundred to thirteen hundred yards from the enemy's line. The batteries of Major Henry to the right of the orchard cross their fire with that of the rest of the line ; those of Alexander are ranged above this position, at the summit of the slope running down to the Trostle house ; on his left, and somewhat in the rear, is located the Washington Artillery, with Dearing's and Cabell's battalions. This artillery, thus placed ahead of the infantry, is, according to Lee's instruction, to batter the enemy's position which he proposes to attack. In the mean while, all the troops that are to participate in the attack take position back of the ridge, so that the Federals cannot see them distinctly. Wilcox has been drawn up in line of battle since daybreak, about one hundred and fifty yards west of the road, above the house of H. Spangler. Pickett plants himself behind Wilcox in the strip of ground which separates Warfield Ridge from that of Seminary Hill. Kemper's and Garnett's brigades are deployed, the former immediately behind the ridge, which is crowned by artillery ; the latter on its left. Armistead posts himself at first still more to the left, but he is soon obliged to abandon this position, which is too much exposed to the fire of the Federal artillery, and to take shelter behind the other two

brigades, ready to move into line at the first signal. A light battery of Hill's corps accompanies these brigades. All the artillery of this corps, crowning the ridges of Seminary Hill, is preparing to support the assault; finally, a portion of Ewell's artillery will also open fire against Cemetery Hill.

About eleven o'clock, Pickett having caused the Godori house and some stacks of straw which might embarrass his march to be set on fire, brisk volleys of musketry are exchanged between the skirmishers of both sides: the artillery participates, but after three-quarters of an hour this useless cannonade is gradually brought to an end. The two armies remain immovable; it seems as though both dreaded the solemn moment when victory would be declared in favor of one of them.

During this time the Federal cavalry makes its appearance in the rear of Hood's division. Kilpatrick, having reunited Merritt's and Farnsworth's brigades, has crossed Plum Run below the Round Tops at about eleven o'clock, has turned the hill situated south-west of this rocky eminence, and is emerging into the open fields extending for a long distance on this side. Adopting, in a contrary sense, the plan which Hood had formed in order to reach the Federal supply-trains, he endeavors to strike the Emmettsburg road, along which those of the enemy are to be found. At the first news of this movement, Law, who takes Hood's place, has detached Robertson's brigade to stop him. Farnsworth, stimulated by the hope of capturing from the enemy a portion of the reserve ammunition and supplies that are so precious to him, charges the Southern infantry with three regiments, but, after crossing two stone fences in pursuit of the enemy's skirmishers, his bold attack breaks down before the well-sustained fire of their line of battle. His troopers, whom he is trying to retire by the right toward the Snyder house, are driven back into a rough piece of ground, wandering about in a state of confusion across the roads, barriers, and thickets, and falling at last one after the other under the enemy's fire. The last to arrive with their chief in the vicinity of Plum Run find themselves shut up within a network of fences, where they are either captured or killed. Farnsworth is among the latter. His death was a great loss to the Federal army. Distinguished for dashing bravery, full of



forethought and vigilance, he possessed all the qualities essential for a cavalry officer.

Merritt was not more successful on the Emmettsburg road, which he is following on leaving the last-mentioned village: on this side the supply-trains and the parks of artillery of the Confederates are protected by Anderson's brigade. The Federal regulars, having vainly attempted to turn his position, dismount for the purpose of attacking it in front, but they are repulsed after a brisk volley of musketry. Early in the afternoon Kilpatrick orders Merritt back, and leads him to the left of the army with the remnants of Farnsworth's brigade. The losses of the Federals are heavy, but they have obtained an important result: by drawing toward them two of the enemy's brigades they have weakened Longstreet's right to such an extent that the latter cannot even attempt a diversion at the moment when the decisive attack is made.

In the mean while, Lee is making the final preparations for this attack. After having designated since morning Pickett and his gallant Virginians to sustain the principal charge, he has not yet selected the troops that are to support him, nor settled the order in which the rest of the army is to take part in the combat. He wishes with Longstreet to examine once more the ground before making the attack. He seems to have relied at first upon Hood's and McLaws' divisions to sustain Pickett's, for no order has yet been given to Hill's troops, which alone, in case of their failure, can accomplish this task. Several officers of the general staff have asserted that this plan was even adopted, and that Lee ordered Longstreet to see it carried out—an assertion which the latter denies in the most emphatic manner. Inasmuch as Lee would not have allowed his lieutenant to violate his order under his own eyes, we are to believe that the examination of the positions of the First corps and those of the enemy caused him to abandon this plan entirely. This supposition is the more probable in view of the fact that the general-in-chief, having under those circumstances visited the positions of Wofford in company with Longstreet, asked the former if he could attack the activities which he had failed to carry the day before, and that Wofford plainly declared the thing to be impossible. It is therefore the



salient point formed by the front of the Federal Second corps that it is expedient to attack in spite of the defences with which it seems to be covered : not only does the formation itself render it more accessible, but its loss would prove more fatal to the Federals than that of any other portion of their line ; for if the Confederates succeed in posting themselves there, they take the defenders of Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill in the rear. But in order that Hood and McLaws might be able to co-operate in this attack, they would be obliged to abandon the positions conquered with so much difficulty on the right, and leave the ground free to the extreme left of the Federal army. The sounds of the battle in which Robertson and Anderson are engaged near the Emmettsburg road reach Lee's ears to remind him of the danger which menaces him on that side. Finally, Longstreet has asserted since that the two divisions led by him the day before had suffered too much to again undertake a decisive effort. They might, at all events, have assigned to them a very useful and less perilous task than the assault on Ziegler's Grove by causing a portion of these two divisions to make strong demonstrations against the left wing of the enemy. The nature of the ground would have enabled troops relatively few in number to draw Meade's attention without compromising themselves, and thus to turn aside a portion of his forces from the point designated to Pickett. But Lee does not appear to have thought of this diversion. Longstreet, who disapproves of his plan, does not assume the responsibility of making it, and the soldiers of Hood and McLaws, after having fought almost alone the previous day, are doomed in their turn to remain inactive spectators of the powerless efforts of their comrades.

It is to Hill that Lee applies for the force necessary to support Pickett. Anderson, whose division forms the right of the Third corps, has deployed, as we have stated, Wilcox's brigade above Pickett's line. The other four brigades are formed in the rear, in the same order as on the previous day : Perry, then Wright on the right, partly masked by the left of the latter ; Posey, next Mahone, on the left, along the extremity of Seminary Hill, occupy the positions which they did not leave during the combat of the 2d. The brigades of Thomas and Perrin having

come forward in the course of the preceding evening, Pender's division finds itself formed in two lines, while its front, reduced by one-half, enables Heth to take position between it and Anderson. Hill's troops, however, in this deployed order could not effectually sustain Pickett's attack. Consequently, Lee orders General Trimble, Pender's successor, to bring the two brigades of his second line, under Lane and Scales, to the rear of Heth's troops, actually commanded by Pettigrew. In this way six brigades support Pickett on the left, attacking with him the Federal positions at the same time. Wilcox, in order to protect Pickett's right flank, will advance as soon as he receives the order. All the troops of the Third corps destined to participate in the attack are placed under Longstreet's command, and the latter is authorized, if he deems it necessary, to push Perry's and Wright's brigades forward. He directs Pickett to designate to each officer the exact place that has been assigned to him. This concentration no doubt weakens, but does not entirely strip, the defensive line which the general-in-chief is obliged to preserve in case of a reverse: the positions which Pickett and Wilcox are about to abandon are covered with a powerful artillery. Anderson, drawn up in line of battle behind Heth and the two brigades of Trimble, is ready to fill the space which the latter will leave. This line has, from one wing to the other, a development of at least five miles: it is therefore weak at all points, and if the projected assault does not succeed there is no reserve left to prevent a counter-attack.

Longstreet learns at last that everything is ready; his orders are awaited to open the fire which is to precede the assault. He has placed Colonel Alexander at the entrance of the wood near Warfield's to watch the effects of the cannonade and to apprise Pickett when the moment for making the charge arrives; but, having no faith in the success of the attack, he writes to Alexander, advising him not to give the order unless the enemy is driven from his positions, or unless he deems the latter sufficiently disorganized to secure the success of the attack. Alexander naturally declines to assume the responsibility which his chief wrongly desires to impose upon him; his ammunition is limited, and he will not open fire unless the attack is determined upon. Long-

street, thus driven to the necessity of declaring his intentions formally, sends word at last to Colonel Walton, directing him to give the signal agreed upon. Much time has been lost, for it is already one o'clock in the afternoon. Two cannon-shots fired on the right by the Washington Artillery at intervals of one minute suddenly break the silence which was prevailing over the battlefield. It means "Be on your guard!" which is well understood by both armies. The solitary smoke of these shots has not yet been dispersed when the whole Confederate line is one blaze. To the seventy-five pieces of cannon of the First corps are added sixty-three of the Third corps which Hill has placed in line, and which, with the exception of Poague's battery, ranged within the line of the former, are posted along the prolongation of Seminary Hill at a distance of about thirteen hundred yards from the Federals. One hundred and thirty-eight pieces of cannon therefore obey Longstreet's signal. The Federals are not at all surprised at this abrupt prelude: they have had time to recover from the shock of the previous day, and have made good use of it. Meade, assisted by Hancock and his several corps commanders, has spent all the morning in rectifying the line; the general disposition is not changed, but the whole portion of the front which the enemy seems to be menacing is occupied by a stronger force. Stannard's brigade of Doubleday's division is formed in first line in column of regiments deployed; behind it the rest of the division is drawn up in the same order. Birney, who has reorganized the Third corps, holds the space of merely two hundred and fifty yards which Doubleday has left vacant in drawing his lines closer: the three brigades of his own division are likewise formed in columns by regiments; that of Humphreys is massed in the second line, more to the left. Two brigades of the Sixth corps, under Torbert and Nevin, have taken position on the right above Caldwell, so as to cover McGilvery's artillery on the left. General Hunt is examining and rectifying with untiring zeal the position of his batteries. Those of the reserve, engaged somewhat at random, have been consolidated. Those army corps which have left the largest portion of their supply-trains in the rear find their guns short of ammunition; the reserve artillery supplies this deficiency. At the extreme left

two batteries of the Fifth corps crown the steep ridge of Little Round Top. McGilvery, with his eight reserve batteries, occupies the position in which he rendered such valuable service the day before, from the Weikert house on the left to the depression which separates the base of Little Round Top from that of Cemetery Hill. This depression, which affords no good positions, separates him from the four batteries of the Second corps, placed by Major Hazzard in the rear of the infantry along the rocky line which gradually trends northward; one of them is placed half-way on the left; the other three, under Arnold, Cushing, and Brown, are located on the high ridge. Woodruff's regular battery occupies Ziegler's Grove. Finally, to the right of the front exposed to the enemy's fire a regular battery, and eight others belonging to the First and Eleventh corps, form under Major Osborne an irregular line turning north-westward and northward. The Union artillery is thus divided into three groups: McGilvery on the left, with forty-four pieces, along the prolongation of the slopes of Little Round Top; Hazzard in the centre, with thirty pieces, resting on Ziegler's Grove; Osborne to the right, on Cemetery Hill, with about fifty pieces, a large part of which, it is true, do not command a view of that portion of the line that is chiefly menaced. Finally, five reserve batteries hold themselves ready to take the place of those it will be necessary to relieve. The Federals therefore have eighty pieces of artillery to reply to the enemy. In conformity with Hunt's orders, they wait a quarter of an hour before replying, in order to take a survey of the batteries upon which they will have to concentrate their fire. They occupy positions affording better shelter than those of the Confederates, but the formation of their line gives the latter the advantage of a concentric fire.

More than two hundred guns are thus engaged in this artillery combat, the most terrible the New World has ever witnessed. The Confederates fire volleys from all the batteries at once, whose shots, directed toward the same point, produce more effect than successive firing. On the previous day their projectiles passed over the enemy; they have rectified the elevation of their pieces and readily obtain a precision of aim unusual to them. The plateau occupied by the Federals forms a slight depression of the



ground in the centre, which hides their movements, but affords them no shelter from the enemy's fire; the shells burst in the midst of the reserve batteries, supply-trains, and ambulances; the houses are tottering and tumbling down; the head-quarters of General Meade are riddled with balls, and Butterfield, his chief of staff, is slightly wounded. In every direction may be seen men seeking shelter behind the slightest elevations of the ground. Nothing is heard but the roar of cannon and the whistling of projectiles that are piercing the air. A still larger crowd of stragglers, wounded, and non-combatants than that of the day before is again making for the Baltimore turnpike with rapid haste.

In the mean while, the Federal infantry, motionless under this fire, stands the trial with remarkable composure. The artillerists are sustained by the excitement of the conflict, but they are also the most exposed. The men who are serving the guns must be relieved, and presently the guns themselves are successively dismounted. The reserve batteries come to take their places, silencing the guns of the enemy, who is advancing too boldly upon Gettysburg for the purpose of taking Cemetery Hill by enfilade. During this struggle, so desperate and murderous, despite the distance intervening between the combatants, Nature seems inclined to favor the Confederates, for a slight breeze from the north-east, driving the smoke over their positions, covers with a thick veil their batteries and the valley through which they are advancing to the assault. This assault, as we have stated, is directed against the salient point occupied by Hancock. It is against this point, therefore, that the Confederates should concentrate their fire, but, on the contrary, they scatter it along the whole extent of the enemy's line. This error was noticed with astonishment by the Union artillerists; so that when, a few years later, peace had brought them into close contact with their adversaries, General Hunt met General Long, Lee's secretary, who had formerly been his pupil at West Point, and asked him to explain the cause of it. "It was owing to the interference of the generals" (commanding the army corps and divisions), replied Long. In noticing this error he added: "I said to myself that you must have been entirely forgetful of the principles you had inculcated

upon us in your teachings." The losses of the Confederates, however, although inferior to those of the Unionists, are not the less severe. Longstreet's artillery has suffered greatly; Kemper's brigade, posted in the rear of Wilcox, loses in a few minutes more than two hundred men—a sacrifice that could easily have been avoided. Lee and Longstreet, always at the post of danger, visit the batteries in person under a shower of shells. The sight of them encourages the soldiers. They say to one another, "It is true that the latter does not approve the plan of battle, but he waits for the signal of attack with no less ardor." In the meanwhile, the ammunition-wagons being too much exposed, it becomes necessary to place them at a distance; hence a great difficulty in supplying the batteries, that have scarcely more than sixty rounds apiece, including grape. The total amount in reserve being less than one hundred rounds, it becomes necessary, moreover, to economize the ammunition in future. Consequently, Colonel Alexander, hoping speedily to silence the Union guns, intends to give Pickett the signal of attack after a quarter of an hour's cannonade. But time is flying; the caissons are getting empty, while the fire of the Federals, concentrated upon certain points by Hunt's orders, is still as regular and precise as at the commencement. The matter, however, must be brought to a close; it is near two o'clock. Alexander writes to Pickett, saying that if he wishes to charge, the moment has arrived, notwithstanding the intensity of the enemy's fire, for he no longer hopes to be able to silence it. The latter calls upon Longstreet, but cannot obtain any instructions from this general, who is cruelly tried between his own convictions and the orders of his chief: he leaves him, stating that he is going to put his troops in motion; Longstreet makes no other reply except by nodding affirmatively. On returning to his division Pickett is at all events waiting for new directions or a favorable opportunity when an urgent message from Alexander decides him at last to give his soldiers the signal of attack. He is informed—what he might have found out himself in spite of the roaring of the Confederate cannon—that the enemy's guns scarcely make any reply. The Federal artillery appears to be silenced from the lack of ammunition. The opportunity so long waited for has therefore at last arrived—a

mistake which the assailants will soon find out to their sorrow. In fact, about a quarter-past two o'clock, Meade, believing that enough ammunition has been expended, and wishing to provoke the attack of the enemy, orders the firing to cease; Hunt, who is watching the battlefield in another direction, issues the same order at the same moment, and causes two fresh batteries, taken from the reserve in the rear of Hancock's line, to advance. For a while the voice of the Confederate cannon is alone heard.

But new actors are preparing to appear on the scene. Pickett has caused the object of the charge they are about to execute to be explained to his soldiers. As the ranks are re-forming many of them can no longer rise; the ground is strewn with the dead, the wounded, and others that are suffering from the heat, for a burning sun, still more scorching than that of the day before, lights up this bloody battlefield. But all able-bodied men are at their posts, and an affecting scene soon elicits a cry of admiration both from enemies and friends. Full of ardor, as if it were rushing to the assault of the Washington Capitol itself, and yet marching with measured steps, so as not to break its alignment, Pickett's division moves forward solidly and quietly in magnificent order. Garnett, in the centre, sweeping through the artillery line, leaves Wilcox behind him, whose men, lying flat upon the ground, are waiting for another order to support the attack. Kemper is on the right; Armistead is moving forward at double-quick to place himself on the left along the line of the other two brigades; a swarm of skirmishers covers the front of the division. The smoke has disappeared, and this small band perceives at last the long line of the Federal positions, which the hollow in the ground where they had sought shelter had, until then, hidden from its view. It moves onward full of confidence, convinced that a single effort will pierce this line, which is already wavering, and feeling certain that this effort will be sustained by the rest of the army. Taking its loss into consideration, it numbers no more than four thousand five hundred men at the utmost, but the auxiliary forces of Pettigrew, Trimble, and Wilcox raise the number of assailants to fourteen thousand. If they are all put in motion in time, and well led against a particular point of the Federal line, their effort may triumph over every obstacle and decide the

fate of the battle. Marching in the direction of the salient position occupied by Hancock, which Lee has given him as the objective point, Pickett, after passing beyond the front of Wilcox, causes each of his brigades to make a half-wheel to the left. This manœuvre, although well executed, is attended with serious difficulties, for the division, drawn up *en échelon* across the Emmettsburg road, presents its right flank to the Federals to such an extent that the latter mistake the three échelons for three successive lines.

The moment has arrived for the Federal artillery to commence firing. McGilvery concentrates the fire of his forty pieces against the assailants, the Federals even attributing the change in Pickett's direction to this fire—a wrong conclusion, for it is when he exposes the flank that the enemy's shots cause the greatest ravages in his ranks. If the thirty-four pieces of Hazzard bearing upon the salient position could follow McGilvery's example, this artillery, which Pickett thought to be paralyzed, would suffice to crush him. But, by order of his immediate chief, Hazzard has fired oftener and in quicker succession than Hunt had directed, and at the decisive moment he has nothing left in his caissons but grapeshot.\* He is therefore compelled to wait until the enemy is within short range. Pickett, encouraged by his silence, crosses several fields enclosed by strong fences, which his skirmishers had not been able to reach before the cannonade; then, having reached the base of the elevation he is to attack, he once more changes his direction by a half-wheel to the right, halting to rectify his line. The Confederate artillery is endeavoring to support him, but is counting its shots, for it is obliged to be sparing of its ammunition: the seven light pieces intended to accompany the infantry, being wanted elsewhere, fail to appear at the very moment they should have pushed forward, and no other battery with sufficient supplies can be found to take their place.

But, what is still more serious, orders do not seem to have been clearly given to the troops that are to sustain Pickett. On the left Pettigrew has put his men in motion at the first order, but, being posted in the rear of Pickett, he has a wider space of

\* See Appendix, Note B.



ground to go over, and naturally finds himself distanced; moreover, his soldiers have not yet recovered from the combat of the previous day: from the start their ranks are seen wavering, and they do not advance with the same ardor as those of Pickett. Covered by a line of skirmishers, the four brigades of Archer, Pettigrew, Davis, and Brockenbrough are deployed from right to left on a single line. But such a line of battle is always difficult to maintain. The left slackens its pace; the right, on the contrary, urged on by the two brigades of the intrepid Trimble, is endeavoring to join Pickett, whom his half-wheel conversion has drawn near it; the four brigades thus find themselves ranged *en échelon*, like those of Pickett, although in an inverse order. Scales, on the right, in rear of Archer, with Lane on his left, following Pettigrew's brigade, is in second line abreast of the last-mentioned *échelon*. Presently, these troops, through their imposing appearance, attract a portion of the enemy's attention and fire, and at a distance of two hundred and fifty yards they stop to reply with volleys of musketry. On the right, Wilcox has remained inactive a considerable time, being probably detained by a diversity of opinion among the chieftains regarding the *rôle* that is assigned respectively to them. In fact, while Pickett, who is too much engaged to watch his movements, depends upon him to cover his right during the attack, Hill, his proper chief, does not desire to bring him into action unless the principal assault is successful. Finally, in pursuance of an order from Pickett at the moment when the latter has halted in the vicinity of the Godori house, Wilcox pushes his brigade forward in a column of deployed battalions. In order to get sooner into line, and thus to draw a portion of the enemy's fire, he marches directly on. He cannot, however, recover the distance that separates him from the leading assailants, the latter having disappeared in a hollow; then, becoming enveloped in smoke, he loses sight of them, and, following alone his direction to the right, does not succeed in covering their flank.

In the mean while, Pickett, causing his skirmishers to fall back, has again put his troops in motion, without waiting for his *échelons* to get completely into line: the artillery and infantry posted along the ridge he is to capture open a terrific fire of grape and mus-

ketry against him at a distance of two hundred yards, while the shot and shell of McGilvery take his line again in flank, causing frightful gaps in its ranks, killing at times as many as ten men by a single shot.

Before narrating the terrible encounter that is impending we must give a sketch of the ground which is about to be so desperately disputed. In the prolongation at the south-west of the hillock properly called Cemetery Hill stands the plateau designated by Lee as the objective point of the attack, which we shall call Ziegler's Grove, from the name of a small wood which descends the slope opposite to Gettysburg. The ridge of this plateau, the summit of which is very level, is bordered at the west by rocks which project from the soil, sometimes to a height of four or five feet, forming a wall, as on the summit of Culp's Hill. The wood is defended by Woodruff's guns, posted along the lower edge, masking the right of the Third division of the Second corps, commanded by Hays. Farther on, the natural wall affords the latter strong defensive positions; fifty yards south of the wood, above a spring called Bryan's Well, it is crowned for a distance of nearly three hundred yards by an ordinary stone wall. Back of this line is deployed the remainder of Hays' infantry; two batteries are posted along the ridge. To the left the wall follows a westerly course, of about eighty yards, to form a junction with another ridge emerging from the soil. Gibbon's division, whose front is four hundred and fifty yards in length, is covered by another wall surmounted by a common post-and-rail fence. Owen's brigade, commanded by General Webb, is on the right, in an angle above Hays' position, Hall in the centre. About one hundred yards farther up the wall terminates abruptly behind the small wood, an intrenchment prolonging the line of the fence in the direction of the level grounds which Birney occupies, and which are covered by the Federal artillery. In the salient angle formed by the wood Doubleday has placed Stan-nard's brigade. The four brigades are ranged in two lines: three batteries, posted along the ridge near the second line, fire over the first, their front being flanked by Hays on the right and Birney on the left.

Seeing their adversaries advancing against these formidable

positions, those amongst the Federals who fought under Burnside have the same opinion: they are at last avenged for the Fredericksburg disaster. The assailants also understand the perils that await them. On the left, Pettigrew is yet far off; on the right, Wilcox strays away from them and disappears amid the smoke. Pickett therefore finds himself alone with his three brigades. Far from hesitating, his soldiers rush forward at a double-quick. A fire of musketry breaks out along the entire front of Gibbon's division. The Confederate ranks are thinning as far as the eye can reach. Garnett, whose brigade has kept a little in advance, and who, although sick, has declined to leave the post of honor, falls dead within a hundred yards of the Federal line; for an instant his troops come to a halt. They are immediately joined by Kemper, who at a distance of sixty yards in the rear has allowed their right to cover his left. The two brigades form a somewhat unsteady line, which opens fire upon the enemy. But the Confederate projectiles flatten themselves by thousands upon the strata of rocks, which is soon covered with black spots like a target, and upon the wall behind which the Unionists are seeking shelter. The game is too uneven: they must either fly or charge. These brave soldiers have only halted for a few minutes, allowing Armistead the necessary time to get into line. Encouraged by the example set by their chiefs, they scale the acclivity which rises before them: their yells mingle with the rattling of musketry; the smoke soon envelops the combatants. Gibbon, seeing the enemy advancing with such determination, tries to stop his progress by a counter-charge, but his voice is not heard; his soldiers fire in haste, without leaving their ranks; the Confederates rush upon them. Unfortunately for the assailants, their right not being protected by Wilcox, their flank is exposed to the little wood which stretches beyond the Federal line. Stannard's soldiers, concealed by the foliage, have suffered but little from the bombardment; Hancock, always ready to seize a favorable opportunity, causes them to form *en potence* along the edge of the wood in order to take the enemy's line in flank. Two regiments from Armistead's right thus receive a murderous fire which almost decimates and disorganizes them. The remainder of the brigade



throws itself in the rear of the centre of Pickett's line, which, following this movement, momentarily inclines toward Hays in order to attack the Federals at close quarters. Armistead, urging his men forward, has reached the front rank between Kemper and Garnett—if it be yet possible to distinguish the regiments and brigades in this compact mass of human beings, which, all covered with blood, seems to be driven by an irresistible force superior to the individual will of those composing it—and throws himself like a solid body upon the Union line. The shock is terrific: it falls at first upon the brigades of Hall and Harrow, then concentrates itself upon that of Webb, against which the assailants are oscillating right and left. The latter general in the midst of his soldiers encourages them by his example; he is presently wounded. The struggle is waged at close quarters; the Confederates pierce the first line of the Federals, but the latter, dislodged from the wall, fall back upon the second line, formed of small earthworks erected on the ridge in the vicinity of their guns. These pieces fire grapeshot upon the assailants. Hancock and Gibbon bring forward all their reserves. To the left of Webb, Hall, seeing his right outflanked, has rectified his line by means of a half-wheel to the rear, which places him on the flank of the assailants; farther on, Harrow, not being directly attacked, advances with his left, and, in spite of the disorder inevitable under such circumstances, he succeeds in almost taking Pickett's line in reverse. The troops posted on the right and left hasten toward the point menaced. Humphreys sends Carr's brigade to the assistance of the Second corps. The regiments become mixed; the commanders do not know where their soldiers are to be found; but they are all pressing each other in a compact mass, forming at random a living and solid bulwark more than four ranks deep. A clump of trees, in the neighborhood of which Cushing has posted his guns, commanding the whole plateau, is the objective point that the Confederates keep in view. Armistead on foot, his hat perched on the point of his sword, rushes forward to attack the battery. With one hundred and fifty men determined to follow him unto death he pierces the mass of combatants, passes beyond the earthworks, and reaches the line of guns, which can no longer fire for fear of killing friends and foes indis-



criminally. But at the same moment, by the side of Cushing, his young and gallant adversary, he falls pierced with balls. They both lie at the foot of the clump of trees which marks the extreme point reached by the Confederates in this supreme effort. These few trees, henceforth historical, like a snail on the strand struck by a furious sea, no longer possessing strength enough to draw back into its shell, constitute the limit before which the tide of invasion stops—a limit traced by the blood of some of the bravest soldiers that America has produced.

In fact, if the Federals have thus seen a large number of their chieftains fall, and their artillery left without ammunition, the effort of the assailants, on the other hand, is exhausted. On the right Wilcox has started in great haste to cover Pickett's flank, but the direction he is following leads him to the low grounds interspersed with bushes whence Plum Run derives its source, separating him from this division, to which he can no longer afford assistance. Pettigrew, on the left, does his best to support him. His own brigade and that of Archer have reached Hays' line, but have failed to effect a breach. Trimble, who is following them closely, sustains them vigorously. Lane has already penetrated the first line of the Federals, drawn up, as it is elsewhere, at the foot of the acclivity, and, beginning to scale it, he draws near the wall which, as we have stated, stands at this point about halfway from the summit. Archer and Scales, covered on their right by the movement of Pickett, who has passed the same wall at the point where it skirts the plain, have preceded Lane by a few minutes. But Pettigrew's two brigades of the left, having remained in the rear, cannot or will not arrive in time to support them. After a combat at short range—very brief, but extremely murderous, in which Trimble is seriously wounded—his troops and those of Pettigrew retire, even before the two brigades under Thomas and Perrin have reached their position, and while Pickett is still fighting on the right. The regular fire of Hays' impregnable line drives the assailants from that point in the greatest disorder as soon as they have taken one step in retreat. The four brigades of the Third Confederate corps that have thus been repulsed leave two thousand prisoners and fifteen stands of colors in the hands of the enemy. A few regi-

ments of Archer's and Scales' brigades, which outflank Hays on the left, throw themselves on the right and unite with Pickett's soldiers, who are still contending with Gibbon. This reinforcement is, however, quite insufficient for the Confederates, who thus find themselves isolated, without support and without reserves, in the midst of the Federal line. Kemper is wounded in his turn. Out of eighteen field-officers and four generals, Pickett and one lieutenant-colonel alone remain unharmed: there is hardly any one left around them, and it is a miracle to see them yet safe and sound in the midst of such carnage. The division does not fall back; it is annihilated. The flags which a while ago were bravely floating upon the enemy's parapets fall successively to the ground, only to be picked up by the conquerors. A number of soldiers, not daring to pass a second time the ground over which the Federals cross their fire, throw down their arms: among those who are trying to gain the Southern lines many victims are stricken down by cannon-balls. The conflict is at an end. Out of four thousand eight hundred men that have followed Pickett, scarcely twelve to thirteen hundred are to be found in the rear of Alexander's guns; three thousand five hundred have been sacrificed and twelve stands of colors lost in this fatal charge.

In the mean while, Wilcox, having lost sight of Pickett, has reached the foot of the acclivities along which the Third Federal corps is massed. After having re-formed his brigade in the low ground covered with bushes which borders these acclivities, he deploys it and resumes his march in order to support Pickett, whom he believes to be still fighting on his left. The Unionists, who from their commanding position overlook the whole battlefield, are astonished at the display of so much audacity, for at this juncture the great struggle is already ended. At a distance of two hundred yards from Wilcox's line, and within its compass, stands the wood into which Stannard has just brought back the troops that have performed so useful a diversion against Pickett on the other side. Seeing a new adversary, he causes them to go through the same manœuvre in an opposite direction, pushing forward as far as a strong fence two regiments whose fire takes the whole Confederate line in flank. The latter come to a halt, replying to the fire of the enemy; but they soon realize

their isolation: the Federal artillery riddles them with shot; the guns that should have supported them are silent for want of ammunition. They recall to mind the disaster of their comrades and retire precipitately, leaving two hundred of their men on the ground. During this time Pickett's soldiers, mixed up with those of Pettigrew and Trimble, have taken the shortest way to cross the valley, and instead of making for their point of departure have thrown themselves more to northward, along the extremity of Seminary Hill, not far from the spot selected by Lee for watching the battle.

The combat was so quickly determined that the reinforcements intended for the assailants have not had time to cover their retreat. To the right of Pickett's old position, which is no longer occupied except by artillery and the remnants of Wilcox's brigade, McLaws makes Wofford's and Barksdale's brigades, commanded by Colonel Humphreys, advance a little: the latter deploys a portion of his forces as skirmishers to the right of Wilcox, forming in the vicinity of the Confederate guns a barrier which would prove very weak, no doubt, if the Federals made a serious effort to pierce it. More to the left, Perry and Wright are only waiting for orders to renew the combat. But Longstreet forbids their advance, justly declaring that a new attack would only result in the useless shedding of precious blood. In fact, it is no longer a question of renewing the assault, but rather to put a stop to the disorganization of the army. Seated impassively upon a wooden fence, he thence directs the members of his staff, who are proceeding in every direction, to gather up the stragglers. In the midst of the latter Lee quickly mounts his horse and endeavors to retain them by his speech, uttering a word of encouragement for each, and even taking upon himself the whole responsibility of the disaster.

These men, always accustomed to follow, and full of blind admiration for him, stop short at the sound of his voice. But the disorder is great; on every side the wounded are forming sad processions that are pressing forward in the direction of the ambulances. The Confederate generals only succeed in rallying a small number of combatants, whom they range in haste close to the guns, against which they expect to see the enemy advance with



troops elated by victory. This artillery, without support, performs, it is true, prodigies of valor in order to conceal its weakness; and one of Henry's batteries, posted alone in advance of the line to the right of the orchard, continues the fight under the concentrated fire of the enemy's guns.

On the side of the Federals there is great anxiety during the struggle. Meade, who was on the left, has hastened to the spot at the moment of Pickett's defeat, followed by the reduced battalions of the Third corps. It is not to be believed, however, that Lee risked the fate of the battle in this partial attack, and that he will not yet make a decisive effort with all the rest of his army. Every one, therefore, is waiting; the wounded are carried off and the ranks re-formed. Along the front, where the struggle has been carried on hand to hand, the combatants, coming from the right and left, are all mixed up. Humphreys has massed his troops behind the Second corps; a portion of Birney's division, which, like himself, has followed Meade, has taken position on the left, ready to strike the enemy in flank should he attempt to advance farther; the whole of Doubleday's division has marched toward the elevated point occupied by Stannard; while Robinson arrives at the same time to reinforce the right of the Second corps. Two brigades of the Twelfth corps, summoned by Meade from the other extremity of the line, appear shortly after the termination of the struggle. The general-in-chief confers upon Newton the command of the First, Second, and Third corps, in the place of Hancock, charging him to restore order on the scene of the last combat. But Pickett's experience having proved how dangerous it was to cross the open space intervening between the enemy and Ziegler's Grove, Meade hastens to the left in the hope of taking the offensive on that side. This wing is composed of the Fifth corps and the largest portion of the Sixth. The former, which is fortified on the summit of the Round Tops and at their bases, can reinforce Crawford's division, which has suffered but little as yet. Sedgwick, after leaving two brigades east of the Great Round Top—Shaler's near Geary, and Neill's along Rock Creek—has still three brigades (one under Wright and two under Wheaton) that have not yet been engaged, and which occupy the space comprised between the Fifth corps and McGilvery's artillery.



Wheaton on the left and Wright on the right are formed several lines deep. On their right Caldwell's division, by order of Hancock, holds itself ready to take the offensive. Among the troops that have suffered, like it, on the previous day, there are many which, encouraged by the success they have just witnessed, might renew the combat against an enemy that has been still worse punished. The soldiers, although fatigued by long marches, are yet able to make a vigorous effort. Against which point of the enemy's line should this effort be directed? An English officer, Colonel Freemantle, who was with Longstreet, and could form a cool judgment of passing events, has declared that, despite the disorder of the infantry, the artillery would have sufficed, in his opinion, to put a stop to any direct attack. But it was feasible to manœuvre offensively without repeating the error committed by the enemy, who had only succeeded in the attacks made under cover of the woods and ravines adjoining Plum Run: it was expedient to operate in this direction. The forces arranged in front formed a vast semicircle, the two extremities of which rested on the Emmettsburg road, and whose summit touched the slopes of the Great Round Top: from this height one could perceive the six or seven brigades ranged along this long line and isolated from the rest of the army by the disorganization of the centre. It is Hood and McLaws, therefore, who must be surprised, struck, and destroyed.

Such is, no doubt, Meade's idea as he is proceeding to the left. But he dares not hazard a great movement, which alone could prove effective. Being but recently placed in command, he does not possess self-reliance enough to risk a great deal in order to gain a great deal. Where are the old colleagues whose advice might have inspired him with a bold determination? Reynolds was the first and most illustrious victim of this great conflict; Hancock, the master-spirit of the defence, is wounded: he has indeed been able to dictate from his couch a note imploring his chief to take the offensive, but he is not on the spot to execute what he suggests; Gibbon has received a serious wound in return for the glory he has acquired; Sickles, who on the previous day committed an error which may well be pardoned, but whose clear judgment, coolness, and irresistible ardor have so frequently fired


the hearts of his companions-in-arms,—Sickles, now lying mutilated on his bed of sickness, is lost to the Army of the Potomac; and Butterfield, although only slightly wounded, is for the present unfit for active service.

Besides, nothing has been prearranged for the offensive. If Pleasonton, who has neither command nor responsibility on the battlefield, exhorts Meade to seize this opportunity to show himself at one stroke a great leader, on the other hand hesitation is marked upon the countenances of many—a hesitation very natural, for some months afterward a number of general officers come forward to declare under oath before the Committee of Congress on the Conduct of the War that in their opinion any attack would have failed.

They are under the impression of having escaped from a terrible danger, and of having done enough for the occasion. The invasion is repulsed; by attempting any further effort everything might be compromised. In short, they are all paralyzed by the common error of the Union chiefs, who believe the enemy to be much stronger numerically than he is in reality. The aggressive audacity of the Confederates has achieved the result, always so important in war, of deceiving the enemy regarding their real strength, thus protecting them at the critical moment. Under this impression Meade is desirous of feeling them before making a serious attack. He gives Sedgwick no instructions, merely directing Sykes to push a reconnoissance on the left over the ground which should have been occupied in great force, without even pointing out the importance of such movement. This operation is thus entrusted to a single brigade of Crawford's division, which, under McCandless, has held since morning that portion of the Trostle wood adjoining the right bank of Plum Run. Leaving Bartlett to keep guard over this wood, Crawford and McCandless advance across the wheat-field on which hundreds of dead, dying, and wounded soldiers have been lying since the day before. Without stopping to contemplate this sad spectacle, the Federals penetrate about five o'clock into the wood situated west of this field.

As we have before observed, the position of the Confederates is very much exposed on this side. Law, having sent Anderson's

brigade to keep Kilpatrick in check on the Emmetsburg road, has been obliged to deploy the remainder of his division upon a long, attenuated line. His old brigade (under Robertson) on the right faces eastward, along the lower slopes of Round Top; Benning occupies the hill of Devil's Den, supporting Kershaw, who forms the right of McLaws' division. The rest of this division covers the position of the orchard: Semmes and Wofford have their troops massed close to the houses; Barksdale's are deployed as skirmishers, whose line extends as far as the positions occupied by Wilcox before the attack. Toward four o'clock, shortly before McCandless receives the order to advance, Law, who understands the danger to which Pickett's check exposes him, decides to bring his troops to the rear. The two brigades on the right fall back toward the Emmetsburg road without molestation. Kershaw, having received a similar order from McLaws, abandons the wood he has captured the day before from Caldwell, and starts in the direction of the orchard. Benning has misunderstood his instructions, and instead of following this movement he prolongs his line to occupy the position which Kershaw has just left. His left, being thus extended, encounters McCandless, who after a short engagement captures from him about one hundred prisoners, compelling the whole brigade to make a speedy retreat. Kershaw finds himself isolated in his turn, and, believing himself already surrounded, in order to escape from the enemy resorts to a manœuvre which we mention on account of its singularity. He sends the color-bearers of his regiments to plant their flags a few hundred yards in the right-rear, across the tributary of Plum Run, subsequently ordering his soldiers to break ranks and to re-form in this new position. An active enemy would not have allowed them to again get together, but McCandless, not daring to venture farther without support, stops before the ravine, satisfied with having recaptured nearly the entire battlefield of the previous day and picked up more than two hundred and fifty prisoners. The sad task of carrying off the large number of wounded, who had remained without care or assistance for the space of twenty-four hours, detains him at every step, and keeps him occupied until the night is far advanced.







The darkness which envelops the battlefield renders any serious undertaking henceforth impracticable. Wheaton, who has at last been ordered to support McCandless, advances on the right of the latter with Nevin's brigade, followed by that of Bartlett; but it is too late, and he comes to a halt at a considerable distance from the orchard. When the information obtained by McCandless finally reaches Meade neither party thinks of anything but to calculate the results of the day's conflict.

Before proceeding to describe the occurrences of the next day we must mention a cavalry combat which, during the great struggle, took place east of Gettysburg and south of the York road. Stuart, not being able to participate in the infantry fight, has since morning been making preparations to take advantage of the victory if it should crown Lee's efforts. The latter has directed him to get around the Federal right, in order to strike the enemy's column in flank if they should retire in the direction of Westminster—a well-conceived plan which would have been productive of disastrous consequences to the Federals had they been beaten on the heights of Gettysburg.

At three o'clock in the morning Stuart, leaving the positions he has occupied to the right of Rock Creek and north of the York road, follows the road which leads from the York road to the Reever house. He thus covers the left of the Second corps and reaches the extremity of Brinkerhoff's Ridge. Rapidly ascending the summit of this ridge, he perceives the enemy's cavalry posted along the slopes upon which stands the Reever house. He at once proposes to separate it from the right of the Army of the Potomac and to strike the road to Westminster between the bridge over Rock Creek and that over White Run, a stream which receives the waters of Cress' Run a little before reaching this road. In order to accomplish this it is necessary for him to conceal his movement from the enemy and detain him in the vicinity of the intersection of the Hanover and Dutch roads. Sheltered behind the high ground of Cress' Ridge, while a screen of skirmishers occupies the edge of the woods which cover a portion of them, and at the same time keep off those of the enemy, the Confederate troopers will be able to reach the Baltimore turnpike unobserved. Without waiting for the issue of the great struggle, they may be able to

create a panic in the rear of the Union army, the effect of which will be decisive on the battlefield. Stuart puts Chambliss' and Jenkins' brigades, which are with him, on the march along the western slopes of Cress' Ridge. Fitzhugh Lee and Hampton have remained behind, near the York road. He sends them an order to join him by following closely in his tracks, so as not to attract the attention of the enemy.

The troops which Stuart has seen near the Reeve house belong to Kilpatrick's division. After sunset of the previous day, Gregg, being summoned back by Pleasanton, has left this position in order to take another in the rear of the army. He has bivouacked near the bridge over White Run on the Baltimore road; but in the mean time, Kilpatrick, returning from Hunterstown and finding the important highway from Bonaughtown unoccupied, has left Custer's brigade there. On the morning of the 3d, Gregg, having been ordered to advance again, so as to cover the right flank of the army, has proceeded along Cress' Run, south of the Hanover road. He thus keeps in view the eastern slopes of Wolf Hill, upon which Stuart must debouch if he passes beyond Brinkerhoff's Ridge. On learning of Custer's presence near the Bonaughtown road he sends him word to go into position on his right, which seems to him to be much exposed, and to extend his line in front of the Reeve house. Although he has been ordered by Kilpatrick to repair to Two Taverns, Custer complies with Gregg's request. Stuart thus has three brigades in front of him, numbering about five thousand troopers. He has himself no less than six thousand sabres in the four brigades placed under his command. He knows nothing of the position of Gregg, who will doubtless soon discover the march of Chambliss and Jenkins. But this march is interrupted from the beginning by an unforeseen incident: Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee, imprudently showing to the enemy a portion of their forces, have unmasked it.

The Dutch road north of the highway follows a ridge but slightly elevated and running parallel with Cress' Run. The plain which stretches out, a little more than half a mile in width, between these elevations, cultivated and intersected by some fences, is watered by a small stream, Little's Run, the source of

which is found in the Rummel farmyard at the foot of Cress' Ridge, four hundred yards south-west of the cross-road connecting the Dutch road with the York turnpike. This cross-road passes through two small pieces of wood situated on either side of the plain—one on the slopes of Cress' Ridge, the other on the hillocks that the Dutch road follows. On the south the plain is bounded by hills adjoining Cress' Run, and which the Hanover road traverses near the Howard house before reaching the cross-road.

Along these hills Custer has taken position. About ten o'clock in the morning Hampton and Lee, following the cross-road beyond the point where Stuart has left it, debouch from the woods on Rummel's farm. Their artillery immediately opens fire upon Custer. The latter, menaced on his right, deploys *en potence* a portion of his brigade which he has till then kept in reserve, and his guns soon silence those of the Confederates. Hampton and Lee, finding out their mistake, speedily fall back behind the wood, where Custer takes good care not to follow them. But at the sound of the conflict Stuart, who has already advanced somewhat, stops: if the enemy menaces his flank he cannot proceed farther. He sends for Hampton and Lee to show them from the summit of Brinkerhoff's Ridge the lay of the ground and to explain his plan to them. But his messengers lose their way, and he waits for his lieutenants in vain. Meanwhile, Custer, having received new orders from Kilpatrick, has set off to join his division on the left of the army beyond Round Top. Gregg has sent one of his two brigades, under McIntosh, to relieve Custer. He has remained with the other, commanded by his namesake, Irvin Gregg, in the positions taken in the morning. It is near two o'clock. The echoes from the hills which separate the two bodies of cavalry from the field of battle around Gettysburg have been repeating for the last hour the sounds of the cannonade which precedes the great attack of Longstreet. The Federals, who have dismounted, anxiously listen to the distant roar of cannon. They feel that the critical moment of the battle has arrived. Although they cannot take part in the combat, nor even follow its movements with the eye, this thought seems to fire their ardor. In fact, McIntosh, scarcely



established in the position which Custer has just vacated in the vicinity of the Howard house, determines to take the offensive—a happy inspiration, for he thereby baffles Stuart's plan at the very moment when he is about to execute it. The Confederate general, equally urged on by the sound of the combat, would like to continue his movement with the brigades of Chambliss and Jenkins under the shelter of Cress' Ridge, while Hampton and Lee detain the enemy north of the Hanover road.

McIntosh, in advancing upon Rummel's farm, has obliged these two last-mentioned brigades to deploy in order to hold him in check. General Lee is in command of both, while Hampton is vainly endeavoring to join Stuart. He has placed his dismounted troopers behind a strong fence. His artillery unmasks, and McIntosh stops, soon realizing the fact that he has to contend with too strong a force.

Gregg, summoned in haste, meets Custer, and brings him back to the aid of his first brigade. Irvin Gregg, posted a considerable distance off, reaches the cross-roads a little later, and remains in reserve. Custer could not arrive more opportunely with his four splendid Michigan regiments. Stuart has seen them from a distance. Finding the enemy's forces, which are massing on his flank, increasing, he determines to send Jenkins' brigade against them, retaining only that of Chambliss to continue his movement. The sole object of this movement, however, is now limited to the task of turning the left flank of the Union cavalry in order to assure its defeat: he is, in fact, obliged to begin by fighting it before striking the rear of the Army of the Potomac.

In the mean time, Gregg is preparing to attack the Confederates, although the latter, posted along the slopes of Cress' Ridge and within the enclosures of the Rummel farm-buildings, have every advantage of position. Two of Custer's regiments, the Fifth and Sixth Michigan, reinforce McIntosh's line, which rests to the right on the woods situated along the Dutch road, and, to the left, on the Hanover road: the other two regiments are kept in reserve. The artillery is posted on the hill near the Howard house, and opens fire upon the Rummel farm-buildings, occupied by Fitzhugh Lee's skirmishers. Lee, who has vainly tried to

turn McIntosh's right, has gradually brought into action the greater portion of his brigade. Jenkins' men are in position on his right, extending as far as the Hanover road. Custer's troopers, on foot, with carbine in hand, are marching in skirmishing order against the enemy, who is speedily dislodged from the farm-buildings by the Federal guns. Gregg, leaving his right firmly established on the wood on the Dutch road, brings his left toward Cress' Ridge, thus drawing near the positions occupied by Stuart. The greater portion of Jenkins' brigade, deployed as skirmishers like the Federals, soon comes forward to meet them. But owing to some strange negligence it soon finds itself short of ammunition, and the Sixth Michigan sends it rapidly to the right-about. Gregg, taking advantage of its withdrawal, sends forward in the centre a portion of McIntosh's brigade. Fitzhugh Lee's men, who have lost their hold on the Rummel farm-buildings, fall back in their turn, becoming separated from those of Jenkins. Stuart, finding that the latter are in great jeopardy, orders Chambliss to go to their assistance. The latter dismounts one of his regiments and directs it against the Federal centre; the others hold themselves in readiness to support it. The progress of the Unionists is stopped, but Stuart has no one left with whom to accomplish the manœuvre he has undertaken. The combat, brought on in spite of him, is of too serious a character not to engage thenceforth his whole attention. Indeed, the regiment sent out by Chambliss has found the Federals strongly posted behind a fence near Little's Run. The Fifth Michigan, armed with repeating carbines, receives it with a well-sustained fire: the attack of the Confederates is repulsed. Fitzhugh Lee, who, from his position on the left of the Rummel farm, has anxiously watched all the phases of the combat, thinks that the moment has arrived for striking a decisive blow. He orders the First Virginia to charge mounted upon McIntosh's right. The First New Jersey, whose ammunition is exhausted, has no time to retire in good order; it is quickly driven back upon the side of the woods. Custer most opportunely hurls against the assailants the Seventh Michigan, which comes to meet them mounted, but stops behind a fence and opens an ineffective fire upon them; the Virginia troopers reply in the same manner. During this firing

Lee causes a portion of his men to advance on foot, who soon demolish the obstacles and put the Federals to a speedy retreat. Their centre falls back in disorder, their left being obliged to form *en potence* behind a fence in order not to be taken in flank.

But this very success has exhausted the strength of the First Virginia. The fusillade takes it in flank, while the shells are pouring into its ranks. It falls back, dragging along with it beyond the Rummel house the whole of Lee's brigade. Hampton, having returned to his command without finding Stuart, concludes that he can no longer remain inactive, for Chambliss on his right is as hard pressed as Lee on his left, the defeat of the latter having decided the Federals to resume the offensive along the whole line. Consequently, he orders two regiments, the First North Carolina and the Jeff. Davis Legion, to charge the enemy. The latter come up at a gallop, sabres in hand, and rush upon one of the Federal batteries, without allowing themselves to be staggered by its rapid and murderous discharges. But Gregg hurls against them the First Michigan, which has till now been kept in reserve. Custer leads it with spirit against the Confederates, much superior in number, but whose front ranks have been decimated by the Union artillery. The latter does not cease firing till the two bodies of cavalry meet almost in front of the cannons' mouths. The Southern column is repulsed after a bloody struggle, but it receives prompt assistance. Lee mounts all of his troopers that are left him and gives the signal for the charge. In compliance with an order from one of Hampton's aides-de-camp, the brigade of the latter follows his example. This strong reinforcement is soon in the middle of the plain in which Custer continues to fight: its arrival gives the Confederates a momentary advantage. Meanwhile, before even becoming engaged, the new-comers are exposed to the fire of the artillery and of the Union skirmishers posted on their right behind the fences. Gregg and McIntosh call their reserves, remount a portion of their skirmishers, and hurl them upon both flanks of the Southern column.\* The combat with the

\* On the part of McIntosh's brigade, the Third Pennsylvania and First New Jersey cavalry regiments had the heaviest part of the fighting, and in the final charge assisted the First Michigan by also charging mounted with the sabre upon both flanks of the Confederate column. Those regiments suffered severely.—Ed.



steel becomes general; the two columns force and repel each other with desperate fury, without achieving any decided success. Hampton, who has joined his brigade, is seriously wounded; a large number of officers of both armies fall around him. At length the Federals fall back, but they thus unmask their artillery, which compels the Southerners to beat a still more speedy retreat. The ground so stubbornly disputed is abandoned by both parties.\* The Unionists have lost 736 men, of whom 112 are killed, 289 wounded, and 335 taken prisoners: Custer's brigade has suffered the most. They have, however, accomplished their object and frustrated the plan of their adversaries. By their first attack, and subsequently by their vigorous resistance, they have interrupted Stuart's flank movement. The latter, it is true, watches till evening to hear the sound of the cannon which is to announce the defeat of the enemy. He still hopes to be able to strike the Westminster road in the midst of the flying Federals; but night at length comes to dissipate this pleasing dream. He withdraws to the York road, for it is no longer an object with him to destroy shattered battalions or to achieve a victory, but rather to cover the retreat of a decimated army and long columns of wounded men.

In fact, when the sun sets over this bloody field for the third time the decree of the God of armies has been irrevocably pronounced. The Confederates feel themselves conquered; therefore, such must be the case. Their heroic efforts and the enormous losses of their adversaries have not sufficed to secure victory to them. The positions which the Federals have so well defended in a strategic point of view are only of secondary importance; but it having been rendered necessary for Lee to attack the Army of the Potomac on the spot where he met it, these positions have acquired a fortuitous value by enabling it to defend itself with advantage. In order to drive this army completely van-

\* In the official reports of Generals Pleasonton, Gregg, and Custer it is stated that the Union cavalry remained masters of the field of the engagement, while General Stuart claims in his report that they were driven from it. A detailed account of this brilliant engagement is given by Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel William Brooke-Rawle in *The Right Flank at Gettysburg*. That writer, who was present, asserts that the Confederates were driven back beyond the Rummel farm-buildings, which in the beginning of the fight had been in their possession, and that the position was held by the Unionists until the end.—ED.



quished on the Baltimore road, it would have been necessary to conquer at least one of the three commanding points of its line of defence—Culp's Hill on the right, Cemetery Hill in the centre, or the Round Tops on the left. Everything has been tried; nothing has succeeded. Since the 2d, and, still later, the next day, it was noticed that the troops did not go a second time into action with the same ardor they had displayed in the first combat, and on the evening of the 3d of July there only remained two brigades that had not been engaged. Moreover, the annihilation of Pickett's division, accomplished under the eyes of a large portion of the army, leaves a profound impression among all the spectators. A new hecatomb is all the advantage accruing to the Union army, more numerous and more easily recruited than that of Lee. In short, material considerations prevent the Confederates from renewing the struggle. On the one hand, they have to carry into Virginia all the booty gathered on the soil of the free States, not for the mere sake of lucre, but through a sagacious foresight, because the shoes, the clothes, and the cattle obtained in Pennsylvania through requisitions will contribute more to prolong the struggle than a barren victory. On the other hand, the infantry ammunition has greatly diminished, while that of the artillery is so reduced that the latter could not keep up for more than an hour a cannonade like that of the 3d. Communications with Virginia are too uncertain for the Confederates to rely on the arrival of supply-trains sent from Richmond. Lee as a conqueror would have procured provisions at the expense of the enemy; being repulsed, he is obliged on that account alone to return to Virginia; an inexorable logic wills it so. One may imagine the anguish of that heart so entirely devoted to the cause it has espoused, and more passionately still to the glory of the army which it animates with its own ardor and which it has sustained in the midst of every trial. At the moment when the stragglers are surrounding the general-in-chief like an irresistible flood he has, so to speak, sacrificed himself in order to rally his soldiers by telling them that he alone was responsible for the disaster. But when the first emotion has passed away, and the fear of an aggressive movement on the part of the enemy has subsided, how bitter must have been his

own reflections! Yonder, in front of him, in the midst of the enemy's guns, lies that small clump of trees at the foot of which Armistead has fallen mortally wounded; there it is that the onward march of the Army of Northern Virginia came to a stop. Master of this point, it would undoubtedly have seen the enemy's army abandon the battlefield to it, and would have been able to cast a victorious glance over the Capitol of Washington and the spires which overlook the city of Philadelphia. Peace imposed upon the government in the White House, every one returning to his home happy and triumphant,—all this brilliant vision, which he believed to be on the point of realization, has vanished with the smoke that enveloped the combatants. It has given place to gloomy prospects: the relinquishment of that invasion which alone could save the Confederacy; the avowal of defeat at the moment when Vicksburg, exhausted, is about to deliver the keys of the Mississippi into the hands of Grant; the return to that unfortunate Virginia, unable to feed her children in return for the blood they have shed for her. In short, at the close of these trying campaigns, which have reduced his brilliant army to a handful of veterans, does not Lee's perspicacity yet enable him to foresee as an inevitable result the painful capitulation which in less than two years will mark the fall of the Confederacy, and at the bottom of which he will be obliged to affix his signature, a victim to his own self-devotion? Those who on that evening approach the general-in-chief may indeed believe that a prophetic glance into the future has revealed to him the end of the great drama, so much moral suffering is depicted upon his features. May he not say to himself that this turn of the wheel of fortune, so rapid and irrevocable, would not have taken place if the movements of his army had been better managed, if it had not been developed on too long a line, and if all his lieutenants had carried out his instructions with their wonted zeal?

Fortunately for them, his soldiers do not share these gloomy presentiments: while acknowledging their defeat, they entertain no doubt as to the final success of the campaign, and are satisfied that a new manœuvre after Jackson's fashion will take them to Baltimore. But Jackson is no longer in their midst, and while

these hopes of victory allay the agonies of the wounded, who are lying in all the houses of the village and the adjoining farms, since sunset the able-bodied soldiers have been ordered to take the first step in retreat. The inhabitants of Gettysburg, who have passed two days and a half in a terrible state of suspense, and who, in order to follow the progress of the battle and to guess on which side victory is leaning, have anxiously questioned the countenances of their enemies located in their midst, find themselves suddenly delivered from doubt. Ewell, called back by Lee, quickly abandons all his positions, and before daybreak he has posted his three divisions north of the seminary on the Cash-town road. Longstreet, on his part, has fallen back to the rear of the orchard and the Emmettsburg road, so that on the morning of the 4th the whole Southern army occupies from north to south, along the ridge of Seminary Hill, a straight line not much extended and very solid. Intrenchments rapidly made render it still stronger. Lee only seeks for temporary protection, for he knows full well that every day of inaction in the presence of the enemy will make his situation worse; but while waiting for the hour of retreat he can in this position brave his adversary if the latter is imprudent enough to seek him there. His powerful artillery, which is ranged along the ridge and is resting on the edge of the wood, commands all the approaches; his infantry, placed in the rear, is completely sheltered; Longstreet, with his troops massed west of the orchard, no longer allows his right to be turned. The Confederate cavalry protects the two wings of the army; Stuart, who has been obliged to make a *détour* northward, not having been informed in time of Ewell's retreat, covers the left flank with three brigades; Fitzhugh Lee, with the fourth, has gone to Cashtown to guard the supply-trains assembled at that point; Imboden, who, after a very useless effort at McConnellsburg, has just joined the army with one brigade of cavalry, a battery, and some infantry, protects at the south the extremity of Longstreet's line; finally, Robertson and Jones, returning to the rear, occupy on the morning of the 4th the defiles of South Mountain, which the army is about to cross.

In the mean while, as soon as nightfall has put an end to the conflict, the Federals have applied themselves to the task of re-



forming their regiments, rectifying their positions, and collecting the wounded: Birney about nine o'clock has made a portion of his soldiers, who are following the tracks of Wheaton's troops, advance toward the battlefield, which is still covered with their dead comrades. The night is cloudless, the full moon casts its quiet light upon the motionless forms of those who are already enjoying the sleep of eternity, or who, too weak to complain, are awaiting death as a deliverance. But in spite of the horror of such a spectacle this calm night is chiefly employed by the exhausted combatants in resting safely. Every one is waiting for daylight to see what the enemy is going to do. In the morning his concentration on Seminary Ridge is noticed. On the right, Slocum advances as far as the York road; on the left, Sedgwick occupies the whole battlefield of the 2d; in the centre, Howard, with a portion of the Eleventh corps, comes down from his citadel into the town of Gettysburg. The cavalry is alone pushed forward to feel the enemy. Buford and his first two brigades start from Westminster early in the morning for Frederick; Merritt, with the third, leaves the battlefield to join him at that place, whence they proceed in the direction of Williamsport; Kilpatrick, taking with him Huey's brigade of Gregg's division, besides his own two brigades, marches upon Monterey by way of Emmetsburg; Gregg's brigade watches the right, and presently follows the Cashtown road, the terminus of which McIntosh occupies at the entrance of Gettysburg. As the day is advancing, the Federals are enabled to examine the position of their adversaries, and they soon find that, notwithstanding the prestige of victory, by attacking it they would expose themselves to as bloody a check as that which Magruder experienced when he hurled his troops intoxicated with success upon the slopes of Malvern Hill. It is evident that, although imperceptible to their view at this moment, Lee is nevertheless preparing for a great movement. But is it a retreat or that grand flank march which they have been dreading for the last two days? In the latter case they cannot abandon the positions whose preservation has cost them so dearly before seeing the enemy in motion, in order to surprise him in the midst of the operation. In the former case, however expedient it might be to get in advance of



the Confederates along the line of the Potomac, it is still necessary, so long as they are within reach, to protect against an aggressive return the thousands of wounded men who are lying on the battlefield. If Meade had been aware of the numerical superiority of his army, he might, while maintaining his positions, menace one of the enemy's flanks and thereby embarrass his movements, whatever might be their object. The Sixth corps, which has not suffered severely, reinforced by Crawford's division, might from seven in the morning operate against Lee's extreme right, and would thus be advantageously posted for the purpose of harassing him during his retreat.

The indications by which the instincts of a true soldier enable him to fathom the projects of his adversaries should not have left Meade in any kind of uncertainty regarding the impending retreat of the Southern army: the movements of the supply-trains of the enemy, and the reports of the inhabitants coming from within the Confederate lines, must have enlightened him: in short, he should have listened to the almost unanimous sentiment of his army, which only asked to be led forward, for in such cases the judgment of all is generally correct. But the Federal staff, attributing very different designs to the adversary, is only preparing against fresh attacks. Toward noon, while the two armies are thus watching each other, torrents of rain pour down upon them, breaking up the roads and fields and rendering it impossible for the artillery to manœuvre with rapidity. This is a new source of suffering for the fatigued and ill-fed soldiers, and each man only thinks of securing shelter to the best of his ability against the storm thus suddenly let loose.

Lee avails himself of this respite imposed by the elements to complete his preparations for the slow and methodical retreat which he has no longer any interest in delaying. All the necessary orders are issued for the army to be on the march at sunset. The large supply-trains, containing provisions and booty, assembled at Cashtown, are directed toward Chambersburg. The facility with which they again cross the chain of South Mountain shows that Lee did not mention the real motives of the attack of the 2d when he alleged the impossibility of falling back as far as the western slope of the mountains with his sup-

ply-trains. There are two routes behind him—that of Chambersburg at the north, and that of Fairfield at the south: the latter is the shortest and covers the first. This is the one which the entire army will follow—Hill at the head, followed by Longstreet, and the latter by Ewell, who closes the march. During this time the wounded who can bear transportation are crowded into all kinds of vehicles: with the exception of those loaded with ammunition all the wagons that have followed the army join this convoy, which starts along the Cashtown road, where it overtakes the remainder of the train of the army. Imboden, with fresh troops of both infantry and cavalry, is entrusted with the difficult mission of escorting through a hostile country this immense column comprising ten thousand beasts of burden and nearly sixteen miles in length: he conducts it, without any halt, by way of Chambersburg and Hagerstown, to the banks of the Potomac, crossing the river over the bridge of boats which the army has left at Williamsport, and brings it to Winchester. Lee gives him several batteries of artillery to assist in the execution of this task, and entrusts him with his first report to President Davis. At four o'clock in the afternoon the head of column takes up the line of march westward, and when, about midnight, it overtakes the other supply-trains on the other side of Cashtown, the rear has not yet left the neighborhood of the battlefield. It is a terrible night for the thousands of victims whom a false point of honor urges forward, either willingly or unwillingly, in the track of the vanquished army. Happy those who are deemed so seriously wounded as to be left in the hands of the enemy! The mournful procession moves slowly along the rough roads in the midst of the storm, which is drowning the complaints of the wounded, and an intense darkness which screens their pale countenances from observation. There is no one near to assist them, for all able-bodied men have remained in the ranks; only at long intervals a platoon doing guard-duty is marching silently alongside of the wagons with head bent, but musket ready, for some kind of surprise may be expected any moment. When the march is interrupted by some obstacle, the occasion is taken advantage of to unload the bodies of those who have just expired and give them a hasty burial. Another column, composed of two

thousand able-bodied Federal prisoners, whom Lee cannot take along with him, and whom he releases on paroles irregularly given, is proceeding at the same time in the direction of Harrisburg, with an escort which is to deliver them to the proper authorities at the first Union post.

While the Confederates are thus beginning their retreat, Meade has summoned another council of war: he wishes to consult his generals regarding the condition of the army and what may be expected from it the next day. The seven army corps, which a few days before the battle numbered eighty-six thousand men under arms, both infantry and artillery, and which had since received a reinforcement of four thousand, can only produce a total effective of fifty-one thousand five hundred and fourteen men on the morning of the 4th. There are therefore thirty-eight thousand wanting at the roll-call. Out of this number, about fifteen thousand are neither killed nor wounded nor taken prisoners: they are stragglers left along the roads during the late marches, deserters who have left their comrades, or men that have strayed and been separated from their regiments during the fight. They will all no doubt again join their colors, but they will not be present the next day to take part in any operation, while their number shows the disorganization of certain army corps. "Must we remain at Gettysburg, or, without waiting for the movements of the enemy, undertake to-morrow either a manœuvre on his flank or make an attack against his front? If he retires, must we follow him directly, or try to reach Williamsport in advance of him by way of the Emmettsburg road?" Such are the questions put by Meade to his council. The unanimous decision is not to approach the enemy, either directly or by attacking him, if he remains in his positions, nor follow the same route if he retires. Opinions in regard to other points being divided, Meade determines to wait twenty-four hours longer, and if the enemy retreats to follow him on his flank by way of Emmettsburg. The Confederate general does not allow him to remain long in suspense: on the morning of the 5th his army had disappeared, Seminary Ridge was deserted, and the battle of Gettysburg ended.

We have seen how this battle was brought about, and, without pretending to say that the Confederates ought to have come out

victorious, we have pointed out the errors which rendered their defeat inevitable: we will once more rapidly enumerate those errors. The principal cause of the defeat was the absence of Stuart, which produced the fortuitous encounter at Gettysburg, delaying the concentration of the army, and rendering it impossible for that army either to resume a defensive position along South Mountain, where Meade would have been obliged to attack it, or to manœuvre in order to dislodge him from those he occupied. Lee, who had four brigades of cavalry with him, failed to turn them to account: he left Robertson and Jones in Virginia, and sent Imboden as far as possible from the enemy, only retaining Jenkins, who at the critical moment found himself in the rear of the infantry. After the battle of the 1st of July the excessive confidence which most of his lieutenants and all his soldiers shared with him made him forget the numerical inferiority of his army and the difficulties which the ground interposed against his usual tactics. This open country, affording commanding positions, rendered all disguised marches and sudden attacks impracticable, and required a perfect harmony of action in the movements in order to secure success. Lee did wrong in giving his line too large an extension and a concave form, which rendered all communications from one extremity to the other very slow: he made matters worse by directing the principal attacks by his two wings. Desiring to strike Culp's Hill and menace the Round Tops at the same time, he was unable to sufficiently outflank either of these two points; then, after having failed in both instances, he hurled a portion of his troops, comparatively so weak as to be doomed to certain destruction, against the centre of Meade's line, where the latter could easily bring together a large portion of his army; finally, whether his orders were issued too late, or that he was unable to make himself understood or obeyed by his subordinates, he lost two days, the 2d and 3d, in making useless preparations. The extreme independence which he encouraged among his corps commanders, and which the division and brigade generals imitated in their turn, rendered the best conceived plans and the most daring efforts fruitless. During the day of the 2d, Longstreet, after beginning his attack too late, failed to engage the whole of McLaws' division in time



to support that of Hood; Rodes and Early, although close to each other, did not attack Cemetery Hill together; the Third corps, with the exception of three brigades, afforded no assistance to the troops engaged on its right and left. On the 3d, Longstreet, while reluctantly executing the orders of his chief, did not give to Pickett's desperate attack the support of all the force placed at his disposal, and did not cause any diversion to be made in his favor by the two divisions under Hood and McLaws.

The Army of the Potomac undoubtedly achieved a victory because it had the double advantage of numbers and the defensive; but this advantage had not prevented its being beaten at Chancellorsville. It conquered at Gettysburg because chance afforded it strong positions, which Buford and Reynolds preserved for it, and which Meade turned to excellent account. Eight days after his appointment this fortunate chieftain gave his soldiers a decisive victory: there was the less reason for begrudging him his glory because, being born on European soil, he could not aspire to the Presidency,\* which fact prevented politicians who were ambitious of attaining that position from harboring jealousy toward him. He was not indebted for this victory either to the inspirations of genius or to the possession of extraordinary qualities. But he knew how to use all the forces under his command: his lieutenants, according to their own testimony, felt that they were at last well handled, while, on their part, having always entertained pleasant relations with their old comrade,

\* Gen. Meade was born Dec. 31, 1815, at Cadiz, Spain, where his parents, who were American citizens, temporarily resided. His father, Richard W. Meade, at the time held the appointment of United States Naval Agent at the port of Cadiz, and Gen. Meade was born under the American flag.

Whatever question there may be as to what the law might have been at the time of Gen. Meade's birth, the reverse of what is stated in the text seems to have been settled by the Act of Congress of February 10, 1855, the passage of which was brought about by a pamphlet written by the late Horace Binney in 1853, on *The Alienigenæ of the United States*. That act provides that "all children heretofore born . . . out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, whose fathers were . . . at the time of their birth citizens thereof, are declared to be citizens of the United States;" that is, they are declared to be *natural-born* citizens as contradistinguished from *naturalized* citizens, and the Constitution provides that "no person except a natural-born citizen shall be eligible to the office of President."—ED.

they gave him the most devoted support. If success, however, covered the faults committed by Meade, which may be palliated on account of his recent appointment, that is no reason why we should ignore them. On the 1st of July he should have gone to Gettysburg himself, instead of sending Hancock there: the concentration of the army would have been effected with more speed; on the morning of the 2d he indicated in too vague terms the position which Sickles was to occupy, and on finding that this general considered that position bad he should have gone to examine it in person, without waiting to be summoned there by the combat; at a later period he should not have deprived the right wing of Geary and his two brigades; on the 3d, when he saw Pickett advancing, he had a quarter of an hour's time to prepare for his reception: he does not appear to have had the slightest idea of the point where his line would be attacked, and consequently came very near having it pierced; finally, if in the evening, instead of throwing a single brigade forward, he had launched three divisions against Longstreet's right, as he could have done, his victory would have been more decisive.

The strength of the two armies has given rise to lively discussions. The returns, used at the North and South in similar forms, have been increased by some and reduced by others at their own pleasure. These returns were under three heads: the first represented the total number of officers and soldiers inscribed on the rolls, whether absent or present; the second represented those present on active duty, comprising all men who were, in the field-hospitals, under arrest, or detached on special service; the third contained the real number of combatants present under arms. The first head was therefore quite fictitious; the second mentioned the number of men to be fed in the army, including non-combatants; the third, the effective force that could be brought on the battlefield. The latter number is evidently the most important to know, but, as we have observed, it varied greatly, for a long march in a week of bad weather was sufficient to fill the hospitals. In ordinary times it was from twelve to eighteen per cent. less than under the second head. It did not even always represent exactly the precise number of combatants: in fact, when, after a long march, the stragglers did not answer

to roll-call, they were not immediately set down as deserters, which would have caused them to lose a portion of their pay; a few days' grace were granted to them, and the result was that thousands of soldiers separated from their commands followed the army at a distance, unable to take part in any battle, and yet figuring on the returns as able-bodied combatants. In this respect there was much more tolerance shown in the Union army than among the Confederates; on this account the falling off in the number of combatants is a new source of mistakes and discussions.

We have stated that this diminution amounted to thirteen thousand for the Army of the Potomac between the 10th of June and the 4th of July. We will spare the reader the details of our calculations, simply presenting the figures that have been given us, which we believe to be as near the truth as possible.

The Army of the Potomac, without French's division, which had not gone beyond Frederick, numbered on its returns on the 30th of June 167,251 men, more than 21,000 of whom were on detached service and nearly 28,000 in the hospitals. The number of men present with their corps was 112,988, and that of men under arms, 99,475; but this last figure included those doing duty at head-quarters, who formed a total of 2750 men who could not be counted among the combatants. Standnard's and Lockwood's brigades having brought Meade a reinforcement of about five thousand men on the 1st of July, the effective forces borne on the returns may be stated as follows:

Troops taking no part in battle.....	2,750
Artillery.....	7,000
Cavalry.....	10,500
Infantry.....	85,500
Total.....	105,750
And 352 pieces of artillery.	

The artillery and infantry, which were alone seriously engaged, even on the battlefield of Gettysburg, form, therefore, a total of about ninety-one thousand men and three hundred and twenty-seven pieces of cannon, Meade having left twenty-five heavy guns in reserve at Westminster. But in order to ascertain the real number of combatants that the Union general could bring into line, it is proper to deduct from three to four thousand left as additional guards near the supply-trains, the batteries

remaining at Westminster, and for all men detached on extra duty, and from four to five thousand for the stragglers entered on the returns. The latter were the much more numerous on account of the fact that, the returns having only been prepared at the end of July, all those who joined the army after the battle were entered as being present; so that these rolls only represent the number of those absent without leave at the totally insignificant figure of 3292. This deduction makes the effective forces of Meade amount to from eighty-two to eighty-four thousand men.

The Army of Northern Virginia on the 31st of May, 1863, contained an effective force of 88,754 officers and soldiers present, 74,468 of whom were under arms. The latter consisted of—

General staff and infantry.....	59,420
Cavalry.....	10,292
Artillery.....	4,756
Total.....	74,468

And 206 pieces of artillery.

During the month of June its effective force was increased by the return of a certain number of sick, who, thanks to the mild weather, had been restored to health, and those who had been wounded at the battle of Chancellorsville, by the arrival of recruits, the result of the conscription law, and by the addition of four brigades—two of infantry under Pettigrew and Davis, one of cavalry under Jenkins, and one made up of mixed troops under Imboden. The first was nearly four thousand strong; that of Davis, consisting of four regiments which are not borne on the returns of the 31st of May, although two of them had formerly belonged to the army, numbered about twenty-two hundred men; the other two contained each about the same effective force. The increase of artillery amounted to fifteen batteries, comprising sixty-two pieces of cannon and about eight hundred men. On the other hand, this effective force was diminished first by the absence of Corse's brigade of Pickett's division and one regiment of Pettigrew's brigade left at Hanover Junction, and three regiments of Early's division left at Winchester—say, about three thousand five hundred men; then by the losses sustained in the battles of Fleetwood, Winchester, and Aldie, amounting to fourteen hundred men; finally, by the admission to the hospitals of men unable to bear the fatigue of the long



marches which the army had to make, and by the absence of those who, voluntarily or otherwise, remained behind during these marches. It is difficult to reckon precisely the number of the disabled, of stragglers, and of deserters that the army had lost during the month of June. Private information and the comparison of some figures lead us to believe that it was not very large, and did not exceed five per cent. of the effective force of the army—say three thousand seven hundred and fifty men in all. We can therefore estimate the diminution of the army at about three thousand seven hundred men on the one hand, and its increase on the other hand, by the addition of three brigades and some artillery, at seven thousand. We believe that the difference of seventeen hundred between these two figures must be lessened at least from one thousand to twelve hundred by the return of the sick and wounded and the arrival of a number of conscripts; that, consequently, the Army of Northern Virginia arrived on the battlefield of Gettysburg with about five thousand combatants more than it had on the 31st of May, 1863—that is to say, in the neighborhood of eighty thousand men. As we have done in regard to the Federal army in order to find out the amount of force really assembled on the battlefield, we will deduct the number of mounted men, which was increased by Jenkins' and Imboden's forces, and reduced in the same proportion,\* making about eleven thousand men; and we may conclude that during the first three days of July, 1863, Lee brought from sixty-eight to sixty-nine thousand men and two hundred and fifty guns† against the eighty-two or eighty-four thousand Unionists with three hundred guns collected on this battlefield. Meade had, therefore, from eighteen to nineteen thousand men more than his adversary—a superiority of nearly one-fourth, which, unfortunately for him, he was unable to turn to advantage.

The losses on both sides were nearly equal, and enormous for the number of combatants engaged, for they amounted to twenty-seven per cent. on the side of the Federals, and more than

\* Twelve hundred cavalymen lost in the battles of Fleetwood, Aldie, Upperville, and Hanover, two hundred maimed or sick.

† These figures relate to the guns actually on the battlefield, deducting those attached to Stuart's command on the one hand and to Pleasonton's on the other.

thirty-six per cent. for the Confederates. Upon this point also the official reports are precise. The Federals lost 2834 killed, 13,709 wounded, and 6645 prisoners—23,186 men in all; the Confederates, 2665 killed, 12,599 wounded, and 7464 missing—22,728 men in all; which, with the 300 men killed or wounded in the cavalry on the 2d and 3d, foot up their total losses at a little more than 23,000 men; that is to say, precisely the same number as those of their adversaries. These figures, however, do not yet convey a correct idea of the injury the two armies had inflicted upon each other in these bloody battles. Thus, while the Federal reports acknowledge only 2834 killed, the reports made by the hospitals bear evidence to the burial of 3575 Union corpses: the number of dead in the Army of the Potomac may be estimated at about four thousand, one thousand or eleven hundred having died of their wounds. On the other hand, Meade has 13,621 Confederate prisoners, but, as there are 7262 wounded among them, there only remains 6359 able-bodied men; the number of 7464 reckoned by Lee as the number of men missing must therefore represent, besides these able-bodied prisoners, most of the men seriously wounded during the attack made by Pickett and Heth and abandoned on the battlefield. We must therefore estimate the number of Confederate wounded to more than thirteen thousand six hundred. It is reasonable to suppose that after the combat the number of their dead increased more rapidly for a few days than in the Union army.

The battle which was so murderous for all was particularly so for those superior officers who had most gallantly exposed themselves on both sides and had fallen by the hundreds. The Confederates lost seventeen generals, thirteen of whom were wounded, three killed, and one captured. The Federals had ten generals wounded, two of them slightly, two more being left in the hands of the enemy, without counting Schimmelpfennig, who remained concealed for three days in Gettysburg. Five generals were wounded, one of whom was a corps commander; four colonels in command of brigades were killed and one wounded—twenty officers in all wearing the stars of generals or performing the duties of that rank. The Confederates left forty-one stands of colors and three guns in the hands of their adversaries; a few flags

less and five or six guns constituted the trophies which bore evidence to their gallantry without compensating them for their defeat.

In the mean while, the North was anxiously waiting for the result of the great conflict. Uneasiness and excitement were perceptible everywhere; terror prevailed in all those places believed to be within the reach of the invaders. Rumor and fear exaggerated their number, and the remembrance of their success caused them to be deemed invincible. In those localities where devotion to the Union or the anti-slavery sentiment predominated all able-bodied men were arming and enlisting. But there were many districts whose secret sympathies were in favor of the Secessionists: people only waited for Lee's victories to openly announce them. Fortunately for the Federal government, the most turbulent individuals had joined the Southern army at the beginning of the war; leaders were wanting to entice the rest. But this was not the case in the large cities of the East, which contained all the elements for a terrible insurrection. This insurrection was expected to break out in New York, despite Lee's defeat: one may judge from this what it would have been if Lee had achieved a victory. On the 4th of July, the day when America celebrates the anniversary of her independence, a proclamation of President Lincoln, written in that simple and noble style of which at times he seemed to possess the secret, announced to the people of the North that the invasion of the free States had been stopped. Three days later it was learned that at the same hour Pemberton had capitulated with his army and the citadel of Vicksburg. Joy was the more keenly felt because the danger had been so great. The war was about to enter into a new phase.

The South, however, on learning her disasters, did not allow herself to become discouraged. She had gone too far to stop, and still believed in her ability to tire out her adversaries. The latter, it is true, were very far as yet from having achieved that decisive success which alone could put an end to the war to their advantage, while the inhabitants of the North, who, in the plenitude of their joy, already believed Lee's army ready to lay down its arms, were harboring great illusions. This compact army, resolute and formidable despite its losses, was destined to hold in check for a long time yet the conquerors of Gettysburg.

## BOOK IV.—THIRD WINTER.

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### CHAPTER I.

#### *HAGERSTOWN.*

IN the evening of July 4th the two armies present near Gettysburg have already had time to review their situation and to estimate the extent of their losses. Including prisoners, the Confederate infantry has been reduced by more than one-third, the Federal infantry by over one-fourth. On both sides the officers exposed themselves gallantly, and the most adventurous chiefs were struck. Moreover, the Army of the Potomac, in addition to its positive losses, is still further reduced by the absence of from twelve to fifteen thousand men who did not answer to their names at the morning roll-call on the 4th.

The retreat of the Confederate army is begun; Lee's plan is decided on. His objective is the ponton bridge left by him on the Potomac at Falling Waters, four miles below the ford at Williamsport. To recruit his strength before risking further battles, his army must again set foot on the friendly soil of Virginia. Still, as we have said, Meade cannot as yet realize the full extent of his own success. He hesitates, and wishes to wait twenty-four hours before deciding what course to pursue. This first fault will be followed by many another which will entail upon the Army of the Potomac the loss of part of the advantages which its victory ought to have secured.

Indeed, the recollection of the check experienced by the Confederates in their ineffectual assaults upon the Unionist positions will haunt the mind of Meade so long as he will find himself alone confronting Lee. He will think of nothing but obliging Lee to renew those assaults; he will constantly avoid assuming the offensive when he finds Lee posted in his front; and, as the Southern general is above all anxious to be sparing of his troops,



battles will be followed by evolutions. The Army of the Potomac, which since its arrival at Fort Monroe has fought eleven pitched battles in sixteen months, is now going to remain ten months without renewing those great contests. But that will not be for want of marching or for not feeling its adversary's pulse. A result so important for the Confederate cause is almost sufficient to justify the campaign, highly imprudent in other respects, which was unexpectedly interrupted at Gettysburg.

As we said, Lee, with about forty thousand men on Seminary Hill, was covering the two roads of Fairfield and Cashtown. One large train has taken the latter. Another, composed principally of the wagons of the Second corps, follows the first, which is shorter, and on which it precedes the army. Stuart will reconnoitre on its flank toward Emmettsburg, and Robertson and Jones will protect it in the defiles of South Mountain. As soon as the sun is down Hill's corps begins its march. That of Longstreet, which follows, is guarding the four thousand Federal prisoners; Pickett's division will conduct them as far as Williamsport, without allowing itself to be turned aside by the strategic movements which may be prescribed to the remainder of the First corps. The Second, by its position, the most remote from the Fairfield road, closes the line of march. Each corps is followed by quite a considerable number of wagons and by its artillery, and Early's division, having charge of the rear-guard, which left its bivouac at two in the morning, sees the sun rising above the heights of Gettysburg without being able to advance on the encumbered road: the Confederate army seems to regret leaving these heights, at the base of which so many valiant soldiers lie. Early's position is perilous, for, Stuart having started with three brigades for Emmettsburg, a mere curtain of cavalry covers his retreat, and the Federal signal corps stationed on the summit of Round Top have for some time past been signalling his movements. Fortunately for him, Meade, as yet, has given no order.

Before proceeding any further we must indicate rapidly the configuration of the country which the two armies are going to cross in order to reach the banks of the Potomac. We have already said that South Mountain, a prolongation of the Blue Ridge, separates the fertile Cumberland Valley

from the undulating plain which lies between the Potomac on the south, the Susquehanna on the north, and Chesapeake Bay on the east. It was by the Cumberland Valley that Lee penetrated Pennsylvania: he had gone out of it to march on Gettysburg; he returned to it to resume the road to Virginia. Besides the railroad which from Harrisburg and Carlisle is extended through Chambersburg and Greencastle as far as Hagerstown, the Cumberland Valley is furrowed by several great roads and numerous ways, all practicable in summer-time. A flourishing agriculture spares the ancient forests only on the mountainsides and in soil naturally poor. Everywhere else the cultivation of the cereals alternates with pasturage which feeds numerous herds of cattle. The country is consequently open, although it is unfavorable to military evolutions, as it opposes to manœuvres in line the obstacle of frequent fences either of wood or stone.

During the previous year, before the battle of Antietam, Lee had defended the crest of South Mountain. But this crest is very long, its passages are very numerous, and paths which scale the summit allow of the principal gaps being turned. For this reason the Southern general did not think it would be possible for him the day after a defeat to pause on that line. Full of confidence, doubtless, in the slowness of his adversaries, he did not even think of availing himself of such an obstacle if they should venture to cross the river in his rear. Thanks to the course of the Potomac between Hancock and Harper's Ferry, he hoped to be able to cross over into Virginia before Meade came up with him. At Hancock, the most northerly point of its course, the river almost reaches the boundary-line of Pennsylvania; at Williamsport it receives, by the Conococheague, the greater part of the waters of the Cumberland Valley; then, as it nears Harper's Ferry before passing the mountains, it winds between the smaller heights which run parallel to the principal chain and furrow the plain. From Hancock to Williamsport its course is east-south-east; from that point to Harper's Ferry it gradually inclines to the south. The country situated on the left bank of the river in this latter part of its course is much more undulating and less fertile than the remainder of the Cumberland Valley. It is intersected by an important stream, the Antietam, and by rivulets that are very

marshy and which are swollen by the first rainfall, enclosed by hills the sides of which are generally wooded.

Lee directed his course toward Williamsport, because it is the point on the Potomac the least remote from Gettysburg. The angle formed by the river at this place offered another advantage for the crossing of the Confederate army. If Meade followed that army step by step, the two branches of the angle protected both its flanks as soon as the passage should be effected, and the army could then descend by the right bank as far as Harper's Ferry fully covered by the river; for the fear of exposing Washington prevented Meade from penetrating Virginia by Williamsport. For the same reason he could not cross the Potomac in advance of his adversary, and if he sought the passage of South Mountain in order to return from there on Williamsport, he would make a *détour* which would give Lee abundant time to pass into Virginia. The pontons on which Longstreet and Hill had crossed the river were at Falling Waters, inside of a bend near which runs the turnpike road from Martinsburg to Williamsport. To reach this last point Lee could avail himself of a high road which was all the better because it had not as yet been travelled by either of the two armies. This road, which begins at Gettysburg, crosses Marsh Run at Black Horse Tavern, and reaches, after running seven miles, the village of Fairfield, at the foot of one of the bases of South Mountain called Jack's Mountain: following this base, it strikes, three miles farther on, at Fountain Dale, the village of Monterey Springs. From there, passing several secondary ranges, it descends to the town of Waynesboro' at the entrance into the Cumberland Valley. The distance from Gettysburg to Waynesboro' is twenty miles; from there to Hagerstown, through Leitersburg, the road runs eleven more, and finally six miles before reaching Williamsport. Only two other principal roads cross South Mountain—the one from Chambersburg to Gettysburg to the north, followed by Lee's army in its offensive march, and that to the south, the road from Washington to Hagerstown through Turner's Gap, which was carried by McClellan in 1862. But between the Potomac and the Monterey Gap several roads, some of them even passable for artillery, debouch into the Cumberland Valley: all, with



one exception, have a double obstacle to pass, for on the south of Jack's Mountain South Mountain forks, one branch, parallel to the principal chain, following it on the east under the name of Catoctin Mountain. In the valley of Catoctin Creek, which separates them, are found the villages of Myersville, Middletown, Jefferson, Burkittsville, and finally Knoxville and Berlin on the Potomac. Frederick is at the foot of the eastern slope of the secondary chain. The only passage situated to the north of this fork branches off into the high road between Fairfield and Monterey, and descends on Ringgold by the passage of Riker's Gap. The first passage to the south goes from Mechanicstown to Hagerstown, crossing the principal chain at Harmon's Gap, above the village of Cavetown; the second connects Lewistown with Berlin, where it crosses the Catoctin, and at the debouch of Braddock's Gap in South Mountain forks—on the right to Funkstown and to Hagerstown, on the left to Boonsboro', a large village at the foot of the mountain. Quite close to Turner's Gap, Fox's Gap opens a passage to the direct road from Middletown to Sharpsburg by Springvale. Farther to the south the road from Burkittsville to Rohrersville crosses the well-known pass of Crampton's Gap; finally, the towpath of the canal lateral to the Potomac, with the railroad at Knoxville, goes round the extremity of South Mountain. There was, therefore, no scarcity of roads for Meade to penetrate the Cumberland Valley: the most of them terminate at Hagerstown, the central nucleus in this region, as Gettysburg is farther north on the opposite slope.

The wagon-train sent by Lee on the Fairfield road had reached that village on the afternoon of July 4th, and, escorted by Jones' and Robertson's cavalry brigades, it had continued its march toward Monterey. As we said, the Federal army had remained immovable that day, with the exception of Kilpatrick's division, which had been sent at daybreak on the 4th on the Emmettsburg road. Pleasonton and his division commanders knew that boldness and promptness are qualities indispensable in cavalry, and when once the order was given to follow the enemy, they construed it in the broadest sense. So, while Buford was hurrying his horsemen on the road to Frederick, Kilpatrick, after having on his way



been joined by Huey's brigade, had already left Emmettsburg. The enemy had not appeared there, consequently he was not manœuvring for the purpose of turning the left of the Federal army. It was now necessary to ascertain if he were retreating upon Hagerstown. In that case the bulk of his column should follow the Fairfield and Monterey road.

Kilpatrick unhesitatingly seeks him there. He reaches that road at Fountain Dale about 9 P.M.; he learns that a large Confederate train had passed through that village a few hours previously; he starts in pursuit of it in the narrow gorge which the road follows to scale the acclivities of South Mountain. A heavy rain increases the obscurity: the wind whistling in the gorge and the torrents roaring on the rocks drown all other noise. The long column of the Confederate wagons, divided into several divisions, pursues its laborious way, Jones' squadrons guarding it in front and in rear, the escort being unable to march on the sides of the road, which is hewn in the mountain's side. The Confederate army is far off; for it is only ten at night, and Hill's first battalions began their march at sunset. Stuart, who is to cover their flank, has by Lee's orders begun to move at the same hour, and by cross-roads takes the direction of Emmettsburg. He little suspects that a division of the enemy has got the start of the army on the very road it is to follow.

The Federal horsemen unexpectedly come up with the rear of the Confederate column at some distance from Monterey. The first squadrons, being received with a sharp volley of musketry, turn rein and dash back to the bulk of the troop; but the road is narrow, the passage is barred against them, and Kilpatrick brings back his men to the front: the Confederate rear-guard is overthrown in its turn and driven back upon its wagons, which it is unable to defend. The drivers attempt to fly, some with their loads, others by cutting the traces: they rush wildly in all directions, pursued by the Federal horsemen. Jones' brigade, bewildered among the teams, is hurried along in their rout. Its chief, left almost alone, escapes with the head of the train and Robertson's brigade. Presently the whole road in the direction of Monterey is illumined by the light of a conflagration. It is the wagons, which the Federals have set on fire, having been

unable to remove them. They have taken a stand of colors and captured more than thirteen hundred prisoners, but the majority of these succeed in eluding their escort and reach the mountain.

Kilpatrick follows the remainder of the train as far as Monterey; then, finding that it will be impossible for him to overtake it, he turns to the left, and in two columns moves along the western side of the mountains which he has just crossed. He thus outstrips the Confederates in reaching the Cumberland Valley, and while he halts, on the morning of July 5th, with the bulk of his division at Smithsburg, one of his regiments enters Hagerstown without firing a shot, on the very line of Lee's communications with Virginia.

These communications had been interrupted in a much more serious manner two days before. French had remained at Frederick with his infantry division and the cavalry which McReynolds had brought back from the disaster at Winchester to cover Washington and to watch the neighborhood of Harper's Ferry. In the afternoon of the 2d some Unionists gave notice to McReynolds that Jones and Robertson, after crossing the Potomac on the 1st of July on the pontons near Falling Waters, had left an insignificant guard at that place. The dull sound of the cannon had summoned to Gettysburg, since the previous day, all those detachments which the Confederate army had left behind. It was an excellent opportunity. One of McReynolds' regiments had started on the evening of the 2d, under the command of Major Foley, and by a rapid march had arrived at Falling Waters on the 3d. The surprise of the Confederates was complete; they dispersed, leaving about a dozen prisoners in the hands of the Federals. The platform of the bridge was burnt; the boats were cut loose and left to be swept away by the current. At the time when Pickett made his decisive charge the only safe means remaining to Lee for crossing into Virginia no longer existed. The following day it commenced raining; the waters of the Potomac rose rapidly; from the 5th all the fords below Hancock were submerged. The elements seemed to conspire with man to shut off all retreat to the vanquished heroes of Gettysburg.

Lee, however, is still ignorant of this new danger when he resumes his march southward in the midst of his columns. Hill's corps passes through the village of Fairfield on the morning of the 5th, and, crossing the Monterey Gap, bivouacs in the evening at Frogtown, on the western slope of the mountain. The débris of the yet smoking vehicles along the route prove to the Confederates that Kilpatrick has preceded them. Stuart, who reaches Emmettsburg on the morning of the 5th for the purpose of covering the left flank, is apprised of his passage, and immediately starts in pursuit. Fearing lest Kilpatrick might overtake the great supply-train which is proceeding to Williamsport by way of Chambersburg, and has no other escort than Imboden's brigade in the Cumberland Valley, he directs his march toward Cavetown by way of the road which leads from Mechanicstown to Hagerstown. On reaching the culminating point of O'Eiler's Gap this road becomes divided, running in the direction of Leitersburg on the right and toward Smithsburg and Cavetown on the left. Stuart, taking the cross-road on the right with Chambliss, sends Jenkins' brigade, commanded by Colonel Ferguson, in the direction of the main turnpike on the left.

At Smithsburg, Kilpatrick occupies the terminus of this last-mentioned road; he has posted a detachment at the point where the cross-road emerges from the defile. Toward two o'clock Ferguson appears before Smithsburg, and attacks the Federals vigorously. The latter, who were taking a rest to which they were fully entitled, are speedily under arms; they keep the assailants in check, not allowing them to reach the plain. But in the mean while Stuart, making his troopers dismount, has succeeded, after a desperate engagement, in dislodging from the rocks the detachment charged with watching the road on the right: he emerges into the valley, while Ferguson, retracing his steps, takes advantage of the pass being open on this side to go in pursuit of Chambliss. Instead, however, of renewing the attack by way of the plain and with all the forces gathered around him, Stuart leaves Kilpatrick at Smithsburg and marches in the direction of Leitersburg, in order to draw near the column of infantry; and night finds the two adversaries at a considerable distance from each other.

While this is going on the remainder of the Confederate army has taken up the line of march, following Hill. Longstreet's corps arrives at Fairfield on the 5th at eight o'clock in the morning, but he reaches Monterey, where Hood's and McLaws' divisions are resting, only at midnight, while Pickett continues his march toward Williamsport with the Federal prisoners. The column is advancing so slowly that the Second corps reaches Fairfield only at four o'clock in the afternoon. All the farm-houses, barns, and out-buildings located along the road as far as Fairfield are filled with the wounded who cannot be carried any farther. The drivers of wagons and the stragglers who have left their respective corps to follow the supply-trains block up the way, rendering the movements of infantry very difficult. Unaccountable panics suddenly take possession of this crowd, rendering fatigue and want of sleep still more unendurable. On the morning of the 5th some mounted men rush into Fairfield at a gallop; at Hagerstown, on the 6th, two old women in a carriage suffice to make the veterans of Ewell and Longstreet rush for their arms. Once engaged, Lee's soldiers will certainly fight as well as on previous occasions, but if the Federals seriously desire to take the offensive all the advantage will be on their side. From Gettysburg to Fairfield the great turn-pike is intersected by numerous roads, which would enable them to strike either flank of the hostile army, while the latter, developed in a single column, could not concentrate quick enough near the point menaced to offer an effective resistance. They could crush Early's division, which closes the march, even before Ewell could go to its assistance, or by this attack they could at least detain Lee on the eastern slope of South Mountain and thus embarrass his retreat.

But will Meade prevent this retreat, which is the most conclusive proof of his victory? We dare not answer in the affirmative. At all events, he can hardly think so. The Sixth Federal corps, which occupies the extreme left, and whose insignificant losses naturally designate it as entitled to take the advance in the new operations, has been ordered on the evening of the 4th of July to hold itself in readiness to make a reconnoissance along the enemy's right at half-past four o'clock in the morning the



next day: General Warren is to accompany Sedgwick in this operation. On the morning of the 5th this corps, the largest in the army, is on the march along the Emmettsburg road. Sedgwick thus follows a direction that takes him far away from the enemy; nevertheless, whether he has been kept back by Meade or he is unwilling to hurry on his troops, the march is very slowly executed. In the mean while, the pickets of the Third corps, having witnessed the retreat of the enemy, follow step by step the Confederate troopers that are covering Early's rear-guard. At noon this rear-guard, formed by Gordon's brigade, is yet at some little distance from Willoughby's Run. Birney, who is advancing with a few detachments, has arrived in sight of the point where the Fairfield road crosses the stream: he asks Meade to allow him to attack the troops that are falling back before him, but he is refused permission, for fear of embarrassing Sedgwick and interfering with his march upon Emmettsburg.

The general-in-chief, however, finally becomes convinced that the enemy is in full retreat, and resolves at once to put the whole army in motion. This determination is both fortunate and timely, but, recalling to mind the opinion expressed the day before by the council of war, Meade, instead of pursuing his adversary, determines to execute a march parallel with the enemy. His army is made to follow the eastern slope of South Mountain in three columns, which concentrate at Middletown on the 7th. The one on the right, formed by the First, Second, and Sixth corps, skirts the foot of Catoctin Mountain by way of Emmettsburg, Mechanicstown, and Lewistown, crossing this chain at Hamburg; the centre column, composed of the Fifth and Eleventh corps, after reaching Emmettsburg by a by-road, moves through Creagerstown and Utica, and across the High Knob in the Catoctin Mountain; finally, the Second and Twelfth corps, with the artillery reserve, make a wide détour to the left by way of Taneytown, Middleburg, and Woodsboro', in order to strike at Frederick the road from Washington to Hagerstown. The base for supplying the army, which should always be located along a railway line, is transferred from Westminster to Frederick. These supplies, therefore, can be promptly and easily obtained: the soldiers, who are short of shoes and provisions, can receive them by hauling over

to Middletown. It was probably this consideration which decided Meade to undertake so eccentric a movement; it would have been better to have waited another day, if necessary, in order to ensure the distribution of provisions, and to follow a more direct line, leaving the task of renewing the equipment of a few battalions to a later period.

But it is evident that Meade did not intend to have a new encounter with his adversary north of the Potomac. Foreseeing neither the destruction of the bridge at Falling Waters by McReynolds nor the rise in the river, he thought that the invaders would surmount this obstacle as easily as they had done a short time before in order to enter Maryland, and he simply proposed to reach the Valley of Virginia before them. It is with this controlling idea that, fearing lest Lee should descend toward Harper's Ferry in order to effect his passage, he ordered French to occupy this point with a portion of his force and to intrench himself among the gorges of Turner's and Crampton's Gaps. He wants to compel his adversary to cross the Potomac above the Antietam; but by directing his course toward Middletown he evidently gives up the hope of overtaking him before he reaches Virginia. This plan is attended by the serious inconvenience that it cannot be carried out until it is ascertained that the enemy has re-entered the Cumberland Valley; for so long as an aggressive return is possible the Federals cannot leave Gettysburg uncovered—an inconvenience to which they would not be exposed if they followed Lee's retreat a little closer.

Everything, however, is urging Meade to avail himself of the advantages afforded him by this retreat of an army whose infantry and artillery did not number more than forty thousand men all told. If, on his part, he cannot bring together more than fifty-five thousand combatants of both arms on the morning of the 4th, he knows that two days of rest would bring him back at least ten thousand stragglers. Moreover, the President and General Halleck, stimulated by the hope of seeing Lee crushed before he has crossed the Potomac, do not hesitate any longer to supply him with reinforcements. Besides French's eleven thousand men, already attached to his army, all the troops of Couch are placed

under his command. The latter consist of from seven to eight thousand men collected near Harrisburg, and five thousand more under W. F. Smith. The latter, whom we have left at Carlisle, were advancing in the Cumberland Valley, following the western slope of South Mountain, and were only fifteen miles distant from the Chambersburg and Gettysburg road on the evening of the 4th. French's soldiers have long been under arms, proving a useful reinforcement for the Army of the Potomac. Those of Couch and Smith, on the contrary, were only militia, absolutely raw recruits, who inspired their chiefs with well-founded mistrust. The first marches of Smith had caused one-half of his troops to disperse along the road; the other half were unfit for a campaign. Nevertheless, in the hands of so experienced a chief they could have rendered some service, by the side of more experienced troops, in the rear or on the flank of the enemy. After summoning Smith to Gettysburg, Meade gave him a counter-order, directing him to follow the Confederates, step by step, in the Cumberland Valley; but by leaving him alone he dooms him to inaction. Finally, all that could be drawn from the Baltimore garrison and the large dépôts of Washington are placed at Meade's disposal. It is true that these reinforcements are, for the most part, regiments of too recent organization, or rather too old, as, for example, those that are returning from the Carolinas to be mustered out of service, and who, being thus caught on the wing, are forwarded to Meade, although having only three or four days still to serve. Some of them consented to prolong this term, others refused; and Meade finally asked Halleck not to send him any troops having less than ten days to perform field-duty: it must be allowed that he was not very exacting. For a while the desire to reinforce him causes all the prejudice which ordinarily prevailed in Washington to be discarded: unfortunately for the Federals, this resolution was adopted too late, for the experienced troops which might have given a decided support to the Army of the Potomac were too far away to join it in time.

In the mean while, Birney has seen Early's rear-guard disappear. Sedgwick has left the Emmettsburg road, to reach the Fairfield road near Marsh Run, and, remaining himself at Black



Horse Tavern with two of his divisions, he has charged Wright to follow the enemy with the third.

The narrowness of the road and the steep acclivities impede the march of the Confederate column on its entrance into the mountain; hence a forced halt at Fairfield. While a large number of vehicles and cannon, escorted by Early, are waiting for the passage to be free, Gordon has formed his brigade on this side of the village across the road by which the Federals are expected to arrive. They make their appearance, in fact, about four o'clock in the afternoon; but, instead of making a vigorous attack upon an enemy embarrassed by the blocking up of the road, Wright merely makes a feeble demonstration, which only costs the Confederates ten men. It is true that he acts conformably to Meade's instructions, who has recommended Sedgwick carefully to avoid any encounter. In order to be more certain that he will not allow himself to be involved in a fight, the general-in-chief has not allowed him to take along his supply of ammunition. As soon as Sedgwick shall have witnessed the retreat of the enemy, he is to return to Emmettsburg and take his place in the column on the right, whose command legitimately belongs to him. Nevertheless, Wright's report, simply bearing evidence to the presence of the enemy's rear-guard at Fairfield, suffices to renew Meade's hesitations. Being again impressed with the idea that Lee's retreat is a mere feint, he suspends on the evening of the 5th the movement in the direction of Middletown which had been ordered a few hours before, and is preparing, with the four army corps which are to form the right and centre columns, to support the Sixth if the latter is attacked by Lee—a very improbable hypothesis, although Sedgwick is made uneasy by the movements of the Confederates in the direction of Cashtown. Finally, a confusion that has sprung up at head-quarters having caused the Fifth corps to be prematurely despatched in the direction of the Emmettsburg road, the First is ordered to hold itself in readiness to assist Sedgwick. The only result of all these changes is to make the Federals waste another day, which might have been precious for the purpose of pursuing the enemy.

The 5th is thus occupied by Meade while waiting for fresh information from Sedgwick, without which he cannot form any



decision : he is still waiting on the morning of the 6th. In the mean time, the Confederate army has resumed its march. Longstreet's corps, which is to take the advance on that day, has left Monterey at daybreak, and by a forced march he reaches Hagerstown in the afternoon : Hill, who follows him, remains all the afternoon on the western slope of South Mountain, within supporting-distance of the rear-guard if the latter is too hard pressed. Ell still closes the march, but after having bivouacked in the evening a little more than a mile on the other side of Fairfield, Early has yielded the post of honor to Rodes' division for that day. In order to make the evacuation of the defile certain, the Second corps remains in the positions it occupied the previous evening till noon on the 6th.

On the morning of the 6th, Sedgwick has advanced with the bulk of his corps as far as the vicinity of Fairfield, having despatched Neill's brigade to make a reconnoissance beyond this village ; but, believing the entire Southern army to be arrayed in front of him in strong positions, he already wishes to return to Emmettsburg. Meade insists on his feeling closer the enemy, who all reports have represented as being in full retreat. Neill, on his part, has made at an early hour the reconnoissance he has been ordered to execute : deploying the largest portion of his brigade as skirmishers, he has advanced against the Confederate rear-guard. Rodes immediately places Daniel's and Doles' brigades in line of battle, and a musketry-fire breaks out at once. But Neill, satisfied with having compelled the enemy to show his strength, halts after a skirmish which only costs the Confederates nine men. Shortly after, Sedgwick, having arrived in person with the rest of Howe's division, causes a demonstration to be made on the right of Rodes by way of the Emmettsburg and Fairfield road ; but, like Neill, he contents himself with ascertaining the fact of the presence of the enemy and with examining from a distance the positions he occupies. Being convinced at last that these positions are impregnable, he leads his troops back toward Fairfield. Rodes at once takes advantage of the departure of the Federals to make for the road, henceforth free, which opens behind him : he takes up the line of march about three o'clock.

Being promptly informed of the retreat of the Confederates, Sedgwick orders Neill to follow them, step by step, with the cavalry brigade of McIntosh, which has been placed under his command. While waiting for instructions, which he soon receives, he makes preparations for putting his whole corps in motion in the direction of Emmettsburg, being convinced that Lee's rear-guard could not without great sacrifices be dislodged from the position it may take in the defile. Two whole days, the 5th and the 6th, were thus almost totally frittered away by the Federals; and Meade himself seems to have been aware of the fact, for in his report he says that the 5th was employed in caring for the wounded and in burying the dead. On the 6th, at five o'clock in the evening, when he was finally convinced that Lee was retreating, the head of column of the enemy's army had already passed beyond Hagerstown and was almost in sight of the Potomac. Undoubtedly, if nothing else had been attempted but to follow this column along the great turnpike, Lee's rear-guard could easily have kept the assailants in check in the gorges of Jack's Mountain. But a multitude of paths and a few roads would have enabled the Federals quickly to turn all the positions taken to bar their passage along the road: a portion of the army could have followed Stuart in the direction of Cavetown without encountering a single foot-soldier of the enemy; there would have been no necessity for the left column to be extended farther south than Turner's Gap, where the great turnpike would have afforded an easy passage for all the supply-trains; and Meade could in the course of two days have descended into the Cumberland Valley on the flank of his adversary. A piece of information—not entirely unforeseen—which he received during the day of the 6th ought to have decided him: the Potomac had risen seven feet at Harper's Ferry; it was still rising, and at this rate of increase it could not fail to submerge all the fords below Hancock. The general-in-chief had been informed, the day before, of the destruction of the bridge at Falling Waters. Lee therefore was blockaded: Providence seemed determined to compel the Federals to fight him once more on the soil of the free States. But Meade merely and simply resumed the project that we have explained above: in

delaying its execution twenty-four hours he had lost the only good chance left him of surprising his adversary. Orders to that effect were issued on the 6th before dark. The three columns were to effect a junction on the evening of the 8th near Middletown.

The Federal cavalry, however, has not remained inactive during the 6th, so unfortunately wasted by the rest of the army; for its two columns have got in advance of Lee along the road he is to follow in order to reach the Potomac. Buford, who had arrived at Frederick the previous evening, has started at four o'clock in the morning with his whole division, to which he imparts his own ardor. Anxious to reach Williamsport, where he hopes to surprise the enemy's supply-trains, he rapidly crosses the two chains of mountains and the Antietam, and, following the direct road to Boonsboro', finally reaches during the afternoon the heights commanding the Potomac ford toward which Lee had directed Imboden with the principal portion of his supply-trains. This train, thus escorted, has also made a forced march to reach the river, having scarcely made any halt since the evening of the 4th. In the defiles of South Mountain, between Cashedown and Chambersburg, it has succeeded in escaping from Gregg's troopers, who have not been able to overtake it, and from Smith's troops, which this general has not dared to push into the defiles alone before an enemy whose strength he has not been able to ascertain. Once in the Cumberland Valley, the column led by Imboden bears westward in the direction of Bridgeport and Mercersburg, in order to get away from the enemy's open roads, protected on the left flank by Fitzhugh Lee's and Hampton's brigades. Several wagons have been abandoned on the way near Mercersburg: Gregg's advance-guard reaches the rear of the supply-trains and captures the baggage of Lee's brigade, which the latter had entrusted to Imboden. Finally, on the 6th all the wagons are massed at the foot of the heights commanding the Potomac and the Conococheague at the point of their confluence. But the swollen river bars the passage to the Confederates, while the destruction of the bridge at Falling Waters deprives them of all means for crossing. The teams are parked near the bank while Imboden's troopers are vainly sounding the waters to find a practicable ford: they are



obliged to relinquish the attempt, confining themselves to the task of establishing, by means of a few boats, a kind of ferry spanning the river for the purpose of enabling a portion of the wounded to cross into Virginia, and to bring back provisions, of which the army is greatly in want—a perilous undertaking, for the enemy is approaching. Fortunately, Imboden has met on the north bank of the Potomac the two regiments left by Ewell at Winchester. His force makes a junction with these foot-soldiers in order to speedily occupy some positions which cover the approaches of Williamsport on the side toward Boonsboro'. This is opportunely done, for Buford, who has come up by way of Downsville in order to draw nearer to the river, has about five o'clock encountered the Southern scouts near St. James' College on the right bank of the stream called Marsh Run. He pushes rapidly forward, driving them before him, and presently attacks the main body of the Confederates at a distance of little more than a mile from Williamsport. The situation of Imboden is peculiarly critical, as the destruction of the supply-trains entrusted to his care would be more fatal to Lee's army than the loss of a battle. Fortunately for him, his positions are good, enabling him to hold Buford in check, whose soldiers are extremely tired. But Kilpatrick is not far away, and his arrival gives the Federals a decided superiority. If, prompted by the same spirit that had actuated him the day before, he had marched on the evening of the 5th from Smithsburg to Hagerstown, he would probably have surprised the supply-train with its feeble escort on the way, and at all events he would have arrived in sight of Williamsport before Buford. He left Smithsburg at sunset, but, fearing perhaps to venture too far in the presence of Stuart after the combat he has just fought, he follows the foot of the mountains, reaching Boonsboro' with his two brigades at eleven o'clock at night. In this village he obtains positive information regarding the march of the enemy's train: it is too late to intercept it before reaching Williamsport, because his men require rest, but it might yet be overtaken on the banks of the river. Nevertheless, instead of taking the direct route, which would still enable him to reach Williamsport considerably in advance of Buford, he proceeds in the direction of Hagerstown. Here he



finds, not the prey he is looking for, but Stuart's troopers, whom this time he has allowed to precede him on the road. In fact, on the morning of the 6th, having ascertained that the pass of Monterey had been successfully effected by the whole army, and finding himself reinforced by Jones' and Robertson's brigades, which have covered this pass, Stuart has taken up the line of march southward. He is the more impatient to get ahead of Kilpatrick—of whose departure from Boonsboro' he has been apprised—for the reason that General Jones, who has just returned from Williamsport, has informed him of the rise in the river and the danger which threatens the supply-train. While the latter general, who has resumed the command of his brigade, is proceeding toward Funkstown for the purpose of clearing the Boonsboro' road, and Chambliss and Robertson are marching in the direction of Hagerstown by way of Leitersburg, Stuart, with Jenkins' brigade, takes a cross-road which leads him to the same point by way of Chewsville.

The columns of cavalry are therefore converging toward Hagerstown from both sides. Chambliss is the first to reach this town; then Robertson, closely followed by a detachment of infantry commanded by General Iverson. But he has scarcely taken position when the outposts of the Tenth Virginia are attacked by the Eighteenth Pennsylvania:\* it is Farnsworth's old brigade, which is coming to dispute Hagerstown to the Confederates. A brisk combat takes place in the streets. The Federals, despite their losses, gain some ground, while Kilpatrick, who has just arrived with Custer's brigade, is preparing to dislodge the Southern troopers, when the appearance of Stuart on his right flank with Jenkins' and Jones' brigades changes the aspect of the fight. Most of the Unionists who have penetrated the town are made prisoners, and Kilpatrick soon discovers that he has too strong a force to cope with. It is three o'clock; he ought to be at Williamsport. Buford's cannon, roaring in the distance, soon remind him of the fact. He is anxious to get away from Stuart in order to join Buford, but the former, fathoming his design, makes great efforts to detain him.

\* The attacking force consisted of two squadrons of the Eighteenth Pennsylvania and one squadron of the First West Virginia.—Ed.

The struggle, in fact, is taking place between Imboden and Buford in the vicinity of the Potomac. The latter has caused Merritt and Gamble to advance, one to the right, the other to the left, of the Downsville road: Devin, who is kept in reserve, is ready to support them. At a distance of about one mile from Williamsport, Gamble is vigorously attacked by the Confederate infantry. His troopers, dismounting, receive them with a well-sustained fire. The Southerners are repulsed, but they have stopped the movement of the Unionists in that direction. Without losing a moment's time, they take advantage of it to throw themselves once more upon Merritt. The latter, supported by a battery of artillery, has so well posted his dismounted regulars that the Confederates dare not approach him from the front, but they occupy his attention by manœuvring, thereby gaining time. This is all they require, for Fitzhugh Lee has been signalled along the Greencastle road with his brigade and that of Hampton. The presence of Kelley's Federal division along the upper Potomac has obliged him, as we have stated, to make this détour in order to cover the right flank of the supply-train. He reaches Williamsport at the most critical moment for the Confederates: Imboden has vainly tried to turn Merritt's right; the regulars have resumed the offensive, while the sound of cannon, drawing near, announces the arrival of Kilpatrick.

The latter, leaving two regiments and one battery before Hagerstown in order to delay Stuart's march, has quickly proceeded toward Williamsport with the remainder of his force. At four o'clock he arrives in sight of the Potomac, re-forms his line to the right of Merritt, and advances against the Confederates, whose confidence has been restored by the arrival of Fitzhugh Lee; but at this moment the news from his rear-guard paralyzes his attack.

Stuart is upon his track. As soon as the Federals had relinquished the offensive he assumed it in his turn, and, knowing that the head of Longstreet's column was approaching Hagerstown, he left that city. Chambliss, followed by Jones, presses close the Federal rear-guard along the great turnpike, while Robertson and Jenkins are endeavoring to turn it on the left by way of a parallel road. The Fifth New York and the First Vermont, form-

ing this rear-guard, have taken a strong position upon a piece of ground behind some wooden enclosures. The Federal guns are well posted ; Chambliss, and Robertson next, charge them in vain both in front and in flank. They are repulsed : Jenkins' troops are made to dismount for the purpose of dislodging the small Federal force. The latter does not, however, yield as yet before such superior forces. While the artillery keeps the enemy's line in check the Fifth New York charges it sword in hand. But it is driven back by the Fifth North Carolina and the Eleventh Virginia. Jones' brigade determines the defeat of the Federals, who are vigorously driven back along the Williamsport road. Kilpatrick witnesses their appearance closely followed by Stuart's four brigades. He has not a moment to lose in order to avoid the fate which he thought he was on the point of making Imboden suffer. Rallying the Fifth New York, he succeeds in stopping these new adversaries for a sufficient length of time to enable him to withdraw the troops engaged before Williamsport and bring back his two brigades on the Boonsboro' road. This movement uncovers Buford's right, who finds himself, in his turn, menaced in flank by Stuart and in front by Lee. Devin, passing to the first line, protects the retreat of the remainder of the two divisions, which, following the Boonsboro' road, halt for the night at some distance from that village.

During the combat Longstreet arrives at Hagerstown with his heads of column. Notwithstanding the extreme fatigue of his men, who have made two forced marches, he only halts them halfway from Williamsport, so as to be able to protect Imboden against any new attack. Pickett, after giving some rest to his division, conducts the prisoners entrusted to his care as far as the banks of the river. Lee's supply-train is saved.

There was nothing left for the Federal cavalry to do but to watch the movements of the enemy's infantry. On the 7th, while Meade's whole army was at last in motion, that of Lee was completing the last stage which brought it near the Potomac. During the evening Johnson's division, which closed the march, arrived at Hagerstown. Being obliged to halt for the water to subside or till the construction of a bridge might enable him to re-enter Virginia, Lee concentrated all his army near this village, so as to



cover the points of crossing, without, however, allowing himself to be pushed back in the direction where stood the obstacle. Wofford's brigade, detached by Longstreet, was posted at Downsville in order to close the entrance of the angle in the middle of which Falling Waters is located. The cavalry, bearing to the right along this point, envelops the army eastward as far north as Hagerstown. Its outposts are pressing hard upon Buford and Kilpatrick, who are holding the line of the Antietam. At the Confederate head-quarters boats are being collected for removing the wounded into Virginia, constructing a bridge, and gathering supplies—the latter a very difficult matter to accomplish, for the rise in all the streams stops the working of the mills and does not allow grain to be ground.

Meade was leaving Gettysburg on the same day. On reaching Frederick, he was informed of the combat at Williamsport and of the rise of the Potomac waters. The rain, which was falling incessantly, was a sure guarantee that Lee would not be able to cross the river for some days. Some effort must therefore be made to overtake him on Maryland soil. But the Union army was ranged *en échelon* east of the Catoclin Mountain, on all the roads between Gettysburg and Middletown, and it was necessary, before altering its direction, that it should be brought together in the vicinity of the last-mentioned village, where there was only a single division belonging to the Eleventh corps. French, with about four thousand men, had occupied the defiles of Crampton's and Turner's Gaps since the 7th of July: from this latter point he commanded Boonsboro', where Buford and Kilpatrick had just retired after recrossing the Antietam. On the 6th he had, in pursuance of Meade's orders, sent Kenly's brigade to take possession of Maryland Heights, for the purpose of closing the passage of Harper's Ferry to the enemy. This position had been occupied after a slight skirmish. The plank floor thrown over the stringers on the railway bridge at Harper's Ferry had been destroyed the day before by a squad of Federal cavalry. Meade did not want it replaced, fearing, no doubt, that the enemy would take possession of it. He soon had cause to regret his action, for if he had been able to send a portion of his cavalry to the right bank of the river on the 8th or the 9th by means of this



crossing, he would have harassed Lee, and probably prevented him from reconstructing the pontons at Falling Waters.

The Confederate army has arrived at Hagerstown worn out by fatigue. In order to secure some rest for it until it could cross the river, Lee orders Stuart on the morning of the 8th to assume the offensive against the Federal cavalry, to drive it back into the mountain, and to compel the enemy to show the forces he has on this side. Knowing the anxious and hesitating character of his adversary, he intends by this vigorous demonstration to lead him astray with regard to his designs, and thus to gain sufficient time to prepare for the passage of the Potomac. Stuart, assembling four brigades and all his artillery on the left bank of the Antietam south of Hagerstown, is advancing along the Boonsboro' turnpike. Jones, who leads the march, finds the Federals posted along Beaver Creek, a small tributary of the Antietam, a few miles from the last-mentioned village. Kilpatrick on the right of the road, Merritt's brigade on the left, are making a stand against Stuart, who has successively deployed Chambliss', Hampton's, and Fitzhugh Lee's brigades to support Jones. The ground is so completely saturated by the rain that the horses cannot leave the turnpike; on either side the mounted men are obliged to fight on foot. The Federals, who are on the defensive, find in this a great advantage. But presently Jenkins' brigade, coming from Downsville, crosses the Antietam below the point of its confluence with Beaver Creek, strikes Merritt's line in the rear, and compels him to retreat. Kilpatrick is carried along by Merritt. Buford hastens to the place of conflict with his other two brigades, but, finding no favorable position above Boonsboro', falls back upon this village by manœuvring in the open plain which surrounds him: avoiding any encounter in the streets, he seeks a point of support more to eastward, near the beginning of the ascent to Turner's Gap. His artillery, posted along these slopes, commands all the approaches of Boonsboro'; farther on, French's infantry is ready to support him. It is five o'clock.

In the mean while, Meade, believing that the enemy's whole army is advancing toward Harper's Ferry, has directed the troops that have already crossed the chain of the Catoctin to proceed toward the passes of South Mountain. At two o'clock he orders

Howard to march in great haste upon Turner's Gap with the First and Eleventh corps; a little later, at five o'clock, he directs Slocum to occupy Crampton's Gap with the Twelfth: the garrison of Maryland Heights, reinforced by several regiments that have come from Washington, numbers more than six thousand men. Useless precautions, for Stuart has not the least intention of attacking Buford in the strong position he occupies; the object of his demonstration has been accomplished: he halts outside of Boonsboro'. Buford, who finds himself supported, resumes the offensive. It is the Confederates' turn to fall back—Jenkins on the Downsville road, the rest of the Southern cavalry upon Hagerstown. Night separates the combatants near the banks of Beaver Creek.

If Meade has been able to push his heads of column as far as South Mountain during the 8th, his army, however, is not yet in a condition to descend into the Cumberland Valley. Its concentration around Middletown is not completed. The column commanded by Slocum has only passed through Frederick in the morning, and arrived with difficulty to go into encampment at Jefferson; the Twelfth corps will not therefore be able to occupy Crampton's Gap until the following day. The Third corps has found the road which had been marked out for it so much encumbered that it is compelled to proceed in the direction of the great turnpike at Frederick, night having overtaken it halfway between that city and Middletown. Schurz's division of the Eleventh corps, which arrives at Turner's Gap before six o'clock in the evening, is the only one to cross South Mountain, and it occupies Boonsboro'; the First is at Turner's Gap. But the soldiers, worn out by fatigue and without shoes, have need of some rest, equipments, and rations. The dépôts of Frederick possess them in abundance. A portion of the 8th is employed by some, and the morning of the 9th by others, in procuring supplies. Besides, Meade is in no hurry. He does not intend, as was the case at Gettysburg, to let the choice of a battlefield depend on the chance of a sudden encounter, and, deceived by Stuart's demonstration, he thinks of naught else but to get his army together. The very activity displayed by the government at Washington in sending him reinforcements is made by him

the occasion of further delay, for he desires to allow these reinforcements time to join the army, while Halleck, far from hurrying him, advises him to wait for them. He therefore confines himself on the 9th to the task of forming his army along the ridge and the western slope of South Mountain. Three good roads enable him to divide this army in order to effect the passage. On the right, the First corps remains at Turner's Gap, while the Sixth and the remainder of the Eleventh join Schurz at Boonsboro'; the Third comes to a stop at Fox's Gap, while the Fifth, preceding it, descends as far as the village of Springvale; Slocum leads the left column, by way of Crampton's Gap, to Rohrer'sville, at the entrance of Pleasant Valley, which adjoins the Potomac below Maryland Heights.

The enemy is not disturbed by this movement. Stuart, who was so active the day before, remains immovable on Beaver Creek, where he covers the approaches to Hagerstown and the upper course of the Antietam. On all sides Federal detachments that are following in the track of the great army of invasion, ready to throw themselves upon it if any disaster befalls it, have advanced without meeting any resistance. Gregg, after ascertaining that this army has completely vacated Pennsylvania, has gone to the assistance of McIntosh and Hill, who have emerged from behind it in the direction of Waynesboro'; Smith reaches the same village on the 8th with such militia as have been able to endure a few days' march and consented to cross the Maryland line. At the west, Kelley is massing his forces in the vicinity of Hancock and watching the fords of the upper Potomac; some Federal scouts have proceeded as far as Clear Spring. From all these points the Confederates are retiring in the direction of Hagerstown and Williamsport.

Meade, although still expecting to be attacked, becomes at last convinced that the Southern army is massed between these two villages. In reality, the whole of it is assembled around the first named, and Lee takes care not to put it in motion without sufficient cause. About three o'clock in the afternoon, however, the Union general, alarmed by false reports, causes the army corps of each column—which, being destined to form a second line, are following the first at a certain distance—to close their ranks. The same idea prompts



the orders which he issues for the march of the following day. The army, advancing no farther than six miles on the left and three miles and a half on the right, crosses the Antietam and Beaver Creek, and takes position along the right bank of these two streams. Slocum, on the left, with his two army corps, is resting on the Potomac, and occupies the road from Sharpsburg to Hagerstown at Bakersville; the Third and Fifth corps, ranged one behind the other, are following the road from Boonsboro' to Williamsport, stopping at a short distance on the other side of the Antietam; the other three corps are posted along Beaver Creek, fronting Hagerstown. Actuated by the same impressions as their chief, the Union generals execute this movement slowly and with great caution, still ready to fight on the defensive. The passage of the small river Antietam, swollen by rainfalls, delays the march of the left and the centre. As we have remarked, above this stream the country adjoining the Potomac is very rough: an army expecting to encounter the enemy cannot fail to have its march impeded at every step by woods, ravines, and swamps. This is not the case with the open country between Boonsboro' and Hagerstown. By advancing with all his forces on this side, and by simply making his cavalry clear his left, Meade could have overtaken his adversary after the afternoon of the 10th: he would thus have kept his army concentrated, instead of leading it through divergent roads. He ought to have manœuvred in such a manner as to drive the enemy toward the Potomac, back him against this insurmountable obstacle, and shut him up, if possible, within one of the angles of the river. Hagerstown, therefore, should have been his only objective point. Consequently, it is the only point before which the Confederates proffer him any resistance. While on their right Jenkins promptly retires before the Federal advance, Longstreet despatches Semmes and Anderson's brigades to assist the Southern cavalry in defending the approaches to Hagerstown. They arrive just in time, for Buford, crossing Beaver Creek, has pushed his outposts toward Funkstown, a small village situated on the left bank of the Antietam, at the point where the turnpike crosses that stream. Stuart, who occupies this place, tries in vain to defend himself; he is dislodged after a vigorous fight. Fortunately for him, just as he is about to be driven back upon Hagerstown, the two bri-



gades of infantry make their appearance on the other side of the Antietam. They cross the river, and, supported by the mounted artillery, attack Buford in turn. The latter calls in vain for the aid of the infantry of the Sixth corps, which is within supporting-distance: Sedgwick, being aware of his chief's circumspection, refuses to respond to this call, and the Federals fall back again upon Beaver Creek.

Lee was still waiting for Meade to shadow out his movement in order to select the position in which to receive his attack. The 10th was therefore another day gained, allowing his soldiers time to recuperate and the river to subside. In the afternoon, however, the demonstrations of the Federal right along the Boonsboro' and Hagerstown road decided him to fortify himself on that side. The Third corps left Hagerstown in order to draw near Williamsport, halting halfway between these two points. Early's division, encamped north of the first, took the positions which Hill had just abandoned at the south-west.

The reports which Lee received during the evening, however, left him no more doubt regarding Meade's intentions and the direction he has given to his columns. A large number of men are actively at work repairing the old boats, in fitting for use those that have been found on the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, in constructing new ones, and in rebuilding the bridge at Falling Waters. In advancing beyond Bakersville the Federals threaten to interrupt this work. It is necessary to bar the direct road from Falling Waters to Williamsport by way of Downsville against them. Lee has foreseen this eventuality: with the perspicacity of an engineer officer he has chosen the line along which his troops will be posted. It forms a vast semicircle, of which Williamsport is the centre, having a radius of nearly four miles and intersecting the three roads leading from this village to Bakersville, Boonsboro', and Hagerstown. On the right it rests on the Potomac at a point where the river, after running north-eastward, suddenly takes a southerly direction; following a little stream as far as Downsville, it again joins, at a distance of about two miles from this village, at St. James' College, the course of Marsh Creek, running straight along its left bank to the vicinity of its source, a little less than a mile above the college, and, following subsequently

a course running perpendicular to the road from Hagerstown to Williamsport, intersects it at the point where Kilpatrick's rear-guard kept Stuart in check on the 6th. The ridge defended on that day by the Confederates affords an excellent position, but farther on the extremity of the line terminates a little to the north of the Clear Spring road, without any other place of support than a small work hastily constructed. The left of the line, running through an open country, is evidently its weakest part: it is covered by the troops which Lee, at the last moment, has left in Hagerstown in order to deceive his adversary. On the right a few detachments are watching the whole lower course of Marsh Creek: thanks to this obstacle and the density of the woods, it is easy for them to obstruct the march of the Federals.

On the 11th the Confederate army is ordered into the positions chosen by its chief. Each of the three army corps occupies one of the three roads converging upon Williamsport, and is deployed on both sides so as to form a continuous line. Toward noon Longstreet is posted around Bakersville, Hill on the Boonsboro' road, Ewell on the Hagerstown road; Rodes' division, which forms the extreme left of the Second corps, remains in the city until dark. The cavalry being no longer needed on the right, where the two armies are sufficiently near each other, Jenkins remains alone on this side; Stuart in the course of the evening vacates the entire left bank of the Antietam, concentrating his cavalry, with the two brigades sent by Longstreet, in Hagerstown, the task of keeping guard over it having been transferred to him by Rodes.

These positions are occupied without striking a blow, although those on the right are within reach of the Federals, who might have been the first to take possession of them if they had resolutely advanced on the morning of the 11th. But everything conspires to delay their march. Three new brigades are announced to arrive in Frederick on that day, while other troops are leaving Washington to join the army. Couch, marching on the track of Smith, has reached Chambersburg with a second division of militia under General Dana. Nearly fifteen thousand men, badly disciplined no doubt, are menacing Hagerstown by way of the north, and their advance-guard has even ventured sufficiently near that city to compel Stuart to send some troops to

meet it. Finally, Meade, more cautious than ever, orders a kind of march in battle-line for all his forces on the 11th—a difficult manœuvre even for a single division, which an army could not execute in a rough and wooded country except at the cost of immense delays and endless groping in the dark. Consequently, he does not expect to accomplish more than from one to two miles during this entire day. By a singular coincidence, the positions he has indicated are opposite to those which Lee has just occupied with his soldiers. The line he has traced for his troops forms a circular arc, convex like that of the Confederates, having alike a radius of from four to five miles, but much more open, its chord being nearly six miles in length. It has Boonsboro' for its centre, and the road from this point to Williamsport divides it into two equal parts. The contact of these two arcs occurs on the Confederate right centre, in the neighborhood of St. James' College. We have stated that two roads running almost parallel form a junction at Williamsport after passing through the country comprised between the Antietam and the Potomac. The Keedysville road, the first to cross the Antietam a little above the battle-field of September 17, 1862, passes the villages of Bakersville and Downsville, crossing the Marsh Run between the two; that from Boonsboro' crosses this stream in sight of St. James' College, after passing the Antietam near its junction with Beaver Creek. These two roads are intersected by the great turnpike from Hagerstown to Sharpsburg, which runs southward by following the dividing-line of the waters between the Antietam and Marsh Run: the intersection of the first-mentioned road is called Jones' cross-roads; that of the second is in the immediate neighborhood of Bakersville: at an equal distance from the two intersections are the adjoining villages of Fairplay and Tilghmanton.

The movement of the Federals is nearly completed by noon. The Twelfth corps, forming the extreme left, rests on Marsh Run, near the bridge on the road from Bakersville to Williamsport, and, passing above Fairplay, extends as far as Jones' cross-roads on its right; the Second and the Fifth corps occupy the space intervening between the Sharpsburg road and the Antietam: the line is continued along the east side of this river by the Sixth, then by the Eleventh corps, drawn up perpendicularly to



the road running from Boonsboro' to Hagerstown—one to the left, the other to the right, the latter extending as far as the road from Hagerstown to Smoketown. The First and Third corps are kept in reserve along the roads running from Boonsboro' to Hagerstown and Williamsport, the former at Beaver Creek bridge, the latter at the Antietam bridge. This disposition of the troops is equally unfortunate for the offensive and defensive. In the former case the divergent routes followed by the various corps and the deployment of almost the entire army on a single front renders all harmony of action impossible; in the second case the line extends too far, being deprived of all support at both wings, especially on the left, where it does not reach the Potomac. The Federals, although sufficiently well informed regarding the position taken by the three corps of the enemy, make no attempt to harass them. On the left, owing to the want of cavalry to clear their front, they have allowed themselves to be intimidated in the morning on Marsh Creek by a handful of men. In the afternoon, Buford, being summoned back from the right with two brigades, comes to reinforce this portion of the line at Bakersville; but the country is so rough and marshy that he soon realizes the impossibility of attempting any serious operation on that side. At the centre, Gregg, who has joined the army by way of Cashtown with his cavalry division, arrives alone in sight of St. James' College; but, being detained by a formal defence, he merely watches the outposts of the enemy along the left bank of Marsh Creek. Meade makes his army advance in the direction of Hagerstown only in order to verify the reports announcing the evacuation of that city. Some reconnoissances are made along both sides of the Antietam: east of this stream, the Confederates since their trifling success of the previous day have again taken position in front of Beaver Creek. In attacking them this time the Federal cavalry is supported by the infantry. Grant's brigade of the Sixth corps, deployed as skirmishers, advances with Kilpatrick upon Funkstown. It soon encounters Anderson's troops on foot, and attacks them vigorously, and, after losing sixty-eight men, remains master of the field. Kilpatrick takes possession of Funkstown without any difficulty, and advances to within a mile and a half of Hagerstown, which he finds still



strongly occupied. With the exception of these trifling movements the whole afternoon is employed by Meade and his generals in rectifying the positions of the various corps.

The Confederates, on their part, having promptly taken position, take advantage of the respite which their adversary has so imprudently granted them. Before sunset the outlines of earthworks and redoubts are defined along all the important points of their line; the shovel and the axe are constantly at work. At this season of the year the nights are short; that of the 11th to the 12th of July has been succeeded by a damp, cloudy morning. The mist hides the positions of the Southerners, who are at work fortifying them. Rodes, having been relieved by Stuart, has taken position on Early's left on the other side of the Williamsport road; his line extends as far as the Clear Spring road, resting on a small work of which we have spoken. Every passing hour diminishes the chances of success for the Federals, so that Lee is anxious to be attacked by them and to be obliged to fight a second battle of Antietam. He has received a supply of ammunition; his soldiers are rested; and on the 11th he addresses them a special order to stimulate their courage. Having no further interest in postponing this battle, he finally causes the curtain to fall which until then had masked his movements. Stuart is ordered to leave Hagerstown and to go with his five brigades to fill up the interval which separates Ewell's left from the Conococheague, in order to cover thereby the weakest portion of the Confederate line.

The soldiers of both armies are full of ardor and only desire to come to blows. The Southerners have not accepted the check experienced at Gettysburg as a positive defeat; they are burning with a desire to be revenged; they are still in hopes of forcing their way into Washington and Baltimore. The Unionists, encouraged by victory, would like to make a supreme effort to drive Lee's army into the river which is barring his retreat. Although the risks attending the attack are greater than on the previous day, they must be run in order to prevent him from rendering his position impregnable. The confidence of the Union army in its leaders would even be less shaken by a reverse than by inaction at such a crisis. This check could not, in fact,

prove a decisive one. If, after having repulsed the Federals, Lee should pretend to follow them, they could easily stop him among the defiles of South Mountain; if, on the contrary, he should recross the Potomac, his success would assume the character of a defeat in the eyes of the country.

But, as usual, Meade exaggerates the forces of his adversary: he is the more disposed to hesitate because several regiments are asking to be mustered out of service at the very moment they come to join him. Moreover, he has not that confidence in himself indispensable to a chief about to assume great responsibilities. It is true that he has taken as chief of the general staff, in the place of Butterfield, the most able division commander in his whole army—Humphreys, an accomplished officer of the engineer corps, who at Gettysburg has shown himself to be an admirable manœuvrer under the enemy's fire; a cool and active chief, firm and just, loved and respected by his subordinates, and possessing all the qualities required for the difficult position he occupied on the evening of the 9th. Experience and authority are alone wanting to him.

The Federals could suddenly attack Lee's right and centre or manœuvre for the purpose of turning his left: in either case it would have been necessary for him to gather the largest number of troops possible at some given point. But Meade insists upon continuing his march in line of battle, on a front which is becoming more and more extended, by keeping every portion of this long line closely connected. His various corps will clear their way by means of reconnoissances in force, the general-in-chief reserving to himself the privilege of selecting the point of attack according to the reports he may receive.

These reconnoissances are effected in such a minute and prudent manner that they return too late to be of use, and generally without having compelled the enemy to show his strength. Meade himself passes the greatest part of the day in watching some movements in detail. He has ordered Sedgwick to direct his right wing, formed of the First, Sixth, and Eleventh corps, toward Funkstown, and to cross the Antietam if the enemy is not in sufficient force to defend the passage. In order to cover this movement, Kilpatrick, who already occupies Funkstown,

advances upon Hagerstown with one brigade of infantry of Ames' division. At eight o'clock in the morning he overtakes, at the entrance of the town, the rear-guard of Stuart, who is already on the march to assume his new position. After a slight engagement, in which they capture a number of stragglers, the Federals take possession of Hagerstown. Then all their right wing makes a half-wheel to the left in order to follow the enemy, whom Kilpatrick finds strongly posted along the Williamsport road. This wing has crossed the Antietam: at the extremity of the line the First corps follows the route from Hagerstown to Smoketown; the Eleventh is posted across the Boonsboro' road; the Sixth, on the left, extends in the direction of the Sharpsburg road; the Fifth and Second corps have formed on the other side of the latter road, the left of the Second resting on Jones' Cross-roads. The First, having inclined to the right for the purpose of assisting Sedgwick, leaves an interval between the two corps which is filled up by a portion of the Third. To the left of Jones' Cross-roads the Twelfth, and, farther on, Buford's cavalry, are posted. With the exception of a trifling inclination in the rear of its extreme right the Federal army presents a front perfectly compact of nearly seven miles in length, from Bakersville to the vicinity of Hagerstown. Although this line is occupied by all the Union forces with the exception of two brigades held in reserve, it is so extended that the corps commanders, becoming uneasy on account of its weakness, are intrenching themselves and asking for reinforcements.

The cavalry alone has made important reconnoissances. On the left, Buford, piercing the line of the enemy's outposts, has penetrated to within two hundred and fifty yards of Downsville, where he informs Slocum that no enemy can be found at a less distance than two miles and a half from his front; but he has also ascertained that no offensive movement would be practicable along the line of the Potomac. At the centre Huey has vigorously driven the outposts of Anderson's division across Marsh Run as far as St. James' College, and noticed the line of intrenchments that the Confederates are constructing.

In the afternoon, Meade, believing, according to the report of his spies, that the Confederates are concentrating their forces on

their centre, orders the Second, the Fifth, and the Sixth corps on the left to close their lines, imposing a new march on his soldiers without drawing them nearer the enemy. Lee looks upon this movement as a preliminary step to an attack, and summons Early's division from the left in order to reinforce this portion of his line. Toward evening it looks as if the combat is about to open spontaneously on that side: the Federal skirmishers advance against the college, capturing a few prisoners. But they are soon brought to a halt by superior orders, and the day of the 12th, like the preceding one, ends without seeing the two armies come in contact.

Night has supervened, and the Union generals, assembled at the head-quarters of their chief, are still discussing the advantages and perils of an attack. Not daring to take the responsibility of ordering it, Meade, under some pretext or other, has summoned his corps commanders for the purpose of consulting them. Does he explain to them all the reasons which militate in favor of an immediate assault? Does he show them the despatch he has just received from Sandy Hook, informing him that on the 13th the Williamsport ford will be practicable, and that, consequently, Lee will be able to cross the Potomac if the occasion for preventing him is not taken advantage of? We know nothing about it. Whatever may be the case, five of the oldest generals declare themselves against the offensive, and Meade has the weakness to adopt their opinion, although not sharing it, according to his own statement. So that since the morning of the 13th he has been beset by regrets. On receiving the despatch in which he announced the result of the council of war, Halleck replied to him frankly, directing him to summon his generals for the purpose of giving them instructions, and not to ask their advice. "You are strong enough," said he to him, "to attack the enemy and beat him before he has crossed the Potomac." These formal instructions enabled Meade to risk a battle without troubling himself about the consequences: he received these instructions during the night. Smith has joined his right with one division. There is yet time to attack Lee, either in front or in flank, during the day of the 13th. But Meade is still hesitating: he dares not reject the decision adopted by the



council of war a few hours previous. The rain, which follows the mist of the day before, seems to presage another rise in the waters of the river, which will detain the enemy for one or two days more. With the exception of a slight forward movement on his right to cover Hagerstown at the south-west, he only orders new reconnoissances to be made, the result of which he is waiting for in order to decide what course to pursue. But Lee's outposts, both very strong and extremely active, keep the Federals at a distance of one hundred and fifty or two hundred yards: the latter, blinded by the rain, can only discover such of the enemy's positions as he allows to be seen. Sedgwick, who has made a half-wheel to the left in order to form a connection with the Eleventh corps, posted on the Williamsport road above Hagerstown, perceives a continuous line of intrenchments. Howard and Kilpatrick, on the extreme right, are under the impression that the enemy might be turned on that side, but they make no effort to ascertain definitely, the cavalry not being authorized to advance in the direction of the Conococheague, where it would only have encountered Stuart's troops; while the Eleventh corps merely drives from Hagerstown toward the Clear Spring road a small detachment of Ramseur's brigade of Rodes' division, which is easily repulsed.

This inaction, however, astonishes the Federal soldiers, making them uneasy. Meade finally realizes his danger. It may be that a despatch which he received during the evening has opened his eyes. General Kelley telegraphs him at half-past four o'clock from Fairview, on the upper Potomac, that Lee, according to reliable information, has at last succeeded in throwing a ponton across. Consequently, at nine o'clock in the evening he finally makes up his mind as to his course. He decides to make a direct attack, thinking, no doubt, that a manœuvre along the right would require too much time. The four army corps forming his left and centre, each of them with at least one division, are to make a reconnoissance in force at seven o'clock in the morning of the next day, holding themselves ready to march against the weakest point of the enemy's line. In a section of country easy to defend and difficult to penetrate this mode of

attack was the only practicable one. But it is too late: the plan should have been adopted on the 12th.

The bridge at Falling Waters is indeed completed during the morning, and the waters have subsided sufficiently to render the Williamsport ford practicable, although still dangerous. Lee is warned by the rain to make haste, for before twenty-four hours have expired another freshet will probably leave him no other means of crossing except the bridge, which would make his retreat extremely perilous. Provisions are collected with great difficulty; a raid on the part of the enemy's cavalry into the valley of the Shenandoah, or a movement of the Federal army in the direction of Winchester, would cut off all communication with Richmond. Lee does not lose a single moment. During the day, while all the wagons are passing the right bank, the troops that are in front of the enemy deceive him through their activity. The outposts are reinforced, and the number of men at work in the trenches is doubled. As soon as it becomes dark the infantry begins to move; Stuart is allotted the task of covering it. As soon as the bridge was passable he sent Jones' brigade into Virginia in order to clear the roads which the army has to follow and form a junction with Corse's brigade, which has arrived at Winchester: the rest of his cavalry, dismounted, forms a long line of skirmishers, relieving those of the infantry. Fitzhugh Lee takes the place of the First corps—Baker, with Hampton's brigade, that of the Third. The other three brigades fortify themselves in Ewell's positions, which are the most exposed. The storm, added to the darkness, conceals this movement from the Federals, but it also renders the march of the Confederates much more difficult. Ewell proceeds toward Williamsport, where he fords the Potomac; Longstreet and Hill reach the bridge at Falling Waters, and cross it successively. A line of earthworks has been constructed on the heights at a distance of little more than a mile from the bridge, so as to enable the rear-guard to cover its approaches.

The Second corps, which is following a macadamized road, promptly arrives at Williamsport, but the crossing of the ford is full of danger. The banks are rugged, and there is not a single boat to carry the ammunition. Large fires have been

lighted on the opposite bank to guide the soldiers through the river, but they are incessantly extinguished by the rain, and in their fitful glimmer that land of Virginia from which they are separated by a roaring torrent seems to be still more distant. However, they have to hasten onward, for the waters are increasing anew. Notwithstanding the confusion which prevails along the shore, the column dashes bravely into the current: the foremost find it difficult to struggle against its violence, but they soon form a chain; the middle-sized men have water up to their shoulders, and the tallest ones are carrying the smallest. Before daybreak Johnson and Rodes have crossed. Early, who brings up the rear, follows at dawn with three brigades; the fourth, under Hays, is guarding as far as the bridge at Falling Waters all the artillery of the corps, which could not attempt the passage. About six o'clock in the morning Ewell's corps is assembled on the right bank, not having lost a single man, but a great deal of ammunition has been damaged, thirty thousand of Rodes' cartridges having been wet.

The march of the two other corps toward the Potomac is much more difficult than that of the Second. The road which they are following is narrow, winding, broken, and encumbered with wagons. The soldiers are stumbling in the mud, fatiguing themselves without moving forward. Longstreet at last reaches the bridge, which, being lit by moving torches, is detached like a trail on the black and deep waters of the Potomac. But there they have to halt, an ambulance full of wounded men having been overturned in the river; the flooring has been broken. In the midst of the inevitable confusion of such an occurrence two hours pass before the communication is re-established. The First corps is not assembled on the Virginia bank until nine o'clock on the morning of the 14th. It is now Hill's turn to cross the river.

But it has been daylight during the last five hours. What has happened in the Federals' camp? They have been keeping good watch at the outposts, and yet nothing has been seen, nothing found out. As at Yorktown, at Corinth, and still on other occasions, the first news of the Confederate troops' retreat is brought by a negro, whose statement is received with but little credence.

Stuart's movements, it is true, have been signalled from three o'clock in the morning, and at daybreak Kilpatrick has sent Custer's brigade to reconnoitre toward Williamsport. But it is only at half-past six o'clock that the first official news of the evacuation of the enemy's camps comes to Meade: at half-past eight he does not yet give full credence to the news, for he limits himself to ordering his corps commanders to push on their reconnoissance until they have found the enemy, who, says he, seems to have made his retreat. This communication arrives too late. The reconnoissance has been made, but, the enemy having disappeared, it has entirely ceased. Custer has soon arrived at Williamsport, but only to see the last of Early's soldiers reach the opposite bank. Kilpatrick, who joins him promptly, on learning that the artillery of the Second Southern corps has taken the road to Falling Waters follows it in that direction with two brigades.

Meade does not seem to have suspected the exact place where the Confederates' pontons were to be found, for he does not make it an objective point to any of his corps. Besides, the Federal infantry, having been ordered to march only after ten o'clock in the morning, had no chance to overtake the enemy. An hour sooner, it is true, Meade, having received the first report of his cavalry, has sent Howard and Newton to Williamsport, but when they occupy that town Ewell is not even any longer in sight on the other bank. During that time Kilpatrick, with Custer's brigade, arrives near the bridge at Falling Waters. The Southern cavalry, which was to protect the approaches to it, has gone to the ford at Williamsport, and has thus exposed the bridge. However, the whole of Longstreet's corps is not yet on the right bank, and Hill's crossing is not commenced. The situation may become critical for the latter, as it is only four or five miles from Fairplay, where the Federal left wing is, to the works erected near the bridge. Heth, who has resumed the command both of his division and that of Pender, which have been united in consequence of their losses, has been ordered to retard the pursuit as much as possible. His first line, which has been posted two miles in advance of the bridge, checks for a certain time the Federal cavalry, but after a lively skirmish it



is compelled to fall back upon the main body of the division, leaving one gun and a few prisoners in the hands of the assailants. The latter soon make their appearance before the positions occupied by Heth, at a distance of fifteen hundred yards, upon a hill which the road ascends before coming in sight of the Potomac. The left of the Confederates, formed by Lane's brigade, is supported by the works we have spoken of. Pettigrew is in the centre, astride of the road; Brockenbrough, on the right, extends as far as the inside of the woods. On the Federal side the Sixth Michigan is the first regiment which reaches Heth's positions, after having captured on the road a gun from the enemy. Believing that they had to deal only with a retreating rear-guard, a Federal squadron\* makes a bold attack on the road. Astonished at so much daring, and not knowing that Fitzhugh Lee, whose duty was to cover the retreat, has already removed his men, the Confederates take the Federal cavalry to be a friendly troop, and allow them to approach. Undeceived when the latter are in their midst, they surround them and take prisoners all those who are not killed; but in the first instant of confusion General Pettigrew has been mortally wounded. At the same time the rest of the Federal regiment makes a demonstration against Brockenbrough. The latter, after having repelled them, assumes the offensive, but the First Michigan comes to the rescue of the Sixth, and these two regiments, fighting on foot, vigorously attack the Southern brigade, drive it back in disorder to its first positions, and capture a considerable number of prisoners.

However, Kilpatrick soon learns that he has superior forces before him, and that, in order to fall upon them with advantage, he must wait either for their retreat or the arrival of the Union infantry. Therefore, he limits himself to keeping the enemy in check by a skirmishing fire. It might be a splendid opportunity for the Federals. If Meade pushed his reconnoissance on his left, Slocum would arrive just in time to crush the Southern rear-guard, which is fatigued by a weary march and unnerved by the ever-melancholy sights of a retreat. But at eleven o'clock Slocum has not yet made his appearance, and the precursory movements of an approaching departure are perceived

\* Portion of the Sixth Michigan, under Major P. A. Weber.—ED.

in the enemy's ranks. In fact, Heth, after having recalled the rest of his troops and requested a few pieces of artillery from Hill in order to cope with those of the enemy's cavalry, has received from his chief the imperative order to fall back. The bridge is free, and it is necessary to pass on. Whatever may be the losses which the rear-guard may sustain while retreating, they will be less than they would be if they allowed themselves to be trifled with on the left bank. While entrusting to Lane's brigade the care of covering the dangerous movement which he is performing, Heth orders the remainder of his troops to march to the bridge at Falling Waters. Kilpatrick immediately takes the offensive with his two brigades, and closely presses the Confederates near the road. Buford, who has at last found and followed the track of the enemy, arrives just in time to fall on their right flank, and causes Brockenbrough's brigade to sustain serious losses. The Federal cavalry gather up a large number of stragglers and capture small detachments, but they are not able to break through the Southern infantry, Lane's soldiers not allowing them to approach the bridge. When the remainder of Heth's troops have crossed the river that valiant brigade at length treads upon the narrow floor which trembles beneath their footsteps, and at the very moment in which Kilpatrick arrives to take possession of it the bridge is hauled up on the right bank. It is one o'clock in the afternoon. The last tie which bound the Confederate army to the soil of Maryland, so eagerly coveted, is finally broken.

If the Confederate generals had committed faults before and during the battle of Gettysburg, they had since well redeemed them. During those ten days of retreat the army, under the most difficult circumstances, had been led with precision and judgment. Lee could not foresee the inundation which nearly caused the loss of his trains; Stuart was able to prevent this disaster. Brought to a standstill at the Potomac, the general-in-chief of the Confederates had but fifty thousand men, infantry and artillery, to oppose Meade. In order to conceal his passage it was necessary to keep the enemy from the river, and with his reduced forces he did not fear to occupy a line of nearly eleven miles in length. While intimidating his adversary, he could,

without being molested, remain forty-eight hours in that position, and then reach the river: he took advantage of a transient opportunity to cross the still swollen waters, which again from the 14th were no longer fordable; but if on that day he was fortunate, he was deservedly so, and the success of his retreat is the condemnation of Meade's hesitations.

The latter would have smarted for them had not the victory of Gettysburg been so recent. The army was greatly disappointed: it felt that their commander had been deceived by Lee, and the confidence which he had won on the battlefield was irrevocably shaken. The chagrin of the Northern people burst out so much the more noisily as it was believed, very wrongly, that Lee was to renew at Williamsport the capitulations of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, which were still filling the minds of all; and what carried the exasperation of the moment to its highest pitch was the fact that his withdrawal, as his retreat was foolishly called, was coincident with the dreadful riot in New York, which will be spoken of hereafter. The President, through the medium of Halleck, manifested his displeasure to Meade. The latter by offering his resignation\* obtained, it is true, a sort of retraction of this blame, but he was not the less conscious of his fault, and the feeling inspired him with an activity which up to that moment he had not shown.

Two thousand prisoners, three stands of colors, and two guns have been gathered by the Unionist cavalry. At noon, Meade, knowing that the pursuit would have no result, stops the movements of his army. His resolution is promptly taken, and his new orders for marching are immediately despatched. He adopts the plan of campaign followed by McClellan on a similar occasion after the battle of Antietam. Lee, on re-entering the Virginia Valley, will absorb the few resources which this country, already exhausted by the incessant passage of the armies, still possesses. Halleck charges Meade to keep himself between the enemy and Washington, in order to shield the capital and thus be able to keep with him the forces especially intended for its protection. Therefore, the Army of the Potomac, instead of following Lee,

\* General Meade did not tender his resignation as an officer, but requested to be relieved of his command.—ED.



will establish itself in Virginia on the eastern declivity of the Blue Ridge, and march on a parallel line with the Southern army while holding the narrow passes of the mountains. After a few days a double equipage of bridges is assembled at Berlin: on the 16th these bridges will connect the two banks of the Potomac. The railroad bridge at Harper's Ferry is rebuilt since the preceding day. These will be the two crossing-points of the army. Four corps, the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh, are led in two columns through Crampton's and Turner's Gaps over the first; the three others through the Antietam's defiles over the second. This march will take place on the 15th and 16th. Gregg, however, with two brigades, has been sent to Harper's Ferry at the first news of Lee's retreat, in order to harass him on the Virginia side.

The Confederate army was still in great need of rest. The two columns which had crossed at Williamsport and Falling Waters were united upon the main road to Winchester. The first halting-place was between Hainesville and Martinsburg. On the 15th, Lee led his soldiers as far as Darksville, and halted between this village and Bunker Hill. In this beautiful plain, which separates the Opequon from North Mountain, they were within reach of the supplies which the Richmond government had sent to Winchester. Separated from Meade on one side by the Potomac, on the other by the Shenandoah and the crests of the Blue Ridge, the army could enjoy during a few days a security precious indeed after the constant anxiety of an active campaign; the corps could get clear of their sick and receive the men restored to health during the invasion. Stuart undertook to watch over their repose.

The Federal cavalry would willingly have interrupted it. On the morning of the 15th one of the two brigades of Gregg, commanded by his namesake, Irvin Gregg, was debouching from Bolivar and proceeding toward Shepherdstown. It was to be supported by that of Huey in order to attempt a surprise of the Confederate rear-guard. Gregg takes possession of Shepherdstown after a skirmish with the Twelfth Virginia, detached on that side by Jones, in which the colonel of that regiment is taken prisoner, and establishes himself in the village. But the following day Huey, delayed in his march, has not arrived. Gregg awaits him, and during that time Stuart, being forewarned,



commences an attack upon him. He orders Jenkins, who is at Martinsburg, to advance on the left, while he is bringing from Bunker Hill Fitzhugh Lee's and Chambliss' brigades by the direct road to Shepherdstown. Jones, if possible, will have to support this attack on the right. At the moment of marching Stuart is called to head-quarters, but Fitzhugh Lee, in his place, gives the order of departure. Three or four Confederate brigades, therefore, are going to be united against a single Union brigade. For the latter the danger is great, but it is saved by the coolness of its chief, and, it must be said, by the desire of Fitzhugh Lee of having, before the attack, a crushing numerical superiority. In fact, the Southern general spends the whole morning in simple skirmishes in order to give Jenkins the necessary time to join him.

About four o'clock, not seeing Jenkins appear, Lee makes his troops dismount in order to attack the Federals, but finds them well established in a hilly country. The Federals even take the offensive. It is true, they are repelled and lose, with their first position, one or two miles of their ground. But, having succeeded in deceiving the enemy as to the smallness of their numbers, Lee, seeing them re-form behind a wall on a crest difficult of access, still awaits, before attacking them again, the arrival of Jenkins. The latter at last makes his appearance, but the combined attack is of no avail against the resistance of the enemy. The Southerners lose in these unsuccessful attacks about a hundred men, among whom is the colonel of the First Virginia, and night at length comes to separate the combatants. The darkness favoring him, Gregg falls back without being pursued.

The Federal army, however, is assembled, on the evening of the 16th, on the bank of the Potomac. Having the control over Harper's Ferry, it has been able not only to repair the railroad bridge over that river, but to throw a bridge over the Shenandoah, whose rising has submerged all the fords. The boats brought from Washington have been launched in the river at Berlin; the two floors have been fixed on the morning of the 17th, and form a double way—one being reserved for the troops, and the other for the wagons.

On that day the crossing commences at the same time upon the

pontons and the railroad bridge. On the 18th four corps are in Virginia: the Second and the Third near Harper's Ferry; the First and the Fifth, with Meade, at Lovettsville, opposite Berlin. Buford, who has crossed the river at this last place, has pushed forward east of the Blue Ridge as far as Purcellville. On the following day all the army has left Maryland. The three corps which have crossed at Harper's Ferry also cross the Shenandoah, and, following the base of Loudoun Mountain, have ranged themselves *en échelon* on the eastern slope of that mountain, from Hillsboro' to Woodgrove, at the foot of Snicker's Gap, which is occupied by a cavalry brigade. The remainder of the army is stationed a little more to the east, at the base of the western slope of the Catoctin, between Waterford, Hamilton, and Purcellville. Buford has pushed forward to Rector's Cross-roads, whence he can proceed to Ashby's Gap or occupy, a little farther on, the railroad and Manassas Gap. This movement is performed without Lee being able to detect it.

Stuart, after having forced Gregg to return to Harper's Ferry, intended to seize upon the passes of the Blue Ridge and to watch from there, as he had done a month before, the march of the enemy. But the waters of the Shenandoah have raised before him an insurmountable barrier. At length, on the 19th, Lee learns that all the Federal army has crossed the Potomac and already occupies Snicker's Gap, and seems to direct itself toward the south. He naturally comes to the conclusion that Meade, seeing himself covered by the rising of the Shenandoah, is rapidly ascending the right bank to cross Manassas or Chester Gap, and thus cut off the communications of the Confederate army with Richmond. The execution of this plan is as easy for Meade as it is dangerous for Lee. Therefore, Lee immediately takes the resolution to leave the banks of the Shenandoah for a position less exposed in the valley of the Rappahannock. Thus he will return near the point from which he started five weeks before with an army full of hopes and illusions: however, he will halt in the upper part of that valley, either sheltering himself with the principal branch or withdrawing behind the Rapidan; for, having the idea of soon again taking the offensive, he is not willing to go as far as Fredericksburg,

where the river would oppose to his movements an insuperable obstacle.

The Virginia Valley has been sufficiently described. The reader no doubt will remember that it is situated between the two parallel chains of North Mountain on the west and the Blue Ridge on the east. It is divided by its geographical configuration into two parts—one on the south, the other on the north, of Front Royal. In the first, the Shenandoah is formed of two branches separated by the foot-hill called Massanutten Mountain: the passes through the Blue Ridge which give access to the western branch—designated under the improper name of Southern branch—are Fisher's and Thornton's Gaps. In the second part the river, whose two branches are united, leaves on the left a large plain which extends as far as North Mountain, whilst it is bordering the western declivity of the other chain, passing successively at the foot of the passes of Chester, Manassas, Ashby's, and finally Snicker's Gap, which is the last before its confluence with the Potomac.

On the evening of the 19th, Longstreet is ordered to lead the first corps to Millwood, to cross the Shenandoah at Berry's Ford, and to take possession of Ashby's Gap: while master of this passage he will annoy the Federals on the other declivity of the mountain, and cover, as he had done before the invasion, the march of the remainder of the army. Whether he yields simply to the exigencies of the situation, or whether he does not wish to give the fiery Stuart the opportunity of going too far from the army, Lee divides his cavalry. Fitzhugh Lee and Chambliss march rapidly upon Front Royal in order to occupy Manassas and Chester Gaps before the Federals; Robertson will accompany the First corps; Baker and Jones will protect the rear-guard when ordered to march.

On the evening of the following day Longstreet arrives at Millwood, but the Shenandoah's waters are so high that he cannot cross his infantry; and on hearing that the Federals are already well established in Ashby's Gap, he decides to go up the river in order to reach Chester Gap as soon as possible, this being the crossing that all the army is to take in its march toward Culpeper, and which it is of importance, above all, to seize upon. The

route which the army will follow crosses the Shenandoah at Hand's Ford, a little below the confluence of its two branches: the engineers have been ordered, on the evening of the 19th, to build at that point a trestle bridge, because it has been necessary to leave at Falling Waters the roughly-prepared pontons on which they had crossed the Potomac. Longstreet depends on this bridge to reach Front Royal with ease. He proceeds to Hand's Ford, while assigning to General Benning's brigade the difficult task of crossing Berry's Ford and guarding Ashby's Gap. But the bridge is not completed, and the river does not appear fordable. However, Corse, who in the morning has taken the advance with his brigade, does not allow himself to be stopped by that obstacle, but makes his men cross the ford in spite of the violence of the stream, and, placing several batteries upon the right bank, immediately hastens his march on Chester Gap. The rest of Pickett's division, which is arriving with Longstreet, follows his example: the men, after having trusted their ammunition to a boat which carries it ashore, boldly throw themselves into the stream and soon re-form upon the Front Royal and Manassas Gap road. The railroad gives the last-named gap a great importance, and it is necessary at any price to close its entrance to the Federal infantry. Fortunately for the Confederates, this is still far off. The Shenandoah, which separates the two adversaries, prevents them from observing each other. Meade, astonished at not having fallen in with even a cavalry picket on the right bank, seems not to have guessed the natural cause of this absence, and to have imagined that Lee has remained near the Potomac in order to re-enter Maryland behind the Union army while it is pushing toward the south. This fanciful fear decides him to stop on the 21st the march of most of his corps and to slacken the progress of the others—a fatal resolution in a moment when, had he hastened, he could have fallen upon the flank of the long column of his enemy.

An unforeseen incident gives him, however, the chance of cutting this column in two, or at least of crushing its rear. In fact, the last corps which form it have been delayed in their march. After the return of the Confederates to Virginia on



the 15th of July, Halleck has ordered General Kelley to cross the rapid Potomac with all the forces which he is able to concentrate, in order to harass the right flank and rear of the enemy's army. Kelley has well performed his part. Crossing the river above the mouth of Back Creek, he has boldly marched on Martinsburg, and on the 19th he dislodges from the village of Hedgesville Baker's cavalry brigade, which covers the Southern army on that side. At this news, without countermanding the marching orders given to Longstreet, Lee forms the plan of surprising the little troop which seems to defy him by risking so near an approach. Ewell is charged with this expedition. On the evening of the 20th, Early's division marches by a very circuitous route to cut off the retreat of Kelley, who has halted at Hedgesville. On the 21st Ewell crosses North Mountain at Mill Gap, follows the course of Back Creek, and invests Hedgesville on the west and north, whilst Ewell is coming from Martinsburg with his two other divisions in order to attack the village in front. The Southern general believes that he has completely surrounded Kelley, but the latter is too well experienced in mountain-warfare to allow himself to be surprised in that manner: he has left a few hours before, and Ewell's march has been of no avail. It is not only a disappointment for the commander of the Second corps, but the consequences of this failure may be fatal to him, it being true that in war small operations are dangerous digressions.

It has made him lose, in fact, one day and a half, as we will soon see; and in consequence of this delay the Federals will come very near stopping his passage. He will make his escape, thanks only to the hesitations of their chief. On the morning of the 22d the Third corps, which takes the lead since the passage of the Potomac, is no farther than Upperville, near the foot of Ashby's Gap. The Twelfth and Second corps, which are following, are ranged *en échelon* at Snickersville and Woodgrove; the other column is disposed on a parallel line on the bank of Goose Creek between Middleburg and Mount Gilead. Buford, with Merritt's brigade, arrives on the 20th at Manassas Gap, in time to prevent Fitzhugh Lee from taking possession of it. But the latter precedes the Federals in the neighboring Chester Gap, and easily

keeps off Gamble's brigade, which arrives to occupy it soon after his arrival.

Meade, however, is not long undeceived. His scouts occupy at Ashby's Gap the crest of the Blue Ridge, and the officers of the signal corps inform him of the movements of the enemy's columns, which they see afar off, marching toward Front Royal. All the Confederate army is in motion: the three corps follow each other on the same route, having the distance of a halting-place between them. On the 21st, Hill has led the Third corps<sup>i</sup> from Bunker Hill to Winchester; on the 22d he marches to Front Royal, whilst Longstreet, having left this last village, marches toward Chester Gap; on the evening of the 21st, Ewell, with his two divisions, has returned to the village of Darks-ville, which he should have marched from in the morning, but he has left behind Early, who will not be able to leave Hedgesville until the following day: to give the latter time to join him Ewell will be obliged to stop at Winchester; finally, Benning's brigade, being sure that the Federals are not descending from Ashby's Gap, moves at the same hour on Manassas Gap along the Blue Ridge. Therefore, the Federal signal corps on the crest can take in at a glance the whole of the enemy's army unfolding itself at their feet. As soon as he has received its reports, Meade conceives the plan of cutting that long column in two by debouching upon its flank through the gorges of Manassas. Unfortunately, the recent interruption of his march deprives this operation of its best chance of success. Nevertheless, he does his utmost to make amends for that delay—so much the more as Buford, feeling himself seriously menaced, urgently asks him for help.

In fact, Corse has arrived in Chester Gap as Gamble is returning to dispute the possession of it with the Confederate cavalry, and his presence has compelled the Federals to make a rapid retreat. In the mean time, he has detached the Seventeenth Virginia in the direction of Manassas Gap. This regiment has been stopped by Buford at the entrance of the pass, but Pickett soon comes to its help, and his deployed infantry drives back the Union cavalry as far as the entrance. Manassas Gap is composed of a succession of gorges, not on the same line, which are open through as many parallel hills. The road and railroad wind side by

side from Springfield to the banks of the Shenandoah, passing on to Linden Station, and then to the confluence of the streams, beyond which the level of the hills is gradually lowering. On the evening of the 21st, Buford has brought back the main body of his force to Linden Station. Pickett occupies Wapping Heights, the most important of the numerous hills which compose the western slope of the Blue Ridge, and whence he commands the egress of the defile.

At last, at midnight, the bridge across the Shenandoah is completed. Hood's division, commanded by Law, as well as that of McLaws, crosses it immediately with the artillery and all the trains, and soon reaches Front Royal. Law goes to Wapping Heights, where Benning during the day will join Pickett's division, and the latter marches on and follows McLaws, who has taken the direct road to Chester Gap. These precautions, taken by Longstreet to cover the movement of his corps, are not useless, for the Union cavalry, returning once more to the charge, boldly attack it in both defiles. At Manassas, Merritt does not succeed, it is true, in dislodging Law from his position, and at Chester Gap Wofford's brigade repels still more promptly the assault of Gamble; but, while thus employing the Confederates, Buford prevents them from making their advance and seizing upon the passage, which will allow the Union infantry to come down to the banks of the Shenandoah.

It is the best service he can render to the Army of the Potomac, whose greater part is now marching to Manassas Gap. The Third corps continues the advance: leaving Upperville on the 22d, it arrives in the evening at Piedmont, where French leaves two divisions; then he follows the road with the third, that of Birney, commanded by Ward, and before midnight reaches Linden Station. On the same evening the Sixth corps has pushed on as far as Barbee's Cross-roads to observe Chester Gap and to prevent any offensive return of the enemy's troops, who have passed, as well as to cover French's rear. The Second and Twelfth corps, which are following the Third, are ranged *en échelon* at Upperville and Snickersville; the Fifth and the First are at Rectortown and White Plains on the Alexandria Railroad; the Eleventh is a little more to the rear, at Mountville. Therefore Meade can



begin the attack very early on the 23d, and concentrate before night four corps, the Third, Sixth, Second, and Fifth, in the Manassas gorges. The Confederates, being taken by surprise, cannot concentrate so rapidly, and it will be sufficient to occupy Front Royal to separate their force into two parts. The promptness with which Meade's orders have been executed on the 22d is of good omen for the operations of the following day.

But the hope of the commander-in-chief is not realized. The Third corps, which alone on the 23d is within reach of the enemy, has within a few days lost its chief and the two division commanders who had bravely led them in several battles. The gallant Sickles has been replaced by General French, one of the old regulars, grown gray in the service, and almost worn out, of a slow and exacting mind, and having in his favor no important military exploit; sickness has forced Birney to leave his division, and Humphreys has left his for the staff. Finally, recruits who have arrived from Washington demand the removal of their commander, a recently-improvised general; and it has been foolishly conceived, in order to take him away from them, to place him at the head of one of the oldest and best brigades of the Army of the Potomac, to the detriment of colonels who have shared its dangers at Gettysburg. In the presence of a corps in which the command is so disorganized the Confederates will be able to easily evade the blow which Meade desires to strike.

The march of the Southern army southward is as regular as it is rapid. On the evening of the 22d, Hill's corps has arrived at Front Royal, where it bivouacs. Benning has joined Law on the slopes of Wapping Heights. The latter has immediately left that position to the care of the former in order to reinforce Longstreet with the remainder of his division by a night-march, before the Third corps has encumbered the Chester Gap road. Day dawns, and the morning is being spent without the enemy making his appearance in front of Benning at Wapping Heights. At nine o'clock he in his turn is relieved by Colonel Walker with a brigade detached from Hill's corps. This corps, having made a long march, already ascends the eastern slopes of Chester Gap, where Benning will soon rejoin it.

Those first hours of the day, so precious to the Federals, have



been occupied by French in making insignificant reconnoissances. Having only a single division, he is perhaps waiting for the two others to cross the defile: the latter, which have been travelling over ten miles from Piedmont, arrive at nine o'clock; and at last he decides to move, but only with great caution. Birney's division, under Ward, moves forward in line of battle. The uneven ground renders its march slow and difficult: however, its left makes at length its appearance before Wapping Heights, occupied by Walker's skirmishers.

The position of the latter, alone with six hundred men, and having before him a whole corps, seems singularly critical. Fortunately for him, the reinforcements come opportunely, thanks to the regularity which characterizes all the movements of the various Confederate corps. Ewell, having started very early, arrives at the moment with Rodes' division to mask the Manassas gorges, while the remainder of his corps will follow the route to Chester Gap. He sees the danger at a glance. Walker, feeling himself too much exposed on Wapping Heights, has left there only a line of skirmishers, and has deployed his brigade on a hill less elevated, it is true, but also less extended and very steep, which is situated more to the west. Ewell sends immediately two hundred and fifty men to reinforce him, and forms the remainder of Rodes' division in a position still more to the rear: he deploys a whole brigade as skirmishers to cover his front, and awaits the attack of the Federals. He has well estimated their forces, and guessed the concentration which Meade is making behind the line of the Blue Ridge. Therefore, he understands that he can no longer think of following the remainder of the army through Chester Gap. His resolution has been immediately taken. Johnson remains with his division at Front Royal, in order to watch the ford where the Strasburg road crosses the south branch of the Shenandoah, and the road to Milford, which runs along the right bank of that stream. This last route will be taken at night by the divisions to reach Thornton Gap. As long as daylight lasts the enemy will be prevented, at any cost, from debouching into the valley. Early, who is too far off to arrive in time, and would run the risk of being cut off, will move on Strasburg with the trains, to follow in the shelter of Massanutten

Mountain the course of the north branch of the Shenandoah, this being a considerable but necessary détour.

The Federals have thus lost the opportunity of crushing Walker's brigade when it was isolated. While Ewell is making his dispositions, Ward has easily taken possession of Wapping Heights. But, instead of availing himself of this slight advantage, French, who sees the enemy's train lengthening itself in the direction of Strasburg, is hesitating anew. The line of Ward's division being broken by the march, he re-forms it on the left to avert an imaginary danger, and pushes forward the Second division under the command of General Prince, who is Humphreys' successor. When at length he moves forward the day is already far spent, and he still retards Prince's march by the exaggerated importance he gives to his skirmishing lines. Reaching the strong position of Walker, the Federals engage him with musketry, which, despite its being brisk, cannot be of any avail. French at length has had the Excelsior brigade formed into an attacking column. This experienced body is commanded by General Spinola, a new-comer, who follows more than he directs his soldiers; but the latter, knowing their profession, vigorously attack and dislodge the enemy. The losses are serious on both sides. Spinola has bravely redeemed his inexperience by two wounds. Walker has also been wounded, and all the superior officers of his brigade are *hors de combat*, as well as a seventh part of his effective force.

The day is on the decline. French, however, can still avail himself of his advantage. If he promptly debouches into the plain, the Fifth corps, which is deployed behind him, the Sixth, which is disposing itself in masses in the defile, will support him; similar forces will soon easily have the best of Rodes, throw him back to the Shenandoah, and close the valleys of both Milford and of Luray against the whole of Ewell's corps. They will then find it easy to precede him to Port Republic, and the Federals will perhaps obliterate on the battlefield of Cross Keys the sad souvenirs left there by Fremont in the preceding year. A prompt and vigorous action would be necessary; and yet French will engage only a brigade. He is uselessly feeling the position of O'Neal's skirmishers, and is overtaken by night before he has made an attack upon them.

Two Confederate brigades have thus detained a Federal corps during a whole day, at a cost of less than a hundred men killed and wounded. The Southern army has been pushing forward, whilst the Union troops were uselessly forming into masses in the Manassas gorges: before the end of the day the Fifth, and then the Sixth corps, have gone beyond Linden Station. Meade, who has committed the fault of not being present at this first essay of his new lieutenant, arrives too late to redeem his remissness. He does not even appear to have stimulated him, and therefore must share the responsibility of his fault. On the evening of the 23d he has three corps in the defile and two others within supporting-distance, and he trusts on the following day to attack with these forces the enemy's army, believing that it is still in large numbers on the north of Front Royal. He fancies that a single Confederate corps has passed through Chester Gap, and comes to the conclusion that the two others will not be able to escape him during the night without leaving this one exposed to the greatest dangers.

Our readers have foreseen the bitter deception which is in store for him. On the morning of the 24th, Longstreet and Hill are already on the south-eastern slope of the Blue Ridge, and pushing forward: they are to encamp, the first at Culpeper Courthouse, the second at Newby's Cross-roads. During the Wapping Heights combat Early has received, at Cedarville, the orders of his chief, and has marched toward Strasburg. Finally, Ewell at the close of the day has brought both Rodes' division and Walker's brigade back to Front Royal, where he has reinforced Johnson. After having allowed his troops to rest near that town, on the 24th, at daybreak, he begins his march toward Luray. When, at the same hour, Meade marches toward Front Royal, looking for the enemy, whom he believes entirely in his power, he finds no one. Lee has escaped him, and he can no longer meet him in the Virginia Valley. The brilliant operation, the idea of which he has conceived from the plan formed by McClellan the preceding year, has utterly failed, not having been executed at the right moment. Nothing remains for him but to look for a suitable position for a new campaign. Warrenton Junction is the only point around which he can concentrate and supply his



army. While turning his back to Lee's army he marches the troops he has near him toward the south-east, between the Blue Ridge and Bull Run Mountain. After having stationed them on the Manassas Gap Railroad, they reach Warrenton Junction on the 25th and 26th.

In the mean time, the Confederate army was completing its movement. Longstreet, coming down from Chester Gap to Flint Hill, and reaching from that place Newby's Cross-roads, arrived on the 24th at Culpeper. The march of the Third corps, which was following him on the same route, was to be, it seemed, more dangerous, for on the evening of the 22d, Sedgwick, bivouacking at Barbee's Cross-roads, was only seven miles and a half from that road, and Flint Hill was much more exposed than Front Royal to the blows of the enemy. Hill, fortunately, did not encounter the Federal cavalry. The latter, to cover the right flank of its marching army, had from the 24th strongly occupied the route from Barbee's Cross-roads to Waterloo.

While Buford was halting at Barbee's Cross-roads the two brigades which had been occupying Warrenton for a few days had come forward on the road to Thornton's Gap as far as Waterloo and Amissville. On learning in this village that one of the enemy's columns is within reach, the Federals move with a few guns to Newby's Cross-roads, where that column is to cross Thornton's River, an affluent of the Rappahanock. But they are too feeble to dispute the crossing, being held in check by Walker's brigade of Heth's division; then, attacked by that of Mahone, they fall back at the moment when Benning, who has crossed before their arrival, returns to flank them. On the morrow Hill joins Longstreet at Culpeper.

Foreseeing that he could not maintain himself long in that position, Lee ordered Ewell, who by short marches was coming from Luray, to push on directly to Madison Court-house, seventeen miles from Culpeper, behind the principal branch of the Rapidan, called Robertson's River. The three divisions of the Second corps were assembled in this town on the 29th, but Early, pushing on, went to occupy Orange Court-house on the south of the Rapidan, which in case of a retreat was to become the base of the army's operations.



## CHAPTER II.

### BRISTOE STATION.

AFTER fifty days' marching and fighting, the campaign which commenced on the 11th of June was at last brought to a close. The two adversaries, after having during all that time kept, as two wrestlers, in a close grapple, at last separated, returning very near to their respective starting-points to take breath. But this repose could not last long. The Federals, having the offensive, were compelled to keep it; they could either directly attack the Confederates at Culpeper or renew, with better chances of success, Burnside's march on Fredericksburg. But the New York riots, which we will relate in the next volume, had occasioned a profound sensation in the North. Far from sending reinforcements to Meade, the Federal government, compelled to concentrate a considerable number of troops in the large cities, was inclined to ask him for some, and he received on the 30th of July the order to limit himself to annoying his adversary by threatening demonstrations.

This order was executed with success. On the 1st of August Buford crossed the Rappahannock with his cavalry and advanced toward Culpeper, pushing before him Baker's Confederate brigade, which had vainly tried to stop him. Anderson's division, sent by Lee, encountered him on the west of Brandy Station. Buford, after a lively skirmish, fell back on the Rappahannock, and crossed it again shortly after. But this demonstration was sufficient to determine Lee to leave Culpeper—a poor situation for a defensive rôle, to which he was again reduced, for, although much exposed, it covered neither Chancellorsville nor Fredericksburg. On the 2d of August he brought back his army behind the Rapidan, the cavalry being left on the Rappahannock to watch the Federals.

The latter felt but little inclined to attack. The regiments raised for nine months in the preceding year had been mustered out; the growing rate of bounties was retarding the enlistments, many waiting in the hope that the rise would continue. The operations of the conscription, interrupted for a while, had just been resumed. They had not yet given any result; on the contrary, they had weakened the active army, a great display of forces being necessary to protect them in the large cities. Gordon's division of the Eleventh corps embarked on the 6th of August at Alexandria for New York; all the other corps furnished important detachments for the same service.\* The system of breaking up the army, which had been abandoned at the hour of greatest peril, was gradually regaining favor: a division was taken from the Army of the Potomac and despatched to South Carolina. The cavalry, which had suffered greatly in the last campaign, repaired successively by brigades to Washington to recuperate and supply themselves. Finally, numerous leaves of absence were granted, both to the officers and soldiers of all arms. The army itself, encamped under the beautiful shades of the green foliage of the Virginia forests, enjoyed in this warm season the beneficent repose which circumstances were allowing it. Therefore, during the whole month of August we have to signalize only an insignificant affair. It was, strange to say, a combined expedition of the navy and the cavalry. The Confederates having fallen unexpectedly upon two vessels in Chesapeake Bay, had hid them in the winding stream of the lower Rappahannock. Kilpatrick's division, then under the command of Custer, came to occupy the right bank of the river and cover two Union gunboats sent in quest of the Confederates. The Second corps, for a short time under the command of the gallant General Warren, marched to Falmouth to support the movement. The two vessels and crews were surprised at Port Conway by Custer and destroyed with artillery; but that insignificant result was not worth the risk run by the cavalry and the

\* Gordon's division went to reinforce General Gillmore in the operations against Charleston, S. C. Later in the month about ten thousand men, selected from the various corps, under Generals Ayres and Ruger, were sent to New York.—ED.

fatigue imposed on a whole army corps. The first part of the month of September also passed tranquilly. Meade was waiting the return of the troops sent to the North and the arrival of the new recruits, when he was suddenly roused from his inaction by unexpected news.

That inaction had been a very fortunate occurrence for the Confederate army. It had returned to the banks of the Rapidan, very proud, no doubt, of the manner in which it had been fighting, but it had lost the illusions which until then it had cherished of the facilities and results of an invasion of the free States. The reaction of the public feeling in the Southern States had been very bitter, and Lee's brave soldiers wrongly thought that in the expression of that sentiment there was a blame which they did not deserve. Their commander, it appears, did not share the disappointment of his fellow-citizens. After Chancellorsville he had not approved of their joy and confidence. It was an unfruitful battle, said he, where his army had suffered irretrievable losses, and which did not prevent his adversaries from re-forming themselves quietly before his own eyes in order to look for a new opportunity of attacking him. On the contrary, the invasion of Pennsylvania, and the shocks which the Army of the Potomac had received at Gettysburg, had made, according to his mind, an impression on the Federals which was to prevent them from seriously disturbing him for several months. He was right. However, he had scarcely arrived at Orange Court-house on the 8th of August when he deemed it incumbent upon himself to offer his resignation to President Davis in a letter full of dignity and modesty. This was of course laid aside and concealed with care from the public: the Army of Northern Virginia was not even to know that their illustrious commander might have left it. When assured by the reports of his scouts that the Federals were preparing no offensive movement, Lee granted numerous leaves of absence to the soldiers who had just made with him such an arduous campaign. By an order of the 16th of August leaves of absence for fifteen or thirty days, according to the States to which they belonged, were granted as a reward in the proportion of twenty-four per cent. of the number of men on the rolls and in active service.

But, great events were about to take place in the West. The Confederate government was secretly concentrating, under the command of Braxton Bragg, all the forces which could be disposed of. To Jefferson Davis' favorite was reserved the task of redeeming Lee's defeat and the disaster of Pemberton. To provide him with the necessary means the law of the 15th of July, calling under arms all the inhabitants of the Confederacy between eighteen and forty-five years of age, was not sufficient. It was resolved in the first days of September that Longstreet's corps should go by railway to reinforce Bragg's army: his arrival was to mark the opening of the campaign which we will relate in the next volume. He left a day or two before the 10th, and the Army of Northern Virginia was thus reduced to 37,806 men in active service, not including the cavalry.

Meade receives the news of Longstreet's departure on the 11th of September. He resolves to take the offensive, even without asking the consent of Halleck. But his forces are scattered, and must be called together. The cavalry, which is to precede the army in its march toward the Rapidan, is compelled to wait for Kilpatrick. The latter leaves the neighborhood of Falmouth on the morning of the 12th, and early on the following day the Federal cavalry presents itself before the principal fords of the upper Rappahannock—Kilpatrick, on the left, at Kelly's Ford; Buford, in the centre, at Rappahannock Bridge; Gregg, on the right, at Sulphur Springs. The Second corps is marching forward to support them on the road taken by Buford. The remainder of the army is to move forward as soon as the position of the enemy is better known.

On that long line the Southerners have only two cavalry brigades, those of Jones and W. H. F. Lee, commanded by General Lomax and Colonel Beale, with a battery of artillery. The river is guarded only by pickets, the main body of the troops being at Culpeper. Warned on the evening of the 12th, Lomax has all the stores collected in that town withdrawn, and on the morning of the 13th he sends reconnoitring detachments on the various roads from Culpeper. The latter are soon repelled on all sides. Buford has reached Brandy Station; Gregg comes to join his right, and soon after Kilpatrick appears on the left.



The three divisions are marching in line of battle through a country known by all as a manœuvring-ground—for they have been fighting on it several times this year—and are pushing before them the Confederate cavalry. Thus they arrive in sight of Culpeper, where Lomax, supported by his battery, is strongly posted awaiting them, being determined to win the necessary time to complete the evacuation of the dépôts. While on his front a simple pretence of attack is maintained, Kilpatrick extends his command on the left to cut off his retreat. At a given signal the Federal line moves forward; the Confederates are driven back to the village in the greatest confusion. Kilpatrick springs forward to attack them from the opposite direction and capture a train which is leaving the station, but he is stopped by an impassable ditch. Before he is able to pass it the Southern cavalry, leaving three pieces of artillery in the hands of their assailants, have reached the Orange road. Custer presses them closely, and takes a great number of prisoners, but he is himself wounded. A prompt retreat assures the safety of the two Confederate brigades. On the following day the Unionists were occupying the whole country from the Rappahannock to the Rapidan: Buford, on the left, was on Robertson's River; Kilpatrick, on the right, toward James City; Gregg, in the rear, at Rappahannock Station.\*

A few days after, the railway bridge having been repaired, Meade concentrated his army in the neighborhood of Culpeper, which became the central dépôt of supplies. He halted in that position, for, on the 15th, Halleck had recommended him not to attack Lee on the Rapidan: the storm which was brewing in the West could no longer be averted, and the government, in order to concentrate all its resources in that quarter, did not wish the Army of the Potomac to fight a battle which might necessitate its reinforcement on the morning after the struggle. It would have been better, perhaps, to adopt a bolder plan—to sacrifice for a time Tennessee and Kentucky, to bring back Rose-

\* A slight misapprehension has crept into the text. Gregg drove the enemy to, through, and beyond Culpeper, followed him to Rapidan Station, and held the line at and near that point until relieved by the infantry on the 17th. Buford took position lower down the Rapidan.—Ed.

crans' army to the Ohio, and to take advantage of Lee's weakness to crush him before the end of the summer season by a decisive blow. But that audacity did not suit the military authorities at Washington, and therefore their prudence was justified. In fact, on the 20th of September the united forces of Bragg and Longstreet were inflicting on Rosecrans a signal defeat. Hardly had the first details of the battle of Chickamauga become known than, on the 23d, Halleck was ordering Meade to detach from his army and despatch to Washington the Eleventh and Twelfth corps with their artillery: Hooker was to command them and go to the prompt assistance of the Federal armies of the West. Halleck's order was received by Meade just at the moment when he had matured a plan for crossing the Rapidan. He at once suspended the projected offensive movement, and ordered the troops required of him to march without delay.

This departure settled again the former proportion between the forces of the two armies. On both sides they were going to try to make up for their weakness by recalling the absent, and completing by new recruits the effective force of the old regiments. From the 10th to the 20th of September the number of officers and soldiers present under arms in the Confederate army had received an addition of exactly nine thousand men. The Federal ranks were being filled up more slowly: the recruits were to serve an apprenticeship of a certain time before being placed before the enemy. In short, at the commencement of October about two-thirds of the troops sent to the North had returned, and Meade, finding himself at the head of seventy-four thousand men, of whom sixty-eight thousand were able to march, thought the moment had come to take the field again: the season being still favorable, it was necessary to take advantage of it. Unforeseen news came to hasten his resolution. His signal corps, posted on the summit of Cedar Mountain, had on the 7th of October observed and read the enemy's signals: the Confederate army was preparing for new operations. The reports of the spies also showed that the enemy was marching toward the south-west. In fact, by a singular coincidence, at the very moment when Meade had resolved upon action, Lee was preparing, not to retreat, but to take the offensive. A change of

position by the Second Federal corps had encouraged him, it is said, by making him believe that another detachment was leaving the Army of the Potomac for the West.

Lee has commenced his movement before Meade. He assigns a double task to his cavalry, which has just been divided into two divisions, under Generals Fitzhugh Lee and Hampton. On the 8th of October, while the former remains on the Rapidan with some infantry to mask the departure of the army, Stuart concentrates Hampton's division at Madison Court-house. He will precede the infantry and cover their right in the flank march which they are undertaking. The Southern general, not forgetting that the pure defensive leads infallibly to defeat, resumes the aggressive strategy in which he has before so well succeeded, and returns nearly to the plan already followed in August, 1862. But finding, no doubt, that his adversary guards himself better than Pope on the Rapidan, he will turn him by crossing Robertson's River near its source to gain access to Culpeper by the north-west. In order to conceal this movement, Hill at the front and Ewell in his rear have directed their march toward the south-east, and will make a wide *détour* to reach Madison Court-house. They will separate at that point: Hill will pass on the north of Culpeper, whilst Ewell will march directly on that town through James City. Lee hopes to take the Union army by surprise and compel it to fight an offensive battle to regain its communications.

The position of the Federals seems to justify that hope: the Second and Fifth corps are at Culpeper, the Third three miles to the north-east of Griffinsburg, the First and Sixth, which are watching the Rapidan at Cedar Mountain and Raccoon Ford, are about six miles from each other and ten miles from the remainder of the army. Meade believes his adversary has retreated: learning on the morning of the 9th that he has withdrawn the pickets posted along the Rapidan, he resolves to seek him beyond that river. Buford will proceed on the same day to Germanna Ford with his cavalry, cross the Rapidan on the following day, and ascend the right bank to assure to the infantry the passage of the upper fords. Newton, with the First corps, will cross one of these fords; the Sixth corps will move



from Cedar Mountain, and the Fifth from Culpeper, to take position within supporting-distance of him. That plan was deficient in being too bold in conception and too prudent in execution. While Meade was despatching orders his signal corps was signalling to him of the numerous bivouac-fires in the direction of Madison, and had intercepted a despatch from Stuart revealing his presence on the right flank of the Federals. There was, then, a great uncertainty as to Lee's designs: the best means to unravel them was perhaps to promptly cross the Rapidan with almost all the army, to outstrip and baffle the enemy. But by dividing his forces Meade was playing into his adversary's hands: nothing was more perilous than slowness at such a moment.

On the evening of the 9th detachments from Hampton's division, crossing Robertson's River, drive in Custer's outposts toward James City, and Meade learns that the enemy is apparently making a movement on his right. In fact, during the day all the Confederate army has crossed the upper Rapidan, and, turning to the north, has been marching toward Madison. Its march has been very slow, because Lee has made his troops follow unfrequented roads. Nevertheless, his army early on the 10th is so placed that it can easily outflank the Federals' right. Although since morning Meade is positively informed of the presence of the enemy at Madison, he persists in his first design: he is persuaded that Stuart's movement against his right is only a feint to mask the retreat of the Confederate army. The First corps will come down the Rapidan as far as Morton's Ford—an excellent ford—which it will cross to join Buford coming from Germanna Ford; then he will come up as far as Raccoon Ford, where the Sixth corps will wait for him, to cross in its turn.

While the Federals are thus tardily and slowly employing themselves the enemy is vigorously executing the movement prepared the day before. At daybreak Stuart crosses Robertson's River with the whole of Hampton's division: his right moves forward with circumspection between Thoroughfare and Cedar Mountains against Custer, who, being ordered not to open the battle, gradually falls back before it. The main body of the division follows the James City road, which ascends the northern extremity of



Thoroughfare Mountain. Kilpatrick awaits the enemy in that position with his second brigade, which Colonel Davis commands since the death of Farnsworth; General Prince, who, with a division of the Third corps, is encamped between Griffinsburg and James City, sends him the One-hundred-and-twentieth New York. But this reinforcement of less than three hundred men is not sufficient to enable Kilpatrick to cope with the forces of the Confederates. The Union troopers have dismounted and formed as skirmishers, with the infantry on the slopes of the hill. While Stuart makes Gordon's brigade, also on foot, confront them, he places himself at the head of Young's cavalry, and, making a *détour*, arrives on their flank at a gallop. The soldiers of the One-hundred-and-twentieth New York are the first exposed to his blows: almost all the regiment falls into his hands. The Union cavalry rapidly retreats to James City, closely pursued by Stuart. Kilpatrick, to retard the pursuit, brings forward his reserves, and a charge of the Fifth New York and Fifth Michigan succeeds in setting free a large number of the prisoners. Despite a new reinforcement brought by Prince, the Federals are overmatched. Pleasanton orders Kilpatrick to cover Prince's retreat by falling back slowly on the Second and Third corps, stationed on the west of Culpeper, and orders Custer to join him at James City. But Stuart is already within sight of this village, and throws shells into it; Pleasanton evacuates it, and brings Davis back to Bethel Church. Custer, who about three o'clock arrives from the south, finds his adversaries established at James City, and after an unsuccessful attempt to dislodge them goes to join Kilpatrick at Bethel. The Confederate troopers who had attacked him in the morning have availed themselves of his departure to occupy Cedar Mountain. At Bethel, Kilpatrick, reinforced by the remainder of Prince's troops, prepares to resist, but Stuart, whose mission is simply to cover Lee's right, is waiting for night at James City. However, the news of the engagement at Thoroughfare Mountain has reached Meade's head-quarters about noon: Hill's movement, being signalled on the road from Madison to Sperryville, cannot leave him in any doubt. The question is no longer to pursue the retreat of the enemy, but to avert the blow which Lee is preparing to strike

at the Army of the Potomac. The three corps which were marching toward the Rapidan are immediately recalled to Culpeper. Sedgwick and Newton, being informed in time, retrace their steps. But Buford has already passed Germanna Ford: at Morton's Ford he of course does not find the troops which he was to join, and while he is awaiting them he is vigorously attacked by Fitzhugh Lee. The latter, hoping to conceal still longer the movement of the Southern army, will not allow the Federals to reconnoitre the right bank of the Rapidan. Calling together his division, much superior in numbers to that of Buford, he compels him to return to the other bank, and after an engagement which costs him dearly he forces open to his followers the passage of the ford. Night, fortunately for the Federals, soon comes to stop him.

During that day the Confederate infantry has been executing the movement which we have before indicated. Whilst Ewell, leaving the banks of the Rapidan, reaches Madison, Hill, who has been camping near this town, has moved toward the north, as though he intended to reach Thornton's Gap and the Virginia Valley by way of Sperryville: he has crossed Robertson's River, and is already as far as Griffinsburg. Lee hopes that the following day will not pass without his forcing Meade to give him battle before Culpeper. That hope was to be deceived. On the evening of the 10th some officers were urging the Union general to move upon his adversary at Madison, and, if the latter was continuing his march, to boldly pursue him. This plan offered some chance of success, but was perilous. Meade, always dreading an offensive battle, preferred retreating beyond the Rapahannock while it was yet practicable. The army was immediately ordered to recross that river early on the following day, the 11th; it was still to fall back on the third day to place itself between the village of Warrenton and Warrenton Junction. In that position, which he hoped to reach before Lee, since he could follow the chord of the arc which his adversary had to describe, Meade was covering his double line of communication—the railway from Orange to Manassas Junction and the main road from Warrenton to Alexandria: on these two parallel roads he intended to resolutely await the Confederates' attack.

All the Federal infantry, being assembled in the neighborhood of Culpeper on the morning of the 11th, easily reached the Rappahannock during the day without encountering the enemy, who, believing them still near the Rapidan, was completing his movement on the north-west of Culpeper. But it was not so with the Union cavalry, which was compelled to bear the burden of conflict in covering the retreat.

Gregg's division, called from Bealeton Station on the morning of the 10th, had arrived at four o'clock at Culpeper. Pleasanton had, then, his three divisions to accomplish that hard task, but that of Buford was on the Rapidan in a very hazardous position. Whilst Meade, following the main body of his army, leaves Culpeper about noon, Pleasanton concentrates in that village Kilpatrick's division to prevent Stuart outstripping Buford on the Rappahannock, and sends Gregg to Rixeyville, on Hazel River, to cover on the north the flank of the army.

At daybreak Stuart, finding no one before him at James City, has ordered Hampton's division to march forward through Bethel Church to Griffinsburg. At this latter place he encounters Custer's cavalry, which is falling back on Culpeper. For his part, Fitzhugh Lee from the break of day follows Buford closely, who, at last apprised of Meade's movement, has taken the road to Stevensburg in order to join him. This route will lead him to Brandy Station on the east of Culpeper. Hampton, however, comes in sight of this village, which on his approach is evacuated by Kilpatrick. A little farther on the Federals pretend to stop on the left bank of Mountain Run. Two squadrons of the Second New York, crossing the brook again, rush on Gordon's Southern brigade to retard its march; Captain Griggs is killed at their head. But the noise of the guns of Fitzhugh Lee, who is approaching behind them, warns the Federals that the enemy is going to outstrip them in reaching Brandy Station.

Stuart, for his part, will not allow them to entirely escape from him. As soon as he perceives them marching forward he finds out their design and endeavors to detain them. Hampton's division, taking the full trot, follows on the north of the railway a route parallel to the road on which Kilpatrick's



column is rapidly moving. Having arrived within reach of that column, Stuart sends two regiments of Jones' brigade against its left flank. The critical moment has arrived for the Federals: they will have to fight on all sides at the same time. In fact, Fitzhugh Lee is approaching the railway from the south. He has kept on the left with the main body of his division, in the hope of joining Hampton near Culpeper, and thus falls, by chance, on the right of the Federals. One of his brigades, following the direct route, reaches their line of retreat, and, dismounting, it lines with troops a rising ground which lies across the railway. Kilpatrick, whom Pleasonton leaves entirely free in the command of his division, is preparing to confront all these enemies. He has not a moment to lose to fight them separately. He sends the Second New York against Jones' two regiments, which are going to attack his left. This valiant regiment, encountering the Confederate column in a narrow passage, overthrows the first squadron and pushes the others back in the greatest confusion on the remainder of the brigade, behind which they find it hard to rally. Hampton is compelled to halt. But in that instant Fitzhugh Lee's guns open fire on the right flank of Kilpatrick. The latter, instead of answering, leaves before them a few regiments in close line, and directs his artillery to continue moving with the remainder of the division. The object is, in fact, not to give a pitched battle, but to reach Brandy Station as promptly as possible. The Federals thus approach the position of the enemy's force which obstructs their way. Kilpatrick has deployed his two brigades in line of regiments in columns of squadrons—Davis on the right, Custer on the left, holding his flag in his own hand. The charge is sounded. Three thousand sabres are glittering in the sun, but the Federals find no enemy before them. The Confederate brigade, feeling that it could not resist them, has gone aside to leave the passage free. However, Hampton and Lee are pushing before them the Union rear-guard and endeavoring again to surround Kilpatrick. Buford fortunately comes, in his turn, to take part in the battle, which, thus engaged on all sides at the same time, becomes a real *mêlée*. Clouds of dust soon envelop the combatants. Gordon's and Young's brigades are pressing the Federals on the north of



the railway; the brigade of Jones charges them near the road; Fitzhugh Lee, who has called all his forces together, attacks them on the south. But Pleasonton re-forms his two divisions, shaken for a while, and repelling, right and left, the assaults of Stuart, reaches the hill of Fleetwood, and there firmly waits a new assault. The Confederates do not go after him, and, thanks to the obscurity, he is soon able to reach again, without any trouble, the Rappahannock bridge. During that struggle, Lee, observing that Meade is escaping him, makes his columns converge upon Culpeper; but when the most part of his forces is assembled in the neighborhood of this village the sound of the cannon, getting fainter, informs him that the Army of the Potomac has outstripped him. Despite his wish to follow it, he is obliged to halt all the afternoon at Culpeper to give time to distribute rations to the various corps—a necessary precaution in the exhausted country which he is crossing. It is only on the morning of the 12th that he will be able to order his columns forward, so as to renew the manœuvre which he has just been performing. He will pass the upper Rappahannock as he has just crossed the Rapidan, and will still endeavor to outflank Meade's right. His objective point is Warrenton: if he reaches it without striking a blow, he will compel his adversary, while leaving the large railroad bridge at Rappahannock Station, either to fall back farther or give that offensive battle which they both seek to avoid.

Meade is in a suitable position to receive him at this time. All his army is stationed behind the Rappahannock, from Kelly's Ford on the south to Freeman's Ford on the north. This last ford is situated near the confluence of Hazel River and Hedge-man's River; the Third corps, which forms the rear-guard, occupies it rather late in the night after having passed the Rappahannock at Beverly Ford. But, through an unhappy inspiration, the Union general loses all the advantages of this situation. The vigor of Stuart's attack on Pleasonton and the clouds of dust which have been observed make him suppose, with reason, that the most part of the enemy's army is assembled at Culpeper. He wishes to be sure of it, believing, wrongly, that they will expect him there the following day; and, not daring to trust

that task to the cavalry alone after the fight which they have just had, he takes the resolution to recross the Rappahannock with three corps and Buford's division; that is to say, with about thirty thousand men.

The Second, Fifth, and Sixth corps will undertake this movement on the 12th at daybreak; the two others will remain on the Rappahannock—the Third on the right, the First on the left. Finally, Gregg is ordered to proceed to Rixeyville beyond Sulphur Springs, where he arrives at nine o'clock in the evening. He is to guard the crossings of Hedgeman's River and to watch with care the road from Culpeper to Warrenton through Jefferson—a very important mission, for this is the route which the enemy's army will follow if it attempts a new turning movement.

On the morning of the 12th the three Federal corps cross the river; the Fifth remains near Beverly Ford in readiness to support, in case of a retreat, the two others, which are advancing in the direction of Culpeper. Buford is reconnoitring, and covers the front of the infantry, which on this unprotected ground has a deployment of more than three miles. The two corps are thus marching in line of battle, flanked right and left by battalions *en échelon*: a strong reserve follows the centre of each. It was, we believe, the first time in this war that the Federals were, with so large a force, manœuvring as if on the drill-ground.

The movement is badly chosen, for Lee, whom they look for in vain at Culpeper, endeavors meanwhile to outflank their right. From daybreak his army is making its way in two columns: Hill, on the left, is marching from Griffinsburg to Amissville; Ewell, following on the right a parallel direction, takes the road from Culpeper to Warrenton, which crosses Hazel River at Rixeyville and Hedgeman's River at Sulphur Springs; Stuart crosses it before him with the main body of his cavalry. Since the preceding day one of his regiments, the Eleventh Virginia, has been pushing on as far as the village of Jefferson, in which place Gregg, while falling back, has left a strong rear-guard, the Thirteenth Pennsylvania.

The Union general has sent another regiment, the First Maine, to Amissville. These troops are thus watching the two

routes followed by the enemy. He again crosses Hedgeman's River on the morning of the 12th, and, remaining at Sulphur Springs with a single brigade, sends Colonel Taylor with the other to scout the country toward Warrenton. All necessary precautions seem to be taken to learn if Lee is endeavoring to turn the Federal right wing, but neither Gregg nor Meade is promptly informed of the fact. These precautions will be of no use, however, owing to a singular concurrence of fortuitous circumstances and culpable negligence.

In the first place, the First Maine, coming back from Amissville in the night, falls unexpectedly near Jefferson on the outposts of the Eleventh Virginia. Dreading some ambush, the former falls back on Little Washington, and thus it cannot give any information to Gregg, from whom it will be separated for several days. The Thirteenth Pennsylvania, attacked in its turn on the morning of the 12th, repels all the assaults of the Eleventh Virginia, but its commander neglects to inform Gregg of the enemy's presence. At length, about ten o'clock, Stuart makes his appearance before Jefferson with the whole of Jones' brigade, commanded by Colonel Funsten, and the Federals are promptly dislodged. They fall back slowly, fighting on foot, and their stubborn resistance retards Stuart's march; but they cannot inform Gregg of their retreat, for a part of the Southern cavalry, flanking them, threatens to cut them off. The Thirteenth Pennsylvania thus arrives, still fighting, near Hedgeman's River. A small wood spreads itself on the right bank at a distance of three hundred and fifty yards from Thompson's Ford: the Federals take advantage of its shelter to cope with their adversaries. Gregg, at last informed of the danger which threatens him, has hastily recalled Taylor, and orders the Tenth New York to cross the river to rescue the Pennsylvanians. This reinforcement arrives when the Federals, dislodged from the wood and closely followed by the enemy, are debouching on the declivity which leads to Thompson's Ford. It stops Stuart and retakes possession of the wood. But the Confederates have still an immense numerical superiority. The two Union regiments are driven back upon the river. They look in vain for a rallying-place near the ford, and cross it in disorder, leaving behind them a large num-



ber of prisoners. Gregg cannot rescue them, but their resistance has given him time to make some dispositions for defending the crossing of the river.

Stuart not daring to attempt this crossing without the support of the infantry, a few hours elapse, during which, by some oversight, Gregg does not think of sending a single despatch to Meade to inform him of the situation. At last, Ewell arrives with the head of his column and a part of his artillery. The latter shell the left bank; the infantry cross the stream after the cavalry, henceforth assured of a strong support. Hedgeman's River is crossed, and the bridge at Thompson's Ford promptly repaired, despite the efforts of Gregg. Instead of yielding the place to the enemy, this gallant officer continues fighting stubbornly: his troops are almost decimated around him, and at last are forced back upon Fayetteville, after having lost more than five hundred of their number. A part of his force has been cut off, and cannot rejoin him until the following day. However, night has come. Ewell stops at Sulphur Springs, and Stuart pushes on in the direction of Warrenton. Hill, for his part, has arrived near Amissville. The sound of the guns, which, strangely, has not reached Meade's ears, has of course been heard by French at Freeman's Ford: he has prepared to receive the attack of the enemy, but, unfortunately, has not thought of informing his commander of what was passing above his position.

The two Federal corps which we have left marching in line of battle have advanced during the day as far as Brandy Station. Buford, who precedes them, has soon encountered Rosser's Confederate cavalry brigade. This officer, following the idea of the Federals at Jefferson, tries to deceive his adversaries by ordering his men to fight on foot, as if they were the skirmishers of an army corps. The ruse does not succeed, despite the reinforcement of Young's brigade, which comes in haste from James City. Buford vigorously pushes the Southern cavalry until he is in sight of Culpeper and assures himself that there is not an infantryman left in the town. His report, promptly despatched, reaches Meade in the afternoon, and throws him into great perplexity. He has received no message from Gregg, and cannot conceive what has become of Lee's army. In this uncertainty he suspends all



marching orders. Meanwhile, hours pass away in the same silence; night comes: Meade, sitting near the fire with his staff not far from the large bridge on the Rappahannock, is waiting for news. At length, near ten o'clock, he receives a despatch of Gregg's dated from Fayetteville, giving the details of the fight which had been going on since the morning, his defeat, and the crossing of the enemy's army at Sulphur Springs. How could Gregg have left his chief so long without sending information as to what was taking place on the right of the army? We have said that Gregg himself no doubt did not receive any information from the detachments which he had sent to scout the country: the enemy making their appearance unexpectedly on Hedgeman's River, the surprise made him neglect that important duty; but he committed an inexcusable error in not taking advantage of the respite that Stuart gave him after the first engagement. He endeavored to retrieve it by despatching several couriers to Meade during the battle of Sulphur Springs, but they were killed or lost their way. It would have been better for the army had he not given battle and had he done more to communicate with his chief. In fact, the position of the army is very critical. Two corps are at Brandy Station; the three others are placed *en échelon* along the Rappahannock, on a line nearly nine miles in length—at Kelly's Ford, at Beverly Ford, and at Freeman's Ford. French, who occupies this last point, is especially exposed, for the enemy's army while descending the Rappahannock could crush him before any of the other corps, except the Fifth, could come to his rescue. But Lee does not know the position of his adversary, and has no other thought than to outflank him in order to cut the railroad in his rear. His objective point is Bristoe Station on Broad Run. It is the point on the entire railroad where he has the greatest chance to outstrip Meade, who has the same distance to travel over; but Lee depends on the marching superiority of his soldiers. If he outstrips Meade, Broad Run will give him magnificent positions for a defensive battle. His orders are therefore given to resume the march through Warrenton on the morning of the following day.

At the news of the engagement at Sulphur Springs, Meade does not lose a moment in concentrating his army. The useless counter-march of the 12th has made him lose not only the line of the

Rappahannock, but also that from Warrenton to Warrenton Junction; for Lee will reach the first of these two points before him. The motives which decided him not to fall upon the flank of his adversary two days before will still prevent his attacking the Confederate army in its march at the foot of Bull Run Mountain. Troubled by the remembrance of Pope's disaster, he does not consider himself secure behind Broad Run. He will cross Bull Run, and halt only at Centreville. This resolution was not worthy of the conqueror of Gettysburg. He ought to have known that his adversary had not more than thirty-six thousand infantry present under arms: even had he believed him stronger, he should not have allowed himself to be pushed back almost under the guns of Washington without a serious effort to prevent it. The soldiers, who had not the information of their commander, but who knew their own strength, desired nothing better than fighting.

They were not to have this satisfaction. Before daybreak the Second and Sixth corps, having promptly retraced their steps by a night-march, have recrossed the Rappahannock: all the army being on the left bank, the Federals burn the railroad bridge, which had just been rebuilt, thus depriving themselves for some time of the means to advance against Culpeper. The Fifth corps from Beverly Ford, and the First from Kelly's Ford, with the Sixth, form the principal column, which is following the line of the railroad in the direction of Bristoe Station. The Second corps hastens to Fayetteville, in order to cover the left of the army against the forces which the day before fought Gregg: it will remain there until the Third has passed it, and will follow as far as Auburn on the road to Greenwich. Kilpatrick accompanies the left, whilst Gregg marches with the main column, and Buford takes the advance with all the trains of the army on a road which will lead him to Bull Run. Meade, who believes himself already outflanked, pushes forward his fatigued soldiers: the column becomes entangled, encumbering the narrow roads of the country: all are marching with the constant thought of a sudden attack. In this manner the army moves over a great distance without halting. The Sixth corps, which leads the advance on the right, has passed beyond Kettle Run, after

having marched over thirty miles during the last twenty-four hours; the two corps which follow are moving *en échelon*; the Third has arrived at Greenwich at ten o'clock in the evening; the Second, which has left Fayetteville very late, and has been retarded by numerous trains, has halted at Auburn about nine o'clock. Warren posts Caldwell's division, with three batteries of artillery, upon the hills which at this point overlook the right bank of Cedar Run and command the ford on the road from Warrenton to Greenwich. In fact, Warren expects shortly to see the enemy debouching along this route.

As we have said, the main body of the Confederate army on the evening of the 12th had not reached the banks of the Rapahannock. Hill was at Amisville, Ewell beyond Jefferson. The two roads which they were following unite at Warrenton: they met in this town about midday on the 13th. All the Federal army was then marching in two columns at some distance from each other. It was a fair opportunity for the two Confederate corps, thus united on their flank, to throw disorder into these columns by a prompt and general attack. Lee did not, however, make the attempt, his numerical weakness rendering him very prudent. Besides, the delay which the countermarching from Culpeper had brought into the Federals' movements made him think that the latter were halting between Catlett's and Warrenton Junction. He dared not continue any farther toward Bristoe, and, while taking advantage of the union of his troops at Warrenton to have a fresh supply of rations issued to them, he ordered Stuart to reconnoitre the supposed position of the Federals in the vicinity of Catlett's. Stuart started with three brigades and two batteries of artillery. The road from Fayetteville to Greenwich is clear, for the Third and Second corps of the Army of the Potomac, which follow it and form the left column, are still at some distance. About four o'clock in the afternoon, leaving Lomax's brigade at Auburn to watch this route, Stuart continues his movement toward Catlett's, with Funsten and Young. Arriving on the edge of a wood commanding Cedar Run Valley and the untimbered slopes of the right bank, he perceives the Federal infantry, which is following the railroad, accompanied by its cumbersome supply-trains. Without betraying his pres-



ence, he discovers that the greater part of the enemy's army is marching, and that, instead of giving battle, it is moving rapidly toward Broad Run. This discovery is sufficient: he hastily resumes his march on the Warrenton road to rejoin his commander and give him an account of his observations.

But in the mean time the Third Federal corps has continued its march, and Graham's brigade, which forms the advance, has reached Auburn on the banks of Cedar Run. French, believing himself far from the enemy, neglects reconnoitring, and the advance of his column is unexpectedly welcomed by the sharp fire of Lomax's cavalry, which occupies the accessible parts of the village. After the first moment of disorder, in which he loses about fifty men, Graham deploys his brigade and compels Lomax to leave the crossing. The latter falls back toward Warrenton, but does not appear to have informed Lee of the perilous situation in which he leaves Stuart with the two other brigades. Indeed, this peril is great. Whilst Stuart returns toward Auburn, where he expects to find Lomax, French is quietly pursuing his march toward Greenwich, and his long column forms a living wall between the Southern cavalry and Lee's army. On approaching Auburn, Stuart's scouts discover with surprise this formidable obstacle. A rapid reconnoissance convinces Stuart that he cannot turn it on any side, and that he is thus caught between the column observed near Catlett's and that which so unexpectedly has just closed his passage on the north. He throws himself immediately, with his men, into one of those thickets of young pines which in Virginia cover the old tobacco-plantations. Cavalry and teams are pressing each other, as game at the sight of hunters, in the thick copse which, a few hundred yards on the south-east of the road and of the village, affords a safer asylum than the tall trees of the old forest. Fortunately, French's soldiers, fatigued by a long march, are not making better reconnoissances on their flanks than on their advance. No one is searching the woods. However, night comes, and the Federals continue passing almost under Stuart's eye. Following the Third corps and its trains, the Second corps continues the uninterrupted march. The situation of the Confederates soon becomes still more critical: Caldwell, who halts on the Auburn hills, bivouacs only a few



hundred yards from their hiding-place. At this time a mere gun-shot or the neighing of a horse would be sufficient to betray them. Stuart for a moment thinks of abandoning his artillery, and, favored by the darkness, of making, sword in hand, a passage for his command; but he soon resolves to await daylight, and sends to Lee three messengers, who, having their knapsacks on their backs and their guns on their shoulders, cross the lines of the Second corps without anybody distinguishing the dark gray of their uniform from the Union blue.

Auburn is situated on the road which Lee has assigned to Ewell for the march of the 14th; he has then but to order him to accelerate this marching in order to effect Stuart's rescue. He has at last been apprised of the Federals' retreat, and notwithstanding the time lost at Warrenton he hopes to outstrip them to Broad Run. His two lieutenants will move on Bristoe. Hill, on the left, will follow through New Baltimore the road from Warrenton to Alexandria; then, turning to the right before coming to Buckland Mills, he will arrive at Bristoe from the north-west: this way, though the longest, is the best. Ewell will reach Auburn after having rescued Stuart, and will follow the road to Greenwich, and near this village will join Hill's right; the two corps united will move toward the railroad, which Ewell will reach a little to the west of Bristoe: they will thus occupy in force the right bank of Broad Run and will bar its passage against the Federal army.

Rodes, who leads the march of the Second Confederate corps, has started long before daybreak, and Stuart at the moment when dawn seems to increase his peril hears the sound of musketry, which informs him of his approaching deliverance. Never, perhaps, had a whole cavalry division spent a night in a more singular position. Shortly after their bivouac a few Federals, wandering at random, had penetrated into the pine woods: if a single one of them had seen them and then made his escape, Stuart was lost. Fortunately, all were seized without the firing of a pistol, but the peril was so obvious that an officer of the Union staff having been also caught, and being invited by Stuart to share his frugal repast, did not fear to answer him, "All right, general; we sup with you to-night, you dine with us to-morrow." At the first gun-

shot the Southern cavalry are in the saddle: they must face it out to the last. Stuart's artillery is advancing to the edge of the wood, concealed by the morning's haze, whilst Caldwell's soldiers, grouped on the heights around their fires, are in full sight of the Confederate gunners. A first volley, well aimed, makes great havoc among them; a single shot, it is said, kills seven. Attacked at the same time on the Warrenton road by Rodes' advance, the Federals believe themselves surrounded. Whilst they endeavor to discover where they are, Stuart starts, and at a gallop makes a wide détour to the south, and, crossing Cedar Run, succeeds in joining without accident Ewell's column, congratulating himself in having got so well out of the scrape.

Despite the surprise which they have just experienced, Caldwell's soldiers are contending with Rodes' division, whilst the remainder of the Second corps, which had been camping on the bank of Cedar Run, is already marching toward Greenwich. In fact, Meade has ordered all his army forward on the 14th at day-break to Centreville, where he is going very early. He believes that the enemy's army, outstripping him, is at Buckland, whilst it has not yet moved beyond Warrenton. The Federals are yielding perhaps to a superstitious fear of the Bull Run battlefield, and wish to spare themselves a third encounter on the ground which has been the scene of McDowell's and Pope's defeats. The main column follows, as on the preceding day, the line of the railroad, the Sixth corps taking the lead, then the First, and after it the Fifth. Warren has been ordered to march from Auburn to Catlett's to take the same route in the rear of this last corps, the road from Auburn to Greenwich appearing too much exposed to run the risk of following it. Gregg, alone on this road, covers the left of the army and the rear-guard of the Third corps, which, having bivouacked at Greenwich, will be able early to cross Broad Run and take again, between Buckland and Gainesville, the main road from Warrenton to Alexandria. This route leads to Centreville by way of the Stone Bridge: to reach this last point the remainder of the army will cross Broad Run a little above Bristoe and Bull Run, at Blackburn's Ford. In consequence of the détour which it must make in order to reach Catlett's, the Second corps finds itself charged alone to cover the retreat. Its situation seems

more critical than it really is. In fact, in the midst of the engagement with Rodes, Caldwell's soldiers hear a lively discharge of musketry from the other side of Cedar Run, on the very route through which they are to fall back. A force of the enemy, crossing that stream above Auburn and descending the left bank, bars the way against Hays' division, which leads the march of the Second corps. Warren understands that if he allows himself to be detained at Auburn he will be separated from the remainder of the army. He orders Caldwell to cross the brook and fall back fighting; Hays in the mean time will break the enemy's line formed before him. Fortunately, this line is composed only of a cavalry regiment, the Fifth North Carolina, which, after a few bold charges, is driven back by two Federal regiments. Caldwell, who has a whole division on his hands, with difficulty withdraws in good order. Ewell, however, who is to move toward Greenwich, not wishing to engage the enemy on the way to Catlett's, soon stops pursuing him, and the two armies resume their parallel march.

At six o'clock in the morning the Third Federal corps crosses Broad Run and proceeds to Gainesville, leaving behind it a large number of stragglers. Gregg's division, arriving at Greenwich after its departure, follows it at some distance. The main column has also commenced marching early, for the Sixth corps will arrive about three o'clock at Centreville, after having travelled over a distance of more than sixteen miles; the First crosses Broad Run behind it; and the Fifth, coming from a greater distance, halts about eleven o'clock on the right bank of this stream. The Second is not yet in sight.

In the mean time, Hill's corps, following the turnpike to Alexandria, soon reaches Broad Run Church, near Buckland. At the moment of turning on the right toward Greenwich its commander learns that a column of the enemy has just crossed the stream a short distance off. It is Gregg, who is covering the Third corps' retreat. Owing to the oblique direction of the road followed by the Federal cavalry, the Confederates can still hear the rolling of the wagons which they are guarding. Pursuing his way with two divisions, Hill leaves Scales' brigade and a battery of artillery at Buckland, and orders Anderson's division



to cross Broad Run. The Confederates, advancing on the main road, encounter Gregg's rear-guard and push it rather closely; but the Federal cavalry, falling back on the infantry, soon makes its escape from Anderson, who, giving up the pursuit, reaches Greenwich. Fitzhugh Lee, after having observed the enemy's infantry, halts in turn and retraces his steps to reconnoitre Hill's left flank. But it is too late, for the latter, with Heth's division, under Wilcox, has already marched beyond Greenwich, and is advancing to Bristoe. The third division, under Wilcox, is still very far in the rear.

We must describe here, in a few words, the ground on which the Confederates are about to debouch, and which will be the theatre of a bloody conflict. About three miles from Manassas Junction, near a brick viaduct with a wooden floor thrown over the deep valley of Broad Run, a few houses grouped on the two banks comprise the village of Bristoe. What remains of these houses at the time of which we are speaking consists simply of high chimneys blackened by fire. On the north-east are the plains of Manassas, untimbered and bordered only by a skirt of wood four or five hundred yards in width which commands the rather rugged slopes of the left bank. The railroad crosses Kettle Run two miles south-west of the Bristoe viaduct. The ground which separates the two streams is rather uneven. Woody along the railroad, which cuts it in a straight line from the south-west to the north-east, it is cultivated on the north-west in the direction of Greenwich. The most elevated part is near the viaduct: for a space of six hundred yards between a small meadow, which it crosses on an embankment, and the station of Bristoe, the road passes through a rather deep cut. It emerges suddenly near the station, and, overlooking on the right the dale which descends to Broad Run, it passes immediately over the embankment which leads to the viaduct. On the north of the railroad three or four isolated hills command the unprotected plain; several like elevations on the south rise from twelve to thirteen yards above the copse. Broad Run waters the meadows situated between two untimbered declivities. A road parallel to the right crest leads from Greenwich to Brentsville, and cuts the railroad at the station. About fourteen hundred yards before



reaching that point it crosses a winding path coming from Weaversville, which, beyond the crossing, descends into the valley, passes over the brook, and ascends near the village of Milford the slopes of the left bank, and strikes at Groveton the road to Alexandria.

A road running parallel to the railroad, roughly built by the Union soldiers whilst they were occupying it, facilitated very much the march of Meade's army. On the north-west of the road it encountered the path from Weaversville to Groveton, and passed on the other side of the woods to reach a ford situated a little below the viaduct. This ford was commanded by slight fortifications raised on the south-east of the railroad.

The road followed by Heth's division cuts in two the right angle formed at Bristoe by the railroad and Broad Run. At a mile and a half from the station it passes through a pine wood, beyond which is a view of both the valley and the Milford ford, which the greater part of the Federal column has just crossed. About noon, before reaching the wood, Hill, who is expecting to meet the enemy, forms Heth's division in line of battle. Cook's brigade deploys on the right, and that of Kirkland on the left, of the road; Walker, who follows the latter, is ordered to prolong his left; Davis remains as a reserve on the road. During this movement the scouts have perceived the Fifth Federal corps, which, as we have said, has been halting on the right bank of the stream, and has just resumed its march. A battery is advanced on the crest which overlooks the bank, and from that point opens fire upon the rear-guard of the enemy, which is crossing Broad Run. All the Union army is beyond that stream except the Second corps, which is following, at some distance, the same route as the Fifth. The latter, on seeing the enemy make his appearance on its rear, should have halted to defend the passage until Warren had crossed it in his turn. Perhaps Sykes, at the head of his column, is not informed of what is going on in the rear; however that may be, he continues marching. Hill, on seeing the Federals marching off, is of course persuaded that they form the rear-guard of the Army of the Potomac, and pushes his soldiers forward in order to prevent them making their escape. Cook and Kirkland, without waiting for Walker to get into line, march through the wood and reach the crest of the plateau.

They are preparing to cross Broad Run when a sharp discharge of musketry bursts suddenly on the right flank of Cook, who is compelled to halt and to make a change of front with one of his regiments.

It is Warren who arrives on the battlefield. The resistance he has offered in the morning to Ewell has retarded his march, but he has recovered a part of the lost time. While approaching Bristoe he has changed the order of his column: Webb has taken the advance with the division the command of which he has won by his gallantry at Gettysburg; it is preceding that of Hays: Caldwell brings up the rear. The Federals follow the track of the railroad; some detachments flank the column on right and left; nothing makes them suspect the enemy's proximity. At the moment their scouts arrive in sight of Broad Run, Warren suddenly hears near his column the cannon-shots fired by Hill upon the Fifth corps, and an instant after his flankers encounter Cook's extreme right on the south of the road from Greenwich to Brentsville. The enemy is approaching the railroad; there is not a moment to lose to prevent his barring the passage against the Second corps. At a glance Warren has become familiar with the ground; his plan is formed and his orders are given. While the detachment already engaged with the enemy keeps him at a distance without betraying by too much daring the forces which follow, Webb quickens the steps of his soldiers, and, concealing his march in the railroad-cut, reaches the entrance to the viaduct: then he turns to the left in line of battle, supporting his right on Broad Run Valley and posting his line on the south of the road, which thus forms for his front a large trench; the earthworks already mentioned and the hills crowned by his artillery form a second line behind that front. A battery is placed on the left bank of the stream to rake the road and flank the Federal position. Hays, following Webb closely, deploys on his left behind the railroad embankment; Caldwell, facing to the rear in line of battle, places himself *en potence*, his right on the cut, so as to cover Hays' left. Warren thus leans toward the stream the crossing of which he must control, presenting a solid front to Hill's attacks, and barring the way against the enemy's troops who might follow his steps.

Whilst the Union general is making these dispositions, *E. J.* orders Henderson, who is still near Greenwich, to advance in haste and form on Heth's right to attack the new enemy who has just revealed himself on that side. He then orders Heth's troops to resume their march toward the viaduct. But Cook immediately finds his flank exposed to the fire both of Webb's division and the artillery posted by Warren a little to the rear. He is compelled to wheel on his right and to face the railroad. Kirkland follows this movement. The two brigades occupy a front nearly equal to that of Webb's division, from which they are separated by the railroad-cut. Walker, who is still moving through the wood, has not been able, in consequence of this change of front, to occupy the position which has been assigned to him on Kirkland's left: following his orders, he does not change the direction of his march, but crosses Broad Run.

However, on the Federal side the Fifth corps has disappeared; the Second is in position and ready to receive the enemy. The attack has not been long in coming. Cook exchanges a sharp fire with Webb's left; Kirkland is soon in line to support him. The two brigades are moving forward on the ground which separates them from the railroad, but their ranks are thinning; they halt, and then resume firing. To support them, Hill brings forward on the left Poague's four batteries, which go into position on the heights north of the railroad and shell the woods occupied by Webb. A battery sent by McIntosh places itself nearer the enemy and behind Cook's left, and mingles its fire with Poague's. The Federals are suffering seriously. Hill, wishing at any cost to close the passage of Broad Run against them, resolves to make a final effort with the troops he has with him. Davis' brigade supports Poague's artillery; Anderson, who arrives on the field, is ordered to deploy Posey's and Perry's brigades on Heth's right; McIntosh posts near these troops the three batteries which he has remaining.

Kirkland follows, in two lines, the slopes of the plateau between the small wood which marks its crest and the road to Brentsville, which on his left descends to Bristoe Station: he thus hopes to separate the Unionists from the viaduct and the neighboring fords, but is seriously wounded before giving the order for the



attack: his soldiers nevertheless eagerly rush forward, reach the road, and, their two lines having been united, scale the side of the trench, beyond which they are awaited by Colonel Heath, whom Webb has placed on his right with Harrow's brigade. But this effort has exhausted them, and after a short struggle, almost hand to hand, they are repulsed, and withdraw in disorder. The Federal battery posted on the opposite bank of the stream, and whose fire Poague has not been able to silence, overwhelms them with shot and shell at the moment when they throw themselves into the trench: a number are killed; others, perhaps remembering the danger through which they had passed, under Heth and Pender, at Gettysburg, prefer surrendering to crossing the road, or hide themselves among rocks, where they are soon captured. The Twenty-sixth and Twenty-eighth North Carolina are nearly annihilated. On the right, General Cook has been wounded almost at the same time as Kirkland, but Colonel Hall, who has assumed command, on seeing the troops of the latter pushing on, has also brought his own forward. The firing is interrupted; the whole line moves forward—not so fast, however, as the next brigade. Being themselves exposed to a terrific fire, Hill's soldiers have soon to witness the defeat of their comrades. At twenty-five yards from the road, the left, composed of the Forty-eighth North Carolina, breaks its decimated ranks and carries away with it the remainder of the troops. In this retreat the two Southern brigades inadvertently pass beyond the battery placed by McIntosh to support them, their immediate commanders ignoring its presence. Warren, whom no incident of the battle escapes, pushes forward his skirmishers, killing or capturing the gunners, seizing the guns, and bringing five of them into his lines. Walker, who, perceiving the change of position made by his neighbors on the right, has immediately recrossed the stream, arrives too late to save the guns, but he forms, with Davis and with Poague's artillery, a new line, which covers the débris of the two other brigades, whose defeat has been bloody and complete.

On the right of the Confederates, Anderson's two brigades composed, before Cook's and Kirkland's attack, the prolongation of their line. They have not come forward, because their commander has been ordered to join Ewell, whom he vainly



looks for while extending his right. However, they have a rather lively fight with Hays' division, which costs them about fifty men killed or wounded: among the latter is General Posey. Gradually the firing ceases. Warren has no interest in taking the offensive; he has only to keep his position until night to be able afterward to join the army at Centreville. Hill has as many combatants as Warren, but the defeat which he has just experienced deceives him as to the enemy's forces. He in vain awaits Ewell, who, it appears, has lost his way: Fitzhugh Lee's division of cavalry alone is seen arriving, then that of Hampton, led by Stuart. At night Warren orders his troops to resume the march. They have suffered but little: Webb, who alone has sustained a serious struggle, has all the advantage of the position. The losses of the Second corps amount to two hundred men. However, the day's work has been rough: at the outset the surprise at Auburn; then a long march; five hours' fighting, during which the remainder of the army seems to have forgotten the rear-guard; finally, after the victory, the necessity of undertaking a night-march. On the whole, the affair has been brilliant both for themselves and their young commander: Warren has again shown the *coup d'œil*, the coolness, and the activity which mark him as a distinguished commander.

The Confederates have had more than five hundred men killed and wounded, among whom are three general officers. Besides, they have left about five hundred prisoners, five guns, and two flags in the hands of their adversaries. They had hoped to be able to bar the way against the Army of the Potomac, but have been outstripped; they were manœuvring to secure the advantage of the defensive, and they have been compelled to give an offensive battle, the result of which has been adverse to them.

The Sixth corps has been ordered on the same evening toward Chantilly by Meade, who still fears to be cut off. The main body of the army has reached Centreville before night, except the Fifth corps, which the commander-in-chief at the news of the battle at Bristoe has sent to the help of the Second. Sykes, having retraced his steps, has halted on learning of the success of his comrades-in-arms. On the morning of the 15th all the

Army of the Potomac is on the left bank of Bull Run, except the trains guarded by Buford, which have not been able to reach Brentsville, and are thus greatly exposed. This time Meade has resolved to await his adversary in the position he has chosen between Chantilly, Centreville, and Blackburn's Ford. But Lee discovers that it is too strong to attack.

The march which has brought the Confederates from the Rapidan to Broad Run has been well directed, except on the 14th. On that day, forgetting that in a country like Virginia all the advantage belongs to the army which retreats to its dépôts, with a railroad by which to remove its supplies, they believed in their ability to outstrip the Federals, and have been beaten in the race. Hill, wishing to regain lost time, has been defeated in the Bristoe attack. Without this unfortunate affair, which has revealed Lee's real designs, they might declare themselves satisfied with the results. In fact, these results are considerable. Through the skilfulness of their manœuvres with a less numerous army they have compelled their adversary to make a retreat of over sixty miles, without the latter having attempted once to interrupt this bold deviation of the line toward Washington. All the country south of Bull Run being abandoned by the Army of the Potomac, the Confederate soldiers complete on the railroad the work of destruction begun by the Unionists. Meade has set the bridges on fire; Lee burns the cross-ties, twists the rails, and destroys the water-stations. He has nothing more to gain by continuing the pursuit, and has put it beyond the power of his enemy to begin anew an active campaign on the Rapidan before the bad weather commences, and has inflicted on the Army of the Potomac a humiliation which will weaken its *morale* by destroying the prestige of the conqueror of Gettysburg.

From the morning of the 15th, therefore, Lee is preparing his movement in retreat. The cavalry is ordered to conceal it by vigorous demonstrations. In the mean time, Meade thinks only of establishing himself firmly in his defensive position before Washington, and, fearing for his right wing, he brings it back toward the Potomac. The Third corps is bivouacking at Fairfax Court-house and Chantilly, where its former commander, General Sickles, mutilated and scarcely restored to health, comes

to claim in vain the command of the soldiers whose love he has won. The Sixth corps extends itself on the right from Chantilly to Frying Pan. The immense train, whose march was retarded on the 14th, is nearing Bull Run under Buford's guard.

Meanwhile, alarm reigns again in the capital; troops scarcely organized arrive in haste from New York. To do Halleck justice, it must be said that he does not share these fears. He has divined Lee's numerical weakness, and understands that he endeavors to conceal it by his bold movements: he insists upon Meade attacking the Confederates in the position which they occupy so far from their base of supplies. The Union general, despite his reluctance to again push forward his fatigued soldiers, resolves to obey, and the forward movement is fixed for the 16th.

But Stuart will neglect nothing to retard it. On the morning of the 15th, whilst the Confederate infantry halts on Broad Run, he moves his cavalry toward the Federal lines: a few hours after Fitzhugh Lee reaches Bull Run at Blackburn's Ford and exchanges a few shots with Warren's troops. Finding them strongly posted at this point, Stuart, with Hampton's division, descends Bull Run in search of the large Federal train. He meets it at Yates' Ford,\* parked near the run, which the wagons are crossing singly. The operation is slow and perilous, but Buford, reinforced by an infantry brigade of the Third corps, keeps a good watch, and after a slight skirmish the Confederates give up the idea of an attack.

Night has come, and it is only on the 16th that Stuart can perform against Meade's flank the movement which is to keep him at a standstill until the Confederates have completed the thorough destruction of the railroad. Leaving Fitzhugh Lee at Manassas, Stuart, at the head of Hampton's division, will endeavor to outflank Meade on his right. In order to avoid Groveton, which is strongly occupied, he reaches Gainesville, crosses the Aldie road, and, bearing at last toward the right, reaches Frying Pan in the

\* A brisk attack by Gordon's brigade of cavalry was made south of this place upon the rear-guard, composed of the Third Pennsylvania cavalry, which was temporarily serving with Buford, but was resisted by that regiment alone for several hours, its reinforcement being delayed until near nightfall.—ED.



evening. Contrary to his expectation, the Federals are strongly posted at this point: after having learned their strength he declines going any farther, and soon commences retracing his steps. The main purpose of his expedition is successful. The elements seem to conspire with him: a hard rain on the 16th swells Bull Run and deepens all the fords. The pontons, which Meade has immediately sent for, are with the great trains, parked far away; the roads are so bad that the crossings will not be re-established in less than twenty-four or thirty-six hours.

Meade's plans are again altered on the morning of the 17th. Astonished at seeing the enemy show himself almost on his rear, he fancies that Lee is moving toward the Potomac and preparing a new invasion. He is not even undeceived on the evening of the 17th, when the enemy's cavalry stops pressing him. In his uncertainty he forms the resolution to still wait and to have Lee's positions felt by his cavalry. Therefore, only the latter cross Bull Run on the 18th.

At the same time, Lee gives to his army the order of retreat: it takes the same roads over which it has been marching a few days before, but in a contrary direction: almost all the wagons meet on the Warrenton road. Stuart remains to cover the roads between Groveton and Manassas; he will not hazard any serious battle on the left bank of Broad Run. Therefore, when Pleasonton's cavalry appears in force he orders his command to retreat slowly. The Unionists follow in two parallel directions: on the left, Merritt, who leads Buford's advance, reaches Bristoe about eleven o'clock in the morning, but is soon halted by the enemy's rear-guard; on the right, Kilpatrick has been ordered, but only at three o'clock in the afternoon, to march forward; at five o'clock he encounters the Southern cavalry near Groveton, and pushes it as far as Gainesville. But darkness soon interrupts the movements of the Federal cavalry; it has not been able to reach the main body of the enemy's army, which apparently is in full retreat.

Meade has at last seen his error: the pontons have arrived, and, besides, Bull Run is fordable; but it is too late to make up for the start that the enemy has. At daybreak the army moves forward in two columns, the Third and Sixth corps



in the advance—one on the left, on the railroad, the other on the right, on the road to Warrenton. But whatever may be their activity, they will not reach Broad Run before night. Meade has therefore ordered his cavalry to push on the track of the enemy as far as possible.

Merritt, on the left, on the same evening occupies Catlett's Station, which he finds deserted. But Stuart, calling together all his forces, has resolved to give Kilpatrick a lesson which will paralyze the daring of the Federal cavalry for the remainder of the retreat. At daybreak the Union general leaves Gainesville with his two brigades—Custer in the advance, followed by Davis—and moves forward on the road to Warrenton. Stuart is waiting for him at Buckland Mills on Broad Run, where the hills of the right bank offer a defensive position. Kilpatrick detaches a regiment on his right on the Haymarket road, and another on the left toward Greenwich, to reconnoitre the flanks. Then the Federal artillery opens the fight. Stuart's answers sharply. Custer attempts several times to cross the stream under the fire of the enemy's troopers, who, dismounted, are lining the bank, but without success. At last, Kilpatrick, having learned that no enemy has appeared on his flank, resolves to turn the enemy's position. A part of Custer's brigade crosses Broad Run on the right and takes in reverse the Confederate line. The remainder of this detachment rushes forward to the bridge on the main road, which has been spared by the war, and takes possession of it by force. Stuart falls back on the road in good order, determining to make the Federals smart for this success. Fitzhugh Lee, whose division left Bristoe the day before, has just reached Auburn. The commander-in-chief's gallant nephew proposes to Stuart a plan which is immediately adopted: Hampton's division will fall back, through New Baltimore, upon Warrenton, endeavoring to attract after them the Federals, who already believe themselves conquerors. When their column will have lengthened itself on the road, Lee's division, following a cross-cut which, running from Auburn, intersects that road between New Baltimore and Buckland Mills, will arrive in dense masses upon its flank to cut in two and scatter it.

Kilpatrick, with Custer's brigade, has halted near the Auburn

road, but Davis, being ordered to keep up the pursuit, has passed New Baltimore. In the mean time, Lee has rejoined his division, given the order to saddle, and approaches the Federals, who, deceived by their scouts, do not suspect his presence. At a short distance from the road he orders a part of his troops to dismount, and forms it as a line of infantry. The outposts, stationed rather badly by Custer on the Auburn road, have scarcely signalled the presence of the Southerners when they appear before them. Custer has barely the time to deploy his command, also on foot, in a parallel line with the road, so as to dispute the possession of it to the assailants; the battery which accompanies him opens fire, and Fitzhugh Lee answers it. At the noise of the cannonade Stuart suddenly halts and resumes the offensive. Davis, warned by the sound, understands the danger which is menacing him. He falls back rapidly upon New Baltimore, whence his commander calls him in great haste. But each of the Union brigades has for its antagonist a division of the enemy. Custer vainly endeavors to defend the road and to extend his right to join Davis.

Lee leads his cavalry impetuously to the attack. The Southerners advance on the Federal battery, which sweeps the Auburn road without being able to stop them. They are twenty paces from the guns, which must not be given up; they must be carried away. This movement determines the retreat of Custer's command. The Confederates reach the road and separate the two Union brigades; then they closely press Custer and force him to recross Broad Run, and attack him below the bridge on the left bank of that stream. In the mean time, Davis, defending himself as well as he can, withdraws before Hampton's division. Arriving near Buckland Mills, he observes Lee, who bars the way against him; but Kilpatrick has despatched him orders, and he throws himself on the north of the road to reach the Manassas Gap road through forest-paths to avoid being caught between the enemy's two divisions. The retreat, at a gallop from New Baltimore, has not been effected without loss; but Hampton's squadrons have also been greatly reduced by this rapid movement, and Lee being wholly occupied in his fighting with Custer beyond Broad Run, Davis can follow the direction which opens him a chance of safety. From the hills where Custer has formed his command Kilpatrick has observed

him, and is ready to share his danger. Followed by a dozen troopers, he crosses Broad Run above the road, dashes, sword in hand, through the Confederate skirmishers, and joins Davis' column. Fortunately, the surgeon-in-chief knows the country from his infancy, and leads the Federal cavalry by unfrequented paths through the forest, and brings it in front of its adversaries on the Manassas Gap road. Stuart, who is following it with a greatly reduced force, cannot attack its rear-guard, which is protected by thickets against any turning movement. He gathers a few wagons and some stragglers, and gives up the chase before reaching Haymarket.

In the mean time, Lee has dislodged Custer from his position on the left bank of Broad Run, but he has not followed him long, and the Union general falls back, without being harassed, on Gainesville, where the two brigades are brought together at about half-past seven in the evening. The Federals have left in Stuart's hands about two hundred prisoners, a hundred killed and wounded, a few wagons, and Kilpatrick's baggage and papers. They could truly congratulate themselves on being free at so little cost, but the moral success won by Stuart far exceeded the material advantages which he had gained.

This combat is the last of the campaign. Stuart, after having met on the south of Haymarket the outposts of the First Federal corps, behind which Kilpatrick has taken refuge, returns to Buckland Mills, which his two divisions evacuate on the morning of the 20th. The Union cavalry now confines itself to escorting the infantry. The Confederates therefore retreat at leisure: after having completely destroyed the railroad as far as the Rappahannock, they camp on the 22d and 23d near the banks of that river. The Federals, abandoning the idea of overtaking them, limit their march to that of the trains which are to supply them. On the 20th the cavalry occupies Warrenton; the Fifth corps is at New Baltimore; the Sixth between these two points; the Third, after having marched on the right toward Haymarket, proceeds to Catlett's Station. On the morning of the 25th the Federal army, awaiting the reconstruction of the railroad as far as this point, has not gone beyond the line of Cedar Run: the Third corps is still at Catlett's Station, the Fifth at Auburn, the



Sixth at Warrenton, and the Second near New Baltimore; the First still occupies Bristoe; Buford's cavalry reaches Bealeton Station only on the 27th. Then the whole army is concentrated on the line from Warrenton to Warrenton Junction, where it can be easily provided for. Under the protection of the cavalry the road is being repaired as far as the Rappahannock. Whilst this work is going on the Federals are condemned to inaction. Halleck desires to organize a grand cavalry expedition, the aim of which shall be to destroy the communications between Richmond and the enemy's army; but these raids, when they are not coincident with operations of the infantry, are only a useless and expensive fancy. Such is Meade's opinion. It is almost useless to add that his adversary takes good care not to attack him at Warrenton.

Lee's prompt retreat caused a disappointment in the South, for it was believed that he was already established under the walls of Washington. It gives him, on the contrary, in our opinion, the greatest credit. The results of a victory won at Gettysburg would have justified all the sacrifices made to secure it, but it was not so with a battle fought in Virginia. Lee, as though he already foresaw the rough adversary whom he is to encounter a few months later, felt that he must spare his forces and sustain himself. At the cost of a thousand men killed and wounded and five hundred captured by the enemy at Bristoe—whose loss was compensated by the two thousand prisoners whom he had taken—he had paralyzed his adversary for four or five weeks, and owing to the approaching bad weather had rendered any offensive campaign almost impossible until the following spring. More could not be asked of him.

The Valley of Virginia during this campaign has been the theatre of some small military exploits which are now to be briefly mentioned, for they are closely connected with those we have just related. In leaving the banks of the Shenandoah, Lee has left in this valley Imboden's brigade, which, having fought in it for a year, is familiar even with its smallest paths. The two opposing armies once settled on the banks of the Rapidan, Imboden contents himself with occupying the upper part of the valley: his force does not allow him to watch the main passes of the



large hills of the Alleghany which divide the Shenandoah from the upper Potomac. Among those hills the central point is Moorefield, situated on the south branch of the Potomac, above Romney: the Federals had established there five squadrons of the First West Virginia, under command of Major Stephens. Imboden was informed by his partisans of their numbers and isolated position. As soon as Meade and Lee had, by leaving the Valley of Virginia, dispensed with his mounting guard on the banks of the Shenandoah, he resolved to take Stephens by surprise. On the 6th of September, at daybreak, twelve or fifteen hundred Confederates surround the Unionists' camp. The latter are only two hundred and fifty strong, but they are alert, and repulse the Southerners, who, after having spent all day in useless assaults, retreat into the mountain. Stephens believes himself no longer liable to a new attack, but Imboden, taught by experience, is preparing his revenge. The Federals, after an expedition of a few days, had just re-entered Moorefield, and were preparing to change the position of their camp, when in the night of the 11th the Southerners, arriving unexpectedly, dash into their midst before they have been able to take up arms. Stephens uselessly tries to rally his men, and succeeds only in making his escape with a few soldiers, leaving in the hands of the enemy one hundred and fifty prisoners.

A month later, when Lee set out for the North, he ordered Imboden to descend the Valley of the Shenandoah and occupy the Blue Ridge passes, through which the enemy, coming from Harper's Ferry, could have menaced his left flank. Calling around him all the partisans who were making war in that country, Imboden marches in the direction of Winchester, where the Federals are not in force, and halts at Berryville, a point from which he covers all the defiles entrusted to his care.

In order to defend the approach to Harper's Ferry, Colonel Simpson, commanding the Ninth Maryland Union regiment, occupies with this force and a few squadrons of cavalry the small town of Charlestown; but, far from observing the enemy, he appears to have protected himself very badly. Harry Gilmor, the indefatigable chief of the Southern partisans, is promptly informed of this neglect. While a part of his troop is going to

tempt fortune on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and captures a post which was guarding Back Creek bridge, he makes himself acquainted with all the approaches to Charlestown, and proposes to Imboden to take its garrison by surprise. Starting at night, the Confederates come in sight of its suburbs on the 18th of October before daybreak. They have not been observed. Gilmor makes a *détour* with his men and a regiment of cavalry, the Eighteenth Virginia, to cut off the enemy's retreat on Harper's Ferry: shortly after, Imboden, with the remainder of the brigade, about eight hundred men, presents himself before the town and summons Simpson to surrender. The latter, who is taken by surprise, endeavors to defend himself, but the assailants do not give him the time: attacked and pressed upon all sides, the Federals fight in detachments in the town. A great number are taken; the others, with a part of their wagons, reach the road to Harper's Ferry. Gilmor, who is awaiting them, scatters the first who present themselves, and captures some prisoners; but the Eighteenth Virginia not supporting him in due time, the fugitives soon overrun him by their increasing number. Simpson makes a passage, and reaches Harper's Ferry with the *débris* of his command. More than four hundred men, wagons, horses, and equipments fall into the Confederates' hands, to whom this brilliant success has cost only about twenty soldiers killed and wounded. They again take the route to the south, well knowing that the garrison of Harper's Ferry will soon come to dispute their victory. This is soon realized, but when the Federals re-enter Charlestown, Imboden is no longer within reach. He halts only at Front Royal, where he well knows they will not come.

After this bold stroke the two parties keep themselves at a distance, and the year will end without fresh combats on the banks of the Shenandoah.

## CHAPTER III.

### *MINE RUN.*

WE left the Confederate army at the end of October posted on the right bank of the upper Rapaphannock and around Culpeper, where Lee has established his head-quarters. The Union army has not been able to go beyond the line of Warrenton and Warrenton Junction: it occupies Auburn and Catlett's Station. But the cavalry, which is pushed on beyond Bealeton, protects the reconstruction of the railroad as far as this point. Owing to the intelligent direction of Colonel McCallum, this great work is completed on the 2d of November. The fine days of this season, which are called in America the "Indian summer," still allow of the making of a short campaign, and it is necessary to take advantage thereof. Lee, having destroyed the railroad with great care, does not suspect the promptness with which it has been rebuilt; therefore, he can be taken by surprise. Meade can perform anew, with better chances of success, the manœuvre which Burnside attempted the preceding year on the same ground. While the enemy's army is encamped in dense mass on the upper Rappahannock, he can conceal from it one or two marches by directing his troops on the lower course of the river; he can arrive opposite Fredericksburg with his bridge equipage before Lee, and can seize the famous heights which command the town. In order to reach the same point by crossing the upper Rappahannock at Kelly's Ford, he can descend the right bank, cross the Rapidan at Germanna Ford, and reach Fredericksburg through Chancellorsville: this movement, counselled, it is said, by Pleasonton, would certainly succeed, for instead of having, like Hooker, the enemy's army before him, Meade would leave it behind at Culpeper, without a chance of its outstripping him. Fredericksburg once in

his possession, before the bad weather he can reach Bowling Green, and perhaps the North Anna River, thus making a long step on the road to Richmond. This plan involves a change of base: the army would leave the Orange and Alexandria Railroad for the Aquia Creek line. Halleck forbids Meade to execute it, urging, as it appears, the necessity of protecting the railway which has just been rebuilt from Manassas Junction to Bealeton—a puerile motive if it did not conceal others, for in that manner the army, instead of using the railroads, would have been simply their guardian.

Meade, having no longer the choice of operations, resolves to attack the Confederates directly. After having had their positions reconnoitred by his cavalry, on the 6th of November he orders his army to move forward on the following day. Lee occupies the right bank of the Rappahannock: he has placed Hill on the left and Ewell on the right of the railroad; the cavalry covers the two wings; the artillery has been withdrawn, but the infantry has been placed as near the river as possible while securing good encampments for it. This precaution seems necessary, for Lee hopes to spend the winter in these encampments. However, in order to be able, if required, to resume the offensive, he has resolved to keep a hold on the left bank of the Rappahannock by the side of the large bridge burnt by Meade—a central point near which his two corps join. The rebuilding of the bridge being too difficult, he throws over a ponton a hundred yards higher up. On the two banks hills not commanded by any great heights cover the crossing and offer excellent positions. On the right batteries with eight guns command the approaches to the bridge. On the left the former Federal works have been surrounded by earthworks mounted with four pieces of artillery: this point is entrusted to Ewell's care. The divisions of Johnson and Early occupy it alternately, the one not on guard remaining at Culpeper and at Brandy Station. Rodes' division is encamped behind Kelly's Ford; only outposts watch the remainder of the river's course.

Rappahannock Bridge and Kelly's Ford are, in fact, the only practicable crossings. On these two points Meade is moving his army. Early on the 7th, Sedgwick leaves Warrenton



with the Sixth corps, and marches to Fayetteville. The Second, Third, and Fifth corps, encamped between Auburn, Catlett's Station, and Warrenton Junction, will follow the line of the railroad. The First corps, stationed on the left of the army, will join the Second and the Third at Bealeton, and form with them a column which, being directed by Meade and commanded by French, will take toward the south the road to Kelly's Ford. The Fifth corps will join the Sixth to form the right, which Sedgwick will lead against the Rappahannock bridge. The two columns, although they have to travel a distance of sixteen miles, arrive about noon, as Meade has ordered, at the points designated. This long march, executed with so much precision at the outset of a campaign, shows that the Union army has at last acquired the essential qualities of troops inured to war. The left column having first commenced the march, we will follow it.

Rodes is guarding Kelly's Ford. Three and five miles higher up are Wheatley's and Norman's Fords, and a third, Stevens' Ford, is a little lower down, near the confluence of Mountain Run. These three crossings being very difficult, Rodes has entrusted the holding of them merely to outposts, and has disposed his division in masses a mile behind Kelly's Ford, on the Stevensburg road. The configuration of the ground does not permit him to defend the ford itself, which is in the centre of a curve described by the Rappahannock. The right bank, of a convex form, is uncovered and low; at a certain distance the ground gently rises, and does not afford any protection for the space of a mile, as far as a grove, beyond which is the village of Kellysville. On the opposite bank rugged and woody declivities form a semicircle of heights which completely command it. Above the ford, in the rapids, determined men could find a crossing without losing their feet. The Second North Carolina, of Ramseur's brigade, a regiment of not more than three hundred and fifty men, guards all the fords entrusted to Rodes' keeping. The main body, encamped near Kelly's Ford, is at the first signal to occupy the *trous de loup* dug alongside the bank. The Thirteenth North Carolina, whose effective force is something over five hundred men, is placed as a reserve, with

a battery of artillery, about one mile behind the ford, on the edge of the grove.

Birney's division, under Ward, the former having command of the Federal Third corps, has arrived at a short distance from Kelly's Ford. The crest which commands the left bank allows him to make his dispositions for fighting without the enemy's knowledge. De Trobriand has charge of the attack with his brigade and a regiment of sharpshooters commanded by Colonel Trepp. The latter relieve the cavalry, which for several days has occupied the crest of the heights, and rapidly descend the bank of the river. Colonel Stallings, who commands the Second North Carolina, quickly appears with his command on the opposite bank, and a brisk fire is opened from the one bank to the other. But the Unionists, armed with telescopic rifles, have a marked advantage; the Confederate battery, which has advanced to defend the approaches of the ford, is exposed to the cross-fire of the Federal artillery, which compels it to make a prompt retreat. De Trobriand takes advantage of this to make a sudden attack. Protected by a part of his skirmishers, Trepp reaches the rapids, throws himself boldly into the water, and reaches the opposite bank. Ramseur, to defend the passage, has brought forward the Thirteenth North Carolina, but despite the efforts of its commander the regiment breaks and in disorder seeks refuge near a neighboring farm-house, while the Federals take in reverse the defenders of the main ford. De Trobriand in his turn springs forward at the head of his brigade, ascends the opposite bank, and captures all the men of the Second North Carolina who fail to find safety in a rapid flight. However, Rodes has arrived on the scene of combat with his division, but the fire of Birney's artillery, which sweeps all the uncovered ground of the right bank, does not permit him to come to the rescue of the Carolinians who have sheltered themselves in the farm-house. The latter suffer themselves to be surrounded, and surrender without resistance. Three hundred prisoners and about fifty wounded men remain in the hands of the Federals, to whom this brilliant affair costs but about a hundred men. The pontons having arrived, the whole Third corps is preparing to follow De Trobriand. Before this deployment of forces

Rodes withdraws to a better position a few miles to the rear. He forms his right toward the Stevensburg road, and his left on the river, near Wheatley's Ford, and awaits with confidence the attack of the Unionists, for he knows that Johnson's division is marching to join him. In fact, as soon as he is aware of the arrival of the Federals in force before Kelly's Ford, Ewell has ordered this division to the menaced point, and has hastily gone to place himself near his lieutenant. Shortly after sunset the two forces are strongly established on a line which entirely closes the angle between the Rappahannock and Mountain Run. Meade has not taken advantage of the last hours of the day to pursue his success. The bridge on which the whole left column is to pass has been built rather late, the soldiers are fatigued by the long march; in short, the Union general is waiting to hear from his right.

The news he is expecting will render useless Ewell's dispositions to resist him. Sedgwick, as we have said, has arrived since noon, with the Fifth and Sixth corps, at a short distance from Rappahannock Bridge. But he is preparing for the fight with his usual circumspection, this time justified by the nature of the ground and the position of the enemy. The hill occupied by the latter is divided into two parts by a deep depression, through which the railroad, after having followed a direction oblique to that of the stream, passes to reach the bridge destroyed a few weeks before. Two small works rise on both sides of the road on the opposite hills and at two hundred and fifty yards from each other. That on the right, on the south-east, is an old Federal redoubt without its moat, and placed on the declivity in such a manner that the assailants have a sight of the interior. The other has already sustained two transformations: it is a lunette built by the Southerners and afterward reshaped by their adversaries, who had raised a parapet with a moat through its gorge; the Confederates have transformed it a second time, while availing themselves of the two flanks to give it the form of a horn-work: it is badly disposed for receiving artillery. An intrenchment starting from the bank of the river joins the redoubt, cuts the railroad to touch on the work, and prolongs itself to the crest



of the hill; then, descending on the declivity which overlooks the river, it stops, after having passed through a grove, at the bank a few hundred yards above the pontons. This part of the intrenchment is easy of access to the enemy, who can shelter themselves behind the hill and grove. On the other side the railroad embankment presents a similar shelter to within a short distance of the two works. A battery placed on the right bank to rake it is not armed. The low and uncovered ground which extends nearly a mile beyond the hills occupied by the Confederates is cut by two ditches parallel to the river; that nearest to the hills is dry, the second has three feet of water. This plain is encircled on the east and north-east by a line of hills occupied by small detachments of cavalry.

The latter about noon have signalled the arrival of Sedgwick's column—an hour later the movement, in the distance, of the rear of the Federal Third corps. Early's division relieved on the preceding day that of Johnson. Although this change is definitive, they are not yet settled close to the river; Gordon's and Pegram's brigades have been placed on the west, that of Hoke on the east of Brandy Station; Hays alone occupies the works on the left bank of the Rappahannock with five Louisiana regiments and Green's battery, which has placed two guns in each small fort. At the first news of the presence of the Federal troops near Rappahannock Bridge, Early has ordered Colonel Goodwin, who commands Hoke's brigade, to proceed at once to Hays' rescue. As soon as he has been able to assemble the remainder of his soldiers, occupied in building the winter quarters which they will not enjoy, he takes the same direction with his two other brigades.

However, the Sixth corps has deployed on the right on each side of the railroad, and the Fifth on its left. The Confederate vedettes are dislodged from the heights, and Sedgwick has them occupied by the First division of the Sixth corps, temporarily commanded by General Russell. From this point he sees in a glance the Southerners' positions and the ground which separates him from them. It is three o'clock. Russell moves forward with two brigades without thoroughly engaging the enemy, while the artillery on the crest opens a sharp fire against the enemy's



works. Russell's brigade on the right of the railroad, and on the left that of Bartlett, commanded by Colonel Upton, are each deploying in two lines. The first line, composed of the Sixth Maine and the Fifth Wisconsin on the right, and of the Fifth Maine and the One-hundred-and-twenty-first New York on the left, is slowly advancing, and crosses the first ditch, driving back the skirmishers who cover Hays' front. The Federal artillery overwhelms with projectiles the enemy's positions, and, although it cannot see the bridge, it renders its passage very dangerous. The Confederate batteries on the right bank cannot reach it, and Green's four guns alone answer effectively.

About four o'clock Hoke crosses the river. Hays places him on his left, behind the breastwork which extends upward to the bank. His own brigade occupies the two works on the right and the remainder of the defences. He has kept as a reserve the Ninth Louisiana. His force consists of nearly two thousand two hundred men. Early soon after brings forward Gordon's and Pegram's brigades, and, leaving them on the right bank, goes to examine Hays' position. He finds it badly prepared for the defence. But Lee, who has just arrived, does not believe the Federals daring enough to attack it, and a garrison of two brigades seems to him sufficient. Wishing neither to reinforce nor recall it, he endeavors to place the artillery on the right bank so as to flank Hays' front. But the Union skirmishers, who have already reached the opposite bank above and below, do not allow him to do so, and he soon stops a useless fire.

The afternoon is thus spent. Russell's brigade has passed beyond the dry ditch, and on the right closely presses Hoke's positions. On the left Upton has halted at about sixty yards from the works occupied by Hays' brigade. Along the line the Confederates confine themselves to defending their works. Their artillery exchanges a few shots with Sedgwick's, but with little damage on either side. Russell, always on his skirmish-line, has studied the enemy's position, and proposes to his commander to assault it as soon as night has come. If the Federals can break into it by surprise and engage its defenders muzzle to muzzle, the batteries on the right bank cannot, in the darkness, fire on them, and the enemy will lose his best positions.

At dusk the artillery-fire has completely ceased. The darkness increases and the weather is cloudy; a violent south-west wind carries away from the Confederates all the sounds which could reveal to them the danger with which they are threatened. In fact, the Federals make their advance so silently that no sentinel detects them. Russell's brigade, which has but a short distance to travel, is only a few steps from the breastwork. In the twinkling of an eye the soldiers of the Sixth Maine scale the parapet and attack, hand to hand, those of Hoke: farther on the left the Fifth Wisconsin seizes upon the two guns placed in the horn-work, dislodges its defenders, and firmly establishes itself in it. But this combat of less than ten minutes has cost Russell half of his command. The Confederates perceive this, and, recovering from their first surprise, endeavor to drive the assailants back beyond the works which they have just scaled. Hays is preparing to bring his reserves to the rescue of Hoke's brigade.

Unfortunately for the Southerners, the violence of the wind drowns the sound of the fight. From the right bank Lee has seen the flash of the first shots fired by his soldiers, but the struggle having been afterward at close quarters, he neither sees nor hears anything more, and, believing it a mere feint, returns at once to his head-quarters. Early, having received from Hays a reassuring message, does not send him any reinforcements. The wind also prevents the Louisianians stationed in the works on the right from attaching more importance to Russell's attack than Lee did: they allow Upton's two regiments to leave the shelter of the railroad and approach to within twenty-five yards of their intrenchments before discovering them. Their surprise is complete. The Fifth Maine and One-hundred-and-twenty-first New York, after having received a volley from the pickets, drive them out of their works without firing a single shot. The redoubt thus conquered with its artillery offers them a solid *point d'appui* from which they cannot be dislodged. This success is so prompt that Hays halts with the Ninth Louisiana, and thinks only of covering the bridge. This success relieves the Federal right, a part of which was already driven beyond the breastworks by Goodwin's repeated assaults. Finally, the arrival of the two reserve regiments of Russell's brigade prevents Goodwin from returning against Up-

ton, and promptly determines the issue of the combat. The line which he had formed is scattered. A part of the Confederate soldiers are closely collected around their colors, planted on the parapet itself, and suffer themselves to be surrounded rather than abandon them. The others fall back on the bridge, but it is too late. Whilst the Federals, who on their right have reached the river above the bridge, are again descending its course, the Sixth Maine makes, in a contrary direction, a similar movement. Leaving the One-hundred-and-twenty-first New York to occupy the captured works, this regiment bears to the right, takes in reverse the Confederates who are struggling against the Fifth Wisconsin, and, passing between the river and the combatants, reaches the head of the ponton bridge, the only way of retreat for the two Southern brigades. The net being thus closed around them, the latter continue their resistance in isolated groups. In the midst of one of these is Colonel Goodwin, who vainly endeavors to open a passage to the bridge: the troops who follow him, pressed on all sides, melt away visibly, and he is brought to a stand at the river with the most resolute of his soldiers.

Early at last is warned of the situation of his men by those who have succeeded in reaching the bridge before the enemy. But he cannot again open the passage to the bridge to rescue them, nor fire upon the enemy for fear of firing into his own men. He and his men are powerless to prevent this bloody revenge for Ball's Bluff. By the flash of the guns they follow the movements of the despairing struggle progressing on the other side of the dark river, which forms before them an impassable abyss. A dam situated below the bridge gives it, in this place, a depth and width which render any crossing impossible. A large number of stragglers throw themselves into these chilly waters, but very few reach the friendly bank. The Federals are reunited, and complete the investment of those who are still struggling. The firing soon ceases, the conquered are disarmed, and a bright light reflected on the waters informs the two armies of the result of this nocturnal combat. It is Early who has set the pontoons on fire, thus inflicting on the Confederates a serious loss. About four hundred and fifty have escaped, among them General Hays, who, after having surrendered, has been carried off by his horse,



under a shower of balls, over the bridge already occupied by the enemy, and has thus been saved almost in spite of himself. The victory won by the Federals has cost them nearly three hundred men, and put into their hands more than sixteen hundred prisoners, eight flags, and four cannon. This remarkable result has been obtained by scarcely three thousand men. The assailants were hardly superior in numbers to the experienced troops whom they have dislodged from the works, scattered, and disarmed; so true it is that the best soldiers, when surprised by night, generally lose all their advantages. We find the proof of the moral effect of this surprise in the report of General Hays, an experienced soldier, who estimates the number of the assailants at twenty-five thousand.

Lee at the news of this defeat, the most painful which had as yet been inflicted on his army, immediately orders a retreat. At three o'clock in the morning Early has left the banks of the Rappahannock. On the morning of the 8th he joins the remainder of Ewell's corps, which, without waiting for Meade's attack, has crossed Mountain Run, and, marching through Stevensburg, has reached at daybreak the heights of Pony Mountain. Hill falls back rapidly from the upper Rappahannock on Culpeper. Up to November 7th the Confederates have lost in all two thousand and thirty-three men. Dislodged from all their positions, they cannot cope with the enemy until they have re-formed behind the Rapidan, and Meade, while quickening the steps of his soldiers, has the chance of attacking separately their retreating columns. In fact, Hill before joining Ewell must go through Culpeper: the three Federal corps which have crossed the Rappahannock at Kelly's Ford have only to march rapidly forward to separate these two columns, and pursue the second or outstrip the first at Culpeper. But Meade cannot take so bold a resolution. Hastily reaching Rappahannock Bridge before daybreak, he cannot persuade himself that Lee has given up the strong position which he occupied on the right bank. On the morning of the 8th, a thick fog hiding it from his sight, he dares not attempt the crossing, and awaits French, who has ascended that bank from Kelly's Ford to the ruins of the bridge. This movement takes up all the morning. At last, the Third corps, after having encountered



Early's rear-guard, reaches the railroad: the Union soldiers show themselves on the banks of the Rappahannock and in the deserted batteries. With their help a ponton is soon thrown over the river, and the Sixth corps rapidly crosses. But the day is on the wane, and Meade has lost all chance of engaging the enemy. The two Federal corps resume the march in line of battle, already performed on the same ground four weeks before, but without going this time beyond Brandy Station. The following day all the army is over the Rappahannock, but Lee has crossed the Rapidan. The Federals are compelled to halt until the reoccupied part of the railroad is repaired so as to allow the march forward.

Owing to the zeal of the officers entrusted with that task, the great bridge is rebuilt in eight days, and on the 19th Brandy Station is reached. Four days are still necessary to bring and distribute the numerous supplies which the army will require. Meade has been thus detained a fortnight between the Rappahannock and Culpeper—a delay which in view of the approaching winter deprives the campaign of its best chance of success. He has, however, taken advantage of this forced inaction to be accurately informed of his adversary's positions.

The Rapidan, a mere stream when it leaves the Blue Ridge, flows toward the south, then toward the south-east, and takes at Liberty Mills a north-east direction, which it follows until it loses itself in the Rappahannock. It has strategical importance only below its confluence with Robertson's River, a little above Rapidan Station, where it is crossed by the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. This part of its course may be divided into two parts—one above and the other below Mine Run, a large brook which descends on the right bank and takes its source in the rugged plateau of the Wilderness.

Above Mine Run the country is tolerably open and cultivated, but extremely rough near Rapidan Station, where the group of hills called Clark's Mountain commands the river for a distance. Lower down it is tolerably level, but very steep declivities, which command the opposite bank, facilitate everywhere the defence both of the southern bank and some fords. Those of the lower part, less difficult to force, are, following the course of the stream, Jacobs', Germanna, Culpeper, and Ely's Fords. The embank-

ment of the river renders the first and the second inaccessible to wagons. If the fords are more practicable below than above Mine Run, the country, on the contrary, is much less so. Although cut with numerous glades along Wilderness Run, the large forest in which was fought the battle of Chancellorsville, with its impenetrable thickets, its deep ravines, and its hills, extends as far as Mine Run. The paths are few and winding. The valley of Mine Run, wide, marshy, with clusters of trees, lies between steep declivities crowned with woods.

The old and new Fredericksburg roads to Orange, very near each other and parallel to the Rapidan, traverse all that country. Our readers are acquainted with them. The first, called the turnpike, is the nearest to the Rapidan; it crosses Wilderness Run near Carter's Tavern, which sheltered the wounded Jackson, and at which terminates the Culpeper road by way of Germanna Ford. Then it extends as far as Orange on a straight line twenty-five miles in length. Nearly five miles from Wilderness Tavern is Locust Grove, also called Robertson's Tavern, where there is an important cross-road, and a little over two miles from there the turnpike crosses Mine Run. The new or plank road separates from the former at Dowdall's Tavern, and passes five miles farther the solitary house called Parker's Store; then, at three miles' distance, New Hope Church. After having crossed several ravines, whose waters form Mine Run, it comes nearer the turnpike and approaches the village of Verdierville, which lies between the two roads six miles from New Hope Church and fourteen from Orange. Several roads connect these two roads with the fords of the Rapidan. We have mentioned the Germanna road, which strikes the turnpike at Wilderness Tavern and continues on to the plank road. A forest-path which separates from it at the left bank of Wilderness Run leads to the mine called Culpeper, situated near the river, and whence one can easily reach the ford of the same name. Two roads lead from Robertson's Tavern—one through successive forks to Germanna, Jacobs', and Mitchell's Fords, beyond Mine Run; the other, much higher still, to Raccoon Ford and to Rapidan Station. To reach these three crossings of the river one crosses Mine Run at Bartlett's and Tinsley's Mills, and by a

bridge a mile below Bowers' Mill, and not far from Zoar Church,\* which is on the left bank.

Lee has chosen for his main line of defence that part of the Rapidan which lies between the railroad bridge and Mine Run. A few works erected opposite each ford are sufficient to prevent the Federal cavalry patrols from guarding the whole course of the river, and to signal their presence on the opposite bank in time to oppose them with considerable force if they have the imprudence to attempt a crossing. Not being able to cover at the same time Fredericksburg and Orange Court-house, Lee, to protect the railroads at Gordonsville, abandons the former of these two towns and the lower fords of the Rapidan. He brings his extreme right back *en potence* on the strong line of Mine Run, and, refusing his left wing, he places it along the upper Rapidan from the railroad to Liberty Mills. Hill is on the left, Ewell on the right. Although their front, for fear of a turning movement, is much prolonged, they can be rapidly concentrated either on the upper Rapidan or on Mine Run, thanks to the Orange Railroad to Gordonsville and to the plank road, which facilitate the movements parallel to their front and allow them to obtain their supplies whilst observing the course of the river. Lee, desiring a central position for his head-quarters, has placed them on the side of Clark's Mountain.

Meade, better informed than usual, estimates the army of his adversary at forty-five thousand men, a number nearly correct, as he has forty-eight thousand two hundred and sixty-nine men, of all arms, present for duty. He has also been informed of an important fact. The defensive works rapidly built on the front of that army cover the Rapidan and the lower part of Mine Run; but they stop at Bartlett's Mill, and no work has been erected either on the turnpike or on the plank road—a serious error, for these two roads thus remain open on the Confederate flank.

Meade can neither turn the enemy's left, from fear of uncovering Washington, nor confront him, nor remove his base of opera-

\* This Zoar Church must not be mistaken for the church of the same name situated between Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg. Bartlett's Mill is also called Barclay's and Bartley's Mill.



tions to the lower Rappahannock, since Halleck forbids it. He resolves to cross the Rapidan at that part of the river which his adversary is not defending, and will attempt to outflank his right and attack him on that extremity by the two parallel roads. He thus hopes to be able to crush Ewell's corps before Hill can come to its rescue, and then inflict the same fate on the latter, and, pushing the enemy's army before him, seize upon Gordonsville. This plan resembles the one Hooker had adopted for the campaign of Chancellorsville, except that, once in the Wilderness, the Army of the Potomac will face the right and not the left. It presents the same advantages and drawbacks. It places the Federals on the flank of the Confederates, and compels them to form a new line of battle on one of their wings. But to succeed it is necessary to conceal this movement from the enemy and to outmarch him. This last condition is hard to perform, for the huge mass of men, horses, and wagons which comprises the Army of the Potomac to reach these two roads will have to cross fords difficult of access and move through a country where the roads seem to have been made on purpose to mislead travellers and delay the marching of troops. Meade is informed of this drawback, but, not having the choice of operations, he persists in his design, confident that his lieutenants will punctually execute the movements which he has combined with an indisputable skill.

The army will march in three columns. French, with the Third corps, will place himself in advance on the right and cross the river at Jacobs' Ford, one mile and a half below the mouth of Mine Run, and proceed toward Robertson's Tavern, where he will join the Second corps. The latter, forming the centre, under Warren's command, will cross Germanna Ford, and instead of taking the direct road to Robertson's Tavern will make a *détour* to Orange Grove on the road to Chancellorsville, to reach the turnpike between Wilderness Church and Robertson's Tavern. Sykes, with the Fifth corps, will have the advance on the left, cross the Rapidan at Culpeper Ford, follow the road coming from Germanna Ford to the point where it forks on the plank road, and then, turning to the right on that route, will go, if possible, to take position at Parker's Store. Gregg's cavalry division will



cover the left of the army, and thus form the extremity of the marching wing. Passing Ely's Ford, it will take the route designated on the map as the Brock road, the same which Jackson had followed during the battle of Chancellorsville, and will halt at Corbin's Bridge, a bridge thrown across the river Po not far from Todd's Tavern, a place whose name is already known to our readers. The two other cavalry divisions remain behind. Custer will observe the fords of the Rapidan on the right, and Merritt will guard the trains parked at Richardsville near the confluence of the Rapidan with the Rappahannock. Meade, rightly thinking that he will at first encounter his adversaries on his right, and wishing to separate them in their first resistance and not allow them time to concentrate, orders the Sixth corps to follow the Third. The column led by French will comprise nearly thirty thousand men. Newton, while leaving a division to guard the railroad, will march with the other two in Sykes' steps, thus giving to the right about twenty-five thousand men. The centre, composed of a single corps and of the reserve artillery, will have an effective force of about ten thousand. This plan has the objection of giving the better roads to the weaker columns and compelling the most numerous to follow the narrower and winding ones. The movement was to commence on the 24th, but a heavy rain having soaked all the roads on the 23d, it was definitively fixed for the 26th of November. After a fine and late autumn the bad weather at last gives unmistakable signs of its approach.

Meade believes that the whole army will cross the Rapidan before sunset on the same day, and will occupy on the 27th, at noon, Robertson's Tavern and Parker's Store. He has ordered eight days' provisions to be taken in the soldiers' knapsacks and in the division trains, and will thus find himself during one week entirely free in his movements. Each of the three columns is accompanied by a bridge-train—a very wise precaution, for the slightest flood may submerge the fords.

The First and Sixth corps, being at a greater distance from the Rapidan, will pass behind the Fifth and Third; each corps will march at six o'clock in the morning. As Meade has reckoned, the Fifth corps on the left, and the Second in the centre, arrive before ten o'clock at the Rapidan. But the right

column is behind time. When the Sixth corps reaches Brandy Station it finds the Third still occupied with the first preparations for its departure; several hours are lost before the column is able to march—an unpardonable delay, justly attributed by Meade to General French. The Third corps reaches Jacobs' Ford only at noon. Unforeseen difficulties impede its crossing. The banks of the river are steep, and a day's work would not suffice to cut them away sufficiently for the crossing of the artillery and wagons. French despatches these to Germanna Ford, where the river is more accessible. But the boats must be brought down, and this retards the building of the bridge for several hours.

However, Meade, who accompanies Warren, fearing to reveal too soon his design, does not allow the remainder of his troops to commence the crossing before the right column has landed on the southern bank. This prudence retards the movements of the whole army. At length, about half-past one, he resolves to wait no longer, and orders Warren and Sykes to prepare for crossing. But the waters of the Rapidan have been swollen by the last rain. At Germanna Ford the soldiers in the advance of the Second corps are in the water up to their necks, and reach the opposite bank only after great difficulty. The fords being impracticable, the pontonniers launch their boats, but in consequence of the overflow the bridges are found too short, and in order to lengthen them it is necessary to hastily cut trees and make trestles. While the heads of columns are thus detained, the troops who follow advance slowly as the way is opened. Nothing is more tiresome than a march interrupted by long halts, during which the soldiers cannot even make their coffee for fear of being interrupted by the order to move. The bridges are at last practicable. Sykes on the left, Warren in the centre, and French on the right, cross them before sunset with a part of their forces. But night stops them at a short distance from the river. The Second corps reaches Flat Run, four miles from Germanna Ford: the advance of the Third corps having lost its way, French finally returns to the river-bank with his fatigued soldiers. It is after midnight when he gives up the bridge to the Sixth corps for crossing. The

entire night is spent before the army has left the Rapidan, more than twelve hours having already been lost.

A few troops, it is true, move forward on the 27th at dawn while the remainder are taking a little needed rest; but Lee is already on his guard. Custer's demonstration at Raccoon Ford has awakened his attention, and soon Stuart's cavalry has informed him of the arrival of the Federal columns on the Rapidan. To deceive the enemy, some troops have retreated without exchanging a single shot with them. Before the end of the day Lee has found out his adversary's plan, and gives his marching orders for the following day. Hill, calling together his corps at Orange Court-house, will move by the plank road toward Verdiersville. That the army may have time to form in the relatively open country lying on the left of Mine Run, Ewell will cross that stream and attack the enemy in the midst of the thickets which cover its right bank. The first encounter must take place in the open forest, in the wood-paths where the artillery is powerless, and where every struggle is confined to resisting the advance of the column, whatever may be the forces which are following.

All the Confederate army has been marching forward on the 27th before daybreak: the sharp and piercing weather causes the soldiers to regret the rough cabins which their adversaries compel them to leave for the second time this winter. Lee is the first on horseback. He starts at three o'clock in the morning from the town of Orange, and soon outstrips the column marching on the plank road. He is looking for Stuart, whom he finds at Verdiersville, and receives his report, and makes his dispositions for an encounter which seems imminent. The Federals not having yet appeared on the main roads, the Second corps has time to cross Mine Run; Hill will therefore be able to arrive on this stream. The line of defence is excellent; the whole army will occupy it on the 28th. The three divisions of the Second corps are marching in three parallel columns: Early, on the right, follows the plank road; Rodes, in the centre, has taken the road to Rapidan Station, which crosses Mine Run near Zoar Church; finally, Johnson, on the left, will cross that stream at Bartlett's Mill, and promptly en-



counter the troops which have crossed the Rapidan at Jacobs' Ford.

Upon their part, the Union soldiers are leaving without regret the cold and damp ground on which they have been stretching themselves for a few hours. The Second corps about ten o'clock reaches the turnpike at Robertson's Tavern, pushing before them, with artillery, the enemy's cavalry: they stop there without being molested, for Ewell has not yet crossed Mine Run. Sykes, covered on the left by Gregg, is moving forward on the plank road in the direction of New Hope Church. The marching wing thus takes the position which its commander has assigned it. But fresh delays impede the right. Prince's division, having started before daybreak, leads the advance of the Third corps. After marching a mile on the Tinsley's Mill and Robertson's Tavern road, Prince arrives about nine o'clock near the Morris house, in a glade where the road forks; the right branch strikes not far from Bartlett's Mill the Raccoon Ford road; the left one leads, after a few détours, to Robertson's Tavern. The skirmishers of Johnson's Confederate division, who have just passed Bartlett's Mill, already show themselves on the former road. Prince hears afar off Warren's cannon, and to join him on the turnpike, according to Meade's orders, he wants to take the left road; but on seeing the enemy on the right he sends for instructions to French, who is some distance in the rear. For two hours the whole column vainly awaits an order from French, who seems lost in the thickness of the forest. At last he orders Prince to take the right, but at the same time writes to Meade that he is near the turnpike and is halting for Warren. This piece of information is obviously false, and he receives for an answer a formal order to bring his corps to Robertson's Tavern, for the general is waiting for him to commence the movement toward Mine Run on the two roads. It is eleven o'clock. The whole of Ewell's corps has crossed this stream. Early, who follows the turnpike, finding Warren already halted at Robertson's Tavern, deploys his division, and thus succeeds in intimidating the Federals. Meade dares not attack him before the centre column is supported by the two others. Sykes, on the left, cannot yet fall in; but nothing excuses French's new delays. After having



at last placed Prince on the right road, he alters once more his plans and orders him to the right against Halford's brigade, which is at the head of the enemy's column. Meade is informed of these new dispositions, and imperatively orders French again to come to Robertson's Tavern, and if the enemy bar the way to at least push forward his left as far as the turnpike. The hours pass away, however: the Third corps, motionless, closes the road to the Sixth, and the whole right is paralyzed at the moment when the success of the movement depends on its prompt execution.

French receives Meade's orders about two o'clock, and, refusing to obey, pushes Prince forward in the direction of Bartlett's Mill, and confines himself to deploying Carr's division on the left of the road in the glade, as if he could in that manner reach the road, from which he is separated by more than three miles. Prince, while leaving his battery in the glade, engages the enemy in the thicket. But French's remissness has given Johnson time to be prepared. When, about three o'clock, Prince becomes seriously engaged with Halford, he finds him supported by the remainder of the enemy's division, and after a bloody struggle he is thrown back to the glade. Carr is engaged in his turn. But Johnson, by a vigorous assault against his left, causes the retirement of Smith's brigade, deployed on a too extended front in the vain hope of joining the Second corps. The two other brigades, short of ammunition, are about to follow his example, and the remainder of the column, squeezed between the two green hills, cannot rescue the troops so seriously engaged. Fortunately, Birney has been able to deploy his men, taking Carr's place, and with a few guns stops the enemy. Johnson has attained his end in having prevented the Federals from completing their movement. This murderous combat has cost him more than five hundred men; the Union losses are about seven hundred killed and wounded. Night finds the combatants face to face. French allows himself to be overtaken by it in a position which he has not known how to leave; darkness renders all movements of the troops impossible in the midst of the labyrinth of the forest. On the 27th the right column has not been able to travel over the seven miles which separate Jacobs' Ford from Robertson's Tavern. This deplorable result, which Meade in his report attrib-

utes alone to French's conduct, would be sufficient to defeat the whole plan of the campaign. In fact, Warren in the centre, awaiting the right, does not go beyond Robertson's Tavern, and Meade, while fearing to risk his left, detains Sykes near New Hope Church.

The Confederates have taken advantage of the remissness of their adversaries. While Johnson fights on the right, Early and Rodes have been marching forward on the two roads which unite at Robertson's Tavern. Thus menaced by two strong divisions, Warren has deployed Hays on each side of the road, and Webb on the right across the road to Rapidan Station; but on both sides they avoid taking the offensive on ground which compels the assailant to march absolutely in the dark. Meade, thinking that the Confederates would not take advantage of the two roads which unite before Robertson's Tavern, orders Newton, who was to follow Sykes on the plank road, to take the turnpike and reinforce Warren. The two divisions of the First corps reach that central position toward evening. Gregg is at Parker's Store. He hoped to continue his march toward the south as far as Corbin's Bridge, but he has found on the plank road General Rosser with a part of Stuart's cavalry, and after a lively engagement drives him in an opposite direction as far as New Hope Church. In his turn, Rosser, reinforced, has compelled Gregg to look for support to Sykes, who is advancing in his steps. He encamps with the Fifth corps in the neighborhood of New Hope Church.

On the evening of the 27th, Lee has averted the principal danger which menaced him: Hill's corps has arrived on Mine Run; the concentration of his army is assured. Ewell is ordered to fall back by night and take position on the left of the Third corps on the lower stream of Mine Run. The audacity with which he has moved forward on the 27th has not only retarded the Unionists' march, but deceived them as to his intentions. Meade is persuading himself that the Confederates wish to crush his right and separate him from the Rapidan: to parry this attack he renounces the extension of his left on the plank road, and Sykes is ordered to return to the turnpike at Robertson's Tavern, where Newton has already brought to Warren the reinforcement of his two divisions. The Sixth corps will leave the right to

likewise increase the centre column, which will comprise the whole army except the Third corps. Meade in this manner sacrifices his plan of turning the defences of Mine Run, in the vain hope of seeing the enemy expose himself by an imprudent manœuvre.

On the morning of the 28th the two divisions of the First corps, placing themselves on the left of the Second, form with it on each side of the turnpike a line of battle which is advanced toward the west, sometimes deployed, but oftener in parallel columns. The right resumes the march interrupted on the preceding day; the Third corps, passing behind the Second, follows toward Rowe's Mill; the Sixth changes direction on reaching Warren's right wing, when they form themselves into line of battle to march toward Mine Run by the paths which run through the forest. But the enemy, whom the Federals hoped to take by surprise in the woods, has disappeared, and when they reach the crest between Rowe's and Bartlett's Mills, which commands Mine Run at the height of more than thirty-five yards, they perceive before them the whole Confederate army posted on the opposite bank. At their feet the stream inundates a part of the valley. The rain which had swollen it, ceasing for two days, has begun again, and the forest-paths are almost impracticable; the artillery and troops which are not on the first line cannot take a step forward without stumbling in the mire. Finally, a fog which is gradually thickening renders all objects indistinct and exaggerates distances. Whilst the Third corps, passing behind the line of battle, places itself on the left of the First, and Sykes, returned by a night-march to Robertson's Tavern, is moving forward in column on the turnpike, the Unionist generals are observing the enemy's positions and looking for the weak points which they can attack.

The time which they employ in that way is not lost to their adversaries. Hill, arriving on the evening of the 27th with all his corps after a very long march, has stationed it on Ewell's right and behind Mine Run. Though, if the Confederate army is assembled, nothing is prepared for the defence of this new ground: the Federals can still on that day attack the Southerners on an equal footing above Bartlett's Mill. But the latter are working, while Meade and his lieutenants are watching and



reflecting. On the morning of the 28th the engineers of each Confederate division have hastily marked out the works designed to cover their front and shelter the artillery. The trees on the edge of the forest are cut, and lines of freshly-dug earth soon cover the crest of the hills. Lee himself directs these works. In the evening, when the Union generals assemble in the tent of their chief, they state that the positions of the Confederates on the left bank of Mine Run are reciprocally flanking each other, commanding the whole valley, and are already strongly fortified, and not to be carried.

However, a resolution must be made, for every hour spent in immobility diminishes the Federals' chances. They have but to turn Mine Run Valley while approaching its sources, and return on the plank road, so imprudently abandoned on the preceding day. Warren, who has proposed this plan, takes upon himself to direct the extreme left of the army. He will feel the enemy's right and shake it by his attacks, or will manœuvre in order to turn it, though to obtain this result he is to extend his lines on the south as far as Fredericksburg. He is reinforced by Terry's division, temporarily withdrawn from Sedgwick; his men receive several days' rations and extra cartridges, for the trains will not be able to follow them; he will take with him only three batteries of artillery.

He starts on the morning of the 29th. The march is long and laborious, for his forces cannot follow the turnpike, encumbered by the troops and the wagons which are moving toward the west, and to reach New Hope Church they follow a short cut already broken up by Sykes' movement in a contrary direction. On the plank road Warren deploys Caldwell's two brigades, and moves forward while pushing before him the skirmishers of Hill's corps. He arrives at last before that corps, whose positions on Mine Run are less strong than Ewell's, and are as yet lacking artificial defences. However, he does not attack them vigorously, as the enemy is appearing behind him. On the Catharpin road \* Rosser has so sharply attacked Gregg's cavalry that Terry has been compelled to detach Shaler's brigade to assist it. Warren endeavors to outflank the Confederate right, but as

\* At Parker's Store, by the road coming from the Catharpin road.—Ed.



he extends his line toward the south, Hill, discovering his design, prolongs his line of battle. Webb, of the Second Union corps, deploys a brigade on the right to join Prince of the Third on the turnpike, and to support by another brigade on the left of Caldwell's division, which on each side of the unfinished embankment of the railroad extends to nine hundred yards on the south of the plank road as far as the Catharpin road, and thus ends Warren's line at sixteen miles on the north of Frederickshall. Finally, when his troops are in place, Warren has but the time before night to examine Hill's positions on Mine Run. The attack cannot take place before the following day, the 30th.

Whilst he is executing this movement the remainder of the army has remained stationary; the rear-guards have joined their corps, the stragglers have come up, and a fresh distribution of rations has been made. The reconnoissance of the enemy's line has given encouraging results. Howe's division of the Sixth corps, which occupies the extreme Federal right in the direction of Bartlett's Mill, outflanks the opposite wing of the enemy. A turning of the valley allows a cross artillery-fire on the extremity of that wing; the declivities it occupies seem accessible; a grove on the right bank offers a shelter to prepare the attack and conceal the reserves.

Meade, who has been vainly looking for the weak point of the enemy's line, receives with pleasure, about six o'clock in the evening, Howe's report. The point designated by the latter will be attacked on the 30th by the Sixth, supported by the Fifth corps, whilst the left will also assume the offensive. Warren, who comes personally for the orders of his chief, assures him that the enemy on this side has no natural or artificial defence. He undertakes to dislodge him on the morning of the following day if Hill does not prevent it by a prompt retreat. Giving full credit to this information, Meade orders Carr's and Prince's divisions to march by night to increase to twenty-six thousand men the force with which Warren is to strike the decisive blow. Sykes, leaving the right, is to support Sedgwick's attack; the centre is occupied only by two divisions of the First corps and Birney's of the Third. These troops will not move forward unless the enemy's line has been broken on one side or the other.

During the night Warren and Sedgwick prepare the orders for the attacks which have been entrusted to them, that of the former to take place at eight o'clock in the morning. Immediately after, the Federal artillery will open fire along the whole line, and at nine o'clock the positions of the Southern extreme left will be assailed by Sedgwick. He closes in mass Howe's division in the grove opposite the enemy's positions, and his batteries are placed during the night; rations and ammunition are distributed to the troops. Warren has placed in line of battle, on a front of sixteen hundred yards, his five divisions, each formed two or three lines deep: Terry, on the left, occupies the Catharpin road; Hays and Webb of the Second corps are respectively on the south and the north of the unfinished railroad; Prince is on Webb's right; Carr joins him at the plank road; Caldwell of the Second corps is in reserve on this road.

The demonstration made by Warren on Mine Run in the afternoon of the 29th, which has cost him about twenty men, has of course attracted Hill's attention toward his extreme right, which he has hastily reinforced. The concentration of the Federal forces on the south of the plank road could the less escape him since Warren, far from concealing them, has, on the contrary, applied himself, while placing them in sight of the enemy and lighting large fires, to making them appear still more considerable than they were in reality. He has himself stated this fact, without explaining the reason of these tactics, which are incomprehensible on the eve of an attack. If he hoped to intimidate the enemy, he was greatly mistaken. Hill, well warned, brings back all his forces on the south of the plank road, thus opposing about twenty thousand men to the twenty-six thousand of his adversary, and hastily constructs a few intrenchments. A small stream and a space of about six hundred yards separate the combatants. The night is long and cold.

The dawn, impatiently waited for on both sides, at length makes its appearance. Meade's manœuvre has been baffled. The Southern army, closed in mass behind Mine Run, presents everywhere a formidable front; the intrenchments roughly sketched the day before by Hill have been completed during the night; the artillery, concealed in the woods, is displayed on all the heights.

The Federals study with attention, then with uneasiness, the positions which they are about to assault. Almost all have witnessed Fredericksburg and Gettysburg; they know by a double experience that a bloody defeat is reserved to the one of the two armies which takes the offensive. It is said that most of them on the morning of the 30th took care to pin to their coats pieces of paper bearing their names. They wished that their names might be placed over the fresh earth which was to cover them in their everlasting sleep. No hope of glory was occupying their minds at that supreme hour, but they were anxious to secure on that distant soil the modest epitaph which allows the soldier's family to distinguish his remains, instead of having to kneel at the grave of the unknown. It was in this manner, it is related, that they silently showed the conviction that they were going to be asked for a useless sacrifice. If it is only a legend—for legends are sometimes easily made—it is worth being quoted, for it perfectly describes the character of the Army of the Potomac.

A few minutes more and it will be eight o'clock: every one is waiting for the signal; faces are grave but resolute. Warren, however, has been still more struck than his soldiers by the formidable aspect of the enemy's positions: those which seemed scarcely defended on the evening of the preceding day are covered with artillery. His first examination had perhaps been too superficial. He ought to have foreseen that by parading his forces on the evening of the 29th, and leaving to his adversaries fourteen hours' respite, he was inviting them to put themselves on their defence. But Warren will not lose time in useless regrets: he has a rapid *coup d'œil* and a correct judgment, and does not shrink from responsibility. His decision is quickly made: the attack trusted to his care cannot succeed, and he does not hesitate to postpone it. He must have great moral courage to take this step, for he will be pardoned more easily, he knows, an unfortunate act of daring than the most justifiable prudence. The fatal hour has come: the regiments under arms receive no orders—a painful waiting to those who are ready to march to death, and which at first arouses in them a feverish impatience. But they soon divine the wise hesitation of Warren; they whisper to each other that the attack is abandoned, and every one imme-



diately forgets the future conflicts and the present sufferings to think only of the absent family and of home, sweet home.

However, on the front of the right wing the Federal artillery has opened exactly at eight o'clock; its firing disturbs the Confederates, who answer without any success. Birney, always daring, has pushed his skirmishers forward: they have already crossed Mine Run and dislodged the enemy from the *trous de loup* which they occupied on the left bank. Sedgwick's guns concentrate their projectiles on the point which the Sixth corps is going to attack. All are astonished at not hearing anything on the left, when at ten minutes to nine Warren's despatch informs Meade of the grave resolution which he has just taken, and asks the commander-in-chief to come and judge personally his motive. Immediately the artillery is ordered to cease firing, Birney recalls his skirmishers, and Sedgwick does not order his troops forward. The attack of the right being subordinate to that of the left, Meade does not hesitate to give this counter-order. He is wrong, perhaps. The eight Federal divisions united near the turnpike have before them only Ewell's corps, since Hill has concentrated all his forces on the plank road opposite Warren. The two armies are thus each divided into two groups, separated from each other by a space of five or six miles, and Lee cannot more promptly reinforce his left than Meade his right. The Federal troops ready for the attack on this side might perhaps succeed, and are profoundly disappointed by the inaction imposed upon them.

Meade has promptly joined Warren; he approves and confirms his decision. To remain faithful to his plan of campaign, he ought to manœuvre still more on the south in order to outflank the enemy's right. But the only roads running from east to west which cross this country are wood-paths soaked by the rain; by going from the Rapidan his communications would be exposed to the dangers of sudden freshets, which are frequent in this season; and on the supplies being exhausted it would be necessary to order the trains to come from Richardsville: in short, he would cease covering the capital, contrary to Halleck's formal instructions. He has then but one favorable chance left: it is to concentrate anew on the turnpike and attack Lee's left



before it has been reinforced. He immediately orders the two divisions of the Third corps to join Birney's, and Sykes and Sedgwick to close in mass around them.

But the Confederates are prepared all along the line to receive their adversaries. The latter have wanted once more to reconcile two incompatible conditions in war: they have had the pretension to take by surprise a vigilant enemy, and grant to themselves the necessary time to survey his positions. The delay of the 30th has allowed Lee time to complete the works which render his front impregnable. When the Federal troops, who have assembled on the turnpike only after sunset on the morning of the next day, perceive the new obstacles which are covering this front, the doubt is no longer possible. If Meade were free to direct his movements, he would conceal himself from the enemy and march on Fredericksburg, and thus derive a great advantage from this campaign's début, but a preposterous order forbids him. Nothing, therefore, remains but to bring his army back to its camps. To conceal this retreat the movement must commence on the evening of the 1st of December.

Lee, however, after having availed himself of the respite which his adversaries were granting, and awaiting them with confidence, begins to feel impatient: perhaps he is afraid that Meade may escape him and reach Fredericksburg. Two divisions advance on the plank road; on the morning of the 2d they find nothing before them. The Federals, sad and silent, have taken advantage of this long winter night to return to the fords of the Rapidan, and have crossed in the morning. The retreat has been well conducted. On the morning of the 3d the Union army re-enters its camps. Lee, soon informed of the crossing by Stuart's scouts, halts his troops and brings them back to their former positions. He experienced, it is said, a great disappointment on seeing the Federals vanish like an autumnal fog in the midst of the forest without his alert cavalry being able to gather up a cannon, a caisson, or an ambulance.

In this campaign, so short and in which so little blood has been shed, he has inaugurated the system of improvised defences which will allow him in the following year to cope with Grant. The enormous losses the latter will sustain before positions not so well

prepared as those of Mine Run will be the justification of the resolution taken on the 30th of November by Meade and Warren, who did not command all the forces of the republic as he did. French's delays on the 26th and 27th, the false manœuvre of the 28th, in short, the remissness of all the Federal movements, were the immediate causes of the failure of an operation which, it must be said, was otherwise well conducted. However, Meade had other things for which to reproach himself: French had not his confidence, and he had the right to ask for his removal; he could have required of Halleck an entire freedom of action; in short, he ought to have obtained from his corps commanders a greater promptness in their movements, and have given them the example by using less time in his reconnoissances. Besides, the season rendered success almost impossible: the winter rains could from day to day transform each brook into an insurmountable obstacle; the fogs, the long nights, and a country unknown to the Unionists, were all in favor of the defence.

Taught by this experiment, the Federals will wait the anniversary of Chancellorsville to resume active operations on the Rapidan, and the month of December will be marked only by insignificant cavalry encounters. On the 11th a Federal regiment leaves Williamsburg on the Virginia peninsula, and crosses the Chickahominy, reaching on the 12th Charles City Court-house, and captures about a hundred Confederate recruits, and immediately returns to its starting-point. Shortly after, in the Valley of Virginia, the Federals attempt a *coup de main*, despite the rigor of the season. Taking advantage of the fact that Imboden has been called to the west of the Shenandoah to fight Averell, Colonel Boyd, with the First New York cavalry, leaves the banks of the Potomac to give chase to the small bands of guerillas who are scouting in this rich country. He reaches New Market without opposition, but is at last stopped by a detachment of Early's division encamped since the end of the campaign at Staunton. He escapes from the Confederates by a prompt retreat. In the mean time, Rosser, the Southern general, has made, with a few bold troopers, a raid around Meade's army: crossing the Rappahannock near Fredericksburg, he arrives at Front Royal, but has not been able to destroy the Federal dépôts nor the railroad, but

arrives in time to reinforce the Confederates in the Shenandoah Valley. Pleasanton, fearing at the same time for Boyd and Averell, the latter being seriously engaged in Western Virginia, starts four regiments of Gregg's cavalry division after Rosser. Colonel Smith, in command, leaves Bealeton on the 21st of December, passes through Sulphur Springs and the village of Sperryville, forces Thornton's Gap on the following day, puts to flight on the 23d a Confederate detachment near Luray, and, after crossing the Shenandoah, goes through an almost inaccessible gorge of Massanutten Mountain called Fort Valley, in the remotest part of which one of the boldest of the Southern partisans, Major Gilmor, has made his base of operations. After having scattered the guard and destroyed the stores, Smith retraces his steps through Little Washington, and re-enters on Christmas Day the Union lines.

Before closing this chapter we must say a word of the expeditions and combats of which Western Virginia was the theatre during the last six months of 1863. The small corps which carry the colors of the two sides continue the war between the Ohio and the Alleghanies without any such great battles as are being fought in the East and West, and seem to have little influence on the struggle in which they have engaged from the first days of Secession.

The invasion of Pennsylvania has, however, suspended for a month this local warfare, postponed only for want of combatants. Jones and Imboden are accompanying Lee's army; Kelley, with the greater part of the Federal troops which were occupying Western Virginia, is guarding the upper Potomac. As soon as Lee has recrossed the river the Unionists prepare to assume the offensive along the chain of the Alleghanies. We will mention here only the operations in Virginia, those of which Eastern Tennessee were the theatre belong to another chapter, for they are closely connected with the struggle around Chattanooga.

Let us briefly recall the configuration of Western Virginia. The main chain of the Alleghanies between the two gaps opened by the waters of the Potomac on the north and New River on the south forms an insuperable wall for the armies, except at a single point in the centre, where a practicable route, coming from Buckhannon and Beverly on the west, crosses the mountain



between the Traveller's Repose Tavern and Monterey. To go through the wild region between the Alleghanies and the Blue Ridge the Federals are compelled either to start from the Potomac and cross the neighboring pass of the Traveller's Repose, or to follow one of the routes which concentrate at Lewisburg on the west of the Alleghanies near New River, and which cross the chain in its least rugged part. These roads descend on the east into parallel valleys, some poor and narrow, others rich and broad, whose waters join to form Jackson's River, known below under the name of James River. Except for the saltpetre, the Confederates derive but few supplies from the country between the Potomac and New River. The Union expeditions, to have a really useful end, should be directed toward the more southern region, whence descends on the east the Roanoke, on the west New River, on the south the Cumberland. In fact, it is at that point that the Virginia and East Tennessee Railroad passes: the importance of this road in a military point of view has been stated elsewhere. This line has been already reached by Carter at the end of 1862; its destruction will be henceforth the Unionists' real objective point in Western Virginia.

They lose no time in taking the field. The Confederates have crossed the Potomac on the evening of the 13th of July; on the same day all the movable force which their adversaries have retained in the Kanawha Valley are preparing to destroy the Tennessee Railroad. This small column, composed of two regiments—one of cavalry, the other of mounted infantry—under the command of Colonel Toland, leaves Brownsville on the banks of the Ohio, follows Coal River, and takes on the right the only road which crosses this country through Guyandotte Mountain to the village of Oceana, whence it breaks into the Alleghanies through the valley of Tug Fork, one of the affluents of Sandy River, and arrives on the 17th at the town of Jeffersonville, near the source of Clinch River, where it captures a dépôt with thirty-five men. The Federals, after a night's rest, resume their rapid march, successively climb the large hills of the main chain, and at last reach the town of Wytheville on the left bank of New River, in the large valley watered by an affluent of that stream and followed by the Tennessee Railroad. Until then they have met with no resistance,



but the direction taken from Jeffersonville has revealed their design, and the Confederates hastily call together at Wytheville all the detachments which are found in the neighborhood. The inhabitants are almost all armed and join them. When the first squadrons of the Unionist Second Virginia enter the streets at a gallop, they are welcomed by a murderous fire from all the windows, which throws them into disorder: the remainder of the regiment comes to their support, and they charge through the town, capturing two guns placed in battery at the market-place, and reach a small bridge on which a railroad passes to enter the city. The Federals burn the bridge, and thus cut the road, but their position soon becomes critical. The railroad brings a reinforcement of two hundred men to the Southerners, who move forward from house to house, sheltered from the enemy's balls. The Federal officers serve as a target to the skilful Virginia hunters. Colonel Powell, commanding the Unionist cavalry, is seriously wounded. Despite Toland's arrival with the Thirty-fourth Ohio, the Federals, driven from all the streets, are compelled to take refuge in the market-place; Toland is soon killed and the number of wounded rapidly increases. The Unionists, to keep off the enemies they cannot reach, set the houses on fire and retreat, leaving their wounded and the guns which they have captured. The Confederates drive them out of the town, rescue the prisoners, and capture part of their guard.

Although weakly pursued, the situation of the Federals is critical. The bridge which they have burnt can be so easily rebuilt that their expedition may be considered a failure; the Wytheville fight has been for them a complete defeat; the orders that Toland was carrying are written in cipher, and no one has the key. It is therefore necessary that his successor, Lieutenant-colonel Franklin, should retreat by the shortest road through the Kanawha Valley. On this route of course the Confederates will await him. He takes a northerly direction, crosses East Mountain, and halts at Raleigh Court-house. The Federals' supplies are exhausted, and they march for two days upon what they can gather up in this almost deserted country. When they reach East Mountain the enemy's cavalry has the audacity to forbid them the access to it, but they have all the

energy of despair, and force open the passage by a brilliant charge. The natural obstacles of the road detain them longer: in the midst of a dark night they have to climb and then descend rugged and rocky slopes; the exhausted horses can no longer carry their riders.

The column debouches at length on the western side of the Alleghanies, but the country is so poor that the Union soldiers can find nothing to stay their stomachs. After a four days' fast they reach Fayetteville on the Kanawha, hardly able to drag themselves along, and for the most part deprived of their horses, which have been starved to death. All their sufferings have been in vain; the expedition has had no results, because it was undertaken with too few men.

The Federals wait, therefore, to renew it with larger forces at their disposal. The month of August has arrived; all fear of a return of Lee to the Potomac seems to have vanished. Imboden has withdrawn to the upper Shenandoah. Kelley, henceforth free to direct his movements, organizes an expedition to invade the centre of the mountainous region. Averell, who commands a cavalry brigade under him, will break through the western hills of the Alleghanies at the Traveller's Repose and descend to Lewisburg, where General Scammon will bring him all the disengaged troops which are in the Kanawha Valley. These combined forces will be able to move without fear into the heart of the enemy's country: if Averell marches southward, he can reach even the Tennessee Railroad with ease. This line has at this moment an especial importance, for it takes to Bragg's army the reinforcements which the government at Richmond sends it: it is the same which has just been used to transfer Longstreet's corps to the West. Therefore, the Confederates have put themselves in position to protect it. General Samuel Jones\* is charged with the defence of the mountains with a strong division composed of infantry and cavalry. One of these brigades, under General Jackson's orders—often designated under the sobriquet of "Mudwall," to distinguish him from his illustrious namesake "Stonewall"—is awaiting Averell in the

\* He must not be mistaken for W. Jones, who has the command of a brigade in Stuart's cavalry.

upper valley of Greenbrier River. He is repulsed in some partial engagements, and pushed beyond the principal chain of the Alleghanies upon the one which extends itself on the east of Warm Springs and Jackson's River, and the Federals, after having descended for some time the course of the river, turn to the right to reach through White Sulphur Springs the town of Lewisburg, where they are to meet Scammon. But before arriving at the first of these two points, a summer health-resort formerly much frequented, they find General Jones, who, with Colonel Potter's brigade and a few cannon, bars the way against them. The Confederates have taken a very strong position on a hill which the road ascends after having crossed Rocky Springs brook. During the 26th of August, Averell vainly endeavors to dislodge him. Hoping that Scammon will come and fall upon his adversaries from an opposite direction, he resumes the attack on the morning of the 27th. But Scammon does not appear, for he has not reached Lewisburg: Jones, emboldened, attacks him in his turn, and about noon Averell, fearing lest his small troop should be brought to a halt in one of the gorges of that mountainous country, resolves to take again the road to the north. He has lost nearly a hundred and fifty men; the Confederates, more than two hundred. The Unionists leave about a hundred wounded and a broken gun, and halt at Huttonsville, near Beverly, on the western side of the Alleghanies.

Two months pass away before either of the two sides shakes off its inaction. At last, stimulated no doubt by the news that Meade is going to cross the Rappahannock, Averell leaves Beverly on the 1st of November with a column composed of all three arms. As in the month of August, he will have to proceed to Lewisburg to concentrate his troops, established in the Kanawha Valley, which will be brought to him by Colonel Duffié.

Scarcely entering through the pass at Traveller's Repose in the rich valley of the Greenbrier, Averell finds Jones, his old adversary. The latter has scattered his troops, that they may take up their winter quarters: surprised by the Federals' rapid march on Huntersville, he cannot fall back toward the east, and is compelled to collect his force and bring it back to the south by the Lewisburg road. The brigade that fought at Rocky Springs



under Potter, and whose command General Echols has resumed, is in this town: he orders it to meet Averell with a part of Jenkins' force, while Jackson, who has remained with his brigade near Huntersville, rapidly falls back to meet him. On the 6th of November, after having closely pressed, at Mill Point, Jackson's rear-guard, whose retreat he endeavors to cut off, the Unionist general finds four miles south of Hillsboro' all the Confederate forces, stationed, as at Rocky Springs, in a well-selected position on the Lewisburg road. It is called Droop Mountain, which, while detached from the Greenbrier chain, runs east to the bank of Greenbrier River, closely shutting the valley on the left bank. The road which follows that bank ascends, in a zigzag way, the northern declivity of Droop Mountain, to come down on the other side, and afterward reascend the side of another height called Spring Creek Mountain, whose summit commands the crest of Droop Mountain and its southern reverse, this reverse, as well as the extremity neighboring the river, being woody. The declivities opposite to the north, which are to be ascended by the Federals, are bare, very steep, and covered with rocks. Jackson, who has arrived first at Droop Mountain with eight regiments, has had time to build a few intrenchments on the crest: his artillery commands all the approaches of the hill. Averell commences the attack with two regiments on foot and four in the saddle. His artillery opens, despite the superiority which the plunging fire gives to his adversaries: he then detaches, on his right, his small infantry force to turn the enemy's position through the point where the hill is separated from the principal chain. In the mean time, his four cavalry regiments dismount and compel Jackson, by a strong demonstration, to keep on the road the main body of his force. The Federal infantry ascend, under a murderous fire, the rugged declivities which crown the left wing of the Confederates, and seize the key of the position before its defenders have been reinforced. At the sight of this success Averell gives to the remainder of his soldiers the signal to attack: his cavalry, carbine in hand, advance in good order in spite of the unfavorable nature of the ground and the bullets and grape which fall upon them. An instant after all the crest is in their possession, and the disordered enemy can no



longer hold the heights of Spring Creek Mountain. The led horses have closely followed the assailants, and the Federal cavalry, leaping into their saddles, at a gallop charge the enemy in their flight. Night alone stops them, more than twelve miles from Spring Creek Mountain. Their success is complete, and has cost only about a hundred men; they have gathered up nearly as many wounded enemies and a good number of prisoners, and inflicted an irretrievable blow on Jackson's troops. They must take advantage of this success. After having taken possession of a piece of artillery and some horses and equipments, and destroyed all Jackson's dépôts, Averell arrives on the evening of the 7th at Lewisburg, where he has the satisfaction of finding Colonel Duffié with his brigade.

It is perhaps the opportunity to turn aside southward to the Tennessee Railroad, but on being compelled to part from Duffié, who returns to the Kanawha, Averell prefers moving to the east and returning to his starting-point by going along the other side of the principal chain of the Alleghanies. He halts only a few hours at Lewisburg; on the 8th of November, after crossing the battlefield of Rocky Creek, he reaches White Sulphur Springs, and on the following day, while a detachment is reconnoitring his right on the side of Union, he passes the Alleghanies by the Warm Springs road and concentrates his column for the night at Callaghan's. From this point he ascends Jackson's River as far as its source, enters Crab Bottom, the basin of the Potomac, reaches Petersburg, where he halts two days, and arrives on the 17th of November at New Creek, on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. The Confederates, intimidated by their defeat at Droop Mountain, have not fired a shot to disturb him; he has destroyed a few dépôts, a few manufactories of saltpetre, and scared a few farmers; but this unfruitful military promenade is not the worthy coronation of a movement commenced in such a brilliant manner.

Averell has felt it, and is scarcely back when he prepares, under the supervision of General Kelley, an expedition against the Tennessee Railroad. The undertaking will be perilous, but the end proposed to the Federals is really worth the risks which they will have to run. The preceding campaign has acquainted

them with a part of the country which they are going to cross. They also understand that instead of endeavoring to bring together in a hostile country two columns, one starting from the banks of the Ohio and the other from those of the Potomac, it is better to assign them a separate task and to divide the enemy's attention. Thoburn's brigade, which occupies Petersburg, will march on the south-east in the direction of Staunton, to annoy Imboden and detain on this side Early's forces, whilst, as we have said, Colonel Boyd will follow the same end by ascending the course of the Shenandoah. On the other side, Duffié's brigade will push forward from Kanawha to the valley of Greenbrier; but whilst his commander will threaten Lewisburg, Colonel Moor, with a detachment of this force, will proceed toward the upper part of the valley, and occupy, if necessary, the gaps which command the Traveller's Repose. In the mean time, Averell will penetrate more on the east into Jackson's River Valley, and to reach Callaghan's follow the way through which he has effected his return in the preceding month.

Jackson's River, after running along the eastern side of the crest of the Alleghanies, forces a passage through the secondary chains to reach, taking the name of James River, the plain of Virginia. The first of these chains borders the river on the east under the designation of Warm Springs Mountain. On the south of the gap opened by the waters it is called Peter's Mountain, and is united to the principal chain twenty-two miles distant, thus forming on its eastern reverse a small valley watered by Dunlap's Creek. The town of Covington is situated near the gap on the left bank of Jackson's River; the village of Sweet Springs is in the mountain, near the source of Dunlap's Creek; that of Callaghan's is at the point where the road from Lewisburg to Covington crosses that stream. The second height, thirteen miles on the east of the preceding one, is called Mill Mountain on the left, and then Rich Patch Mountain until it nears Potts' Mountain on the right of Jackson's River. In the valley, which spreads itself on the east of Mill Mountain flows the Cow-Pasture River; it is crossed by a railroad from Charlottesville and Staunton, which ascends Jackson's River, and which, in 1863, stopped at Covington. The opposite valley, comprised

between Peter's Mountain and Potts' Mountain, is only a narrow passage which Potts' Creek crosses on the north to empty itself at Covington into Jackson's River. On the east of these mountains there are two or three lines of secondary hills, then a large valley spreading itself as far as the Blue Ridge, which is the prolongation of the valleys of the Cumberland and the Shenandoah. On the north of Staunton the valley, rich and fertile, is watered by the affluents of the James, which, to leave it, throws itself among the rocks of the Blue Ridge, forming Balcony Falls. These affluents are, on the right, Craig's Creek, a sinuous torrent, near which is found the village of Newcastle, and, more to the southward, the Catawba, upon which, at a short distance, is situated Fincastle, the principal county-town; on the left, North River, on which is the town of Lexington, renowned in Virginia for the military academy in which Jackson\* was a professor, and which had the honor of having for its president General Lee during the last years of his life. The road from Fincastle to Lexington crosses the James on Buckhannon Bridge. A gap like that of Balcony Falls, from which it is separated by the large group of the Peaks of Otter, opens a passage to the Roanoke River, which rises in Catawba Mountain and waters a more southern section of the large passage situated on the west of the Blue Ridge. The Tennessee Railroad, while passing at the foot of the peaks of La Loutre, penetrates by the defile of Buford's Gap into this basin, and for a space ascends the Roanoke before going through the valleys whose waters descend to the Ohio by the New River. Salem is the principal station on this part of the line; it is the main point of the nearest railroad from Callaghan's, from which it is separated only by thirty-eight miles as a crow flies: however, as it occupies the centre of the only section of this line which the Federals did not seem to threaten, the Confederate authorities had chosen it as a suitable place for their dépôts intended to provide for Longstreet's corps in the West. That was an especial reason for Averell's blow.

This general, despite the rigor of the season, leaves New Creek on the 8th of December with two regiments of mounted infantry, a cavalry regiment, and a battery of artillery. He passes Peters-

\* "Stonewall."—Ed.



burg on the 10th, and makes a part of the march with Thoburn, who leaves him before the end of the day to perform the special task with which he is entrusted. Duffié also is on the march, and his column is moving on the valley of Greenbrier.

The Confederates could oppose superior forces to their adversaries. Imboden keeps good watch on the Shenandoah; Jones' troops, encamped along the Greenbrier from Huntersville, where Jackson is, to Lewisburg, which is occupied by Echols, are beginning to recover from the disaster of Droop Mountain. In order to be able to support the one or the other, we have said that Early, with a part of his infantry, has taken position on the Charlottesville Railroad at Staunton. Fitzhugh Lee, with a cavalry brigade, is in this last town, in readiness to move promptly to any place where the enemy are signalled.

Averell has the advantage of the initiative: he selects his route. With the exception of Lee's cavalry, which are not numerous, the Confederates have, as it were, nothing but infantry, and therefore cannot march as fast as their adversaries. The latter, therefore, easily penetrate the valley of Jackson's River. Whilst Thoburn makes a demonstration on the Staunton road, Averell, passing behind Jackson, who is occupied by the movements of Moor's column, captures one of his trains, again destroys his dépôts, crosses to Callaghan's on the 13th, and bivouacs at night on the banks of Dunlap's Creek, without having met with any resistance. But the direction taken by the Federals does not allow them to conceal their design any longer: it must therefore be executed promptly. On the 14th, at two o'clock in the morning, they are all in the saddle, and soon reach Sweet Springs. The column, following the Union road to Fincastle, crosses successively the chains of Peter's and Potts' Mountains; then, turning to the right, ascends Craig's River, passes Newcastle, and crosses the Catawba Rapids and Catawba Hills, arriving on the 16th, at ten o'clock in the morning, before Salem. The Unionists in this fifty-six hours' march have not halted more than two or three times. Everywhere astonishment is depicted on the faces of the inhabitants at the sight of their uniforms. No one thinks of molesting them: a wedding party which they meet in the Potts' Mountain gap is scattered and runs at their approach. Favored by the weather, they have punctu-



ally performed what they desired, and enter Salem without striking a blow. The 16th is employed in the destruction of the Confederate stores; the railroad is wrecked for a length of eighteen miles, including five bridges. This time success is complete, for one of the principal arteries of the Confederacy is interrupted for a fortnight. At four o'clock Averell gives the order of departure. The most difficult part of his task still remains to be performed. The elements now seem to conspire against him: clear and dry weather is followed by a cold rain, which is soon changed to sleet, which covers the roads, rocks, and trees with a coat of ice.

In order that Averell should not escape him, Early, who commands the Confederates, has undertaken to guard all the crossings and roads between Staunton on the north-east and Newport, on New River, on the south-west. In front of the Federals, who return from the south-east, Jones on the right, with Echols' brigade and some other troops, guards Peter's Mountain crest above Sweet Springs and the road followed by Averell in going to Salem. Jackson, who is concealed from Moor, has crossed the Alleghanies, and, going through Jackson's River, has descended that river; he occupies Covington and Callaghan's, thus shutting closely the entrance of the valley against the Federals if they endeavor to turn Echols' left. Covington is especially important. The road and railway, which ascend the right bank of Jackson's River before reaching the town, pass on the left bank through two large wooden bridges at a point called Island Ford, and follow a narrow defile between the river and the extremity of Warm Springs Mountains. At length, Imboden and Fitzhugh Lee proceed to Lexington and take position on Jackson's left, completing the line opposed to Averell while clinging to the banks of the James River. They take the lead with their cavalry; Early's infantry follows them.

The Confederate dispositions are excellent, and it seems that there is no longer any chance of safety for Averell. After leaving Salem he has travelled about eight miles; then halted to give his troops an indispensable rest. On the 17th of December he resumes his march in the direction of Newcastle, but is compelled to cross seven times the swollen and frozen waters of Craig's

Creek ; the crossing of the artillery has been very perilous ; the greater part of the supplies have been damaged, the soldiers being able to save only their coffee. The advance, arriving at Newcastle at eleven o'clock in the evening, fortunately finds something with which to feed the men and horses, and on the 18th, while the rear painfully keeps up its marching to regain the lost time, Averell pushes his cavalry forward in order to look for a crossing. Perhaps his presence on the road from Newcastle to Lexington has led the Confederates into error about his designs. However that may be, Early, deceived by false rumors, fancies that the Unionists wish to cross the James below the point where the swollen Jackson's River takes this new name ; and he orders Lee to proceed to Buckhannon, where he expects to see them appear. Jackson, for his part, in order to shut them off from the entrance of the valley of Cow-Pasture River, quits Callaghan's and Covington, leaving but a mere guard on the bridges at Island Ford, with orders to burn them if necessary, and proceeds to establish himself at Clifton Forge, an old iron-works situated at the foot of a rugged mountain which divides in two passages the gorge between Mill Mountain and Rich Patch Mountain. This manœuvre is very imprudent, for it is difficult to believe that Averell will throw himself on the Lexington road before the main body of his enemies, and it seems to invite him to force the passage of Covington between Jones and Jackson, who no longer meet. A mere chance comes to aggravate the consequences of this fault for the Confederates. A courier whom Jones sends to Early, his superior officer, to report on the new positions taken by Echols and Jackson falls into the hands of the enemy. Averell thus learns that the passage to Covington is not yet guarded. He hastens to take advantage of it. On the 18th, whilst his rear-guard rallies at Newcastle and his cavalry are skirmishing with that of Jones in Potts' Mountain, a new chance facilitates the execution of his design. On the maps of Virginia is found a road which descends from Sweet Springs by the narrow valley of Potts' Creek to join, a few miles above the bridges at Island Ford, the road from Newcastle to Covington : this road has not been travelled over during the war by a single wagon ; Jones believes it out of repair, and does not even think of having it reconnoitred. A

Union farmer informs Averell that it is, on the contrary, very practicable, and that by following it one can promptly reach the bridges. The Union general's plan is soon formed. On the morning of the 19th, whilst the rear-guard and the trains take the direct Covington road, Averell, ascending with a part of his cavalry the slopes of Peter's Mountain, feigns a vigorous attack in the direction of Sweet Springs. Jones, persuaded that he wishes to reach the banks of Dunlap's Creek by the road which he has followed in advancing, concentrates all his troops in front of Sweet Springs, and does not think of extending his line as far as Covington. But Averell suddenly disappears, descends the valley of Potts' Creek, and his advance, arriving at a gallop on the bridges at Island Ford, takes possession of them before the Confederate guard has been able to set them on fire. The crossing is guaranteed; a great part of the column has reached the banks of the river and crossed the bridges, but the train and its escort are still two or three miles behind. Jackson, informed of Averell's movement, hastens to make up for his error. He ascends the right bank of Jackson's River: whilst the main body of his column takes the road from Newcastle to Covington, he detaches about fifty men in the hope of outstripping the Federals near the bridges. The small party of Confederates finds Averell already on the other bank, but it retards the march of his rear-guard by placing itself between it and him. Night is coming, and when day dawns again this rear-guard has not yet reached the approaches of the bridges, whilst Jackson, bringing his troops by a circuitous route, prepares to attack him. Averell resolves to burn them, and reascends the left bank of Jackson's River. The detachment which he has left on the other bank, after having destroyed all the wagons, disengages itself by an offensive movement from the enemy's clutches, rapidly reaches the water's edge, and has the good luck to find a ford, and thus rejoins the remainder of the column, while leaving behind it about sixty prisoners and four men drowned.

Averell arrives at Covington, and at a stretch pursues his route as far as Callaghan's. The first game is won: the Confederates have been baffled; their greatest force is henceforth behind the Federals or too far away to be able to overtake them. But all




the perils are not averted, nor the sufferings. The loss of the greater part of the train compels the Federals to live on what they are able to gather on their way. Frozen, famished, exhausted by marches and want of sleep, they cannot halt long enough to rest themselves: even the fires which would warm them are forbidden to the outposts. In fact, the enemy still surrounds them on three sides: Jackson follows them closely; Jones, hastily returning from Sweet Springs, occupies the passes of the Alleghanies and the Lewisburg road; Fitzhugh Lee, with his cavalry, can easily, while following the Lexington road to Huntersville, prevent the return of the Federals on the north. Fortunately, a mountain-pathway which crosses the Alleghanies and runs in the small valley of Anthony's Creek allows Averell to avoid—at the cost of great suffering, it is true—the Lewisburg road: he reaches in this manner the Greenbrier Valley, close to Droop Mountain, without meeting Jones, who is looking after Duffié. The demonstration made by Moor farther to the north has decided the Confederates to leave Huntersville and the western sides of the Alleghanies, so that Averell can reach, without any impediment, the Traveller's Repose, and cross the passes which bring him to Elkwater in the basin of the Monongahela. A well-supplied train which the Federals meet at this point makes them forget their sufferings, and, returning by short marches through the friendly country, they reach at last their encampments on the Ohio Railroad on the 1st of January, 1864.

The small column which Averell has led to the heart of the Virginia mountains has lost about a hundred prisoners and a small number of wagons, but not one gun, despite the impediments it has encountered. Not being able to keep all the prisoners whom they have captured, they bring back a hundred and twenty, among whom are forty officers. They have, we have said, interrupted for a fortnight one of the main railroad lines of the Confederacy and destroyed dépôts precious to the enemy's army; they have kept on the move forces fourfold their own. Although this expedition can have no decisive influence on the grand operations which winter has just interrupted both in the East and in the West, we have related it in detail, because it has been skilfully conducted and can give the reader an idea of the



manner in which war was made in the Alleghanies. He will admit that the Federals, taught by experience, will henceforth offer to the Confederates the same results by the raids of which the latter seemed, until then, to possess the secret. Redeeming the error which had brought to him disgrace after Chancellorsville, Averell has learned, like Stuart, how to evade all the dispositions made by his adversaries in order to surround him, and his campaign has in a brilliant manner terminated the year 1863, which has witnessed so much bloodshed between the Rappahannock and the Susquehanna.

## APPENDIX TO VOL. III.



DETAILED STATEMENTS OF THE SITUATIONS, TO FACILITATE A  
PROPER UNDERSTANDING OF VOL. III.

### THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE.

FOR the first time we are enabled to give herewith complete and official details of the situations, together with statements of the effective forces of both armies, for which we are indebted to the courtesy of the Secretary of War, and especially to General Townsend. In these details will be found the designation not only of brigades, but also of each regiment. As the mention in full of the States to which these regiments belonged would occupy considerable space, we have adopted the official abbreviations, the key to which we append here:

Alabama,	Ala.	Massachusetts,	Mass.
Arkansas,	Ark.	Michigan,	Mich.
California,	Cal.	Minnesota,	Minn.
North Carolina,	N. C.	Mississippi,	Miss.
South Carolina,	S. C.	Missouri,	Mo.
Connecticut,	Conn.	New Hampshire,	N. H.
Delaware,	Del.	New Jersey,	N. J.
Florida,	Fla.	New York,	N. Y.
Georgia,	Ga.	Ohio,	O.
Illinois,	Ill.	Pennsylvania,	Pa.
Indiana,	Ind.	Rhode Island,	R. I.
Iowa,	Ia.	Tennessee,	Tenn.
Kansas,	Kan.	Texas,	Tex.
Kentucky,	Ky.	Vermont,	Vt.
Louisiana,	La.	Virginia,	Va.
Maine,	Me.	Wisconsin,	Wis.
Maryland,	Md.		

U. S., abbreviation for United States, designates those bodies of troops that were raised directly by the Federal government.

The statements of effective forces are a summary of those furnished monthly by the general staff to the Departments at Washington and Richmond, which contain thousands of figures. It will be seen from

this what was the condition of the two armies. Fortunately, both parties continued to employ the forms adopted in the old army of the United States, which render comparisons easy.

### FEDERAL ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.\*

(APRIL 30, 1863.)

*Commander-in-Chief*, MAJOR-GENERAL J. HOOKER.

*Chief of Staff*, Brigadier-general D. Butterfield.

FIRST ARMY CORPS, Major-general John Reynolds.

1st division, Brig.-gen. Wadsworth.

1st brigade, Col. Phelps—22d, 23d, 24th, 84th N. Y.

2d " Brig.-gen. Cutler—7th Ind., 76th, 95th, 147th N. Y., 56th Pa.

3d " Brig.-gen. Paul—22d, 29th, 30th, 31st N. J., 137th Pa.

4th " Brig.-gen. Meredith—19th Ind., 24th Mich., 6th, 7th Wis.

Artillery—1st N. H. (Bat. H), 1st N. Y. (Bat. L), 4th U. S. Art. (Bat. B).

2d division, Brig.-gen. Robinson.

1st brigade, Col. Root—16th Me., 94th, 104th N. Y., 107th Pa.

2d " Brig.-gen. Baxter—12th Mass., 26th N. Y., 90th, 136th Pa.

3d " Col. Leonard—13th Mass., 83d, 97th N. Y., 18th, 88th Pa.

Artillery—2d, 6th Bats. Me., Pa. Bat., 5th U. S. Art. (Bat. C).

3d division, Maj.-gen. Doubleday.

1st brigade, Brig.-gen. Rowley—121st, 135th, 142d, 151st Pa.

2d " Col. Roy Stone—143d, 149th, 150th Pa.

Artillery—1st Pa. Art. (Bats. B, G, I).

### SECOND ARMY CORPS, Major-general Couch.

1st division, Maj.-gen. Hancock.

1st brigade, Brig.-gen. Caldwell—5th N. H., 61st N. Y., 81st, 148th Pa.

\* In some minor details this statement is inaccurate. See revised roster in Addenda, for which, and for the other valuable statements therein contained, we are indebted to General Richard C. Drum, adjutant-general of the army, and Colonel Robert N. Scott, in charge of the publication of the official records of the Union and Confederate armies.—Ed.

2d brigade, Brig.-gen. Meagher—28th Mass., 63d, 69th, 88th N. Y., 116th Pa.

3d “ Brig.-gen. Zook—52d, 57th, 66th N. Y., 140th Pa.

4th “ Col. Brooke—27th Conn., 2d Del., 64th N. Y., 53d, 145th Pa.

Artillery—1st N. Y. Art. (Bat. B), 4th U. S. Art. (Bat. C).

2d division, Brig.-gen. Gibbon.

1st brigade, Brig.-gen. Sully—19th Me., 15th Mass., 1st Minn., 34th, 82d N. Y.

2d “ Brig.-gen. Owen—69th, 71st, 72d, 108th Pa.

3d “ Col. Hall—19th, 20th Mass., 7th Mich., 51st, 59th N. Y., 127th Pa.

Detached—Col. Andrews—Sharpshooters.

Artillery—1st R. I. Light Art. (Bats. B, H).

3d division, Maj.-gen. French.

1st brigade, Col. Carroll—14th Ind., 24th, 28th N. J., 4th, 8th O., 7th Va.

2d “ Brig.-gen. Hays—14th Conn., 12th N. J., 108th N. Y., 130th Pa.

3d “ Brig.-gen. Max Weber—1st Del., 4th, 10th N. Y., Battalion 132d Pa.

Artillery—1st N. Y. Art. (Bat. G), 1st R. I. Art. (Bat. G).

### THIRD ARMY CORPS, Major-general Sickles.

1st division, Brig.-gen. Birney.

1st brigade, Brig.-gen. Graham—57th, 63d, 68th, 105th, 114th, 141st Pa.

2d “ Brig.-gen. Ward—20th Ind., 3d, 4th Me., 38th, 40th N. Y., 99th Pa.

3d “ Col. Hayman—17th Me., 3d, 5th Mich., 1st, 37th N. Y.

Artillery—1st N. J. Art. (Bat. B), 1st R. I. Art. (Bat. E), 3d U. S. Art. (Bats. F, K).

2d division, Maj.-gen. Berry.

1st brigade, Brig.-gen. Carr—1st, 11th, 16th Mass., 11th N. J., 26th Pa.

2d “ Brig.-gen. Revere—70th, 71st, 72d, 73d, 74th, 120th N. Y.



3d brigade, Brig.-gen. Mott—5th, 6th, 7th, 8th N. J., 2d N. Y., 115th Pa.

Artillery—1st N. Y. Art. (Bat. D), 4th N. Y. Art. (Bat. Indep.), 1st U. S. Art. (Bat. H), 4th U. S. Art. (Bat. K).

3d division, Brig.-gen. Whipple.

1st brigade, Col. Franklin—86th, 124th N. Y., 122d Pa.

2d “ Col. Bowman—12th N. H., 84th, 110th Pa.

3d “ Col. Berdan—1st and 2d U. S. Sharpshooters.

Artillery—10th N. Y. Art., Indep., 11th N. Y. Art., Indep., 1st O. Art. (Bat. H).

FIFTH ARMY CORPS, Major-general Meade.

1st division, Brig.-gen. Griffin.

1st brigade, Brig.-gen. Barnes—2d Me., 18th, 22d Mass., 1st Mich., 13th, 25th N. Y., 118th Pa.

2d “ Col. McQuade—9th, 32d Mass., 4th Mich., 14th N. Y., 62d Pa.

3d “ Col. Stockton—20th Me., 16th Mich., 12th, 17th, 44th N. Y., 83d Pa.

Artillery—Mass. Art. (Bats. C, E), R. I. Art. (Bat. C), 5th U. S. Art. (Bat. D).

2d division, Maj.-gen. Sykes.

1st brigade (regulars), Brig.-gen. Ayres—3d, 4th, 12th, 14th U. S. Inf.

2d “ (regulars), Col. Burbank—2d, 6th, 7th, 11th, 17th U. S. Inf.

3d “ Col. O’Rorke—5th, 140th, 146th N. Y.

Artillery—1st O. Art. (Bat. L), 5th U. S. Art. (Bat. I).

3d division, Brig.-gen. Humphreys.

1st brigade, Brig.-gen. Tyler—91st, 126th, 129th, 134th Pa.

2d “ Col. Allabach—123d, 131st, 133d, 155th Pa.

Artillery—1st N. Y. Art. (Bat. C), 1st U. S. Art. (Bat. E).

SIXTH ARMY CORPS, Major-general Sedgwick.

1st division, Brig.-gen. Brooks.

1st brigade, Brig.-gen. Torbert—1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 15th, 23d N. J.

2d brigade, Brig.-gen. Bartlett—5th Me., 16th, 27th, 121st N. Y.,  
96th Pa.

3d “ Brig.-gen. Russell, 18th, 32d N. Y., 49th, 95th, 119th Pa.  
Artillery—1st Md. Art. (Bat. A), 1st Mass. Art. (Bat. A), 1st N. J.  
Art. (Bat. A), 2d U. S. Art. (Bat. D).

2d division, Brig.-gen. Howe.

1st brigade, Col. Grant—26th N. J., 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th Vt.

2d “ Brig.-gen. Hall—7th Me., 21st N. J., 20th, 33d, 49th,  
77th N. Y.

Artillery—1st N. J. Art., Indep., 5th U. S. Art. (Bat. F).

3d division, Maj.-gen. Newton.

1st brigade, Col. Shaler—65th, 67th, 122d N. Y., 23d, 82d Pa.

2d “ Col. Browne—7th, 10th, 37th Mass., 36th N. Y., 2d R. I.

3d “ Brig.-gen. Wheaton—62d N. Y.

Artillery—1st Pa. Art. (Bat. C), 2d U. S. Art. (Bat. G).

Light brigade, Brig.-gen. Pratt—6th Me., 31st, 43d N. Y., 61st Pa.,  
5th Wis., 3d N. Y. Batt.

#### ELEVENTH ARMY CORPS, Major-general Howard.

1st division, Brig.-gen. Devens.

1st brigade—41st, 45th, 54th N. Y., 153d Pa.

2d “ —17th Conn., 25th, 55th, 75th, 107th O.

Artillery—13th N. Y. Bat.

2d division, Brig.-gen. von Steinwehr.

1st brigade—29th, 154th N. Y., 27th, 73d Pa.

2d “ —33d Mass., 134th, 136th N. Y., 73d O.

Artillery—1st N. Y. Art. (Bat. I).

3d division, Maj.-gen. Carl Schurz.

1st brigade, Brig.-gen. Schimmelpfennig—82d Ill., 68th, 157th N. Y.,  
61st O., 74th Pa.

2d “ —58th, 119th N. Y., 82d O., 75th Pa., 26th Wis.

Artillery—1st O. Art. (Bat. I).

Corps Artillery, Lieut.-col. Schirmer—2d N. H. Art. (Bat. Indep.),  
1st O. Art. (Bat. K), 1st Va. Art. (Bat. C).

Corps Cavalry—Cos. A and B 1st Ind. Cav.

## TWELFTH ARMY CORPS, Major-general Slocum.

1st division, Brig.-gen. Williams.

1st brigade, Brig.-gen. Knipe—5th Conn., 10th Me., 28th N. Y., 46th, 128th Pa.

2d “ Col. Ross—20th Conn., 3d Md., 123d, 145th N. Y.

3d “ Brig.-gen. Ruger, 27th Ind., 2d Mass., 13th N. J., 107th N. Y., 3d Wis.

Artillery—1st N. Y. Art. (Bats. K, M), 4th U. S. Art. (Bat. F).

2d division, Brig.-gen. Geary.

1st brigade, Col. Candy—5th, 7th, 29th, 66th O., 28th, 147th Pa.

2d “ Brig.-gen. Kane—29th, 109th, 111th, 124th, 125th Pa.

3d “ Brig.-gen. Greene—60th, 78th, 102d, 137th, 149th N. Y.

Artillery—Hampton's Bat., Knap's Pa. Bat.

## CAVALRY CORPS, Major-general Stoneman.

1st division, Brig.-gen. Pleasonton.

1st brigade, Col. Davis—8th Ill., 3d Ind., 8th, 9th N. Y.

2d “ Col. Devin—1st Ind., 1st Mich., 6th N. Y., 8th, 17th Pa.

2d division, Col. Duffié.

1st brigade, Col. Sargent—1st Mass., 4th N. Y., 6th O., 1st R. I.

2d “ Col. Irvin Gregg—3d, 4th, 16th Pa.

3d division, Brig.-gen. D. M. Gregg.

1st brigade, Col. Kilpatrick—1st Me., 2d, 10th N. Y.

2d “ Col. Wyndham—12th Ill., 1st Md., 1st N. J., 1st Pa.

Regular brigade, Brig.-gen. Buford—6th Pa., 1st, 2d, 5th, 6th U. S. Cav.

Regular brigade of mounted artillery, Capt. Robertson—6th N. Y. (Bat., Indep.), 2d U. S. Art. (Bats. B, L, M), 5th U. S. Art. (Bat. E).

Reserve Artillery, Captain Graham—1st Conn. Art., foot (Bats. B, M), 32d Mass. (inf. Co. C); 5th, 15th, 29th, 30th, 31st, 32d independent N. Y. batteries; 1st U. S. Art. (Bat. K), 2d U. S. Art. (Bat. A), 3d U. S. Art. (Bat. C), 4th U. S. Art. (Bat. G), 5th U. S. Art. (Bat. K).

Engineer brigade, Brig.-gen. Benham—15th, 50th N. Y., Battalion of U. S. engineers.

## CONFEDERATE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA.

(MAY 1ST, 1863.)

*Commander-in-Chief*, GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE.

## GENERAL STAFF.

*Chief of Staff*, Brigadier-general Chilton.*Chief Quartermaster*, Lieut.-colonel Corley.*Commissary-in-Chief*, Lieut.-colonel Cole.*Chief of Ordnance*, Lieut.-colonel Baldwin.*Assistant Adjutant-General*, Lieut.-colonel Murray.*Chief of Engineers*, Lieut.-colonel Smith.*Military Secretary*, Colonel Long.

## FIRST ARMY CORPS.

In the absence of Lieutenant-general Longstreet with Hood's, Pickett's, and Ransom's divisions, the remainder of the corps is under the immediate control of the general-in-chief.

1st division, Maj.-gen. Anderson.

1st brigade, Brig.-general Mahone—6th, 12th, 16th, 41st, 66th Va.,  
Grandy's Battery.

2d " Brig.-gen. Perry—2d, 5th, 8th Fla.

3d " Brig.-gen. Wilcox—8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 14th Ala.,  
Lewis' Battery.

4th " Brig.-gen. Posey—12th, 16th, 19th, 48th Miss.

5th " Brig.-gen. Wright—3d, 22d, 48th, 2d Bat. Ga.

5th division, Maj.-gen. McLaws.

1st brigade, Brig.-gen. Wofford—16th, 18th, 21st Ga., Phillips' and  
Cobb's Legions.

2d " Brig.-gen. Kershaw—2d, 3d, 7th, 15th S. C., James'  
Battery.

3d " Brig.-gen. Barksdale—13th, 17th, 18th, 21st Miss.

4th " Brig.-gen. Semmes—10th, 50th, 51st, 53d Ga., Cable's  
Artillery.



## SECOND ARMY CORPS, Lieutenant-general T. J. Jackson.

1st division, Maj.-gen. A. P. Hill.

- 1st brigade, Brig.-gen. Heth—40th, 47th, 51st, 22d Batt. Va.  
 2d “ Brig.-gen. McGowan—1st, 12th, 13th, 14th S. C., Orr’s Rifles.  
 3d “ Brig.-gen. Thomas—14th, 31st, 41st, 49th Ga.  
 4th “ Brig.-gen. Lane—17th, 18th, 28th, 33d, 37th N. C.  
 5th “ Brig.-gen. Archer—1st, 7th, 14th Tenn., 5th, 13th Batt. Ala.  
 6th “ Brig.-gen. Pender—13th, 16th, 22d, 34th, 38th N. C.

2d division, Brig.-gen. Rodes (temporarily).

- 1st brigade, Brig.-gen. Rodes—3d, 5th, 6th, 12th, 26th N. C.  
 2d “ Brig.-gen. Colquitt—6th, 19th, 23d, 27th, 28th Ga.  
 3d “ Brig.-gen. Doles—4th, 12th, 21st, 44th Ga.  
 4th “ Brig.-gen. Ramseur—2d, 4th, 13th, 14th N. C.  
 5th “ Brig.-gen. Iverson—5th, 12th, 20th, 21st N. C.

3d division, Brig.-gen. Early.

- 1st brigade, Brig.-gen. Hays—5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th La.  
 2d “ Brig.-gen. Gordon—13th, 26th, 31st, 38th, 60th, 61st Ga.  
 3d “ Brig.-gen. Hoke—6th, 21st, 24th, 57th, 1st Batt. N. C.  
 4th “ Brig.-gen. Smith—13th, 49th, 52d, 58th Va.

4th division, Brig.-gen. Trimble.

- 1st brigade, Brig.-gen. Colston—10th, 23d, 37th Va., 1st, 3d N. C.  
 2d “ Brig.-gen. Paxton, 2d, 4th, 5th, 27th, 33d Va.  
 3d “ Brig.-gen. Nicholls—1st, 2d, 10th, 14th, 15th La.  
 4th “ Brig.-gen. Jones—21st, 42d, 44th, 48th, 50th Va., Engineer Sappers.

## SECOND CORPS ARTILLERY.

Reserve artillery, Brig.-gen. Pendleton—Washington Artillery, Alexander’s Artillery.

## CAVALRY DIVISION.

Major-general J. E. B. Stuart.

- Brigade of Brig.-gen. W. H. F. Lee.  
 “ “ Fitzhugh Lee.  
 “ “ Hampton.  
 “ “ Jones (on the Shenandoah).

*Effective Force of the Army of the Potomac Before and After the Battle of Chancellorsville.*

DATES.	Present for duty.	Present.	Absent.	Total.	Cannon.
April 30, 1863.					
Staff and troops at head-quarters..... }	3,774	4,485	2,116	6,601	
Artillery reserve.....	1,610	1,776	216	1,992	
First corps.....	17,130	19,595	6,862	26,457	
Second corps.....	16,836	19,051	9,313	28,364	
Third corps.....	18,986	20,795	6,862	27,657	
Fifth corps.....	15,920	18,292	6,876	25,168	
Sixth corps.....	23,730	26,496	6,564	33,060	
Eleventh corps.....	13,539	15,412	4,358	19,770	
Twelfth corps.....	18,455	14,895	4,793	19,688	
Cavalry corps.....	12,778	17,193	4,845	22,038	
Total.....	138,758	157,990	52,805	210,795	404
May 10, 1863.					
Staff and troops at general head-quarters..... }	3,881	4,439	1,499	5,938	
Artillery reserve.....	1,733	1,872	229	2,101	
First corps.....	16,289	18,554	7,126	25,680	
Second corps.....	14,543	16,834	8,557	25,391	
Third corps.....	14,389	16,231	8,765	24,996	
Fifth corps.....	14,304	16,371	6,377	22,748	
Sixth corps.....	18,554	20,440	9,138	29,578	
Eleventh corps.....	11,282	12,826	4,585	17,411	
Twelfth corps.....	10,699	11,944	5,486	17,430	
Cavalry corps.....	18,398	17,193	4,845	22,038	
Total.....	118,922	136,704	56,607	193,311	402

*Comparative Details of those Present and Absent in the two Preceding Tables.*

DATES.	Present for duty.	Sick.	On special duty.	In arrest.	Absent on detached service.	On leave of absence.	Without leave.	Absent sick.
April 30.	138,758	6,323	12,480	809	19,696	2,327	1,704	24,911
May 10...	118,822	5,446	11,698	498	19,145	2,087	3,259	32,316

The special duty comprises posts and detachments of every description, most of the men being able to join the ranks again on the day of battle. The reader will observe, by comparing the two statements, an increase in the number of absentees without authority after a great battle, such absentees being nearly all within the lines, and not in the

hands of the enemy. The increase of men absent sick is owing to the admission into the hospitals of those who had been wounded at Chancellorsville. The diminution in the total effective force is due somewhat to the number of killed, but especially to the disbanding of regiments whose term of service had expired.

*Effective Force of the Army of Northern Virginia before the Battle.*

We have not been able to procure an account of the effective force of this army up to a date as near the battle as for the Army of the Potomac: we subjoin that of March 31, 1863, whose figures do not differ materially from those of the following month:

DATE.	Present for duty.	Present.	Absent.	Total.
March 31, 1863.				
Staff.....	337	37	2	39
First corps, Anderson's division.....	8,232	9,960	4,459	14,419
McLaws' " .....	8,567	10,095	3,646	13,741
A. P. Hill's " .....	11,359	13,614	5,797	19,411
Second corps, D. H. Hill's " .....	9,632	11,418	4,285	15,703
Early's " .....	8,234	9,939	4,531	14,470
Trimble's " .....	6,229	8,095	4,383	12,478
Cavalry, Stuart.....	6,966	8,453	3,822	12,275
In the Valley of Virginia.....	3,402	3,796	1,067	4,863
Detached artillery and small corps.....	1,741	1,972	488	2,460
Total .....	64,399	77,379	32,480	109,859

Cannon, 96.

Present for duty.	Sick.	On special duty.	In arrest.	Absent on detached service.	On leave of absence.	Without leave.	Absent sick.
64,399	6,308	5,050	1,222	6,251	4,140	5,953	16,136

The statements subsequent to the battle having been prepared after Longstreet's return with the largest portion of his corps, all comparison with the above is out of the question: one of these statements will be found in the latter part of this volume, on the occasion of the battle of Gettysburg.

## THE VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN.

## FEDERAL ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE.

(JUNE, 1863).

*Commander-in-Chief*, MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. GRANT.

THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS, Major-general McClernand.

9th division, Brig.-gen. Osterhaus. Brigade, Garrard.

				"	Sheldon.
10th	"	"	A. J. Smith.	"	Burbridge.
				"	Landram.
12th	"	"	Hovey.	"	McGinnis.
				"	Slack.
13th	"	"	Carr.	"	Lawler.
				"	Benton.

FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS, Major-general W. T. Sherman.

5th division, Brig.-gen. Blair. Brigade, Giles A. Smith.

				"	T. Kilby Smith.
				"	Ewing.
8th	"	"	Tuttle.	"	Mower.
				"	Buckland.
				"	John E. Smith.
11th	"	"	Steele.	"	Woods.
				"	Manter.
				"	Thayer.

SIXTEENTH ARMY CORPS, Major-general Hurlbut.

1st division, Brig.-gen. W. S. Smith.

2d " " Kimball.

4th " " Lauman.

SEVENTEENTH ARMY CORPS,\* Major-general McPherson.

7th division, Brig.-gen. Quinby. Brigade, Sanborn.

				"	Holmes.
				"	Boomer (killed May 22).
3d	"	"	Logan.	"	Stevenson.
				"	J. E. Smith.

\* The Thirteenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth corps formed the Army of the Tennessee proper; the thirteen divisions composing it were numbered consecutively.



6th division, Brig.-gen. McArthur. Brigade, Leggett.  
 “ Ransom.

#### NINTH ARMY CORPS, Major-general Parke.

1st division, Brig.-gen. Welsh.

2d “ Brig.-Gen. Potter.

#### HERRON'S DIVISION.

Engineer corps, Major Tweeddale.

1st cavalry division, Col. Mizner.

2d “ “ Brig.-gen. Grierson.

We have not been able to procure the necessary documents to complete this account of the composition of Grant's army.\* But, on the other hand, we are enabled to give a detailed statement of the effective force of this army, month after month, during the entire Vicksburg campaign:

#### *Effective Force of the Federal Army of the Tennessee.*

DATES.	Present for duty, and on special duty.	Sick.	Present.	Present and absent.	Serviceable horses.	Cannon.
January 31, 1863.						
Thirteenth corps.....	23,810	5,600	29,410	38,790	4,800	12
Fifteenth corps.....	17,074	6,728	23,802	30,329	2,015	32
Sixteenth corps.....	40,532	2,273	42,805	51,024	2,231	60
Seventeenth corps.....	32,060	2,417	34,477	43,464	1,517	56
Engineers.....	636	5	641	811		
Total .....	114,112	17,023	131,135	164,418	10,563	160
February 28.						
Thirteenth corps.....	23,090	6,256	29,346	38,091	5,975	68
Fifteenth corps.....	20,549	6,041	26,590	33,598	800	36
Sixteenth corps.....	45,686	5,047	50,733	61,937	3,680	45
Seventeenth corps.....	19,510	1,674	21,184	26,547	1,393	60
Engineers.....	687	84	771	963		
Total .....	109,522	19,102	128,624	161,136	11,848	209
March 31.						
Thirteenth corps.....	25,529	3,885	29,414	40,674	4,261	61
Fifteenth corps.....	20,537	4,749	25,286	33,021	791	40
Sixteenth corps.....	48,223	5,547	53,770	64,746	9,015	161
Seventeenth corps.....	19,890	1,152	21,042	26,321	1,388	60
Engineers.....	824	54	878	1,063		
Total .....	115,003	15,387	130,390	165,825	15,460	322

\* See revised roster in Addenda.—ED.

*Effective Force of the Army of the Tennessee (continued).*

DATES.	Present for duty, and on special duty.	Sick.	Present.	Present and absent.	Service- able. horses.	Cannon.
April 30.						
Thirteenth corps.....	27,335	2,683	30,018	39,493	3,740	36
Fifteenth corps.....	26,172	5,242	31,414	40,476	850	36
Sixteenth corps.....	45,411	4,329	49,740	58,444	8,137	175
Seventeenth corps.....	20,152	1,206	21,358	26,291	1,276	60
Total .....	119,070	13,460	132,530	164,704	14,003	307
May 31.						
Thirteenth corps.....	26,986	2,550	29,536	38,180	909	33
Fifteenth corps.....	17,829	1,244	18,073	27,937	1,353	44
Sixteenth corps.....	51,558	4,815	56,373	69,909	2,472	93
Seventeenth corps.....	15,487	1,106	16,593	25,216	1,074	56
Total .....	111,860	9,715	120,575	161,242	5,778	226
June 30.						
Thirteenth corps.....	25,264	4,656	29,920	41,729	280	
Fifteenth corps.....	16,543	2,793	19,336	27,347	1,338	50
Sixteenth corps.....	41,601	5,171	46,772	57,661	4,471	74
Seventeenth corps.....	15,531	1,844	17,375	24,195	1,277	40
Ninth corps.....	8,218	482	8,700	11,934	340	16
Herron's division.....	4,490	706	5,196	6,102	343	12
Engineers and colored regiments..... }	3,614	685	4,299	5,026		
Total .....	115,261	16,337	131,598	173,994	8,049	192*

## CONFEDERATE ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI.

(MAY 1, 1863.)

*Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the Mississippi and Tennessee,*  
GENERAL JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON.

*Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Mississippi,* LIEUTENANT-  
GENERAL PEMBERTON.

Division, Bowen.	Brigade, Green.
"	" Cockerell.
	" Gates.
" M. L. Smith.	" Vaughn.
	" Shoupe.
	" Baldwin.

\* Incomplete.

Division, Stevenson.	Brigade, Reynolds.
	" Moore.
	" Lee.
" Forney,	" Hébert.
"	" Harris.
"	" Tilghman.
" Loring.	" Buford.
"	" Featherston.
Division, Gardner, at Port Hudson,	Brigade, Gregg.
	" Maxey.
	" Beall.

Cavalry brigade, Wirt Adams.

Reinforcements arrived at Jackson : Brigade, W. H. Walker.

" Gist.

This list having been prepared, not from official sources, but simply from information collected here and there from various reports, is very incomplete, and contains perhaps some inaccuracies. We have found it impossible to correct it and supply the documents that are wanting.

#### DETAILED STATEMENT OF THE FORCES.

THE following statement of the forces of the two armies, although made from returns having the difference of one month's date between them, may be useful for comparing the various elements of these armies and their respective forces. It will be noticed, for instance, that the disabled men play by far a greater part in the Confederate than in the Federal army. In fact, the total number of soldiers and officers on the sick-list, either in field or general hospitals, under arrest, absent with leave, or deserters, amounts for the Confederates to 45,423; that is, more than three-ninths of an aggregate force of 133,680 men; for the Federals to 26,704, or two-ninths of an aggregate force of 167,251 men.

The total number sick, absent with leave, and in arrest is greater in the Southern than in the Northern army.

	Army of Northern Virginia (May 31).	Army of the Potomac (June 30).
Present:		
Under arms.....	{ officers.. 6,116 enlisted men... 68,343	6,422 93,053
	Total..... 74,459	99,475
Sick.....	{ officers..... 456 enlisted men... 6,931	190 3,168
On extra duty.....	{ officers..... 200 enlisted men... 5,751	333 9,311
Under arrest.....	{ officers..... 112 enlisted men... 836	68 443
	88,745 — 88,745	112,988—112,988
Absent (officers and enlisted men):		
On detached service.....	7,847	21,428
On leave.....	3,404	1,655
Without leave.....	7,767	3,292
Sick .....	25,917 *	27,888
	Total..... 44,935 — 44,935	54,263 — 54,263
	Grand total..... 133,680	167,251
	Cannon..... 206	352

Here is now the detailed statement of the forces of the two armies at the dates above stated. It will be remarked that between this date and that of the 30th of June, to which relates the statement of the composition of the Army of Northern Virginia by regiments, that army has been greatly altered. But in this organization, of which we have spoken elsewhere, there has been but little modification in the whole of its effective force; the aim has been to divide the army into three corps instead of two. A new brigade has been formed for General Davis of the Second and Eleventh Mississippi, which were long separated from the army, and of two new regiments, the Forty-second Mississippi and the Fifty-fifth North Carolina; Pettigrew's strong brigade, recently arrived from North Carolina, and Archer's and Pender's brigades, borrowed from Hill, have been added to it to form a division commanded by General Heth; Hill's division has been placed under General Pender; and Anderson's, taken from Longstreet, with the two preceding ones forms the Third corps, commanded by Hill. The First and Second corps have thus found themselves reduced to three divisions each. Longstreet has kept the first, and Ewell the second. From the 31st of May to the 1st of July the army has gained—1st, Pettigrew's brigade; 2d, Jenkins' and Imboden's; it has lost—1st, Corse's brigade and a regiment of Pettigrew's, left at Hanover Junction; 2d, three regiments of Early's division, left at Winchester.

\* In this number are included the wounded of Chancellorsville.



## ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA.

*Effective Force May 31st.*

	Present under arms.	Total present.	Absent.	Total.
General staff and that of the } army corps.....	47	47	1	48
First corps... { Anderson's division.	7,440	9,159	4,517	13,676
{ McLaws            "	7,311	8,736	4,066	12,802
{ Hood's             "	7,720	9,148	3,439	12,587
{ Pickett's       "	6,687	7,945	4,105	12,050
{ Hill's            "	9,299	11,335	7,073	18,408
Second corps { Rodes'           "	8,473	10,229	5,579	15,799
{ Early's          "	6,943	8,350	4,713	13,063
{ Johnson's       "	5,564	6,713	5,158	11,871
Stuart's cavalry division.....	10,292	11,922	4,807	16,729
Artillery.....	4,703	5,170	1,477	6,647
Total.....	74,479	88,754	44,935	133,680

## ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

*Effective Force June 30, 1863.*

	Present under arms.	Total present.	Present and absent.	Cannon.
Head-quarters and troops attach- ed thereto.....	2,580	3,031	4,125	
Artillery reserve.....	2,868	2,745	3,138	150
First corps.....	10,355	12,157	17,502	28
Second corps.....	13,056	14,373	22,317	24
Third corps.....	12,630	13,881	22,403	30
Fifth corps.....	13,211	15,102	21,365	26
Sixth corps.....	15,710	17,625	24,036	48
Eleventh corps.....	10,576	12,096	17,374	26
Twelfth corps.....	8,597	9,816	14,574	20
Cavalry.....	10,192	12,162	20,417	
Total.....	99,475	112,988	167,251	352

The absent are composed as follows :

On detached service.....	21,428
On leave.....	1,665
Sick.....	27,888
Without leave.....	3,292
	54,263

Present and equipped :

Infantry.....	77,208
Artillery.....	6,692

## ROSTER OF TROOPS.\*

## FEDERAL ARMY OF THE POTOMAC

*(July, 1863).*

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE G. MEADE.

Brigadier-general Patrick, provost-guard.

" " Benham, engineer brigade.

" " Tyler, artillery reserve.

1st brigade, Major McGilvery.

2d " ————.

3d " ————, 150 cannon,

## FIRST CORPS.

MAJOR-GENERAL J. F. REYNOLDS.

1st division, Major-general Wadsworth.

1st brigade, Meredith, 19th Ind., 24th Mich., 2d, 6th, 7th Wis.  
(Iron brigade).

2d " Cutler, 56th Pa., 14th, 76th, 95th, 147th N. Y.

2d division, Brigadier-general Robinson.

1st brigade, Paul, 94th, 104th N. Y., 107th Pa., 16th Me.

2d " Baxter, 83d N. Y., 2d Mass., 88th, 90th Pa.

3d division, Major-general Doubleday.

1st brigade, Rowley, 20th N. Y., 121st, 142d Pa.

2d " Stone, 142d, 149th, 150th Pa. (Bucktails).

3d " Stannard, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th Vt.

Corps artillery, 28 cannon.

## SECOND CORPS.

MAJOR-GENERAL HANCOCK.

1st division, Brigadier-general Caldwell.

1st brigade, Cross, 5th N. H., 61st, 81st N. Y.

2d " Kelly, 28th Mass., 63d, 69th, 88th N. Y., 116th Pa.

3d " Zook, 52d, 57th, 66th N. Y., 140th Pa.

4th " Brooke, 27th Conn., 2d Del., 64th N. Y., 53d, 145th Pa.

2d division, Brigadier-general Gibbon.

1st brigade, Harrow, 19th Me., 15th Mass., 82d N. Y., 1st Minn.

2d " Webb, 69th, 71st, 72d, 106th Pa.

3d " Hall, 19th, 20th Mass., 7th Mich., 42d, 59th N. Y.

\* For revised roster see Addenda.—ED.

- 3d division, Brigadier-general Hays.  
 1st brigade, Carroll, 14th Ind., 4th, 8th O., 2d W. Va.  
 2d " Smyth, 14th Conn., 1st Del., 10th, 12th, 108th, 136th  
       N. Y.  
 3d " Willard, 37th, 111th, 125th, 126th N. Y.  
 Corps artillery, Captain Hazard, 24 cannon.

## THIRD CORPS.

## MAJOR-GENERAL SICKLES.

- 1st division, Brigadier-general Birney.  
 1st brigade, Graham, 57th, 63d, 68th, 105th, 114th, 141st Pa.  
 2d " Ward, 4th, 5th Me., 20th Ind., 99th Pa., 86th, 124th  
       N. Y., 1st, 2d Berdan Sharpshooters.  
 3d " Trobriand, 17th Me., 3d, 5th Mich., 40th N. Y., 110th  
       Pa.

- 2d division, Brigadier-general Humphreys.  
 1st brigade, Carr, 1st, 11th, 16th Mass., 12th N. H., 11th N. Y.,  
       26th Pa.  
 2d " Brewster, 70th, 71st, 72d, 73d, 74th, 120th N. Y.  
 3d " Burling, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th N. J., 115th Pa.  
 Corps artillery, Captain Randolph, 5 batteries, 30 cannon.

## FIFTH CORPS.

## MAJOR-GENERAL SYKES.

- 1st division, Brigadier-general Barnes.  
 1st brigade, Tilton, 18th, 22d Mass., 118th Pa.  
 2d " Sweitzer, 9th, 32d Mass., 4th Mich., 62d Pa.  
 3d " Vincent, 16th Mich., 44th N. Y., 83d Pa., 20th Me.  
 2d division, Brigadier-general Ayres.  
 1st brigade, Day, 3d, 4th, 6th, 12th, 14th U. S. infantry.  
 2d " Burbank, 2d, 7th, 10th, 11th, 17th U. S. infantry.  
 3d " Weed, 140th, 146th N. Y., 91st, 155th Pa.

- 3d division, Brigadier-general Crawford.  
 1st brigade, McCandless, 1st, 2d, 6th Pa. Res., 1st Pa. Rifles.  
 2d " Fisher, 5th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th Pa. Res.  
 Corps artillery, Captain —, 5 batteries, 26 cannon.

## SIXTH CORPS.

## MAJOR-GENERAL SEDGWICK.

1st division, Brigadier-general Wright.

1st brigade, Torbert, 1st, 2d, 3d, 15th N. Y.

2d " Bartlett, 5th Me., 121st N. Y., 95th, 96th Pa.

3d " Russell, 6th Me., 49th, 119th Pa., 5th Wis.

2d division, Brigadier-general Howe.

1st brigade, Grant, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th Vt.

2d " Neill, 7th Me., 43d, 49th, 77th N. Y., 61st Pa.

3d division, Brigadier-general Wheaton.

1st brigade, Shaler, 65th, 122d N. Y., 23d, 82d Pa.

2d " Eustis, 7th, 10th, 37th Mass.

3d " Nevin, 62d N. Y., 93d, 98th, 139th Pa.

Corps artillery, Captain —, 8 batteries, 48 cannon.

## ELEVENTH CORPS.

## MAJOR-GENERAL HOWARD.

1st division, Brigadier-general Barlow.

1st brigade, Von Gilsa, 41st, 44th, 68th N. Y., 153d Pa.

2d " Ames, 17th Conn., 75th, 107th O.

2d division, Brigadier-general Von Steinwehr.

1st brigade, Costar, 134th, 154th N. Y., 73d Pa.

2d " Smith, 33d Mass., 55th, 73d O.

3d division, Major-general Schurz.

1st brigade, Von Amsberg, 82d Ill., 45th, 157th N. Y., 61st O.,  
74th Pa.2d " Krzyzanowski, 58th, 119th N. Y., 82d O., 75th Pa., 26th  
Wis.

Corps artillery, Captain —, 5 batteries, 26 cannon.

## TWELFTH CORPS.

## MAJOR-GENERAL SLOCUM.

1st division, Brigadier-general Williams.

1st brigade, Ruger, 5th, 20th Conn., 3d Md., 123d, 146th, 149th  
N. Y.

2d " Colgrove, 27th Ind., 2d Mass., 107th N. Y., 13th N. J.

3d " Lockwood, 1st E. Shore, 1st Md., 150th N. Y.



2d division, Brigadier-general Geary.

1st brigade, Candy, 5th, 7th, 66th O., 28th, 128th, 147th Pa.

2d " Kane, 29th, 109th, 111th Pa.

3d " Greene, 60th, 78th, 102d, 137th N. Y.

Corps artillery, Captain —, 4 batteries, 20 cannon.

#### CAVALRY CORPS.

##### MAJOR-GENERAL PLEASANTON.

1st division, Brigadier-general Buford.

1st brigade, Gamble, 8th, 12th Ill., 8th Ind., 8th N. Y.

2d " Devin, 6th, 9th N. Y., 17th Pa.

3d " Merritt, 1st, 2d, 5th U. S. cavalry.

2d division, Brigadier-general Gregg.

1st brigade, McIntosh, 1st, 3d Pa., 1st N. J., 2d Mass.

2d " Irvin Gregg, 1st Me., 10th N. Y., 4th, 16th Pa.

3d " Huey, 8th Pa., 1st Md., 6th O., 2d N. Y.

3d division, Brigadier-general Kilpatrick.

1st brigade, Farnsworth, 5th N. Y., 1st O., 18th Pa., 1st Vt., 1st W. Va.

2d " Custer, 5th, 7th Mich.

### CONFEDERATE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA

(*June, 1863*).

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, GENERAL R. E. LEE.

#### FIRST CORPS.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL J. LONGSTREET.

1st division, Major-general J. B. Hood.

1st brigade, D. R. Anderson, 7th, 8th, 9th, 11th Ga.

2d " Bennings, 2d, 15th, 17th, 20th Ga.

3d " Law, 4th, 15th, 44th, 47th, 48th Ala.

4th " Robertson, 1st, 4th, 5th Texas, 3d Ark.

Artillery battalion, Major Henry, 4 batteries.

2d division, Major-general McLaws.

1st brigade, Barksdale, 13th, 17th, 18th, 21st Miss.

2d " Kershaw, 2d, 3d, 7th, 8th, 15th, 3d Batt. S. C.

3d brigade, Wofford, 16th, 18th, 24th Ga., Cobb's Legion, Phillips' Legion (Ga.).

4th " Semmes, 10th, 50th, 51st, 53d Ga.

Artillery battalion, Colonel Cabell, 4 batteries.

3d division, Major-general Pickett.

1st brigade, Kemper, 1st, 3d, 7th, 11th, 24th Va.

2d " Armistead, 9th, 14th, 38th, 53d, 57th Va.

3d " Garnett, 8th, 18th, 19th, 28th, 56th Va.

(Brigades of Corse and Jenkins absent.)

Artillery battalion, Major Dearing, 4 batteries.

Corps artillery, Major Eschelmann, Washington Art., Alexander's Batt., 10 batteries.

## SECOND CORPS.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL EWELL.

1st division, Major-general J. Early.

1st brigade, Smith, 31st, 49th, 52d Va.

2d " Hoke (Avery), 6th, 21st, 57th N. C.

3d " Hays, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th La.

4th " Gordon, 13th, 26th, 31st, 38th, 60th, 61st Ga.

Artillery battalion, Lieutenant-colonel Jones, 4 batteries.

2d division, Major-general Ed. Johnson.

1st brigade, Jones, 21st, 25th, 42d, 44th, 50th Va.

2d " Walker, 2d, 4th, 5th, 27th, 33d Va. (Stonewall Brigade).

3d " Stewart, 10th, 23d, 37th Va., 1st, 3d N. C., 1st Md.

4th " Nichols, 1st, 2d, 10th, 14th, 15th La.

Artillery battalion, Lieutenant-colonel Andrews, 4 batteries.

3d division, Major-general Rodes.

1st brigade, Neal, 3d, 5th, 6th, 12th Ala.

2d " Ramseur, 2d, 4th, 14th, 30th N. C.

3d " Dole, 4th, 12th, 21st, 44th Ga.

4th " Iverson, 5th, 12th, 20th, 23d N. C.

5th " Daniel, 32d, 43d, 45th, 53d, 2d Batt. N. C.

Artillery battalion, Lieutenant-colonel Carter, 4 batteries.

Corps artillery, Colonel Brown's Battalion, 1st Va. Battery, 8 batteries.

## THIRD CORPS.

## LIEUTENANT-GENERAL 'A. P. HILL.

1st division, Major-general R. H. Anderson.

- 1st brigade, Mahone, 6th, 12th, 16th, 41st, 61st Va.
- 2d    "     Wright, 3d, 22d, 48th, 2d Batt. Ga.
- 3d    "     Perry, 2d, 5th, 8th Fla.
- 4th    "     Posey, 12th, 16th, 19th, 48th Miss.
- 5th    "     Wilcox, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 14th Ala.
- Artillery battalion, Lieutenant-colonel Cutts, 3 batteries.

2d division, Major-general Pender.

- 1st brigade, McGowan (Perrin), 1st, 12th, 13th, 14th S. C., Orr's Rifles.
- 2d    "     Thomas, 14th, 35th, 45th, 49th Ga.
- 3d    "     Lane, 7th, 18th, 28th, 33d, 37th N. C.
- 4th    "     Scales, 13th, 16th, 22d, 34th, 38th N. C.
- Artillery battalion, Major Poague, 4 batteries.

3d division, Major-general H. Heth.

- 1st brigade, Archer, 1st, 7th, 14th Tenn., 5th, 13th Batt. Ala.
- 2d    "     Pettigrew, 11th, 26th, 47th, 52d N. C.
- 3d    "     Brockenbrough, 40th, 47th, 55th, 22d Batt. Va.
- 4th    "     Davis, 2d, 11th, 26th, 42d Miss., 55th N. C.
- Artillery battalion, Lieutenant-colonel Garnett, 4 batteries.
- Corps artillery, Major McIntosh, McIntosh's and Pegram's battalions, 9 batteries.

## CAVALRY DIVISION.

## MAJOR-GENERAL J. E. B. STUART.

- 1st brigade, Robertson, 4th, 5th, 59th, 63d N. C.
- 2d    "     W. Hampton, 1st N. C., 1st, 2d S. C., Cobb's, Davis', and Phillips' Legions.
- 3d    "     Fitzhugh Lee, 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th Va.
- 4th    "     W. H. F. Lee, 9th, 10th, 13th, 15th Va., 2d N. C.
- 5th    "     Jones, 6th, 7th, 11th, 12th, 35th Batt. Va.
- 6th    "     Jenkins, 14th, 16th, 17th, 26th, 34th Batt. Va.
- Horse artillery, 7 batteries.
- Independent brigade, Imboden.

## NOTES.

### NOTE A, PAGE 2.

More than sixteen years after Hooker's appointment, and only a few months before that brave soldier's death, the public was made acquainted with the confidential letter that the President addressed to him in transmitting his order of assignment as commander of the Army of the Potomac. The paternal tone of this letter, mingled with a vein of humor, and the practical good sense which it breathes throughout, portray so admirably the character of Mr. Lincoln that we deem it proper to insert its full text:

EXECUTIVE MANSION,  
*Washington, D. C., January 26, 1863.*

MAJOR-GENERAL HOOKER:

GENERAL: I have placed you at the head of the Army of the Potomac. Of course I have done this upon what appears to me to be sufficient reasons, and yet I think it best for you to know that there are some things in regard to which I am not quite satisfied with you. I believe you to be a brave and skilful soldier, which, of course, I like. I also believe you do not mix politics with your profession, in which you are right. You have confidence in yourself, which is a valuable, if not an indispensable, quality. You are ambitious, which, within reasonable bounds, does good rather than harm; but I think that during General Burnside's command of the army you have taken counsel of your ambition, and thwarted him as much as you could, in which you did a great wrong to the country and to a most meritorious and honorable brother-officer. I have heard, in such way as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the army and the Government needed a dictator. Of course it was not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the command. Only those generals who gain successes can set up dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship. The Government will support you to the utmost of its ability, which is neither more nor less than it has done and will do for all commanders. I much fear that the spirit which you have aided to infuse into the army, of criticising their commander and withholding confidence from him, will now turn upon you. I shall assist you as far as I can to put it down. Neither you nor Napoleon, if he were alive again, could get any good out of an army while such a spirit prevails in it. And now beware of rashness. Beware of rashness, but with energy and sleepless vigilance go forward and give us victories.

Yours, very truly, A. LINCOLN.



## BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE.

WE will not here give all the documents from which we have already borrowed the elements of our history, and which are enumerated at the end of the first and second volumes. But as we progress in this work and years pass away documents become more numerous and complete. The Federal reports, the statements of the contributors to the newspapers, are better written, clearer, and more circumstantial; every one has made some advance in his military education, both in the North and in the South. The military operations, while being condensed, so to speak, are also more easily related: war, being made in a more methodical manner, lends itself better to a narration of the events. In short, the ardent passions which animated the combatants having, thank God! been calmed before the principal actors of the great drama have passed away, its history has become for them an inexhaustible subject of courteous controversy, of which the great public of the United States is to-day the arbitrator. This controversy is pursued sometimes in the periodicals exclusively devoted to one of the two armies, as the *Army and Navy Journal* in the North and the *Southern Historical Society's Papers* in the South. It is remarkable that sometimes in the very same journal, such as the *Weekly Times* of Philadelphia, the most interesting light is thrown by both sides upon the facts which we have undertaken to relate. Besides, it is not limited to the discussion of facts between officers of the opposing armies, for it is more lively perhaps between those who fought under the same flag, and who bandy with each other the responsibility of the defeats which have been successively experienced by each of the two parties. Before commencing the narration of the decisive battle of Gettysburg we provoked on the causes of Lee's defeat a discussion of this kind, which has been to us of great help; it has been published in the *Southern Historical Society's Papers*, thanks to the kindness of the editor, the Rev. J. Wm. Jones, who solicited on this point the opinion of some of the principal officers of the Confederate army.

The special works of Hotchkiss and Allan on Chancellorsville, of Bates on Gettysburg—the one written from the Southern standpoint, the other from the Northern—as well as the maps published by the former and that of Bachelder of Gettysburg, have been for us invaluable guides. But the most useful documents for such a work are those which emanate from the actors themselves, and which are written at the first moment, when facts are too recent to allow any glossing of the truth. Unfortunately, the printed reports of Lee and his

subordinates stop after the battle of Chancellorsville. However, the Rev. J. Wm. Jones has published a great number of them, furnished by the authors and their families, and has thus made up for this blank. On the other side we owe to the kindness of Colonel Meade, the general's son, the use of all the military papers of his father, which he kindly permitted us to have copied. In this voluminous collection, which contains the reports of his subordinates, the directions that he gave them, and his telegraph despatches, one finds the most lifelike description of all the incidents of the struggle and the motives which inspired each movement, and finds fortuitous or voluntary errors, which, on being later accredited, have covered the faults of the one and unjustly condemned the others.

We have largely borrowed, for the same campaigns, from the following works: "Four Years with General Lee," by General Taylor; "Personal Reminiscences of General Lee," by the Rev. J. Wm. Jones; "Life of General Lee," by J. Esten Cooke; "Pickett and his Men," by W. Harrison; and for that of Vicksburg a narration of the siege by a resident has furnished us with some curious details. Let us quote, in short, among our authors, the most illustrious of all, General Sherman, to whom we owe, under the form of "Memoirs," the pages the most original, brilliant, and instructive which have ever been written on the war. General Sherman, who has never been ambitious for any political post nor solicited the votes of any political party, has had the rare courage to say frankly in these Memoirs what he thought of the officers who served near or under him. Judgments without any reticence, thus expressed by the commander of an army, clash with many feelings of self-love, and sometimes wound legitimate susceptibilities and excite some manifestations of anger; but they have, in the eyes of the historian, an incomparable value.

## ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS TO VOLS. I. AND II.

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SINCE the publication of the preceding volumes we have received a large number of documents from America, either recently printed or in manuscript, and their examination has enabled us to detect some inaccuracies of detail in those volumes: some of them have even thrown a new light upon events which we have narrated. Recognizing it as the first duty of an historian to dispel as promptly and as far as he can the clouds of error which so readily gather about and obscure the truth, we shall not wait for a second edition (supposing that one be issued) to point out to our readers the principal errors into which scanty or inaccurate information may have led us.

We herewith append these corrections, indicating the volume and page to which each note refers.

### VOLUME I.

#### PAGE 35.

Although victorious at the battle of San Pascual, the Americans were still obliged to repel the attacks of their adversaries for two days. Fortunately for them, the naval division of Commodore Stockton was waiting for them at San Diego, and a detachment of marines and soldiers, sent by the latter, brought them a relief of which they stood greatly in need. After resting for a fortnight at San Diego, Kearney's small band, reinforced by more than four hundred and fifty men, resumed its march under the supreme command of Stockton. On the 8th of January, 1847, the Americans dispersed the enemy's forces that had rallied against them at Rio San Gabriel, and beat them again the next day before Los Angeles. After a violent quarrel with Stockton, who disputed the command with him, Kearney continued his march, overtook a Mormon battalion on the 21st, which had arrived from the North, and finally occupied Upper California, in conjunction with Lieutenant-colonel Fremont.

## PAGE 142.

The Virginia ordinance of secession was freely voted for by the legislature, the majority of which was in favor of separation.

## PAGE 187.

The Federal arsenals of the North, although *disgarnished*, were not absolutely empty.

## PAGE 248.

Johnston did not stop the trains, with his army on board, in the open country; he landed his troops at Manassas Junction, and thence led them to battle.

## PAGE 249.

Elzey takes the place of Kirby Smith in the command of the latter's brigade.

## PAGE 254.

The official documents we have before us, and particularly one despatch from Patterson to General Scott, dated July 20, informing the latter of the departure of Johnston's troops for Manassas Junction, do not justify us in persisting to blame General Patterson as we have done: by mistake we exaggerated his forces; besides, he had with him only troops whose terms of service were about to expire, and who would return to their homes. But even if he had had a more numerous and better organized army at his disposal, he could not long have prevented Johnston from escaping him, as the latter had in his rear a line of railway connecting him with Beauregard. General Scott, in advising him to watch and detain the Confederates, told him that the battle between Beauregard and McDowell would take place on the 18th. Now, on that day Johnston was still at Winchester; he only started during the day; and Patterson did all that could be expected from him by announcing this departure to his chief in a despatch which, had it been speedily forwarded, might have reached its destination in time to have been of use to McDowell before Bull Run.

## PAGE 297, line 18.

Hominy is made of hulled and broken grains of white Indian corn.

## PAGE 308.

The forwarding of arms deposited in the arsenals of the North to the South by Mr. Floyd has excited violent discussions and given place to searching inquiries. The result of these inquiries, without lessening the culpability of the Federal Secretary of War in our



estimation, diminishes the amount of damage he thus caused to the army, of which he was the responsible chief. It is on record that to the 20,000 muskets which were already in the arsenals of the Southern States, and which did not quite represent the quota of those States, he added 115,000, taken from the arsenals of the North. But there yet remained a large quantity of them in the latter establishments. The lack of percussion-caps, and the rival pretensions of the seceded States in regard to the distribution of these arms, did not allow the Confederate government to derive as prompt a benefit from them as it had hoped.

PAGE 415.

The original of the despatch found in Baker's hat was deposited in the War Department, where, without any consideration for the memory of a brave officer, which required the despatch to be made known, it was buried away among the files. Fortunately, a copy of it had been preserved, and its publication vindicated the victim of Ball's Bluff from most of the accusations that had been directed against him.

PAGE 422, line 13.

The Naval School of Annapolis was only founded in 1845.

PAGE 506.

Albert Pike was not a half-breed, but a white man—a Northern man who, by his lofty stature, his daring and natural genius, had acquired great influence over the Indian tribes.

PAGE 526.

Beauregard, on leaving Manassas for the borders of the Mississippi, had taken no troops with him. A work published in the South, whose worthlessness we have since discovered, led us into error upon this point.

PAGE 620.

General Shields was not an officer of the old regular army.

## VOLUME II.

PAGES 69, 70.

On the strength of information obtained a few days after the battle of Fair Oaks, we stated that in the afternoon of the 31st of May General McClellan, while ordering Sumner to cross the Chickahominy, had tried to make the largest portion of his right wing effect the

passage of this river in front of the latter's encampments—that is to say, in the vicinity of New Bridge, where two bridges were already nearly completed; that Generals Franklin and Porter having represented to him that these bridges would not be available for artillery before night, he decided to defer this passage till next day; that finally, on the morning of the 1st of June, these last-mentioned officers, more prudent than Sumner, had taken advantage of the latitude of action granted them by their chief to relinquish an operation which appeared to them impracticable. This hesitation, we said, had saved the Confederates from an imminent disaster.

Since then, General McClellan on the one hand, and Generals Franklin and Porter on the other—that is to say, the three persons interested—having concurred in assuring us that the former had not ordered the latter to cross the river either on the evening of the 31st or on the morning of the 1st, we have no alternative but to accept such evidence as irrefutable: the conclusions we had arrived at naturally fall to the ground at the same time. These, then, to sum up, are the modifications which it is proper to make to our narrative: When, at the first news of the combat that was taking place along the left wing in the afternoon of the 31st, McClellan ordered Sumner to hold himself ready to cross the Chickahominy, the bridges in process of construction at New Bridge and above that place were not completed. Thinking that it would be impossible to make use of them on that day, he simply gave orders to the officers of the engineer corps in the evening to hasten their completion during the night. Smith's division, which was only within half a mile's distance, could cross over them at the first intimation of their availability. It would undoubtedly have been of great advantage to the Federals to have supported Sumner's movement of the 31st on that side, but the testimony of all those who had charge of the construction of the bridges shows that even the infantry could not have made use of them on that day. Thanks to their incessant efforts, at a quarter-past eight in the morning on the 1st of June, notwithstanding the rise in the river, a bridge of boats was built alongside the crumbling pier of the New Bridge, and, availing themselves of the old causeway, they succeeded in making the approaches accessible to troops of all arms: a trestle-bridge, erected a little higher up, surrounded by muddy ground, was only accessible to the infantry. These contrivances for crossing the river were very fragile, for on the same day, at noon, the swollen waters of the Chickahominy had submerged them; the opposite bank had complete command of

the narrow causeway over which the Federals were obliged to traverse the marshy soil of the valley, and the enemy would have required but a small force to stop them. If they had succeeded in taking position on the other side of the river, it looked as if they would soon be deprived of all communication with the rest of the army, and probably be attacked in this position by a more numerous enemy. General McClellan, being detained on the morning of the 1st of June among the troops of his left, who had just fought such a hard battle, a witness to the material losses and the demoralization of a portion of his forces, did not deem it advisable to order so hazardous a movement as the passage of the Chickahominy by his right wing. Franklin and Porter, who were in command, took no part in this decision. They could not act without orders, and the general-in-chief was alone responsible for the immobility of his right wing. We believe that the passage was not impossible: from eight o'clock till twelve the bridges were available. This was more time than was required to effect the passage of two divisions; a third (Slocum's) could even have crossed the river higher up, near Mechanicsville. A simple movement of Sumner toward his right would have sufficed to menace the rear of the Confederate troops if they had attempted to oppose this passage. The army of which G. W. Smith had just taken the command after the battle of the 31st was not in a condition during the new struggle that was taking place on the morning of the 1st to dispute the right bank of the Chickahominy to Franklin and Porter: their appearance on its left might therefore have turned its retreat into a positive disaster. From the first step taken in that direction they could have assisted Sumner without troubling themselves about the rise in the river on their rear for the future. We are convinced, therefore, that their immobility was a great misfortune to the Federals. But the writer who, in order to form a judgment of certain events, gathers around him documents which lay before him the details of the interior situation of both parties, should not condemn the actors as if the latter had known all these details: McClellan, therefore, should not be blamed for not having attempted a bold manœuvre which, in the existing state of affairs, seemed to him singularly hazardous, and which, if it held out chances of positive success, seemed also likely to compromise the very existence of his army.

## PAGE 80.

Captain Royall was seriously but not mortally wounded. He survived both his wound and the war.



Although the charge of General Cooke was made under unfavorable circumstances, he must be praised for having ordered it. He could not select his ground, and by sacrificing a portion of the Fifth cavalry he saved several Federal batteries, to which he gave time to withdraw.

## PAGE 103.

Instead of Richardson, read French.

## PAGE 285.

Sigel and Reynolds occupy in the afternoon, after a slight skirmish, the road from Warrenton to Centreville—one at Groveton, the other more to the eastward. King, who, instead of preceding, follows them, attacks the enemy more to the westward along this road, at the point where it inclines toward Young's Branch.

## PAGES 286-293, or Note D, Appendix, pages 760-762.

The second battle fought in the vicinity of Bull Run shares with the first the privilege of provoking more recriminations and discussions in the Northern States than all the other events of the war. These discussions, after having occupied the attention of a court-martial summoned too soon to have been able to judge the question with a full knowledge of the facts, have been continued in the newspapers, in pamphlets, and in books. The recent decision of a high commission of inquiry, which annulled the sentence of the court-martial, failed to put an end to them. The animosities which inspired them and kept them alive have rendered extremely difficult the task of the historian who is desirous to eliminate the truth from the mass of exaggerations that surround it. Being obliged by conflicting representations to inquire once more into this question, and being now furnished with fuller particulars, and enlightened by the evidence we had not been able to collect before our narrative was written, we have been able to detect some errors in this account, which we hasten to rectify.

The first relates to certain movements of Longstreet's corps during the afternoon of the 29th of August. We said that that general, taking advantage of the inactivity of Porter's corps, which was opposed to him, had sent Hood's division to Jackson's relief, whose timely arrival along the Warrenton road would have checked the offensive movements of King. Hood, as we will presently explain, had been in the position where King met him since eleven o'clock in the morning. It was Wilcox's division that Longstreet, after having at first transferred it from his left to his right in order to watch Porter, had



brought back again to the left, near Jackson's, but it arrived too late to take part in the battle.

Our second mistake was in blaming Porter for having remained immovable while hearing the sound of battle in the direction of Groveton. Irrefutable testimony has proved to us that while the combat was limited to the extreme Federal right during the successive attacks of Hooker and Kearny—that is to say, during the whole afternoon—this sound did not reach the point where Porter was stationed; the distant booming of cannon, which alone could be heard, had resounded so frequently in the forests of Virginia without announcing anything more than a trifling artillery-duel that people had ceased to pay any attention to it. It was only the sound of King's attack, much nearer than the attacks preceding it, which reached Porter's ears at the very moment he was preparing a movement which, as will be seen, was interrupted by darkness.

While waiting for a second edition to correct the few pages we have devoted to the events of the 29th of August, we give a summary of what took place on that day at the left wing of the Federals or the right wing of the Confederates; that is to say, of the facts bearing upon the merits of a quarrel already twenty years old—a sketch far more complete and precise than the one contained in our second volume, and which, having drawn it up with great care, we have the pretension to believe to be scrupulously correct:

Longstreet, arriving from Gainesville with General Lee, and following the Warrenton turnpike, reached an elevated position to the right of Jackson on the 29th of August, between ten and eleven o'clock in the morning. He brought with him, in the order we enumerate them, the following provisional divisions: Hood (two brigades), accompanied by Evans' independent brigade; Wilcox (three brigades); Kemper (three brigades); D. R. Jones (three brigades). Anderson, with the last three brigades of the First corps, was too much in the rear to appear on the battlefield on that day. At noon this corps was deployed in two lines, each division occupying part of its front. Hood, being naturally first in line, had since eleven o'clock taken position across the turnpike, placing Law's brigade on the left and Wofford's on the right, in front of Groveton. Evans was on his right; Wilcox on his left, but slightly in the rear, connected the two corps of the Confederate army at the foot of the hill upon which Lee had posted a portion of his artillery. His division was on Evans' right; the first brigade, under Hunton, was drawn close to the latter; the other two, extending across a

rough country, formed but a partial connection with D. R. Jones' division. About noon the three brigades of this division had planted themselves on the extreme right in very strong positions among the woods, resting upon the Manassas railroad near the point where it strikes the road from Gainesville to Bristoe and Manassas Junction. Robertson's cavalry cleared Longstreet's flank on the other side of the railway.

Before Longstreet's arrival Sigel's troops outflanked Jackson's right, and for a moment they even caused considerable alarm on his rear; but Stuart's cavalry soon put a stop to a movement which Sigel was not strong enough to follow up vigorously; and at eleven o'clock Hood's arrival made Jackson's safety completely secure on that side. During this time McDowell and Porter were carrying out the new instructions they had received from Pope, who, as we have stated (page 288), directed them to march from Manassas Junction upon Gainesville in order to strike the flank and rear of the enemy on the right; Porter, with his two divisions, was marching along the road above mentioned; he was followed by King's division, which was temporarily attached to his command. General McDowell was with this column, while Ricketts, at the head of the Second division of his own corps, had borne more to the right, and was to strike the turnpike north of Groveton. The direction followed by Porter brought him face to face with D. R. Jones. He therefore found himself suddenly in the presence of an enemy upon whom neither Pope nor himself had counted, and utterly unable to continue the movement which had been prescribed to him. McDowell was not long in joining him. Resuming the command of King's division, he sought to deploy it to the right of Porter in order to assist Ricketts, and thus form a continuous front of attack against the enemy he had so unexpectedly encountered.

But the impenetrable thickets which covered the ground on that side rendered such deployment impossible, and McDowell, justly thinking that the presence of the enemy on the road from Gainesville to Bristoe would not permit him to strike his flank, as Pope desired, determined, instead of attacking him in front with his forces and those of Porter combined, to bring King back to the rear in order to overtake Ricketts and operate with his whole corps in a less eccentric fashion against Jackson's right wing. This decision, which justified the latitude left by Pope's orders, was certainly the best, and it is only to be regretted that he did not take along with him the whole of Porter's corps, leaving only a small force before Longstreet.

The support of this corps, if it had arrived in time for that purpose, would probably have secured the success of King's attack. It is difficult to know precisely what orders McDowell, the senior officer of the two, gave to Porter; but, at all events, these orders do not appear to have been positive, and the retrograde movement undertaken by the former was no encouragement to the latter to attempt a direct attack with his reduced forces. This attack had not been contemplated in the instructions of the general-in-chief. Porter was entirely ignorant of what was taking place on his right. Finally, his scouts having taken some prisoners, he learned from them that he had before him a portion of Longstreet's corps, which the general staff still believed to be among the defiles of the Alleghanies. Consequently, Porter, while McDowell was pursuing his way with King through a long and sinuous road, confined himself to watching the enemy in front of him. Longstreet, on his part, as soon as he was informed by Robertson of the appearance of a large Federal column on his right wing, hastened to reinforce it, and at half-past four o'clock withdrew Wilcox's division from the place it occupied on his left, to send it to take a position between Kemper and Jones. Porter, therefore, by his mere presence had succeeded in drawing or in detaining at the extreme Confederate right six brigades; that is to say, one half of Longstreet's corps: two of Kemper's brigades, which did not participate in the fight that King was engaged in along the road, could promptly have supported Jones and Wilcox if Porter, interpreting his instructions differently, had attacked them vigorously, and it is natural to infer that any success achieved at first by the latter would speedily have been neutralized by the arrival of considerable reinforcements. It is true that toward six o'clock Longstreet, perceiving at a distance King's division on the march, called back Wilcox's division to his left in great haste; but the latter did not leave his second position before sunset, and did not reach the turnpike until after the termination of the combat between Hood and King. It was, in fact, on the road where Pope, still believing in his ability to outflank Jackson's right, and ignorant of Longstreet's presence, had despatched the new division that McDowell had brought him. At the same time, Longstreet, wishing to relieve the Second corps, ordered Hood to advance, whose fresh troops dashed against those of King, while his artillery on the left and Evans' and Hunton's brigades on the right pressed them close on both flanks. The combat was long and desperate: the Federals, inferior in numbers, made a good stand in the dark, but they could naturally gain no ground over their ad-



versaries. The result of the battle was the same at every point: the Confederate lines had not been broken; they were compact and ready to resume the offensive: this, therefore, was a serious check for the Federals, and left them in a position all the more dangerous because their chieftain did not as yet appreciate its gravity.

Far from endorsing the reproaches Pope has lavished upon Porter, we have been led, while writing this new account, to modify the judgment, far too severe, we had ourself passed upon the latter general.

This recital, in fact, clearly proves that if Porter exhibited too much prudence in a situation which, altogether unforeseen, restored to him his freedom of action, this excess of prudence was productive of no evil effects upon the Federal army; for if he remained immovable with six brigades in front of him or within reach, the Confederates kept eight which did not fire a single musket-shot during the whole day. As we stated (p. 292), he did not receive the order of attack, which Pope sent him at half-past four o'clock, in time to execute it: this order only reached him about half-past six o'clock, and the nature of the ground rendered any aggressive movement in the dark impossible. Even if he had been able to execute this movement, the day's results could certainly not have been changed.

PAGE 553.

Colonel Farnsworth of the Eighth Illinois is not the General Farnsworth who was killed the following year at Gettysburg.

PAGE 555.

The information furnished by General McClellan himself enables us to correct a few errors in our account of his removal from command. McClellan was alone in his tent when Buckingham entered. The latter, although a stranger to the Army of the Potomac, was not unknown. He had many friends in it—among others, the general-in-chief himself. He had been in search of Burnside, and was desirous that the latter should be present at the painful interview he was about to have.

PAGE 681, line 19.

Besides the President, a small number of magistrates and employés take the oath to support the Constitution in the Republic of the United States.

PAGE 697.

Of these twenty-five millions of bonds, eighteen millions were issued.





## ADDENDA BY THE EDITOR.

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*Organization of the Army of the Potomac, commanded by MAJOR-GENERAL JOSEPH HOOKER, in the Chancellorsville Campaign, May 1-5, 1863.*

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### GENERAL HEAD-QUARTERS.

#### PROVOST GUARD.

Colonel William F. Rogers.

1st Maryland Light Artillery, Battery B.	80th New York.
21st New York.	Ohio Light Artillery, 12th Battery.
23d New York.	8th U. S. Infantry, Company G.
35th New York.	

#### HEADQUARTERS GUARD.

Colonel John S. Crocker.

93d New York.

#### ENGINEER BRIGADE.

Brigadier-general Henry W. Benham.

15th New York.	50th New York.	Battalion United States.
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#### SIGNAL CORPS.

Captain S. T. Cushing.

#### GUARDS AND ORDERLIES.

Lieutenant-colonel Rufus Ingalls.

Independent Company Oneida (N. Y.) Cavalry.

### ARTILLERY.

Brigadier-general Henry J. Hunt.

#### ARTILLERY RESERVE.

Captain William M. Graham.

1st Connecticut Heavy Artillery, Bat. B.	New York Light Artillery, 32d Bat.
1st Connecticut Heavy Artillery, Bat. M.	1st U. S. Artillery, Battery K.
New York Light Artillery, 5th Battery.	3d U. S. Artillery, Battery C.
New York Light Artillery, 15th Battery.	4th U. S. Artillery, Battery G.
New York Light Artillery, 29th Battery.	5th U. S. Artillery, Battery K.
New York Light Artillery, 30th Battery.	32d Massachusetts Infantry, Co. C.

## FIRST ARMY CORPS.

MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN F. REYNOLDS.

## ESCORT.

Captain Constantine Taylor.  
1st Maine Cavalry, Company L.

## FIRST DIVISION.

Brigadier-general James S. Wadsworth.

*First Brigade.*

Colonel Walter Phelps, Jr.  
22d New York.  
24th New York.  
30th New York.  
84th New York (14th Militia).

*Second Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Lysander Cutler.  
7th Indiana.  
76th New York.  
95th New York.  
147th New York.  
56th Pennsylvania.

*Third Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Gabriel R. Paul.  
22d New Jersey.  
29th New Jersey.  
30th New Jersey.  
31st New Jersey.  
137th Pennsylvania.

*Fourth Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Solomon Meredith.  
19th Indiana.  
24th Michigan.  
2d Wisconsin.  
6th Wisconsin.  
7th Wisconsin.

*Artillery.*

Captain John A. Reynolds.  
New Hampshire Lt. Art'y., 1st Bat.  
1st New York Lt. Artillery, Bat. L.  
4th U. S. Artillery, Battery B.

## SECOND DIVISION.

Brigadier-general John C. Robinson.

*First Brigade.*

Colonel Adrian R. Root.  
16th Maine.  
94th New York.  
104th New York.  
107th Pennsylvania.

*Second Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Henry Baxter.  
12th Massachusetts.  
26th New York.  
90th Pennsylvania.  
136th Pennsylvania.

*Third Brigade.*

Colonel Samuel H. Leonard.  
13th Massachusetts.  
83d New York.  
97th New York.  
11th Pennsylvania.  
88th Pennsylvania.

*Artillery.*

Captain Dunbar R. Ransom.

Maine Light Artillery, 2d Battery.  
Maine Light Artillery, 5th Battery.

Pennsylvania Light Artillery, Bat. C.  
5th U. S. Artillery, Battery C.

## THIRD DIVISION.

Major-general Abner Doubleday.

*First Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Thomas A. Rowley.  
121st Pennsylvania.  
135th Pennsylvania.  
142d Pennsylvania.  
151st Pennsylvania.

*Second Brigade.*

Colonel Roy Stone.  
143d Pennsylvania.  
149th Pennsylvania.  
150th Pennsylvania.

*Artillery.*

Major Ezra W. Matthews.  
1st Pa. Lt. Art., Bat. B.  
1st Pa. Lt. Art., Bat. F.  
1st Pa. Lt. Art., Bat. G.

SECOND ARMY CORPS.

MAJOR-GENERAL DARIUS N. COUCH.

ESCORT.

Captain Riley Johnson.

6th New York Cavalry, Companies D and K.

FIRST DIVISION.

Major-general Winfield S. Hancock.

*First Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. John C. Caldwell.  
5th New Hampshire.  
61st New York.  
81st Pennsylvania.  
148th Pennsylvania.

*Second Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Thomas F. Meagher.  
28th Massachusetts.  
63d New York.  
69th New York.  
88th New York.  
116th Pennsylvania (Battln.).

*Third Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Samuel K. Zook.  
52d New York.  
57th New York.  
66th New York.  
140th Pennsylvania.

*Fourth Brigade.*

Colonel John R. Brooke.  
27th Connecticut.  
2d Delaware.  
64th New York.  
53d Pennsylvania.  
145th Pennsylvania.

*Artillery.*

Captain Rufus D. Pettit.  
1st New York Light Artillery, Battery B.  
4th U. S. Artillery, Battery C.

SECOND DIVISION.

Brigadier-general John Gibbon.

*First Brigade.*

(1) Brig.-gen. Alfred Sully.  
(2) Colonel Byron Laflin.  
19th Maine.  
15th Massachusetts.  
1st Minnesota.  
34th New York.  
82d New York.

*Second Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Joshua T. Owen.  
69th Pennsylvania.  
71st Pennsylvania.  
72d Pennsylvania.  
106th Pennsylvania.

*Third Brigade.*

Colonel Norman J. Hall.  
19th Massachusetts.  
20th Massachusetts.  
7th Michigan.  
42d New York.  
59th New York.  
127th Pennsylvania.

*Artillery.*

1st Rhode Island Light Art., Bat. A.  
1st Rhode Island Light Art., Bat. B.

*Not Brigaded.*

1st Co. Massachusetts Sharpshooters.

THIRD DIVISION.

Major-general William H. French.

*First Brigade.*

Colonel Samuel S. Carroll.  
14th Indiana.  
24th New Jersey.  
28th New Jersey.  
4th Ohio.  
8th Ohio.  
7th West Virginia.

*Second Brigade.*

(1) Brig.-gen. Wm. Hays.\*  
(2) Col. Chas. J. Powers.  
14th Connecticut.  
12th New Jersey.  
108th New York.  
130th Pennsylvania.

*Third Brigade.*

Colonel John D. MacGregor.  
1st Delaware.  
4th New York.  
10th New York (Battln.).  
132d Pennsylvania.

*Artillery.*

1st New York Light Art., Bat. G.      1st Rhode Island Light Art., Bat. G.

\* Captured May 3.



## THIRD ARMY CORPS.

MAJOR-GENERAL DANIEL E. SICKLES.

## FIRST DIVISION.

Brigadier-general David B. Birney.

*First Brigade.*

- (1) Brig.-gen. Chas. K. Graham.\*  
 (2) Colonel Thomas W. Egan.

57th Pennsylvania.  
 63d Pennsylvania.  
 68th Pennsylvania.  
 105th Pennsylvania.  
 114th Pennsylvania.  
 141st Pennsylvania.

*Second Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. J. H. H. Ward.

20th Indiana.  
 3d Maine.  
 4th Maine.  
 38th New York.  
 40th New York.  
 99th Pennsylvania.

*Third Brigade.*

Colonel Samuel B. Hayman.

17th Maine.  
 3d Michigan.  
 5th Michigan.  
 1st New York.  
 37th New York.

*Artillery.*

Captain A. Judson Clark.

New Jersey Light Artillery, Bat. B.      3d U. S. Artillery, Batteries F and K.  
 1st Rhode Island Light Art., Bat. E.

## SECOND DIVISION.

- (1) Major-general Hiram G. Berry.†  
 (2) Brigadier-general Joseph B. Carr.

*First Brigade.*

- (1) Brig.-gen. Joseph B. Carr.  
 (2) Colonel William Blaisdell.

1st Massachusetts.  
 11th Massachusetts.  
 16th Massachusetts.  
 11th New Jersey.  
 26th Pennsylvania.

*Second Brigade.*

- (1) Brig.-gen. Joseph W. Revere.  
 (2) Colonel J. Egbert Farnum.‡

70th New York.  
 71st New York.  
 72d New York.  
 73d New York.  
 74th New York.  
 120th New York.

*Third Brigade.*

- (1) Brig.-gen. Gershom Mott.§  
 (2) Colonel Wm. J. Sewell.

5th New Jersey.  
 6th New Jersey.  
 7th New Jersey.  
 8th New Jersey.  
 2d New York.  
 115th Pennsylvania.

*Artillery.*

Captain Thomas W. Osborn.

1st New York Light Art., Battery D.      1st U. S. Artillery, Battery H.  
 New York Light Art., 4th Battery.      4th U. S. Artillery, Battery K.

## THIRD DIVISION.

- (1) Brigadier-general Amiel W. Whipple.||  
 (2) Brigadier-general Charles K. Graham.

*First Brigade.*

Colonel Emlen Franklin.  
 86th New York.  
 124th New York.  
 122d Pennsylvania.

*Second Brigade.*

Colonel Samuel M. Bowman.  
 12th New Hampshire.  
 84th Pennsylvania.  
 110th Pennsylvania.

*Third Brigade.*

Colonel Hiram Berdan.  
 1st U. S. Sharpshooters.  
 2d U. S. Sharpshooters.

*Artillery.*

- (1) Captain Albert A. Von Puttkammer.  
 (2) Captain James F. Huntington.

New York Light Artillery, 10th Battery.      1st Ohio Light Art., Battery H.  
 New York Light Artillery, 11th Battery.

\* Assigned to command of 3d Division May 4.

† Assigned to command May 3.

‡ Wounded May 3.

§ Killed May 3.

|| Wounded May 4.

## FIFTH ARMY CORPS.

MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE G. MEADE.

## FIRST DIVISION.

Brigadier-general Charles Griffin.

*First Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. James Barnes.

2d Maine.  
 18th Massachusetts.  
 22d Massachusetts.  
 2d Co. Mass. Sharpshooters.  
 1st Michigan.  
 13th New York (Battalion).  
 25th New York.  
 118th Pennsylvania.

*Second Brigade.*

(1) Colonel James McQuade.\*  
 (2) Colonel Jacob B. Sweitzer.

9th Massachusetts.  
 32d Massachusetts.  
 4th Michigan.  
 14th New York.  
 62d Pennsylvania.

*Third Brigade.*

Colonel T. B. W. Stockton.

20th Maine.  
 16th Michigan.  
 12th New York.  
 17th New York.  
 44th New York.  
 83d Pennsylvania.

*Artillery.*

Captain Augustus P. Martin.

Massachusetts Light Artillery, Bat. C.      1st Rhode Island Light Art., Bat. C.  
 Massachusetts Light Artillery, Bat. E.      5th U. S. Artillery, Battery D.

## SECOND DIVISION.

Major-general George Sykes.

*First Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Romeyn B. Ayres.

3d U. S. Inf., Cos. B, C, F, G, I and K.  
 4th U. S. Inf., Cos. C, F, H and K.  
 12th U. S. Inf., Cos. A, B, C, D, G (1st  
 Battln.), A, C and D (2d Battln.).  
 14th U. S. Inf., Cos. A, B, D, E, F, G  
 (1st Battln.), F and G (2d Battln.).

*Second Brigade.*

Colonel Sidney Burbank.

2d U. S. Inf., Cos. B, C, F, I and K.  
 6th U. S. Inf., Cos. D, F, G, H and I.  
 7th U. S. Inf., Cos. A, B, E and I.  
 10th U. S. Inf., Cos. G and H.  
 11th U. S. Inf., Cos. B, C, D, E, F, G  
 (1st Battln.), C and D (2d Battln.).  
 17th U. S. Inf., Cos. A, C, D, G, H (1st  
 Battln.), A and B (2d Battln.).

*Third Brigade.*

Colonel Patrick H. O'Rorke.

5th New York.  
 140th New York.  
 146th New York.

*Artillery.*

Captain Stephen H. Weed.

1st Ohio Light Artillery, Battery L.  
 5th U. S. Artillery, Battery I.

## THIRD DIVISION.

Brigadier-general Andrew A. Humphreys.

*First Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Erastus B. Tyler.

91st Pennsylvania.  
 126th Pennsylvania.  
 129th Pennsylvania.  
 134th Pennsylvania.

*Second Brigade.*

Colonel Peter H. Allabach.

123d Pennsylvania.  
 131st Pennsylvania.  
 133d Pennsylvania.  
 155th Pennsylvania.

*Artillery.*

Captain Alanson M. Randol.

1st N. Y. Lt. Art., Bat. C.  
 1st U. S. Artillery, Bat. E.

\* Disabled May 4.

## SIXTH ARMY CORPS.

MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN SEDGWICK.

ESCORT.

Major Hugh H. Janeway.

1st New Jersey Cavalry, Co. L.

1st Pennsylvania Cavalry, Co. H.

FIRST DIVISION.

Brigadier-general William T. H. Brooks.

*First Brigade.**Second Brigade.**Third Brigade.*

- (1) Colonel Henry W. Brown.\*  
 (2) Colonel William H. Penrose.  
 (3) Colonel Samuel L. Buck.†  
 (4) Colonel William H. Penrose.

Brig.-gen. Joseph J. Bartlett.

Brig.-gen. David A. Russell.

1st New Jersey.  
 2d New Jersey.  
 3d New Jersey.  
 4th New Jersey.  
 15th New Jersey.  
 23d New Jersey.

5th Maine.  
 16th New York.  
 27th New York.  
 121st New York.  
 96th Pennsylvania.

18th New York.  
 32d New York.  
 49th Pennsylvania.  
 95th Pennsylvania.  
 119th Pennsylvania.

*Artillery.*

Major John A. Tompkins.

Massachusetts Light Artillery, Bat. A.

Maryland Light Artillery, Bat. A.

New Jersey Light Artillery, Bat. A.

2d U. S. Artillery, Battery D.

SECOND DIVISION.

Brigadier-general Albion P. Howe.

*Second Brigade.**Third Brigade.**Artillery.*

Colonel Lewis A. Grant.

Brig.-gen. Thomas H. Neill.

Major J. Watts de Peyster.

26th New Jersey.  
 2d Vermont.  
 3d Vermont.  
 4th Vermont.  
 5th Vermont.  
 6th Vermont.

7th Maine.  
 21st New Jersey.  
 20th New York.  
 33d New York.  
 49th New York.  
 77th New York.

New York Lt. Art., 1st Bat.  
 5th U. S. Artillery, Bat. F.

THIRD DIVISION.

Major-general John Newton.

*First Brigade.**Second Brigade.**Third Brigade.*

Colonel Alexander Shaler.

- (1) Colonel William H. Browne.\*  
 (2) Colonel Henry L. Eustis.

Brig.-gen. Frank Wheaton.

65th New York.  
 67th New York.  
 122d New York.  
 23d Pennsylvania.  
 82d Pennsylvania.

7th Massachusetts.  
 10th Massachusetts.  
 37th Massachusetts.  
 36th New York.  
 2d Rhode Island.

62d New York.  
 93d Pennsylvania.  
 98th Pennsylvania.  
 102d Pennsylvania.  
 139th Pennsylvania.

*Artillery.*

Captain Jeremiah McCarthy.

1st Pa. Lt. Art., Bats. C, D.\*

2d U. S. Artillery, Bat. G.

*Light Brigade.*

Colonel Hiram Burnham.

6th Maine.  
 31st New York.  
 43d New York.  
 61st Pennsylvania.  
 5th Wisconsin.  
 New York Lt. Art., 3d Battery.

\* Wounded May 3.

† Disabled.

## ELEVENTH ARMY CORPS.

MAJOR-GENERAL OLIVER O. HOWARD.

ESCORT.

Captain Abram Sharra.

1st Indiana Cavalry, Companies I and K.

## FIRST DIVISION.

- (1) Brigadier-general Charles Devens, Jr.\*  
 (2) Brigadier-general Nathaniel C. McLean.

*First Brigade.*

Colonel Leopold von Gilsa.  
 41st New York.  
 45th New York.  
 54th New York.  
 153d Pennsylvania.

*Second Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Nathaniel C. McLean.  
 17th Connecticut.  
 25th Ohio.  
 55th Ohio.  
 75th Ohio.  
 107th Ohio.

*Unattached.*

8th New York (one company).

*Artillery.*

Captain Julius Dieckmann.  
 New York Light Art., 13th Battery.

## SECOND DIVISION.

Brigadier-general Adolph von Steinwehr.

*First Brigade.*

Colonel Adolphus Buschbeck.  
 29th New York.  
 154th New York.  
 27th Pennsylvania.  
 73d Pennsylvania.

*Second Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Francis C. Barlow.  
 33d Massachusetts.  
 134th New York.  
 136th New York.  
 73d Ohio.

*Artillery.*

Captain Michael Wiedrich.  
 1st New York Light Artillery, Battery I.

## THIRD DIVISION.

Major-general Carl Schurz.

*First Brigade.*

Colonel Alexander Schimmelfennig.  
 82d Illinois.  
 68th New York.  
 157th New York.  
 61st Ohio.  
 74th Pennsylvania.

*Second Brigade.*

Colonel W. Krzyzanowski.  
 58th New York.  
 119th New York.  
 75th Pennsylvania.  
 26th Wisconsin.

*Unattached.*

82d Ohio.

*Artillery.*

1st Ohio Light Artillery, Battery I.

## RESERVE ARTILLERY.

Lieutenant-colonel Louis Schirmer.

New York Light Artillery, 2d Battery.  
 1st Ohio Light Artillery, Battery K.  
 1st West Virginia Light Artillery, Battery C.

\* Wounded May 2.



## TWELFTH ARMY CORPS.

MAJOR-GENERAL HENRY W. SLOCUM.

## FIRST DIVISION.

Brigadier-general Alpheus S. Williams.

*First Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Joseph F. Knipe.  
 5th Connecticut.  
 28th New York.  
 46th Pennsylvania.  
 128th Pennsylvania.

*Second Brigade.*

Colonel Samuel Ross.\*  
 20th Connecticut.  
 3d Maryland.  
 123d New York.  
 145th New York.

*Third Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Thomas H. Ruger.  
 27th Indiana.  
 2d Massachusetts.  
 13th New Jersey.  
 107th New York.  
 3d Wisconsin.

*Artillery.*

Captain Robert H. Fitzhugh.

1st New York Light Artillery, Battery K.  
 1st New York Light Artillery, Battery M.  
 4th U. S. Artillery, Battery F.

## SECOND DIVISION.

Brigadier-general John W. Geary.

*First Brigade.*

Colonel Charles Candy.  
 5th Ohio.  
 7th Ohio.  
 29th Ohio.  
 66th Ohio.  
 28th Pennsylvania.  
 147th Pennsylvania.

*Second Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Thomas L. Kane.  
 29th Pennsylvania.  
 109th Pennsylvania.  
 111th Pennsylvania.  
 124th Pennsylvania.  
 125th Pennsylvania.

*Third Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. George S. Greene.  
 60th New York.  
 78th New York.  
 102d New York.  
 137th New York.  
 149th New York.

*Artillery.*

Captain Joseph M. Knap.

Pennsylvania Light Artillery, Bat E.  
 Pennsylvania Light Artillery, Bat F.

*Unattached.*

10th Maine Infantry (Det.).

## CAVALRY CORPS.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL GEORGE STONEMAN.

## FIRST DIVISION.

Brigadier-general Alfred Pleasonton.†

*First Brigade.‡*

Colonel Benjamin F. Davis.  
 8th Illinois.  
 3d Indiana.  
 8th New York.  
 9th New York.

*Second Brigade.*

Colonel Thomas C. Devin.  
 1st Michigan, Co. L.  
 6th New York.  
 8th Pennsylvania.  
 17th Pennsylvania.

*Artillery.*

New York Light Artillery, 6th Battery.

\* Wounded May 3.

† Assumed command of First and Second Divisions May 4.

‡ Detached with General Averell to May 4.

## SECOND DIVISION.

Brigadier-general William W. Averell.

<i>First Brigade.</i>	<i>Second Brigade.</i>	<i>Artillery.</i>
Colonel Horace B. Sargent.	Colonel John B. McIntosh.	
1st Massachusetts.	3d Pennsylvania.	2d U. S. Artillery, Bat. A.
4th New York.	4th Pennsylvania.	
6th Ohio.	16th Pennsylvania.	
1st Rhode Island.		

## THIRD DIVISION.

Brigadier-general David McM. Gregg.

<i>First Brigade.</i>	<i>Second Brigade.</i>	<i>Reg. Reserve Cav. Brigade.</i>
Colonel Judson Kilpatrick.	Colonel Percy Wyndham.	Brig.-gen. John Buford.
1st Maine.	12th Illinois.	6th Pennsylvania.
2d New York.	1st Maryland.	1st United States.
10th New York.	1st New Jersey.	2d United States.
	1st Pennsylvania.*	5th United States.
		6th United States.
	<i>Artillery.</i>	
	Captain John M. Robertson.	
	2d U. S. Artillery, Batteries B and L.	
	2d U. S. Artillery, Battery M.	
	4th U. S. Artillery, Battery E.†	

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*Organization of the Army of Northern Virginia at the Battle of Chancellorsville, Va., May 1-3, 1863.‡*

## FIRST CORPS.§

## McLAWS' DIVISION.

Major-general Lafayette McLaws.

<i>Wofford's Brigade.</i>	<i>Kershaw's Brigade.</i>
Brigadier-general W. T. Wofford.	Brigadier-general James D. Kershaw.
16th Georgia.	2d South Carolina, Col. John D. Kennedy.
18th Georgia.	3d South Carolina, Major R. C. Maffett.
24th Georgia.	7th South Carolina, Col. Elbert Bland.
Cobb's Georgia Legion.	8th S. C., Col. John W. Henagan.
Phillips' Georgia Legion.	15th S. C., Lt.-col. Joseph H. Gist.
	3d S. C. Battalion, Lt.-col. W. G. Rice.

\* Detached on special duty.

† Detached with General Buford's brigade.

‡ Cavalry not included; only two brigades, Fitz. Lee's and W. H. F. Lee's, were present.

§ Lieutenant-general Longstreet, with Hood's and Pickett's divisions and Dearing's and Henry's artillery battalions, in South-eastern Virginia.

*Semmes' Brigade.*

Brigadier-general Paul J. Semmes.  
 10th Georgia, Lieut.-col. W. C. Holt.  
 50th Georgia.  
 51st Georgia.  
 53d Georgia, Col. James P. Simms.

*Barksdale's Brigade.*

Brigadier-general William Barksdale.  
 13th Mississippi, Colonel J. W. Carter.  
 17th Mississippi, Colonel W. D. Holder.  
 18th Mississippi, Col. Thos. M. Griffin.  
 21st Mississippi, Lt.-col. B. G. Humphreys.

*Artillery.*

Colonel H. C. Cabell and Major S. P. Hamilton commanders.  
 Carlton's Georgia Battery (Troup Artillery).  
 Fraser's Georgia Battery.  
 McCarthy's Va. Bat. (1st Howitzers).  
 Manly's North Carolina Battery.

## ANDERSON'S DIVISION.

Major-general Richard H. Anderson.

*Wilcox's Brigade.*

Brigadier-general C. M. Wilcox.  
 8th Alabama, Col. Y. L. Royston, Lt.-col. H. A. Herbert.  
 9th Alabama, Maj. J. H. J. Williams.  
 10th Alabama, Col. J. H. Forney.  
 11th Alabama, Col. J. C. C. Sanders.  
 14th Alabama, Col. L. Pinckard.

*Mahone's Brigade.*

Brigadier-general William Mahone.  
 6th Virginia, Col. George T. Rogers.  
 12th Virginia, Lt.-col. E. M. Field.  
 16th Virginia, Lt.-col. R. O. Whitehead.  
 41st Virginia, Col. Wm. Allen Parham.  
 61st Virginia, Col. V. D. Groner.

*Wright's Brigade.*

Brigadier-general A. R. Wright.  
 3d Georgia, Maj. J. F. Jones, Capt. C. H. Andrews.  
 22d Georgia, Lieut.-col. J. Warden.  
 48th Georgia, Lt.-col. R. W. Carswell.  
 2d Georgia Batt., Major Geo. W. Ross.

*Posey's Brigade.*

Brigadier-general Carnot Posey.  
 12th Mississippi, Lt.-col. M. B. Harris.  
 Major S. B. Thomas.  
 16th Mississippi, Col. Samuel E. Baker.  
 19th Mississippi, Col. N. H. Harris.  
 48th Mississippi, Col. Joseph M. Jayne.

*Perry's Brigade.*

Brigadier-general E. A. Perry.  
 2d Florida.  
 5th Florida.  
 8th Florida.

*Artillery.*

Lieut.-col. J. J. Garnett.  
 Maj. Chas. Richardson.  
 Grandy's Virginia Battery.  
 Lewis' Virginia Battery.  
 Maurin's Louisiana Battery.  
 Moore's [Huger's] Virginia Battery.

## ARTILLERY RESERVE, FIRST CORPS.

*Alexander's Battalion.*

Colonel E. P. Alexander.  
 Eubank's Virginia Battery.  
 Jordan's Virginia Battery.  
 Moody's Louisiana Battery.  
 Parker's Virginia Battery.  
 Rhett's South Carolina Battery.  
 Woolfolk's Virginia Battery.

*Washington (La.) Artillery.*

Colonel J. B. Walton.  
 Eshleman's 4th Company.  
 Miller's 3d Company.  
 Richardson's 2d Company.  
 Squires' 1st Company.

## SECOND CORPS.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL THOMAS J. JACKSON.  
 MAJOR-GENERAL AMBROSE P. HILL.  
 BRIGADIER-GENERAL R. E. RODES.  
 MAJOR-GENERAL J. E. B. STUART.

## HILL'S DIVISION.

Major-general A. P. Hill.  
 Brigadier-general Henry Heth.  
 Brigadier-general W. D. Pender.  
 Brigadier-general J. J. Archer.

*Heth's Brigade.*

Brigadier-general Henry Heth.  
 Colonel J. M. Brockenbrough.

40th Virginia, Col. J. M. Brockenbrough,  
 Lt.-col. F. W. Cox, Capt. T. E. Betts.  
 47th Virginia, Col. Robert M. Mayo.  
 55th Virginia, Col. Francis Mallory, Lt.-  
 col. Wm. S. Christian, Major A. D.  
 Saunders, Adjutant R. L. Williams,  
 Major Evan Rice.  
 22d Virginia Battalion, Colonel E. P.  
 Tayloe.

*Thomas' Brigade.*

Brigadier-general E. L. Thomas.

14th Georgia, Colonel R. W. Folsom.  
 35th Georgia, Captain John Duke.  
 45th Georgia, Lieut.-col. W. L. Grice.  
 49th Georgia, Major S. T. Player.

*Archer's (5th) Brigade.*

Brigadier-general J. J. Archer.  
 Colonel B. D. Fry.

13th Alabama, Col. B. D. Fry.  
 5th Ala. Batt., Capt. S. D. Stewart, Capt.  
 A. N. Porter.  
 1st Tenn. (Prov. Army), Lt.-col. N. J.  
 George.  
 7th Tennessee, Lt.-col. John A. Fite.  
 14th Tennessee, Col. Wm. McComb,  
 Capt. R. C. Wilson.

*McGowan's Brigade.*

Brigadier-general S. McGowan.  
 Colonel O. E. Edwards.  
 Colonel A. Perrin.  
 Colonel D. H. Hamilton.

1st South Carolina, Col. D. H. Hamil-  
 ton, Captain W. P. Shooter.  
 1st South Carolina Rifles, Col. James  
 M. Perrin, Lt.-col. F. E. Harrison.  
 12th South Carolina.  
 13th South Carolina, Colonel O. E. Ed-  
 wards, Lt.-col. B. T. Brockman.  
 14th South Carolina, Col. A. Perrin.

*Lane's (4th) Brigade.*

Brigadier-general J. H. Lane.

7th North Carolina, Colonel E. G. Hay-  
 wood, Lt.-col. J. L. Hill, Maj. Wm.  
 L. Davidson, Capt. N. A. Pool.  
 18th North Carolina, Col. Thomas J.  
 Purdie, Lt.-col. F. George, Major  
 John D. Barry.  
 28th North Carolina, Col. S. D. Lowe,  
 Capt. Edward F. Lovell.  
 33d N. C., Colonel Clark M. Avery,  
 Capt. Joseph H. Saunders.  
 37th North Carolina, Colonel W. M.  
 Barbour.

*Pender's Brigade.*

Brigadier-general W. D. Pender.

13th North Carolina, Col. A. M. Scales,  
 Lt.-col. J. H. Hyman.  
 16th North Carolina, Col. John S. Mc-  
 Ilroy, Lt.-col. Wm. A. Stowe.  
 22d North Carolina, Lt.-col. Chris. C.  
 Cole.  
 34th North Carolina.  
 38th North Carolina, Lieut.-col. John  
 Ashford.



*Artillery.*

Colonel R. L. Walker.

Brunson's South Carolina Battery.  
 Crenshaw's Virginia Battery.  
 Davidson's Virginia Battery (Letcher Art.).  
 McGraw's Virginia Battery.  
 Marye's Virginia Battery.

## D. H. HILL'S DIVISION.

Brigadier-general R. E. Rodes.  
 Brigadier-general S. D. Ramseur.

*Rodes' Brigade.*

Brigadier-general R. E. Rodes.  
 Colonels E. A. O'Neal and J. M. Hall.

3d Alabama, Capt. M. F. Bonham.  
 5th Alabama, Col. J. M. Hall, Lt.-col.  
 E. L. Hobson, Capt. W. T. Renfro,  
 Capt. T. M. Riley.  
 6th Alabama, Col. James N. Lightfoot.  
 12th Alabama, Col. Saml. B. Pickins.  
 26th Alabama, Col. E. A. O'Neal, Lt.-  
 col. John S. Garvin, Lieut. M. J.  
 Taylor.

*Colquitt's Brigade.*

Brigadier-general A. H. Colquitt.  
 6th Georgia, Col. John T. Lofton.  
 19th Georgia, Col. A. J. Hutchins.  
 23d Georgia, Col. Emory F. Best.  
 27th Georgia, Col. C. T. Zachry.  
 28th Georgia, Col. Tully Graybill.

*Ramseur's Brigade.*

Brigadier-general S. D. Ramseur.  
 Colonel F. M. Parker.  
 2d North Carolina, Col. W. R. Cox.  
 4th North Carolina, Col. Bryan Grimes.  
 14th North Carolina, Col. R. T. Bennett.  
 30th North Carolina, Col. F. M. Parker.

*Doles' Brigade.*

Brigadier-general George Doles.

4th Georgia, Col. Philip Cook, Lt.-col.  
 D. R. E. Winn.  
 12th Georgia, Col. Edward Willis.  
 21st Georgia, Col. J. T. Mercer.  
 44th Georgia, Col. J. B. Estes.

*Iverson's Brigade.*

Brigadier-general Alfred Iverson.  
 5th North Carolina, Col. Thomas H.  
 Garrett, Lt.-col. J. W. Lea, Major  
 Wm. J. Hill, Capt. S. B. West.  
 12th North Carolina, Lt.-col. R. D.  
 Johnston of the 23d N. C., Major D.  
 P. Rowe.  
 20th North Carolina, Col. T. F. Toon,  
 Lt.-col. N. Slough.  
 23d North Carolina, Col. D. H. Christie.

*Artillery.*

Lieutenant-colonel D. H. Carter.

Bondurant's Ala. Battery (Jeff. Davis  
 Art.).  
 Carter's Va. Battery (King William  
 Art.).  
 Fry's Va. Battery (Orange Artillery).  
 Page's Va. Battery (Morris Artillery).

## EARLY'S DIVISION.

Major-general Jubal A. Early.

*Gordon's Brigade.*

Brigadier-general John B. Gordon.  
 13th Georgia.  
 26th Georgia.  
 31st Georgia.  
 38th Georgia.  
 60th Georgia.  
 61st Georgia.

*Smith's Brigade.*

Brigadier-general William Smith.  
 13th Virginia.  
 49th Virginia.  
 52d Virginia.  
 58th Va., Col. F. H. Board.

*Hoke's Brigade.*

Brigadier-general Robert F. Hoke.  
 6th North Carolina.  
 21st North Carolina.  
 54th North Carolina.  
 57th North Carolina.  
 1st N. C. Battalion.

*Hays' Brigade.*

Brigadier-general Harry T. Hays.  
 5th Louisiana.  
 6th Louisiana.  
 7th Louisiana.  
 8th Louisiana.  
 9th Louisiana.

*Artillery.*

Lieutenant-colonel R. S. Andrews.  
 Brown's Maryland Battery (Chesapeake Art.).  
 Carpenter's Virginia Battery.  
 Dement's Maryland Battery.  
 Raine's Virginia Battery (Lee Art.).

## TRIMBLE'S DIVISION.

Brigadier-general R. E. Colston.

*Paxton's (1st) Brigade.*

Brigadier-general E. F. Paxton.  
 Colonel J. H. S. Funk.  
 2d Virginia.  
 4th Virginia.  
 5th Va., Col. J. H. S. Funk.  
 27th Va., Lt.-col. J. K. Edmondson.  
 33d Virginia.

*Jones' (2d) Brigade.*

Brigadier-general J. R. Jones.  
 Colonel T. S. Garnett.  
 Colonel A. S. Vanderverter.  
 21st Virginia.  
 42d Virginia, Lt.-col. R. W. Withers.  
 44th Virginia.  
 48th Virginia, Col. T. S. Garnett, Maj. Oscar White.  
 50th Virginia, Col. A. S. Vanderverter, Major L. J. Perkins, Captain ——— Kelly, Captain ——— Mathews.

*Colston's (3d) Brigade.*

Colonel E. T. H. Warren.  
 Colonel T. V. Williams.  
 Lieutenant-colonel S. T. Walker.  
 Lieutenant-colonel S. D. Thruston.  
 Lieutenant-colonel H. A. Brown.  
 1st North Carolina, Col. J. A. McDowell, Lt.-col. H. A. Brown.  
 3d North Carolina, Lt.-col. S. D. Thruston.  
 10th Virginia, Col. E. T. H. Warren, Lt.-col. S. T. Walker, Maj. Joshua Stover.  
 23d Virginia.  
 37th Virginia, Col. T. V. Williams.

*Nicholls' (4th) Brigade.*

Brigadier-general F. T. Nicholls.  
 Colonel J. M. Williams.  
 1st Louisiana.  
 2d Louisiana, Col. J. M. Williams.  
 10th Louisiana, Lt.-col. John M. Leggett.  
 14th Louisiana.  
 15th Louisiana.

*Artillery.*

Lieutenant-colonel H. P. Jones.  
 Carrington's Virginia Battery (Charlotteville Art.).  
 Garber's Virginia Battery (Staunton Art.).  
 Latimer's Virginia Battery (Courtney Art.).  
 Thompson's Battery (Louisiana Guard Art.).

ARTILLERY RESERVE, SECOND CORPS.  
Colonel S. Crutchfield.

*Brown's Battalion.*

Colonel J. Thompson Brown.

Brooke's Virginia Battery (Brooke Art.).  
Dance's Va. Battery (Powhatan Art.).  
Graham's Va. Battery (Rockbridge Art.).  
Hupp's Va. Battery (Salem Art.).  
Smith's Bat. (3d Richmond Howitzers).  
Watson's Bat. (2d Richmond Howitzers).

*McIntosh's Battalion.*

Major D. G. McIntosh.

Hurt's Virginia Battery.  
Johnson's Virginia Battery.  
Lusk's Virginia Battery.  
Wooding's Va. Battery (Danville Art.).

## RESERVE ARTILLERY ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL WILLIAM N. PENDLETON.

*Sumter (Ga.) Battalion.*

Lieutenant-colonel A. S. Cutts.

Patterson's Battery (B).  
Ross' Battery (A).  
Wingfield's Batterv (C).

*Nelson's Battalion.*

Lieutenant-colonel W. Nelson.

Kirkpatrick's Va. Bat. (Amherst Art.).  
Massie's Va. Battery (Fluvanna Art.).  
Milledge's Georgia Battery.

*Organization of the Union forces, commanded by MAJOR GENERAL  
U. S. GRANT, in the operations against Vicksburg, Miss.*

*April 30, 1863.*

ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE.

MAJOR-GENERAL ULYSSES' S. GRANT.

ESCORT.

Captain E. D. Osband.

4th Illinois Cavalry, Co. A.

ENGINEERS.

Major William Tweeddale.

1st Battalion Engineer Regiment of the West.

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THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS.

MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN A. MCCLERNAND.

ESCORT.

Captain David R. Sparks.

3d Illinois Cavalry, Co. L.

NINTH DIVISION.

Brigadier-general Peter J. Osterhaus.

*First Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Theophilus T. Garrard.\*

118th Illinois.

49th Indiana.

69th Indiana.

7th Kentucky.

120th Ohio.

*Second Brigade.*

Col. Lionel A. Sheldon.†

54th Indiana.

22d Kentucky.

16th Ohio.

42d Ohio.

114th Ohio.

*Cavalry.*

3d Ill., Cos. A, E and K.

*Artillery.*

Michigan Light Artillery, 7th Battery.

Wisconsin Light Artillery, 1st Battery.

TENTH DIVISION.

Brigadier-general Andrew J. Smith.

ESCORT.

4th Indiana Cavalry, Co. C.

\* Succeeded by Brig.-gen. A. L. Lee, May 18, and he in turn (being wounded) by Col. James Keigwin, May 19.

† Succeeded by Colonel Daniel W. Lindsey, May —.



## ADDENDA.

*First Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Stephen G. Burbridge.  
 16th Indiana.  
 60th Indiana.  
 67th Indiana.  
 83d Ohio.  
 96th Ohio.  
 23d Wisconsin.

*Second Brigade.*

Colonel William J. Landram.  
 77th Illinois.  
 97th Illinois.  
 108th Illinois.  
 130th Illinois.  
 19th Kentucky.  
 48th Ohio.

*Artillery.*

Illinois Light Artillery, Chicago Mercantile Battery.  
 Ohio Light Artillery, 17th Battery.

## TWELFTH DIVISION.

Brigadier-general Alvin P. Hovey.

## ESCORT.

1st Indiana Cavalry, Co. C.

*First Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. George F. McGinnis.  
 11th Indiana.  
 24th Indiana.  
 34th Indiana.  
 46th Indiana.  
 29th Wisconsin.

*Second Brigade.*

Colonel James R. Slack.  
 47th Indiana.  
 24th Iowa.  
 28th Iowa.  
 56th Ohio.

*Artillery.*

2d Illinois Light Artillery, Battery A.  
 1st Missouri Light Artillery, Battery A.  
 Ohio Light Artillery, 2d Battery.  
 Ohio Light Artillery, 16th Battery.

## FOURTEENTH DIVISION.

Brigadier-general Eugene A. Carr.

## ESCORT.

3d Illinois Cavalry, Co. G.

*First Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. William P. Benton.  
 33d Illinois.  
 99th Illinois.  
 8th Indiana.  
 18th Indiana.  
 1st United States.

*Second Brigade.*

Colonel William M. Stone.\*  
 21st Iowa.  
 22d Iowa.  
 23d Iowa.  
 11th Wisconsin.

*Artillery.*

Indiana Lt. Art., 1st Battery.  
 Iowa Light Art., 1st Battery.†

*Unattached.*

2d Illinois Cavalry, Cos. F, G, H, I and K.  
 Kentucky Infantry (Pioneers), Patterson's  
 Company.  
 6th Missouri Cavalry, Cos. B, E, F, G, H, I  
 and K.

\* Succeeded by Brig.-gen. Michael K. Lawler, May 2.

† Temporarily detached from 1st Division, 15th Corps.

## FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS.

MAJOR-GENERAL WILLIAM T. SHERMAN.

## FIRST DIVISION.

Major-general Frederick Steele.

*First Brigade.*

Colonel Francis H. Manter.

13th Illinois.  
 27th Missouri.  
 29th Missouri.  
 30th Missouri.  
 31st Missouri.  
 32d Missouri.

*Third Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. John M. Thayer.

4th Iowa.  
 9th Iowa.  
 26th Iowa.  
 30th Iowa.

*Second Brigade.*

Colonel Charles R. Woods.

25th Iowa.  
 31st Iowa.  
 3d Missouri.  
 12th Missouri.  
 17th Missouri.  
 76th Ohio.

*Artillery.*

Iowa Light Artillery, 1st Battery.\*  
 2d Missouri Light Artillery, Battery F.  
 Ohio Light Artillery, 4th Battery.

*Cavalry.*

Kane County, Illinois.  
 3d Illinois, Co. D.

## SECOND DIVISION.

Major-general Frank P. Blair.

*First Brigade.*

Colonel Giles A. Smith.

113th Illinois.  
 116th Illinois.  
 6th Missouri.  
 8th Missouri.  
 13th U. S. (1st Battln.).

*Third Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Hugh Ewing.

30th Ohio.  
 37th Ohio.  
 47th Ohio.  
 4th West Virginia.

*Second Brigade.*

Colonel Thomas Kilby Smith.†

55th Illinois.  
 127th Illinois.  
 83d Indiana.  
 54th Ohio.  
 57th Ohio.

*Artillery.*

1st Illinois Light Artillery, Battery A.  
 1st Illinois Light Artillery, Battery B.  
 1st Illinois Light Artillery, Battery H.  
 Ohio Light Art., 8th Battery (Section).

*Cavalry.*

Thielemann's Illinois Battalion, Cos. A and B.  
 10th Missouri, Co. C.

## THIRD DIVISION.

Brigadier-general John M. Tuttle.

*First Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Ralph P. Buckland.

114th Illinois.  
 93d Indiana.  
 72d Ohio.  
 95th Ohio.

*Second Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Joseph A. Mower.

47th Illinois.  
 5th Minnesota.  
 11th Missouri.  
 8th Wisconsin.

\* Temporarily attached to 14th Division, 13th Corps.

† Succeeded May 24 by Brig.-gen. J. A. J. Lightburn.

*Third Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Charles L. Matthies,

8th Iowa.

12th Iowa.

35th Iowa.

*Artillery.*

Captain Nelson T. Spoor.

1st Illinois Light Artillery, Battery E.

Iowa Light Artillery, 2d Battery.

UNATTACHED.

4th Iowa Cavalry.

## SEVENTEENTH ARMY CORPS.

MAJOR-GENERAL JAMES B. McPHERSON.

ESCORT.

Captain John S. Foster.

4th Company Ohio Cavalry.

THIRD DIVISION.

Major-general John A. Logan.

ESCORT.

Captain John R. Hotaling.

2d Illinois Cavalry, Co. A.

*First Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. John E. Smith,

20th Illinois.

31st Illinois.

45th Illinois.

124th Illinois.

23d Indiana.

*Second Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Elias S. Dennis.\*

30th Illinois.

20th Ohio.

68th Ohio.

78th Ohio.

*Third Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. John D. Stevenson.

8th Illinois.

17th Illinois.

81st Illinois.

7th Missouri.

32d Ohio.

*Artillery.*

Major Charles J. Stolbrand.

1st Illinois Light Artillery, Battery D.

2d Illinois Light Artillery, Battery G.

2d Illinois Light Artillery, Battery L.

Michigan Light Artillery, 8th Battery.

Ohio Light Artillery, 3d Battery.

SIXTH DIVISION.

Brigadier-general John McArthur.

ESCORT.

11th Illinois Cavalry, Co. G.

*First Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Hugh T. Reid.

1st Kansas (Mounted).

16th Wisconsin.

*Second Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Thomas E. G. Ransom.

11th Illinois.

72d Illinois.

95th Illinois.

14th Wisconsin.

17th Wisconsin.

18th Wisconsin.†

\* Succeeded by Brig.-gen. M. D. Leggett, May 15.

† Assigned to 1st Brigade, 7th Division, May 13.

*Third Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. M. M. Crocker.\*

11th Iowa.

13th Iowa.

15th Iowa.

16th Iowa.

*Artillery.*

Major Thomas D. Maurice.

2d Illinois Light Artillery, Battery F.

Minnesota Light Artillery, 1st Battery.

1st Missouri Light Artillery, Battery C.

Ohio Light Artillery, 10th Battery.

## SEVENTH DIVISION.

Colonel John B. Sanborn.†

## ESCORT.

2d Illinois Cavalry, Co. E.

4th Missouri Cavalry, Co. F.

*First Brigade.*

Colonel Jesse I. Alexander.‡

48th Indiana.

59th Indiana.

4th Minnesota.

*Second Brigade.*

Colonel Samuel A. Holmes.

56th Illinois.

17th Iowa.

10th Missouri.

24th Missouri, Co. E.

80th Ohio.

*Third Brigade.*

Colonel George B. Boomer.§

93d Illinois.

5th Iowa.

10th Iowa.

26th Missouri.

*Artillery.*

Captain Frank C. Sands.

1st Missouri Light Artillery, Battery M.

Ohio Light Artillery, 11th Battery.

Wisconsin Light Artillery, 6th Battery.

Wisconsin Light Artillery, 12th Battery.

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May 31, 1863.

## ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE.

MAJOR-GENERAL ULYSSUS S. GRANT.

## ESCORT.

Captain E. D. Osband.

4th Illinois Cavalry, Co. A.

## ENGINEERS.

Major William Tweeddale.

1st Battalion Engineer Regiment of the West.

## THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS.

MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN A. McCLEARNAND.||

## ESCORT.

Captain David R. Sparks.

3d Illinois Cavalry, Co. L.

\* Assigned to 7th Division May 2, and succeeded by Col. Wm Hall.

† Succeeded by Brig.-gen. M. M. Crocker, May 2. Brig.-gen. Isaac F. Quinby (the permanent commander) resumed command May 17.

‡ Succeeded by Colonel Sanborn, May 2.

§ Succeeded by Colonel Holden Putnam, May 22.

|| Succeeded by Major-general E. O. C. Ord, June 19.



## ADDENDA.

## NINTH DIVISION.

Brigadier-general Peter J. Osterhaus.

*First Brigade.*

Colonel James Keigwin.  
 118th Illinois.  
 49th Indiana.  
 69th Indiana.  
 7th Kentucky.  
 120th Ohio.

*Second Brigade.*

Colonel Daniel W. Lindsey.  
 54th Indiana.  
 22d Kentucky.  
 16th Ohio.  
 42d Ohio.  
 114th Ohio.

*Cavalry.*

3d Illinois, Cos. A, E and K.

*Artillery.*

Michigan Light Artillery, 7th Battery.  
 Wisconsin Light Artillery, 1st Battery.

## TENTH DIVISION.

Brigadier-general Andrew J. Smith.

## ESCORT.

4th Indiana Cavalry, Co. C.

*First Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Stephen G. Burbridge.  
 16th Indiana.  
 60th Indiana.  
 67th Indiana.  
 83d Ohio.  
 96th Ohio.  
 23d Wisconsin.

*Second Brigade.*

Colonel William J. Landram.  
 77th Illinois.  
 97th Illinois.  
 108th Illinois.  
 130th Illinois.  
 19th Kentucky.  
 48th Ohio.

*Artillery.*

Illinois Light Artillery, Chicago Mercantile Battery.  
 Ohio Light Artillery, 17th Battery.

## TWELFTH DIVISION.

Brigadier-general, Alvin P. Hovey.

## ESCORT.

1st Indiana Cavalry, Co. C.

*First Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. George F. McGinnis.  
 11th Indiana.  
 24th Indiana.  
 34th Indiana.  
 46th Indiana.  
 29th Wisconsin.

*Second Brigade.*

Colonel James R. Slack.  
 47th Indiana.  
 24th Iowa.  
 28th Iowa.  
 56th Ohio.

*Artillery.*

1st Missouri Light Artillery, Battery A.  
 Ohio Light Artillery, 2d Battery.  
 Ohio Light Artillery, 16th Battery.

## FOURTEENTH DIVISION.

Brigadier-general Eugene A. Carr.

## ESCORT.

3d Illinois Cavalry, Co. G.

<i>First Brigade.</i>	<i>Second Brigade.</i>	<i>Artillery.</i>
Colonel Henry D. Washburn.*	Brig.-gen. Michael K. Lawler.	
33d Illinois.	21st Iowa.	2d Illinois Lt. Art., Bat. A.
99th Illinois.	22d Iowa.	Indiana Lt. Art., 1st Bat.
8th Indiana.	23d Iowa.	
18th Indiana.	11th Wisconsin.	
1st United States.		

## UNATTACHED.

2d Illinois Cavalry (7 companies).  
 Kentucky Infantry (Pioneers), Patterson's Co.  
 6th Missouri Cavalry (7 companies).

## FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS.

MAJOR-GENERAL WILLIAM T. SHERMAN.

## FIRST DIVISION.

Major-general Frederick Steele.

<i>First Brigade.</i>	<i>Second Brigade.</i>
Colonel Francis H. Manter.†	Colonel Charles R. Woods.
13th Illinois.	25th Iowa.
27th Missouri.	31st Iowa.
29th Missouri.	3d Missouri.
30th Missouri.	12th Missouri.
31st Missouri.	17th Missouri.
32d Missouri.	76th Ohio.
<i>Third Brigade.</i>	<i>Artillery.</i>
Brig.-gen John M. Thayer.	
4th Iowa.	Iowa Light Artillery, 1st Battery.
9th Iowa.	2d Missouri Light Artillery, Battery F.
26th Iowa.	Ohio Light Artillery, 4th Battery.
30th Iowa.	

*Cavalry.*

Kane County, Illinois.  
 3d Illinois, Co. D.

## SECOND DIVISION.

Major-general Frank P. Blair.

<i>First Brigade.</i>	<i>Second Brigade.</i>
Colonel Giles A. Smith.	Brig.-gen. J. A. J. Lightburn.
113th Illinois.	55th Illinois.
116th Illinois.	127th Illinois.
6th Missouri.	83d Indiana.
8th Missouri.	54th Ohio.
13th U. S. (1st Battln).	57th Ohio.
<i>Third Brigade.</i>	<i>Artillery.</i>
Brig.-gen. Hugh Ewing.	
30th Ohio.	1st Illinois Light Artillery, Battery A.
37th Ohio.	1st Illinois Light Artillery, Battery B.
47th Ohio.	1st Illinois Light Artillery, Battery H.
4th West Virginia.	Ohio Light Artillery, 8th Battery.

\* Succeeded Brig.-gen. W. P. Benton (on sick leave), May 31, and was in turn relieved by Colonel David Shunk, June 27.

† Succeeded by Colonel Bernard G. Farrar, June 13.

## ADDENDA.

*Cavalry.*

Thielemann's Illinois Battalion, Cos. A and B.  
10th Missouri, Co. C.

## THIRD DIVISION.

Brigadier-general John M. Tuttle.

*First Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Ralph P. Buckland.\*  
114th Illinois.  
93d Indiana.  
72d Ohio.  
95th Ohio.

*Second Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Joseph A. Mower.  
47th Illinois.  
5th Minnesota.  
11th Missouri.  
8th Wisconsin.

*Third Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Charles L. Matthies.†  
8th Iowa.  
12th Iowa.  
35th Iowa.

*Artillery.*

1st Illinois Light Artillery, Battery E.  
Iowa Light Artillery, 2d Battery.

## UNATTACHED.

4th Iowa Cavalry.

## SIXTEENTH ARMY CORPS.

## FOURTH DIVISION.

Brigadier-general Jacob G. Lauman.

*First Brigade.*

Colonel Isaac C. Pugh.  
41st Illinois.  
53d Illinois.  
3d Iowa.  
33d Wisconsin.

*Second Brigade.*

Colonel Cyrus Hall.  
14th Illinois.  
15th Illinois.  
46th Illinois.  
76th Illinois.  
53d Indiana.

*Third Brigade.*

Colonel George E. Bryant.‡  
28th Illinois.  
32d Illinois.  
12th Wisconsin.

*Artillery.*

Captain George C. Gumbart.  
2d Illinois Light Artillery, Battery E.  
2d Illinois Light Artillery, Battery K.  
Ohio Light Artillery, 5th Battery.  
Ohio Light Artillery, 7th Battery.  
Ohio Light Artillery, 15th Battery.

*Cavalry.*

Major James G. Wilson.  
15th Illinois, Cos. F and I.

## SEVENTEENTH ARMY CORPS.

MAJOR-GENERAL JAMES B. MCPHERSON.

## ESCORT.

Captain John S. Foster.

4th Company Ohio Cavalry.

\* Succeeded by Colonel William L. McMillen, June 22.

† Succeeded by Colonel Joseph J. Woods, June 1.

‡ Succeeded by Colonel Amory K. Johnson, June 9.

## THIRD DIVISION.

Major-general John A. Logan.

## ESCORT.

2d Illinois Cavalry, Co. A.

*First Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. John E. Smith,\*  
 20th Illinois.  
 31st Illinois.  
 45th Illinois.  
 124th Illinois.  
 23d Indiana.

*Second Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Mortimer D. Leggett.†  
 30th Illinois.  
 20th Ohio.  
 68th Ohio.  
 78th Ohio.

*Third Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. John D. Stevenson.  
 8th Illinois.  
 17th Illinois.  
 81st Illinois.  
 7th Missouri.  
 32d Ohio.

*Artillery.*

Major Charles J. Stolbrand.  
 1st Illinois Light Artillery, Battery D.  
 2d Illinois Light Artillery, Battery G.  
 3d Illinois Light Artillery, Battery L.  
 Michigan Light Artillery, 8th Battery.  
 Ohio Light Artillery, 3d Battery.

*Unattached.*

63d Illinois.

## SIXTH DIVISION.

Brigadier-general John McArthur.

## ESCORT.

11th Illinois Cavalry, Co. G.

*First Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Hugh T. Reid.  
 1st Kansas (Mounted).  
 16th Wisconsin.

*Second Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Thomas E. G. Ransom.  
 11th Illinois.  
 72d Illinois.  
 95th Illinois.  
 14th Wisconsin.  
 17th Wisconsin.

*Third Brigade.*

Colonel William Hall.‡  
 11th Iowa.  
 13th Iowa.  
 15th Iowa.  
 16th Iowa.

*Artillery.*

Major Thomas D. Maurice.  
 2d Illinois Light Artillery, Battery F.  
 Minnesota Light Artillery, 1st Battery.  
 1st Missouri Light Artillery, Battery C.  
 Ohio Light Artillery, 10th Battery.

## SEVENTH DIVISION.

Brigadier-general Isaac F. Quinby.§

## ESCORT.

2d Illinois Cavalry, Co. E.  
 4th Missouri Cavalry, Co. F.

\* Succeeded by Brig.-gen. M. D. Leggett, June 3.

† Succeeded by Colonel Manning F. Force, June 3.

‡ Succeeded by Colonel Alexander Chambers, June 6.

§ Succeeded by Brig.-gen. John E. Smith, June 3.



*First Brigade.*

Colonel John B. Sanborn.  
 48th Indiana.  
 59th Indiana.  
 4th Minnesota.  
 18th Wisconsin.

*Third Brigade.*

Colonel Holden Putnam.†  
 93d Illinois.  
 5th Iowa.  
 10th Iowa.  
 26th Missouri.

*Second Brigade.*

Colonel Samuel A. Holmes.\*  
 56th Illinois.  
 17th Iowa.  
 10th Missouri.  
 24th Missouri, Co. E.  
 80th Ohio.

*Artillery.*

Captain Frank C. Sands.‡  
 1st Missouri Light Artillery, Battery M.  
 Ohio Light Artillery, 11th Battery.  
 Wisconsin Light Artillery, 6th Battery.  
 Wisconsin Light Artillery, 12th Battery.

*June 30, 1863.*

## ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE.

MAJOR-GENERAL ULYSSES S. GRANT.

## ESCORT.

Captain E. D. Osband.  
 4th Illinois Cavalry, Co. A.

## ENGINEERS.

Major William Tweeddale.  
 1st Battalion Engineer Regiment of the West.

## NINTH ARMY CORPS.

MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN G. PARKE.

## FIRST DIVISION.

Brigadier-general Thomas Welsh.

*First Brigade.*

Colonel Henry Bowman.  
 36th Massachusetts.  
 17th Michigan.  
 27th Michigan.  
 45th Pennsylvania.

*Third Brigade.*

Colonel Daniel Leasure.  
 2d Michigan.  
 8th Michigan.  
 20th Michigan.  
 79th New York.  
 100th Pennsylvania.

*Artillery.*

Pennsylvania Light Artillery, Battery D.

\* Succeeded by Colonel Green B. Raum, June 10.

† Succeeded by Brig.-gen. Charles L. Matthies, June 2.

‡ Succeeded by Captain Henry Dillon, June —.

## SECOND DIVISION.

Brigadier-general Robert B. Potter.

*First Brigade.*

Colonel Simon G. Griffin.  
 6th New Hampshire.  
 9th New Hampshire.  
 7th Rhode Island.

*Second Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Edward Ferrero.  
 35th Massachusetts.  
 11th New Hampshire.  
 51st New York.  
 51st Pennsylvania.

*Third Brigade.*

Colonel Benjamin C. Christ.  
 29th Massachusetts.  
 46th New York.  
 50th Pennsylvania.

*Artillery.*

2d New York Light Artillery, Battery L.

*Artillery Reserve.*

2d United States Artillery, Battery E.

## THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS.

MAJOR-GENERAL EDWARD O. C. ORD.

## ESCORT.

3d Illinois Cavalry, Co. L.

## NINTH DIVISION.

Brigadier-general Peter J. Osterhaus.

*First Brigade.*

Colonel James Keigwin.  
 118th Illinois (Mounted).  
 49th Indiana.  
 69th Indiana.  
 7th Kentucky.  
 120th Ohio.

*Second Brigade.*

Colonel Daniel W. Lindsey.  
 54th Indiana.  
 22d Kentucky.  
 16th Ohio.  
 42d Ohio.  
 114th Ohio.

*Cavalry.*

2d Illinois (3 companies).  
 3d Illinois, Cos. A, E and K.  
 6th Missouri (7 companies).

*Artillery.*

Michigan Light Artillery, 7th Battery.  
 Wisconsin Light Artillery, 1st Battery.

## TENTH DIVISION.

Brigadier-general Andrew J. Smith.

## ESCORT.

4th Indiana Cavalry, Co. C.

*First Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Stephen G. Burbridge.  
 16th Indiana.  
 60th Indiana.\*  
 67th Indiana.  
 83d Ohio.  
 96th Ohio.  
 23d Wisconsin.

*Second Brigade.*

Colonel William J. Landram.  
 77th Illinois.  
 97th Illinois.  
 130th Illinois.  
 19th Kentucky.  
 48th Ohio.

*Artillery.*

Illinois Light Artillery, Chicago Mercantile Battery.  
 Ohio Light Artillery, 17th Battery.

\* Temporarily attached to 9th Division.

## ADDENDA.

## TWELFTH DIVISION.

Brigadier-general Alvin P. Hovey.

## ESCORT.

1st Indiana Cavalry, Co. C.

*First Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Geo. F. McGinnis.

11th Indiana.  
24th Indiana.  
34th Indiana.  
46th Indiana.  
29th Wisconsin.

*Second Brigade.*

Colonel James R. Slack.

87th Illinois.  
47th Indiana.  
24th Iowa.  
28th Iowa.  
56th Ohio.

*Artillery.*

1st Missouri Light Artillery, Battery A.

Ohio Light Artillery, 2d Battery.\*

Ohio Light Artillery, 16th Battery.

## FOURTEENTH DIVISION.

Brigadier-general Eugene A. Carr.

## ESCORT.

3d Illinois Cavalry, Co. G.

*First Brigade.*

Colonel David Shunk.

33d Illinois.  
99th Illinois.  
8th Indiana.  
18th Indiana.  
1st United States.

*Second Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Michael K. Lawler.

21st Iowa.  
22d Iowa.  
23d Iowa.  
11th Wisconsin.

*Artillery.*

2d Illinois Light Artillery, Bat. A.

Indiana Light Artillery, 1st Bat.

## UNATTACHED.

2d Illinois Cavalry (detachment).

Kentucky Inf. (Pioneers), Patterson's Co.

## FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS.

MAJOR-GENERAL WILLIAM T. SHERMAN.

## FIRST DIVISION.

Major-general Frederick Steele.

*First Brigade.*

Colonel Bernard G. Farrar.

13th Illinois.  
27th Missouri.  
29th Missouri.  
30th Missouri.  
31st Missouri.  
32d Missouri.

*Second Brigade.*

Colonel Charles R. Woods.

25th Iowa.  
31st Iowa.  
3d Missouri.  
12th Missouri.  
17th Missouri.  
76th Ohio.

*Third Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. John M. Thayer.

4th Iowa.  
9th Iowa.  
26th Iowa.  
30th Iowa.

*Artillery.*

Iowa Light Artillery, 1st Battery.

2d Missouri Light Artillery, Battery F.

Ohio Light Artillery, 4th Battery.

*Cavalry.*

Kane County, Illinois.

3d Illinois, Co. D.

\* Temporarily attached to 9th Division.

## SECOND DIVISION.

Major-general Frank P. Blair.

*First Brigade.*

Colonel Giles A. Smith.  
 113th Illinois.  
 116th Illinois.  
 6th Missouri.  
 8th Missouri.  
 13th U. S. (1st Battln.).

*Second Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. J. A. J. Lightburn.  
 55th Illinois.  
 127th Illinois.  
 83d Indiana.  
 54th Ohio.  
 57th Ohio.

*Third Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Hugh Ewing.  
 30th Ohio.  
 37th Ohio.  
 47th Ohio.  
 4th West Virginia.

*Artillery.*

1st Illinois Light Artillery, Battery A.  
 1st Illinois Light Artillery, Battery B.  
 1st Illinois Light Artillery, Battery H.  
 Ohio Light Artillery, 8th Battery.

*Cavalry.*

Thielemann's Illinois Battalion, Cos. A and B.  
 10th Missouri, Co. C.

## THIRD DIVISION.

Brigadier-general John M. Tuttle.

*First Brigade.*

Colonel William L. McMillen.  
 114th Illinois.  
 93d Indiana.  
 72d Ohio.  
 95th Ohio.

*Second Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Joseph A. Mower.  
 47th Illinois.  
 5th Minnesota.  
 11th Missouri.  
 8th Wisconsin.

*Third Brigade.*

Colonel Joseph J. Woods.  
 8th Iowa.  
 12th Iowa.  
 35th Iowa.

*Artillery.*

1st Illinois Light Artillery, Battery E.  
 Iowa Light Artillery, 2d Battery.

## UNATTACHED.

4th Iowa Cavalry.

## SIXTEENTH ARMY CORPS.

## FIRST DIVISION.

Brigadier-general W. Sooy Smith.

*First Brigade.*

Colonel John M. Loomis.  
 26th Illinois.  
 90th Illinois.  
 12th Indiana.  
 100th Indiana.

*Second Brigade.*

Colonel Stephen G. Hicks.  
 40th Illinois.  
 103d Illinois.  
 15th Michigan.  
 46th Ohio.

*Third Brigade.*

Colonel Joseph R. Cockerill.  
 97th Indiana.  
 99th Indiana.  
 53d Ohio.  
 70th Ohio.

*Fourth Brigade.*

Colonel William W. Sanford.  
 48th Illinois.  
 49th Illinois.  
 119th Illinois.  
 6th Iowa.

*Artillery.*

Captain William Cogswell.  
 1st Illinois Light Artillery, Battery F.  
 1st Illinois Light Artillery, Battery I.  
 1st Illinois Light Artillery, Battery M.  
 Illinois Light Artillery, Cogswell's Bat.  
 Indiana Light Artillery, 6th Battery.

*Cavalry.*

7th Illinois, Co. B.



## PROVISIONAL DIVISION.\*

Brigadier-general Nathan Kimball

*Engelmann's Brigade.*

Colonel Adolph Engelmann.

43d Illinois.

61st Illinois.

106th Illinois.

12th Michigan.

*Richmond's Brigade.*

Colonel Jonathan Richmond.

18th Illinois.

54th Illinois.

126th Illinois.

22d Ohio.

*Montgomery's Brigade.*

Colonel Milton Montgomery.

40th Iowa.

3d Minnesota.

25th Wisconsin.

27th Wisconsin.

*Artillery.*

Ohio Light Artillery, 11th Battery.

## FOURTH DIVISION.†

Brigadier-general Jacob G. Lauman.

*First Brigade.*

Colonel Isaac C. Pugh.

41st Illinois.

53d Illinois.

3d Iowa.

33d Wisconsin.

*Second Brigade*

Colonel Cyrus Han.

14th Illinois.

15th Illinois.

46th Illinois.

76th Illinois.

*Third Brigade.*

Colonel Amory K. Johnson.

28th Illinois.

32d Illinois.

53d Indiana.

12th Wisconsin.

*Artillery.*

Captain George C. Gumbart.

2d Illinois Light Artillery, Battery E.

2d Illinois Light Artillery, Battery K.

Ohio Light Artillery, 5th Battery.

Ohio Light Artillery, 7th Battery.

Ohio Light Artillery, 15th Battery.

*Cavalry.*

Major James G. Wilson.

15th Illinois, Cos. F and I.

## SEVENTEENTH ARMY CORPS.

MAJOR-GENERAL JAMES B. MCPHERSON.

## ESCORT.

Captain John S. Foster.

4th Company Ohio Cavalry.

## THIRD DIVISION.

Major-general John A. Logan.

## ESCORT.

2d Illinois Cavalry, Co. A.

\* Composed of the 1st and 2d Brigades of the 3d Division, and four regiments from the 6th Division.

† Temporarily attached to the 13th Corps.

*First Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Mortimer D. Leggett.

20th Illinois.

31st Illinois.

45th Illinois.

124th Illinois.

23d Indiana.

*Second Brigade.*

Colonel Manning F. Force.

30th Illinois.

20th Ohio.

68th Ohio.

78th Ohio.

*Third Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. John D. Stevenson.

8th Illinois.

17th Illinois.

81st Illinois.

7th Missouri.

32d Ohio.

*Artillery.*

Major Charles J. Stolbrand.

1st Illinois Light Artillery, Battery D.

2d Illinois Light Artillery, Battery G.\*

2d Illinois Light Artillery, Battery L.

Michigan Light Artillery, 8th Battery.

Ohio Light Artillery, 3d Battery.

## SIXTH DIVISION.

Brigadier-general John McArthur.

## ESCORT.

11th Illinois Cavalry, Co. G.

*First Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Hugh T. Reid.

1st Kansas (Mounted).

16th Wisconsin.

*Second Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Thomas E. G. Ransom.

11th Illinois.

72d Illinois.

95th Illinois.

14th Wisconsin.

17th Wisconsin.

*Third Brigade.*

Colonel Alexander Chambers.

11th Iowa.

13th Iowa.

15th Iowa.

16th Iowa.

*Artillery.*

Major Thomas D. Maurice.

2d Illinois Light Artillery, Battery F.

Minnesota Light Artillery, 1st Battery.

1st Missouri Light Artillery, Battery C.

Ohio Light Artillery, 10th Battery.

## SEVENTH DIVISION.

Brigadier-general John E. Smith.

## ESCORT.

4th Missouri Cavalry, Co. F.

*First Brigade.*

Colonel John B. Sanborn.

48th Indiana.

59th Indiana.

4th Minnesota.

18th Wisconsin.

*Second Brigade.*

Colonel Green B. Raum.

56th Illinois.

17th Iowa.

10th Missouri.

24th Missouri, Co. E.

80th Ohio.

*Third Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Charles L. Matthies.

93d Illinois.

5th Iowa.

10th Iowa.

26th Missouri.

*Artillery.*

Captain Henry Dillon.

1st Missouri Light Artillery, Battery M.

Ohio Light Artillery, 11th Battery.

Wisconsin Light Artillery, 6th Battery.

Wisconsin Light Artillery, 12th Battery.

\* Temporarily attached to Battery D, 1st Illinois Light Artillery.

## HERRON'S DIVISION.

Major-general Francis J. Herron.

*First Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. William Vandever.

37th Illinois.

26th Indiana.

20th Iowa.

34th Iowa.

38th Iowa.

1st Missouri Light Artillery, Battery E.

1st Missouri Light Artillery, Battery F.

*Second Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. W. W. Orme.

94th Illinois.

19th Iowa.

20th Wisconsin.

1st Missouri Light Artillery, Battery B.

## UNATTACHED CAVALRY.

Colonel Cyrus Bussey.

5th Illinois.

3d Iowa.

2d Wisconsin.

## DISTRICT NORTH-EAST LOUISIANA.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL ELIAS S. DENNIS.

63d Illinois.

108th Illinois.

120th Illinois.

131st Illinois.

10th Illinois Cavalry, Cos. A, D, G and K.

## UNITED STATES COLORED TROOPS.

Colonel Isaac F. Shepard.

*Post of Milliken's Bend, La.*

Colonel Hiram Scofield.

8th Louisiana.

9th Louisiana.

11th Louisiana.

13th Louisiana.

1st Mississippi.

3d Mississippi.

*Post of Goodrich's Landing, La.*

Colonel William F. Wood.

1st Arkansas.

10th Louisiana.

*Organization of the Army of the Potomac, commanded by MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE G. MEADE, at the Battle of Gettysburg, July 1-3, 1863.*

[Compiled from the records of the Adjutant-general's Office.]

FIRST ARMY CORPS.

MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN F. REYNOLDS.\*

FIRST DIVISION.

Brigadier-general J. S. Wadsworth.

*First Brigade.*

- (1) Brig.-gen. S. Meredith, wounded.  
(2) Colonel W. W. Robinson.

19th Indiana.  
24th Michigan.  
2d Wisconsin.  
6th Wisconsin.  
7th Wisconsin.

*Second Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. L. Cutler.

7th Indiana.  
76th New York.  
95th New York.  
147th New York.  
14th N. Y. State Militia.  
56th Pennsylvania.

SECOND DIVISION.

Brigadier-general John C. Robinson.

*First Brigade.*

- (1) Brig.-gen. Gabriel R. Paul, wounded.  
(2) Colonel Richard Coulter.

16th Maine.  
13th Massachusetts.  
94th New York.  
104th New York.  
107th Pennsylvania.

*Second Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Henry Baxter.

12th Massachusetts.  
83d New York.  
97th New York.  
11th Pennsylvania.  
88th Pennsylvania.  
90th Pennsylvania.

THIRD DIVISION.

Major-general Abner Doubleday.†

*First Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Thomas A. Rowley.

20th N. Y. State Militia.  
121st Pennsylvania.  
142d Pennsylvania.  
151st Pennsylvania.

*Second Brigade.*

- (1) Col. Roy Stone, wounded.  
(2) Col. Langhorne Wister, wounded.  
(3) Col. Edmund L. Dana.

143d Pennsylvania.  
149th Pennsylvania.  
150th Pennsylvania.

*Third Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. George J. Stannard.

12th Vermont.‡  
13th Vermont.  
14th Vermont.  
15th Vermont.‡  
16th Vermont.

ARTILLERY BRIGADE.

Colonel C. S. Wainwright.

2d Maine.  
5th Maine.  
½ L, 1st New York.  
B, 1st Pennsylvania.  
B, 4th United States.

\* General Reynolds was killed July 1, while in command of the left wing of the army. Major-general Abner Doubleday commanded the corps July 1, and Major-general John Newton on the 2d and 3d.

† General Doubleday commanded the corps on the 1st of July, General T. A. Rowley being in command of the division, and Colonel Chapman Biddle of the 1st Brigade.

‡ Not engaged.

§ E, 1st New York Heavy Artillery, attached.



## SECOND ARMY CORPS.

MAJOR-GENERAL WINFIELD S. HANCOCK.\*

## FIRST DIVISION.

Brigadier-general John C. Caldwell.

*First Brigade.*

(1) Colonel E. E. Cross, killed.

(2) Colonel H. B. McKeen.

5th New Hampshire.

61st New York.

81st Pennsylvania.

148th Pennsylvania.

*Third Brigade.*

(1) Brig.-gen. S. K. Zook, killed.

(2) Lieut.-col. John Fraser.

52d New York.

57th New York.

66th New York.

140th Pennsylvania.

*Second Brigade.*

Colonel Patrick Kelly.

28th Massachusetts.

63d New York.

69th New York.

88th New York.

116th Pennsylvania.

*Fourth Brigade.*

Colonel John R. Brooke.

27th Connecticut.

2d Delaware.

64th New York.

53d Pennsylvania.

145th Pennsylvania.

## SECOND DIVISION.

(1) Brigadier-general John Gibbon, wounded.

(2) Brigadier-general William Harrow.

*First Brigade.*

(1) Brig.-gen. William Harrow.

(2) Colonel Francis E. Heath.

19th Maine.

15th Massachusetts.

1st Minnesota.

82d New York.

*Second Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. A. S. Webb.

69th Pennsylvania.

71st Pennsylvania.

72d Pennsylvania.

106th Pennsylvania.

*Third Brigade.*

Colonel N. J. Hall.

19th Massachusetts.

20th Massachusetts.

7th Michigan.

42d New York.

59th New York.

*Unattached.*

Andrew (Mass.) Sharpshooters.

## THIRD DIVISION.

Brigadier-general Alexander Hays.

*First Brigade.*

Colonel S. S. Carroll.

14th Indiana.

4th Ohio.

8th Ohio.

7th Virginia.

*Second Brigade.*

(1) Col. Thos. A. Smyth, wounded.

(2) Lieut.-col. F. E. Pierce.

14th Connecticut.

1st Delaware.

12th New Jersey.

10th N. Y. (battalion).

108th New York.

*Third Brigade.*

(1) Col. G. L. Willard, killed.

(2) Col. Eliakim Sherrill, killed.

(3) Lieut.-col. James M. Bull.

39th New York.

111th New York.

125th New York.

126th New York.

## ARTILLERY BRIGADE.

Captain J. G. Hazard.

A, 1st Rhode Island.

B, 1st Rhode Island.

I, 1st United States.

A, 4th United States.

## CAVALRY SQUADRON.

Captain Riley Johnson.

D and K, 6th New York.

\* After the death of General Reynolds, General Hancock was assigned to the command of all the troops on the field of battle, relieving General Howard, who had succeeded General Reynolds. General Gibbon, of the 2d Division, assumed command of the corps. These assignments terminated on the evening of July 1. Similar changes in commanders occurred during the battle of the 2d, when General Hancock was put in command of the 3d Corps, in addition to that of his own. He was wounded on the 3d.

## THIRD ARMY CORPS.

- (1) MAJOR-GENERAL DANIEL E. SICKLES, wounded.  
 (2) MAJOR-GENERAL D. B. BIRNEY.

## FIRST DIVISION.

- (1) Major-general D. B. Birney.  
 (2) Brigadier-general J. H. H. Ward.

*First Brigade.*

- (1) Brig.-gen. C. K. Graham, wounded.  
 (2) Colonel A. H. Tippin.

57th Pennsylvania.  
 63d Pennsylvania.  
 68th Pennsylvania.  
 105th Pennsylvania.  
 114th Pennsylvania.  
 141st Pennsylvania.

*Second Brigade.*

- (1) Brig.-gen. J. H. H. Ward.  
 (2) Colonel H. Berdan.

1st U. S. Sharpshooters.  
 2d U. S. Sharpshooters.  
 3d Maine.  
 4th Maine.  
 20th Indiana.  
 99th Pennsylvania.  
 86th New York.  
 124th New York.

*Third Brigade.*

Colonel P. R. de Trobriand.

3d Michigan.  
 5th Michigan.  
 40th New York.  
 17th Maine.  
 110th Pennsylvania.

## SECOND DIVISION.

Brigadier-general A. A. Humphreys.

*First Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Joseph B. Carr.

1st Massachusetts.  
 11th Massachusetts.  
 16th Massachusetts.  
 26th Pennsylvania.  
 11th New Jersey.  
 84th Pennsylvania.\*  
 12th New Hampshire.

*Second Brigade.*

Col. William R. Brewster.

70th New York.  
 71st New York.  
 72d New York.  
 73d New York.  
 74th New York.  
 120th New York.

*Third Brigade.*

Col. George C. Burling.

5th New Jersey.  
 6th New Jersey.  
 7th New Jersey.  
 8th New Jersey.  
 115th Pennsylvania.  
 2d New Hampshire.

## ARTILLERY BRIGADE.

Captain George E. Randolph.

E, 1st Rhode Island.  
 B, 1st New Jersey.  
 D, 1st New York.  
 K, 4th United States.  
 4th New York.

\* Not engaged.

## FIFTH ARMY CORPS.

MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE SYKES.

## FIRST DIVISION.

Brigadier-general James Barnes.

*First Brigade.*

Colonel W. S. Tilton.

18th Massachusetts.  
 22d Massachusetts.  
 118th Pennsylvania.  
 1st Michigan.

*Second Brigade.*

Colonel J. B. Sweitzer.

9th Massachusetts.  
 32d Massachusetts.  
 4th Michigan.  
 62d Pennsylvania.

*Third Brigade.*

(1) Col. Strong Vincent, killed.  
 (2) Col. James C. Rice.

20th Maine.  
 44th New York.  
 83d Pennsylvania.  
 16th Michigan.

## SECOND DIVISION.

Brigadier-general R. B. Ayres.

*First Brigade.*

Colonel Hannibal Day.

3d United States.  
 4th United States.  
 6th United States.  
 12th United States.  
 14th United States.

*Second Brigade.*

Colonel Sidney Burbank.

2d United States.  
 7th United States.  
 10th United States.  
 11th United States.  
 17th United States.

*Third Brigade.*

(1) Brig.-gen. S. H. Weed, killed.  
 (2) Colonel Kenner Garrard.

140th New York.  
 146th New York.  
 91st Pennsylvania.  
 155th Pennsylvania.

## THIRD DIVISION.

Brigadier-general S. W. Crawford.

*First Brigade.*

Colonel William McCandless.

1st Pennsylvania Rifles.  
 1st Pennsylvania Reserves.  
 2d Pennsylvania Reserves.  
 6th Pennsylvania Reserves.

*Third Brigade.*

Colonel J. W. Fisher.

5th Pennsylvania Reserves.  
 9th Pennsylvania Reserves.  
 10th Pennsylvania Reserves.  
 11th Pennsylvania Reserves.  
 12th Pennsylvania Reserves.

## ARTILLERY BRIGADE.

Captain A. P. Martin.

D, 5th United States.  
 I, 5th United States.  
 C, 1st New York.  
 L, 1st Ohio.  
 C, 3d Massachusetts.

## PROVOST GUARD.

Captain H. W. Rider.

D and E, 12th New York.

SIXTH ARMY CORPS.

MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN SEDGWICK.

FIRST DIVISION.

Brigadier-general H. G. Wright.

*First Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. A. T. A. Torbert.  
1st New Jersey.  
2d New Jersey.  
3d New Jersey.  
15th New Jersey.

*Second Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. J. J. Bartlett.  
5th Maine.  
121st New York.  
95th Pennsylvania.  
96th Pennsylvania.

*Third Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. D. A. Russell.  
6th Maine.  
49th Pennsylvania.  
119th Pennsylvania.  
5th Wisconsin.

SECOND DIVISION.

Brigadier-general A. P. Howe.

*Second Brigade.*

Colonel L. A. Grant.  
2d Vermont.  
3d Vermont.  
4th Vermont.  
5th Vermont.  
6th Vermont.

*Third Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. T. H. Neill.  
7th Maine.  
43d New York.  
49th New York.  
77th New York.  
61st Pennsylvania.

THIRD DIVISION.

Brigadier-general Frank Wheaton.

*First Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Alexander Shaler.  
65th New York.  
67th New York.  
122d New York.  
23d Pennsylvania.  
82d Pennsylvania.

*Second Brigade.*

Colonel H. L. Eustis.  
7th Massachusetts.  
10th Massachusetts.  
37th Massachusetts.  
2d Rhode Island.

*Third Brigade.*

Colonel David I. Nevin.  
62d New York.  
93d Pennsylvania.  
98th Pennsylvania.  
102d Pennsylvania.\*  
139th Pennsylvania.

ARTILLERY BRIGADE.

Colonel C. H. Tompkins.

1st Massachusetts.  
D, 2d United States.  
G, 2d United States.  
F, 5th United States.

C, 1st Rhode Island.  
G, 1st Rhode Island.  
1st New York.  
3d New York.

CAVALRY DETACHMENT.

Captain William L. Craft.  
H, 1st Pennsylvania.  
L, 1st New Jersey.

\* Not engaged.



## ELEVENTH ARMY CORPS.

MAJOR-GENERAL O. O. HOWARD.\*

## FIRST DIVISION.

- (1) Brigadier-general F. C. Barlow, wounded.  
 (2) Brigadier-general Adelbert Ames.

*First Brigade.*

Colonel Leopold von Gilsa.

41st New York.  
 54th New York.  
 68th New York.  
 153d Pennsylvania.

*Second Brigade.*

- (1) Brig.-gen. Adelbert Ames.  
 (2) Colonel A. L. Harris.

17th Connecticut.  
 25th Ohio.  
 75th Ohio.  
 107th Ohio.

## SECOND DIVISION.

Brigadier-general A. von Steinwehr.

*First Brigade.*

Colonel C. R. Coster.

27th Pennsylvania.  
 73d Pennsylvania.  
 134th New York.  
 154th New York.

*Second Brigade.*

Colonel Orland Smith.

33d Massachusetts.  
 136th New York.  
 55th Ohio.  
 73d Ohio.

## THIRD DIVISION.

Major-general Carl Schurz.

*First Brigade.*

- (1) Brig.-gen. A. Schimmelfennig, capt'd.  
 (2) Colonel George Von Amsberg.

45th New York.  
 157th New York.  
 74th Pennsylvania.  
 61st Ohio.  
 82d Illinois.

*Second Brigade.*

Colonel W. Krzyzanowski.

58th New York.  
 119th New York.  
 75th Pennsylvania.  
 82d Ohio.  
 26th Wisconsin.

## ARTILLERY BRIGADE.

Major T. W. Osborn.

I, 1st New York.  
 I, 1st Ohio.  
 K, 1st Ohio.  
 G, 4th United States.  
 13th New York.

## UNATTACHED.

I and K, 1st Indiana Cavalry.  
 Independent company, 8th New York Infantry.

\* During the interval between the death of General Reynolds and the arrival of General Hancock on the afternoon of July 1, all the troops on the field of battle were commanded by General Howard, General Schurz taking command of the 11th Corps, and General Schimmelfennig of the 3d Division.

## TWELFTH ARMY CORPS.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL ALPHEUS S. WILLIAMS.\*

## FIRST DIVISION.

Brigadier-general Thomas H. Ruger.

*First Brigade.*

Colonel A. L. McDougall.

5th Connecticut.  
 20th Connecticut.  
 123d New York.  
 145th New York.  
 46th Pennsylvania.  
 3d Maryland.

† *Second Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. H. H. Lockwood.

150th New York.  
 1st Maryland (Potomac Home  
 Brigade).  
 1st Maryland (Eastern Shore).

*Third Brigade.*

Colonel S. Colgrove.

2d Massachusetts.  
 107th New York.  
 13th New Jersey.  
 27th Indiana.  
 3d Wisconsin.

## SECOND DIVISION.

Brigadier-general John W. Geary.

*First Brigade.*

Colonel Charles Candy.

28th Pennsylvania.  
 147th Pennsylvania.  
 5th Ohio.  
 7th Ohio.  
 29th Ohio.  
 66th Ohio.

*Second Brigade.*

(1) Colonel George A. Cobham, Jr.  
 (2) Brig.-gen. Thomas L. Kane.

29th Pennsylvania.  
 109th Pennsylvania.  
 111th Pennsylvania.

*Third Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. George S. Greene.

60th New York.  
 78th New York.  
 102d New York.  
 137th New York.  
 149th New York.

## ARTILLERY BRIGADE.

Lieutenant Edward D. Muhlenberg.

F, 4th United States.  
 K, 5th United States.  
 M, 1st New York.  
 Knap's Pennsylvania.

## HEAD-QUARTERS GUARD.

Battalion 10th Maine.

\* During the battle Major-general H. W. Slocum, the proper commander of this corps, held temporary command of the right wing of the army.

† Unassigned during progress of battle; afterward attached to 1st Division as 2d Brigade.

## CAVALRY CORPS.

MAJOR-GENERAL ALFRED PLEASANTON.

## FIRST DIVISION.

Brigadier-general John Buford.

<i>First Brigade.</i>	<i>Second Brigade.</i>	<i>Reserve Brigade.</i>
Colonel William Gamble.	Colonel Thomas C. Devin.	Brig.-gen. Wesley Merritt.
8th New York.	6th New York.	1st United States.
8th Illinois.	9th New York.	2d United States.
12th Illinois (detachm't.).	17th Pennsylvania.	5th United States.
3d Indiana (detachment).	3d Virginia (detachm't.).	6th United States.
		6th Pennsylvania.

## SECOND DIVISION.

Brigadier-general D. McM. Gregg.

(Head-quarters Guard.—A, 1st Ohio.)

<i>First Brigade.</i>	<i>* Second Brigade.</i>	<i>Third Brigade.</i>
Colonel J. B. McIntosh.	Colonel Pennock Huey.	Colonel J. I. Gregg.
1st New Jersey.	2d New York.	1st Maine.
1st Pennsylvania.	4th New York.	10th New York.
3d Pennsylvania.	8th Pennsylvania.	4th Pennsylvania.
1st Maryland.	6th Ohio.	16th Pennsylvania.

A, Purnell (Maryland).  
 3d Penna. Heavy Art., sec. Bat. H.

## THIRD DIVISION.

Brigadier-general Judson Kilpatrick.

(Head-quarters Guard.—C, 1st Ohio.)

<i>First Brigade.</i>	<i>Second Brigade.</i>
(1) Brig.-gen. E. J. Farnsworth.	Brig.-gen. George A. Custer.
(2) Colonel N. P. Richmond.	
5th New York.	1st Michigan.
18th Pennsylvania.	5th Michigan.
1st Vermont.	6th Michigan.
1st Virginia.	7th Michigan.

## HORSE ARTILLERY.

<i>First Brigade.</i>	<i>Second Brigade.</i>
Captain John M. Robertson.	Captain John C. Tidball.
B and L, 2d United States.	E, 1st United States.
M, 2d United States.	K, 1st United States.
E, 4th United States.	A, 2d United States.
6th New York.	C, 3d United States.
9th Michigan.	

\* Not engaged.

## ARTILLERY RESERVE.

(1) BRIGADIER-GENERAL R. O. TYLER, disabled.

(2) CAPTAIN JOHN M. ROBERTSON.

*First Regular Brigade.*

Captain D. R. Ransom.

H, 1st United States.  
 F and K, 3d United States.  
 C, 4th United States.  
 C, 5th United States.

*Second Volunteer Brigade.*

Captain E. D. Taft.

B, 1st Connecticut.\*  
 M, 1st Connecticut.\*  
 5th New York.  
 2d Connecticut.

*Fourth Volunteer Brigade.*

Captain R. H. Fitzhugh.

B, 1st New York.  
 G, 1st New York.  
 K, 1st N. Y. (11th Bat. attached).  
 A, 1st Maryland.  
 A, 1st New Jersey.  
 6th Maine.

*First Volunteer Brigade.*

Lieutenant-colonel F. McGilvery.

15th New York.  
 C and F, Pennsylvania.  
 5th Massachusetts.  
 9th Massachusetts.

*Third Volunteer Brigade.*

Captain James F. Huntington.

F and G, 1st Pennsylvania.  
 H, 1st Ohio.  
 A, 1st New Hampshire.  
 C, 1st Virginia.

*Train Guard.*

Major Charles Ewing.

4th New Jersey Infantry.

*Head-quarters Guard.*

Captain J. C. Fuller.  
 C, 32d Massachusetts.

## DETACHMENTS AT HEAD-QUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

## COMMAND OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL-GENERAL.

Brigadier-general M. R. Patrick.

93d New York.\*  
 8th United States.\*  
 1st Massachusetts Cavalry.

2d Pennsylvania Cavalry.  
 E and I, 6th Pa. Cavalry.  
 Detachment Regular Cavalry.

## ENGINEER BRIGADE.

Brig.-gen. H. W. Benham.

15th New York.\*  
 50th New York.\*  
 Battalion United States.\*

## GUARDS AND ORDERLIES.

Captain D. P. Mann.

Independent Company Oneida Cavalry.

\* Not engaged.



*Organization of the Army of Northern Virginia, GENERAL R. E. LEE  
commanding, during the Gettysburg campaign.*

FIRST CORPS.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL JAMES LONGSTREET.

McLAWS' DIVISION.

Major-general Lafayette McLaws.

*Kershaw's (1st) Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. J. B. Kershaw.

2d South Carolina.  
3d South Carolina.  
7th South Carolina.  
8th South Carolina.  
15th South Carolina.  
3d South Carolina Batt.

*Semmes' (2d) Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. P. J. Semmes (wounded).  
Colonel Goode Bryan.

10th Georgia.  
50th Georgia.  
51st Georgia.  
53d Georgia.

*Barksdale's (3d) Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. W. Barksdale (wounded).  
Colonel B. G. Humphreys.

13th Mississippi.  
17th Mississippi.  
18th Mississippi.  
21st Mississippi.

*Wofford's (4th) Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. W. T. Wofford.

16th Georgia.  
18th Georgia.  
24th Georgia.  
Cobb's Georgia Legion.  
Phillips' Georgia Legion.

*Artillery.*

Colonel H. C. Cabell.

Carlton's Georgia Battery (Troup Artillery).  
Fraser's Georgia Battery (Pulaski Artillery).  
McCarthy's Battery (1st Richmond Howitzers).  
Manly's North Carolina Battery.

PICKETT'S DIVISION.

Major-general George E. Pickett.

*Garnett's (1st) Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. R. B. Garnett (killed).  
Major George C. Cabell.

8th Virginia.  
18th Virginia.  
19th Virginia.  
28th Virginia.  
56th Virginia.

*Armistead's (2d) Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. L. A. Armistead (killed).  
Colonel W. R. Aylett.

9th Virginia.  
14th Virginia.  
38th Virginia.  
53d Virginia.  
57th Virginia.

*Kemper's (3d) Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. J. L. Kemper (wounded).  
Colonel Joseph Mayo, Jr.

1st Virginia.  
3d Virginia.  
7th Virginia.  
11th Virginia.  
24th Virginia.

*Corse's (4th) Brigade.\**

Brig.-gen. M. D. Corse.

15th Virginia.  
17th Virginia.  
29th Virginia.  
30th Virginia.

\* Not engaged at Gettysburg; encamped at Gordonsville July 1-8.

*Artillery.*

Major James Dearing.

Blount's Virginia Battery.  
 Caskey's Virginia Battery (Hampden Artillery).  
 Macon's Battery (Richmond Fayette Artillery).  
 Stribling's Virginia Battery (Farquhar Artillery).

## HOOD'S DIVISION.

Major-general John B. Hood (wounded).

*Law's (1st) Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. E. M. Law.  
 Colonel Jas. L. Sheffield.

4th Alabama.  
 15th Alabama.  
 41th Alabama.  
 47th Alabama.  
 48th Alabama.

*Anderson's (2d) Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Geo. T. Anderson (wounded).  
 Colonel W. W. White.

7th Georgia.  
 8th Georgia.  
 9th Georgia.  
 11th Georgia.  
 59th Georgia.

*Robertson's (3d) Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. J. B. Robertson.

3d Arkansas.  
 1st Texas.  
 4th Texas.  
 5th Texas.

*Benning's (4th) Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. H. L. Benning.

2d Georgia.  
 15th Georgia.  
 17th Georgia.  
 20th Georgia.

*Artillery.*

Major M. W. Henry.

Bachman's South Carolina Battery (German Artillery).  
 Garden's South Carolina Battery (Palmetto Light Artillery).  
 Latham's North Carolina Battery (Branch Artillery).  
 Reilly's North Carolina Battery (Rowan Artillery).

## RESERVE ARTILLERY, FIRST CORPS.

Colonel J. B. Walton, Chief of Artillery.

*Alexander's Battalion.*

Colonel E. P. Alexander.

Jordan's Virginia Battery (Bedford Artillery).  
 Moody's Louisiana Battery (Madison Light Artillery).  
 Parker's Virginia Battery.  
 Rhett's South Carolina Battery (Brooks' Artillery).  
 Taylor's Virginia Battery.  
 Woolfolk's Virginia Battery (Ashland Artillery).

*Washington (La.) Artillery.*

Major B. F. Eshleman.

Miller's 3d Company.  
 Norcom's 4th Company.  
 Richardson's 2d Company.  
 Squires' 1st Company.

## SECOND CORPS.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL RICHARD S. EWELL.

## EARLY'S DIVISION.

Major-general Jubal A. Early.

*Hays' (1st) Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Harry T. Hays.

5th Louisiana.  
6th Louisiana.  
7th Louisiana.  
8th Louisiana.  
9th Louisiana.

*Smith's (3d) Brigade..*Brig.-gen. William Smith.  
Col. John S. Hoffman.

13th Virginia.  
31st Virginia.  
49th Virginia.  
52d Virginia.  
58th Virginia.

*Hoke's (2d) Brigade.*Brig.-gen. R. F. Hoke.  
Col. Isaac E. Avery (wounded).  
Col. A. C. Godwin.

6th North Carolina.  
21st North Carolina.  
54th North Carolina.  
57th North Carolina.  
1st N. C. Battalion.

*Gordon's (4th) Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. J. B. Gordon.

13th Georgia.  
26th Georgia.  
31st Georgia.  
38th Georgia.  
60th Georgia.  
61st Georgia.

*Artillery.*

Lieutenant-colonel H. P. Jones.

Carrington's Virginia Battery (Charlottesville Art.).  
Garber's Virginia Battery (Staunton Art.).  
Green's Battery (Louisiana Guard Art.).  
Tanner's Virginia Battery (Courtney Art.).

## JOHNSON'S DIVISION.

Major-general Edward Johnson.

*Steuart's (1st) Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. George H. Steuart.

1st Maryland Battalion.  
1st North Carolina.  
3d North Carolina.  
10th Virginia.  
23d Virginia.  
37th Virginia.

*Walker's (3d) Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. James A. Walker.

2d Virginia.  
4th Virginia.  
5th Virginia.  
27th Virginia.  
33d Virginia.

*Nicholl's (2d) Brigade.*Colonel J. M. Williams.  
Brig.-gen. A. Iverson.\*

1st Louisiana.  
2d Louisiana.  
10th Louisiana.  
14th Louisiana.  
15th Louisiana.

*Jones' (4th) Brigade.*Brig.-gen. John M. Jones (wounded).  
Lieut.-col. R. H. Dungan.  
Colonel B. T. Johnson.

21st Virginia.  
25th Virginia.  
42d Virginia.  
44th Virginia.  
48th Virginia.  
50th Virginia.

\* Assigned July 19th.

*Artillery.*

Lieutenant-colonel R. S. Andrews.

Brown's Maryland Battery (Chesapeake Art.).  
 Carpenter's Virginia Battery (Alleghany Art.).  
 Dement's 1st Maryland Battery.  
 Raine's Virginia Battery (Lee Battery.).

## RODES' DIVISION.

Major-general R. E. Rodes.

*Daniel's (1st) Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. Junius Daniel.

32d North Carolina.  
 43d North Carolina.  
 45th North Carolina.  
 53d North Carolina.  
 2d North Carolina Battln.

*Iverson's (2d) Brigade.\**Brig.-gen. Alfred Iverson.  
Brig.-gen. S. D. Ramseur.

5th North Carolina.  
 12th North Carolina.  
 20th North Carolina.  
 23d North Carolina.

*Doles' (3d) Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. George Doles.

4th Georgia.  
 12th Georgia.  
 21st Georgia.  
 44th Georgia.

*Ramseur's (4th) Brigade.\**

Brig.-gen. S. D. Ramseur.

2d North Carolina.  
 4th North Carolina.  
 14th North Carolina.  
 30th North Carolina.

*O'Neal's (5th) Brigade.*Brig.-gen. E. A. O'Neal.  
Colonel C. A. Battle.

3d Alabama.  
 5th Alabama.  
 6th Alabama.  
 12th Alabama.  
 26th Alabama.

*Artillery.*

Lieutenant-colonel Thomas H. Carter.

Carter's Va. Battery (King William Art.).  
 Fry's Va. Battery (Orange Artillery).  
 Page's Va. Battery (Morris Artillery).  
 Reese's Alabama Battery (Jeff. Davis Art.).

## RESERVE ARTILLERY, SECOND CORPS.

Colonel J. Thompson Brown, Chief of Artillery.

*Brown's Battalion.†*

Captain W. J. Dance.

Dance's Virginia Battery (Powhatan Artillery).  
 Hupp's Virginia Battery (Salem Artillery).  
 Graham's Virginia Battery (Rockbridge Artillery).  
 Smith's Battery (3d Richmond Howitzers).  
 Watson's Battery (2d Richmond Howitzers).

*Nelson's Battalion.*

Lieutenant-colonel William Nelson.

Kirkpatrick's Virginia Battery (Amherst Artillery).  
 Massie's Virginia Battery (Fluvanna Artillery).  
 Milledge's Georgia Battery.

\* Temporarily consolidated July 10, 1863.

† 1st Virginia Artillery.



## THIRD CORPS.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL AMBROSE P. HILL.

ANDERSON'S DIVISION.

Major-general R. H. Anderson.

*Wilcox's (1st) Brigade.**Mahone's (2d) Brigade.**Wright's (3d) Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. C. M. Wilcox.

Brig.-gen. William Mahone.

Brig.-gen. A. R. Wright.  
Colonel Wm. Gibson.  
Colonel E. J. Walker.  
Capt. B. C. McCurry.  
Capt. C. H. Anderson.

8th Alabama.

6th Virginia.

3d Georgia.

9th Alabama.

12th Virginia.

22d Georgia.

10th Alabama.

16th Virginia.

48th Georgia.

11th Alabama.

41st Virginia.

2d Georgia Battln.

14th Alabama.

61st Virginia.

*Perry's (4th) Brigade.**Posey's (5th) Brigade.**Artillery (Sumter Battln.).*Colonel David Lang.  
Brig.-gen. E. A. Perry.

Brig.-gen. Carnot Posey.

Major John Lane.

2d Florida.

12th Mississippi.

Patterson's Georgia Bat.

5th Florida.

16th Mississippi.

Ross' Georgia Battery.

8th Florida.

19th Mississippi.

Wingfield's Georgia Bat.

48th Mississippi.

(Irwin Artillery).

HETH'S DIVISION.

Major-general Henry Heth.

Brigadier-general J. J. Pettigrew.

*First Brigade.\***Second Brigade.*Brig.-gen. J. J. Pettigrew (wounded).  
Major J. Jones.  
Lt.-col. W. J. Martin.  
Colonel J. K. Marshall.  
Colonel T. C. Singeltary.Brig.-gen. Charles W. Field.  
Colonel J. M. Brockenbrough.  
Brig.-gen. H. H. Walker.†

11th North Carolina.

40th Virginia.

26th North Carolina.

47th Virginia.

44th North Carolina.†

55th Virginia.

47th North Carolina.

22d Virginia Battln.

52d North Carolina.

*Third Brigade.\***Fourth Brigade.*Brig.-gen. James J. Archer.  
Colonel B. D. Fry.  
Colonel S. G. Shepard.  
Brig.-gen. H. H. Walker.

Brig.-gen. Joseph R. Davis.

13th Alabama.

2d Mississippi.

5th Alabama Battalion.

11th Mississippi.

1st Tenn. (Prov. Army).

42d Mississippi.

7th Tennessee.

55th North Carolina.

14th Tennessee.

\* Temporarily consolidated July 10th, under Pettigrew's command.

† Left at Hanover Junction, and not engaged at Gettysburg.

‡ Assigned July 19th. Appears in return for July 31st as commanding both 2d and 3d brigades.

*Artillery.*

Lieutenant-colonel John J. Garnett.  
Major Charles Richardson.

Grandy's Virginia Battery (Norfolk Light Artillery Blues).  
Lewis' Virginia Battery.  
Maurin's Louisiana Battery (Donaldsonville Artillery).  
Moore's Virginia Battery.

## PENDER'S DIVISION.

Major-general William D. Pender (wounded).  
Brigadier-general James H. Lane.

*First Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. S. McGowan.  
Colonel A. Perrin.

1st South Carolina.  
1st South Carolina Rifles.  
12th South Carolina.  
13th South Carolina.  
14th South Carolina.

*Second Brigade.\**

Brig.-gen. James H. Lane.

7th North Carolina.  
18th North Carolina.  
28th North Carolina.  
33d North Carolina.  
37th North Carolina.

*Third Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. E. L. Thomas.

14th Georgia.  
35th Georgia.  
45th Georgia.  
49th Georgia.

*Fourth Brigade.\**

Brig.-gen. A. M. Scales (wounded).  
Colonel W. Lee J. Lowrance.

13th North Carolina.  
16th North Carolina.  
22d North Carolina.  
34th North Carolina.  
38th North Carolina.

*Artillery.*

Major William T. Poague.

Brooke's Virginia Battery.  
Graham's North Carolina Battery.  
Ward's Mississippi Battery (Madison Light Art.).  
Wyatt's Virginia Battery (Albemarle Artillery).

## RESERVE ARTILLERY, THIRD CORPS.

Colonel R. L. Walker, Chief of Artillery.

*McIntosh's Battalion.*

Major D. G. McIntosh.

Hurt's Alabama Battery (Hardaway Artillery).  
Lusk's Virginia Battery.  
Johnson's Virginia Battery.  
Rice's Virginia Battery (Danville Artillery).

*Pegram's Battalion.*

Major W. J. Pegram.  
Captain E. B. Brunson.

Brander's Virginia Battery (Letcher Artillery).  
Brunson's South Carolina Battery (Pee Dee Artillery).  
Crenshaw's Virginia Battery.  
McGraw's Virginia Battery (Purcell Artillery).  
Marye's Virginia Battery (Fredericksburg Art.).

\* Under Trimble's command July 3d.

## CAVALRY.

MAJOR-GENERAL J. E. B. STUART.

*Hampton's (1st) Brigade.*Brig.-gen. Wade Hampton.  
Colonel L. S. Baker.1st North Carolina.  
1st South Carolina.  
2d South Carolina.  
Cobb's Georgia Legion.  
Jeff. Davis Legion.  
Phillips' Georgia Legion.*Robertson's (2d) Brigade.\**

Brig.-gen. B. H. Robertson.

4th North Carolina.  
5th North Carolina.*Fitz. Lee's (3d) Brigade.*

Colonel Thomas T. Munford.

1st Maryland Battln (?).  
1st Virginia.  
2d Virginia.  
3d Virginia.  
4th Virginia.  
5th Virginia.*Jenkins' (4th) Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. A. G. Jenkins.

14th Virginia.  
16th Virginia.  
17th Virginia.  
34th Virginia Battln.  
36th Virginia Battln.*Jones' (5th) Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. William E. Jones.

6th Virginia.  
7th Virginia.  
11th Virginia.  
12th Virginia.  
35th Virginia Battln.*W. H. F. Lee's (6th) Brigade.*

Colonel J. R. Chambliss.

2d North Carolina.  
9th Virginia.  
10th Virginia.  
13th Virginia.  
15th Virginia.*Not Brigaded (?)*

Imboden's Command.

43d Virginia (Mosby's) Battalion.

*Stuart Horse Artillery.†*

Major R. F. Beckham (?).

Breathed's Maryland Battery.

Chew's Virginia Battery.

Griffin's 2d Maryland Battery.

Hart's South Carolina Bat. (Washington Art.).

McGregor's Virginia Battery.

Moorman's Virginia Battery.

\* Relieved at his own request, August 4, 1863.

† Captain Thomas E. Jackson's battery appears on return for July 31, 1863, as in the cavalry division, but it is not mentioned in reports of the campaign.

*Itinerary of the Army of the Potomac and Co-operating Forces in the  
Gettysburg Campaign, June and July, 1863.\**

JUNE 5.

THE Army of the Potomac, commanded by Major-general Joseph Hooker, was posted on the north bank of the Rappahannock River, confronting the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, under General R. E. Lee, mainly concentrated about the town of Fredericksburg, on the south bank of the river. The several corps of the Army of the Potomac were distributed as follows: First corps (Reynolds'), in the vicinity of White Oak Church; Second corps (Couch's), near Falmouth; Third corps (Birney's), at Boscobel, near Falmouth; Fifth corps (Meade's), in the vicinity of Banks', United States, and adjacent fords on the Rappahannock; Sixth corps (Sedgwick's), near White Oak Church, with the Second division (Howe's), thrown forward to Franklin's Crossing of the Rappahannock, a little below Fredericksburg, near the mouth of Deep Run; Eleventh corps (Howard's), near Brooke's Station, on the Aquia Creek Railroad; and the Twelfth corps (Slocum's), near Stafford Court-house and Aquia Landing. The cavalry corps (Pleasanton's) had two divisions in the vicinity of Warrenton Junction and one division in the neighborhood of Brooke's Station.

JUNE 6.

Howe's (Second) division, Sixth army corps, crossed the Rappahannock at Franklin's Crossing. Wright's (First) and Newton's (Third) divisions were moved to the same point from White Oak Church, taking position on the north bank of the river.

JUNE 7.

Wright's (First) division, Sixth corps, was sent across the Rappahannock at Franklin's Crossing, relieving Howe's (Second) division, which returned to the north side.

JUNE 8.

The cavalry corps (Pleasanton's), consisting of Buford's (First), D. McM. Gregg's (Third), and Duffie's (Second) divisions, and the regular reserve brigade, supported by detachments of infantry under Generals Ames and Russell, moved to Kelly's and Beverly Fords, preparatory to crossing the Rappahannock on a reconnoissance toward Culpeper.

JUNE 9.

Newton's (Third) division, Sixth corps, relieved Wright's (First) division on the south bank of the Rappahannock at Franklin's Crossing. The cavalry corps, supported by Generals Ames' and Russell's infantry, crossed the Rappahannock at Kelly's and Beverly Fords, fought the enemy at or near Beverly Ford, Brandy Station, and Stevensburg, and recrossed the river at Rappahannock Station and Beverly Ford.

\* Compiled under the direction of Brigadier-general Richard C. Drum, Adjutant-general U. S. Army, by Joseph W. Kirkley, of the Adjutant-general's Office.



## JUNE 10.

The cavalry corps took position in the neighborhood of Warrenton Junction. Its infantry supports in the reconnoissance of the day previous rejoined their respective commands. Howe's (Second) division, Sixth corps, moved from Franklin's Crossing to Aquia Creek.

## JUNE 11.

The Third corps marched from Boscobel, near Falmouth, to Hartwood Church.

## JUNE 12.

The First corps marched from Fitzhugh's plantation and White Oak Church to Deep Run; the Third corps, from Hartwood Church to Bealeton, with Humphreys' (Third) division advanced to the Rappahannock; and the Eleventh corps, from the vicinity of Brooke's Station to Hartwood Church.

## JUNE 13.

The First corps marched from Deep Run to Bealeton; the Fifth corps, from the vicinity of Banks' Ford, *vid* Grove Church, toward Morrisville; Wright's (First) and Newton's (Third) divisions, Sixth corps, from Franklin's Crossing to Potomac Creek; the Eleventh corps, from Hartwood Church to Catlett's Station; and the Twelfth corps, from near Stafford Court-house and Aquia Creek Landing, *en route* to Dumfries. McReynolds' (Third) brigade of Milroy's division, Eighth army corps, marched from Berryville to Winchester.

## JUNE 14.

The First and Third corps marched from Bealeton to Manassas Junction; the Fifth corps arrived at Morrisville, and marched thence, *vid* Bristersburg, to Catlett's Station; Wright's (First) and Newton's (Third) divisions, Sixth corps, moved from Potomac Creek to Stafford Court-house; the Eleventh corps, from Catlett's Station to Manassas Junction, and thence toward Centreville; the Twelfth corps reached Dumfries. Tyler's command of the Eighth army corps fell back from Martinsburg to Maryland Heights.

## JUNE 15.

The Second corps (Hancock's\*) moved from Falmouth to near Aquia; the Fifth corps, from Catlett's Station, *vid* Bristoe Station, to Manassas Junction; the Sixth corps, from Aquia Creek and Stafford Court-house to Dumfries; the Twelfth corps, from Dumfries to Fairfax Court-house; and the cavalry corps from Warrenton Junction to Union Mills and Bristoe Station; the Eleventh corps arrived at Centreville. Milroy's (Second) division of the Eighth army corps evacuated Winchester and fell back to Maryland Heights and Hancock, Md.

## JUNE 16.

The Second corps marched from near Aquia, *vid* Dumfries, to Wolf Run Shoals, on the Occoquan; the Sixth corps, from Dumfries to Fairfax Station; and the cavalry corps, from Union Mills and Bristoe Station to Manassas Junction and Bull Run.

\* General Hancock assumed command of the Second corps June 9, 1863, succeeding General Couch, who was assigned to the command of the Department of the Susquehanna.

## JUNE 17.

The First corps marched from Manassas Junction to Herndon Station; the Second corps, from Wolf Run Shoals to Sangster's Station; the Third corps, from Manassas Junction to Centreville; the Fifth corps, from Manassas Junction to Gum Springs; the Eleventh corps, from Centreville to Cowhorn Ford, or Trappe Rock, on Goose Creek; and the Twelfth corps, from Fairfax Court-house to near Dranesville. The cavalry corps moved from Manassas Junction and Bull Run to Aldie.

## JUNE 18.

The Sixth corps moved from Fairfax Station to Germantown, and the Twelfth corps, from near Dranesville to Leesburg. J. I. Gregg's cavalry brigade advanced from Aldie to Middleburg, and returned to a point midway between the two places.

## JUNE 19.

The First corps marched from Herndon Station to Guilford Station; the Third corps, from Centreville to Gum Springs; and the Fifth corps, from Gum Springs to Aldie. Gregg's cavalry division, except McIntosh's brigade, advanced to Middleburg. McIntosh's brigade moved from Aldie to Haymarket.

## JUNE 20.

The Second corps moved from Sangster's Station to Centreville, and thence toward Thoroughfare Gap; the Second division (Howe's), Sixth corps, from Germantown to Bristoe Station.

## JUNE 21.

The Second corps arrived at Gainesville and Thoroughfare Gap. The cavalry corps (except McIntosh's brigade of Gregg's division), supported by Barnes' (First) division, Fifth corps, marched from Aldie and Middleburg to Upperville. McIntosh's cavalry brigade marched from Haymarket to Aldie, and thence to Upperville. Stahel's division of cavalry, from the defences of Washington, moved from Fairfax Court-house, *via* Centreville and Gainesville, to Buckland Mills.

## JUNE 22.

The cavalry corps and Barnes' (First) division of the Fifth corps returned from Upperville to Aldie. Stahel's cavalry division moved from Buckland Mills, *via* New Baltimore, to Warrenton.

## JUNE 23.

Stahel's cavalry division moved from Warrenton, *via* Gainesville, to Fairfax Court-house.

## JUNE 24.

Newton's (Third) division, Sixth corps, moved from Germantown to Centreville, and the Eleventh corps from Cowhorn Ford, or Trappe Rock, on Goose Creek, to the south bank of the Potomac at Edwards' Ferry. Stahel's cavalry division moved from Fairfax Court-house to near Dranesville.

## JUNE 25.

The First corps marched from Guilford Station, Va., to Barnesville, Md.; the Third corps, from Gum Springs, Va., to the north side of the Potomac at Edwards' Ferry.

wards' Ferry and the mouth of the Monocacy; and the Eleventh corps, from Edwards' Ferry, Va., to Jefferson, Md. These corps crossed the Potomac at Edwards' Ferry. The Second corps marched from Thoroughfare Gap and Gainesville to Gum Springs. Howe's (Second) division, Sixth corps, moved from Bristoe Station to Centreville. Crawford's division (two brigades) of Pennsylvania Reserves, from the defences of Washington, marched from Fairfax Station and Upton's Hill to Vienna. Stannard's Vermont brigade, from the defences of Washington, left the mouth of the Occoquan *en route* to join the Army of the Potomac. Stahel's cavalry division moved from near Dranesville, Va., *via* Young's Island Ford on the Potomac, *en route* to Frederick City, Md.

## JUNE 26.

The First corps marched from Barnesville to Jefferson, Md.; the Second corps, from Gum Springs, Va., to the north side of the Potomac at Edwards' Ferry; the Third corps, from the mouth of the Monocacy to Point of Rocks, Md.; the Fifth corps, from Aldie, Va., *via* Carter's Mills, Leesburg, and Edwards' Ferry, to within four miles of the mouth of the Monocacy, Md.; the Sixth corps, from Germantown and Centreville to Dranesville, Va.; the Eleventh corps, from Jefferson to Middletown, Md.; the Twelfth corps, from Leesburg, Va., *via* Edwards' Ferry, to the mouth of the Monocacy, Md.; and the cavalry corps (Buford's and Gregg's divisions), from Aldie to Leesburg, Va. Stahel's cavalry division was *en route* between the Potomac and Frederick City, Md. Crawford's Pennsylvania Reserves moved from Vienna to Goose Creek.

## JUNE 27.

The First corps marched from Jefferson to Middletown, Md.; the Second Corps, from near Edwards' Ferry, *via* Poolesville, to Barnesville, Md.; the Third corps, from Point of Rocks, *via* Jefferson, to Middletown, Md.; the Fifth corps, from a point between Edwards' Ferry and the mouth of the Monocacy to Ballinger's Creek, near Frederick City, Md.; the Sixth corps, from Dranesville, *via* Edwards' Ferry, to near Poolesville, Md.; the Twelfth corps, from near the mouth of the Monocacy, *via* Point of Rocks, to Knoxville, Md.; Buford's cavalry division, from Leesburg, Va., *via* Edwards' Ferry, to near Jefferson, Md.; and Gregg's cavalry division, from Leesburg, Va., *via* Edwards' Ferry, toward Frederick City, Md. Stahel's cavalry division reached Frederick City, Md. Crawford's Pennsylvania Reserves moved from Goose Creek, Va., *via* Edwards' Ferry, to the mouth of the Monocacy, Md.

## JUNE 28.

The First corps marched from Middletown to Frederick City; the Second corps, from Barnesville to Monocacy Junction; the Third corps,\* from Middletown to near Woodsboro'; the Sixth corps, from near Poolesville to Hyattstown; the Eleventh corps, from Middletown to near Frederick; and the Twelfth corps, from Knoxville to Frederick City. Buford's cavalry division moved from near Jefferson to Middletown. Gregg's cavalry division reached Frederick City, and marched thence to New Market and Ridgeville. Crawford's Pennsylvania Re-

\* General Sickles resumed command of the Third corps, relieving General Birney, who had been temporarily in command.

serves marched from the mouth of the Monocacy, and joined the Fifth corps\* at Ballinger's Creek.

## JUNE 29.

The First and Eleventh corps marched from Frederick City to Emmettsburg; the Second corps, from Monocacy Junction, *via* Liberty and Johnsville, to Uniontown; the Third corps, from near Woodsboro' to Taneytown; the Fifth corps, from Ballinger's Creek, *via* Frederick City and Mount Pleasant, to Liberty; the Sixth corps, from Hyattstown, *via* New Market and Ridgeville, to New Windsor; the Twelfth corps, from Frederick City to Taneytown and Bruceville; Gamble's (First) and Devin's (Second) brigades, of Buford's (First) cavalry division, from Middletown, *via* Boonsboro', Cavetown, and Monterey Springs, to near Fairfield; and Merritt's reserve cavalry brigade, of the same division, from Middletown to Mechanicstown; Gregg's (Second) cavalry division, from New Market and Ridgeville to Westminster, and Kilpatrick's (Third) cavalry division, formerly Stahel's division, from Frederick City to Littlestown.

## JUNE 30.

The First corps marched from Emmettsburg to Marsh Run; the Third corps, from Taneytown to Bridgeport; the Fifth corps, from Liberty, *via* Johnsville, Union Bridge, and Union, to Union Mills; the Sixth corps, from New Windsor to Manchester; the Twelfth corps, from Taneytown and Bruceville to Littlestown; Gamble's and Devin's brigades of Buford's cavalry division, from near Fairfield, *via* Emmettsburg, to Gettysburg; Gregg's cavalry division, from Westminster to Manchester; and Kilpatrick's cavalry division, from Littlestown to Hanover. Kenly's and Morris' brigades, of French's division, left Maryland Heights for Frederick City, and Elliott's and Smith's brigades, of the same division, moved from the Heights, by way of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, for Washington City.

## JULY 1.

*Battle of Gettysburg, First Day.*—The First corps moved from Marsh Run, and the Eleventh corps from Emmettsburg, to Gettysburg; the Second corps, from Uniontown, *via* Taneytown, to near Gettysburg; the Third corps from Bridgeport, *via* Emmettsburg, to the field of Gettysburg; the Fifth corps, from Union Mills, *via* Hanover and McSherrystown, to Bonaughtown; the Sixth corps, from Manchester *en route* to Gettysburg; and the Twelfth corps from Littlestown, *via* Two Taverns, to the field of Gettysburg. Gregg's cavalry division marched from Manchester to Hanover Junction, whence McIntosh's and J. I. Gregg's brigades proceeded to Hanover, while Huey's brigade returned to Manchester. Kilpatrick's cavalry division moved from Hanover, *via* Abbottsville, to Berlin. Stannard's Vermont brigade, from the defences of Washington, joined the First corps on the field of Gettysburg. W. F. Smith's (First) division of the Department of the Susquehanna marched from the vicinity of Harrisburg to Carlisle. Kenly's and Morris' brigades of French's division reached Frederick City.

## JULY 2.

*Battle of Gettysburg, Second Day.*—The Second, Fifth, and Sixth corps, Lockwood's brigade from the Middle Department, McIntosh's and J. I. Gregg's

\* General Meade relinquished command of the Fifth corps to General Sykes, and assumed command of the Army of the Potomac.



brigades of D. McM. Gregg's cavalry division, and Kilpatrick's cavalry division, reached the field of Gettysburg. Gamble's and Devin's brigades of Buford's cavalry division marched from Gettysburg to Taneytown, and Merritt's reserve brigade from Mechanicstown to Emmettsburg.

## JULY 3.

*Battle of Gettysburg, Third Day.*—Gamble's and Devin's brigades, of Buford's cavalry division, moved from Taneytown to Westminster; Merritt's reserve brigade, from Emmettsburg to the field of Gettysburg; and Huey's brigade, of Gregg's cavalry division, from Manchester to Westminster.

## JULY 4.

Gamble's and Devin's brigades, of Buford's cavalry division, marched from Westminster, and Merritt's reserve brigade from Gettysburg, *en route* to Frederick City; Huey's brigade, of Gregg's cavalry division, from Westminster, *via* Emmettsburg, to Monterey; J. I. Gregg's cavalry brigade, from Gettysburg to Hunterstown; and Buford's cavalry division, from Gettysburg, *via* Emmettsburg, to Monterey. Smith's division of Couch's command moved from Carlisle, *via* Mount Holly, to Pine Grove, and the remainder of Couch's troops from the vicinity of Harrisburg toward Shippensburg and Chambersburg. Elliott's and Smith's brigades, of French's division, arrived at Washington from Maryland Heights, and moved to Tennallytown. Morris' brigade, of French's division, marched from Frederick City to Turner's Gap in South Mountain.

## JULY 5.

Leaving Gettysburg, the Second corps marched to Two Taverns; the Fifth corps, to Marsh Run; the Sixth corps, to Fairfield; the Eleventh corps, to Rock Creek; the Twelfth corps, to Littlestown; and McIntosh's brigade, of Gregg's cavalry division, to Graefenburg Spring. Buford's cavalry division reached Frederick City. J. I. Gregg's cavalry brigade moved from Hunters-town to Greenwood. Kilpatrick's cavalry division and Huey's brigade, of Gregg's cavalry division, marched from Monterey, *via* Smithsburg, to Boonsboro'.

## JULY 6.

The First corps marched from Gettysburg to Emmettsburg; the Fifth corps, from Marsh Run to Moritz Cross-roads; the Sixth corps, from Fairfield to Emmettsburg, except Neill's (Third) brigade, of Howe's (Second) division, which, in conjunction with McIntosh's brigade of cavalry, was left at Fairfield to pursue the enemy; the Eleventh corps, from Rock Creek to Emmettsburg; Buford's cavalry division, from Frederick City to Williamsport, and thence back to Jones' Cross-roads; Kilpatrick's cavalry division and Huey's brigade, of Gregg's cavalry division, from Boonsboro', *via* Hagerstown\* and Williamsport, to Jones' Cross-roads; McIntosh's brigade, of Gregg's cavalry division, from Graefenburg Spring to Fairfield; and J. I. Gregg's brigade, of Gregg's cavalry division, from Greenwood to Marion. Smith's division of Couch's command moved from Pine Grove to Newman's Pass. Kenly's brigade, of French's

\* Richmond's brigade, of Kilpatrick's division, remained at Hagerstown, whence it retired toward Boonsboro'.

division, marched from Frederick City *en route* to Maryland Heights. Elliott's and Smith's brigades, of French's division, left Tennallytown, *via* Washington and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, *en route* to Frederick City.

## JULY 7.

The First corps marched from Emmettsburg to Hamburg; the Second corps, from Two Taverns to Taneytown; the Third corps, from Gettysburg, *via* Emmettsburg, to Mechanicstown; the Fifth corps, from Moritz Cross-roads, *via* Emmettsburg, to Utica; the Sixth corps, from Emmettsburg to Mountain Pass, near Hamburg; the Eleventh corps, from Emmettsburg to Middletown; and the Twelfth corps, from Littlestown to Walkersville. Buford's and Kilpatrick's cavalry divisions and Huey's brigade, of Gregg's cavalry division, moved from Jones' Cross-roads to Boonsboro'. J. I. Gregg's cavalry brigade was moving *en route* from Chambersburg to Middletown. McIntosh's brigade of cavalry and Neill's brigade, of the Sixth corps, moved from Fairfield to Waynesboro'. Smith's division, of Couch's command, marched from Newman's Pass to Altodale. Kenly's brigade, of French's division, with other troops forwarded by Schenck from Baltimore, reoccupied Maryland Heights. Elliott's and Smith's brigades, of French's division, reached Frederick City from Washington.

## JULY 8.

The First Corps marched from Hamburg to Turner's Gap in South Mountain; the Second corps, from Taneytown to Frederick City; the Third corps, from Mechanicstown to a point three miles south-west of Frederick City; the Fifth corps, from Utica to Middletown; the Sixth corps, from near Hamburg to Middletown; the Eleventh corps, from Middletown to Turner's Gap in South Mountain, Schurz's (Third) division being advanced to Boonsboro', and the Twelfth corps from Walkersville to Jefferson. J. I. Gregg's cavalry brigade was moving *en route* from Chambersburg to Middletown. Smith's division, of Couch's command, moved from Altodale to Waynesboro'. Campbell's and Mulligan's brigades, of Kelley's command, Department of West Virginia, were concentrated at Hancock, whence they moved to Fairview, on North Mountain.

## JULY 9.

The Second corps marched from Frederick City to Rohrsersville; the Third corps, from near Frederick City to Fox's Gap in South Mountain; the Fifth corps, from Middletown, *via* Fox's Gap, to near Boonsboro'; the Sixth corps, from Middletown to Boonsboro'; and the Twelfth corps, from Jefferson to Rohrsersville. J. I. Gregg's cavalry brigade reached Middletown from Chambersburg. Elliott's and Smith's brigades, of French's division, marched from Frederick City to Middletown.

## JULY 10.

The First corps marched from Turner's Gap to Beaver Creek, where it was joined by Kenly's brigade, of French's division, from Maryland Heights; the Second corps, from Rohrsersville to near Tilghmanton; the Third corps, from Fox's Gap, through Boonsboro', to Antietam Creek, in the vicinity of Jones' Cross-roads, where it was joined by Elliott's and Smith's brigades, of French's

division, which marched from Middletown, and Morris' brigade, of the same division, which marched from Turner's Gap; the Fifth corps, from near Boonsboro' to Delaware Mills, on Antietam Creek; the Sixth corps, from Boonsboro' to Beaver Creek; the Eleventh corps, from Turner's Gap to Beaver Creek; and the Twelfth corps, from Rohrsersville to Bakersville. Buford's and Kilpatrick's cavalry divisions moved from Boonsboro' to Funkstown, and Huey's brigade, of Gregg's cavalry division, from Boonsboro' to Jones' Cross-roads.

## JULY 11.

The Second corps moved from near Tilghmanton to the neighborhood of Jones' Cross-roads; the Twelfth corps, from Bakersville to Fairplay and Jones' Cross-roads; Gamble's and Devin's brigades, of Buford's cavalry division, from Funkstown to Bakersville; J. I. Gregg's cavalry brigade, from Middletown to Boonsboro'; Kilpatrick's cavalry division, from Funkstown to near Hagerstown; and Neill's brigade, of the Sixth corps, McIntosh's cavalry brigade, and Smith's division, of Couch's command, from Waynesboro' to Leitersburg.

## JULY 12.

The First, Sixth, and Eleventh corps moved from Beaver Creek to Funkstown; McIntosh's cavalry brigade, from Leitersburg to Boonsboro'; Kilpatrick's cavalry division and Ames' (First) division, Eleventh corps, occupied Hagerstown; Neill's brigade, of the Sixth corps, moved from Leitersburg to Funkstown, where it rejoined its corps; Smith's division (except one brigade left at Waynesboro'), from Leitersburg to Cavetown; Dana's (Second) division, of Couch's command, from Chambersburg to Greencastle; and Averell's cavalry brigade, Department of West Virginia, from Cumberland *en route* to Fairview.

## JULY 13.

The Sixth corps moved from Funkstown to the vicinity of Hagerstown; Smith's division, of Couch's command, from Waynesboro' and Cavetown to Hagerstown and Beaver Creek. Averell's cavalry brigade joined Kelley's infantry at Fairview.

## JULY 14.

The First corps marched from Funkstown to Williamsport; the Second corps, from near Jones' Cross-roads to near Falling Waters; the Third corps, from Antietam Creek, near Jones' Cross-roads, across Marsh Creek; the Fifth corps, from the vicinity of Roxbury Mills, on Antietam Creek, to near Williamsport; the Sixth corps, from the neighborhood of Hagerstown to Williamsport; the Eleventh corps, from Funkstown, *via* Hagerstown, to Williamsport; and Williams' (First) division of the Twelfth corps, from Jones' Cross-roads to near Falling Waters, and thence to near Williamsport. Buford's cavalry division moved from Bakersville to Falling Waters; McIntosh's and J. I. Gregg's brigades, of D. McM. Gregg's cavalry division, from Boonsboro' to Harper's Ferry, and Huey's brigade, of same division, from Jones' Cross-roads, *via* Williamsport, to Falling Waters; and Kilpatrick's cavalry division, from Hagerstown, *via* Williamsport, to Falling Waters. Kelley's command, Department of West Virginia, marched from Fairview to Williamsport.

## JULY 15.

The First corps marched from Williamsport to Rohrersville; the Second corps, from near Falling Waters to near Sandy Hook; the Third corps, from Marsh Creek to near Burnside's Bridge, on the Antietam; the Fifth corps, from near Williamsport to Burkittsville; the Sixth corps, from Williamsport to Boonsboro'; the Eleventh corps, from Williamsport, *via* Hagerstown, to Middletown; and the Twelfth corps, from Fairplay and near Williamsport to Sandy Hook. Buford's cavalry division moved from Falling Waters to Berlin; McIntosh's and J. I. Gregg's brigades, of D. McM. Gregg's cavalry division, from Harper's Ferry to Shepherdstown, and Huey's brigade, of same division, from Falling Waters to Boonsboro'; and Kilpatrick's cavalry division from Falling Waters, *via* Williamsport and Hagerstown, to Boonsboro'. Kelley's command, Department of West Virginia, marched from Williamsport to Indian Spring.

## JULY 16.

The First corps marched from Rohrersville to near Berlin; the Third corps, from Burnside's Bridge to Pleasant Valley, near Sandy Hook; the Fifth corps, from Burkittsville, *via* Petersville, to near Berlin; the Sixth corps, from Boonsboro' to near Berlin; the Eleventh corps, from Middletown, *via* Jefferson, to Berlin; and the Twelfth corps, from Sandy Hook to Pleasant Valley. Buford's cavalry division moved from Berlin to Petersville; Huey's brigade, of Gregg's cavalry division, from Boonsboro', *via* Harper's Ferry, to Shepherdstown; and Kilpatrick's division from Boonsboro' to Berlin, whence De Forest's (First) brigade proceeded to Harper's Ferry.

## JULY 17.

The Third corps moved from near Sandy Hook, crossed the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, and proceeded to a point three miles south of the Ferry; the Fifth corps moved from near Berlin to Lovettsville, crossing the Potomac at Berlin. Gregg's cavalry division marched from Shepherdstown to Harper's Ferry; Kilpatrick's cavalry division, from Berlin and Harper's Ferry to Purcellville—Custer's brigade crossing the Potomac at Berlin, and De Forest's brigade the Shenandoah at Harper's Ferry. Kelley's command, Department of West Virginia, moved from Indian Spring to Hedgesville, crossing the Potomac at Cherry Run.

## JULY 18.

The First corps moved from near Berlin to Waterford, crossing the Potomac at Berlin; the Second corps, from near Sandy Hook to Hillsboro', crossing the Potomac and Shenandoah rivers at Harper's Ferry; the Third corps, from near Harper's Ferry to Hillsboro'; the Fifth corps, from Lovettsville to near Purcellville; and Buford's cavalry division, from Petersville to Purcellville, crossing the Potomac at Berlin.

## JULY 19.

The First corps marched from Waterford to Hamilton; the Second and Third corps, from Hillsboro' to Woodgrove; the Fifth corps, from near Purcellville to a point on the road to Philomont; the Sixth corps, from near Berlin to Wheatland; and the Eleventh corps, from Berlin to near Hamilton, both corps cross-



ing the Potomac at Berlin; the Twelfth corps, from Pleasant Valley to near Hillsboro', crossing the Potomac and Shenandoah rivers at Harper's Ferry. Buford's cavalry division moved from Purcellville, *via* Philomont, to near Rector's Cross-roads. McIntosh's brigade, of Gregg's cavalry division, moved from Harper's Ferry toward Purcellville, and Huey's and J. I. Gregg's brigades, of the same division, from Harper's Ferry to Lovettsville. Kilpatrick's division of cavalry marched from Purcellville to Upperville. Kelley's command, Department of West Virginia, fell back from Hedgesville to the Maryland side of the Potomac at Cherry Run.

#### JULY 20.

The First corps marched from Hamilton to Middleburg; the Second and Third corps, from Woodgrove, the former going to Bloomfield, and the latter to Upperville; the Fifth corps, from a point on the Purcellville and Philomont road, *via* Union, to Panther Skin Creek; the Sixth corps, from Wheatland to near Beaver Dam; the Eleventh corps, from near Hamilton, *via* Mount Gilead, to Mountville; and the Twelfth corps, from near Hillsboro', *via* Woodgrove, to Snickersville. Buford's cavalry division moved from near Rector's Cross-roads to Rectortown, Gamble's brigade going thence to Chester Gap, Devin's brigade to Salem, and Merritt's brigade to Manassas Gap. McIntosh's brigade, of Gregg's cavalry division, reached Purcellville, and marched thence to Hillsboro'. Huey's and J. I. Gregg's brigades, of same division, moved from Lovettsville to Goose Creek.

#### JULY 21.

Huey's and J. I. Gregg's brigades, of D. McM. Gregg's cavalry division, moved from Goose Creek to Bull Run. Kelley's command, Department of West Virginia, recrossed the Potomac from Maryland into Virginia at Cherry Run.

#### JULY 22.

The First corps moved from Middleburg to White Plains; the Second corps, from Bloomfield to Paris; the Third corps, from Upperville, *via* Piedmont, to Linden; the Fifth corps, from Panther Skin Creek to Rectortown; and the Sixth corps, from near Beaver Dam to Rectortown. Devin's brigade, of Buford's cavalry division, moved from Salem to Barbee's Cross-roads; Huey's and J. I. Gregg's brigades, of D. McM. Gregg's cavalry division, from Bull Run to Broad Run; and Kilpatrick's cavalry division, from Upperville to Piedmont.

#### JULY 23.

The First corps marched from White Plains to Warrenton; the Second corps, from Paris to Linden; the Third corps, from Linden to Manassas Gap; the Fifth corps, from Rectortown, *via* Markham Station, Farrowville, and Linden, to Manassas Gap; the Sixth corps, from Rectortown to White Plains and Barbee's Cross-roads; the Eleventh corps, from Mountville to New Baltimore; and the Twelfth corps, from Snickersville to Ashby's Gap, and thence to Markham Station. Buford's cavalry division concentrated at Barbee's Cross-roads; McIntosh's brigade, of Gregg's cavalry division, moved from Hillsboro' to Snickersville, and Kilpatrick's cavalry division from Piedmont to Amissville.

## JULY 24.

The Second corps moved from Linden to Markham Station; the first division (Wright's), Sixth corps, from White Plains to New Baltimore; the second division (Howe's), Sixth corps, from Barbee's Cross-roads to Markham Station, and thence to Orleans; the third division (Wheaton's), Sixth corps, from Barbee's Cross-roads to Thumb Run; and the Twelfth corps, from Markham Station to Linden, countermarching, *viâ* Markham Station, to Piedmont. Huey's and J. I. Gregg's brigades, of D. McM. Gregg's cavalry division, moved from Broad Run to Warrenton Junction. Kelley's command, Department of West Virginia, advanced from Cherry Run to Hedgesville.

## JULY 25.

The First corps marched from Warrenton to Warrenton Junction, the second division (Robinson's) going on to Bealeton; the Second corps, from Markham Station to White Plains; the Third corps, from Manassas Gap to near Salem; the Fifth corps, from Manassas Gap, *viâ* Farrowville and Barbee's Cross-roads, to Thumb Run; the Sixth corps concentrated at Warrenton, Wright's (first) division moving from New Baltimore, Howe's (second) division from Orleans, and Wheaton's (third) division from Thumb Run; the Eleventh corps moved from New Baltimore to Warrenton Junction, and the Twelfth corps from Piedmont, *viâ* Rectortown and White Plains, to Thoroughfare Gap. Kelley's command, Department of West Virginia, occupied Martinsburg.

## JULY 26.

The Second corps marched from White Plains to near Germantown; the Third corps, from near Salem to the vicinity of Warrenton; the Fifth corps, from Thumb Run to the vicinity of Warrenton, Crawford's (third) division taking position at Fayetteville; and the Twelfth corps, from Thoroughfare Gap, *viâ* Greenwich and Catlett's Station, to Warrenton Junction. Buford's cavalry division took position at Warrenton and Fayetteville. McIntosh's brigade, of Gregg's cavalry division, marched from Snickersville *en route* to Warrenton. Kelley's command, Department of West Virginia, occupied Winchester.

## JULY 27.

The Fifth corps encamped between Warrenton and Fayetteville. McIntosh's brigade, of Gregg's cavalry division, reached Warrenton from Snickersville, *viâ* Upperville and Middleburg.

## JULY 28.

McIntosh's brigade, of Gregg's cavalry division, moved from Warrenton to Warrenton Junction.

## JULY 29.

McIntosh's and J. I. Gregg's brigades, of D. McM. Gregg's cavalry division, moved from Warrenton Junction to Warrenton.

## JULY 30.

Kenly's (third) division, First corps, moved from Warrenton Junction to Rappahannock Station; the Second corps, from near Germantown to Elk Run; McIntosh's and J. I. Gregg's brigades, of D. McM. Gregg's cavalry division, from Warrenton to Amissville; and Kilpatrick's cavalry division, from Amissville to Warrenton.

## JULY 31.

The Second corps marched from Elk Run to Morrisville; Howe's (second) division, Sixth corps, from Warrenton to near Waterloo; the Twelfth corps, from Warrenton Junction to Kelley's Ford; and Kilpatrick's cavalry division, from Amissville to Warrenton Junction.

*Instructions from Meade to French.*

JUNE 29, 1863.

MAJOR-GEN. FRENCH, Comdg. Harper's Ferry :

The major-general commanding directs that you remove the property of the government at Maryland Heights, etc. by canal to Washington—that you march with your command to join this army without delay. For the purpose of removing and escorting the property to Washington, you will detach such portion of your command as may be necessary, and order them to report to Maj.-Gen. Heintzelman. This force should not exceed three thousand men, and of course, in your discretion, may be less than that.

The head-quarters of this army will be at Middleburg to-night, and the army are all in march for the line between Emmettsburg and Westminster. Where the head-quarters will be after to-night will depend upon the information derived from the front of the enemy and his movements. Your march must be as rapid as possible in view of the efficiency of your troops to join.

You will require to carry the amount of ammunition and supplies ordered for the Army of the Potomac. If your supplies do not hold out, you must purchase from the people through your quartermaster and commissary. Some supplies may possibly be found at Frederick as you march through; upon this you cannot count with any certainty.

The commanding general expects to engage the enemy within a few days, and looks anxiously for your command to join.

Please acknowledge receipt of this order by bearer.

Very respectfully, etc.,

DANIEL BUTTERFIELD,

*Major-Gen. and Chief of Staff.*

[*Confidential.*]

JULY 1, 1863.

MAJ.-GEN. FRENCH :

The major-general commanding encloses for your information the orders as to his disposition for an attack from the enemy, which will be understood by consulting the map of Frederick county. He directs that you will hold Frederick, camping your troops in its immediate vicinity; also the Monocacy bridges, both rail and turnpike. You will also guard the Baltimore and Ohio R. R. from Frederick to a junction with Gen. Schenck, to whom you will communicate your instructions.

In the event of our being compelled to withdraw and retire before the enemy, you will be in readiness to throw your command by rail or march, as may be most practicable and speedy, into the defences of Washington.

He desires that for the present you will hold the line of communication to Frederick. Keep it open, and send up from Frederick all stragglers, keeping the town clear and in good order.

Very respectfully, etc.,

S. WILLIAMS,

*Asst. Adjutant-General.*



















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